1989

A Critical Analysis of CBS Evening News Coverage of Two U.S.-U.S.S.R. Summit Meetings: Vienna 1979 and Geneva 1985

James M. Ellis Jr.

College of Humanities and Sciences
Virginia Commonwealth University

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by James M. Ellis, Jr., entitled *A Critical Analysis of CBS Evening News Coverage of Two U.S.-U.S.S.R. Summit Meetings: Vienna 1979 and Geneva 1985*, has been approved by his committee as satisfactory completion of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Science.

[redacted]

Dr. Ted J. Smith III, School of Mass Communications, thesis director

[redacted]

Dr. J. David Kennamer, School of Mass Communications

[redacted]

Dr. Lynn Nelson, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

[redacted]

Mr. George Crutchfield, Director of the School of Mass Communications

[redacted]

Dr. Elske v.P. Smith, Dean of the College of Humanities and Sciences

August 4, 1989

Date

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CBS EVENING NEWS COVERAGE OF TWO U.S.-U.S.S.R. SUMMIT MEETINGS: VIENNA 1979 AND GENEVA 1985

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

By

James M. Ellis, Jr.
B.A., University of Virginia, May 1982

Thesis Director: Dr. Ted J. Smith, III
Associate Professor
School of Mass Communications

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
August, 1989

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I express my thanks to Dr. Ted Smith, the chairman of my thesis committee, for his guidance in the organization and execution of this project. His willingness to discuss it at any time and his enthusiasm for it helped tremendously. His advice on creating the coding instrument made for an efficient and valuable effort. Dr. J. David Kennamer helped to bring the principals in this project together initially, and he has made every effort during my time at VCU to maximize the quality of my education, and of the School of Mass Communications in general. He is a friend and teacher, a model for the profession, in my opinion. Dr. Lynn Nelson instilled the desire to understand and present as much contextual material as was practical. His extensive knowledge of Soviet affairs assured a balanced project. The committee as a group has shown flexibility, which I greatly appreciate.

I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Survey Research Laboratory at VCU, especially Dr. Scott Keeter, the acting director. Without his support and the use of the SRL facilities, this would be a much poorer analysis. He allowed me the time to complete the thesis despite a heavy workload at the SRL, and I appreciate his understanding and patience.

Many other people have contributed their thoughts and good wishes for this project through its course, and I am grateful to them as well, especially to my family and to W. G. Hawkes, a good friend who endured verbal -- and verbose -- descriptions of this research several times, and helped to focus the early thinking about the analysis.

Of course, without the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, this work would not be possible. I commend them on a job well done in preparing the compilation of coverage used in this analysis. VTNA is not responsible for my interpretations of the materials they prepared.

Finally, in the position traditionally reserved for the one who does the most, I would like to say thank you to Lisa Clark, my beloved friend and companion. Lisa entered all of the study data and did almost all of the typing in this manuscript. Her comments on the writing were very helpful and welcome. Without her completely unconditional support and comfort, this work might remain undone.

While the support and aid I received from all made this a better endeavor, only I am responsible for errors or deficiencies.

James M. Ellis, Jr.
Richmond, Virginia
May, 1989

To my family everywhere

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Abstract

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CBS EVENING NEWS COVERAGE OF TWO U.S.-U.S.S.R. SUMMIT MEETINGS: VIENNA 1979 AND GENEVA 1985

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at Virginia Commonwealth University.

By James M. Ellis, Jr.
B.A., University of Virginia, May 1982

Thesis Director: Dr. Ted J. Smith, III
School of Mass Communications

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
August, 1989

Abstract. Nearly four hours of CBS Evening News summit reports, loaned by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive, were coded to construct a descriptive analysis and comparison of the coverage of the 1979 and 1985 summit meetings. Variables coded include speaker, language, origin of video and audio content, topic and quoted sources. Soviet speakers and topics were given proportionately more air time in 1985 than in 1979. But despite large differences in several important areas such as Soviet willingness to communicate via television, different leaders and their images, geopolitical factors, and improved video technolgy, many patterns of coverage showed similarities from 1979 to 1985. Nuclear weapons and disarmament talks garnered one-third of all summit-related story time, with U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and the summits themselves being covered almost as much as nuclear issues. Coverage time spent on the leaders themselves remained stable. Overall, coverage of the 1985 summit was two-and-a-half times as extensive as 1979 coverage (perhaps because of attention paid in 1979 to a then-

impending gasoline shortage), and 1985 coverage seemed to include more attempts to present "background information." A portion of the expanded 1985 coverage did not appear to be well balanced, but CBS coverage overall did not seem politically biased. The literature indicates that the study abstracted here may be the first analysis of video content pertaining to summit meetings. The literature also indicates that the perceptions and goals of summitry have changed since World War II, that the process is now seen by many as increasingly bureaucratized and ritualistic. Printed media coverage which was reviewed contained references to this trend, but also to the possibility for individual leaders to achieve diplomatic breakthroughs on the basis of charisma or personal initiative. While no specific hypothesizing was done in these areas, the results of this analysis suggest that, from 1979 to 1985, either CBS coverage of summits, or the summits themselves, or both, were ritualistic and stable, and thus produced similar patterns of summit coverage across years during which large changes in other areas occurred.

CHAPTER 1

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

The quality of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. affects the world. Summit meetings are central events in the relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Summit meetings also happen to possess several characteristics very conducive to television coverage. Summit meetings are about larger-than-life people and issues, they often take place in exotic foreign locales, they afford rare chances to cast an extended look on powerful people, they are predictable in pace and location, and they are important beyond doubt. The American media bring their latest technology to the summits, and the superpowers plan the summit agendas well in advance. The setpiece nature of a summit is no guarantee of serenity, but the level of predictability for all participants is very high. And if something out of the ordinary does happen at a summit, everyone – including the media – is already on the scene with the latest technology, elite staffs, and reams of background information.

If what the "gatekeepers" of the flow of general news choose to show their audiences does have effects on our citizens and our government, then it seems reasonable to believe that what they choose to show us about summits in particular affects our attitudes about the Soviet Union and such perennial summit issues as arms control, human rights, and bilateral negotiations. For people who do not follow international affairs closely, the extravaganza of summit coverage may provide much of the information they use to formulate overall attitudes about the Soviet Union. While it seems impossible to detect systematic effects of media content among individuals, it is now generally believed that the important "effect" of news coverage is to set the agenda for public discussion and opinion formation (McCombs and

Shaw, 1972; Lang and Lang, 1981; Lichty, 1982; Weaver, 1982, 1984). We Americans link the strength of our society to the vigorousness of public discourse, and media news coverage does play an important and apparently efficacious role in the actions of the U.S. government and citizens, in that it tends to guide the focus of concern and research, and perhaps to chill discussion on other topics or segments of opinion outside the realm of publicity (see Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Katz, 1983, on this "spiral of silence"). Television coverage of summit meetings may be crucial to the public's understanding of the meetings themselves, as well as U.S.-Soviet relations in general.

Despite all this, a review of communications literature did not identify a single systematic analysis of how television covers summit meetings, or of how that coverage might be evolving. The closest thing was a study by Waples (1956) on newspaper and radio coverage of the 1955 Geneva summit meeting of the Big Four (U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France). The study reported here will examine CBS evening news coverage of two recent summits – Geneva 1985 (Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev) and Vienna 1979 (Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev) – in an attempt to identify similarities and differences in the allotment of air time to various subjects.

An analysis of relevant communications and foreign affairs literature suggests four major forces that may well have had effects on summit coverage between 1979 and 1985. Three of these forces are summarized below, while the fourth is discussed in Chapter 2.

1. Changes in Soviet techniques of international communication

There is no doubt that the Soviet government has responded to a need for the use of sophisticated broadcast propaganda, specifically on television. Concern with "public relations" – execution of propaganda – has been characteristic of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) since its inception. The Soviets have always worked hard at international propaganda, as well as domestic propaganda, and they pay close attention to how they are

perceived in the West.

Propaganda is not defined so much by its content as by its purpose. A useful definition of propaganda sees it as preconceived, systematic communication with the intent to persuade or manipulate its audience (Shultz and Godson, 1984:34; Hazan, 1982:9). The Soviet Ministry of Agitation and Propaganda – Agitprop – coordinates most of these activities under the close direction of the Politburo. There is little doubt among scholars that the form and content of official Soviet communications represent a consensus of the top Soviet leadership (Barghoorn, 1964:5; Markham, 1967:115; Tatu, 1976:48; Shultz and Godson, 1984:18; Mickiewicz, 1984:120; Hazan, 1987:74). Four major trends in the Soviet Union over the past 40 years indicate that the Politburo has remained flexible enough to respond to television as a social force, and more recently, as an effective propaganda channel. This lengthy period of development indicates that the Soviet concern with "public relations" (as it was frequently called in 1985 and 1986 in the popular United States press) is not entirely a Gorbachev phenomenon. Ultimately, of course, the picture is quite complex. But the four major trends outlined below capture much that is relevant to this discussion.

Commitment of economic resources to television. The Soviets began to commit resources to the manufacture and distribution of television sets during the 1960s. Between 1940 and 1950, the U.S.S.R. was producing only 960 sets per year (Mickiewicz, 1984:113). Ten years later, in 1960, there were still just 4.8 million sets in the Soviet Union, compared to roughly 50 million in the U.S. (Mickiewicz, 1981:18). But by 1975 there were over 55 million television sets in the Soviet Union, with more than 6.5 million being produced annually (Mickiewicz, 1981:18; Powell, 1975:290).

The Soviets began using satellites for television transmission in the late 1960s, and satellites now allow almost all Soviet citizens to receive at least two state-run television channels (Dudkin, 1986:36). The development of the communications infrastructure will continue under Gorbachev, if he has his way. His plans, summarized widely in Soviet and American media, include doubling the phone system by the early 1990s, introducing computers and data

bases throughout the economy, training Soviet children to be computer literate, and involving the media in these efforts (Dizard and Swensrud, 1988:10; *Newsweek*, Nov. 18, 1985:56; *Time*, April 10, 1989:95; Kakuchaya, 1987:70-71).

The flow of electronic information is inherently more difficult to control than is the flow of printed materials. In addition, the Eastern European countries have large areas which can receive broadcasts from the West – for instance, 80 percent of the population of East Germany can receive West German television, while areas of Czechoslavakia receive both West German and Austrian telecasts, and parts of Hungary receive Austrian television as well. Frequent Soviet contact with citizens of Warsaw Pact countries has served to convey information, values, and consumer-oriented envies partially formed by these transmission "overlaps" (Sharlet, 1984:139,143). Thus, it has become more difficult for the Soviet government to insulate its people from outside information. Official Soviet policy on media use has recognized these shifts. In 1960, Soviet policy was rewritten to give to radio official primacy in reporting breaking news stories (Hollander, 1967:360). Since then, the orientation of domestic Soviet propaganda has changed from operating in a vacuum to countering versions of news entering the Soviet Union from the West (Hopkins, 1973:33). In the early 1980s, in any given week 20 percent of the Soviet population listened at least once to one of four major Western broadcasters – the British Broadcasting Corporation, Deutsche Welle from West Germany, the Voice of America, and Radio Liberty (Mickiewicz, 1984:115). Speed in reporting became more desirable in the Soviet broadcast media, in response to Western competition, as noted by Hollander (1967:362, citing "The Publicizing of High Ideas: All-Union Creative Conference of Publicists" in *Sovietskaya Pechat* (*Soviet Press*), no. 7, July 1964:1-17):

> We must respond promptly to various, perhaps unfavorable, phenomena and incidents that occur in our life. Or else it turns out that while we keep silent, the people learn about them from foreign radio broadcasts and, furthermore, learn about them in incorrect and distorted interpretations. We still consider ourselves to have a monopoly in the field of information. But this isn't so. After all, by lagging in information, we sometimes involuntarily orient people to foreign radio, and once any false version begins it is difficult to stamp it out.

Thus, there have been since the 1960s in the Soviet Union pressures toward more open communications exerted because of the characteristics of broadcast technologies.

Development of survey research. A second contributing factor in the increased Soviet use of television was the loosening of repression after Khrushchev's consolidation of power in 1956, which included liberating the sciences from the most onerous Party constraints and re-establishing sociology as a respectable field of study (Heller and Nekrich, 1986; Shlapentokh, 1985:444; Friedberg, 1983:255). Sociologists have brought survey research methods to bear on many aspects of Soviet life, including media use, since the early 1960s (White, 1964:22). The first reported research on electronic media use was done in the spring of 1963 by the State Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television and the Moscow University School of Journalism (Hopkins, 1970:326). Political constraints have prevented Soviet sociologists from treating any remotely controversial issues (Hopkins, 1970:23; Mickiewicz, 1981:vii; Shlapentokh, 1985:456), but one hugely important finding has been generated from media use research: contrary to 60 years of Party dogma, communication is not simply a matter of reaching the audience, but of making the message interesting and comprehensible. This "hypodermic needle" (or "silver bullet") theory of the media was discounted by Western researchers immediately following World War II. Soviet audience research has now reached the same conclusions. The Soviets have identified fragmented groups of individual users of media, not one mass eagerly awaiting mobilization. The Soviets have come to the realization that they had overestimated their effectiveness in domestic propaganda, and they had to make room for a media audience composed of individuals who choose what they want to attend to. The fundamental importance of this discovery is that it challenges the near-religious assertion that the Party knows what the people want because the Party *is* the people. This important empirical finding warrants some concise elaboration:

> It is no longer assumed that just because a message has been broadcast, televised, or printed, it has been received, understood, and assimilated . . . The Russian public, when examined scientifically, turns out to be much less homogeneous, monolithic, and

> malleable than the Soviets (and Western observers who were, perhaps, persuaded by the Stalinistic theories of their communication efficacy) had thought. (Mickiewicz, 1981:16)

> One of the harmful dogmas is to accept silently the notion that people in our society more or less uniformly or equally assimilate the entire mental nourishment that is issued to them. That is, by the way, a profound delusion, because, in the language of cybernetics, the output of propaganda (*i.e.*, that which is assimilated) often turns out not to be what was expected in the input. (Kryazeva, quoted in Mickiewicz, 1981:145)

> One must keep in mind that the concept in the Stalin era was essentially of a gray and malleable mass, to be sculptured by the press (among other forms of political education). Against this concept, recent Soviet writings on public opinion formation are remarkably sophisticated, though in many cases elementary by American standards.
>
> An initial admission is that the publication or airing of information is not equivalent to creation of public opinion . . . Soviet students of mass communications seem to be at the point of saying, as Bernard Berelson did in 1948: "Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects." (Hopkins, 1970:312)

Of course, if the Soviet government realized that many of their own people were not assimilating traditional propaganda, the implications for international propaganda efforts are clear.

Development of quasi-governmental think tanks. A third trend is allied with the second: the development of semi-independent think-tank institutions to study the West and certain aspects of modernization. Staffed largely by non-government workers, they operate at the edges of the government hierarchy to cope with the more technical nature of decision making and thus may have more intellectual freedom and greater effect (Tatu, 1976:59). It would not be too far-fetched, for instance, to cast the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada (headed by Georgi Arbatov) in a leading role in the Soviets' implementation of a television strategy. There is no question among Western observers that, throughout the 1970s, the Soviets studied how we use television and public relations in general, so that they might be more effective in presenting their views to the world (Gelman, 1982:51). The results of

these early efforts can be seen in the adaptation of Western terminologies for these activities, widespread admission of their presence, and real success in rehabilitating Leonid Brezhnev's image in the West from that of the boorish, slow-witted *apparatchik* (government bureaucrat) to "Likable Leonid," he of the grandfatherly mien and the taste for fine Western automobiles (Ellis, 1986). It is important to note, however, that this think-tank research is still guided by Party ideals, that its purpose is to increase the effectiveness of domestic and international propaganda, and that measuring "public opinion" in the U.S.S.R. usually means measuring the degree of success for propaganda efforts (Shlapentokh, 1985:444).

The power of television itself. A fourth important factor in the development of Soviet use of television is the power of television itself. It has, by virtue of its visual, live qualities, an inherent credibility and powerful impact. It lends itself especially well to the portrayal of faraway events, scenes and personalities. If seeing is believing, then being on television is being believable, legitimate. No matter what theory of communication the message-sender espouses, television is simply too good to ignore. Although television is used by Soviet people more for entertainment than information, Soviet surveys have shown high scores for television news credibility and objectivity (Mickiewicz, 1981:45). And as the new medium becomes more familiar to more people, it will be used with greater facility (Jakubowicz, 1988:35).

Thus, changes in Soviet society related to television have moved the Politburo to sanction more widespread use of more sophisticated television content and techniques. These changes led this researcher to expect more media access to Soviet officials in 1985 compared to 1979, more Soviet-produced or -manipulated content being available to Western journalists, and a more "Western-looking" media effort by the Soviets. It is no secret that this is the case. The question is: To what *degree* did the Soviet profile increase in summit coverage from 1979 to 1985?

2. Changes in media technology

Major advances in the technological arsenal available to television news have occurred since the 1970s. Smaller and less expensive video cameras made motion picture film nearly obsolete, eliminating time-consuming transport and development of the film because of a concomitant growth in satellite capabilities. By 1985, network news organizations could (and did) send to Geneva by commercial airplane complete earth-to-satellite transmission stations in only five large suitcases, which Plante (1986:34) called "the greatest technical advance in the area of international news coverage." The growth of Intelsat, the international cooperative satellite network used by the networks in Geneva in 1985, has been tremendous. In 1979, the series IV and IV-A satellites then in use each had 40 percent of the channel capacity of the series V-A and V-B satellites first launched in 1984 and 1985, in time for the Geneva summit (Pelton, 1986:53). The system itself experienced, between 1972 and 1986, tremendous increases in voice channels available (1,123 percent), television hours (747 percent), fixed full-time channels (569 percent) and net financial investment (695 percent), while annual charges for voice channels decreased by 36 percent (Pelton, 1986:52).

In studies of international newsgathering and newsflow that covered, in aggregate, 1971 to 1981, Adams (1982), Larson (1982;1984), and Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984) concluded that general coverage of international news items on American networks is very similar across the three networks in quantity and quality. About 25 to 45 percent of the average network evening newscast is devoted to international news items (the numbers vary with the definition of "international news item"). Larson (1982:29) showed that the U.S.S.R. was the most frequently mentioned country in international news items on all three networks from 1972 to 1981 (aside from the U.S.). While he and Adams (1982) saw an increase in the proportion of foreign news items during the 1970s, Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984:362) believed that a small increase in international coverage in the late 1970s overall was a function of domestic coverage. "Specifically, the findings suggest that the amount of newstime allotted to foreign news content was negatively related to the amount of newstime devoted to prominent

domestic news events," they wrote. There is clear evidence, though, that the amount of videotaped material of international affairs increased over the decade (Larson, 1984:43).

There is no reason to believe that these technological improvements would not affect summit coverage. They probably resulted in greater use of videotaped material from foreign locales, more remote live or videotaped reporting in general, and possibly more coverage overall.

3. Changes in journalistic values

Ted J. Smith (1988) used numerous sources to illustrate a decline in the public status of journalists during the 1970s and 1980s. He believes this decline may be attributable to a fundamental change in journalistic values, from the "new journalism" of the 1960s – based on the assumption that true objectivity was impossible – to a journalism based on cultural relativism, a journalism divorced from concepts of parochialism or identification with one culture or another.

Smith sees cultural relativism as an attempt by journalists to be so objective as to shed their cultural identity. Journalists practicing cultural relativism lose their ability to exercise strict selection methods in their roles as gatekeepers of the information flow. In the case of the Soviet Union, Smith reported, this new super-objectivity may account for a startling 550-percent increase from 1981 to 1985 in appearances by Soviet spokesmen on evening network newscasts. Some of these spokesmen seemed to be treated more gently than a working journalist's knowledge of Soviet propaganda techniques would seem to recommend (T. J. Smith, 1988:38). Smith sees the increased public dissatisfaction with journalists as an effect of journalists' abandoning a foundation in their culture – and its inherent bias – for the position of cultural relativism.

If journalistic values have changed – whether along the lines sketched above or some others – one might expect to see the change manifested in qualitative aspects of summit

coverage, such as the kinds of questions asked of Soviet sources and American sources, or evaluations of each side's progress in the summit. Such a change would also reinforce other pressures for expanded coverage.

Summary

In summary, summit meetings are now a central element of U.S. and Soviet relations. Network evening news coverage of summit meetings presumably has some effects on U.S. public opinion and general attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy, the presidency, and the U.S.S.R. While a review of the literature did not reveal any analysis specifically concerning television news coverage of summit meetings, at least four forces that may be changing how the networks handle international news were identified. Three of these forces were explained in this chapter. They are: changing Soviet uses of television, changes in technology available to the American television networks, and changes in how journalists conduct their activities. The fourth, changes due to differences in the context and content of the particular summit meetings, will be treated in Chapter 2.[1]

1. In addition to the three forces explained above, at least two other trends theoretically could have affected summit coverage from 1979 to 1985, but were not implicated in the literature review. First, the U.S. government could have undergone significant shifts in its philosophy of media use and techniques. But despite some large differences in ideologies and personnel, the media strategies of the Carter and Reagan administrations were similar. Second, the summit process itself could have changed. Again, this did not seem to be the case for the years under consideration. There is strong evidence, however, of a marked shift in the perceived purposes of summitry from World War II to the present. For more on this, see the discussion in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT HAPPENED AT THE SUMMITS

In addition to the three forces described in Chapter 1, a fourth pressure for changed summit coverage would be the unique sets of events and conditions surrounding each summit. This chapter will discuss some of the context in which each meeting took place. Of course, the three forces already examined are themselves part of the context. But events around the globe besides those forces created different perceptions and expectations for each summit.

Articles in *Newsweek* and *Time* magazines pertaining to the summits were researched before the videotaped CBS coverage was viewed. Newsmagazine coverage clearly expanded in 1985 as compared to 1979. Due to the small number of *Time* and *Newsweek* articles about the 1979 summit, three articles from *U.S. News & World Report* were included in the readings, in order to expand the amount of information on the summit. The magazine articles are summarized below. Political orientation tends to shape such summaries; this chapter will concentrate on what the magazine coverage emphasized, not whether it was "correct." Interpretation will be avoided.

Vienna: June 15-18, 1979: Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev

The 1979 summit meeting took place from Friday, June 15, to Monday, June 18, in Vienna, Austria. The meeting was announced on May 11, although CBS news had speculated as early as April 16 that a summit meeting was imminent, according to the *Television News Index and Abstracts*. The major reason for the meeting was the signing of the second Strategic Arms

Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Context. The SALT process is often associated with the detente started by Richard Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972. In a cogent summary, Labrie (1979) traces the roots of SALT to recognition in late 1966 of a large nuclear buildup by the U.S.S.R., along with evidence of Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses being installed around Moscow. The U.S. itself was nearing the completion of an expansion in nuclear forces. The administration of Lyndon Johnson moved to keep the arms race from expanding into the defensive arena, which was seen as a destabilizing response in the long run by Secretary of Defense Richard McNamara. Soviet unwillingness to negotiate in January 1967 was later tempered by the announcement of a planned deployment of American ABM technology. Three days after Congress confirmed appropriations for this Sentinel ABM system, on June 27, 1968, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko announced in Moscow that the Soviets were ready to negotiate the limitation of nuclear weapons with the U.S. Negotiations originally scheduled to begin in September of 1968 were postponed because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia on August 20. Nixon was President by the time negotiations began in November 1969.

The negotiating teams eventually agreed to focus efforts on an ABM treaty and a protocol for further negotiations on offensive weapons. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May of 1972 included four days of hectic negotiations, after which SALT I was signed. SALT I consisted of an ABM treaty limiting each country to one defended city and one defended group of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an interim agreement on limiting the expansion of both nuclear forces. Essentially, some quantitative expansion was allowed, but the general effect of SALT was to focus development toward qualitative improvements, because old weapons systems were allowed to be upgraded or replaced by newer technology.

SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 and culminated almost seven years later with the 1979 Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. A host of technical issues and the Watergate scandal kept Nixon from completing SALT II. Under President Gerald Ford, negotiations were delayed by the emergence of new weapons systems and a growing

skepticism in the U.S. about the value of detente. A different outlook on the SALT process was brought in by the Carter administration, and additional time was spent adjusting the negotiations to the new administration. In the meantime, accusations of Soviet cheating on the provisions of SALT I appeared in the U.S. press. Carter believed in SALT II despite the delays, and many technical considerations were resolved by May 11, 1979, when it was announced in Washington and Moscow that Carter and Brezhnev would meet in Vienna in June. As Labrie (1979:415) put it:

> The SALT agreements that were signed by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev were the result of over six and one-half years of negotiations. Three successive American administrations had labored to produce a set of documents that was remarkable in its breadth and detail. As the two leaders arrived in the Austrian capital for the first summit meeting in almost four years between the heads of State of the most powerful nations on earth, it appeared that all of the many issues that composed SALT II had been resolved. The summit itself seemed anticlimactic.

The 1979 Vienna summit was essentially the last product of detente, the end of a decade of Soviet expansion and American introspection following the Vietnam experience. Thousands of pages have been written on the "rise and fall" of detente in the 1970s. While specific theories differ, the rationale behind most of them seems to be that the expectations of neither country were met by the behavior of the other.

Soviet dissatisfaction stemmed from difficulties in obtaining the favorable trade relations, loans, and access to Western technology that they thought were assured with detente. Western reluctance, especially on the part of the U.S., to open the doors too wide was created by unequal concepts of what detente was. The West, particularly the U.S., took "detente" to mean a lessening of the competition with the U.S.S.R. We took "peaceful coexistence" to mean something on a par with "live and let live." The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, made quite explicit to their party apparatus the operational definitions of these terms. At the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, Brezhnev spoke of the victories of the international Communist movement, the "unwaning ideological struggle," and stressed that "total victory for the socialist cause in the entire world is inevitable. And we will not spare efforts to

achieve that triumph" (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:630).

At the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in February 1976, Brezhnev said:

> Detente does not in any way rescind, nor can it rescind or alter, the laws of class struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see in detente a path toward the creation of more favorable conditions for the peaceful construction of socialism and communism. (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:653)

The 1978 edition of the Soviet *Short Political Dictionary*, the party's propaganda encyclopedia, defines detente as the "steady strengthening of the position of the countries of the socialist camp" and a defeat for the "imperialist forces" (cited in Heller and Nekrich, 1986:630). It goes on to say:

> In the conditions of detente the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism does not diminish but becomes more complex, taking on the most varied forms. Detente creates favorable conditions for the wide dissemination of the appeal of communist ideology and socialist values; it facilitates the development of an offensive ideological struggle within the framework of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems. (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:631)

American objections to detente focused on Soviet behavior consistent with this rhetoric, especially Soviet-sponsored military actions in Africa and Central America. The 1970s were being recognized as a decade of widespread Soviet expansion in the developing countries. After the 1980 presidential elections and the fall of detente, observers were to look back and see a fundamental shift of American public opinion to the right. Although that interpretation was somewhat shaken by Democratic gains in the 1982 mid-term elections (possibly resulting not so much from a realignment of public opinion back to the left, but rather from the recession of 1982), there is no doubt that the American disappointment with detente led us to a different view of the Soviet Union through at least the early 1980s. While complaints about detente being a one-way street in favor of the Soviet Union began in 1975, widespread dissatisfaction with detente crystallized before the Vienna summit around Carter's impending Senate battle to get SALT II ratified, a source of conflict for an administration already under

criticism for its foreign policy naivete and inability to solve seemingly intractable domestic problems such as the energy shortage and inflation.

Detente ended completely in December 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Senate debate on SALT II was postponed, and despite Carter's attempts in May 1980 to get the treaty back onto the Senate agenda, the changed political climate precluded its ratification. The U.S. abided by its provisions, nevertheless, up to and beyond its expiration date in 1985.

Expectations and events. In general, expectations for the 1979 Vienna summit were low. Brezhnev's health was seen as a limiting factor to substantive negotiations. He was known to be experiencing problems associated with cerebral arteriosclerosis. He had also previously suffered at least one stroke. His attention span was decreasing, his speech was sometimes slurred, he seemed disoriented at times, and he had trouble walking unaided. A personal physician had accompanied him to meetings of the CPSU Central Committee in April.

Carter's political health was poor, as well, and prognostication about the SALT ratification battle was rampant before the document was even signed. The last public opinion poll before the summit gave Carter only a 30 percent approval rating (*Time*, June 25, 1979:11). In addition, Roper poll data showed a steady erosion of public support for the SALT II treaty, from 42 percent in favor in October/November 1978, to 40 percent in January 1979, to 33 percent in early May 1979. At the same time, roughly 30 percent of those surveyed were saying they had no opinion or were not following SALT II (T.W. Smith, 1983). Democratic Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson was the most vocal opponent of SALT II, characterizing it as part of a policy of appeasement. In short, then, "The participants knew . . . that they were going to Vienna somewhat impaired, Brezhnev by his age (72) and ailments; Carter by his loss of political support . . . Neither leader had any illusions about making major breakthroughs" (*Time*, June 1, 1979:11).

Jimmy Carter arrived in Vienna on the evening of Thursday, June 14, accompanied by his wife Roslynn, daughter Amy, four Georgians from his White House staff including press secretary Jody Powell, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and President of the U.S.S.R., arrived Friday morning, also accompanied by several staff members, including three members of the Politburo. Several times during the summit Brezhnev's deficiencies showed. At the airport, a screen of potted trees was set up so the press could not easily record his journey from the plane to the terminal. An arrival speech was passed up after Soviet advance men got a look at the steep steps up to the speaking platform. At the tomb of the unknown Soviet soldier in central Vienna on Friday, he was to place a wreath, but he shuffled aimlessly past the monument until guided back by aides. Walking with Carter down the steps of the baroque palace where they had just conducted their first substantive meeting on Saturday, Brezhnev lost his balance and Carter steadied him, then held his hand as they descended. The impression formed by print journalists for *Newsweek* and *Time* magazines was not favorable: "the Soviet President appeared slack-jawed, vacant-eyed and lacking in vigor" (*Newsweek*, June 25, 1979:30); "Old, wondering men, slow of body and even of wit, moved through the ceremonial rituals, letting everyone know without meaning to that their search for legitimacy is based on brute force" (Sidey, *Time*, July 2, 1979:32).

The two men actually met for the first time on Friday, on a courtesy call to the Austrian President and Chancellor, followed by a photo session, but no discussions took place then. Brezhnev later went to the Soviet war memorial, an episode described above. The evening ended at the opera, where both men were greeted warmly by the crowd. Although the performance had been shortened for the leaders, first Brezhnev and then Carter left early to get ready for Saturday's activities.

Saturday morning saw the first substantive meeting between the two men. It was cut short by 90 minutes. "Most of the dialogue consisted of reading prepared remarks, and there was less genuine give-and-take than the American President had hoped for. . . and the participants never reached one item on the original morning agenda: SALT II" (*Newsweek*, June 25, 1979:26). It was after this meeting that Brezhnev stumbled on the palace stairs. An afternoon meeting devoted to SALT II was more successful. Carter pressed an alert Brezhnev into stating

a limit on construction of the new Soviet Backfire bomber (30 per year), which was included as a protocol to the SALT II treaty. An exchange of toasts at a dinner that Saturday evening focused on regional concerns ("trouble spots"). Carter stated his desire to see pluralism and economic free choice in developing nations. Brezhnev, in his toast, said, "Why pin on the Soviet Union the responsibility for the objective course of history and, what is more, use this as a pretext for worsening our relations?" (*Newsweek*, June 25, 1979:27).

On Sunday, the Carters and some members of their entourage attended church services and heard the Vienna Boys Choir, then talks resumed at the Soviet Embassy. For the first time since World War II, the defense ministers and chiefs of staff of both countries met face to face: U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones talked about reducing troop levels in Central Europe with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov. No progress was made. At the start of a separate meeting between Carter and Brezhnev, Brezhnev "helped" Carter up the stairs to the embassy, but after this meeting, Brezhnev slipped coming back down the stairs and it was Carter who steadied Brezhnev (said by *Newsweek* to have looked "dazed"), then held his hand the rest of the way down the stairs.

The signing ceremony of the SALT II treaty was held Monday, June 18, 1979, at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. Carter intentionally slowed his hand so as not to outdistance the struggling Brezhnev. "Then the two men stood up and quite unexpectedly embraced. In contrast to the stiff formality of the summit talks, the moment was a warm and moving exchange between the failing Soviet leader, 72, and the vigorous American President, 54" (*Time*, July 2, 1979:28). Carter left immediately after the signing for Washington, D.C., and a joint session of Congress. There were no reports on Brezhnev's activities after the signing ceremony.

No progress had been expected on any other front, and none was achieved. The leaders had held one private meeting and five sessions with their full advising groups in attendance. The most famous image of the summit is that of Carter kissing Brezhnev on the cheek after

signing SALT II. The meeting marks the end of detente and the last major achievement of the older generation of the Soviet leadership.

Media coverage. Coverage of the summit may have been diluted somewhat by domestic troubles, especially the energy crisis. Gasoline lines and price increases were covered extensively, as were meetings of OPEC ministers. The cover of the July 2 issue of *Newsweek* was devoted to the oil shortage, not the SALT II signing or the impending Senate debate. The oil shortage had become a news item in late 1978 (after the first crisis in 1973-74). The beginning of summer 1979 saw a resurgence in coverage. It is possible that the shortage diminished the intensity and extent of summit coverage.

Comments in the newsmagazines about media coverage of the summit were scarce. The Geneva summit in 1985 and the Reykjavik meeting in 1986 are probably thought of as the first summits where the media wondered aloud about their own possibly overblown role in the summit process. But one commentator sounded the same alarm after the Vienna meeting.

> The Vienna summit may have tipped the balance. It may have been the occasion when the show biz finally outweighed the statecraft. The meeting was important, yes . . . But the more than 2,000 reporters, commentators, anchormen, photographers, directors, scriptwriters, and producers drawn to a summit now dwarf the participants in numbers, machinery, and perhaps even in celebrity.
>
> "Where's Walter Cronkite?" gasped a journalist from the Soviet magazine *Literary Gazette*. "I want to interview him."
>
> . . . It is calculated beyond any contradiction that there were 40 journalists for every genuine source of information . . . The perception of how the two leaders talked and negotiated was clearly almost as important for U.S. domestic consumption as the document of SALT II. (Sidey, *Time*, June 25, 1979:79)

There was very little hint of any pre-summit maneuvering. Reports of such maneuvering centered on newsworthy events: Carter's approval of the MX program (thought to encourage the Senate as to his defense intentions and to help with SALT II ratification), and the U.S.S.R.'s announcement of acceptance of a Chinese invitation to begin bilateral negotiations, "widely discounted as window dressing" (*Newsweek*, June 18, 1979:35). Eight articles in all were found in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* for *Time* and *Newsweek* concerning the

summit from buildup to requiem, plus one additional article on Carter's media image. The earliest summit piece was dated June 18, 1979, the latest July 2, 1979. (*U.S. News and World Report* ran the earliest preview, on May 21, 1979.) See the bibliography section for a complete listing of the articles used in this chapter.

Geneva: November 19-21, 1985: Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev

The Geneva summit was the first since Vienna. It was announced in early July, and took place from Tuesday, November 19, to Wednesday, November 20, with a morning press conference on Thursday, November 21, before the participants left Geneva. The long buildup period included a trip by Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow to discuss the summit agenda, a week before the summit itself. There was also considerable communication in the form of arms control offers and counter-offers during September and October 1985. The six years and five months between summits was the longest period of time separating any two summits in the previous 30 years. The harshness of U.S.-Soviet rhetoric had reached a level unsurpassed since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The situation between the two countries had changed dramatically since 1979.

Context. In November of 1980, less than a year after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Ronald Reagan was elected President. His election and subsequent events during his first term were interpreted by many observers as indications of a fundamental change in "the mood of the nation." The economic fortunes of the country headed upward after the recession of 1981-82. Soviet leadership was at that time undergoing a prolonged crisis. Three changes of leadership occurred within 28 months; this crisis combined with economic difficulties to hinder foreign policy options. The Soviet failure to prevent U.S. Pershing nuclear missiles from being delivered to West Germany and other NATO nations in November of 1983 was an important boost to the U.S. as well. The deployment went ahead without drastic consequences for NATO despite a huge Soviet propaganda effort. The Soviet shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September 1983 probably helped to solidify Western resolve on the missile deployment issue.

In response to the Pershing deployment, the Soviets walked out of all arms negotiations then underway. Reagan showed no great concern for bringing them back to the table. Reagan himself was riding high as the Great Communicator. The rather offhand broaching of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) concept, or Star Wars, in March 1983 turned out to be a strong source of leverage with the Soviet government, which had experienced a change in style, a generational change, when it was stabilized by the succession of Gorbachev to the secretariat in March 1985. The "Gucci comrade" had taken the Western press by storm on trips to Canada and England while he was essentially second in command to Yuri Andropov and Constantin Chernenko. His telegenic style cast him as a rival to Reagan at the President's own game.

In general, pressures almost exactly opposite those in 1979 prodded Reagan and Gorbachev to meet. Not since 1955 had the two superpowers gone so long without a summit. No ongoing process such as SALT II existed to compel a summit meeting. Even though the U.S. had voluntarily abided by the provisions of the unratified SALT II, the treaty lapsed in 1985. (Ironically though, SALT added support for a summit by its demise.) Although the U.S. nuclear freeze movement had waned from its crest in 1983, it had heightened the salience of arms control, always a key summit issue. Harsh rhetoric between the superpowers was said in many places to be at a long-time high. These ingredients contributed to popular support in the U.S. for a rapprochement.

In addition, Reagan's political advisors and pollsters identified the detorioration of U.S.-Soviet relations as the only issue on which he was politically vulnerable to the Democrats in 1984, when the try for a second term was underway. On this advice, Reagan had delivered a strikingly moderate speech on January 16, 1984, which was answered in kind by then-General Secretary Andropov on January 24, echoing the call for a dialogue (Mandelbaum and Talbott, 1987:40).

Once in power in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev apparently had decided to concentrate on his domestic situation. To do anything about it, he needed to consolidate power. What better way

to demonstrate prestige and authority than to participate in a summit? Following that, he needed to have a calm foreign arena in order to devote time and resources to technological advancement, managerial restructuring, and the satisfaction of the higher expectations of Soviet consumers. In light of these goals, the most frightening prospect he could face would be a new round in the arms race, fought in the American style, with terrifically expensive computer-based high technology. This was exactly the threat posed by Reagan's SDI, which thus added to the factors piling up on both sides in favor of bilateral arms negotiations (to which the Soviets returned in 1985) and a summit meeting.

Expectations and events. Once again, the premier issue was arms control. Reagan had called SALT II "fatally flawed" in his 1980 presidential campaign, had shown stubbornness in arms negotiations and in the ultimately successful attempt to base Pershing missiles in Western Europe, and had engaged in some of the most inflammatory anti-Communist rhetoric since the 1950s. Now he held the possibility of SDI, a technological dream that burgeoned into the ultimate "bargaining chip." Numerous Soviet rumors were floated to the press during the pre-summit buildup about the possibility of massive 50 percent cuts in nuclear armaments if only Reagan would abandon SDI. Star Wars was the arms-control centerpiece of the summit, and the basic questions for political observers on the eve of the meeting were: Is Reagan capable enough to even discuss nuclear armaments? Is he smart enough not to abandon SDI?

Further down on the "Scorecard of major issues" (as *Newsweek* termed it in a post-summit article [Dec. 2, 1985:33]) were regional conflicts (Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central America), human rights (Soviet treatment of dissidents) and bilateral relations (cultural exchanges, trade, air travel). This ranked agenda was identical to one in a *Time* magazine pre-summit article (Nov. 18, 1985:21).

Both leaders came into the 1985 summit with good domestic support and strong reputations for "communicating." Reagan's abilities were known and respected, but Gorbachev had his own telegenic abilities, and several articles portrayed the summit as a contest between Reagan, the master, and Gorbachev, the youngster with momentum who just might beat the champion

at his own game.

Approximately 2,000 journalists had attended the 1979 summit; more than 3,600 attended the 1985 meeting. One of the notable events of the summit occurred on that first day, when Jesse Jackson confronted Gorbachev during a break in the proceedings. Jackson, who was making it a habit to show up in places around the world as a sort of self-appointed ambassador, asked Gorbachev several times about granting visas to Soviet Jews, but was stonewalled. The two men shared their views on the need for stopping the nuclear arms race. A swarm of reporters captured Gorbachev's fancy footwork, and the incident only added to Gorbachev's reputation as an intelligent, tough leader.

After gaining access to sources in news briefings during the first day of meetings, the horde of journalists was unexpectedly stymied by a news blackout proposed by George Shultz later that day, and agreed to by the Soviet team. The highly personal and private nature of the two leaders' meetings further hampered coverage. The only information available to journalists during the two days of meetings was hard information on how long the men had talked, where and when, and soft speculation provided by aides from both sides on what the summit might eventually mean. No information on the actual content of talks was made available to the press until the leaders were ready to depart Thursday morning.

A short ceremony Thursday morning at which Reagan and Gorbachev signed the only agreement produced directly by the summit (an agreement to renew cultural exchanges) was followed by an unusual 1-1/2 hour-long press conference by Gorbachev. Reagan had to leave to brief NATO allies on the summit, then fly to Washington to address a joint session of Congress about the summit. Gorbachev was to travel to similar briefings of Warsaw Pact representatives and then the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Once the summit ended, reporters were able to reconstruct events and content through interviews with aides. In short, Reagan had suggested to Gorbachev immediately upon greeting him on Wednesday that they spend as much time as possible alone. Gorbachev agreed, and they ended up spending over five hours together in a total of six private meetings over two

days that made a shambles of the summit agenda from that very first encounter.

Reagan held firm on SDI, unable to convince Gorbachev of its possible value to peace, but resistant to any notion of abandoning SDI research. On other issues, Gorbachev insisted that human rights issues were internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and that the U.S.S.R. was obligated to help "national wars of liberation" around the world, the standard Soviet rationale. Late on Wednesday, efforts moved from arms control accommodation to the creation of a joint statement for release Thursday. The major accomplishments of the meeting, as seen by the newsmagazines, were an agreement to hold two more summits, and the fact that Geneva occurred at all and featured a civil atmosphere. Of less significance, according to the newsmagazines, were agreements on consulates, negotiations that cleared the way for restoration of direct air service between New York City and Moscow, and the signing of the cultural exchange agreement on Thursday morning.

Media coverage. The Geneva meeting featured unprecedented efforts on both sides -- unprecedented especially for the Soviets -- to influence the media and public expectations for the summit. *Newsweek* and *Time* ran several long articles and analysis pieces on this "pre-summit maneuvering." No doubt the longer time period between the announcement of the summit in early July and the actual meeting facilitated this maneuvering. But news organizations are supposed to be able to react to events within hours. Although the 1979 buildup period was only one month, that is still a long time by news standards. Yet relatively little about any pre-summit buildup appeared in the newsmagazines. Certainly there were no long pieces about use of the media, just articles setting the context for the meeting. The amount of attention paid by the media to how the summit participants were using the media stands out as a major difference in newsmagazine coverage in 1985 compared to 1979.

Along with efforts by both sides (but especially the U.S.) to downplay the probability of any major breakthroughs in the 1985 summit, a consensus emerged in pre-summit articles that summits should not be seen as places for such breakthroughs. In fact, summits were dangerous places for concrete negotiations by unknowledgeable leaders, and should be used instead for

simply getting to know one another, to inject a "human element" into the superpower relationship (*Newsweek*, Nov. 25, 1985:44-45; *Newsweek*, Nov. 18, 1985:114; *Newsweek*, July 15, 1985:30).

The tendencies of the participating governments to seek media manipulation combined with the news blackout to produce a strange and unrewarding experience for representatives of the media in Geneva. *Newsweek* said:

> If the superpowers settled little else at Geneva, they seemed to agree on how to manipulate reporters: first the orchestrated briefings, next a sudden blackout – then, when everything was getting desperate, a grand finale. The blackout could not have been imposed only to conceal substance (there wasn't much). It also put to the test a new generation of "atmospheric" weapons in an ongoing war of public relations. For at this summit, practically *everything* was atmospheric, from Reagan's topcoat-less initial greeting (how vigorous for an old man, the picture said), to Gorbachev's meeting with Jesse Jackson (how firm, how hip). The president, just by being publicly amiable, came across as "presidential". As for actual news, most of the 3,500 journalists could have safely spent the week skiing.
>
> Geneva took on the air of an American political convention: thousands of reporters and photographers battling for pool credentials to cover events that consisted mostly of two smiling men clasping hands. The face-to-face encounters may have helped ease world tensions, but without serious agreements their news value was only skin deep . . . Full coverage would likely have meant even more unenlightening "spin control" from the two governments. The blackout not only helped Gorbachev and Reagan, it spared viewers a new round of leak stories and manipulative verbiage. They got nice sidebars on Swiss watchmaking instead. (*Newsweek*, Dec. 2, 1985:38)

The *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature* contained 21 stories in *Time* and *Newsweek* about the 1985 summit, with many of them either mentioning or focusing on media manipulation by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The earliest was dated June 15, 1985, the latest December 30, 1985.

Summary

The 1979 summit was a product of a diplomatic structure (detente and SALT) that had nearly run its course by meeting time, while the 1985 summit was widely regarded with excitement as a fresh start to U.S.-Soviet relations. There were references in both years to the

inherent importance of each meeting. "With both leaders essentially sticking to the scripts that had been worked out in advance, the [1979] summit was not expected to alter basic policies. But every summit is a historic event . . ." (*Time*, June 25, 1979). The historic aspect of the 1985 meeting was mentioned after the fact, but the most-repeated theme was that of new beginnings, that the opening of dialogue was better than what had existed, and that even no progress was progress, simply for the fact that the two men had met.

> [The summit] might indeed mark a new direction for superpower relations. Even though the opportunity of a bold stroke for peace may be squandered, the summit is likely to start a continuing dialogue that, no matter how spirited, would be better than the frozen silence in which the White House and Kremlin have eyed each other since Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met in Vienna in 1979. (*Time*, Nov. 18, 1985:18)

> A summit represents high history, the great encounter above the tree line. It sometimes excites almost sacramental expectations. Geneva produced neither great treaties nor triumphant rhetoric . . . . And yet it was an extraordinary encounter – the most powerful forces in human history suddenly condensed, embodied in two men coming out of the mountain cold and sitting down by the fire to talk. What mattered, for now, was less the treaties not signed than the conversation begun. The important moments of one of the world's great public encounters transpired in sealed privacy. (*Time*, Dec. 2, 1985:17)

The essential importance of each meeting could not have been seen as any greater than it was. They were *summits*, each obliging the media to pay maximum attention. The 1979 summit lasted one day longer (if one includes the 1985 Thursday morning press conference as a "day") and featured the signing of a treaty central to debate then growing over fundamental U.S. foreign policy. Expectations expressed by official sources for both summits were low. Their value was seen to be mainly intrinsic: just meeting and talking was good, whether or not the leaders agreed to concrete diplomatic arrangements. A variation on this basic scheme of lowering expectations occurred in 1985 when both Reagan and Gorbachev said after the summit that its true value would not be known for some time, comments which were seen by some observers as an attempt to lower expectations for any immediate results from the summit.

If the media like bad news as well as good, then the politically wounded Carter and the physically unpredictable Brezhnev should not have discouraged attention in comparison to the mediagenic Reagan and Gorbachev. The news blackout in Geneva would seem to mitigate further against comparatively more coverage of the actual event. Yet the newsmagazine coverage of the 1985 summit was far more extensive than in 1979. It seems unlikely that the actual summit events would account for this difference. Certainly the broader contexts could play a role, though. The 1979 summit was the end of an era, and featured two leaders who may have worn out their welcome in America. The 1985 summit featured a President at the peak of his domestic popularity and a Soviet newcomer who had captured tremendous positive attention after three years of physically incapable predecessors. It may be that the personalities of the leaders exerted an effect in coverage patterns.

Goals of this analysis

There are many ways to approach this kind of analysis. Qualitative issues are perhaps more exciting to think about, but the lack of previous work in this area indicates a need for a more quantitative foundation before qualitative analyses can be successfully devised and executed. For instance, why create variables and coding categories and spend hours viewing the material, only to discover that the work explains something like three percent of all coverage? It is difficult to construct meaningful qualitative coding schemes before a broader survey of the material has been conducted, as Rapaport (1969) has noted, and as common sense would dictate.

On the other hand, *some* qualitative variables should be tried out on the initial run; if they seem reliable, they lend a desirable depth to the analysis, and might be used again. If they seem unreliable, then improvements can be made based on what was learned the first time.

This analysis will focus on building a quantitative profile of each year's summit coverage, identifying similarities and differences in coverage, and informally assessing the contributions

made to those patterns by each of the four forces which have been outlined. Some qualitative variables will also be coded.

Because of the well-documented shift in the Soviet attitude toward the uses of television, it is expected that the 1985 summit coverage will be more extensive generally, and that it will feature more coverage of Soviet topics, including more speaking parts for Soviet speakers of all types, more use of English by Soviet speakers, and perhaps qualitatively more favorable treatment of the Soviets.

Technological advances in news collection and transmission would lead to expectations for an increased use of material gathered and transmitted from foreign locations, and from the Soviet Union in particular, because of the new Soviet media awareness.

A change in journalistic values toward a position of cultural relativism would also create pressure for more coverage of Soviet spokesmen and events, as well as more favorable coverage.

If summit meetings are ritualistic and programmed, then some aspects of coverage may be quite similar from 1979 to 1985, despite all the changes during those six years. If, on the other hand, summits are entirely products of their immediate surroundings, then there may be very few, or no, similarities in coverage. The same ideas apply to CBS itself, of course. For instance, if CBS coverage of summits is ritualistic, then CBS would tend to produce similar patterns of coverage despite changes in the environment. There are no clear expectations here. Certainly some specific topics will differ from one summit to the other, but there is also ample evidence that news organizations tend to routinize the collection of news (Ettema and Whitney, 1982). These two tendencies seem to be at odds.

The methodology is described in detail in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Selection of coverage

Coverage of the summits was selected using the printed abstracts of the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (VTNA). The VTNA abstracts present broadcast-by-broadcast summaries of every news story, including a general subject heading and the names of speakers in the stories. The appropriate abstracts were reviewed for the days of the actual summit meetings, and for a period of six weeks before the opening date and after the closing date of the summits. This period was developed as a result of the actual distribution of summit-related stories – almost all summit-related coverage occurred within this 13-week (approximately) time frame. For the 1979 summit, the period of coverage from which stories were selected extended from May 4 to July 15 (the summit took place June 15-18). For the 1985 summit, the selection period was October 8 to December 31, with the summit occurring on November 19-21.

The CBS network was chosen for study because in 1979 it was the evening news ratings leader (although it had fallen by 1985). More analysis has been done on CBS content than on other networks, mainly because of the ratings lead and a stronger tradition of perceived quality in news broadcasting. Every VTNA story abstract that mentioned the summit meeting was selected for viewing. The 1979 meeting's close connection with the SALT II treaty and ratification debate introduces the possibility that this selection method allowed some stories that mentioned the summit on the air to slip through unselected, because the abstracts are necessarily brief. Several stories indexed under the SALT II heading were selected in cases

where mentions of the summit seemed likely. There was much SALT II coverage that was not selected because there was no indication in the abstract that the summit was mentioned. There seems to be no similar consideration for the 1985 coverage.

A total of 23 stories were initially selected for 1979, and 58 for 1985. Four of the 1979 stories did not mention the summit, and three of the 1985 stories did not mention the summit. Thus, a total of 19 VTNA stories were analyzed for 1979, and 55 VTNA stories were analyzed for 1985.

Each story as abstracted by VTNA could contain a number of reports by different journalists along different themes, so a "story" in the sense used here does not necessarily mean one coherent, organized report. A VTNA story might begin with 45 seconds of Dan Rather at the anchor position, two to three minutes of a Washington, D.C., correspondent reporting on Presidential activities, another two minutes from Moscow filed by a foreign correspondent, a short piece by a third correspondent about issues on the summit agenda, a return to Mr. Rather for a half-minute segue into a one-minute commentary by yet another correspondent, and a final stop back at the anchor desk for 10 seconds before a commercial break. Overall, selected VTNA stories ranged in duration from 10 seconds to more than eight minutes. The story device was useful for selection purposes, but the actual unit of analysis for this study is at a more basic level called a *turn*.

In newspaper content analysis, the importance of an issue is often measured by how many column inches are given to the subject. The corresponding unit of measure in television content is time. The basic analytical goal of this study is to describe patterns in the amount of time given to various issues and personalities by CBS during its summit coverage in 1979 and 1985.

Several characteristics of the coverage were identified as worthy of investigation. Their names and brief definitions appear below. (More information on the methodology can be found in Appendix A.) These characteristics were named and defined before the tapes were viewed. Because the definition of a turn is a function of these variables, the definition appears after the descriptions of the variables.

Type

Each turn was coded as one of four types, depending on how the turn was presented to the audience.

Event: an event turn concentrated on what one might consider to be "straight news." An event turn had to be a straightforward notification that something did happen, was in the process of happening, or was definitely scheduled to happen.

Issue: an issue turn dealt with a theme or concept on the summit agenda. In addition, an issue turn had to avoid an event orientation. A turn that stated "Jimmy Carter addressed Senate leaders today about SALT II" would be an event turn (a presidential speech). But a report that stated "One of the main issues identified by President Carter in a speech to Senate leaders yesterday is SALT II" would be an issue turn. Issue turns were usually easy to identify, and were often accompanied by graphics displaying words, icons, and/or video content running in a small section of the graphic display.

Analysis: an analysis turn left the noncommital realm of straight news reporting and entered into interpreting events for the viewer. Analysis turns included brief statements by Sovietologists, commentary pieces by reporters and quick comments by summit participants on how the meetings were going (usually something like "Very well – we're talking.") in answer to questions shouted by off-camera reporters as the pack moved from doorway to driveway. Reporters also occasionally engaged in interpretation and prognostication in the course of mainly straight news stories. When they did so, those turns were coded as analysis turns.

Process: a process turn focused on something "behind the scenes," such as security arrangements, accommodations for the dignitaries, media arrangements, local color, and so on. This category also included audio or video content pertaining to past summits and the backgrounds of the leaders involved.

Speaker

The actual speaker of the audio content was coded for each turn. A turn has one and only one speaker. When the speaker changed, a new turn began. In cases where more than one speaker was speaking at the same time, there was always a primary speaker. Usually this was because the reporter was talking over the subject of the video content. In approximately five cases, very short (one sentence or shorter) "bridges" inserted by newsmen between longer quotes by other speakers were ignored. These verbal bridges lasted only one to two seconds and served to unite the quotes of the subject rather than separate them. It seemed both misleading and impractical to start separate turns for them. When dignitaries spoke on camera and were followed by their interpreters, both the dignitary's and the interpreter's comments were coded as the dignitary's alone. In other words, the speaker remained as "Soviet leader," for example, for the interpreter's speech. If, however, a dignitary was not heard to speak, but his interpreter was, the speaker was coded as "other." Speaker categories are:

US media - a member of the American media.

USSR media - a member of the Soviet media.

US official - a member of the executive branch of the U.S. administration. These speakers were either identified by name or simply as a "senior White House official," or something similar.

USSR official - someone specifically identified as a spokesman for the Soviet leader personally, or "the Kremlin."

US citizen - any other speaker identifiable as a U.S. citizen, including members of Congress, Sovietologists, the "man in the street," etc. Also referred to in this paper as "general U.S."

USSR citizen - any other speaker identifiable as a Soviet citizen, including Americanologists, man in the street, etc. Also referred to in this paper as "general U.S.S.R."

US leader - Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan.

USSR leader - Leonid Brezhnev or Mikhail Gorbachev.

Other - any other speaker.

Quotation

Each turn was marked as either a statement made on the speaker's own authority, without explicit mention of a source, or as a "quoted" turn, where explicit mention of a source was made, along with mention of a paraphrase taking place. Presumably, most of what journalists say is attributable to a source. This variable was designed to track turns where explicit reference to a quoted source is made.

Quoted Source

If a turn was coded as a paraphrase as defined above, then the source of the quote was coded using the same categories developed for the speaker variable. Otherwise, it was left blank on the coding sheet.

Audio Origin

The actual location of each speaker at the time of speaking was coded here. In two or three cases it was necessary to watch one or two minutes of content before this determination could be made. Locations were grouped in the following manner:

Studio - audio content originating in the network anchor studio in New York City.

US location - audio content originating from anywhere in the United States other than the studio.

USSR location - audio content originating from anywhere in the U.S.S.R.

Summit location - audio content originating from the site of the summit, while the summit was the focus of the coverage. Reports about arms negotiations in Geneva in 1985 were coded as "other," not as "summit," for instance.

Other - audio content originating from any other identifiable location.

Unknown - audio content whose origin location could not be determined.

Video origin

The same concepts described above applied to the video content of the programming. The first category was modified to "Studio/Graphics" for this variable, to account for slide or computer-generated graphics used to fill the entire video picture, or as a backdrop behind the studio anchor desk.

Language

The language used by the actual speaker. In the case of a speaker followed by an interpreter's rendering of the statement, the entire sequence was coded as having been said in the original language, in parallel with the fact that the speaker code did not change. When only the interpreter's rendering was presented, the language was coded as that being spoken by the interpreter. Possible languages were English, Russian, "Summit" (the language of the host country of the summit), and any other language.

Subject

A wide variety of subjects were identified before analysis, and several were added as needed. Subjects were linked to the variable *type*, with a different list of subjects and codes for each story type. Some 63 subject categories were used in the coding process. For a complete list, see Appendix A.

Topics

To make this analysis more useful, the 63 subject categories were combined into 12 topic categories, which indicate the general topic of each turn. These topics are:

US leader - any turn focused on Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan.

USSR leader - any turn focused on Leonid Brezhnev or Mikhail Gorbachev.

General US - any turn focused on some other U.S. official, citizen, event, or the country itself.

General USSR - any turn focused on some other U.S.S.R. official, citizen, event or the country itself.

US-USSR relations - any turn focused on the U.S. and U.S.S.R. nations as actors in a relationship, including coverage of summit meetings and negotiations.

Nuclear war/talks - any turn focused on arms control negotiation, explanations or events concerning nuclear weapons, or general expressions concerning warfare.

Regional issues - otherwise known as "trouble spots," such areas as the Middle East, Africa, Central America, Afghanistan, or Europe, where a specific military presence or action could be discussed.

Human rights - any turn focused on questions of Soviet dissidents, Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R., or Soviet allegations of U.S. human rights violations such as unemployment or racism.

Bilateral issues - any turn focused on trade relations, cultural exchanges, or consulates, but also including general statements about the maintenance of peace between the two countries or keeping a dialogue going while not specifically mentioning or implying nuclear arms negotiations.

SALT II - turns focusing on the SALT II negotiations before the 1979 summit, or the ratification debate in 1979. Substantial coverage of this issue demanded that this category be kept as a topic.

Media activities - turns focused on the media as actors in the summit process, including specific content about the 1985 pre-summit propaganda war, stories on how Soviet or foreign media were operating, and general mentions of what journalists were doing with the summit story.

Other topic - all other categories not covered above.

Time

Each turn was timed to the nearest five seconds. The VTNA tapes show time in 10-second increments. After a little practice, very accurate estimates of five-second increments could be made. The total time coded for each story unit was checked against the VTNA's time records until agreement within 10 seconds was reached for each VTNA story. The majority of VTNA stories caused no problems on this dimension.

An additional variable was originally included early in the coding process to measure any evaluation of the subject injected by the media into their reporting. This researcher did not believe his early efforts to make this determination provided useful information. It was very difficult to separate the positive or negative qualities of the information itself from the qualities of any assessments added by the reporters themselves. There also seemed to be very few gratuitous evaluations made by journalists. Accordingly, this variable was not coded and does not enter into this analysis.

Several attributes at the story level were coded as well. The year, month, day of broadcast and total time for each story were recorded. Three additional story variables were recorded as described below.

Period

Three periods were coded: before, during, and after the summit meeting. This is a VTNA story-level attribute that is also valid for every turn in a VTNA story. The before period included all stories shown up to and including the day before the first summit meeting. The during period covered the first to the last day of summit activity, inclusive. The after period covered the day after the summit ended until the end of the range of coverage six weeks later. The specific dates are as follows:

Year	Before	During	After
1979	May 4 - June 14	June 15 - 18	June 19 - July 29
1985	Oct. 8 - Nov. 18	Nov. 19 - 21	Nov. 22 - Jan. 2

Level

This variable was modeled after Larson (1982;1984) as a measure of the use of videotape from various foreign locations. It is not meaningful to analyze turns using this particular variable. The audio and video origin variables provide turn-level statistics on these characteristics. There are three levels:

Anchor - a report whose audio and video content both consist entirely of studio-originated turns.

Domestic - a report which has at least one turn with audio or video content originating from outside the studio, but inside the U.S.

Foreign - a report which has at least one turn whose audio or video content originates from outside the U.S.

Live foreign - this was a fourth category added to Larson's original three, to distinguish live broadcast from outside the U.S. from taped foreign content. It did not seem completely reliable, as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish live from taped content. Therefore, it is not included in this analysis.

Focus

This variable is also a story-level variable. This is a measure of how much of the VTNA story concentrated on the summit meeting. Each turn in which the summit was specifically mentioned was noted. If the total time for all turns in which the summit was mentioned added to more than 50 percent of the VTNA story's total time, the story was coded as a summit *focus*. If the total was between 10 and 50 percent, it was a summit *theme*, and less than 10 percent was a summit *mention*.

Definition of a turn

As mentioned above, the *turn* is the unit of analysis for this study. Turns are created by relationships among the variables described above. When either type, speaker, quote, source of quote, audio origin, video origin, subject or language changed to a different coding category, then a new turn began. It is conceivable that the same speaker might talk consistently through 10 or 15 turns as the video content shows pictures from the U.S., studio-produced graphics, footage from abroad, offers several paraphrases and so on. Each change marks the start of a new turn, and each turn is measured in seconds. Note that a video cut does not necessarily mark the beginning of a new turn. There must be a change in *coding category*. One might see 10 video cuts, from daytime to nighttime scenes, but if they were all shot in the U.S., there would be no change in the *code* for video origin, even though they might have taken place in several different U.S. cities.

Individual turns ranged from five to 90 seconds in length, with the vast majority lasting 20 seconds or less. Coding turns in this manner seems to be a useful way of analyzing

television content. It provides numerous data points, allows great flexibility in tracking various phenomena, and can be accomplished in a reasonable amount of time. It promotes accuracy in counting the total time spent showing specific issues or content, because several variables can be tracked simultaneously: when one changes, a new turn begins. It also seems easier to determine the subjects of 10-second blocks of time instead of two-minute aggregations of video clips, quotes, and reportage.

A coding sheet was developed to record observations for the variables described above. Approximately four hours of coverage were analyzed in roughly 24 hours over five days, by the researcher. Considerations of cost and flexibility aside, Smith and Verrall (1985) provide a sound rationale for the researcher-coded project in a description of an analysis they carried out on Australian television content:

> Coding of data by researchers, the procedure used in this study, has been attacked by Krippendorff (1980:74) as "probably the worst practice in content analysis" on the grounds that it prevents independent reliability checks and produces unreplicable results. He suggests using "independent" coders who are trained by working through a standard sample of material, comparing their results at each step with "ostensibly correct results" as determined by a "panel of experts" (the researchers?). Individuals who are not "suitable" for the task are eliminated. Although Krippendorff's concern for reliability and replicability is highly laudable, it is difficult to see how the reliability checks generated by this or any other extensive training procedure are "independent" in any meaningful sense of the word. Further, to the extent that trained coders are less "expert" than the researchers who trained them, validity is decreased. Finally, successful replication depends less on who codes the material than on the clarity and completeness of coding instructions. This study was designed in light of these considerations. . . In deference to established usage, however, it is perhaps better described as a critical analysis than a "scientific" content analysis.

This researcher will follow this convention, and term this project a critical analysis.

The completed coding sheets served as data entry forms. The data were entered into a UNIFY relational data base, then written to a data file for analysis using SPSSX (3.0). Unless otherwise noted, results in this report are expressed in terms of seconds of coverage, or percentages of the total coverage devoted to one summit or the other. Results are reported in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

This chapter will present a description of overall summit coverage. Several figures and tables are included to highlight some findings. Complete tables for the database can be found in Appendix B. Readers should refer to Chapter 3 and Appendix A for complete information on variable names and categories.

Extent of Coverage

Overall, 871 turns totaling 12,130 seconds (3.4 hours) were coded. Coverage for 1979 accounted for 170 turns totaling 3,335 seconds (about 55 1/2 minutes). Coverage of the 1985 summit was clearly more extensive than for 1979: 701 turns totaling 8,795 seconds (almost 2 1/2 hours), representing increases over 1979 of 312 percent and 164 percent, respectively. The average turn length in 1979 was 19.6 seconds; in 1985 it was 12.5 seconds. This difference evidently reflects the pressure of video technology to increase the activity on-screen. The 1985 coverage featured many more switches of video content, and more speakers talking in shorter bursts. For example, in 1979, Jimmy Carter appeared as a speaker in six turns for 140 seconds, an average of 23.3 seconds per turn. In 1985, Ronald Reagan appeared as a speaker in 24 turns for 230 seconds, an average of just 9.6 seconds per turn, a trend entirely in line with the "sound bite" phenomenon of the 1988 presidential elections.

Topics Presented

All turns were coded as presenting one subject only. The 63 subjects originally coded were combined into 12 general topic areas for this analysis. In general, there was notable stability in the coverage devoted to topics from 1979 to 1985. Not surprisingly, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations generally, which included coverage of the actual summit meetings, garnered the most coverage in both years. CBS allotted 35.1 percent of all coverage time in 1979 to this topic, compared to 31 percent in 1985. Nuclear war and arms control was the second-most covered topic in both years, getting 21.6 percent of 1979 coverage and 20.6 percent of 1985 coverage. Third in 1979 was coverage of the SALT II ratification controversy (13.8 percent), while in 1985 the U.S.S.R. in general was third in coverage (11.3 percent). These issues are clearly products of the different summit contexts, as there was no SALT II coverage in 1985, and coverage of the U.S.S.R. in general in 1979 accounted for just 1.2 percent of all coverage time. A similar gain occurred in the time allotted to discussions of media-related activities, including the 1985 pre-summit "public relations war," and descriptions of the media at the summit. In 1979, 3.9 percent of coverage overall was on this topic. In 1985, it rose to 9.9 percent. See Figure 1 for topic coverage information (p. 41).

Coverage time spent on the two leaders as topics remained remarkably consistent: 7 percent for both Carter and Reagan; 5.4 percent for Brezhnev and a surprising 4.6 percent for Gorbachev. Coverage of the three "minor" summit agenda issues – regional issues, human rights, and bilateral issues – expanded slightly in 1985 (from 8.9 percent to 11.1 percent) and reflected different priorities among the three issues as well.

Type of turn

The majority of time in 1979 was spent on event turns (55.8 percent). Analysis turns accounted for 25.6 percent of coverage time, followed by process (11.4 percent) and issues turns (7.2 percent). In 1985, issues turns were presented more than any other (28.9 percent), followed closely by analysis turns (28.7 percent), process turns (21.5 percent), and event turns

Figure 1


TOPICS COVERED
Percentage of overall coverage
US-USSR RELATIONS
NUCLEAR WAR/TALKS
GENERAL USSR
MEDIA ACTIVITIES
US LEADER
USSR LEADER
BILATERAL ISSUES
SALT II
REGIONAL ISSUES
HUMAN RIGHTS
GENERAL US
OTHER
0
10
20
30
40
Vienna
Geneva

(20.9 percent). Because this variable involved more judgment than most others reported here, the differences may not be meaningful. In addition, the changes could be the result of an evolution of the researcher's sensitivity to identifying turn types. The videotaped stories were coded in chronological order beginning with 1979 coverage, so an evolving conception of turn type would introduce bias.

Speaker

Network news time is a precious commodity. Perhaps the most reliable quantitative measure of a person's importance or of the issue represented by the speaker is the amount of speaking time given by CBS to him or her. Naturally, the speaker given the most time was CBS itself, as represented by various reporters and commentators. In 1979, CBS speakers accounted for 85.5 percent of coverage, a share which fell to 79.2 percent in 1985. The U.S. leader and U.S. officials also saw their shares shrink from 1979 to 1985, while general U.S. speakers, Soviet media, Soviet officials, general Soviet speakers, and the Soviet leader all experienced slight increases in speaking time.

The expanded role of Soviet speakers is clear. In 1979, one Soviet speaker (Brezhnev) was given one turn for 30 seconds (0.9 percent of all coverage). In 1985, there were many more Soviet speakers of varying types who were given a total of 52 turns for 460 seconds (5.2 percent of all coverage, a proportional increase over 1979 of 477 percent). Seventeen of these 52 turns, totaling 165 seconds (35.9 percent of total Soviet speaking time), were spoken in English, a clear sign of the Soviet commitment to presenting an accessible, perhaps even likable, profile of themselves on television. It will not surprise anyone that no U.S. speaker spoke Russian in the coverage analyzed here.

It should also be noted that many of the general U.S. speakers were experts on the U.S.S.R. and spent much time talking about Gorbachev, the Soviet Union, and the new Soviet media image. In general, while CBS did account for a slightly smaller proportion of speaking time in 1985 than in 1979, the contest for speaking time in summit coverage seems to be a zero-sum

game, which had many more participants in 1985 than in 1979. The net result, proportionately, was increased time for Soviet speakers and less time for American speakers, as illustrated in Figure 2 (p. 44).

Quoting other sources

Overall, only slight variation in the use of quoted sources was observed. In 1979, 13.5 percent of CBS speaking time was spent on turns specifically quoting or paraphrasing other sources. That proportion rose to 19.7 percent in 1985. There was a very stable group of four sources quoted more often than any others: U.S. administration officials were by far the first choice for quoting, followed by Soviet media, the President, and the Soviet leader. This pattern was unchanged from 1979 to 1985. Soviet sources again showed advances here, from an aggregate of 33.8 percent of all time spent on quoting sources in 1979, to 36.8 percent in 1985. U.S. sources experienced an aggregate decrease, from 66.3 percent in 1979 to 59.1 percent in 1985.

Origin of audio and video content

The coverage in 1979 was less likely to blend video content and audio content originating from different locations than was the 1985 coverage. In 1979, in aggregate, when CBS journalists were speakers, 70.7 percent of audio content and 69.1 percent of video content originated from the site of the summit. The balance for U.S.-location contents was exact, and nearly so for studio-originated programming. In 1985, on the other hand, there were much wider differences. For instance, 16.2 percent of 1985 audio content where CBS journalists were speakers originated from the studio, compared to 20.5 percent of video content (this figure includes computer-generated graphics presented to fill the screen). U.S.-location audio accounted for 27.9 percent of CBS speaking time, but U.S.-location video accounted for only 19.4 percent.

In general, the 1985 coverage featured a wider range of origination points for both video and audio content, a range which bordered on the gratuitous at times. For instance, a discussion

Figure 2


SPEAKING PARTS
Percentage of Total Coverage Time
US media 85.5%
Other 0.4%
Brezhnev 0.9%
US official 3.0%
Carter 4.2%
US citizen 6.0%
Vienna 1979
US media 79.4%
USSR official 0.3%
USSR media 1.0%
Gorbachev 1.0%
Other 1.9%
US official 2.2%
Reagan 2.6%
USSR citizen 2.8%
US citizen 8.8%
Geneva 1985

of regional issues included a five-second statement in Spanish by a Sandinista soldier recorded in Nicaragua, and a mention of Gorbachev was accompanied by a 10-second video clip of his trip to Bulgaria four days previously: while the video showed schoolgirls depositing bouquets of flowers with Gorbachev, followed by footage of a triumphant motorcade, the voiceover said, "Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may tell Shultz what can and cannot be resolved when they meet in Moscow, Gorbachev's first working session with a senior Reagan administration official. And Shultz has a lot to tell Gorbachev."

The 1985 reports were much more likely to include short segments from various locations. This led to the decrease in the average length of a turn, from 19.6 seconds in 1979 to 12.5 seconds in 1985. It is also quite notable that video content originating in the Soviet Union accounted for 16.9 percent of all video time when CBS journalists were speakers, almost as much time as video originating in the U.S. (outside the studio). There was no video or audio content at all in 1979 that originated from the Soviet Union.

Period

Summit stories were classified as belonging to one of three periods: before the summit, during the summit, and after the summit. The 1979 Vienna summit was defined as beginning on Friday, June 15, and ending on Monday, June 18. Although the first official meeting took place on June 16, both leaders met for the first time on Friday. They paid a courtesy call to the Austrian leader, then held a brief photography session. They traded comments. Later that same evening, they attended the opera together. The day was treated as the first day of the summit, and announced as such by Walter Cronkite on Friday's news program, even though the official start was not until Saturday.

The 1985 Geneva summit was defined as beginning on Tuesday, November 19, and ending on Thursday, November 21. Although both leaders had arrived earlier and there was some activity before Tuesday, the 19th marked the first actual meeting between the two men. The summit was scheduled to end on Wednesday, but Reagan and Gorbachev decided to extend it

to Thursday morning with a joint press conference. These definitions are important because one day's coverage around the beginning and end of the summit represented a substantial proportion of coverage overall.

In 1979, 40.2 percent of coverage time came before the summit actually began, while 55.6 percent occurred during the summit, and 4.2 percent as followup. All of the followup coverage was devoted to the issue of SALT II ratification.

In 1985, 58 percent of coverage time occurred before the summit, while 31.2 percent came during the summit, and 10.7 percent afterwards. The 1979 summit was a day longer than the 1985 summit, due to the inclusion of the Friday "prologue." If that Friday in 1979 is defined as pre-summit, then 53.7 percent of 1979 coverage came before the summit, 42.1 percent during the summit, and 4.2 percent after the summit. Either way, coverage of the 1985 summit allotted proportionately less time to the summit meetings themselves, and more time to pre-summit activities and post-summit followups. Figure 3 shows a week-by-week comparison of coverage (p. 47).

The period variable reveals interesting similarities in allotment of time to the U.S. and Soviet leaders as speakers, as topics of coverage, and as quoted sources in 1979 and 1985. In every case, the Soviet leader received his greatest exposure during the summit meetings, while the U.S. leader received his highest exposure before the summit in five out of six cases (only coverage of Carter as a topic broke this pattern, but not by much). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show these data (pages 48,49 and 50).

The top four non-leader topics overall each showed differences in coverage by period. Naturally, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations category peaked during the summits because that category includes coverage of the actual events at the summits. Nuclear arms issues gained coverage through the 1985 time frame, but lost coverage through the 1979 time frame (although, if SALT II ratification is grouped with nuclear arms issues in 1979, that topic shows much greater coverage). Coverage of regional issues peaked in 1979 during the summit. In 1985, coverage of the U.S.S.R. in general was mainly a product of pre-summit reporting, while

COVERAGE BY WEEK

Percentage of Total Time



Figure 3

Figure 4


LEADERS AS TOPICS
Percentage of Total Coverage Time
20
15
10
5
0
6.7
1.1
7.8
8.9
0
0
Before
During
After
VIENNA 1979
Carter
Brezhnev
20
15
10
5
0
10.2
4.2
3.3
6.2
1.1
2.1
Before
During
After
GENEVA 1985
Reagan
Gorbachev

Figure 5


LEADERS AS SPEAKERS
Percentage of Total Coverage Time
20
15
10
5
0
6.7
0
2.7
1.6
0
0
Before
During
After
VIENNA 1979
Carter
Brezhnev
20
15
10
5
0
3.7
0.5
0.7
2.4
2.1
0
Before
During
After
GENEVA 1985
Reagan
Gorbachev

Figure 6


LEADERS AS QUOTED SOURCES
Percentage of CBS Speaking Time
When Quoting Sources
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
24.1
6.9
11.5
19.2
0
0
Before
During
After
VIENNA 1979
Carter
Brezhnev
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
18.5
1.9
7.9
46
16.1
11.3
Before
During
After
GENEVA 1985
Reagan
Gorbachev

coverage of media activities and the public relations war remained fairly consistent before, during and after the summit. Figure 7 shows this information (p. 52).

The period variable is, of course, highly reliable, and seems to lend much depth to the analysis. It is a useful way to categorize summit coverage.

Level of foreign coverage

Using Larson's (1982) typology, complete VTNA story units were coded on one of three levels of foreign coverage. Anchor reports and domestic reports were used with equal frequency in 1979, four times each (21 percent of all stories). There were 11 foreign video VTNA stories in 1979, accounting for the other 58 percent of 1979 stories. The 1985 coverage was much more likely to use foreign video: 76 percent of the 55 stories broadcast in 1985 were in this category. Nine stories (16 percent) were domestic video, and just four stories (7 percent) were anchor stories.

An attempt was made to distinguish live foreign video content from pre-recorded foreign video, but the distinction was hard to make. There was much content in both years that *looked* live, but it was often unclear whether it actually *was* live.

Focus

The VTNA stories were coded into one of three levels of attention paid specifically to the summit. A mention story contained less than 10 percent specific summit material, a theme story contained 10 to 50 percent summit material, and a focus story contained more than 50 percent. Each turn in a story was checked for a specific reference to the summit. The total time for all the turns with specific summit mentions was expressed as a percentage of the total VTNA story time, to code the story as a whole into one of the three groups for the focus variable.

In general, 1979 coverage was more tightly focused on the summit: 74 percent of all VTNA

Figure 7



Top four non-leader topics overall

stories in 1979 were focus stories, compared to just 34 percent of 1985 stories. The 1985 coverage contained 26 theme stories (45 percent), to just two such stories (11 percent) in 1979. The proportions of mention stories were similar: 16 percent in 1979 and 21 percent in 1985. Table 1 shows this information.

TABLE 1

FOCUS OF STORIES BY SUMMIT

(Percentages in parentheses)

Focus	1979	1985
Mention	3 (16)	10 (18)
Theme	2 (11)	25 (45)
Focus	14 (74)	20 (36)

The results reported here are discussed in Chapter 5. Possible roles played by the four forces mentioned throughout this analysis are examined in the following chapter as well.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

Before beginning this last chapter, it should be emphasized that this quantitative analysis is not designed to answer the whys of summit coverage, but to sketch some of the whats. Some intriguing questions or hypotheses may result from this analysis, but they cannot be answered here. This is just a first step.

Quantitative results

In this comparison of summit coverage, where the contexts of the two summit meetings were so different in many ways, similarities in coverage may be more revealing than differences. In the coverage of both summits, a remarkably stable hierarchy of topics existed, broken only by one or two major themes specific to particular contexts. U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations (including summit coverage) and nuclear war issues combined for over 50 percent of all coverage time in both 1979 and 1985. The perception that arms control is the centerpiece of summitry is clearly related to this pattern of coverage.

Coverage of leaders as topics was also very similar in both summits, as was coverage of the three minor summit issues -- human rights, bilateral issues, and regional conflicts. There was also a fairly consistent pattern in the attention paid to leaders before, during and after the summits. These similarities lead this researcher to conclude that they probably result from forces exerted by the organizations involved -- CBS news, and the governments of the U.S. and Soviet Union -- that tend to standardize the summit process. Many times in the literature, the word "ritual" was used in some form to describe summitry in general, or specific actions at a

summit. Standardized network news coverage of summits may be both a cause and an effect of a summit process in which bureaucracies and ritualistic patterns play increasingly larger roles.

Specific events and differences in context were not without some effect on coverage, though. Large differences in overall coverage appeared for the SALT II treaty negotiations and ratification controversy, media activities, and the U.S.S.R. in general. SALT II was a topic for 13.8 percent of all 1979 coverage, while it was not covered at all in 1985 because it did not exist as an issue, obviously. Media activities received 3.9 percent of all 1979 coverage, and 9.9 percent of all 1985 coverage. The public relations aspects of the 1985 pre-summit period and of the Geneva summit itself seemed to account for much of this increase. Coverage of the U.S.S.R. in general rose from 1.2 percent of all 1979 coverage to 11.3 percent of all 1985 coverage, while coverage of the U.S. in general fell slightly from 3.0 percent to 2.1 percent. Only 40 seconds of coverage, distributed over three turns, concerned the U.S.S.R. in general in 1979. In 1985, there were 995 seconds (over 16 1/2 minutes) of such coverage, distributed over 82 turns. Almost all of this coverage came as a result of a series of four reports on Soviet life at home entitled "Over There." Reported by Bruce Morton, the "Over There" series consisted of four episodes totalling 860 seconds (almost 15 minutes, or 86 percent of all coverage on this topic): "Soviet Education," "Soviet Women," "Blue-Collar Families," and "Soviet Society."

The increased coverage of the Soviet Union was also reflected in the data on video and audio origin. In 1979, no video or audio content originated from the U.S.S.R., while in 1985 14.4 percent of audio and 18.5 percent of video content originated from the U.S.S.R. Clearly, events of very high news values combined with different Soviet policies toward the electronic eye to produce this large increase in Soviet coverage. The news value of the new leader Gorbachev, whether partially concocted or not, is evident. But just as evident is the change in Soviet policy toward foreign broadcasters. In 1979, the summit coverage included a story about a photograph, taken for the Associated Press, of a Soviet grandmother being arrested after protesting the U.S.S.R.'s strict emigration policies with a hand-lettered sign. The Soviets refused to allow the photograph to be transmitted by satellite out of the country, accusing AP

of "deliberate provocation" by attempting to release the photograph on the eve of the summit. The photograph was taken to Vienna by hand, and shown on the news the next day. In 1985, however, coverage from the Soviet Union included apparently unscripted interviews by a CBS reporter with Soviet citizens, about their opinions on the summit meeting.

Overall, there was a remarkable increase in the amount of summit coverage from 1979 to 1985. There are two differences in the wider 1979 context which may account in part for the relative lack of 1979 summit coverage. First, there was extensive coverage in 1979 given to a developing energy crisis. Behr and Iyengar (1985) showed that CBS gave tremendous coverage to the energy crisis in late 1978. A sharp drop in coverage in early 1979 was followed by a large peak (though smaller than in late 1978) during the spring of 1979, around the time of the summit. Independent analysis of the *Television News Index and Abstracts* showed that in 45 of the 51 recorded news programs between May 10 and June 30 (one night on a weekend was not recorded), there was at least one VTNA story unit devoted to the energy crisis. The average was over one VTNA story per night. On several nights, the first 10 to 15 minutes of the program were devoted entirely to various energy-related subjects such as OPEC meetings, gas lines, mandatory conservation policies announced by President Carter, and so on. It may be true for the 1979 summit that, as Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984:362) reported for general foreign news coverage from 1972 to 1981, "the amount of newstime allotted to foreign news content was negatively related to the amount of newstime devoted to prominent domestic news events."

The second important contextual difference was that the 1979 summit was announced only one month before it took place, while the 1985 summit was announced five months ahead of time.[1] This long 1985 pre-summit period probably lent itself to more pre-summit coverage than in 1979, but there is no doubt that the public relations war which accounted for much of

1. Another contextual difference: the 1979 summit occurred over a weekend, while the 1985 summit took place during the middle of the week. There is no evidence to suggest that this affected coverage, though.

the pre-summit coverage took two players, and without the changed Soviet attitude towards television, there probably would not have been such a spectacle, with or without a five-month buildup.

In general, though, there seemed to be more similarities in proportional allotments of coverage across the two summits than differences, overall. This may indicate that contextual differences have to be quite large before quantitative effects become apparent.

Recall that at least four forces were proposed as possible pressures for changes in summit coverage from 1979 to 1985. These forces are: changes in Soviet attitudes toward television, changes in media technology, changes in journalistic values, and changes in the contexts of the summits. Possible effects of these four forces will be examined below.

Changes in Soviet attitudes toward television

If the Soviets did gain a greater awareness of the power of television between 1979 and 1985 and moved to make better use of the medium, then one would expect certain changes in how they presented themselves. They would probably want to maximize their television time, and make sure it was of favorable quality. Some changes along these lines were apparent in this analysis. More Soviet speakers of more types were seen in 1985 than in 1979, as one would expect. As their time increased, U.S. speakers' time dropped compared to 1979, especially the time given to the President and administration officials. More than one-third of the time, Soviet speakers used English, much of it nearly flawless in accent and idiom. The English-speaking Soviets concentrated on dispelling "inaccuracies" pertaining to the Soviet Union, and on analyses of American public opinion. Russian-speaking Soviets were mainly citizens, many of whom appeared in the pre-summit series "Over There," which attempted to explain Soviet society to America.

While these observations are in line with what one might expect to see if the Soviets did evolve a more television-conscious leadership, the question is complicated because the coverage analyzed here is constructed by CBS, not by the Soviets. A difference in speaking opportunities

could result not from different degrees of access to Soviet sources, but a greater willingness on the part of CBS to take advantage of access offerred to them. This analysis cannot address that issue. But, based on current newspaper and television commentaries and analyses, it certainly seems to be the case that the Soviets have begun to focus on television as a propaganda channel, perhaps more as the result of a natural evolution and a growing familiarity with the medium as of anything else. At the very least, these trends mean that the gatekeeping function of the media will come under increasing scrutiny.

Changes in journalistic values

There was nothing in this analysis to suggest that journalistic values did not change between 1979 and 1985; however, there does not seem to be enough material to investigate this issue fully. One indicator of such a change would be an increase in the amount of coverage given to Soviet sources. As we have seen, coverage of the summit in general and of Soviet sources did increase from 1979 to 1985, but there were other factors that may have induced this increase, such as the longer pre-summit period in 1985 and the aggressive Soviet media strategy, not to mention a significant and newsworthy change in Soviet leadership. It can be said, however, that the increased coverage does not work against the possibility of the existence of a change in journalistic values between 1979 and 1985.

Another indicator of such a change would be a substantial qualitative difference in the kinds of questions asked of Soviet sources. But, there were no questions asked of Soviet sources in 1979, nor was there much interchange between journalists and Soviet sources in the 1985 coverage, so there is no basis for comparison of summit coverage on this point. This very lack of interchange, however, means that even highly subjective assertions may carry more credibility than they deserve. American sources are seen issuing 10-second pronouncements, and Soviet sources reply with their own 10-second clips. Neither position is challenged, neither is supported. This kind of situation seems consonant with Smith's idea of cultural relativism as practiced by journalists.

Another ingredient in Smith's concept is that American media will often be highly critical of American institutions, but not of Soviet institutions. There is one example of such a double standard in the 1985 coverage. It occurs in a report on a series of commercials aired in the U.S. concerning SDI.

In the "Over There" series, Soviet children were everywhere, dancing, moving in an orderly fashion from place to place, studying hard, issuing calls for peace, and condemning SDI per Gorbachev's position. Summit followup coverage included a 130-second report on a children-to-children link from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. via live satellite television. The report included an American child "interviewing" a Soviet child about SDI, and a "handshake" across the miles created by merging separate video images. These child-focused reports were all relayed entirely without comment.

The three SDI commercials shown in the U.S. that were examined in a CBS report on November 14 all featured children. These advertisements were created in the U.S.; two were in support of SDI and one was opposed. *This* use of children, however, was excoriated by John O'Toole, a New York advertising executive. "It's a cheap shot," he said. All three ads, he said, were simplistic and exploited the fears of parents. "Using children to simply create some sort of emotional aura, in which you get across a political point, *is* reprehensible." Yet there was never any comment about the practice of going to Soviet school children for information on SDI.

The "Over There" stories stands as another possible example of a change in values, or perhaps it is indicative only of inadequate reporting. These stories seemed to present standard propaganda themes ("good PR") with noticeably little balance provided by Morton. For example, the blue-collar family profiled in another piece were Communist Party members who had just acquired a stereo and a car, according to the husband. The family was shown dining at a table groaning under a variety of meats and vegetables. Even if the situation of this one family was portrayed accurately in the report, it is clearly not representative of a society where close to 90 percent of the population are not Party members, the waiting time for a car

is about six years, and many of the desirable consumer goods are available only to Party members through the system of *nomenklatura*.

Much was made of the fringe benefits of working at the factory: a bakery on premises, health care, and day care facilities. "All of these low-cost services are part of an implicit bargain the Soviet workers have made with their government," Morton said. "They are less free than workers in the West, but more secure. 'Here,' they tell visitors, 'we never have to worry about being unemployed.'" This piece ended with a montage of Soviet workers at various factory posts, followed by this assessment of Morton's (accompanied by footage of what was apparently the honor guard at Lenin's tomb):

> Yevgeni, and Russians generally, are defensive and proud of their country. They are anxious to have correct opinions, but they really believe their government a lot of the time. And if their government tells them war is necessary, this nation of obedient patriots would surely fight.

At this point, the background sound of the booted soldiers is raised precipitously, and they march loudly past the camera in a severe low-angle shot. The effect, for this researcher, was quite impressive.

In the piece on Soviet women, the viewer is treated to this quotation from the subject of the report, a female surgeon:

> I think that there are many women who would like to live our lives, and achieve our successes in industry and social life. But maybe they don't have those rights there [America]. I think not.

Early in the report, Morton identified this woman and her family as "Cuppies": Communist urban professionals. The selection of a woman surgeon probably reflected a desire to appeal to Americans, because doctors in the Soviet Union do not enjoy the status they possess in America, nor do Soviet women, who endure tremendous workloads at home and on the job in the male-dominated Russian society. The fact that they lived with her husband's parents was cited as a bonus – the grandparents helped out with household chores. No

mention was made of the extreme housing shortage in Moscow, which sometimes forces two or more extended families to share the same apartment.

At least once in each report, Morton did make some note that the Soviet citizens being profiled had been selected for CBS by the Soviet government, or that school children dancing and singing were doing so for the visitors. But the obscure placement and lack of emphasis of these disclaimers made them difficult to identify, and, in this researcher's opinion, fairly ineffective. It could be that Morton thought his viewers would assume the interviews were arranged, and a brief reminder was all that was necessary. And, staged or not, the images of Soviet people that filled these reports had absolutely no counterparts in the rest of the coverage analyzed. Perhaps the feeling was that incomplete information was better than no information at all. The new Soviet openness and approach to television was most clearly shown in this series, and in the man-on-the-street comments collected in Moscow about the summit. The fact that "Over There" was brought to viewers by CBS and not by TASS or Novosti could only help establish viewer confidence in the credibility of the information, despite the occasional mentions of possible rigging by the Soviet government.

Overall, the new access to Soviet sources produced coverage more focused on Soviet peoples and society than on Gorbachev or other Soviet officials. In general, CBS made a clear effort to expand its 1985 coverage to more background subjects, and there was a much greater use of expert opinions in 1985 than in 1979. There was a greater variety of speakers of various types in 1985, especially during the summit itself, when people such as Bella Abzug, Phyllis Schlafly, Jesse Jackson, Nancy Reagan, Raisa Gorbachev, and Avital Scharansky all got speaking parts. It may be a fine line between evidence of efforts to expand access to the media and a change in journalistic values. The quantitative data analyzed here are not adequate to this discussion, and the qualitative information presented above is clearly not systematically constructed. The question must remain open.

Changes in media technology

Advances in video technology and satellite communication through the 1970s and 1980s have allowed more extensive use of video and audio information from foreign locales. The summit coverage analyzed here did show this tendency, although even in 1979 there was a high proportion of content originating overseas. The major difference in foreign coverage -- the jump in content originating in the Soviet Union -- can be ascribed to the new Soviet attitude toward television's uses, not to technological advances. The technology to gather and disseminate information in the U.S.S.R. existed in 1979, but the Brezhnev government did not allow Western journalists to use it. It was a political decision to open this channel, not a technological innovation, although general pressures brought on by broad technological advances in the 1960s and 1970s probably made such a decision inevitable.

There was clearly a more varied look to the 1985 content. It was edited in shorter segments, video was used much more extensively to "illustrate" speakers' words, and content came from a wider variety of sources. Computer-generated graphics added a new element to the picture. It would not be surprising if the increasing fragmentation of the content hurts comprehension of the information, which seems already to be dishearteningly low (Sahin, Davis and Robinson, 1982).

While technological advances gave a different texture to the 1985 coverage, the stability of patterns of coverage involving leaders and topics indicates that technological changes may not have had any great substantive effects. Most changes concerning Soviet-related content seem directly attributable to forces other than technological change.

Changes in context

The greatest effect of the differing contexts of the two meetings seemed to be on what issues were covered. The summits themselves and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general were covered the most in both years, with nuclear arms issues second in both years. The leaders were also covered in very similar amounts, and in similar patterns before, during and after the

summits, which suggests that their different personal qualities did not affect the amount of coverage they received. The issues that did change were related to specific contextual items: SALT II ratification (1979), media activities (1985), and small variation in the "minor" three summit issues of regional issues, human rights, and bilateral issues.

For these two summits, about 20 percent of all coverage was "elective" for CBS, allocated to specific contextual items such as the SALT II ratification battle in 1979 or the public relations war in 1985. The other 80 percent or so was allocated in very stable patterns to leaders, the summit and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general, other topics, and the four major types of summit issues: nuclear weapons, human rights, bilateral issues (trade, cultural exchanges) and regional conflicts. Overall, despite large differences in context, including the media blackout in 1985, the low popularity of both leaders in 1979, and the high popularity of both leaders in 1985, there were more quantitative similarities in coverage than differences. This may indicate that there are strong ritualistic pressures exerted by summits, or CBS, or both, that tend to create similar allotments of coverage time from one summit to another.

Limitations of this analysis

This study should stand on its quantitative variables. Several attempts were made to gather qualitative information, but they did not seem to produce reliable data. The media evaluation analysis was abandoned after the first 15 stories, mainly because it did not seem possible to separate characteristics of the information from values injected by reporters, and partly because there were very few such value-laden interpretations by reporters.

The subject analysis may also be somewhat limited. It was more subjective than the other information coded from the videotaped content. While it seemed to produce fairly reliable information, it should be stressed that subjects, along with all other information reported in this analysis, were coded on one pass through the data by the researcher. It is possible that the researcher's sensitivity to various distinctions and coding categories evolved over the course of coding. There is no doubt, for instance, that it became easier and faster to code purely

quantitative aspects of the coverage such as time per turn, speaker, origins of content, and so on. There is no reason to exclude more subjective variables from being affected by the same process, although there is no evidence that this was the case. A second pass through the data, perhaps in conjunction with a random selection of stories to code, would go a long ways toward increasing the reliability of the data, though.

On the positive side, the turn mechanism proved to be a very useful way of analyzing specific characteristics of video content. The trick is to know what characteristics should be measured. This analysis points out some specific questions that seem to be worth investigating further. First, having identified the amount of coverage devoted to leaders of both countries, what was the coverage like qualitatively? This report has sketched some aspects of the quality of such coverage, but a more systematic approach is in order. The limitations of the subject typology used could be ameliorated by a count of key words, to fill in possible gaps created by very quick mentions of highly important or loaded words that may not register in the subject typology. Such key words might be leaders' names, "nuclear war," "SALT II," "*glasnost*," and so on.

On another positive note, the numerous data points provided by the turn variable allow for flexibility in data analysis using numerous subcategories. And the quantitative measures can be used to point the way toward answers to questions about issues such as the roles of the four forces treated in this analysis.

Ultimately, this analysis at least serves as a foundation to guide future research on summit coverage, especially to guide the development of qualitatively-oriented typologies for analysis. This analysis does provide good baseline measurements on the amount of coverage devoted to leaders, to summit activities, nuclear war and arms control, and the "minor" summit issues (regional issues, human rights, bilateral issues). These results indicate fairly stable allotments of time to these issues from 1979 to 1985, proportionally speaking. This study did not cover as much qualitative material as was first hoped, mainly because of a lack of reliable information about what the coverage was like generally. Those general questions have at least been

addressed in this research.

It would also seem profitable to expand the scope of summit content research to eventually cover all summit meetings. In the review of the literature, there seemed to be evidence of a real change in the general conception of what summits ought to do. The first summits, during and immediately following World War II, were very substantive meetings at which policy was directly decided by leaders who had the authority to uphold decisions, due to the crisis of war. Success of these meetings was measured in terms of what the leaders decided to do, as stated in communiques. Yet professional diplomats such as Richard Nixon (1985), James Schlesinger (1987), and Dean Rusk (Cullen, 1985) are now on record as saying that the leaders of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should never attempt to actually negotiate anything at a summit, that such negotiation should only be carried out by the professional cadres of negotiators who know about the minutiae of issues on the agenda and who are trained to do the job. This leaves the leaders signing pre-negotiated agreements and posing for pictures. There was no evidence to indicate that this change took place over the six years from Vienna to Geneva. Judging from Waples' (1956) criteria for evaluating the success of the 1955 Geneva summit of the Big Four (the U.S., U.S.S.R., France, and England), the change probably occurred between 1955 and 1979. No doubt the Nixon-Brezhnev summits would be crucial to this change. This large subject is obviously beyond the scope of this project, but it seems ripe for study.

Summary of results

Four forces were identified as possible factors in possible changes in CBS evening news coverage of summit meetings in 1979 and 1985. Quantitative data from this coverage suggests that changes in how the Soviet government handles television had a major role in summit coverage, contributing to higher exposure of Soviet officials, and especially impressive increases in exposure of the Soviet Union and its people in general. The Soviets were able to compete effectively for the precious commodity of network news time. In the process, they added several types of speakers to the battle for a relatively small piece of the pie, which was

naturally dominated by the network itself. This cut into the time allotted to official U.S. speakers.

Improved media technology seemed to have some quantitative effects. More foreign video was used in 1985, originating from a wider range of locations. And the new technology allowed more local journalists to cover the summit, because they could file reports directly with their local stations, thus adding to the large number of international media representatives in attendance (*Newsweek*, December 2, 1985:40). But the more important effects of the new technology may be seen in the shorter blocks of time given to speakers and subjects in 1985, as the average length of a turn decreased by more than a third, and the average length of speaking turns by Presidents decreased by well over half. The profusion of video clips from a wider variety of sources, computer-generated graphics, and voice-overs which were more likely to be detached from the video content all introduced a more fragmented, possibly distracting texture to the coverage. Comprehension of the information by some viewers may suffer as a result.

There was not enough interplay between media representatives and Soviet or American sources to allow for a complete analysis of the question of a change in journalistic values. In 1979, there were simply no Soviet sources. In 1985, Soviet sources and American sources were almost always presented without any direct on-camera interplay with journalists. They issued opinions or position statements in illustration of journalists' words, and then disappeared. The news blackout at Geneva restricted any opportunity for such byplay, of course. The fact, however, that there was very little attempt by journalists to qualify anything that was being said by either American or Soviet spokesmen may itself indicate cultural relativism being practiced by journalists. Aside from the "Over There" series and the report on U.S. commercials concerning children and SDI, there was nothing in the 1985 coverage that stood out from 1979's coverage as proof or disproof of a change in journalistic values.

It should again be noted that the increased coverage of the Soviet Union came about not simply because the Soviets might have decided to be covered more. Highly newsworthy

events were occurring in the U.S.S.R. in 1985; even the public relations war seemed at times to be covered more as a news event in and of itself than as anything else. And in the end, CBS makes the decisions on whom or what to cover, and what to put on the air, not the Soviets. But the specific examples of the SDI story and the "Over There" series should prod the media to a more carefully balanced treatment of news from the Soviet Union, despite the exhilarating novelty and apparent promise of the situation there. In general, these examples should remind all consumers of news of the wisdom of using numerous sources of information.

Ramifications of the findings

Perhaps the single most important finding of this study is that the Soviet leader actually dominated coverage during the summit itself, compared to the American President, not only in 1985 but in 1979 as well. The very limited access to the Soviet leader that normally exists in the U.S.S.R. obviously is attenuated when he goes to a summit, so the fact that this concentration on his summit appearances exists should not be surprising. But it is a clear statement of the opportunity presented to the Soviet leader by the modern summit meeting. He can command the spotlight for those two or three days which, despite the contrary opinions of professional diplomats, are days described by the media as holding forth the hope of fundamental changes for the better. Although the coverage of Brezhnev in 1979 was not very favorable because it dwelled on his deteriorating health, he still was the focus of attention. And Gorbachev in 1985 was the source of quoted material an astounding 46 percent of the time when quoted material was used. His coverage was generally much more favorable than Brezhnev's, too.

Overall, the quantitative data suggest a strong ritualistic nature to summit coverage. Gorbachev, for all his newsmaking qualities, actually received proportionately less coverage (as a topic) than did Brezhnev. The Soviet media were used as quoted sources in almost identical proportions. Patterns of coverage of leaders before, during and after the summits

were very similar. Pre-summit stories in both years dwelled on nuclear war and featured large amounts of footage of the newest nuclear weapons in action, a clear indication that the summit process is very strongly linked to arms control.

In the final analysis, what appears to be an emerging consensus which portrays summits as rituals, and not as places for actual negotiations, seems to be supported by these data, although they cannot illuminate any cause-and-effect relationship.

REFERENCES

Adams, William C. Covering the World in Ten Minutes: Network News and International Affairs. In William C. Adams [ed.], *Television Coverage of International Affairs*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1982.

Barghoorn, Frederick C. *Soviet Foreign Propaganda*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Behr, Roy L. and Shanto Iyengar. Television news, real-world cues, and changes in the public agenda. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49/1 (1985), 38-57

Berelson, Bernard. Communications and public opinion. In Wilbur Schramm [ed.], *Mass Communications*. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1960.

Cullen, Robert B. Are summits worth it? *Newsweek*, 106/22 (November 25, 1985), 44-45.

Dizard, Wilson and S. Blake Swensrud. U.S.S.R.: Glasnost and the information revolution. *InterMedia*, 16/1 (January 1988), 10-19.

Dudkin, Valeri. Spanning time zones. *InterMedia*, 14/4-5 (April-May 1986), 36.

Ellis, James M. The changing portrayal of three Soviet leaders in the Western media: An informal qualitative content analysis. Unpublished paper. School of Mass Communications, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, 1986.

Friedberg, Maurice. Cultural and intellectual life. In Robert F. Byrnes [ed.]: *After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1983.

Gelman, Harry. *The Politburo's Management of Its American Problem*. Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1982.

Hazan, Baruch. *Soviet Impregnational Propaganda*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis, 1982.

Hazan, Baruch. *From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in the Kremlin*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

Heller, Mikhail and Aleksandr M. Nekrich. *Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present*. New York: Summit Books, 1986. (Revised Russian manuscript 1985.)

Hollander, Gayle Durham. Recent developments in Soviet radio and television news reporting. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 31/3 (1967), 359-365.

Hopkins, Mark W. *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*. New York: Pegasus, 1970.

Jakubowicz, Karol. Democratising communication in Eastern Europe. *InterMedia*, 15/3 (1988), 34-38.

Kakuchaya, Olvar. Openness and information. *InterMedia*, 15/4-5 (1987), 70-71.

Katz, Elihu: Publicity and pluralistic ignorance: Notes on "The spiral of silence." In Ellen D. Wartella, Charles Whitney and Sven Windahl [eds.]: *Mass Communications Yearbook (Vol. 4)*. Sage Publications; Beverly Hills, California; 1983.

Krippendorff, Klaus. *Content Analysis*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1980.

Labrie, Roger P. *SALT Handbook*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979.

Lang, Gladys Engel and Kurt Lang. Watergate: An exploration of the agenda-building process. In G. Cleveland Wilhoit and Harold de Bock [eds.], *Mass Communications Yearbook (Vol. 2)*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1981.

Larson, James F. International affairs coverage on U.S. evening network news, 1972-1979. In Adams [ed.], *op. cit.*, 1982.

Larson, James F. *Television's Window on the World: International Affairs Coverage on the U.S. Networks*. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1984.

Lichty, Lawrence W. Video versus print. *The Wilson Quarterly*, 6/5 (1982, special edition), 51-61.

Mandelbaum, Michael and Strobe Talbott. *Reagan and Gorbachev*. New York: Vintage Books; 1987.

Markham, James W. *Voices of the Red Giants*. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1967.

McCombs, Maxwell E. and Donald L. Shaw. The agenda setting function of the mass media. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36/2 (1972), 176-87.

Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. *Media & the Russian Public*. New York: Praeger, 1981.

Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. Policy issues in the Soviet media system. In Erik P. Hoffmann [ed.], *The Soviet Union in the 1980s*. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1984.

Nixon, Richard. Superpower summitry. *Foreign Affairs*, 64/1 (1985), 1-11.

Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. The spiral of silence: A theory of public opinion. *Journal of Communication*, 24/2 (1974), 43-51.

Pelton, Joseph N. Intelsat: Global telecommunications for the 21st century. *InterMedia*, 14/4-5 (1986), 52-58.

Plante, Jim. Reporting by satellite, a challenge for the networks. *InterMedia*, 14/3 (1986), 34-35.

Powell, David E. Television in the U.S.S.R. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 39/3 (1975), 287-300.

Rapaport, Anatol. A system-theoretic view of content analysis. In George Gerbner, O. R. Holsti, Klaus Krippendorff, W. J. Paisley, and P. J. Stone [eds.], *The Analysis of Communication*

Content. New York: John Wiley, 1969.

Sahin, Haluk, Dennis K. Davis and John P. Robinson. Television as a source of international news: What gets across and what doesn't. In Adams [ed.], *op. cit*., 1982.

Schlesinger, James. Reykjavik and revelations: A turn of the tide? *Foreign Affairs*, 65/3 (1987), 426-446.

Sharlet, Robert. Dissent and the "contra-system" in the Soviet Union. In Hoffman, *op. cit*., 1984.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir E. Two levels of public opinion: The Soviet case. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49/4 (1985), 443-459.

Shultz, Richard and Roy Godson. *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984.

Sidey, Hugh. Vienna query: Where's Walter? *Time*, 113/26 (June 25, 1979), 19.

Sidey, Hugh. The beauty of freedom. *Time*, 114/1 (July 2, 1979), 32.

Smith, Ted J. III and Derek O. Verrall. A critical analysis of Australian television coverage of election opinion polls. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 49/1 (1985), 58-79.

Smith, Ted J. III. *Moscow Meets Main Street: Changing Journalistic Values and the Growing Soviet Presence on American Television*. Washington, D.C: Media Institute, 1988.

Smith, Tom W. The polls: Attitudes toward the Soviet Union. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 47/2 (1983), 277-292.

Tatu, Michel. Decision making in the U.S.S.R. In Richard Pipes [ed.], *Soviet Strategy in Europe*. New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1976.

Vanderbilt Television News Archive. *Television News Index and Abstracts*. Nashville, Tennessee: VTNA, 1979, 1-1092.

Waples, Douglas. Publicity versus diplomacy: Notes on the reporting of "summit" conferences. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 20/1 (1956), 308-314.

Weaver, David H. Media agenda-setting and media manipulation. In D. Charles Whitney, Ellen Wartella and Sven Windahl [eds.], *Mass Communication Review Yearbook (Vol. 3)*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1982.

Weaver, David H. Media agenda setting and public opinion: Is there a link? In Robert H. Bostrom [ed.], *Communication Review Yearbook 8*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1984.

Weaver, James B., Christopher J. Porter and Margaret E. Evans. Patterns in foreign news coverage on U.S. network T.V.: A 10-year analysis. *Journalism Quarterly*, 61/2 (1984), 356-363.

White, Ralph K. Social science research in the Soviet bloc. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28/1 (1964), 20-26.

NEWSMAGAZINE ARTICLES ABOUT THE SUMMITS

VIENNA 1979

Newsweek:

Man-to-man in Vienna. June 18, 1979 (v. 93), 32+

The SALT summit. June 25, 1979 (v. 93), 26-27.

SALT II: Sealed with a kiss. July 2, 1979 (v. 94), 25-26.

Time:

Carter's irresponsible press. March 26, 1979 (v. 113), 88.

On to the summit in Vienna. June 18, 1979 (v. 113), 17.

Khorosho, said Brezhnev. June 25, 1979 (v. 113), 10+.

Vienna query: Where's Walter? June 25, 1979 (v. 113), 19.

Signed and sealed with a kiss. July 2, 1979 (v. 114), 28-29.

The beauty of freedom. July 2, 1979 (v. 114), 32.

U.S. News & World Report:

Ailing Brezhnev vs. eager Carter. May 21, 1979 (v. 86), 7.

Carter vs. Brezhnev: A contrast in styles. June 18, 1979 (v. 86), 20.

After the summit. June 25, 1979 (v. 86), 21-23.

GENEVA, 1985

Newsweek:

Gorbachev's surprises. July 15, 1985 (v. 106), 30+.

Psy-war games. September 16, 1985 (v. 106), 34-35.

A wish list from Moscow. October 7, 1985 (v. 106), 24-26.

As Moscow sees it. October 28, 1985 (v. 106), 50.

Getting serious? November 11, 1985 (v. 106), 40+.

Gorbachev's cold shower. November 18, 1985 (v. 106), 48+.

Close encounters at the summit. November 18, 1985 (v. 106), 114.

Showdown in Geneva. November 25, 1985 (v. 106), 32-38+.

Words to watch out for. November 25, 1985 (v. 106), 112.

The fresh start. December 2, 1985 (v. 106), 26-28.

Behind closed doors. December 2, 1985 (v. 106), 28-32.

The ringmasters of the media circus. December 2, 1985 (v. 106), 38+.

Time:

Maneuvering for position. September 9, 1985 (v. 126), 30.

Escalating the propaganda war. September 16, 1985 (v. 126), 31.

Setting the summit table. September 30, 1985 (v. 126), 22.

Pressing the pinstripe suit. October 7, 1985 (v. 126), 17.

The whole world will be watching. November 18, 1985 (v. 126), 18-22+.

When history reaches a peak. November 25, 1985 (v. 126), 30-36+.

Behind closed doors. December 2, 1985 (v. 126), 16+.

Filling up the empty hours. December 2, 1985 (v. 126), 36-37.

Selling an agreed version. December 30, 1985 (v. 126), 86.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Barghoorn, Frederick C.: *The Soviet Image of the United States.* Harcourt, Brace and Co.; New York; 1950.

Bechhofer, C. E.: *Through Starving Russia.* Methuen & Co. Ltd.; London; 1921.

Bialer, Seweryn: *The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline.* Alfred A. Knopf; New York; 1986.

Cohen, Stephen F.: *Sovieticus.* W.W. Norton & Company; New York; 1986.

Dallin, David J. [translated by Joseph Shaplen]: *The Real Soviet Russia.* Yale University Press; New Haven, Connecticut; 1944.

Ettema, James S. and D. Charles Whitney: *Individuals in Mass Media Organizations.* Sage Publications; Beverly Hills, California; 1982.

Frei, Daniel: *Perceived Images: U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament.* Rowman and Allanheld; Totowa, New Jersey; 1986.

Gelman, Harry: *The Rise and Fall of Detente: Causes and Consequences.* RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior; Santa Monica, California; 1985.

Hook Sidney, Vladimir Bukovsky and Paul Hollander: *Soviet Hypocrisy and Western Gullibility.* University Press of America; Lanham, Maryland; 1987.

Kenez, Peter: *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929.* Cambridge University Press; Cambridge, England; 1985.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich: *The Anatomy of Terror.* Public Affairs Press; Washington, D.C.; 1956 (1979 reprint).

Kissinger, Henry: Danger at the summit. *Newsweek*, 108:15 (October 13, 1986), 38-41.

Lovenstein, Meno: *American Opinion of Soviet Russia.* American Council on Public Affairs; Washington, D.C.; 1941.

Smith, Hedrick: *The Russians.* Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co.; New York; 1976.

APPENDIX A

CODING CATEGORIES AND FORMS

The following pages contain complete coding information for this analysis, and a copy of the actual instrument used to code the coverage described in this paper. The category "Value" on the coding instrument, as noted in the text, was not used in the analysis. This column was used instead to check turns for a mention of the summit in determining the focus of the VTNA story.

The identification number for each turn was written just to the left of the "Type" column, and the code for a quoted speaker was written just to the right of the "Quote" column. Where VTNA stories ran for more than 15 turns, additional coding sheets were used and marked to identify them as a continued VTNA story.

CODING CATEGORIES

TYPE

Process	1
Event	2
Issue	3
Analysis	4

LANGUAGE

Emglish	1
Russian	2
Summit	3
Other	4

SPEAKER

US media	1
USSR media	2
US official	3
USSR official	4
US citizen	5
USSR citizen	6
Reagan/Carter	7
Gorb./Brezhnev	8
Other	9

AUDIO/VIDEO ORIGIN

None	0
Studio/Graphics	1
US	2
USSR	3
Summit	4
Other	5
Unknown	6

QUOTATION

Speaker on own responsibility	1
Speaker paraphrasing someone else	2

SUBJECT CATEGORIES

PROCESS

EVENT

ISSUE

ANALYSIS


TYPE
SPKR
QUOTE
AUDIO ORIGIN
VIDEO ORIGIN
SUBJECT
LANGUAGE
VALUE
TIME
YEAR
ID #
MONTH
DAY
TIME
PERIOD
LEVEL
FOCUS
COMMENTS

APPENDIX B

TABLES

This section contains the complete tables used in this analysis. All descriptions of data contained in this report were generated from these tables. There are three sets of tables: the coverage overall, coverage controlling for period, and coverage controlling for speaker. Percentages shown in the tables are calculated using the total coverage time devoted to that particular summit as the denominator, to allow comparison from one summit to the other. These percentages represent proportions of total coverage time. Percentages derived from small numbers of observations should be treated with caution. Although these figures represent a census of the material, smaller numbers will be more sensitive to variations introduced by changes of definitions or by coding or data entry mistakes. Every effort has been made, however, to do an honest and accurate analysis.

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
Total	170	3335	19.6	100%	701	8795	12.5	100%	871	12130	13.9	100%
TOPICS												
US leader	16	235	14.7	7.0%	49	620	12.7	7.0%	65	855	13.2	7.0%
USSR leader	13	180	13.8	5.4%	34	405	11.9	4.6%	47	585	12.4	4.8%
General US	5	100	20.0	3.0%	15	185	12.3	2.1%	20	285	14.3	2.3%
General USSR	3	40	13.3	1.2%	82	995	12.1	11.3%	85	1035	12.2	8.5%
US-USSR relations	50	1170	23.4	35.1%	186	2730	14.7	31.0%	236	3900	16.5	32.2%
Nuclear war/talks	27	720	26.7	21.6%	146	1815	12.4	20.6%	173	2535	14.7	20.9%
Regional issues	12	185	15.4	5.5%	18	215	11.9	2.4%	30	400	13.3	3.3%
Human rights	3	20	6.7	.6%	30	315	10.5	3.6%	33	335	10.2	2.8%
Bilateral issues	7	95	13.6	2.8%	41	450	11.0	5.1%	48	545	11.4	4.5%
SALT II	29	460	15.9	13.8%					29	460	15.9	3.8%
Media activities	5	130	26.0	3.9%	75	870	11.6	9.9%	80	1000	12.5	8.2%
Other topic					25	195	7.8	2.2%	25	195	7.8	1.6%
TYPE												
Process	18	380	21.1	11.4%	160	1895	11.8	21.5%	178	2275	12.8	18.8%
Event	91	1860	20.4	55.8%	129	1835	14.2	20.9%	220	3695	16.8	30.5%
Issues	18	240	13.3	7.2%	234	2540	10.9	28.9%	252	2780	11.0	22.9%
Analysis	43	855	19.9	25.6%	178	2525	14.2	28.7%	221	3380	15.3	27.9%
SPEAKER												
US media	145	2850	19.7	85.5%	500	6970	13.9	79.2%	645	9820	15.2	81.0%
USSR media					7	90	12.9	1.0%	7	90	12.9	.7%
US official	6	100	16.7	3.0%	18	190	10.6	2.2%	24	290	12.1	2.4%
USSR official					4	30	7.5	.3%	4	30	7.5	.2%
US citizen	11	200	18.2	6.0%	86	775	9.0	8.8%	97	975	10.1	8.0%
USSR citizen					30	250	8.3	2.8%	30	250	8.3	2.1%
US leader	6	140	23.3	4.2%	24	230	9.6	2.6%	30	370	12.3	3.1%
Soviet leader	1	30	30.0	.9%	11	90	8.2	1.0%	12	120	10.0	1.0%
Other	1	15	15.0	.4%	21	170	8.1	1.9%	22	185	8.4	1.5%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone	141	2930	20.8	87.9%	577	7380	12.8	83.9%	718	10310	14.4	85.0%
Quoted source	29	405	14.0	12.1%	124	1415	11.4	16.1%	153	1820	11.9	15.0%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
US media					1	10	10.0	.7%	1	10	10.0	.6%
USSR media	4	65	16.3	16.0%	17	235	13.8	16.7%	21	300	14.3	16.5%
US official	13	170	13.1	42.0%	46	565	12.3	40.1%	59	735	12.5	40.5%
USSR official	1	5	5.0	1.2%	9	80	8.9	5.7%	10	85	8.5	4.7%
US citizen	3	40	13.3	9.9%	3	35	11.7	2.5%	6	75	12.5	4.1%
USSR citizen					4	25	6.3	1.8%	4	25	6.3	1.4%
US leader	3	65	21.7	16.0%	20	220	11.0	15.6%	23	285	12.4	15.7%
Soviet leader	5	60	12.0	14.8%	18	195	10.8	13.8%	23	255	11.1	14.0%
Other					5	45	9.0	3.2%	5	45	9.0	2.5%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
AUDIO												
Studio/Graphics...	25	425	17.0	12.7%	76	1130	14.9	12.8%	101	1555	15.4	12.8%
US location.....	37	750	20.3	22.5%	244	2775	11.4	31.6%	281	3525	12.5	29.1%
USSR location.....			.		99	1270	12.8	14.4%	99	1270	12.8	10.5%
Summit location...	108	2160	20.0	64.8%	265	3325	12.5	37.8%	373	5485	14.7	45.2%
Other location....			.		9	215	23.9	2.4%	9	215	23.9	1.8%
Unknown location..			.		8	80	10.0	.9%	8	80	10.0	.7%
VIDEO												
None.....	1	10	10.0	.3%			.		1	10	10.0	.1%
Studio/Graphics...	24	460	19.2	13.8%	96	1455	15.2	16.5%	120	1915	16.0	15.8%
US location.....	37	750	20.3	22.5%	189	2110	11.2	24.0%	226	2860	12.7	23.6%
USSR location.....			.		131	1625	12.4	18.5%	131	1625	12.4	13.4%
Summit location...	108	2115	19.6	63.4%	249	3045	12.2	34.6%	357	5160	14.5	42.5%
Other location....			.		28	455	16.3	5.2%	28	455	16.3	3.8%
Unknown location..			.		7	70	10.0	.8%	7	70	10.0	.6%
Technical problem.			.		1	35	35.0	.4%	1	35	35.0	.3%
LANGUAGE												
English.....	169	3305	19.6	99.1%	663	8480	12.8	96.4%	832	11785	14.2	97.2%
Russian.....	1	30	30.0	.9%	36	305	8.5	3.5%	37	335	9.1	2.8%
Summit.....			.		1	5	5.0	.1%	1	5	5.0	.0%
Other.....			.		1	5	5.0	.1%	1	5	5.0	.0%
PERIOD												
Before.....	57	1340	23.5	40.2%	407	5105	12.5	58.0%	464	6445	13.9	53.1%
During.....	102	1855	18.2	55.6%	219	2745	12.5	31.2%	321	4600	14.3	37.9%
After.....	11	140	12.7	4.2%	75	945	12.6	10.7%	86	1085	12.6	8.9%
WEEK												
May 4-10.....	2	20	10.0	.6%			.		2	20	10.0	.2%
May 11-17.....	4	50	12.5	1.5%			.		4	50	12.5	.4%
May 25-31.....	2	100	50.0	3.0%			.		2	100	50.0	.8%
June 1-7.....	1	10	10.0	.3%			.		1	10	10.0	.1%
June 8-14.....	48	1160	24.2	34.8%			.		48	1160	24.2	9.6%
Summit: June 15-18	102	1855	18.2	55.6%			.		102	1855	18.2	15.3%
July 9-15.....	11	140	12.7	4.2%			.		11	140	12.7	1.2%
Oct. 15-21.....			.		3	25	8.3	.3%	3	25	8.3	.2%
Oct. 22-28.....			.		53	685	12.9	7.8%	53	685	12.9	5.6%
Oct. 29-Nov. 4....			.		37	550	14.9	6.3%	37	550	14.9	4.5%
Nov. 5-11.....			.		64	850	13.3	9.7%	64	850	13.3	7.0%
Nov. 12-18.....			.		250	2995	12.0	34.1%	250	2995	12.0	24.7%
Summit: Nov. 19-21			.		219	2745	12.5	31.2%	219	2745	12.5	22.6%
Nov. 22-28.....			.		34	425	12.5	4.8%	34	425	12.5	3.5%
Nov. 29-Dec. 5....			.		19	245	12.9	2.8%	19	245	12.9	2.0%
Dec. 13-19.....			.		11	120	10.9	1.4%	11	120	10.9	1.0%
Dec. 20-26.....			.		9	125	13.9	1.4%	9	125	13.9	1.0%
Dec. 27-31.....			.		2	30	15.0	.3%	2	30	15.0	.2%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SUBJECT												
US leader background.....	2	20	10.0	.6%	11	165	15.0	1.9%	13	185	14.2	1.5%
Soviet leader background.....	5	55	11.0	1.6%	1	5	5.0	.1%	6	60	10.0	.5%
Summit site prep..					2	55	27.5	.6%	2	55	27.5	.5%
Local color.....	3	115	38.3	3.4%	13	250	19.2	2.8%	16	365	22.8	3.0%
Media activity....	2	45	22.5	1.3%	27	220	8.1	2.5%	29	265	9.1	2.2%
Summit history....	1	70	70.0	2.1%	3	40	13.3	.5%	4	110	27.5	.9%
USSR delegation...	1	15	15.0	.4%					1	15	15.0	.1%
Summit generally..	1	5	5.0	.1%	18	165	9.2	1.9%	19	170	8.9	1.4%
SALT II completed.	1	15	15.0	.4%					1	15	15.0	.1%
Carter: whip ass..	2	40	20.0	1.2%					2	40	20.0	.3%
PR war.....					3	40	13.3	.5%	3	40	13.3	.3%
Soviet life at home.....					43	565	13.1	6.4%	43	565	13.1	4.7%
Raisa G.....					7	50	7.1	.6%	7	50	7.1	.4%
Nancy R.....					3	40	13.3	.5%	3	40	13.3	.3%
Star Wars kids....					13	140	10.8	1.6%	13	140	10.8	1.2%
Wives' joint action.....					8	85	10.6	1.0%	8	85	10.6	.7%
Leaders joint action.....	5	125	25.0	3.7%	6	90	15.0	1.0%	11	215	19.5	1.8%
US leader speech..					11	135	12.3	1.5%	11	135	12.3	1.1%
USSR leader speech					1	15	15.0	.2%	1	15	15.0	.1%
US leader press conf.....					10	150	15.0	1.7%	10	150	15.0	1.2%
USSR leader press conf.....					4	45	11.3	.5%	4	45	11.3	.4%
US leader travel..	3	50	16.7	1.5%	1	5	5.0	.1%	4	55	13.8	.5%
USSR leader travel	1	15	15.0	.4%	2	15	7.5	.2%	3	30	10.0	.2%
Summit meetings...	24	490	20.4	14.7%	16	275	17.2	3.1%	40	765	19.1	6.3%
Other meetings....	2	35	17.5	1.0%	30	425	14.2	4.8%	32	460	14.4	3.8%
US action, general					5	55	11.0	.6%	5	55	11.0	.5%
USSR action, general.....					5	65	13.0	.7%	5	65	13.0	.5%
US poll.....	2	75	37.5	2.2%	6	135	22.5	1.5%	8	210	26.3	1.7%
USSR media.....	1	10	10.0	.3%	7	110	15.7	1.3%	8	120	15.0	1.0%
MX announcements..	8	295	36.9	8.8%					8	295	36.9	2.4%
SALT II ratification...	28	445	15.9	13.3%					28	445	15.9	3.7%
US-USSR relations.	6	170	28.3	5.1%	3	45	15.0	.5%	9	215	23.9	1.8%
US leader summit action.....	8	120	15.0	3.6%	3	25	8.3	.3%	11	145	13.2	1.2%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
USSR leader summit action	5	85	17.0	2.5%	12	140	11.7	1.6%	17	225	13.2	1.9%
Other			.		10	95	9.5	1.1%	10	95	9.5	.8%
Nuclear war/arms control	5	60	12.0	1.8%	81	1015	12.5	11.5%	86	1075	12.5	8.9%
Regional issues	7	95	13.6	2.8%	17	205	12.1	2.3%	24	300	12.5	2.5%
Human rights	2	15	7.5	.4%	28	275	9.8	3.1%	30	290	9.7	2.4%
Bilateral issues	1	10	10.0	.3%	8	125	15.6	1.4%	9	135	15.0	1.1%
Peace			.		11	120	10.9	1.4%	11	120	10.9	1.0%
Dialogue	3	30	10.0	.9%	15	125	8.3	1.4%	18	155	8.6	1.3%
US behavior			.		2	10	5.0	.1%	2	10	5.0	.1%
USSR behavior			.		4	70	17.5	.8%	4	70	17.5	.6%
Summit generally			.		31	310	10.0	3.5%	31	310	10.0	2.6%
Star Wars			.		26	270	10.4	3.1%	26	270	10.4	2.2%
US-USSR relations			.		4	25	6.3	.3%	4	25	6.3	.2%
Other			.		15	100	6.7	1.1%	15	100	6.7	.8%
Nuclear war/arms control	14	365	26.1	10.9%	33	455	13.8	5.2%	47	820	17.4	6.8%
Regional issues	5	90	18.0	2.7%	1	10	10.0	.1%	6	100	16.7	.8%
Human rights	1	5	5.0	.1%	2	40	20.0	.5%	3	45	15.0	.4%
Bilateral issues			.		1	10	10.0	.1%	1	10	10.0	.1%
Peace			.		1	10	10.0	.1%	1	10	10.0	.1%
Dialogue	3	55	18.3	1.6%	5	60	12.0	.7%	8	115	14.4	.9%
US leader	1	5	5.0	.1%	13	140	10.8	1.6%	14	145	10.4	1.2%
USSR leader	2	25	12.5	.7%	14	185	13.2	2.1%	16	210	13.1	1.7%
US-USSR relations	2	20	10.0	.6%	15	325	21.7	3.7%	17	345	20.3	2.8%
US summit strategy	5	100	20.0	3.0%	5	80	16.0	.9%	10	180	18.0	1.5%
USSR summit strategy	2	25	12.5	.7%	7	80	11.4	.9%	9	105	11.7	.9%
Summit generally	6	140	23.3	4.2%	36	620	17.2	7.0%	42	760	18.1	6.3%
PR war			.		19	225	11.8	2.6%	19	225	11.8	1.9%
Other negotiations			.		1	20	20.0	.2%	1	20	20.0	.2%
USSR life at home			.		16	165	10.3	1.9%	16	165	10.3	1.4%
Star Wars			.		6	75	12.5	.9%	6	75	12.5	.6%

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
Total	170	3335	19.6	100%	701	8795	12.5	100%	871	12130	13.9	100%
PERIOD Before												
TOPICS												
US leader	5	90	18.0	6.7%	40	520	13.0	10.2%	45	610	13.6	9.5%
USSR leader	2	15	7.5	1.1%	17	215	12.6	4.2%	19	230	12.1	3.6%
General US	1	15	15.0	1.1%	8	110	13.8	2.2%	9	125	13.9	1.9%
General USSR	1	10	10.0	.7%	71	905	12.7	17.7%	72	915	12.7	14.2%
US-USSR relations	17	390	22.9	29.1%	91	1350	14.8	26.4%	108	1740	16.1	27.0%
Nuclear war/talks	16	510	31.9	38.1%	88	985	11.2	19.3%	104	1495	14.4	23.2%
Regional issues	2	45	22.5	3.4%	12	145	12.1	2.8%	14	190	13.6	2.9%
Human rights					12	130	10.8	2.5%	12	130	10.8	2.0%
Bilateral issues	2	40	20.0	3.0%	25	245	9.8	4.8%	27	285	10.6	4.4%
SALT II	8	140	17.5	10.4%					8	140	17.5	2.2%
Media activities	3	85	28.3	6.3%	39	465	11.9	9.1%	42	550	13.1	8.5%
Other topic					4	35	8.8	.7%	4	35	8.8	.5%
TYPE												
Process	5	180	36.0	13.4%	119	1470	12.4	28.8%	124	1650	13.3	25.6%
Event	33	795	24.1	59.3%	64	995	15.5	19.5%	97	1790	18.5	27.8%
Issues	3	55	18.3	4.1%	142	1485	10.5	29.1%	145	1540	10.6	23.9%
Analysis	16	310	19.4	23.1%	82	1155	14.1	22.6%	98	1465	14.9	22.7%
SPEAKER												
US media	46	1080	23.5	80.6%	278	3920	14.1	76.8%	324	5000	15.4	77.6%
USSR media					6	75	12.5	1.5%	6	75	12.5	1.2%
US official	4	75	18.8	5.6%	14	145	10.4	2.8%	18	220	12.2	3.4%
USSR official					3	25	8.3	.5%	3	25	8.3	.4%
US general	4	95	23.8	7.1%	49	440	9.0	8.6%	53	535	10.1	8.3%
USSR general					22	190	8.6	3.7%	22	190	8.6	2.9%
US leader	3	90	30.0	6.7%	19	190	10.0	3.7%	22	280	12.7	4.3%
Soviet leader					3	25	8.3	.5%	3	25	8.3	.4%
Other					13	95	7.3	1.9%	13	95	7.3	1.5%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	49	1195	24.4	89.2%	338	4315	12.8	84.5%	387	5510	14.2	85.5%
Quoted source...	8	145	18.1	10.8%	69	790	11.4	15.5%	77	935	12.1	14.5%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
US media.....			.		1	10	10.0	1.3%	1	10	10.0	1.1%
USSR media.....	1	15	15.0	10.3%	5	75	15.0	9.6%	6	90	15.0	9.7%
US official.....	2	45	22.5	31.0%	31	395	12.7	50.3%	33	440	13.3	47.3%
USSR official...			.		7	55	7.9	7.0%	7	55	7.9	5.9%
US general.....	3	40	13.3	27.6%	2	20	10.0	2.5%	5	60	12.0	6.5%
USSR general....			.		4	25	6.3	3.2%	4	25	6.3	2.7%
US leader.....	1	35	35.0	24.1%	11	145	13.2	18.5%	12	180	15.0	19.4%
Soviet leader...	1	10	10.0	6.9%	2	15	7.5	1.9%	3	25	8.3	2.7%
Other.....			.		5	45	9.0	5.7%	5	45	9.0	4.8%
AUDIO												
Studio/Graphics.	13	240	18.5	17.9%	29	495	17.1	9.7%	42	735	17.5	11.4%
US location.....	20	490	24.5	36.6%	171	1925	11.3	37.7%	191	2415	12.6	37.5%
USSR location...			.		89	1125	12.6	22.0%	89	1125	12.6	17.5%
Summit location.	24	610	25.4	45.5%	104	1300	12.5	25.5%	128	1910	14.9	29.6%
Other location..			.		9	215	23.9	4.2%	9	215	23.9	3.3%
Unknown location			.		5	45	9.0	.9%	5	45	9.0	.7%
VIDEO												
None.....	1	10	10.0	.7%			.		1	10	10.0	.2%
Studio/Graphics.	13	300	23.1	22.4%	62	890	14.4	17.4%	75	1190	15.9	18.5%
US location.....	20	490	24.5	36.6%	128	1455	11.4	28.5%	148	1945	13.1	30.2%
USSR location...			.		107	1350	12.6	26.4%	107	1350	12.6	20.9%
Summit location.	23	540	23.5	40.3%	85	1000	11.8	19.6%	108	1540	14.3	23.9%
Other location..			.		21	370	17.6	7.2%	21	370	17.6	5.7%
Unknown location			.		4	40	10.0	.8%	4	40	10.0	.6%
LANGUAGE												
English.....	57	1340	23.5	100%	380	4880	12.8	95.6%	437	6220	14.2	96.5%
Russian.....			.		25	215	8.6	4.2%	25	215	8.6	3.3%
Summit.....			.		1	5	5.0	.1%	1	5	5.0	.1%
Other.....			.		1	5	5.0	.1%	1	5	5.0	.1%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
PERIOD During												
TOPICS												
US leader	11	145	13.2	7.8%	8	90	11.3	3.3%	19	235	12.4	5.1%
USSR leader	11	165	15.0	8.9%	15	170	11.3	6.2%	26	335	12.9	7.3%
General US	4	85	21.3	4.6%	7	75	10.7	2.7%	11	160	14.5	3.5%
General USSR	2	30	15.0	1.6%	9	75	8.3	2.7%	11	105	9.5	2.3%
US-USSR relations	33	780	23.6	42.0%	79	1140	14.4	41.5%	112	1920	17.1	41.7%
Nuclear war/talks	11	210	19.1	11.3%	27	450	16.7	16.4%	38	660	17.4	14.3%
Regional issues	10	140	14.0	7.5%	2	15	7.5	.5%	12	155	12.9	3.4%
Human rights	3	20	6.7	1.1%	15	160	10.7	5.8%	18	180	10.0	3.9%
Bilateral issues	5	55	11.0	3.0%	8	75	9.4	2.7%	13	130	10.0	2.8%
SALT II	10	180	18.0	9.7%					10	180	18.0	3.9%
Media activities	2	45	22.5	2.4%	29	340	11.7	12.4%	31	385	12.4	8.4%
Other topic					20	155	7.8	5.6%	20	155	7.8	3.4%
TYPE												
Process	13	200	15.4	10.8%	36	380	10.6	13.8%	49	580	11.8	12.6%
Event	48	940	19.6	50.7%	52	685	13.2	25.0%	100	1625	16.3	35.3%
Issues	15	185	12.3	10.0%	54	575	10.6	20.9%	69	760	11.0	16.5%
Analysis	26	530	20.4	28.6%	77	1105	14.4	40.3%	103	1635	15.9	35.5%
SPEAKER												
US media	93	1700	18.3	91.6%	159	2235	14.1	81.4%	252	3935	15.6	85.5%
US official					3	30	10.0	1.1%	3	30	10.0	.7%
USSR official					1	5	5.0	.2%	1	5	5.0	.1%
US general	4	60	15.0	3.2%	29	260	9.0	9.5%	33	320	9.7	7.0%
USSR general					7	55	7.9	2.0%	7	55	7.9	1.2%
US leader	3	50	16.7	2.7%	4	20	5.0	.7%	7	70	10.0	1.5%
Soviet leader	1	30	30.0	1.6%	8	65	8.1	2.4%	9	95	10.6	2.1%
Other	1	15	15.0	.8%	8	75	9.4	2.7%	9	90	10.0	2.0%

(continued)

	Vienno 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Averoge length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Averoge length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Averoge length	Percent of time
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media olone.....	81	1595	19.7	86.0%	192	2430	12.7	88.5%	273	4025	14.7	87.5%
Quoted source...	21	260	12.4	14.0%	27	315	11.7	11.5%	48	575	12.0	12.5%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
USSR media.....	3	50	16.7	19.2%	6	85	14.2	27.0%	9	135	15.0	23.5%
US officiol.....	11	125	11.4	48.1%	4	50	12.5	15.9%	15	175	11.7	30.4%
USSR official...	1	5	5.0	1.9%	1	10	10.0	3.2%	2	15	7.5	2.6%
US leader.....	2	30	15.0	11.5%	4	25	6.3	7.9%	6	55	9.2	9.6%
Soviet leader...	4	50	12.5	19.2%	12	145	12.1	46.0%	16	195	12.2	33.9%
AUDIO												
Studio/Grophics.	11	175	15.9	9.4%	20	225	11.3	8.2%	31	400	12.9	8.7%
US location.....	7	130	18.6	7.0%	26	320	12.3	11.7%	33	450	13.6	9.8%
USSR locotion...			.		9	140	15.6	5.1%	9	140	15.6	3.0%
Summit location.	84	1550	18.5	83.6%	161	2025	12.6	73.8%	245	3575	14.6	77.7%
Unknown location			.		3	35	11.7	1.3%	3	35	11.7	.8%
VIDEO												
Studio/Graphics.	10	150	15.0	8.1%	9	150	16.7	5.5%	19	300	15.8	6.5%
US location.....	7	130	18.6	7.0%	29	295	10.2	10.7%	36	425	11.8	9.2%
USSR location...			.		14	190	13.6	6.9%	14	190	13.6	4.1%
Summit location.	85	1575	18.5	84.9%	161	2015	12.5	73.4%	246	3590	14.6	78.0%
Other location..			.		2	30	15.0	1.1%	2	30	15.0	.7%
Unknown locotion			.		3	30	10.0	1.1%	3	30	10.0	.7%
Technical prob..			.		1	35	35.0	1.3%	1	35	35.0	.8%
LANGUAGE												
English.....	101	1825	18.1	98.4%	209	2660	12.7	96.9%	310	4485	14.5	97.5%
Russion.....	1	30	30.0	1.6%	10	85	8.5	3.1%	11	115	10.5	2.5%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
PERIOD After												
TOPICS												
US leader			.		1	10	10.0	1.1%	1	10	10.0	.9%
USSR leader			.		2	20	10.0	2.1%	2	20	10.0	1.8%
General USSR			.		2	15	7.5	1.6%	2	15	7.5	1.4%
US-USSR relations			.		16	240	15.0	25.4%	16	240	15.0	22.1%
Nuclear war/talks			.		31	380	12.3	40.2%	31	380	12.3	35.0%
Regional issues			.		4	55	13.8	5.8%	4	55	13.8	5.1%
Human rights			.		3	25	8.3	2.6%	3	25	8.3	2.3%
Bilateral issues			.		8	130	16.3	13.8%	8	130	16.3	12.0%
SALT II	11	140	12.7	100%			.		11	140	12.7	12.9%
Media activities			.		7	65	9.3	6.9%	7	65	9.3	6.0%
Other topic			.		1	5	5.0	.5%	1	5	5.0	.5%
TYPE												
Process			.		5	45	9.0	4.8%	5	45	9.0	4.1%
Event	10	125	12.5	89.3%	13	155	11.9	16.4%	23	280	12.2	25.8%
Issues			.		38	480	12.6	50.8%	38	480	12.6	44.2%
Analysis	1	15	15.0	10.7%	19	265	13.9	28.0%	20	280	14.0	25.8%
SPEAKER												
US media	6	70	11.7	50.0%	63	815	12.9	86.2%	69	885	12.8	81.6%
USSR media			.		1	15	15.0	1.6%	1	15	15.0	1.4%
US official	2	25	12.5	17.9%	1	15	15.0	1.6%	3	40	13.3	3.7%
US general	3	45	15.0	32.1%	8	75	9.4	7.9%	11	120	10.9	11.1%
USSR general			.		1	5	5.0	.5%	1	5	5.0	.5%
US leader			.		1	20	20.0	2.1%	1	20	20.0	1.8%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	11	140	12.7	100%	47	635	13.5	67.2%	58	775	13.4	71.4%
Quoted source...			.		28	310	11.1	32.8%	28	310	11.1	28.6%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
USSR media.....			.		6	75	12.5	24.2%	6	75	12.5	24.2%
US official.....			.		11	120	10.9	38.7%	11	120	10.9	38.7%
USSR official...			.		1	15	15.0	4.8%	1	15	15.0	4.8%
US general.....			.		1	15	15.0	4.8%	1	15	15.0	4.8%
US leader.....			.		5	50	10.0	16.1%	5	50	10.0	16.1%
Soviet leader...			.		4	35	8.8	11.3%	4	35	8.8	11.3%
AUDIO												
Studio/Graphics.	1	10	10.0	7.1%	27	410	15.2	43.4%	28	420	15.0	38.7%
US location.....	10	130	13.0	92.9%	47	530	11.3	56.1%	57	660	11.6	60.8%
USSR location...			.		1	5	5.0	.5%	1	5	5.0	.5%
VIDEO												
Studio/Graphics.	1	10	10.0	7.1%	25	415	16.6	43.9%	26	425	16.3	39.2%
US location.....	10	130	13.0	92.9%	32	360	11.3	38.1%	42	490	11.7	45.2%
USSR location...			.		10	85	8.5	9.0%	10	85	8.5	7.8%
Summit location.			.		3	30	10.0	3.2%	3	30	10.0	2.8%
Other location..			.		5	55	11.0	5.8%	5	55	11.0	5.1%
LANGUAGE												
English.....	11	140	12.7	100%	74	940	12.7	99.5%	85	1080	12.7	99.5%
Russian.....			.		1	5	5.0	.5%	1	5	5.0	.5%

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
US media												
TOPICS												
US leader	15	220	14.7	7.7%	40	550	13.8	7.9%	55	770	14.0	7.8%
USSR leader	13	180	13.8	6.3%	29	355	12.2	5.1%	42	535	12.7	5.4%
General US	5	100	20.0	3.5%	13	170	13.1	2.4%	18	270	15.0	2.7%
General USSR	3	40	13.3	1.4%	49	685	14.0	9.8%	52	725	13.9	7.4%
US-USSR relations	43	990	23.0	34.7%	135	2305	17.1	33.1%	178	3295	18.5	33.6%
Nuclear war/talks	22	635	28.9	22.3%	107	1440	13.5	20.7%	129	2075	16.1	21.1%
Regional issues	12	185	15.4	6.5%	16	205	12.8	2.9%	28	390	13.9	4.0%
Human rights	3	20	6.7	.7%	19	220	11.6	3.2%	22	240	10.9	2.4%
Bilateral issues	7	95	13.6	3.3%	21	235	11.2	3.4%	28	330	11.8	3.4%
SALT II	17	255	15.0	8.9%					17	255	15.0	2.6%
Media activities	5	130	26.0	4.6%	58	695	12.0	10.0%	63	825	13.1	8.4%
Other topic					13	110	8.5	1.6%	13	110	8.5	1.1%
TYPE												
Process	17	365	21.5	12.8%	109	1460	13.4	20.9%	126	1825	14.5	18.6%
Event	72	1460	20.3	51.2%	127	1825	14.4	26.2%	199	3285	16.5	33.5%
Issues	18	240	13.3	8.4%	146	1740	11.9	25.0%	164	1980	12.1	20.2%
Analysis	38	785	20.7	27.5%	118	1945	16.5	27.9%	156	2730	17.5	27.8%
PERIOD												
Before	46	1080	23.5	37.9%	278	3920	14.1	56.2%	324	5000	15.4	50.9%
During	93	1700	18.3	59.6%	159	2235	14.1	32.1%	252	3935	15.6	40.1%
After	6	70	11.7	2.5%	63	815	12.9	11.7%	69	885	12.8	9.0%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	117	2465	21.1	86.5%	379	5595	14.8	80.3%	496	8060	16.3	82.1%
Quoted source...	28	385	13.8	13.5%	121	1375	11.4	19.7%	149	1760	11.8	17.9%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
US media.....			.		1	10	10.0	.7%	1	10	10.0	.6%
USSR media.....	4	65	16.3	16.9%	17	235	13.8	17.2%	21	300	14.3	17.1%
US official.....	13	170	13.1	44.2%	46	565	12.3	41.2%	59	735	12.5	41.9%
USSR official...	1	5	5.0	1.3%	9	80	8.9	5.8%	10	85	8.5	4.8%
US general.....	2	20	10.0	5.2%	3	35	11.7	2.6%	5	55	11.0	3.1%
USSR general....			.		4	25	6.3	1.8%	4	25	6.3	1.4%
US leader.....	3	65	21.7	16.9%	19	210	11.1	15.3%	22	275	12.5	15.7%
Soviet leader...	5	60	12.0	15.6%	16	165	10.3	12.0%	21	225	10.7	12.8%
Other.....			.		5	45	9.0	3.3%	5	45	9.0	2.6%
AUDIO												
Studio/Graphics.	25	425	17.0	14.9%	76	1130	14.9	16.2%	101	1555	15.4	15.8%
US location.....	18	410	22.8	14.4%	155	1945	12.5	27.9%	173	2355	13.6	24.0%
USSR location...			.		65	925	14.2	13.3%	65	925	14.2	9.4%
Summit location.	102	2015	19.8	70.7%	199	2775	13.9	39.8%	301	4790	15.9	48.8%
Other location..			.		5	195	39.0	2.8%	5	195	39.0	2.0%
VIDEO												
None.....	1	10	10.0	.4%			.		1	10	10.0	.1%
Studio/Graphics.	24	460	19.2	16.1%	93	1430	15.4	20.5%	117	1890	16.2	19.2%
US location.....	18	410	22.8	14.4%	109	1350	12.4	19.4%	127	1760	13.9	17.9%
USSR location...			.		85	1175	13.8	16.9%	85	1175	13.8	12.0%
Summit location.	102	1970	19.3	69.1%	187	2535	13.6	36.4%	289	4505	15.6	45.9%
Other location..			.		24	435	18.1	6.2%	24	435	18.1	4.4%
Unknown location			.		1	10	10.0	.1%	1	10	10.0	.1%
Technical prob..			.		1	35	35.0	.5%	1	35	35.0	.4%
LANG												
English.....	145	2850	19.7	100%	500	6970	13.9	100%	645	9820	15.2	100%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
USSR media												
TOPICS												
General USSR....			.		1	10	10.0	11.1%	1	10	10.0	11.1%
Nuclear war/talks....			.		3	40	13.3	44.4%	3	40	13.3	44.4%
Human rights....			.		1	20	20.0	22.2%	1	20	20.0	22.2%
Media activities			.		2	20	10.0	22.2%	2	20	10.0	22.2%
TYPE												
Process.....			.		3	30	10.0	33.3%	3	30	10.0	33.3%
Issues.....			.		3	45	15.0	50.0%	3	45	15.0	50.0%
Analysis.....			.		1	15	15.0	16.7%	1	15	15.0	16.7%
PERIOD												
Before.....			.		6	75	12.5	83.3%	6	75	12.5	83.3%
After.....			.		1	15	15.0	16.7%	1	15	15.0	16.7%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....			.		7	90	12.9	100%	7	90	12.9	100%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
US general.....	1	20	20.0	100%			.		1	20	20.0	66.7%
US leader.....			.		1	10	10.0	100%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
AUDIO												
US location.....			.		1	15	15.0	16.7%	1	15	15.0	16.7%
USSR location...			.		4	50	12.5	55.6%	4	50	12.5	55.6%
Summit location.			.		2	25	12.5	27.8%	2	25	12.5	27.8%
VIDEO												
US location.....			.		1	15	15.0	16.7%	1	15	15.0	16.7%
USSR location...			.		6	75	12.5	83.3%	6	75	12.5	83.3%
LANG												
English.....			.		4	55	13.8	61.1%	4	55	13.8	61.1%
Russian.....			.		3	35	11.7	38.9%	3	35	11.7	38.9%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
US official												
TOPICS												
US leader.....			.		3	30	10.0	15.8%	3	30	10.0	10.3%
US-USSR relations....	1	20	20.0	20.0%	5	60	12.0	31.6%	6	80	13.3	27.6%
Nuclear war/talks....	1	15	15.0	15.0%	5	65	13.0	34.2%	6	80	13.3	27.6%
Bilateral issues			.		3	25	8.3	13.2%	3	25	8.3	8.6%
SALT II.....	4	65	16.3	65.0%			.		4	65	16.3	22.4%
Other topic.....			.		2	10	5.0	5.3%	2	10	5.0	3.4%
TYPE												
Process.....			.		6	65	10.8	34.2%	6	65	10.8	22.4%
Event.....	6	100	16.7	100%			.		6	100	16.7	34.5%
Issues.....			.		11	115	10.5	60.5%	11	115	10.5	39.7%
Analysis.....			.		1	10	10.0	5.3%	1	10	10.0	3.4%
PERIOD												
Before.....	4	75	18.8	75.0%	14	145	10.4	76.3%	18	220	12.2	75.9%
During.....			.		3	30	10.0	15.8%	3	30	10.0	10.3%
After.....	2	25	12.5	25.0%	1	15	15.0	7.9%	3	40	13.3	13.8%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	5	80	16.0	80.0%	17	180	10.6	94.7%	22	260	11.8	89.7%
Quoted source...	1	20	20.0	20.0%	1	10	10.0	5.3%	2	30	15.0	10.3%
SOURCE OF QUOTE												
Soviet leader...			.		2	30	15.0	100%	2	30	15.0	100%
AUDIO												
US location.....	6	100	16.7	100%	9	95	10.6	50.0%	15	195	13.0	67.2%
USSR location...			.		3	45	15.0	23.7%	3	45	15.0	15.5%
Summit location.			.		4	40	10.0	21.1%	4	40	10.0	13.8%
Other location..			.		2	10	5.0	5.3%	2	10	5.0	3.4%
VIDEO												
US location.....	6	100	16.7	100%	9	95	10.6	50.0%	15	195	13.0	67.2%
USSR location...			.		3	45	15.0	23.7%	3	45	15.0	15.5%
Summit location.			.		4	40	10.0	21.1%	4	40	10.0	13.8%
Other location..			.		2	10	5.0	5.3%	2	10	5.0	3.4%
LANG												
English.....	6	100	16.7	100%	18	190	10.6	100%	24	290	12.1	100%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
USSR official												
TOPICS												
US-USSR relations....			.		1	10	10.0	33.3%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
Media activities			.		1	5	5.0	16.7%	1	5	5.0	16.7%
Other topic.....			.		2	15	7.5	50.0%	2	15	7.5	50.0%
TYPE												
Process.....			.		1	5	5.0	16.7%	1	5	5.0	16.7%
Issues.....			.		3	25	8.3	83.3%	3	25	8.3	83.3%
PERIOD												
Before.....			.		3	25	8.3	83.3%	3	25	8.3	83.3%
During.....			.		1	5	5.0	16.7%	1	5	5.0	16.7%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....			.		4	30	7.5	100%	4	30	7.5	100%
AUDIO												
US location.....			.		1	10	10.0	33.3%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
USSR location...			.		1	10	10.0	33.3%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
Summit location.			.		2	10	5.0	33.3%	2	10	5.0	33.3%
VIDEO												
US location.....			.		1	10	10.0	33.3%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
USSR location...			.		1	10	10.0	33.3%	1	10	10.0	33.3%
Summit location.			.		2	10	5.0	33.3%	2	10	5.0	33.3%
LANG												
English.....			.		1	5	5.0	16.7%	1	5	5.0	16.7%
Russian.....			.		3	25	8.3	83.3%	3	25	8.3	83.3%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
$PEAKER												
US general												
TOPICS												
US leader			.		4	30	7.5	3.9%	4	30	7.5	3.1%
USSR leader			.		5	50	10.0	6.5%	5	50	10.0	5.1%
General USSR			.		15	140	9.3	18.1%	15	140	9.3	14.4%
US-USSR relations			.		21	175	8.3	22.6%	21	175	8.3	17.9%
Nuclear war/talks	3	60	20.0	30.0%	18	155	8.6	20.0%	21	215	10.2	22.1%
Human rights			.		2	15	7.5	1.9%	2	15	7.5	1.5%
Bilateral issues			.		6	55	9.2	7.1%	6	55	9.2	5.6%
SALT II	8	140	17.5	70.0%			.		8	140	17.5	14.4%
Media activities			.		11	125	11.4	16.1%	11	125	11.4	12.8%
Other topic			.		4	30	7.5	3.9%	4	30	7.5	3.1%
TYPE												
Process			.		20	185	9.3	23.9%	20	185	9.3	19.0%
Event	8	140	17.5	70.0%			.		8	140	17.5	14.4%
Issues			.		20	140	7.0	18.1%	20	140	7.0	14.4%
Analysis	3	60	20.0	30.0%	46	450	9.8	58.1%	49	510	10.4	52.3%
PERIOD												
Before	4	95	23.8	47.5%	49	440	9.0	56.8%	53	535	10.1	54.9%
During	4	60	15.0	30.0%	29	260	9.0	33.5%	33	320	9.7	32.8%
After	3	45	15.0	22.5%	8	75	9.4	9.7%	11	120	10.9	12.3%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone	11	200	18.2	100%	86	775	9.0	100%	97	975	10.1	100%
AUDIO												
US location	11	200	18.2	100%	59	510	8.6	65.8%	70	710	10.1	72.8%
USSR location			.		1	30	30.0	3.9%	1	30	30.0	3.1%
Summit location			.		22	195	8.9	25.2%	22	195	8.9	20.0%
Unknown location			.		4	40	10.0	5.2%	4	40	10.0	4.1%
VIDEO												
US location	11	200	18.2	100%	51	450	8.8	58.1%	62	650	10.5	66.7%
USSR location			.		9	90	10.0	11.6%	9	90	10.0	9.2%
Summit location			.		23	200	8.7	25.8%	23	200	8.7	20.5%
Unknown location			.		3	35	11.7	4.5%	3	35	11.7	3.6%
LANG												
English	11	200	18.2	100%	86	775	9.0	100%	97	975	10.1	100%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
USSR general												
TOPICS												
US leader.....			.		2	10	5.0	4.0%	2	10	5.0	4.0%
General US.....			.		1	5	5.0	2.0%	1	5	5.0	2.0%
General USSR....			.		13	110	8.5	44.0%	13	110	8.5	44.0%
US-USSR relations....			.		6	45	7.5	18.0%	6	45	7.5	18.0%
Nuclear war/talks....			.		4	35	8.8	14.0%	4	35	8.8	14.0%
Bilateral issues			.		4	45	11.3	18.0%	4	45	11.3	18.0%
TYPE												
Process.....			.		14	110	7.9	44.0%	14	110	7.9	44.0%
Event.....			.		2	10	5.0	4.0%	2	10	5.0	4.0%
Issues.....			.		8	80	10.0	32.0%	8	80	10.0	32.0%
Analysis.....			.		6	50	8.3	20.0%	6	50	8.3	20.0%
PERIOD												
Before.....			.		22	190	8.6	76.0%	22	190	8.6	76.0%
During.....			.		7	55	7.9	22.0%	7	55	7.9	22.0%
After.....			.		1	5	5.0	2.0%	1	5	5.0	2.0%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....			.		30	250	8.3	100%	30	250	8.3	100%
AUDIO												
USSR location...			.		25	210	8.4	84.0%	25	210	8.4	84.0%
Summit location.			.		3	20	6.7	8.0%	3	20	6.7	8.0%
Other location..			.		1	5	5.0	2.0%	1	5	5.0	2.0%
Unknown location			.		1	15	15.0	6.0%	1	15	15.0	6.0%
VIDEO												
USSR location...			.		26	225	8.7	90.0%	26	225	8.7	90.0%
Summit location.			.		3	20	6.7	8.0%	3	20	6.7	8.0%
Other location..			.		1	5	5.0	2.0%	1	5	5.0	2.0%
LANG												
English.....			.		12	105	8.8	42.0%	12	105	8.8	42.0%
Russian.....			.		18	145	8.1	58.0%	18	145	8.1	58.0%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
US leader												
TOPICS												
General US			.		1	10	10.0	4.3%	1	10	10.0	2.7%
General USSR			.		2	30	15.0	13.0%	2	30	15.0	8.1%
US-USSR relations	5	130	26.0	92.9%	7	60	8.6	26.1%	12	190	15.8	51.4%
Nuclear war/talks	1	10	10.0	7.1%	6	50	8.3	21.7%	7	60	8.6	16.2%
Bilateral issues			.		5	65	13.0	28.3%	5	65	13.0	17.6%
Media activities			.		1	5	5.0	2.2%	1	5	5.0	1.4%
Other topic			.		2	10	5.0	4.3%	2	10	5.0	2.7%
TYPE												
Process			.		2	10	5.0	4.3%	2	10	5.0	2.7%
Event	4	130	32.5	92.9%					4	130	32.5	35.1%
Issues			.		20	205	10.3	89.1%	20	205	10.3	55.4%
Analysis	2	10	5.0	7.1%	2	15	7.5	6.5%	4	25	6.3	6.8%
PERIOD												
Before	3	90	30.0	64.3%	19	190	10.0	82.6%	22	280	12.7	75.7%
During	3	50	16.7	35.7%	4	20	5.0	8.7%	7	70	10.0	18.9%
After			.		1	20	20.0	8.7%	1	20	20.0	5.4%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone	6	140	23.3	100%	24	230	9.6	100%	30	370	12.3	100%
AUDIO												
US location	2	40	20.0	28.6%	17	185	10.9	80.4%	19	225	11.8	60.8%
Summit location	4	100	25.0	71.4%	7	45	6.4	19.6%	11	145	13.2	39.2%
VIDEO												
Studio/Graphics			.		2	15	7.5	6.5%	2	15	7.5	4.1%
US location	2	40	20.0	28.6%	16	175	10.9	76.1%	18	215	11.9	58.1%
Summit location	4	100	25.0	71.4%	6	40	6.7	17.4%	10	140	14.0	37.8%
LANG												
English	6	140	23.3	100%	24	230	9.6	100%	30	370	12.3	100%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
Soviet leader												
TOPICS												
General USSR....			.		1	5	5.0	5.6%	1	5	5.0	4.2%
US-USSR relations....	1	30	30.0	100%	5	40	8.0	44.4%	6	70	11.7	58.3%
Nuclear war/talks....			.		3	30	10.0	33.3%	3	30	10.0	25.0%
Human rights....			.		1	5	5.0	5.6%	1	5	5.0	4.2%
Other topic.....			.		1	10	10.0	11.1%	1	10	10.0	8.3%
TYPE												
Process.....			.		1	5	5.0	5.6%	1	5	5.0	4.2%
Event.....	1	30	30.0	100%			.		1	30	30.0	25.0%
Issues.....			.		9	80	8.9	88.9%	9	80	8.9	66.7%
Analysis.....			.		1	5	5.0	5.6%	1	5	5.0	4.2%
PERIOD												
Before.....			.		3	25	8.3	27.8%	3	25	8.3	20.8%
During.....	1	30	30.0	100%	8	65	8.1	72.2%	9	95	10.6	79.2%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	1	30	30.0	100%	11	90	8.2	100%	12	120	10.0	100%
AUDIO												
Summit location.	1	30	30.0	100%	11	90	8.2	100%	12	120	10.0	100%
VIDEO												
Studio/Graphics.			.		1	10	10.0	11.1%	1	10	10.0	8.3%
USSR location...			.		1	5	5.0	5.6%	1	5	5.0	4.2%
Summit location.	1	30	30.0	100%	9	75	8.3	83.3%	10	105	10.5	87.5%
LANG												
Russian.....	1	30	30.0	100%	11	90	8.2	100%	12	120	10.0	100%

(continued)

	Vienna 1979				Geneva 1985				Total			
	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time	Turns	Total seconds	Average length	Percent of time
SPEAKER												
Other												
TOPICS												
US leader.....	1	15	15.0	100%					1	15	15.0	8.1%
General USSR....			.		1	15	15.0	8.8%	1	15	15.0	8.1%
US-USSR relations....			.		6	35	5.8	20.6%	6	35	5.8	18.9%
Regional issues.			.		2	10	5.0	5.9%	2	10	5.0	5.4%
Human rights....			.		7	55	7.9	32.4%	7	55	7.9	29.7%
Bilateral issues			.		2	25	12.5	14.7%	2	25	12.5	13.5%
Media activities			.		2	20	10.0	11.8%	2	20	10.0	10.8%
Other topic.....			.		1	10	10.0	5.9%	1	10	10.0	5.4%
TYPE												
Process.....	1	15	15.0	100%	4	25	6.3	14.7%	5	40	8.0	21.6%
Issues.....			.		14	110	7.9	64.7%	14	110	7.9	59.5%
Analysis.....			.		3	35	11.7	20.6%	3	35	11.7	18.9%
PERIOD												
Before.....			.		13	95	7.3	55.9%	13	95	7.3	51.4%
During.....	1	15	15.0	100%	8	75	9.4	44.1%	9	90	10.0	48.6%
EXPLICIT SOURCE												
Media alone.....	1	15	15.0	100%	19	140	7.4	82.4%	20	155	7.8	83.8%
Quoted source...			.		2	30	15.0	17.6%	2	30	15.0	16.2%
AUDIO												
US location.....			.		2	15	7.5	8.8%	2	15	7.5	8.1%
Summit location.	1	15	15.0	100%	15	125	8.3	73.5%	16	140	8.8	75.7%
Other location..			.		1	5	5.0	2.9%	1	5	5.0	2.7%
Unknown location			.		3	25	8.3	14.7%	3	25	8.3	13.5%
VIDEO												
US location.....			.		2	15	7.5	8.8%	2	15	7.5	8.1%
Summit location.	1	15	15.0	100%	15	125	8.3	73.5%	16	140	8.8	75.7%
Other location..			.		1	5	5.0	2.9%	1	5	5.0	2.7%
Unknown location			.		3	25	8.3	14.7%	3	25	8.3	13.5%
LANG												
English.....	1	15	15.0	100%	18	150	8.3	88.2%	19	165	8.7	89.2%
Russian.....			.		1	10	10.0	5.9%	1	10	10.0	5.4%
Summit.....			.		1	5	5.0	2.9%	1	5	5.0	2.7%
Other.....			.		1	5	5.0	2.9%	1	5	5.0	2.7%

APPENDIX C

COMPLETE LIST OF STORIES ANALYZED

The following pages contain the information used to order from the VTNA the coverage used in this analysis. Abstracts of these stories may be found in the appropriate VTNA *Television News Index and Abstracts* volumes.

CBS EVENING NEWS STORIES: VIENNA, 1979

Date	Start Time	Stop Time	Total Time	Comments/Description
05-10-79	05:36:10	05:39:00	02:50	SALT II: Probable Vienna signing
05-11-79	05:46:40	05:47:30	00:50	Carter-Brezhnev meeting announced
05-30-79	05:45:50	05:47:30	01:40	SALT II: Vienna signing mentioned
06-01-79	05:38:00	05:38:10	00:10	Brezhnev quoted on Vienna summit
06-08-79	05:30:00	05:35:00	05:00	SALT II: re Vienna
06-12-79	05:38:10	05:39:40	01:30	Vienna: Carter leaves soon, CBS poll
06-13-79	05:30:10	05:33:00	02:50	Vienna: SALT II signed, 1st meeting
06-13-79	05:55:20	05:57:20	02:00	Vienna: review, schedule
06-14-79	05:30:00	05:33:10	03:10	Vienna: Carter in flight, Brezhnev tomorrow
06-14-79	05:52:00	05:57:00	05:00	Vienna: the city, Carter on USSR nukes
06-15-79	05:30:00	05:34:40	04:40	Vienna: meetings, Brezhnev's health
06-15-79	05:54:40	05:57:30	02:50	Vienna: possible agreements, opera
06-16-79	06:30:10	06:35:50	05:40	Vienna: Brezhnev quoted, meetings
06-16-79	06:36:50	06:38:50	02:00	Vienna: Tomorrow previewed
06-17-79	06:00:10	06:06:30	06:20	Vienna: SALT III, Brezhnev ideas, etc.

06-18-79	05:30:10	05:38:50	08:40	Apparent Vienna results
06-18-79	05:56:00	05:57:10	01:10	Vienna recap
06-25-79	05:43:00	05:45:10	02:10	SALT II misunderstandings
07-09-79	05:46:00	05:48:20	02:20	SALT II: Senate debate opens

CBS EVENING NEWS STORIES, GENEVA 1985

Date	Start Time	Stop Time	Total Time	Comments/Description
10-21-85	95:37:30	05:37:50	00:20	Gorbachev in Bulgaria
10-22-85	05:33:50	05:36:00	02:10	Arms control and Geneva
10-23-85	05:30:10	05:32:30	02:20	Pre-summit maneuvering: Reagan at U.N.
10-23-85	05:33:00	05:33:30	00:30	Pre-summit maneuvering: Gorbachev
10-24-85	05:30:30	05:33:10	02:40	PSM: Reagan at U.N.
10-25-85	05:30:10	05:33:50	03:40	PSM: Shultz to Moscow
10-30-85	05:30:10	05:31:50	01:40	PSM: Reagan BBC + USSR interviews
10-31-85	05:30:10	05:32:50	02:40	PSM: Soviet media reports
11-04-85	05:34:20	05:36:00	01:40	Pre-summit maneuvers: Shultz and Gorbachev
11-04-85	05:36:00	05:30:50	02:50	Reagan's speech in USSR
11-05-85	05:35:30	05:37:10	01:40	Pre-summit maneuvers: Shultz and Gorbachev
11-07-85	05:35:00	05:35:10	00:10	Last arms talks before Geneva
11-08-85	05:52:50	05:56:40	03:50	On to the Summit I: Soviet Education
11-11-85	05:30:10	05:32:10	02:00	On to the Summit II: Final PR Push
11-11-85	05:32:10	05:35:10	03:00	High-Tech Weapons I: Summit angle

11-11-85	05:49:10	05:52:40	03:30	On to the Summit III: Soviet Women
11-12-85	05:30:10	05:32:10	02:00	Pre-summit maneuvers: Reagan on Europe TV
11-12-85	05:32:10	05:35:00	02:50	High-Tech Weapons II
11-12-85	05:49:40	05:53:20	03:40	On to the Summit IV: Blue-collar Families
11-13-85	05:41:50	05:42:10	00:20	Gorbachev's criticism of Star Wars
11-13-85	05:42:10	05:44:50	02:40	On to the Summit V: Reagan's preparations
11-13-85	05:53:40	05:56:50	03:10	On to the Summit VI: Soviet society
11-14-85	05:41:50	05:43:40	01:50	On to the Summit VII: Reagan's speech preview
11-14-85	05:43:40	05:47:10	03:30	Public Relations of the Summit
11-15-85	05:35:10	05:37:30	02:20	Pre-summit publicity offensives
11-15-85	05:38:40	05:42:50	04:10	More pre-summit publicity
11-15-85	05:48:30	05:51:50	03:20	Commentary: Summit and Berlin wall
11-15-85	05:53:40	05:56:50	03:10	More pre-summit maneuvers
11-18-85	05:30:30	05:30:50	08:20	The Summit: Star Wars, Gorbachev arrives
11-18-85	05:46:20	05:49:30	03:10	USSR PR and their TV news approach
11-18-85	05:50:50	05:53:30	02:40	Commentary: weather, de Tocqueville, etc.
11-18-85	05:55:10	05:57:20	02:10	Summit review, possible course described
11-19-85	05:30:30	05:38:30	08:00	Summit: 1st meeting, Gorb & Jesse Jackson

11-19-85	05:43:30	05:46:20	02:50	Summit: Soviet coverage of it
11-19-85	05:48:50	05:51:10	02:20	PR benefits for USSR of Gorb/Jackson mtg
11-19-85	05:56:10	05:56:40	00:30	Summit Review: Day 1
11-20-85	05:30:30	05:35:40	05:10	Summit: blackout, schedules, coverage
11-20-85	05:36:10	05:37:00	00:50	Summit: Nancy and Raisa
11-20-85	05:38:10	05:44:10	06:00	Summit: Public reaction, Pravda, etc.
11-20-85	05:50:30	05:52:50	02:20	Commentary, summit and US allies
11-20-85	05:54:30	05:57:00	02:30	Summit: apparel compared
11-21-85	05:30:20	05:35:30	05:10	Summit conclusion, etc.
11-21-85	05:44:20	05:49:00	04:40	Kremlin use of media, post-summit poll
11-21-85	05:50:10	05:53:10	03:00	Human rights, unsolved summit problems
11-21-85	05:54:50	05:57:00	02:10	Summit analysis
11-22-85	05:30:10	05:34:10	04:00	Summit: Reagan returns, Soviet coverage
11-23-85	00:05:30	00:06:00	00:30	Summit followup
11-26-85	05:50:10	05:52:20	02:10	Geneva aftermath commentary
11-27-85	05:32:20	05:32:50	00:30	Geneva followup: Gorbachev speaks
12-02-85	05:54:40	05:56:50	02:10	Summit cultural agreement recalled

12-05-85	05:39:20	05:41:20	02:00	Geneva failure to reach arms control
12-13-85	05:48:50	05:49:10	00:20	US plan for USSR out of Afghanistan
12-19-85	05:43:50	05:45:30	01:40	Gorbachev arms offer said result of Geneva
12-23-85	05:35:10	05:37:20	02:10	New arms control
12-30-85	05:46:50	05:47:20	00:30	Reunited US/USSR families

VITA