Defense Date

2008

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Science

Department

Mathematical Sciences

First Advisor

Jill Hardin

Abstract

The sale of text advertisements on search engines using an auction format called Generalized Second Price (GSP) has become increasingly common. GSP is unique in that it allows bidders to revise their bid if they are unhappy with the result of the auction, and because the auction sells multiple units of a related good simultaneously. We model this sale as a hierarchical game with complete information, allowing one potential bidder to bid in each stage. The hierarchical game has an entirely different set of equilibria from the simultaneous bid game studied in earlier research on this auction. Under hierarchical bidding, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves guarantees higher auctioneer revenue than any equilibrium in GSP.

Rights

© The Author

Is Part Of

VCU University Archives

Is Part Of

VCU Theses and Dissertations

Date of Submission

October 2008

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