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the ramerican

political science review

vol. 2, 2017

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2017

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Beyond the Axis of Convenience: Re-examining Russian-Chinese Relations and the Search for Multipolarity 123
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Describing Russia's relationship with China as if it were merely a fallback option is to underestimate the strength of the political and economic alliance. This article seeks to provide an overview of the Sino-Russian partnership, including a comparison of current presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping's personal lives and worldviews. Extensive use is made of speeches and state media to convey the overlap in national interests as well as outlines for bilateral cooperation. The overall purpose is to illustrate that Moscow and Beijing have forged a strong alliance, while discussing concerns for the future, especially in regards to China's potential emergence as a new type of global hegemon.

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In 1894, the exploration of Rwandan territory and its control begins; but by 1994, no one seemed to care. The Rwandan genocide went under the radar, with crucial world powers turning their heads away from the crisis. Key international leaders, including the UN, claimed the genocide happened so quickly that it could not have been prevented; we will test this claim by examining the history behind the genocide, laying out the facts chronologically. In a span of 100 years—colonization to genocide—we witness the state of Rwanda turn from a harmonious civilization to a barbaric desert, in which tensions were often documented by groups like the Human Rights Watch and served as early-warning signs for the genocide to come. This paper will delve into the various aspects of Rwandan history which created the ideology that sparked the gruesomely pronounced destruction of an African nation.

Book Reviews

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Mikaela Reinard, VCU

Letter from the Department of Political Science

The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to present Volume 2 of *The Ramerican Political Science Review*. This journal presents some of the best undergraduate work produced by students at VCU during the 2016-2017 academic year.

Political science students ask normatively important questions impacting politics at home and abroad, and the six papers featured in this volume are examples of the extensive research and the systematic investigations conducted in order to begin answering those questions.

Domestically, U.S. politics are becoming increasingly contentious. College campuses and public spaces are the battlefields on which the new culture wars are being fought, and **Margaret Hemenway** and **Mariah Hines** explore the way the politics of identity plays out within these contexts by testing diversity's impact on tolerance and social identity's impact on political mobilization, respectively.

Internationally, the political and economic landscape is constantly shifting, with nations repositioning themselves and their allyships in order to meet the demands of an increasingly globalized and weaponized world. **David Hayter** explores one of these shifting partnerships by exploring the relationship between Russia and China; Hayter investigates how those nations have used existing institutional frameworks to advance their relationship, and asks how such partnerships might impact other nations if the balance of economic and political power shifts toward multipolarity.

The questions political science students ask encompass a range of sub-fields and use a variety of theoretical approaches and political science methods. **Trevor Davis** offers an in-depth case study of Somaliland to better develop theories concerning international legal responses to secessionist movements. **Matthew Helton** uses a survey experiment to explore whether media frames that contribute to a narrative of social deviance around the queer community negatively impact feelings toward the queer community in general and support for that community via policy initiatives such as access to PrEP. These papers demonstrate the utility of both qualitative and quantitative research methods as applied to the study of political science.

Additionally, political science research informs its readers of what lessons we should be learning from the past and how we might apply those lessons to an uncertain future. **Savannah-Zhané Jolley** explores historical underpinnings of the Rwandan genocide, as well as the muted international response to the death and devastation, in order to better understand the warning signs when presented with future genocidal crises.

We hope that these articles not only help to provide better understanding of relevant questions concerning the state of our politics, domestically and abroad, but also that they help inspire new questions for our readers. Furthermore, we hope that the work of this volume's researchers will encourage other students to conduct their own political science research, and to submit it for consideration to *The Ramerican Political Science Review* next year, whether exploring American politics, international relations, comparative politics, public policy or political theory.

While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science and the contributions of our alumni, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. Over forty submissions were received and reviewed by the editors. The researchers featured in this issue went through a "revise and resubmit" process, wherein they made content and style changes that were requested by the editorial staff. The articles were then edited once more by the editorial staff prior to publication. This final product is a testament to their immense efforts during the summer months. The Department of Political Science would, therefore, like to thank this year's editorial board:

David Abbey, Class of 2015

Saffeya Ahmed, Class of 2019

Moige Nyamweya, Class of 2018

Mikaela Turkan Reinard, Class of 2018

The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf for advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing submissions and formatting this journal.

VCU Department of Political Science
August 2017

Diversity and Tolerance: The Intergroup Contact Theory in Practice

Margaret Hemenway, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract

There are a variety of theories regarding how an individual's social and political tolerance is affected when in a diverse environment and surrounded by members of different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. This study seeks to examine these concepts in the context of university campuses. This paper suggests that increased exposure to groups different from one's own corresponds to an increased tolerance level toward those groups. This conclusion is due, in part, to the fact that universities provide more of a collaborative environment rather than a competitive one. Using a survey, students at multiple Eastern universities are polled to determine the perceived diversity of their school and their environment, as well as their levels of social and political tolerance towards groups different than their own.

Introduction

The student body of Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) is 50.6% white, 18.8% African American, 13.3% Asian, and 8.7% Hispanic, as well as 5.7% being of two or more races ("Virginia Commonwealth University Overview" 2016). VCU is not only one of the most diverse university in the Commonwealth of Virginia, but is also one of the nation's most diverse schools – especially when the size of its student body is considered. About 5% – almost 1,600 – are international students hailing from over one hundred different countries. VCU's President, Michael Rao, said that, "Diversity is absolutely essential at a research university, just as it is in life. It is an indispensable part of the learning process. It shapes what we learn and how we learn it, how we solve problems, how we interact with one another, and how we think about ourselves and each other" ("Division for Inclusive Excellence" 2016). It is clear that one of VCU's goals in focusing so much on diversity is to create a more tolerant and open-minded student

body that is accepting of those from different backgrounds. In contrast, another Virginia university, Christopher Newport University (CNU), is less diverse: CNU's student body is approximately 75% white, with no other racial or ethnic group constituting more than 10% of the university population ("Christopher Newport University Overview" 2016). This does not necessarily indicate a flaw or a benefit in either school, but the contrast does provide an opportunity to investigate how different levels of diversity and different attitudes towards diversity can impact one's tolerance.

This paper explores whether or not a diverse campus actually has positive correlation with tolerance. Does exposure to individuals of different races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions cultivate a sense of tolerance in the students? The principles of the intergroup contact theory would suggest that the answer to this question is yes: additional intergroup exposure allows both groups to overcome prejudices and work to develop positive attitudes towards each other (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). In fact, under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between members of different groups (Merino 2010). Considering that universities are intended to promote friendship, human interaction, and collaboration in addition to learning and research, there is no doubt that a college environment falls under the category of "appropriate conditions" for interpersonal contact. Exposure to greater amounts of racial and ethnic diversity helps not only to increase tolerance, but also to reduce stereotyping and other negative intergroup perceptions and interactions (Harell 2010; Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag 2015). For these reasons, it is expected that students attending more diverse schools should report higher levels of social and political tolerance.

Many studies have previously demonstrated a link between high levels of ethnic and racial diversity and high levels of ethnic tolerance, showing that racial prejudice tends to be lower in the environments of ethnically mixed schools (Janmaat 2012). This study does not seek to challenge this well-researched link, but rather expand on it by incorporating religion and culture as well. By defining diversity as not just the ethno-racial heterogeneity, but also the religious and cultural heterogeneity, an analysis of the correlation between diversity and tolerance can point to the variables that have a greater impact: it may be that religion matters more than race in the perception of groups. Especially considering that the United States is less secular than many demographically similar European countries, it is not unreasonable to presume that religion could play a large role in intergroup tolerance within the U.S. This is consistent with the current hypotheses of this study: students attending more diverse schools and those exposed to a more diverse environment should be more socially and politically tolerant towards groups that are different than their own.

This study surveys college students about their personal levels of tolerance as well as the volume and frequency of their involvement in intergroup contact in order to demonstrate the relationships between diversity and tolerance. By comparing the results between highly diverse universities, such as VCU, and more homogeneous ones, such as CNU, it becomes easier to understand the relationship between tolerance and diversity in addition to potentially identifying other factors that could impact either of these two variables. The importance of this is that it has the possibility to shed light on the potential effects, both positive and negative, of diversity. Alternatively, the results could suggest that a diverse

campus in and of itself does not have a noticeable effect on increasing tolerance, rather that those who choose to attend diverse schools are already more tolerant. Regardless, with diversity becoming a major focus of many schools, organizations, and even businesses, it becomes increasingly necessary to understand how and why diversity and being in a diverse environment affects people's attitude and behavior. While this study is incapable of establishing a causal relationship, it does have the potential to find correlations between diversity and tolerance which can then prompt experimental research to find cause-and-effect relationships between the two variables.

Tolerance as a whole has multiple facets to its fundamental importance in society. The significance of political tolerance is evident; a lack of tolerance for other groups and a lack of respect for the legal and civil rights of other groups has a strong negative effect on a democratic society and hinders the effectiveness of the political system. Social tolerance is less wide-scale and often involves individual perceptions of a group or a subset of a group rather than how two different groups perceive each other. Due to this, it may be argued that political tolerance is of greater normative importance than social tolerance; however, it is both difficult and uncommon to have one without the other. Overall, for a nation that is both as diverse and democratic as the United States, at least a moderate level of both personal and political tolerance is necessary for society to adequately function.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: a review of the literature regarding diversity and tolerance and the respective theories about the relationships between the two is provided, followed by a detailed explanation of the methodology, outlining the conceptualization,

operationalization, and measurement of the variables. The findings and results are then outlined and summarized, followed by a conclusion that completes the paper.

Literature Review

Past research on tolerance has offered many different perspectives and conclusions, including various definitions of the concept of 'tolerance' itself. Tolerance can be split up into multiple parts (i.e. social vs. cultural vs. religious vs. political tolerance); in this study, political tolerance is more focused on accepting others' legal rights whereas social (personal) tolerance is centered on respecting other individuals, focusing on interpersonal over intergroup relations (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1982; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). Another way of splitting up the concept of tolerance involves distinguishing the object on the receiving end of the tolerance, whether it be a group of people, an action or set of actions, or values. In general, research involving tolerance is most focused on tolerance towards objectionable or minority groups (Sullivan et al. 1982; Rapp & Freitag 2015). Many authors consider tolerance to be a "willingness to put up with" something that they previously or currently reject or oppose, thus implying that tolerance can only exist after a sense of objection or disapproval has been formed (Sullivan et al. 1982; Harell 2010; Rapp 2015). This perspective on tolerance offers a somewhat pessimistic view, assuming that tolerant individuals were initially intolerant. It also implies that tolerance is only an issue in society if an objection to a certain group or idea exists (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus 1979). A more open-minded approach would be to define tolerance as being prepared to respect, or at least acknowledge, the social, civil, and political rights of

others (Gibson 1992; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). For the purpose of this study, this second definition will be used for tolerance, as it is not required that students have a previous or existing aversion towards any given group in order to be tolerant towards them.

Tolerance, as a variable, is inherently difficult to measure consistently. As tolerance is almost always a dependent variable in studies related to the concept, it is often measured through the use of subjective survey questions. Sullivan et al. (1979) pointed out that simply asking respondents about their feelings about a certain group or idea allows the respondents' political beliefs to act as a confounding variable, and so their answers may not accurately reflect their level of tolerance. In order to solve this issue, respondents first must be allowed to specify the group which they oppose the most, or their 'least-liked group,' and only then should they be asked questions regarding their feeling about that group in particular (Sullivan et al. 1979; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). This "content-controlled" method has become the norm, as it offers the least-biased approach to determining tolerance as defined by Sullivan et al. (1979): a "willingness to put up with" ideas, groups, or values that one rejects. The same three authors put this method to the test when they compared this content-controlled measure, which used each respondent's least-liked group, to Samuel Stouffer's method (Sullivan et al. 1982). In 1954, Stouffer found high levels of intolerance in the United States directed at atheists, communists, and socialists, but the later-identified issue with his study is that he asked all respondents how they felt about these groups – overlooking the potential for bias (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1982). However, this bias actually led to an increase in tolerance in Stouffer's research: when Sullivan et al. (1982) compared their content-controlled

study to Stouffer's data, they found significantly lower level of tolerance – presumably because respondents were now being asked about the group they opposed the most. This suggests that using the method presented by Sullivan et al. (1982) provides a more accurate measure of tolerance; many studies since then have also come to this realization and asked respondents about their least-liked group before asking questions about tolerance (see Harell 2010; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015; Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag 2015). “Broader” questions that do not specify a group toward which the respondent may or may not be tolerant, and instead refer to other groups as a whole, can also avoid this bias.

When discussing tolerance towards a minority group that is gaining in size (e.g. immigrants or refugees), there are two main schools of thought as to how attitudes of members of the majority towards the minority group are formed. Both of these are mentioned in Rapp's studies, in which the relationship between tolerance and diversity with regards to volunteer associations and immigration are investigated (Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag 2015). The first school of thought is the ethnic competition thesis, which offers two separate explanations for how competition and hostility forms against expanding minority groups such as immigrants (Hwang and Murdock 1991; Rapp 2015). The first explanation draws on the intergroup conflict theory, which simply emphasizes individuals' preferences to interact with those most similar to themselves, and states that hostility is merely a personal situation (Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin 2010; Rapp 2015). The implication of this idea is that there exists an overall negative association with people who are different. The economic threat thesis expands upon this idea, arguing that hostility towards minority groups and the size of minority groups increase simultaneously, largely due to real or perceived

interethnic competition over jobs and monetary resources (Blalock 1967; Rapp 2015). In essence, the majority group feels that their political, economic, and social privileges may be at risk because of the increasing size of the minority group (Rapp 2015). The second explanation offered by the ethnic competition thesis involves both the social identity and group threat theories. Not only do members of the majority consider themselves superior to members of the minority, but they are also more willing to grant rights to members of their own group, and intergroup conflict over economic or political resources is likely to increase (Hjerm 2007; Rapp 2015). Overall, the ethnic competition theory takes both these perspectives into account when observing increased hostility and competition between majority and minority.

This contrasts heavily with the second school of thought: the intergroup contact theory. According to this theory, an expansion of the minority group should be accompanied by an increase in tolerance from both groups as a result of increased opportunities for interaction between the groups (Rapp 2015). In practice, additional intergroup exposure allows both groups to overcome prejudices and work to develop positive attitudes towards each other (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). According to Merino (2010), under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. This has multiple potential causes, such as the exposure to a variety of political perspectives offered by exposure to members of different groups and therefore increasing tolerance, or that increased social diversity enhances ability to deal with conflict or the taking of new perspectives – both skills necessary to increase tolerance (Harell 2010). Multiple authors' research support this theory, finding that

individuals actively engaged in socio-economically, ethnically, and ideologically heterogeneous associations are more likely to be truly tolerant toward other groups, as are those who belong to more diverse networks and are therefore exposed to greater amounts of racial and ethnic diversity (Harell 2010; Rapp 2015; Rapp & Freitag 2015). Other authors question this theory, insisting that the effects of group identification and group conformity are significant enough to prevent any kind of overall adjustment of a group's attitude towards another simply on the basis of contact. Without denying that intergroup contact does positively affect interpersonal relations and attitudes, critics of the intergroup contact theory contend that these effects are very limited, and that the overall mentality of the group is not significantly affected by individual interactions, thus preventing elimination of intergroup prejudice solely through social contact (Forbes 1997). Other researchers emphasize heavily the environment of the contact, noting that intergroup contact in negative situations or unfavorable conditions "may increase prejudice and intergroup tension" and that the attitudes and personalities of the individuals involved as well as the "characteristics of the contact setting" are all factors contributing to the enhancement and inhibition of intergroup contact's effects (Amir 1976; Stephan 1987; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006). Ultimately, critics of intergroup contact hypotheses are unable to consistently demonstrate that contact does not reduce prejudice, especially at the individual level (Pettigrew et al. 2011). Thus, taking both its support and criticisms into account, the intergroup contact theory is the best candidate for the primary theory on which this study's hypotheses are based. This is further explained in the "Hypotheses" section of this paper.

Diversity, like tolerance, is a very subjective statistic; however, diversity is more of a relative statistic than an absolute one. A country with a wide variety of different cultures, religions, and ethnicities, all fairly evenly distributed (i.e. no one group of any kind holds a majority), can be said to be much more diverse than a country with a ninety percent white and Christian population. That said, although there is a lower bound on diversity (e.g. a country where all citizens are essentially the exact same), there is no concrete upper bound – and so diversity as a variable must always be discussed and compared relatively rather than absolutely. Janmaat (2012) investigated classroom diversity in England, Sweden, and Germany and its effect on both tolerance and participation. In order to measure diversity, the ethnic fractionalization index, computed using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, was used in order to enumerate the level of diversity of a population (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg 2003). Other authors, such as Qian (2013), who studied diversity and tolerance and their effects on business and entrepreneurship, and Dowd (2016), who examined religious diversity and religious tolerance, also utilized the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as it applies to diversity in order to quantify this variable. In this sense, diversity is defined as the sum of the squares of the population shares of each group, in proportion to the average population share, accounting for the probability of two randomly selected people from the same population belonging to different groups (Alesina et al., 2003). In general, this method is the most preferred for quantifying diversity of a large community as an independent variable, as long as accurate and up-to-date demographical statistics are available. The only issue with quantifying diversity in this manner is that it fails to take into account whether any given individual actually experiences diversity.

For this reason, factoring in perception of diversity may provide a better estimate of the true levels of intergroup contact that one experiences.

Dowd's (2016) research involved analyzing how religious diversity affects the likelihood that communities encourage or discourage respect for religious freedom. When comparing the impact of religious observance on respect for religious freedom across four settings, it was found that religious observance had a more positive impact on respect for religious freedom in the most religiously diverse and integrated of the four settings. The data suggests that religious segregation, rather than religious diversity, inhibited religious-based support for religious tolerance (Dowd 2016). This falls in line with the contact theory; interaction between different religious groups serves to reduce prejudice between them. For example, even small amounts of contact with Muslim-Americans often leads to greater tolerance of their culture and beliefs (Nacos & Torres-Reyna 2007; Merino 2010). On the other hand, segregation is likely to only enhance prejudice and hinder the fostering of tolerance (Dowd 2016). Merino's (2010) research takes a different approach, using diversity as a dependent variable and examining responses to religious diversity at the national and community level within the United States. Nearly ninety percent of respondents either strongly or somewhat agreed that religious diversity has been good for America; this suggests that theologically exclusive beliefs held by a substantial percentage of Americans are a significant hurdle to the full inclusion of non-Christians in American society, and like Dowd's (2016) research, it supports both the intergroup contact theory and Berger's (1967) hypothesis that the coexistence of multiple religions ultimately "erodes" religious beliefs by bringing people with different beliefs into contact (Merino 2010). Nevertheless, this erosion process can

be hindered by strict religious groups with “theological exclusivity” that generally discourage interaction with those who do not belong to their religious sect (Berger 1967; Merino 2010). It is important to take factors such as culture, ethnicity, and sociopolitical status into account in addition to religion when examining diversity, partially because simply differentiating people based on religion leads to ignoring other aspects of the individual, like the factors listed above, which link them to members of other religious groups.

One study that specifically focused on the effect of diversity on tolerance was Janmaat’s (2012) investigation of classroom ethno-racial diversity and how it affects both tolerance and participation. In this study, the ethnic fractionalization index was used to measure ethnic diversity (Alesina et al. 2003). This index takes both the number of ethnic affiliations and the size of each group into account. Similarly to Rapp’s (2015) study, Janmaat identified two contrasting theories on the relationship between diversity and tolerance: the intergroup conflict theory and the intergroup contact theory (Putnam 2007; Janmaat 2012; Rapp 2015). The conflict theory focuses on the idea of the majority group perceiving the minority group(s) as a threat. Thus, tolerance and size of the minority group have a negative correlation and hostility to minority groups is at a low in homogeneous societies (Blalock 1967; Janmaat 2012). The second theory, the intergroup contact perspective, offers a much different view of intergroup relations and the effects of a homogeneous society. According to this theory, isolation serves as a breeding ground for stereotypes, usually negative, and the best way to overcome prejudice is to allow for intermingling of diverse groups (Janmaat 2012). There are, however, a set of prerequisites for this to be most effective: the groups must be equal in

terms of rights, they must share common experiences and goals, and the contact between the groups must be frequent and continuous (Allport 1954; Gurin, Nagda, & Lopez 2004; Janmaat 2012). Generally, in academic, community, and societal situations, these conditions are met, and because of this, the concepts of the contact theory can reasonably be applied. In Janmaat's (2012) study, a positive effect of classroom diversity on ethnic tolerance was found in schools in Sweden and Germany, which is in agreement with the contact perspective on inter-ethnic relations. Ethnic majority students in Germany and Sweden turned out to have significantly more tolerant views on immigrants, the minority group, when their classrooms were more diverse (Janmaat 2012). Despite this, Janmaat's hypothesis was not supported due to a lack of consistent link in diversity. The effect of diversity varies, and country-specific factors certainly do influence the effects of interethnic tolerance.

Another study focusing on the relationship between tolerance and diversity was conducted by Rapp and Freitag (2015), in which the process by which associational diversity relates to the formation of tolerance is investigated, along with the importance of associations as schools of tolerance. Similarly to Janmaat's (2012) study on tolerance in European classrooms and Rapp's (2015) study on cultural diversity and tolerance in Swiss municipalities, Rapp and Freitag (2015) advocate for the contact theory, wherein consistent contact in diverse settings acts to reduce prejudice and increase tolerance towards opposing groups. In their study, active involvement in volunteer associations and its relationship to tolerance is examined and the data showed that as levels of diversity increased, the likelihood of intolerance in an individual declined. One unique aspect of this study is that while Rapp and Freitag (2015) used the

well-established 'least-liked group' method (Gibson 1992), or 'content-controlled' method (Sullivan et al. 1982), to measure tolerance, they chose a different approach to measuring diversity, instead subjectively capturing perceived diversity among respondents to the survey in order to operationalize their independent variable (Rapp & Freitag 2015). They found that those actively engaged in socioeconomically, ethnically, and ideologically heterogeneous associations are more likely to be truly tolerant towards other groups; however, as the length of exposure to such a diverse environment increases, tolerance was shown to somewhat decline (Rapp & Freitag 2015). This gives credence to the aforementioned competition thesis: it is possible that prolonged exposure to minority groups allows individuals to witness these groups expand and become a perceived threat to the majority, as explained by the group threat theory (Hwang and Murdock 1991; Hjern 2007; Rapp 2015). In general, however, the intergroup contact theory is the best approach in this study of the relationship between tolerance and diversity, particularly because the length of a college education is not sufficient to meet the definition of "prolonged exposure" to the point of a decline in tolerance.

Hypotheses

The primary reason to focus on the intergroup contact theory over the ethnic competition thesis when forming a hypothesis is that school is, at all levels, far more of a collaborative environment rather than a competitive one. Every student has the chance to graduate and be successful, and other students' successes does not change that opportunity. Additionally, throughout the process of attending the forty or more classes usually necessary to graduate from a four-year institution, one will generally be

exposed to a wide variety of different people. Of course, the level of diversity of this group is highly dependent on the size and demographics of the school, but one of the goals of this study is to show that students who attend universities that are large, diverse, or both are often quite tolerant of those who are different from them, either in race, religion, culture, or background. Past political tolerance research supports this, suggesting that exposure is likely to increase the cognitive skills that lead to greater levels of tolerance (Harell 2010). Furthermore, the necessary conditions outlined by Allport (1954) for intergroup contact to have positive effects are all adequately met in a university environment: different groups hold equal status, they share common goals, they cooperate between each other, and they all have the support of authorities – in this case, university officials, professors, and staff. The essential question of this study asks how the amount of diversity on college campuses affects students' tolerance of different cultures, beliefs, or backgrounds. Taking the principles of the intergroup contact theory into account, two clear hypotheses can be logically formulated as follows:

H₁: *Students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of political tolerance towards different religious and ethno-racial groups.*

H₂: *Students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of personal tolerance towards individuals of different religious and ethno-racial groups.*

Methodology

The intergroup contact theory suggests that those with more direct contact and exposure to groups of people different from their own will be more tolerant of these different groups. Additionally, college campuses provide a perfect environment for contact between wide varieties of groups. With these two statements in mind, the hypotheses of this study are formed, stating that students attending more diverse universities should demonstrate higher levels of both personal and political tolerance for different religious and ethno-racial groups. In order to test these hypotheses, an online survey is designed to be distributed by college professors to their students to obtain a representative sample of students at three Eastern universities: Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU), Christopher Newport University (CNU), and Mars Hill University (MHU). These three universities each present a different environment: VCU is by far the most diverse, with 49% of its student body being nonwhite. MHU, a small, private, Christian university, is less diverse, with slightly over one third of its students being students of color. CNU, while being less racially diverse than Mars Hill, offers a more religiously diverse student body, as it is a public school with no religious affiliations. The anonymous, online survey asks respondents a variety of questions: first, about personal information such as their religious and racial background, as well as their length of attendance at their current school. Next, they are asked about how diverse they perceived their own environment to be: friends, classes, and school as a whole. Respondents are also quizzed with questions about various religious and ethnic groups and foreign countries to determine their level of religious and cultural literacy. Finally, respondents complete a

series of questions to determine their levels of both personal and political tolerance. For more details on exact survey contents, see Appendix.

The independent variable of this study is diversity; however, this is split into several different variables in order to create a more comprehensive and detailed regression analysis. In total, there are eleven predicting variables used for linear regression, each drawn from different sections of the survey. The first of these is Perception of Diversity, which represents the perceived diversity of the respondents' environments, as described in their survey responses. This variable receives a value between 1 and 5, with a higher value indicating a more diverse environment; this score was determined based on answers to questions about the racial, ethnic, and religious diversity of the respondent's friends, classes, and school as a whole. The second is Importance of Diversity, which uses respondents' answers to questions about how they personally felt about diversity to assign them a score between 1 and 5, with higher values indicating a more favorable view of diversity and a higher importance. The next two variables, Religious and Cultural Literacy, are drawn from the results of the religious and cultural literacy quiz embedded in the survey. Respondents were asked twelve questions total on the quiz; six about religious groups, texts, and traditions, and six about the culture of certain countries and ethnic groups. The value for these variables are from 0 to 6, each representing the number of questions the respondent answered correctly in the corresponding section. This variable helps to explain their exposure to diversity by testing their knowledge of other religious and cultures. The fifth variable is Length of Attendance, assigned a value from 1 to 5, with a larger number corresponding to more time spent at the school. This is factored in because if a school is a diverse environment, and being in

this environment affects tolerance, then the amount of time spent in that environment should also affect tolerance. The remainder of the predicting variables receive a value of either 0 or 1, making them dichotomous variables: the first of these are Race/Ethnicity and Religion. Since White/Caucasian and Christian serve as the majority in each category respectively, not just in the survey results but also in the general population, they are considered the majority group in this context, and so respondents who selected White/Caucasian as their Race/Ethnicity receive a value of 0 for that variable, and respondents who select Christian as their Religion receive a value of 0 for the religion variable. Those who selected a race or ethnicity other than White/Caucasian receive a score of 1 for the race/ethnicity variable, and those who selected a religion other than Christianity receive a score of 1 for the religion variable. The next variable, titled "Born in US," simply gives respondents a score of 1 if they were not born in the United States, and a 0 otherwise. The last few variables are derived from questions about with whom the respondents live or have lived: there are three variables under this category, one each for whether or not the respondent lives or has lived with a non-related individual of a different race, ethnicity, or religion. Each of these receive a value of 0 or 1, where 1 indicates that they did live with someone who was of a different race/ethnicity/religion. As a whole, this set of variables is intended to best demonstrate which factors that play into diversity have the highest correlation with increased tolerance. Both diversity and intergroup contact as a whole are difficult to measure, but when split up into the individual parts, it is easier to see the relevance of each aspect of these concepts.

The dependent variable of this study is tolerance; the primary purpose of the survey is to measure each respondent's level of tolerance. A

common approach to testing tolerance involves questioning respondents about their 'least-liked group' in order to remove bias and focus on a group that the respondent actively dislikes rather than one they are indifferent about. This method defines tolerance as a "willingness to put up with" something that they previously or currently reject or oppose (Sullivan et al. 1982; Harell 2010; Rapp & Freitag 2015). This approach does have its own issues; in this case each respondent's tolerance score is heavily dependent on whether or not there exists a group they can define as 'least-liked' and their ability to identify this. Especially in a college environment, as is the case with this survey, it is not unreasonable to assume that students, who tend to be more tolerant than older adults, may struggle with choosing a racial or ethnic group that they strongly object to in any way. For this reason, a more open-minded approach to defining tolerance, one that does not imply a preexisting rejection of a group, may be better for this study. In this sense tolerance can be defined as the state of being prepared to respect the social, civil, and political rights of others (Gibson 1992; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). The risk of this definition is that it often accompanies questions about specific groups (e.g. Muslims, Syrian refugees, etc.) rather than generalized questions about groups that are different from the respondent; this presents a clear opportunity for confounding variables as respondents who have exposure or belong to the group in question will provide a different perspective from those who do not. The solution to this issue is general questions that do not focus on any specific group, whether it be a minority or a dominant group, presenting questions that ask about respondent's feelings, perceptions, and opinions of groups that are different from their own as a whole. This avoids the

potential bias that comes with asking about a specific group while still giving an accurate estimate of an individual's tolerance level.

Tolerance, as the dependent variable, comes solely from the survey results. In this study, tolerance is split into two categories: personal tolerance and political tolerance. Personal tolerance, or social tolerance, as it can also be called, is the tolerance of the inherent diversity of large social groups or communities (Dima & Dima 2016). Individuals that are more socially tolerant are more comfortable interacting with different groups and would be less likely, for example, to refuse to go on a date with someone solely on the grounds of their race or ethnicity. Political tolerance, on the other hand, can be defined as accepting "the full legal rights" of an individual or group of individuals, "regardless of how dangerous or repugnant" their views might seem to be (Sullivan et al. 1982; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry 1996; Bloom & Bagno-Moldavsky 2015). In total, respondents are asked twelve questions about political tolerance and eight questions about personal tolerance; each question had five answer options receiving a score from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating higher tolerance. The scores for all of the questions for each section are averaged together to get two values between 1 and 5 to represent each respondent's personal and political tolerance. Since all of the variables assume a numerical form on a similar scale, the data is modeled using a simple linear regression to determine correlation between diversity and tolerance. The results and analysis of this regression as well as other conclusions that can be drawn from the data are outlined and explained in the proceeding Results section.

Results

Table 1: Model Summary for Political Tolerance				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.689 ^a	.475	.424	.488059
a. Predictors: (Constant), Lived with different ethnicity?, Born in US?, Importance of Diversity, Religious Knowledge Quiz Score, Lived with different religion?, Length of Attendance, Religion, Race/Ethnicity, Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score, Perception of Diversity, Lived with different race?				
Table 2: Model Summary for Personal Tolerance				
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.612 ^a	.375	.315	.548209
a. Predictors: (Constant), Lived with different ethnicity?, Born in US?, Importance of Diversity, Religious Knowledge Quiz Score, Lived with different religion?, Length of Attendance, Religion, Race/Ethnicity, Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score, Perception of Diversity, Lived with different race?				

Table 3: Coefficients for Political Tolerance

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2.036	.330		6.162	.000
Perception of Diversity	-.051	.069	-.058	-.741	.460
Religious Knowledge Quiz Score	-.022	.039	-.044	-.561	.576
Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score	-.002	.037	-.003	-.041	.968
Importance of Diversity	.403	.056	.548	7.256	.000
Race/Ethnicity	.018	.110	.013	.162	.872
Religion	.451	.095	.350	4.757	.000
Born in US?	-.404	.177	-.170	-2.289	.024
Length of Attendance	-.040	.039	-.076	-1.014	.313
Lived with different religion?	-.045	.117	-.028	-.384	.702
Lived with different race?	-.135	.182	-.104	-.741	.460
Lived with different ethnicity?	.202	.177	.154	1.146	.254

a. Dependent Variable: Political Tolerance

Table 4: Coefficients for Personal Tolerance

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Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
	(Constant)	2.195	.371		5.914	.000
	Perception of Diversity	.170	.078	.187	2.177	.032
	Religious Knowledge Quiz Score	.003	.044	.005	.062	.951
	Cultural Knowledge Quiz Score	-.080	.042	-.161	-1.929	.056
	Importance of Diversity	.249	.062	.328	3.979	.000
	Race/Ethnicity	-.055	.124	-.038	-.444	.658
	Religion	.396	.106	.298	3.719	.000
	Born in US?	-.077	.198	-.031	-.387	.699
	Length of Attendance	-.006	.044	-.010	-.129	.898
	Lived with different religion?	.082	.131	.049	.624	.534
	Lived with different race?	.025	.204	.018	.120	.905
	Lived with different ethnicity?	.243	.198	.179	1.224	.224
a. Dependent Variable: Personal Tolerance						

Two regression analyses were run, the results of which are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 above. Tables 1 and 3 pertain to the first regression analysis, comparing the predicting variables to the first dependent variable:

political tolerance. Table 1 depicts the R-squared value of 0.475 suggests that 47.5% of the variance in respondents' political tolerance scores can be predicted from the eleven independent variables, which are outlined in the methodology section and listed below the table. Table 2 shows that the strength of association for personal tolerance is not as strong; the R-squared value of 0.375 suggests that 37.5% of the variance in students' personal tolerance scores can be predicted from the explanatory variables. This is a flat decrease of ten percentage points between political and personal tolerance, insinuating that diversity and the factors that compose it better explain the former than the latter; however, which predicting variables actually significantly affect the tolerance variables differs between the two.

The standardized and unstandardized coefficients of each predicting variable as well as the statistical significance of each are shown in Tables 3 and 4, for political and personal tolerance respectively. At a significance level of $\alpha=0.05$, the following variables are significant predictors of political tolerance: Importance of Diversity, Religion, and Born in US. Of these, Importance of Diversity has the greatest effect on political tolerance, as its Standardized β (Beta) value of 0.548 is greater than that of Religion (0.350) and Born in US (-0.170). In fact, because the Born in US variable received a value of 0 for those born in the United States and 1 otherwise, the unstandardized B-value of -0.404 suggests that respondents born outside of the US scored an average of 0.404 points lower out of 5 on the political tolerance section of the survey. The positive unstandardized B-values for Importance of Diversity and Religion indicate the following: first, an increase of 1 point of the Importance of Diversity variable suggests a corresponding increase of 0.403 points for the political tolerance variable

(both are on a scale from 1 to 5). In other words, the average difference in political tolerance between a student with an Importance of Diversity score of 1 and one with a score of 5 would be 1.612 – a fairly significant number. Second, a similar trend is suggested by the B-value for Religion: as this variable was dichotomous, it only received a value of 0 or 1, with 0 corresponding to Christian and 1 otherwise; the average difference between political tolerance scores of non-Christians versus Christians was 0.451, implying that non-Christians are somewhat more tolerant than Christians. The fact that the survey was fairly evenly distributed between non-Christians and Christians strengthens this assumption; see Table 5 for the distribution of religion of respondents. This data is not sufficient to support the first hypothesis of this study because Perception of Diversity did not correlate positively with political tolerance, H_1 is not supported by the data.

Table 5: Religion Frequency Table

		Freq uency	Per cent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Christian	70	55.6	55.6	55.6
	Not Christian	56	44.4	44.4	100.0
	Total	126	100.0	100.0	

For personal tolerance, the statistically significant predicting variables were somewhat different. At a significance level of $\alpha=0.05$, the variables Perception of Diversity, Importance of Diversity, and Religion

were all statistically significant. This suggests a few noteworthy things. First, a diverse environment only has a meaningful effect on personal, or social, tolerance, but does not affect students' perceptions and opinions of the legal rights of groups different from their own. Second, while being born outside of the United States actually correlates with a slightly reduced political tolerance, it has no significant effect on personal tolerance, meaning that foreign-born students have different perceptions on the legal rights of different groups than American-born ones, but maintain similar perceptions of different groups on a social and personal level as compared to American-born respondents. Of these three significant variables, Importance of Diversity is once again the strongest predictor, indicating that of the variables factoring into diversity, the importance of diversity to each respondent has the greatest correspondence with higher tolerance. With an unstandardized B-value of 0.249, as shown in Table 4, it is suggested that a student who indicated that diversity was extremely important to them (received a score of 5 for this variable) would, on average, have a personal tolerance score 0.996 points higher than one who indicated that diversity was entirely unimportant to them (received a score of 1 for this variable). Similarly to political tolerance, the B-value Religion variable demonstrates that non-Christians are more tolerant; they receive personal tolerance scores 0.396 points higher on average compared to Christians. The Perception of Diversity variable is statistically significant with regards to its ability to predict personal tolerance. Specifically, the unstandardized B-value of 0.170 suggests that respondents who reported that their environment was extremely diverse (received a score of 5 for this variable) would, on average, have a personal tolerance score 0.68 points higher than those who reported that their environment was very

homogeneous (received a score of 1 for this variable). Recall that the second hypothesis of this study is that those students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of personal tolerance for different religious and ethno-racial groups; for this hypothesis to be supported by the data, the Perception of Diversity would have to display a statistically significant positive correlation with personal forms of tolerance. Because it is statistically significantly positive in predicting personal tolerance, the second hypothesis is supported by the data.

While the variables mentioned and analyzed above are the only statistically significant predictors of tolerance, examination of the statistically insignificant variables can still provide insight into trends related to diversity and tolerance. First, Tables 3 and 4 show that Cultural and Religious Knowledge has essentially no correlation whatsoever with either form of tolerance. Not only are neither of them statistically significant in either regression, but the B-values for these predictors are consistently very close to 0. On the other hand, the Lived with Different Ethnicity variable has a moderately large B-value in both regressions; however, it is statistically insignificant in both as well. This suggests that if the data set was larger, whether or not the respondent lived with someone of a different ethnicity may actually have been a noteworthy predictor of both forms of tolerance. This is interesting for multiple reasons: first, in neither case was the Race/Ethnicity variable a significant predictor of tolerance, and second, none of the other 'Lived with' variables had B-values as large as that of this one, and the other 'Lived with' variables were far less statistically significant as well (even greater p-values).

The data resulting from this study's survey and the preceding analysis suggest several correlations. One of which being that of the personal characteristics reported, a student's Religion is the best predictor of tolerance. Second, one's opinion of diversity is a strong predictor of tolerance as well; this may be unsurprising, as those who are tolerant of other groups should have no qualms with diversity, but it does lend support to the validity of the results of this study. Finally, contact with groups different from one's own, as represented by the diversity of one's environment, only demonstrates a positive correlation with personal tolerance, indicating that opinions of the legal rights of other groups are likely not affected by intergroup contact. Furthermore, students born inside of the United States show a better respect for the American concept of equal rights for all citizens, as the Born in US variable demonstrated a negative correlation with political tolerance, hinting that immigration may be a source of intolerance in more ways than one.

Conclusions

First, it is important to note that this is a preliminary study in which a small fraction of the overall populations of the universities participated, and so the results may not be generalizable to the entire student bodies. That said, the principles of the intergroup contact theory are somewhat supported by the results of this study, as the data show that higher levels of social tolerance correspond to a more diverse environment. The fact that political tolerance does not correlate with a more diverse environment is not necessarily surprising; previous research has suggested that while intergroup contact usually lowers prejudice at an individual level, it can fail to do so at a group level of analysis (Forbes 1997; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006).

In essence, social tolerance is more of an individualized concept, especially in the context of this study. Individuals considered more personally tolerant are those who reported that they were more likely to interact with members of different groups and would be more comfortable doing so. On the other hand, political tolerance is more of a group attitude, shaped by the members of a given racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural group, rather than a select few individuals. Research on group psychologies supports this, noting that intergroup attitudes can only be changed after intergroup relations have adjusted, and an improvement in relations between some of the individual members of each group is not sufficient to make this change (Forbes 1997). This distinction between intergroup and interpersonal attitudes offers a reasonable explanation for why Perception of Diversity is a significant, positively-correlated predictor for personal tolerance, but an insignificant predictor for political tolerance. Interacting with other groups impacts how one personally treats and perceives certain members of different groups (i.e. their friends), but is not sufficient to uproot deep-seated political beliefs that have been reinforced for years by their family and their environment (Pettigrew 1998). Further research may be needed to determine which environment is best suited for the adjustment of political beliefs and increase of political tolerance.

There are many other questions raised by the results of this study. According to common theories about how intergroup contact increases tolerance, a behavioral and attitude improvement towards different groups results from repeated contact in a variety of settings, and repetition of intergroup encounters makes them more comfortable (Jackman & Crane 1986, Pettigrew 1998). A diverse university environment would seem to fit this description, yet neither personal nor political tolerance was

significantly impacted by length of attendance, which would best indicate the overall time spent interacting with members of different groups – a student who has attended a school for two years has had twice as much time to interact with members of different groups than a student who has only just attended for one. Another interesting question is why the results indicate no correlation between knowledge of different ethnic and religious groups: generally, being familiar with the traditions and principles of other groups suggests a more informed perspective on said group, whether this leads to a more positive or negative opinion of them. Overall, the majority of research on tolerance does not take religious and cultural literacy into account, thus further research is required to make meaningful conclusions about these variables.

Some of the results of this study, while not predicted by the hypotheses, are in line with expectations set by current polls and research. For example, the Born in US variable had a statistically significant negative correlation with political tolerance; this is supported by multiple international surveys of political tolerance. Americans are more tolerant than any other country's citizens when it comes to freedom of speech and press, even for those that they disagree with (see Wike & Simmons 2015; Wike 2016). As political tolerance involves respecting the legal rights of those that one disagrees with, it is unsurprising that individuals tolerant of the right of those with opposing views to share them are also more politically tolerant. Additionally, the fact that the Perception of Diversity variable had a statistically significant positive correlation with personal tolerance is exactly what the intergroup contact theory would predict: being in a diverse environment and being surrounded by members of

different groups corresponds to being more tolerant of the members of those groups, at the very least at an individual and interpersonal level.

The most important takeaway from this study is that religion was a main predictor of both types of tolerance, personal and political. This is noteworthy because the majority of studies that have examined the relationship between diversity and intergroup tolerance in the past have pertained to ethno-racial groups only, essentially focusing on the more visible human characteristic of appearance, which is generally very heavily impacted by race and ethnicity. Many of these studies have demonstrated a link between high levels of ethnic and racial diversity and high levels of tolerance, showing that prejudice tends to be lower in the environments of ethno-racially mixed schools (Janmaat 2012). A distinct lack of research on religious tolerance in schools in the United States exists. Some researchers have investigated countries as a whole, such as Dowd's (2016) findings that religious segregation severely inhibits tolerance in the case of Nigeria, but surveys or experimental studies on religious diversity and how it affects tolerance within the United States are few and far between. The findings of this study suggest that those who are non-Christian (i.e. in a minority religious group in the US) are more tolerant, both politically and socially, of groups different from their own. This presents a significant opportunity for further research, such as investigations as to why Christians in the U.S. seem to be less tolerant than their non-Christian counterparts.

Overall, the hypotheses that students that attend more diverse colleges and are exposed to more diversity should demonstrate higher levels of tolerance for different religious and ethno-racial groups was somewhat but not entirely supported by the results. Perception of Diversity did correlate positively with personal tolerance, and a positive opinion of

diversity correlated positively with both forms of tolerance, but this is not sufficient to fully support both hypotheses – only H₂ can be said to be sufficiently supported by the data. Taking these results and past research into account, it seems that the best avenue for further research is to investigate religion and how one’s religious beliefs and upbringing impacts not just their religious tolerance, but their tolerance of different ethno-racial groups as well.

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Identity and Social Movements: Analyzing Social Movement Participation through Identity Theory

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Abstract

This paper investigates the potential relationship between the strength of one's social identities and their likelihood to support social movements structured around those identities, as well as the relationship between social identity and an individuals' proclivity to participate in such movements. Drawing on social identity theory, this paper looks at social identity from a number of angles—the paper investigates strength of social identities such as race, gender and sexuality, and analyzes them in relation to support for, and active participation within, current movements and groups dedicated to creating policy change for those groups.

Introduction

Social movements have long been avenues of radical social change. While earlier social movements focused on political representation or Marxist class-based struggles, recent studies of social movements show a new trend based on social identity. From the civil rights movement of the 1960s to the feminist movement of the 1980s, social movements have existed for decades as a way in which identity groups fight for equality.

Identity-based social movements have been incredibly influential in inciting social change. For example, during the 1960s, change regarding African American social rights was largely made possible by the works of identity-based groups such as the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). These groups, and many others, were effective in mobilizing African Americans and other sympathizers to support legislative and social change. As identity-based social movements rose to prominence in the 1980s, similar achievements were made in advancing women's rights and

LGBTQ rights. For this reason, social movements are viable mechanisms by which to ignite change.

The study of social movements is normatively important to the field of political science because participation in social movements is a characteristic of societies with high levels of democracy (Della Porta, 2015). In addition, participation in social movements is indicative political participation, as those who participate in social movements are also likely to participate in political activities such as lobbying, canvassing, and voting (Cisar, 2015). Moreover, social movements are signs of a country's political landscape, and can potentially foretell regime change and political revolution (Goodwin & Rojas, 2015).

As identity-based social movements are some of the most influential movements regarding political change, this paper will seek to answer the question, "Why are individuals motivated to participate in identity-based social movements?" Utilizing identity theory and theories of identity salience and interdependence, this paper will conduct a survey and analyze collected data to answer the research question. Additionally, this paper will explore the implications of the data analysis and suggest several future research trajectories.

Social Movement Participation: Macro-Level Theories of Participation

Over the past several decades, the study of social movements such as environmentalism, women's rights, and LGBTQ rights has led to an increasingly diverse range of theories. Theories behind social movement participation range in scope from macro to micro, oftentimes building upon previously established theories (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). There are three primary macro-level schools of thought regarding participation in social

movements: political process theory (PPT), resource mobilization theory (RMT), and identity theory (IT) (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).

Scholars of the first primary theory, political process theory (PPT), propose that participation in social movements is based on the individual's perception that their political and governmental institutions offer opportunities for social change (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). This theory considers the accessibility of political and governmental institutions as the motivating factor for social movement participation. According to PPT, in societies where political and governmental institutions are closed off, restrictive or unlikely to respond to change, people are less likely to participate social movements. Likewise, Political Process theorists assert that within societies where political and governmental institutions are flexible and open to change, people are more likely to participate in social movements. PPT asserts that people participate in social movements based on their belief that their governmental institutions will be open to the changes that they desire (Cisar, 2015) (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).

Scholars of the second primary theory, resource mobilization theory, argue from a similar perspective of strategic motivation (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). RMT maintains that individuals participate in specific social movements opposed to others simply because those specific movements offer incentives (ranging anywhere from career-related benefits to monetary goods) for participation. RMT theorists maintain that if an individual perceives that a social movement offers incentives for benefits that the individual does not already have, the individual is more likely to participate in that social movement. In this sense, individuals participate in certain movements based on the financial or professional incentives that the social movement offers (Della Porta & Diani, 2015).

Finally, scholars of the third primary theory, identity theory, assert that participation in social movements is based on the individual's identity (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). Identity is often described in terms of a collective group identity, and identity theorists assert that "movement participation [is] an expression of identification with a group" (Klandermans, 2015). IT identifies four competing micro-level theories of motivation: collective identity theory, "crushed" identity theory, competitive identity theory, and connected identity theory, which will be discussed later in this study.

Macro-Models of Rational/Strategic Participation

From a strictly abstract level, both PPT and RMT operate from a rationalist perspective. In brief, rationalist models contend that individuals are rational actors that are moved to participate based on "individual self-interest" (Oliver 2015, p 246). PPT asserts that for individuals living in societies in which the governmental and political institutions are open and accessible, it is rational to participate in social movements. For individuals living in societies that are antithetical to the ones previously mentioned, it is rational for individuals to refrain from participation in social movements. For PPT theorists, it is only rational to participate in social movements if governmental and political institutions are open to change. (Eder, 2015).

Similarly, RMT asserts that an individual's participation in a social movement is based on a rational assumption that participating in a social movement will lead to access to resources and benefits unattainable without participation in that movement (Della Porta and Diani, 2015). For example, according to RMT theorists, it would be rational for an individual to

participate in a social movement that offered financial incentives for joining. It would similarly be rational for an individual to participate in a social movement if that movement offered an opportunity for a desirable job or position.

As rational theoretical models, both RMT and PPT imply that an individual's decision to participate in a social movement is based on a strategic perception that participation in social movements will in some way benefit the individual personally. These benefits are weighed on a system of "pros and cons". According to both theories, individuals participate only when they believe that the gains of participation in the social movement outweigh the costs of participation. For PPT and RMT theorists, individuals must weigh the potential gains (political change or financial incentives, respectively) of participating in successful movements with the potential costs (social stigmatization, exacerbated discrimination, loss of social standing) that participation may accrue should the movement fail.

For these reasons, RMT and PPT have often been linked to game-theory explanations of social theory (Eder, 2015). According to some critics, RMT and PPT are oversimplifications of individual behavior, as they reduce individual behavior in terms of basic, two-level structures (Eder, 2015). In doing so, they paint an incomplete narrative; in fact, scholar Klaus Eder claims that these models are "theoretically deficient since [they are] based on a short cut between the individual actor and social institutions." (Eder, 2015, p. 41). In other words, both RMT and PPT create broad generalizations that are not useful in understanding the complexities of social movement participation.

Moreover, although PPT and RMT establish factors that lead an individual to act rationally, they are limited in explaining irrational action

(Eder 2015). PPT and RMT are only truly applicable when an individual is acting in self-interest, but there are many scenarios in which an individual could choose to participate in a social movement even when participation is not related to the individual's own self-interest. For example, rationalist models oftentimes have difficulty explaining participation in civil rights movements. Scholar Pamela Oliver specifically highlights the inability of rationalist models to explain motivation and participation in the American civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s, wherein individuals who openly participated in these movements risked substantial physical, social, and economic harm to achieve civil rights. For many rationalists, the potential benefits of achieving civil rights would not obviously outweigh the costs of participation. Rationalist models of self-interest such as PPT and RMT do not account for situations when an individual acts even when it is not obviously beneficial to do so. Oliver asserts that to understand why individuals participate in movements in which the pros do not obviously outweigh the cons, one must evaluate motivations for participation at a deeper psychological level (Oliver 2015). A more in-depth understanding of social movements is necessary for this study; therefore, this study will not utilize PPT and RMT as explanatory factors for social movement participation.

Identity Theory: A Non-Rationalist Theory of Motivation

A deeper understanding of the psychological motivations of social movement participation can be found within the third primary macro-level school. Scholars of the third primary theory, identity theory, assert that participation in social movements is based on the individual's identity (Della Porta & Diani, 2015). Often, identity is described in terms of a collective

group identity, and identity theorists assert that “movement participation [is] an expression of identification with a group” (Klandermans, 2015). IT identifies four competing micro-level theories of motivation: collective identity theory, “crushed” identity theory, competitive identity theory, and connected identity theory.

Identity theory differs from the prior two theories in that it places emphasis on perceptions of individual identity. Identity itself refers to an individual’s own perception of his/her social relationship within a given context or environment (Stryker, 2015). Identities can be construed either broadly or narrowly, and it is common for individuals to form more than one identity (Stryker, 2015). In addition, identities may change over time, and often vary in importance based on situational context. Identity may also be extended to include the collective group, or may be limited entirely to the self and the individual (Stryker 2015).

Identity theory works to identify behavioral choices and seeks to analyze why exactly individuals choose to do certain things; according to identity theory scholars, all behavioral choices are based on the individual’s perceived identity. In explaining social movement participation, identity theory and its subsequent micro-theories are important because they work to explain the complexities of individual motivations. These theories also work to explain the reasons why individuals participate in movements as well as why individuals may abstain from such participation (Stryker, 2015). As the research question in this study is specifically targeted towards participation in identity based social movements, identity theory is the most relevant theory, as it allows the research to better understand motives of participation in identity-based social movements from a more complex level.

Micro-Level Theories of Motivation

As previously mentioned, there are four micro-level theories of motivation, which, for the sake of the research, will be referred to throughout this paper as the “Four Cs”. As all of the following theories fall under the umbrella of identity theory, many of them employ similar arguments and concepts. Nevertheless, it is useful to define each theory individually as certain concepts within these theories will be used to conceptualize other terms later in this study.

The first “C” theory is that of collective identity. Within this theory, individuals are motivated to participate based on their perception that they share a common identity with those members of the social group. According to scholar Verta Taylor, “collective identity is the shared definition of a group that derives from its members’ common interests in solidarity” (Taylor, 1989). Scholars of collective identity theory assert that it is a powerful motivational method, as it allows individuals to connect with a larger group or community. When individuals identify beyond the “me” and connect with the “we”, they are likely to be more motivated to participate in a social movement. Identity as a collective concept is thought to lead to social change because it fosters collectivization of resources, ideas, and goals (Stryker, 2015). Though collective identity theory is helpful in understanding group mobilization, it does little to explain instances of identity intersectionality, and is thus too broad to utilize within this study.

The second “C” theory is that of “crushed” identity. Within “crushed” identity theory, also referred to as “rejection/stigmatized” identity theory, individuals are motivated to participate in an identity-based social movement based on their perception that this particular identity has been stigmatized or rejected by society (Kaplan & Liu, 2015). Scholars

Howard Kaplan and Xiaru Liu describe this theory as a “coping” mechanism for those that identify with stigmatized groups (2015). Within their study, they find that those that identify with a group that has been stigmatized in the past join social movements in order to improve their own perceptions of these stigmatized identities (Kaplan & Xiaru, 2015). More simply put, Kaplan and Liu assert that individuals are likely to join identity-based social movements if it increases their own self-esteem (2015).

Within this theory, Liu and Kaplan extensively focus on the role that emotions, particularly shame and pride, play in an individual’s decision to participate in a movement. For many members of stigmatized groups, low self-esteem is attributed to the shame that comes from discrimination and a perception of being the “other”. Shame, according to Liu and Kaplan, later turns to anger, which is the primary motivating factor that leads to participation. This anger is usually directed towards members of the majority group, who are perceived as possessing some right that the stigmatized majority does not have. Anger is later transformed to pride; Liu and Kaplan state that “anger... creates pride by booting participants out of hiding and into a public arena of collective action” (2015, p. 259). Pride then raises self-esteem; in this way, participation in social movement leads to the “crushed” individual feeling in some way redeemed or validated. However, while this theory is useful in understanding the role that self-esteem, positive perceptions, and stigmatization play in the motivational process, it is not vastly useful to the study because it is targeted specifically towards stigmatized identity groups and is therefore limited in scope.

The third “C” theory is that of competitive identity theory. Within this theory, individuals have a hierarchy of several salient identities, and individuals participate in a social movement based on identity salience

(Stryker, 2015). Specifically, Scholar Sheldon Stryker states that “The theory proposed that choice among behaviors expressive of particular roles reflects relative location in a salience hierarchy of identities associated with those roles.”(Stryker, 2015, p. 28). Saliency, as used in Stryker’s study, refers to the relative importance of an identity when it is considered amongst other identities. For example, if an individual feels that their gender identification is more important than their racial identification, gender identity may be considered more salient within that individual. To Stryker, relative identity importance is key to motivation towards participation; the more important the identity is to an individual, the more motivated an individual is to participate in a social movement related to that identity (Stryker, 2015).

In Stryker’s view, individuals constantly reevaluate the relative importance of each identity they hold; in some cases, identities may conflict, and an individual may have to choose between two competing identities. Say, for example, that a person is made to choose between participating in a rally benefiting one identity based social movement, and an organized march benefiting another identity based movement. All other matters (pros/cons) being equal, Stryker asserts that the individual will participate in the activity that aligns with the identity they consider to be most personally important. In this respect, identity salience and participation in social movements are reciprocating in the sense that individuals participate in movements because of their saliency, and participation itself increases the saliency of that identity (Stryker, 2015). For example, if an individual who identifies strongly as a feminist attends a feminist political rally, the relative importance of that individual’s feminist identity is made stronger by the act of participating (Stryker, 2015). An increase in identity salience causes an increase in motivation, making

competitive identity theory an effective way of understanding identity and its relationship to motivation. A potential within this theory is that it is somewhat circular in nature. Still, the correlation between salience and participation exists in nearly every study using salience as a variable; thus, this paper will assume that the saliency theory is valid.

The fourth “C” theory is that of connected identity theory. Within this theory, individuals participate in social movements based on their perception that they are interdependent with the members of the social movement. Scholar Rupert Brown defines interdependence itself as the perception that “one person’s experiences, actions and outcomes are linked in some way to the experiences, actions and outcomes of others in the group.” (Brown, 1988, 27). Connected identity theory is split between two forms of interdependence: task interdependence and fate interdependence.

Task interdependence, according to Brown, refers to the belief that one shares a common goal with members of a group (1988). Task interdependence could be applied to any scenario in which the success or failure of each individual member of the group is dependent on the success of the group as a whole (Brown, 1988). Brown states that while task interdependence is an essential factor in all group interaction, it does not necessarily rely on social identity (Brown, 1988). For this reason, task interdependence will not be useful in this study because it does not necessarily pertain to social identities. The second form of interdependence, interdependence of fate, is more useful to this study. Interdependence of fate, according to scholar Kay Deaux, refers to “the belief that one’s own destiny is shared with similar others.” (Deaux, 1996). Deaux uses social movements based on ethnicity, gender, and sexuality in order to extrapolate on this theory. In her view, individuals who identify with these groups

generally have the perception that legislation or social stigmas targeted towards the group as a whole is also targeted to themselves (Deaux, 1996). Similarly, the success of one member of the group is viewed to be beneficial to the group as a whole. Say, for example, that an individual identifies herself as a member of the lesbian community. A bill enacted specifically targeting gay men might not necessarily directly affect the individual. However, if the individual perceives herself as having a linked fate with all members of the LGBTQ community, the individual may nonetheless feel strongly motivated to participate in a movement against that particular bill. Interdependence, therefore, helps to explain why individuals are motivated to participate in social movements even when they are not directly targeted.

Social Movement Participation through a lens of Identity Importance and Interdependence

To answer the research question at hand, it is necessary to utilize a theory that is nuanced and narrow in scope. While other micro and macro level theories present sound and cogent arguments, many are too broad in scope to be applied at the level of identity-based social movements. In addition, the previously mentioned rationalist theories are overly simplistic; because of this, applying these theories throughout this research paper would not produce the detailed results needed for proper analysis. For these reasons, this paper will primarily utilize identity theory. The final two theories discussed, competitive identity theory (Salience) and connected identity theory (Interdependence), are most pertinent to the research question that this study seeks to explain. These theories are most useful because they both account for reasons why an individual would participate

in a social movement, and reasons why an individual would choose not to participate in a social movement. In addition, these theories work from an individualistic level rather than a macro level, which enhances the ability of this study to be applied at a detailed level.

Data and Methodology

This study will conduct a survey in order to collect and measure data based on both interdependence and salience. Surveys are beneficial in identity studies because they allow the respondent to respond openly and honestly. Surveys are preferable to case studies or experiments because they allow researchers to ask specific and direct questions related to their primary research question. Surveys can be adapted to fit many research questions, which aids the researcher in collecting specific data points. While surveys may sometimes be weakened by confusing language or word structure, this study seeks to minimize that bias by presenting the questions in a clear and coherent manner. As a whole, surveys enable researchers to have a more nuanced understanding of the respondent's actual beliefs (Abdelal et al. 2009) (Sylvan and Metskas, 2009). This study's survey will be administered via SurveyMonkey.com to students attending universities in Southern and Northern plain-states

Identity: Measurement and Conceptualization of Key Variables

This study utilizes two primary independent variables: level of identity salience, and level of perceived identity interdependence. The primary dependent variables are level of participation in an identity-based social movement and level of support of an identity-based social

movement. As data will be collected based on the respondent's perception of their own identity, the unit of analysis for this study will be individuals.

The first independent variable (IV1) is level of salience. This variable is directly related to competitive identity theory, and is conceptualized as the relative importance of a held identity in respect to other held identities. While there is no definite way to measure importance, several academic studies suggest that importance can be measured by presenting the respondent with a list of commonly held identities and asking the respondent to rank each identity based on an ordinal scale (Brady & Kaplan, 2009). This study will follow a similar method of measurements. Respondents will first be given a list of nine social identities and will then be asked to list the importance of each identities on a scale of 1 – 10, with 1 being “not important at all” and 10 being “extremely important”. This variable will be coded using an ordinal scale, where 1 represents an extremely low level of identity importance, and 10 represents an extremely high level of identity importance. This scale will measure general identity importance; that is, the importance of an identity when not compared to other identities. Then, respondents will be given the same list of identities and will be asked to rank the personal importance of each identity as they relate to each other, with the rank of “1” signaling the identity they hold personally most important. As the SPSS data analysis program I will be using for this study traces variables from low to high, this variable will be coded so that a score of “9” represents the most important identity, and a score of “1” represents the least important identity. Taken together, these scales will allow me to analyze an individual's level of identity salience.

The second independent variable (IV2) is level of perceived interdependence. This variable is directly related to connected identity theory, and is conceptualized as the level of “linked-fate” perception, or, the extent to which the respondent believes that their individual fate is dependent on the fate of other members of an identity group. Fate, in this study, will be conceptualized from a perspective of success/failure. Most studies of linked fate use ordinal scales to measure this variable because it allows for variation in responses (Dawson, 2009). This study will follow a similar method of measurement. Respondents will be presented with a list of social identities and will be asked to rank, on a scale of 1 – 10, how much they feel that they share a similar fate as those in the identity group, with 10 meaning “my success/failure is not at all dependent on the success/failure of this group” and 1 meaning “my success/failure is entirely dependent on the success/failure of this group”. This variable will be coded using an ordinal scale, where 1 represents an extremely low level of perceived interdependence, and 10 represents an extremely high level of perceived interdependence.

The dependent variables are level of participation and level of support. Level of participation is conceptualized as the average number of times an individual has participated in an identity based social movement. To measure level of participation, individuals will be given a list of identity-based social activist groups and will be asked how many times they have actively participated in that group. These responses will be coded using interval measurements, with the lowest interval, signifying low levels of participation, coded as a 0, and the highest interval, signifying high levels of participation, coded as 4. Each respondent’s interval score will be averaged to analyze the average level of participation.

In addition to levels of participation, I will also be measuring level of support. This will account for respondents who may wish to participate in a movement, but have never had the opportunity to do so. This variable is important to the research question because level of support is a possible indicator of a respondent's future participation in that movement. To measure level of support, individuals will be presented with a statement regarding a social movement's goals, values, and missions, and will be asked to indicate their level of support for this statement. The responses will be coded on a six-point ordinal scale, with the lowest level of support "Strongly Disagree" being equal to 0, and the highest level of support "Strongly Agree" being equal to 6.

As it would be nearly impossible to compile a comprehensive list of every identity-based social activist group, I have chosen to highlight three social activist groups related to the variables I perceive to be most important regarding participation: race, gender, and sexuality. The groups I have chosen are Black Lives Matter (BLM), the National Organization for Women (NOW), and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC). These groups have been selected because they are all large, active, and highly influential organizations related to a particular identity group. In addition, all three groups have received significant media coverage over the past several years, and are thus more likely to be recognized by the vast majority of survey respondents.

Hypotheses

Based on these conceptualizations of the variables, this study will seek to test the following hypotheses:

H1: As the level of salience of an identity increases, the level of participation in and support of a social movement related to that identity increases.

H2: As the level of perceived identity interdependence increases, the level of participation in and support of a social movement related to that identity increases.

H3: Individuals are most likely to participate in, or support, an identity-based social movement if that identity is viewed to be both highly interdependent and highly salient.

Results & Methods of Analysis

To analyze the survey data, I performed several regression analyses using the SPSS database. Within each data set, I controlled for political science as a major, as this was a variable that could be controlled for within all cases. As certain survey responses were only available for those of a certain category (i.e. questions regarding NOW participation/support were only available for women) I decided to control for the excluded factors within each subgroup. For the analysis regarding gender participation/support, I controlled for race and sexual orientation. For the analysis regarding race participation/support, I controlled for sexual orientation and gender. For the analysis regarding sexual orientation participation/support, I controlled for race and gender.

In total, there were 163 respondents to the survey. As females are overrepresented through the survey data (n = 114), the gendered results were more robust than either the race related results (n = 29) and sexual orientation related results (n = 26). Because of the low sample size for black

respondents and respondents identifying on the LGBTQ spectrum, it is slightly more difficult to analyze these results with any level of significance. The results are still included below, as they will be further analyzed in the discussion.

Gender Results

In regard to the dependent variable *level of average participation*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence (Gender LF) and salience (GND SAL) was largely proven null. As shown in the above coefficients table, both linked fate and salience are insignificant in determining the average level of respondent participation in NOW. The only significant factors in determining participation in NOW seem to be race and sexuality; specifically, there is a significant correlation between being black, or being on the LGBTQ

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.050	.107		.468	.641
	Gender LF	.009	.012	.079	.748	.456
	GND SAL	-.021	.013	-.151	-1.603	.112
	Gender IMP	.015	.011	.144	1.383	.170
	POC	-.040	.079	-.058	-.508	.612
	POC (Just Black)	.201	.095	.234	2.111	.037
	Sexual Orientation	.163	.081	.186	2.016	.046
	PoliSci Major	.024	.070	.033	.343	.732

a. Dependent Variable: DV: Average Gender Participation

spectrum and participating in NOW. However, because both black respondents and LGBTQ respondents are so underrepresented within the data, it is difficult to draw any major conclusions between these control variables and participation.

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	4.258	.412		10.336	.000
	Gender LF	-.036	.047	-.083	-.763	.447
	GND SAL	-.031	.050	-.061	-.624	.534
	Gender IMP	.098	.043	.247	2.297	.024
	POC	.040	.306	.015	.129	.897
	POC (Just Black)	.461	.368	.144	1.254	.213
	Sexual Orientation	-.005	.312	-.001	-.015	.988
	PoliSci Major	-.020	.269	-.007	-.074	.941

a. Dependent Variable: Support of NOW

Similarly, in regard to the dependent variable *level of support*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence and saliency was proven null. A cursory glance at the above table would suggest that interdependence and salience negatively affect support; however, because both variables are highly insignificant, this effect can be disregarded. The only significant factor in determining support of NOW would appear to be the general level of gender importance (Gender IMP). This correlation between general importance and support of NOW is interesting as it seems to indicate that female respondents listed gender as being important in general, but not as important as other identities. Nevertheless, this variable will not be taken to support my hypothesis, as it has no statistical relation to salience or interdependence.

Race Results

In regard to the dependent variable of *level of participation*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence (Race LF) and salience (Race SAL) was again proven null by the race related data. As shown in the above table, both interdependence and salience were largely insignificant in predicting a person’s average BLM participation. Both sexual orientation and political orientation are somewhat significant, and suggest that those that are along the LGBTQ spectrum and those that are political science majors are more likely to participate in the BLM movement. However, the total responses for black individuals identifying as LGBTQ was extremely low (n = 5), thus, it is difficult to draw a conclusion regarding the correlation between sexuality and BLM participation. In contrast, the total responses for black individuals identifying as political science majors appears relatively high (n = 15) when compared to the total number of black respondents (n=29), which suggests that those black respondents who were political science majors were more

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	-.285	.587		-.485	.633
	Race LF	-.018	.056	-.062	-.317	.754
	Race SAL	.029	.059	.090	.494	.626
	Race IMP	.064	.051	.241	1.253	.223
	Gender	.388	.421	.174	.922	.366
	Sexual Orientation	1.001	.428	.418	2.341	.029
	PoliSci Major	.738	.358	.408	2.063	.051

a. Dependent Variable: Average BLM Participation

likely to participate in the BLM. Still, as shown above, the variable of political science major falls just beyond the limits of significance, and can therefore not be used as an accurate predictor of BLM participation.

In regard to the dependent variable of *level of support*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence and saliency was proven to be null. Both

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.393	.625		5.430	.000
	Race LF	.086	.060	.232	1.435	.165
	Race SAL	-.080	.063	-.191	-1.268	.218
	Race IMP	.047	.054	.138	.866	.396
	Gender	1.849	.448	.646	4.129	.000
	Sexual Orientation	.623	.455	.203	1.368	.185
	PoliSci Major	.143	.381	.062	.377	.710

a. Dependent Variable: BLM Support

saliency and interdependence were found to be poor predictors of an individual's support of BLM. There is, however, a significant positive correlation between gender and participation, which at first glance seems to indicate that black women are more likely to support the BLM movement than black men. Nonetheless, this correlation is likely skewed because of the overrepresentation of black women within the responses; black women (n=23) made up the clear majority of responses analyzed. Thus, this correlation can be largely disregarded.

Sexual Orientation Results

In regard to the dependent variable *level of participation*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence (Sexual Orientation LF) and salience (SO SAL), was yet again proven null. An analysis of HRC Participation resulted in no significant variables, and suggests that none of my variables were able

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.824	.932		4.102	.001
	Sexual orientation LF	-.195	.123	-.441	-1.595	.128
	SO IMP	.438	.139	1.009	3.156	.005
	SO SAL	-.208	.139	-.341	-1.496	.152
	Gender	.975	.627	.321	1.555	.137
	PoliSci Major	-1.001	.592	-.372	-1.692	.108
	POC	-.078	.705	-.029	-.110	.914
	POC (Just Black)	.492	.838	.123	.587	.565

a. Dependent Variable: Support of HRC

to predict levels of participation. As previously discussed, this may be attributed to the small sample size of respondents who identified along the LGBTQ spectrum.

In regard to the dependent variable *level of support*, my hypothesis concerning interdependence and salience was proven to be null. Neither interdependence nor salience were found to be significant predictors of support. From the above table, there is a significant correlation between the general importance of sexual orientation. Similar to the results for gender, this would seem to indicate that indicate that LGBTQ respondents, in

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.262	.378		.693	.497
	Sexual orientation LF	.018	.050	.119	.371	.715
	SO IMP	.061	.056	.403	1.091	.290
	SO SAL	-.094	.056	-.440	-1.675	.111
	Gender	.206	.254	.193	.809	.429
	PoliSci Major	-.030	.240	-.032	-.126	.901
	POC	-.055	.286	-.058	-.193	.849
	POC (Just Black)	.006	.339	.004	.017	.987

a. Dependent Variable: Average HRC Participation

general, listed sexual orientation as being important in general, but not as important as other identities. Nevertheless, this variable will not be taken

to support my hypothesis, as it has no statistical relation to salience or interdependence.

Discussing the Results

The results of the data analysis suggest that identity interdependence and identity salience have no significant correlation with an individual's level of participation within a social movement or their support of that social movement. Several factors could explain this. One potential explanatory factor is that the sample from which the data was taken was not very representative. As shown in the graphs within the appendix, the individuals surveyed were primarily white, heterosexual, and female. While the abundance of female respondents was beneficial in analyzing gender, because of the lack of representation amongst racial minorities and those along the LGBTQ spectrum, it was difficult to fully analyze factors related to race or sexual orientation.

Across the board, respondents appeared to be supportive of social movements. 57% (n = 66) of the women surveyed listed themselves as strongly or somewhat supportive of the National Organization for Women. 89% (n = 26) of black respondents listed themselves as strongly or somewhat supportive of the Black Lives Matter Movement. 57% (n = 15) of respondents that identified along the LGBTQ spectrum listed themselves as strongly or somewhat supportive of the Human Rights Campaign. In contrast, average levels of participation were low within all groups. 77% (n = 88) of women had never participated within the NOW. Roughly 50% (n = 15) of black respondents had either participated in Black Lives Matter once, or had never participated in BLM at all. 46% (n = 12) of respondents that identified as LGBTQ had never participated within the HRC. This gap between support of social movements and actual participation within these

movements suggests that support of a movement cannot be used as a prediction of participation.

These low levels of participation can possibly be attributed to the age of the group surveyed. Nearly 90% (n =147) of the respondents identified as being between 17 and 24 years of age. As young college students, it is possible that these respondents had other obligations such as classes or part-time jobs that prevented them from participating in social movements. Moreover, a lack of participation could have been caused by a lack of opportunity. While many college campuses generally afford students the ability to peacefully demonstrate on behalf of a social movement, it is possible that some campuses intentionally or incidentally restricted students' ability to demonstrate. Additionally, a lack of participation could have been caused from a lack of access. The respondents surveyed may not have had access to transportation, which would have inhibited their ability to participate in movements that were based in faraway locations.

Finally, a lack of participation could have been due to the organizations that I decided to test. While I considered Black Lives Matter, the National Organization for Women, and the Human Rights Campaign to be very recognizable and active groups, it is possible that individuals had very little knowledge of these organizations, which would have prevented their ability to accurately respond to my questions. In addition, it could be true that an individual may not have participated within the movements that I chose, but could have participated in a similar identity based movement. For example, a respondent identifying as part of the LGBTQ community may not have participated within the Human Rights Campaign, but may have participated within other LGBTQ rights organizations such as GLAAD or OutRight International. As previously mentioned in this paper, it would have been

nearly impossible to test an exhaustive list of social identity organizations. However, including additional identity-based activist organizations may have helped to provide more support to my hypotheses.

Theoretical Explanations

There are several theoretical explanations for the lack of correlation between identity and participation. One such theory, the free rider problem (FRP), states that individuals within a collective identity group will not rise to collective action because of their belief that they can benefit from the collective goal without actually participating (Olson 1965). This theory is best explained by economist Mancur Olson, who asserts that collective action only occurs when individuals must participate in order to receive the benefits of the common goal (1965). Olson's theory is expanded upon by scholar Pamela Oliver. In her study of rational action, Oliver states that a separate, underlying problem within the FRP is that of efficacy (2015). In its most basic understanding, the efficacy problem refers to an individual's belief that their participation within a collective group will not produce a noticeable effect (Oliver 2015). Because many individuals believe that their participation alone is not sufficient enough to produce change, they instead choose to not participate at all (Oliver 2015).

Theories such as Olson's FRP and Oliver's efficacy problem help to explain the results of the data in that they show why identity interdependence and salience are not necessarily indicative of participation. An individual might identify very strongly with a certain collective group, but that individual may choose not to participate in that movement because they do not believe that their contribution will be effective, or because they believe that they can receive the collective good without participating. The respondents surveyed may have participated at

higher levels if participation was in some way incentivized. Olson suggests that incentives, and especially material incentives, are powerful factors in encouraging collective action (1965). However, organizations such as Black Lives Matter, the National Organization for Women, and the Human Rights Campaign generally only offer what Oliver refers to as “solidarity incentives” (2015). Solidarity incentives are those incentives related to social responsibility and morality; for example, an incentive for participation in NOW may be the feeling of value and self-worth that a woman might feel as a result of helping other women. In contrast, material incentives are generally related to money and other tangible goods; an individual may be more motivated to participate in a NOW rally for pay-equality because of the material incentive of monetary gain. Future analysis of identity and participation should instead take into account the effect of material incentives on participation; it may be the case that college students, such as those surveyed, are only drawn to action when they are presented with significant material incentives for participation.

Scholar Bert Klandermans expands upon Olson’s theory of incentives by asserting that incentives must be weighed on the basis of perceived costs and benefits (2015). The benefits of participation are calculated based on the expected outcomes of the participation and the value of the incentive (Klandermans 2015). Klanderman stresses that costs and benefits are based on rational expectations; if an individual expects that a movement is likely to fail, or that the potential benefits of the movement’s success are invaluable, then that individual will not participate in the movement (2015). Similar to the FRP, an individual must also expect that their own participation will be matched by the participation of others; if this is not the case, then the individual will be less likely to participate within the movement.

Klanderman's theory of costs and benefits help to explain the significant gap between social movement support and social movement participation. When deciding whether or not to participate in the given social movements, it is possible that many respondents believed one or more of the following: that the social movement was unlikely to succeed; that the value of that the collective good/incentive was relatively low; or that their participation within that movement would not be matched by the participation of others. The weighing of costs and benefits adds a separate dimension to factors of identity salience and identity interdependence, thus, future studies regarding identity and participation should consider the role that cost and benefits play in mobilizing individuals to participate within social movements.

Conclusion and Future Research Trajectories

This paper sought to answer the question, "Why are individuals motivated to participate in identity-based social movements?" Ultimately, a conclusive answer could not be drawn by using identity theory and theories of identity interdependence and identity salience. This data suggests that there is no significant correlation between identity interdependence, identity salience and social movement participation. Several control variables such as general importance, gender, and major showed signs of significance, however, because of the unrepresentative demographics, these variables were not useful to the research question at hand.

While the hypotheses were largely rendered null by the results of the survey data, it must be mentioned that this is a preliminary study whose findings may not be generalizable. There are two important takeaways from this study. First, the data seems to show that there is a distinct disconnect between support, participation, and mobilization. The data indicates that

though respondents had high levels of support for the chosen organizations, this support was not reflected in the level of participation. The level of participation is directly related to the extent to which an organization is able to mobilize individuals to collective action. From the results of this study, it is clear that organizations cannot significantly mobilize individuals to action on the bases of identity interdependence and identity interdependence and identity salience. Thus, identity-based movements must mobilize on the bases of other, non-identity related factors.

Though this study has refrained from utilizing the previously mentioned rationalist models of participation (PPT and RMT), to analyze participation, the results of the data suggest that PPT and RMT may help in analyzing discrepancies between the hypothesis and the results. Should future researchers wish to examine this further, it is recommended that they attempt to include other macro-level theories such as PPT and RMT within their study. As social movement mobilization is a potential indicator of levels of democracy it is an important factor to the field of political science (Goodwin & Rojas, 2015). Thus, it is necessary that future research focuses on exploring other non-identity based explanatory factors.

Second, the data suggests that participation within social movements is based on complex levels of decision making that cannot be limited to identity. While it would be inaccurate to assume merely on the basis of this study that identity does not play any role within the decision making process, it is necessary that future researchers closely examine other influential factors. Potentially influential factors such as emotion have been widely researched in recent years, and could possibly be used to bridge the gap between identity and participation (Klandermans 2015; Taylor 2000). In addition, scholars have recently made efforts to construct integrated

frameworks of social decision making (Van Zomeren et. al, 2008). This research is important, as it allows political scientists to develop a more nuanced understanding of decision making as it pertains to motivation and participation.

To conclude, this study recommends that future researchers focus on developing theories that integrate collective identity with other mobilizing factors. In doing so, future researchers will be able to more thoroughly explain what factors most contribute to an individual's decision to participate in identity-based social movements. Should future researchers wish to replicate this study, it is recommended that they select from a larger, more representative sample size so that their analysis will be more accurate and robust.

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Appendix

Survey Questions

* 36. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 being **not at all important** and 10 being **extremely important**, please list how personally important each identity is to you.

	1 - not at all important	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 - extremely important
Gender	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Race	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ethnicity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sexual orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religion/spirituality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Socioeconomic class	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Age	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nationality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Physical ability/disability	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 37. On a scale of 1-10, with 1 meaning "my success/failure is **not at all dependent** on the success/failure of this group", and 10 meaning "my success/failure is **entirely dependent** on the success/failure of this group," please rate the following identities.

	1 - not at all dependent	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 - entirely dependent
Gender	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Race	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ethnicity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sexual orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religion/spirituality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Socioeconomic class	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Age	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nationality	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Physical ability/disability	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

38. Please rank the following attributes according to how important each identity is to you.

1 = MOST important

9 = LEAST important

<input type="text"/>	Gender
<input type="text"/>	Race
<input type="text"/>	Ethnicity
<input type="text"/>	Sexual orientation
<input type="text"/>	Religion/spirituality
<input type="text"/>	Socioeconomic class
<input type="text"/>	Age
<input type="text"/>	Nationality
<input type="text"/>	Physical ability/disability

For the following questions, please consider your experience with the National Organization for Women (NOW).

* 40. How often have you participated in each of the following activities, as they pertain to the National Organization for Women (NOW) specifically?

	Never	Once	Two - Four times	Five or more times
Attended a rally for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Signed a petition for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Utilized social media to promote this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Donated money to this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Participated in a march for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Peacefully protested on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Boycotted certain stores/corporations/products/etc. on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other types of participation on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 41. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"I support the goals, values and mission of the National Organization of Women (NOW)."

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree or disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

For the following questions, please consider your experience with the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement.

* 44. How often have you participated in each of the following activities, as they pertain to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement specifically?

	Never	Once	Two - Four times	Five or more times
Attended a rally for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Signed a petition for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Utilized social media to promote this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Donated money to this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Participated in a march for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Peacefully protested on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Boycotted certain stores/corporations/products/etc. on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other types of participation on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 45. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"I support the goals, values and mission of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement."

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree or disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

For the following questions, please consider your experience with the Human Rights Campaign (HRC).

* 48. How often have you participated in each of the following activities, as they pertain to the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) specifically?

	Never	Once	Two - Four times	Five or more times
Attended a rally for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Signed a petition for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Utilized social media to promote this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Donated money to this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Participated in a march for this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Peacefully protested on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Boycotted certain stores/corporations/products/etc. on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other types of participation on behalf of this organization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 49. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:


"I support the goals, values and mission of the Human Rights Campaign (HRC)."

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Slightly agree
- Neither agree or disagree
- Slightly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Demographics and Descriptive Statistics

Race


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	19	10.4	10.4	10.4
American Indian or Alaskan Native	2	1.1	1.1	11.5
Asian / Pacific Islander	8	4.4	4.4	15.9
Black or African American	22	12.1	12.1	28.0
Hispanic or Latino	12	6.6	6.6	34.6
Mixed race/ethnicity - Not Black or African American	5	2.7	2.7	37.4
Mixed race/ethnicity - Part Black or African American	7	3.8	3.8	41.2
Other (please specify)	4	2.2	2.2	43.4
Other (please specify) (Middle Eastern)	1	.5	.5	44.0
White / Caucasian	102	56.0	56.0	100.0
Total	182	100.0	100.0	



Gender


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid				
Female	114	62.6	62.6	73.1
I do not identify as either male or female	3	1.6	1.6	74.7
Male	46	25.3	25.3	100.0
Total	182	100.0	100.0	

Gender





Sexual Orientation


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	19	10.4	10.4	10.4
Bisexual	15	8.2	8.2	18.7
Gay	5	2.7	2.7	21.4
Lesbian	3	1.6	1.6	23.1
Queer	3	1.6	1.6	24.7
Some other sexual orientation	3	1.6	1.6	26.4
Straight	134	73.6	73.6	100.0
Total	182	100.0	100.0	



PoliSci Major

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Non Political Science Major	109	59.9	66.9	66.9
	Political Science Major	54	29.7	33.1	100.0
	Total	163	89.6	100.0	
Missing	System	19	10.4		
Total		182	100.0		





BLM Support

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1	1	.5	3.4	3.4
	3	2	1.1	6.9	10.3
	5	6	3.3	20.7	31.0
	Strongly Support	20	11.0	69.0	100.0
	Total	29	15.9	100.0	
Missing	System	153	84.1		
Total		182	100.0		

Support of NOW

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Oppose	1	.5	.9	.9
	3	33	18.1	28.9	29.8
	4	14	7.7	12.3	42.1
	5	28	15.4	24.6	66.7
	Strongly Support	38	20.9	33.3	100.0
	Total	114	62.6	100.0	
Missing	System	68	37.4		
Total		182	100.0		

Support of HRC

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	3	7	3.8	26.9	26.9
	4	4	2.2	15.4	42.3
	5	3	1.6	11.5	53.8
	Strongly Support	12	6.6	46.2	100.0
	Total	26	14.3	100.0	
Missing	System	156	85.7		
Total		182	100.0		

Representative Deviance in the Media: Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) Through a Queer Lens

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Abstract

The HIV/AIDS epidemic devastated the American queer community starting in the early 1980s. To date, hundreds of thousands of queer people have died from AIDS-related illnesses. Using an original survey experiment, this paper explores the possible effects of covering the life-prolonging drug Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) through a queer-lens. The paper analyzes the role of the media in determining public support for, or opposition to, PrEP based on the way their coverage frames the issue. The paper also examines whether such framing effects might lead to colder feelings toward the gay community in general.

Introduction

Does the way the media frames content regarding Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) influence consumers' opinions of the medication? More specifically, does the framing of PrEP through a queer lens influence consumers' opinions of the medication? The stereotype that HIV is a "gay disease" has existed since the epidemic began in the United States in June of 1981, but scientific evidence only supports the claim that queer individuals—specifically men—are more susceptible to contracting the virus due to their means of sexual intercourse. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) asserts that anal intercourse, which is most commonly associated with men who engage in sexual activity with other men (MSM), is the highest-risk sexual behavior for HIV transmission due to the thin lining of the rectum. This is partially the reason why HIV diffused through queer communities quicker than it did through heteronormative communities. This cognitive link between the queer community

(specifically gay and bisexual men) and the HIV/AIDS epidemic has permeated through time; therefore, it is possible that PrEP being viewed through a queer lens, instead of through a general medical lens, in the media could negatively impact consumers' perception of the significance and essentiality of PrEP in combating the global spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Whether or not the queer lens is negative is a matter of interpretation; however, my own repeated first-hand experiences and cultural background suggests that to view through a queer lens is to view negatively.

Background Information

Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is a malignant virus that enters the human body via contact with blood, semen, vaginal fluid, or other bodily fluids. Once inside the body, the virus attacks and destroys white blood cells known as CD4 cells or t-cells, the purpose of which is to fight off infection. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is the final stage of HIV, which causes severe damage to a compromised immune system. An individual is identified as having AIDS when his or her CD4 cell count drops below 200, effectively preventing the body from fighting off any type of infection (CDC.gov, 2016). According to AVERT, a UK-based international non-profit that provides educational material, there are 36.7 million people living worldwide with HIV, 40% of whom are unaware of their infected status and an estimated 1.8 million of whom are children (*Global HIV and AIDS Statistics, 2017*). Once HIV advances to AIDS, patients are often diagnosed with various AIDS-related illnesses which are, in the vast majority of cases, fatal.

There is a common misconception that HIV is a virus that mainly targets homosexual men, or more specifically, MSM; however, this is not

true. AVERT provides a snapshot that encompasses the entire demographic living with HIV/AIDS, highlighting key populations that are circumstantially prone to heightened exposure risk, which include MSM, people who inject drugs (PWID), sex workers, prisoners, transgender people, women and girls, children, young people and adolescents. The reasons for heightened exposure to HIV infection is subgroup-specific. Biological, behavioral, and legal factors expose MSM to risk and often prevent them from accessing necessary services. PWID are at risk due to sharing needles, criminalization, marginalization, poverty, and increased likelihood of imprisonment. Sex workers and transgender people are disposed to heightened exposure due to social, economic, and legal factors, such as being prone to injection drug use and inconsistent condom use among multiple partners, as well as healthcare discrimination. There is also a lack of programs for these populations because it is difficult to ensure they will reach those they are intended to service. Inmates in prisons are exposed to high-risk activities and situations, such as drug use, sexual violence, and lack of contraceptive availability, that increase their risk of infection. Females are disadvantaged due to discriminatory cultural norms that bar them from accessing healthcare and education, expose them to poverty, and put them at risk of gender-based violence. Children in specifically vulnerable populations, including but not limited to orphans, are at risk of being infected through mother-to-child transmission (MTCT). Young people and adolescents are vulnerable to infection because of inadequate education prior to the sexual debut (*Key Affected Populations, Global HIV and AIDS Statistics, 2017*).

Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) is a daily pill for individuals who are at ongoing substantial risk of HIV infection, with the preventive

capabilities for persons susceptible to HIV, including but not limited to those of the high-risk subgroups mentioned above. The drug contains two medications that are used to treat HIV, so if an individual is exposed to the virus through sexual intercourse or injection drug use, PrEP works to prevent the virus from taking hold in the body. Currently the only Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis on the market is Truvada, manufactured by Gilead Sciences, Inc. If taken regularly and as prescribed, it can reduce the risk of HIV infection via sexual transmission by as much as 92%. When used with other forms of contraception, such as condoms, the risk of HIV infection via sexual transmission is reduced by almost 99%. When used regularly and as prescribed, the risk of HIV transmission via shared needle for the purpose of drug injection is reduced by more than 70% (CDC.gov, 2016).

PrEP's usage has exponentially increased since its recent approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for prevention in 2012. The drug's success was put into context via a modeling study conducted by the Infectious Diseases Society of America that found PrEP could potentially reduce the amount of new HIV cases among MSM by more than thirty percent over the next ten years (Jenness et al., 2016, pp.1800-7). It is crucial to stipulate that PrEP is not a drug exclusively for MSM. PrEP is a drug for any individual who is at a substantial and ongoing risk of contracting HIV, including pregnant women or women who are likely to become pregnant in areas highly burdened by HIV, men who have not undergone voluntary medical male circumcision (VMMC), uninfected individuals with otherwise compromised immune systems who may become exposed to the virus, young girls aged 9-14 in sub-Saharan Africa who are subjected to an increased likelihood of sexual assault, PWID, sex workers, children who are born to HIV-infected mothers, young

adolescents in areas highly burdened by HIV, and transgender individuals, in addition to MSM and other key populations. PrEP's utility is not subgroup-specific; it is a useful preventative measure for any individual who is not infected by HIV but at substantial risk of HIV infection.

According to the World Health Organization, research and trials have shown that combinations of three or more antiretroviral medications exist as one of the most effective medical treatments of HIV currently (*HIV/AIDS Fact Sheet*, 2017). Without the assistance of insurance, the universally recognized cost of Truvada is \$1,539.00 USD for 30 tablets, which is roughly equivalent to a one-month supply (Corbin, 2015). According to UNAIDS, an estimated 2.1 million individuals worldwide became newly infected with HIV in 2015, including 150,000 children, most of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa and were infected during pregnancy, through childbirth, or breastfeeding. 18.2 million individuals living with HIV, as of June 2016, were accessing antiretroviral therapy (ART), which is the combination of multiple antiretroviral medications to slow the rate at which HIV multiplies by making copies of itself in the human body (*HIV/AIDS Fact Sheet*, 2017).

When the media references PrEP, it is typically through the lens of the queer community with a focus on what impact the drug would have on gay and bisexual men and the rate of new transmissions within that subgroup (ex. Bahler, 2017; Florencio, 2017; Gottlieb, 2017). Reverse content analysis, which Exoo (2009) explains looks at the media so as to determine what stories received no press coverage (p. 2), reveals there is a small body of PrEP media coverage that focuses on the drug's impact on non-queer communities, such as intravenous drug users, marginalized groups (other than gay and bisexual men), and the general public. This is

not to say that media coverage of PrEP through these lenses does not exist, but rather that they are considerably less in number.

It is important to research the way in which media frames coverage of PrEP, because if the coverage is negatively biased the media needs to be aware so that an attempt can be made to present information in a more neutral way. The lens through which the media discusses PrEP is impactful because representation matters. If PrEP is only associated with the queer community then it will carry the perceptions of that community with it, be they positive or negative (though it is fair to say the association with this subgroup is typically negative). A diversification of association is the best way to create a balanced view of PrEP in the media. Diversification offers representation to each group that is impacted by PrEP by allowing them to evaluate the utility of the medication through the lens of experience for each specific community. It is through the multiplicity of testimonial that the public can fully evaluate the merit of the medication. The media originally reported HIV/AIDS as a gay cancer, and the association stuck. Other such harmful associations should be avoided at all costs. This research is necessary because PrEP deserves the opportunity to reach its full potential unimpacted by the bias or stereotypes that may be associated with or result from reporting through any specific lens.

Theoretical Discussion

Media framing is the way the media organizes, adds context to, and presents information to consumers. The concept of framing is broad, and the process has the tendency to impact the psychological message the consumer receives. In the specific context of studying PrEP and the way in which it is framed by the media, it is necessary to highlight the concepts of representative deviance, cultural bias, and knowledge deficiency.

Gadi Wolfsfeld (2011) discusses representative deviance in his book, *Making Sense of Media and Politics: Five Principles in Political Communication*. He explains that since the news deals with what is deviant and unexpected, it logically results in people believing the world is as the news describes it (p. 50). This concept is often linked with cultural bias, which Wolfsfeld (2011) explains as every media story being rooted in a time and place specific to the culture in which it occurs and reflective of its society's norms and morals (p. 47). This is significant when discussing media framing of PrEP because the coverage of the AIDS epidemic in the early 1980's identified the virus as a gay-specific malady, which exemplifies the concept of knowledge deficiency. Wolfsfeld (2011) defined knowledge deficiency as not knowing the background, jargon, or intricacies of a particular field due to a lack of focused training (p. 66). When the media attempts to report on a topic whilst being knowledge deficient, there is a risk of over-simplification, misrepresentation, or in this case, the creation of connections between two things that share no explicit association besides a biological reality. The virus was first called Gay Related Immune Deficiency (GRID) before it was officially renamed HIV. At that time in America's cultural history, members of the queer community were viewed as being deviant, disruptive, and in some harsher cases, as abominations; the prevalence of HIV in the queer community during this specific time was viewed by many to be God's vengeance on sinners. While societal attitudes toward the queer community have become more progressive, there is still a lingering stereotypical connection between HIV and gay/bisexual men, which is a result of the cultural bias with which the HIV/AIDS epidemic was originally reported. This cultural bias led to representative deviance in the reporting of topics and issues regarding

HIV/AIDS—the epidemic is typically viewed through a queer lens, contextualizing discussion of the epidemic in its application to the queer community. HIV/AIDS is not a “gay disease,” as it has often been depicted. The epidemic disproportionately affects gay and bisexual men, but the HIV virus is present within and has the ability to impact every demographic in the world, as was previously discussed. Framing the virus specifically within the context of the queer community is not only a misrepresentation, but it also has detrimental repercussions on the scientific advances made to combat the spread of the virus. If HIV is viewed as specifically and singularly affecting the queer community, which carries a cultural stigmatization, any scientific advances that impede the diffusion of the virus will automatically be viewed with more skepticism by media consumers because those advances carry the same cultural stigmatization of the epidemic and its association with the queer community.

Hypothesis

- Null Hypothesis 1: When presented with a scenario about expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will not be less likely to support proposed legislation when the information is framed through a queer lens.
- Directional Hypothesis 1: When presented with a scenario about expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will be less likely to support proposed legislation when the information is framed through a queer lens.
- Null Hypothesis 2: Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will not make respondents feel colder toward the gay community.

- Directional Hypothesis 2: Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will make respondents feel colder toward the gay community.

Methods

The method through which data was collected for this study was an optional-response survey. The copy of the full text of the survey is available in Appendix A. The survey consisted of seven questions. Control variables were addressed by questions regarding exposure to PrEP, level of exposure, political identification, gender identity, and sexual orientation. The independent variable is the treatment accompanying the survey that each individual took. There were two treatment options; one of which posed a scenario toward the general public, and one which posed the same scenario, but did so through a queer frame. The survey questions directly relating to the dependent variables asked the degree to which respondents supported legislation that would expand public access to PrEP and a feeling thermometer in regards toward the queer (LGBTQIA+) community.

The survey was created with SurveyMonkey.com via collaboration between the project creator and the project creator's professor. 92 individuals responded; however, two responses had to be removed from the sample because the surveys were submitted with incomplete questions, which would have resulted in skewed data. The 90 responses were obtained from two specific survey portals via web submission, with portal assignment randomly based on date of birth. Each portal had a different treatment, with 45 respondents reporting to each portal. The separate treatments, located in Appendix A, were written by the project creator for the purpose of this project. The responses were manually coded and entered into a Microsoft Excel Data Sheet. If respondents

strongly supported the proposed legislation, they were assigned a 0; if they supported it, a 1; if they moderately supported it, a 2; if they neither supported nor opposed it, a 3; if they moderately opposed it, a 4; if they opposed it, a 5; if they strongly opposed it, a 6. When asked to rate their feelings toward the queer community, if respondents answered 100, they were assigned a 0; if 85, a 1; if 70, a 2; if 60, a 3; if 50, a 4; if 40, a 5; if 30, a 6; if 15, a 7; if 0, an 8. If respondents had been exposed to PrEP, they were assigned a 0; if not, a 1. In response to the level of exposure to PrEP, high received a 0; moderate received 1; small received 2; none received 3. In response to subjects being asked to place themselves on an ideological political spectrum, very liberal received a 0; liberal received a 1; somewhat liberal received a 2; neither liberal nor conservative received a 3; somewhat conservative received a 4; conservative received a 5; and very conservative received a 6. Female respondents were assigned a 0, and male respondents were assigned a 1. Heterosexual (straight) respondents were assigned a 0, and homosexual (gay) respondents were assigned a 1. The Microsoft Excel Data Sheet was then uploaded to SPSS software and analyzed using ANOVA analysis to determine correlation. Regression analysis was also run for correlation in reference to the demographic information submitted. The results are analyzed below.

Findings

The data was tested using ANOVA analysis in order to search for correlations between the independent variable (Treatment Group 1 – Target; Treatment Group 2 – General) and the dependent variables (support for proposed legislation and temperature on the feeling thermometer for the gay community). Regression analysis was used to search for correlations between both dependent variables and the

constants (whether or not the respondent had heard of PrEP, level of exposure to PrEP, political ideology, gender, and sexual orientation); the results of which are located in Appendix B.

From the research collected, respondents who received Treatment 2, which was not framed through a queer lens, were more likely to support legislation that expanded public access to PrEP than were respondents who received Treatment 1, which was framed through a queer lens, but only slightly and not in a statistically significant way. Respondents who received Treatment 1, which was framed through a queer lens, were more likely to feel more warmly towards the gay community when rating their feelings using a feeling thermometer than were respondents who received Treatment 2, which was not framed through a queer lens, but not in a statistically significant way. Additionally, Treatment group 2 had double the respondents who identified on the conservative spectrum of ideology than did those in Treatment group 1, which is a possible explanation for this unexpected result. Survey results are located in Appendix C.

Regression analysis revealed statistically significant correlations between the dependent variables and constants (demographics). When viewing the likelihood of respondents to support the proposed legislation from either treatment group, their level of exposure to PrEP and self-placement on an ideological spectrum were statistically significant. When viewing individuals' temperatures toward the gay community on the feeling thermometer from both treatment groups, respondents' self-placement on an ideological spectrum was statistically significant.

Conclusion

Null Hypothesis 1 (When presented with a scenario about expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will not be less likely to

support proposed legislation when the information is framed through a queer lens.) is accepted, and Directional Hypothesis 1 (When presented with a scenario about expanding public access to PrEP, individuals will be less likely to support proposed legislation when the information is framed through a queer lens.) is rejected. Null Hypothesis 2 (Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will not make respondents feel colder toward the gay community.) is accepted, and Directional Hypothesis 2 (Framing the discussion of PrEP through a queer lens will make respondents feel colder toward the gay community.) is rejected. It is important to note that as a preliminary study, these findings from may not be generalizable.

This study—which presented respondents with two different scenarios, one creating a link between PrEP and the queer community and one that did not establish a link to the queer community, before asking to what degree the respondent supported a miniscule tax increase to ensure individuals' low-cost access to PrEP—is not representative of the entire population, and the demographics were skewed female and liberal. The respondents to the survey were recruited for the project from a personal network, so there existed a lack of diversity amongst those who responded. People tend to surround themselves with like-minded individuals from similar backgrounds as there is a level of comfort in commonality. The skewed demographic of the respondents impacted the research in two ways. Women are less likely to have heard of PrEP or be aware of its association with a particular community, specifically because in the United States (where the survey was administered), PrEP is mainly marketed to homosexual men and MSM. This is not to say that PrEP is exclusively marketed to the aforementioned demographics, as it has been proven that

PrEP is an effective means of curtailing the risk of HIV exposure to all non-infected individuals, especially those who are at a substantial and ongoing risk of infection. The other impact of the skewed demographic played out in political ideology. Liberally-minded persons in the United States tend to be more accepting of diversity and more willing to advocate for the government provision of services to groups deemed in need. There is no guarantee that the skewed demographics of the survey's respondents significantly impacted the outcome of the research, but that is one reason that this question warrants more research and testing, preferably with a more diverse pool of survey respondents.

Aside from the question being tested amongst a more diverse group of individual respondents, there are other ways in which the project could be improved if replicated in the future. The treatment could establish a more concrete connection between PrEP and an association with the queer communities, specifically homosexual men and MSM. The feeling thermometer used in the survey could have options that range from 0 to 100, moving in increments of 1 instead of increments of 10 or 15. The future project could also strive to determine how viewing PrEP through the lenses of other communities compares to that of viewing the medication through a queer lens. This would likely establish the degree of prejudice that would be expected to accompany the queer lens. There are multiple other ways in which the project could be changed or improved for future replication, but these are some of the changes that would likely further clarify the results by putting them into a more fully-realized context.

In addition to the research question asked in this project, there are new research questions that should be asked in the future, including but not limited to the following: What is the most effective way to market PrEP

that targets key populations without alienating those who would be responsible for carrying the financial burden of distribution? Which lens is the most positive through which PrEP is viewed? To what degree does an association with the queer community damage the public image/perception of PrEP's utility? Even though the hypothesis in this specific project was not accepted, the research question—What impact does representative deviance have on the media's coverage of PrEP, specifically when that coverage is framed through a queer lens?—warrants more research and testing. The media's purpose is to present information in a neutral way so that the public can be educated on topics of importance. If the media's coverage of PrEP is biased in any way, be it intentional or not, then it should be addressed and attempts need to be made at rectification. As was asserted earlier, this research is necessary because PrEP deserves the opportunity to reach its full potential unaffected by the bias or stereotypes that may be associated with or result from media reporting through any specific lens.

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Appendix A

Treatment 1: The new Medicaid expansion adopted by 31 states and the District of Columbia makes it more difficult to obtain Truvada, the prescription name for a Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). The expansion of Medicaid significantly complicates the process individuals go through to obtain the drug, which is a daily pill that reduces the risk of HIV transmission during sexual intercourse by more than 90 percent. PrEP usage has exponentially increased among individuals who are at ongoing substantial risk of HIV infection since the drug was approved by the FDA for prevention in 2012. It is believed that PrEP can reduce new HIV cases by as much as one-third over the next ten years among men-who-have-sex-with-men (MSM), a common term used to describe gay and bisexual men.

Treatment 2: The new Medicaid expansion adopted by 31 states and the District of Columbia makes it more difficult to obtain Truvada, the prescription name for a Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). The expansion of Medicaid significantly complicates the process individuals go through to obtain the drug, which is a daily pill that reduces the risk of HIV transmission during sexual intercourse by more than 90 percent. PrEP usage has exponentially increased among individuals who are at ongoing substantial risk of HIV infection since the drug was approved by the FDA for prevention in 2012.

Survey:

1. The Department of Health and Human Services has recommended Congress pass legislation that protects individuals' low-cost access to Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). This will be financed by through a minuscule tax increase. Please rate your level of your support for this bill.

- I strongly support this bill.
- I support this bill.
- I moderately support this bill.
- I neither support nor oppose this bill.
- I moderately oppose this bill.
- I oppose this bill.
- I strongly oppose this bill.

2. On the feeling thermometer below, please rate how you feel in regards to the gay community.

- 100° - Very warm or favorable feeling.
- 85° - Quite warm or favorable feeling.
- 70° - Fairly warm or favorable feeling.
- 60° - A bit more warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling.
- 50° - No feeling at all.
- 40° - A bit more cold or unfavorable feeling than warm feeling.
- 30° - Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling.
- 15° - Quite cold or unfavorable feeling.
- 0° - Very cold or unfavorable feeling.

3. Have you ever heard of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?

- Yes
- No

4. How would you classify your level of exposure to information regarding Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?

- A lot of exposure
- A moderate amount of exposure
- A small amount of exposure
- No exposure

5. Where would you place yourself on an ideological political spectrum?

- Very Liberal
- Liberal
- Somewhat Liberal
- Neither Liberal nor Conservative
- Somewhat Conservative
- Conservative
- Very Conservative

6. Which of the following best describes your gender?

- Male
- Female

7. Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation?

- Heterosexual (Straight)
- Homosexual (Gay)

Appendix B

Dependent Variable 1—Support of Legislation

Descriptives

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Maximum
1	45	1.56	1.501	.224	1.10	2.01	0 6
2	45	1.53	1.486	.222	1.09	1.98	0 6
Total	90	1.54	1.485	.157	1.23	1.86	0 6

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.011	1	.011	.005	.944
Within Groups	196.311	88	2.231		
Total	196.322	89			

Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients B	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t				
			Std. Error	Sig.			
1	(Constant)		-.368	.718	-.513	.609	
	Group		-.317	.250	-.127	.209	
	Heard of PrEP?		-.475	.416	-.114	.256	
	Level of exposure		.670	.287	.233	2.334	.022
	Ideological Spectrum		.607	.083	.728	7.284	.000
	Gender		.081	.305	.263	.266	.791
	Sexual Orientation		-.297	.372	-.799	.427	
					.073		

a. Dependent Variable: Support for bill

Dependent Variable 2—Feeling Thermometer towards Gay Community

Descriptives

Queer feeling
thermometer

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum Maximum
1	45	.82	1.353	.202	.42	1.23	0 5
2	45	1.09	1.856	.277	.53	1.65	0 8
Total	90	.96	1.621	.171	.62	1.30	0 8

ANOVA

Queer feeling
thermometer

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.600	1	1.600	.606	.438
Within Groups	232.222	88	2.639		
Total	233.822	89			


Coefficients^a

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients	Standardized Coefficients	t				
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Sig.			
1	(Constant)		-.538	.841	-.640	.524	
	Group		-.029	.293	-.099	.922	
	Heard of PrEP?		-.210	.488	-.430	.668	
	Level of exposure		.210	.337	.095	.625	.534
	Ideological Spectrum		.636	.098	.585	6.515	.000
	Gender		.334	.358	.086	.935	.353
	Sexual Orientation		-.418	.436	-.960	.340	
					.094		

a. Dependent
Variable: Queer
feeling
thermometer


Appendix C

Treatment 1 (Target):



On the feeling thermometer below, please rate how you feel in regards to the gay community.


Answered: 45 | Displayed: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
100° - Very warm or favorable feeling.	57.78% 20
85° - Quite warm or favorable feeling.	24.44% 11
70° - Fairly warm or favorable feeling.	8.89% 4
60° - A bit more warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling.	2.22% 1
50° - No feeling at all.	0.00% 0
40° - A bit more cold or unfavorable feeling than warm feeling.	6.67% 3
30° - Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling.	0.00% 0
15° - Quite cold or unfavorable feeling.	0.00% 0
0° - Very cold or unfavorable feeling.	0.00% 0
TOTAL	45

Have you ever heard of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
Yes	31.11%	14
No	68.89%	31
Total		45

How would you classify your level of exposure to information regarding Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
A lot of exposure	2.22%	1
A moderate amount of exposure	11.11%	5
A small amount of exposure	22.22%	10
No exposure	64.44%	29
Total		45

Where would you place yourself on an ideological political spectrum?


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses
Very Liberal	20.00% 8
Liberal	40.00% 18
Somewhat Liberal	17.78% 8
Neither Liberal or Conservative	13.33% 6
Somewhat Conservative	4.44% 2
Conservative	4.44% 2
Very Conservative	0.00% 0
Total	45

Which of the following best describes your gender?


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
Male	28.89%	13
Female	71.11%	32
Total		45

Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation?

Answered: 44 Skipped: 1




Answer Choices	Responses	
Heterosexual (Straight)	79.55%	35
Homosexual (Gay)	20.45%	9
Total		44

Treatment 2 (General):

The Department of Health and Human Services has recommended Congress pass legislation that protects individuals' low-cost access to Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP). This will be financed by through a minuscule tax increase. Please rate your level of your support for this bill.


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
- I strongly support this bill.	31.11%	14
- I support this bill.	26.67%	12
- I moderately support this bill.	13.33%	6
- I neither support or oppose this bill.	22.22%	10
- I moderately oppose this bill.	2.22%	1
- I oppose this bill.	2.22%	1
- I strongly oppose this bill.	2.22%	1
Total		45

On the feeling thermometer below, please rate how you feel in regards to the gay community.


Answered: 43 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
100° - Very warm or favorable feeling.	51.11%	22
85° - Quite warm or favorable feeling.	28.89%	13
70° - Fairly warm or favorable feeling.	8.89%	4
60° - A bit more warm or favorable feeling than cold feeling.	0.00%	0
50° - No feeling at all.	6.67%	3
40° - A bit more cold or unfavorable feeling than warm feeling.	0.00%	0
30° - Fairly cold or unfavorable feeling.	0.00%	0
15° - Quite cold or unfavorable feeling.	0.00%	0
0° - Very cold or unfavorable feeling.	4.44%	2
Total		43


Have you ever heard of Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?

Answered: 45 Skipped: 0




How would you classify your level of exposure to information regarding Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP)?

Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Where would you place yourself on an ideological political spectrum?


Answers: 43 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
Very Liberal	13.33%	6
Liberal	35.56%	16
Somewhat Liberal	17.78%	8
Neither Liberal or Conservative	15.56%	7
Somewhat Conservative	6.67%	3
Conservative	6.67%	3
Very Conservative	4.44%	2
Total		43

Which of the following best describes your gender?


Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
Male	15.56%	7
Female	84.44%	38
Total		45

Which of the following best describes your sexual orientation?

Answered: 45 Skipped: 0



Answer Choices	Responses	
Heterosexual (Straight)	88.89%	40
Homosexual (Gay)	11.11%	5
Total		45

International Legal Recognition after Unilateral Secession: The Case of Somaliland

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Abstract

In several ways, Somaliland resembles a state more than Somalia; yet it does not have international legal recognition as a sovereign state. This paper examines what legal arguments Somaliland has to unilaterally secede from Somalia, how lack of international legal recognition is affecting Somaliland, and why Somaliland has been unable and will likely continue to be unable to achieve international legal recognition as a sovereign state. These arguments will be made by examining relevant international law as well as by examining the rational self-interests that other states may or may not have in recognizing Somaliland.

International law neither strictly forbids nor affirms the right to secede, with affirmation understood as extending international legal sovereignty of the secessionist state and prohibition understood as not extending international legal sovereignty. While a secessionist state may achieve international legal sovereignty via a treaty with the central government of the rump state, the issue of achieving international legal sovereignty after unilateral secession is much more complex and difficult to achieve for the secessionist state (Crawford, 1999). In cases of unilateral secession, international law seeks to balance two often-conflicting norms: the right of peoples to self-determination and the protection of the territorial integrity of existing sovereigns. In the case of *Reference re Secession of Quebec*, the Canadian Supreme Court found that a people could achieve international legal sovereignty through secession if their right to internal self-determination had been denied or if their secession resulted in a political reality that other sovereigns recognized (*Secession of*

Quebec, 1998). However, even if a state may have the legal right to secede, that right is not always recognized, as seen with the case of Somaliland. While Somaliland has historically been denied its right to internal self-determination within the state of Somalia and has also existed as a de facto state since its secession from Somalia, it has yet to achieve international legal sovereignty (Poore, 2009, pp. 117-50). This is because legal recognition is dependent on the self-interests of other sovereigns who have the power to recognize or not recognize Somaliland. While the international community at large has benefited in some ways from the existence of Somaliland, the self-interests of regional powers and super powers is such that international legal recognition for Somaliland is unlikely (Fisher, 2012, pp. 123-45).

The circumstances in which unilateral secession is legal are laid out in the advisory opinion of *Reference re Secession of Quebec*, in which the Canadian Supreme Court determined that Quebec had no right to secede from Canada under the Canadian Constitution. Since there was no right to secede under domestic law, the Court then examined the questions of whether or not international law allowed Quebec to succeed from Canada unilaterally. Proponents of secession brought three arguments to the Court. First, international law does not specifically prohibit secession. However, the court found that there is no law that affirms the rights to secession either, with the exception of the colonized or oppressed peoples. The second argument brought forth by proponents of secession is that the right of peoples to self-determination, understood as a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development, is considered a general principle of international law and has been codified in many international treaties (*Secession of Quebec*, 1998). Several UN and regional

international organization resolutions include the right to self-determination, however while many international agreements affirm this right, the same documents balance it by protecting territorial integrity and the stability of relations between sovereign states (Bruno et al., 1995). International law, therefore, is engaged in a balancing act between these competing interests. As a result, self-determination should be exercised whenever possible within the framework of existing sovereign states, consistent with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states. However, when internal self-determination is not possible, a right to external self-determination, i.e. secession, may exist. Quebec was not deemed to have a right to secession, since many Quebecois have held high-level government offices and the rights of the Quebecois population at large have not been infringed upon in any significant way. The last argument addressed by the Court was in regards to the “effectivity” principle, which is the legal recognition of a political reality that a sovereign has been created out of secession (*Secession of Quebec*, 1998). This argument claims that since international law does not prohibit secession, international recognition could help codify sovereignty if such a political reality existed. The Court stated that if de facto secession occurred, it would depend on support from the population of Quebec to make the secession a reality and recognition from other sovereigns could give Quebec legal status. Revolutions are inherently illegal, but they still occur and have the ability to create new sovereign entities. An illegal act such as this may gain legal status through recognition. However, this does not mean that the act was legal retroactively (*Secession of Quebec*, 1998). While Quebec was not deemed to have a right to external self-determination, the circumstances surrounding Somaliland are quite

different. Given the criteria outlined in this case, Somaliland has two strong arguments for international legal status—it was denied a right to internal self-determination, and its existence is a political reality.

First, Somaliland has been denied its right to internal self-determination. Despite maintaining international legal sovereignty, as exemplified by its seat at the UN, Somalia is a failed state with little, if any control over its territory (United Nations, 2016; Messner et al., 2016). Thus, the people of Somaliland are unable to exercise their right to internal self-determination. The Somali state has no democratic channels that have any substantial power in which the people of Somaliland could influence political affairs. There have been attempts to undermine this argument, such as when President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan appointed two northerners from Somaliland as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in 2000 (Huliaras, 2002, pp. 168-75). But again, the government in Mogadishu is almost powerless, so this did little to influence affairs in favor of the interests of the people of Somaliland. As the Canadian central government was unwilling to recognize the secession of Quebec, the Somali central government is unwilling to recognize the secession of Somaliland (Poore, 2009, pp. 137-50). In addition to failure by the central state to recognize its right to secede, Somaliland also has a strong argument in that it was denied the right to self-determination even before the Somali state collapsed. Somaliland has not always been unified with the southern part of Somalia. Somaliland existed as a distinct colonial territory for 80 years. After colonial rule ceased, Somaliland was internationally recognized as a sovereign state for five days before joining the southern, formerly Italian colony on July 1, 1960 (Kaplan, 2008, pp. 143-57; Huliaras, 2002). While there was a referendum on unification, it lacked legitimacy. During that vote, sixty

percent of Somaliland voters rejected unification. However, the southern Somali population, which was much larger than that of Somaliland, voted in favor of unification. In effect, the right to Somaliland's self-determination was vetoed. In response, over half of the eligible Somaliland voting population boycotted the election (Poore, 2009). Those who did vote in Somaliland voted to maintain the status quo in accordance to customary international legal practice of *uti possidetis*; as you possess (Ratner, 1996, pp. 590-624; Cassese, 1995).

The second argument for legal recognition has to do with the "effectivity" principle mentioned in *Reference re Secession of Quebec* (1998). In order to explore this argument, which is predicated on a secessionist movement that has resulted in a de facto state, it is first helpful to review the various definitions of sovereignty. Krasner (1999) identifies four types of sovereignty—international legal, Westphalian, domestic, and interdependence. States may possess some of these forms of sovereignty and not others. International legal sovereignty, which Somalia has and Somaliland is seeking, is a matter of authority and legitimacy, but not control. It is dependent on the practice of mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal judicial independence. It allows sovereigns to engage in treaty making, establish diplomatic immunity, and offers protection from legal action taken in other states. This form of sovereignty is almost universally desired because it provides benefits without imposing a cost. Westphalian sovereignty is defined as political organization based on the exclusion, de facto or de jure, from authority structures within a given territory (Krasner, 1999). Again, this form of sovereignty relates to issues of authority and legitimacy, but not control. In a globalized world, it is worth questioning whether this form

of sovereignty continues to exist, or whether it should exist (Hannum, 1990). When comparing the Westphalian sovereignty of Somalia and Somaliland, they both lack Westphalian sovereignty, but in different ways. Somaliland exists *de facto* within a territory that Somalia claims. However, Somalia exists *de jure* within Somaliland territory, even if it has no control over that territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal organization of political authority within a state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their state. This form of sovereignty involves authority and control, both the specification of a legitimate authority within a given territory and the extent to which that authority can be effectively exercised. Interdependence sovereignty is the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. Therefore, it is exclusively concerned with control and not authority or legitimacy (Krasner, 1999).

Compared to Somalia, Somaliland enjoys a higher level of domestic and interdependence sovereignty; and in almost all accounts, Somaliland better fits the modern definition of a state. Somaliland has an organized political leadership. Somaliland has held several democratic elections since it declared independence, which at times has even included a parliament controlled by the opposition party. The administration apparatus of the government of Somaliland has been built from the bottom up, through integrating traditional norms, values, and relations in combination with western notions of democracy. This has resulted in a government that is far more legitimate than the governments of many neighboring states. Its legitimacy was only bolstered by the fact that Somaliland conducted a referendum on a constitution that was overwhelmingly approved.

Somaliland also has the capacity to provide public services, specifically and perhaps most importantly, security (Walls & Kibble, 2010, pp. 31-56; Hannum, 1990; Huliaras, 2002, pp. 157-82). The government of Somaliland employs roughly 26,000 people and about 70 percent of the national budget is used for the maintenance of security forces. There is widespread ownership of small arms among the civilian population, and the bearing of arms in public is strictly illegal. Additionally, security forces have destroyed tens of thousands of landmines. Thus, the security forces play a crucial role in maintaining stability. Somaliland has a permanent population that is thought to be between two and three million. Furthermore, the combination of increased security and a stable government has resulted in hundreds of thousands of refugees returning to Somaliland (Pegg, 1997; Kaplan, 2008, pp. 143-57). Somaliland has a defined territory, over which it has had effective control for an extended period of time. Its current borders largely reassemble its borders while it was the British Protectorate of Somaliland (Huliaras, 2002). Somaliland has even been able to enter in relations with other states, possessing a high level of international engagement as an entity relative to other de facto states. This is partly due to its strategic position on the Horn of Africa as well as its ability to cooperate with foreign partners in combating terrorism and piracy (Caspersen, 2015, pp. 184-92). Nonetheless, international legal recognition would enhance Somaliland's ability to engage other sovereigns as well as international organizations. While many of Somaliland's governing structures remain fragile, they are stronger than Somalia's and surely demonstrate that the state of Somaliland is a political reality. This leaves reason for Somaliland to be optimistic, since historically international legal

sovereignty has typically been achieved through first obtaining *de facto* sovereignty (Jackson, 1990).

The lack of international legal recognition has had several negative effects on Somaliland, the most obvious of which being that Somaliland does not receive foreign aid from sovereigns that do not recognize it. The major exception is that the United Kingdom does provide some aid to its former protectorate. In addition, Somaliland does receive some aid from NGOs, but is unable to receive development aid from the World Bank and other international institutions (Caspersen, 2015, pp. 184-92). Instead, aid is given to the Somali government in Mogadishu, which does not recognize the government of Somaliland and thus, does not distribute aid to the area controlled by Somaliland. However, the minimal amount of foreign aid may not be entirely negative. As Eubank argues, the lack of foreign aid has made political leaders more dependent on the local population for tax revenue, which has made the government bargain with domestic business and as a result, political behavior has been restrained and more accountable (Eubank, 2012, pp. 465-80). Not only does Somaliland struggle to receive foreign aid, but it is also difficult for the *de facto* state to borrow money. Somaliland cannot have direct relations with the International Monetary Fund or the African Development Bank. While this may not be completely negative because it prevents Somaliland from getting into debt, Somaliland's trade is adversely affected because its central bank cannot issue letters of credit. In general, Somaliland cannot enter into formal trade agreements with other nations. Foreign investors shy away from investment in Somaliland due to a lack of insurance and other investment protections. As a result, many professionals in the diaspora, who could greatly benefit Somaliland's legal, accounting, health, and educational

systems, are reluctant to return due to Somaliland's uncertain legal status (Huliaras, 2002; Kaplan 2008).

International legal sovereignty, by definition, is dependent on recognition from other sovereigns, so it is important to note what interests these sovereigns might have in recognizing or not recognizing Somaliland. As stated above, Somaliland has been willing to cooperate with external actors to combat piracy and terrorism, which is important given that Somaliland exists in a region ripe with these problems (Caspersen, 2015). Also, while external self-determination may seem like a recipe for instability and war, it may actually be able to prevent war in this case (Sureta, 1973). While Somalia is currently in no position to wage war against Somaliland, it is possible that in the future a stable government could form in Mogadishu, which may try to reestablish control over Somaliland. Even if a stable government forms in Mogadishu, it seems unlikely that Somaliland would be willing to peacefully reunify with its southern neighbor (Spears, 2003, pp. 89-98). If that is the case, international legal recognition of Somaliland may help prevent a war by making both states subject to the UN prohibition of aggressive war (Poore, 2009). As far as states that might be the first to recognize Somaliland, the UK seems the most likely, given that Somaliland was formerly a British protectorate and the UK continues to support it. Within Somaliland's region, Djibouti and Ethiopia have both signed agreements of cooperation, and Ethiopia has even established a trade agreement. These seem to be the greatest prospects; yet, they fall well short of formal recognition (Fisher, 2012, p. 123-45).

The interests of existing sovereigns against recognizing Somaliland seem to outweigh the interests for recognizing it. Formal recognition from

Ethiopia is unlikely, as there is a large Somali population in eastern Ethiopia. There is a concern that any recognition of Somaliland may encourage the Ethiopian Somali population to once again take up arms in a secessionist movement (Woodward, 1996). This is a view shared by the African Union—a union with a long, committed history to respecting territorial sovereignty. There is a fear that Somaliland’s legal recognition would increase the weight of claims for secession in other parts of Africa. Looking at super powers, with the exception of the UK, it appears that none of the UN Security Council members have any sort of significant interest in extending legal recognition to Somaliland (Fisher, 2012, p. 123-45). While it may seem appropriate for Somaliland appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it is not a legal state. Therefore, the ICJ, according to Chapter II, Article 35 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, would be unable to obtain jurisdiction unless the UN the Security Council made such a request (Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946, pp. 1318-31). Given that the crux of Somaliland’s problem is largely to do with a lack of support, specifically from super powers, it seems unlikely that the ICJ will be able to exercise jurisdiction over this potential case. In sum, even if Somaliland has a legitimate case for legal recognition, finding a forum to present its case is a difficult task that will require other sovereigns to cooperate and at the moment, it seems that these sovereigns have little self-interest in doing so.

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BEYOND THE AXIS OF CONVENIENCE: Re-examining Russian-Chinese Relations and the Search for Multipolarity

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Abstract

Describing Russia's relationship with China as if it were merely a fallback option is to underestimate the strength of the political and economic alliance. This article seeks to provide an overview of the Sino-Russian partnership, including a comparison of current presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping's personal lives and worldviews. Extensive use is made of speeches and state media to convey the overlap in national interests as well as outlines for bilateral cooperation. The overall purpose is to illustrate that Moscow and Beijing have forged a strong alliance, while discussing concerns for the future, especially in regards to China's potential emergence as a new type of global hegemon.

Contemporary analysis describes the Russia-China relationship as an "axis of convenience," with the underlying notion that the US and Europe still retain global primacy, and that any economic arrangement would be unequal. This viewpoint underestimates the partnership the two countries have formed, especially since 2012 under the leadership of Vladimir Putin in Russia & Xi Jinping in China. Through the extensive use of international organizations, such as the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the BRICS group of emerging economies, the two states seek to carry the world away from what they perceive to be a unipolar, US-dominated imperialist system based on military coercion, and restore a multipolar order built on international law, diplomacy and national sovereignty.

To take a closer look, this article will begin with an overview of the Sino-Russian partnership, including a comparison of Putin and Xi's personal

lives, which may serve as the pretext for “a clear personal affinity” that they feel for each other.^[1] Second, the national interests of Russia and China are explored in detail, referencing especially speeches given by leaders of both countries, and outlining bilateral cooperation. In order for the two states to guarantee these mutual interests, they have gone to great lengths to prove the legitimacy of the partnership across multiple arenas, namely by the use and creation of international organizations, which are looked at third. Finally, the conclusion underlines the case that Moscow and Beijing have forged a strong alliance, and discusses concerns for the future, especially as regards to China’s potential emergence as a new type of global hegemon.

Beyond the Axis of Convenience

Though the history of Russia’s partnership with China can be traced back as far as 1567, the first diplomatic visit on record (which bore no fruit, as the two travelling Cossacks were denied an audience with China’s Emperor due to not presenting any tribute)^[2] it is more pertinent to the present question to look at the history beginning after the fall of the Soviet Union. Up until this time, the relations between the two countries had swayed, with the most notable extremes in the 20th century being the communist alliance, and subsequently what are commonly known as the “Sino-Soviet split” and the Nixon-Kissinger “triangulation” policy.

A pivotal moment came in 1996, with the appointment of Yevgeniy Primakov as foreign minister of the newly formed Russian Federation. It was at this point that “national identity tilted sharply away from the West, with...greater priority for Asia,”^[3] as Primakov advised Yeltsin to push a “Russo-Chinese strategic partnership,” specifically to counter the US and its

unilateral approach to world affairs.^[4] His disdain for American interventionism was best seen in 1999 when he famously cancelled a diplomatic visit to Washington and ordered his plane turned around over the Atlantic once a NATO strike against Yugoslavia became imminent.

In Bobo Lo's work titled with the phrase most commonly used to describe the Sino-Russian relationship, "Axis of Convenience," he describes China as the importer exploiting Russia the exporter, particularly in terms of natural resources, "while Moscow hopes that China will become [a]...counterweight to the West, Beijing sees Russia as little more than a resource-cow for Chinese growth and an easy consumer market."^[5] Others, such as Yun Sun, writing for the Center for Strategic & International Studies, have described the relationship as perfectly complementary, matching a textbook example of supply and demand.^[6]

It is worth noting that Lo's book was published in 2008, when trade between the two countries was around \$48.2 billion,^[7] whereas Sun wrote later, in 2015, when trade had nearly doubled, with projections at his time of writing indicating a total of \$100 billion in trade.^[8] Additionally, the BRIC (now BRICS) group was not a formal association, with the first summit not being held until 2009.^[9] Lastly, Russia and China had only performed one small military drill together under the auspices of the SCO in 2005, whereas more drills followed in the years to come, including some major firsts for the Chinese People's Liberation Army, detailed below.

While both Russia and China have appealed to the primacy of international organizations in maintaining global security and international democracy, there exist many instances where the two states have cooperated directly with each other. A lot of attention is drawn especially to the relatively new tradition of "first visits," where new leadership in each

country makes a point to visit the other on their first diplomatic trip abroad, beginning with former Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2003.^{[10][11]}

This has held true for Putin and Xi,^{[12][13]} and the two have met with each other much more than with any other nation.

Xi and Putin

One important development in the relationship came in 2012, with Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency of Russia, and the accession of Xi Jinping as the president of China. The two leaders have lead somewhat parallel lives, which may be an explanation as to why they work so well together, and at such a high profile. The four-way simultaneous culmination of their two lives with the rising global prominence of their respective nations has reached an apex that stands poised to revise the international system in their collaborative vision.

Table 1 highlights the similar backgrounds of Putin and Xi. Their ages differ by only one year, they both hold doctoral degrees in fields important to the growth of their respective states - Putin inherited an economically crippled Russia in 2000; Xi is heading a Communist Party. Each has held roles in state organizations, with Putin serving in the Soviet Union's intelligence agency known as the KGB, and Xi as a member of the Central Military Commission. Lastly, both were born to veterans of the Second World War. This is important in the gravity the war holds for both nations, losing several millions of lives each. As will be explored in more detail below, the memory of the war brought the two leaders together in major events in 2015, the 70th anniversary of the war's end, in which they sought to remind their people and the world of their resolve, and ability to defend themselves against foreign aggressors.

Table 1 (Comparative Backgrounds of Putin and Xi)

	Born	Father's background	Education	State employment
Putin	1952	WWII veteran	PhD in Economics	KGB
Xi	1953	WWII & Revolution veteran	PhD in Marxist Law	Central Military Commission

Sources: Vladimir Putin Personal Website; People's Daily Online, March 30, 2010.

While the two leaders have a great deal in common, they can only achieve so much if their citizens are unwilling to work together. After all, what good would a high-speed rail line to Beijing be if nobody were willing to make the journey from Moscow?^[14] A 2015 poll shows China as the second most favorable nation to Russians, at 43%, coming in behind Belarus and ahead of Kazakhstan.^[15] China's population, however, shows a 51% favorability rating, one of the highest in the world at the time of worldwide polling in regards to Russia.^[16] This mutual respect extending beyond leadership makes cooperation not only easier, but also almost mandatory if a country's leader is to adequately represent the populace. Of course, China does not operate as a democracy, and Russia's status as such remains contentious on the global stage; however, the leaders undoubtedly recall the periods of revolution and civil war in their countries, and see popular uprising in their neighborhoods as well as the Middle East. While there may not be direct accountability via the ballot box, a certain

level of indirect accountability theoretically exists, and is far more dangerous than simply losing votes.

It should also be noted that leadership in both countries have made moves to influence public opinion in regards to this alliance. Apart from having state controlled media in both countries, Moscow and Beijing worked together to bring their respective cultures to each other's population.^[17] These initiatives, namely the 2006 Year of Russia in China, followed by the Year of China in Russia,^[18] predate Xi as the Chinese leader, but the long-term effects are being seen in these more recent polling results.

National Interests

Both Russia and China went through a significant amount of change in the 20th century. Each saw revolutions with the final outcome being communist leadership. As previously mentioned, both countries saw devastating losses in World War II, an event that shapes national identity to this day. For Russia's part, the communist party fell in 1991, and the country was plunged into turmoil with an ill-conceived privatization process. China remains a communist country, though with a series of reforms that combines market economics with Marxist principles, a system named by reformer Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics."^[19] With such considerations, finding a cohesive national identity, followed by clearly defined national interests can be somewhat difficult.

Gilbert Rozman has sought to solve the puzzle in his work "The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order." The book is the third in a series in which he outlines Chinese national identities vis-a-vis Japan, Korea, and

finally Russia. He summarizes Russia's interest, via what is often called the "Millennium Manifesto" as resting "on the distinctiveness of its values, rather than on its acceptance of universal values,"^[20] a theme that Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have reinforced numerous times. China, Rozman says, seeks a "great revival of the Chinese nation," a theme known as the "China Dream," as popularized by Xi.^[21]

The Russian Idea

On December 30, 1999, Putin published an essay entitled "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium," which thoroughly and explicitly outlined his thoughts on Russian national interests.^[22] In the opening remarks, he notes, "First, Russia is not a state symbolizing top standards of economic and social development now. And second, it is facing difficult economic and social problems." He continues with comparisons of per capita GDP and global market share between Russia and the US. It is clear that his belief is that the US at the time had set the benchmark for developed nations, and that Russia should strive to be on equal footing. He makes a firm note that neither "experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks," nor, "[the] mechanical copying of other nations' experience" can be successful. This is a theme he revisited 15 years later, speaking to the United Nations General Assembly, "Nations shouldn't be forced to all conform to the same development model that somebody has declared the only appropriate one."^[23] He made his point by directly criticizing previous Soviet experiences in the spread of Communism, but it was also a thinly veiled message to the United States that its experiments in promotion of democracy were failing.

Even more recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov published an article in March of 2016 entitled “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background.” After outlining in great detail the cooperation and conflict between Russia and the rest of Europe, he indicates a desire to uphold “the rightful role of our country as a leading center of the modern world,” and that Russia will provide “values of sustainable development, security and stability.” He criticizes American Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” concept, where “rapid globalization signals the ultimate victory of the liberal capitalist model, whereas all other models should adapt to it under the guidance of the wise Western teachers,” by immediately debunking the theory with the case of China, who “in just three decades” achieved top-level economic status. He calls it an “axiomatic fact” that there are many development models outside of the “monotony of existence within the uniform, Western frame of reference.” China is also the only nation explicitly named as he notes that BRICS and SCO partner states share the approach that “long-term success can only be achieved on the basis of movement to the partnership of civilizations based on respectful interaction of diverse cultures and religions.”^[24] Lavrov in his writing indicates a consistency in general Russian foreign policy over time, but also a consistency with the president. With the nods to China, he also reminds readers that China is Russia’s top partner.

The China Dream

In one of his first public addresses as President of China, Xi Jinping announced, “In my view, to realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.” His speech was in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, a museum on Tian’anmen

Square showcasing Chinese art, as well as an elaborate exhibit on China's modern history. It is telling that this exhibit, the Road to Rejuvenation, begins with the Opium Wars and foreign occupation of China, a series of humiliations at the hands of Western powers. With these events kept fresh in the minds of the population, Xi's platform simply states that China can and will be prosperous, but only on its own terms, and on its own ideology of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." His guidance to the people is that "we have to continue taking this road, unswervingly," however, to, "keep in mind that to turn blueprints into realities takes a long time and it also demands long and hard efforts."^[25]

The main interest of the Chinese Communist Party, the driving force behind any initiative taken towards a great renewal, is economic growth, to then fully transition from socialism to communism. With Marx, Lenin, Mao and Deng all having paved the way for today's China, Xi now turns to economist Jeremy Rifkin, who proposes a "third industrial revolution powered by both the Internet and renewable energy sources."^[26] Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang has reportedly required top economic and planning officials to read Rifkin, who himself has visited and advised Chinese leadership. Speaking in China, Rifkin outlines China's potential to kick-start his third industrial revolution as being due in part to adherence to socialism, as infrastructure is only created by governments and never markets, and its resources:

China is ideally suited for the third industrial revolution because it has the most ample reserves of renewable energy resources in the world. It has the most solar radiance, most wind of any major country, off its coast. China contains massive amounts of geothermal heat under the ground and massive amounts of biomass from its rural, agricultural areas. China's

renewable energy resources can provide for every man, woman, and child here until kingdom come.^[27] With Rifkin providing the roadmap, Xi has a clear direction in which to drive China forward.

Military and Security

There is much to be said of the unprecedented moves China and Russia have made in the realm of security. Starting in 1998, Moscow and Beijing adopted a direct presidential hot line, notably China's first with another government.^[28] Joint training exercises, usually under the auspices of the SCO, have also featured new forays in Chinese foreign policy. Peace Mission 2007, for example, was the first overseas exercise for Chinese airborne Units.^[29]

The year 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the allied victory in World War II. For Russia and China, the war has held an especially important role in their national histories, due to the casualties suffered at the hands of their respective occupying forces. On May 9 in Moscow, and September 3 in Beijing, large-scale military parades were held. Of import in Moscow was the appearance not only of Xi Jinping, but the official debut of the guard of honor of the three services of the PLA. This was also only the fifth time that the PLA guard of honor had marched overseas.^[30] Beijing would host Putin as well as Russian troops, which formed the largest contingent of foreign soldiers in the parade.

Putin and Xi each took the opportunity to discuss contemporary international relations in their speeches at these parades. The focus, as expected, was on multipolarity, or more exactly, against unipolarity and hegemony. First, Putin remarked, "In the last decades, the basic principles of international cooperation have come to be increasingly ignored,"

principles, he continued, “that have been hard won by mankind as a result of the ordeal of the war.” The President concluded with a thinly veiled criticism of the US, describing “attempts to establish a unipolar world,” and, “strong-arm bloc thinking,” underscoring the fact that this mentality “undermines sustainable global development.”^[31] In Beijing, Xi was less direct in discussing how “[all] countries should jointly uphold the international order and system underpinned by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,” and proposed to “build a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation.” For China’s part, he said that China “will remain committed to peaceful development,” and promised “[no] matter how much stronger it may become, China will never seek hegemony or expansion. It will never inflict its past suffering on any other nation.”^[32]

Color Revolutions and External Influence

Russia and China have each experienced mass protests, either at home or in their periphery, which leadership in both countries has indicated as being orchestrated from without. Russia has seen so-called “color revolutions” in the neighboring post-Soviet states of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and twice in Ukraine. Lavrov, pinning blame on Western powers, described the “technology of unconstitutional change of governments” as having been “tried and tested,” as well as appearing to be “destructive for the nations targeted by such actions.”^[33] 2014 saw protests in Hong Kong, which Chinese leadership accused American group the National Endowment for Democracy of supporting as part of a “US strategy to undermine foreign governments in the name of promoting democracy.”^[34] These movements only help to strengthen Russian and Chinese resolve to

steer the world in the direction of multipolarity, with respect for national sovereignty and distinct forms of governance and development, in contrast to the singular rule imposed by the US.

Multipolarity and International Organizations

As previously stated, key components of Russian and Chinese national interests revolve around state sovereignty and multipolarity in global rule. It is with these ends in mind that both states have been proclaiming the importance of international organizations, and Russia specifically seems to seek a substitute for the widely accepted international anarchy with a more “orderly type of relations,” in which multipolarity is a “structural condition for greater coordination.”^[35] Chinese leadership have made statements in a similar regard, with Deng Xiaoping as early as 1984 noting that “to obtain peace one must oppose hegemonism,”^[36] and Jiang Zemin later outlining tenets of China’s future goals as including “promoting multipolarity in the international system.”^[37] In fact, most Chinese statements regarding foreign policy include some mention of these terms, as well as those like cooperation and connectivity.

The primary organization on the planet is the United Nations, whose charter guarantees national sovereignty and prevention from foreign interference, something leadership in both states see as being overrun by American exceptionalism.^[38] Voting in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) between Russia and China has reflected a strong partnership since the year 2000, whether it is voting in unison (six dual vetoes,) or abstaining from votes altogether rather than voting against the other. In this regard, of Russia’s five lone negative votes, China abstained all but once, in the case of Cyprus in 2004, though it should be noted that in the ambassador’s

remarks at the hearing, he expressed hope that the Council would have “[carried] out further considerations and [considered] fully the views of all parties with a view to achieving consensus,” echoing Russia’s primary reasoning for voting no - the haste of the UNSC to move ahead of a Cyprian referendum.^[39] It is of greater concern that the more recent and high profile Russian vetoes, namely those pertaining to Georgia and Ukraine, were duly met with Chinese abstentions.^[40]

Beyond the UN, Russia and China have created multilateral organizations of their own. The BRICS group of emerging economies (an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has made moves, in creating what is called the New Development Bank, to stand as an alternative to the western dominated World Bank and IMF. In the realm of security, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization facilitates military cooperation and dialogue between states, including those that have contentious relationships around the globe.

The BRICS Group and Abandoning the Dollar

Many moves have been taken on the part of both Russia and China to reduce their reliance on the dollar or the euro as trade currencies. For starters, the countries in 2014 agreed to a currency swap of \$24.5 billion, and Russia’s Deputy Finance Minister Alexey Moiseev has gone on record to state that the goal is to have 50 percent of trade done in national currencies. Alexander Gabuev writes, “For Moscow, this will help to lower the risk of being overly exposed to the euro and the dollar. For Beijing, it will be just another major step in promoting its currency before turning to full convertibility.”^[41] China is also working to open its Shanghai Stock

Exchange to foreigners, and it has been hinted that Russian companies could have some sort of preferred status on the market.^[42]

Additionally, China is championing its New Silk Road project, also known by the moniker One Belt One Road (OBOR,) invoking the pride of China's historical role in the Silk Road trade route between Europe and the Far East. The most discussed function of OBOR is its economic component, "literally a global project, and it belongs not to China, but to every country that chooses to participate in it. China wants to promote world peace and the sovereignty of states, and it intends to achieve this by integrating the global economy into OBOR and vice versa." Apart from economics, there are three other purposes of the project, namely: security and diplomacy, culture, and great power politics.^[43]

Including local ownership simultaneously with economic integration could, in a way, work in tandem with more overt security measures taken by the OBOR project. Pepe Escobar, a former correspondent for Al-Jazeera,^[44] writes, "If it succeeds even in part, it could take the gloss off al-Qaeda- and ISIS-style Wahhabi-influenced jihadism not only in China's Xinjiang Province, but also in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Imagine it as a new kind of Eurasian war on terror whose "weapons" would be trade and development."^[45] This insinuation of peaceful gestures to steer other nations away from extremism actually sits perfectly in line with statements, detailed below, from Xi Jinping as pertains to China's peaceful development.

Russia for its part has developed what is known as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which created a free-trade zone with former Soviet states, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Ukraine was always seen as an obvious prospective member, however Ukrainian

leader Viktor Yanukovich was also seeking free trade with the European Union. Internal conflicts led to his ouster, and Ukraine never joined. At first, it seemed that the two economic zones would be vying for position in Central Asian states, however in 2015, they actually merged, creating a “common economic space” in Eurasia.^[46] This cooperation symbolizes a priority of cooperation over all else, or as one Chinese expert of international relations put it, “the keyword is connectivity.”^[47]

Economic partnership continued to grow, when at the 2015 BRICS summit in the Russian city of Ufa, the New Development Bank (NDB) was announced. The official statement reads that, “Unlike the World Bank, which assigns votes based on capital share, in the New Development Bank each participant country will be assigned one vote, and none of the countries will have veto power.”^[48] The main purpose of the NDB is to serve as “an institution that focuses on accelerating the pace towards the transition to the ‘green economy’,”^[49] which further cements China’s stated goals in pursuing Rifkin’s third industrial revolution.

NDB Versus the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

One area for concern is that one year prior to the creation of the NDB, China already created the \$100 billion AIIB, which holds the largest share at 20%, with India and Russia holding lesser stakes.^[50] What is the purpose of two separate banking systems, and will the AIIB, which favors China to Russia prove to be an unequal partnership? Chinese leadership has stated that “the two will play a complementary role in funding infrastructure development in Asia,”^[51] while the NDB president, Kundapur Kamath, has suggested that “the market is big enough for all of us.”^[52] The explicit goals of each bank vary as well, with AIIB focused directly on Asia, whereas NDB

seeks to fund any developing nation,^[53] and to fund exclusively green initiatives, with the first scheduled funds totaling \$811 million having been approved in April of 2016 for renewable energy projects in the four of the member countries of Brazil, India, South Africa and China.^[54]

Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Diplomacy

The Central Asian republics are seen by both states as a “test case for their aim to create a multipolar world order.”^[55] Of primary importance in this regard is the inclusion of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A 2006 declaration from the SCO references what is known as the “Shanghai Spirit,” which outlines “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations and pursuit of common development,” as being the “underlying philosophy...of SCO.”^[56]

Additionally important to the SCO are the three states of Iran, India and Pakistan. Iran, having until 2015 been confined to observer status due to United Nations sanctions for its alleged nuclear weapons program,^[57] is now ready to accede to full membership, a move welcomed by Xi Jinping in a state visit to Tehran in early 2016.^[58] This may fuel further accusations of the SCO being anti-Western, since relations remain poor between Iran and key Western allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia; however, it may indicate that the SCO is ready to work with whomever, under the above-stated principles of mutual benefit and equality, if not to simply snub the West on the global stage.

Perhaps more striking is the new membership of both India and Pakistan.^[59] Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in May of 2015, which included a visit to President Xi’s hometown of Xi’an, the first

time the Chinese leader has ever hosted a foreign leader in this manner.^[60]

Modi, for his part, made strong public statements in reference to “harmonious partnership” between the two states as being “essential for economic development and political stability,” and punctuated the trip with a simple message on Twitter, “I strongly believe that this century belongs to Asia.”^[61] With this kind of rhetoric, one might forget that the two countries still have multiple border disputes, which almost came to armed conflict as recently as May 2013.^[62] Through the belief in partnership above all else, the states have shown a willingness to cooperate, and not let these disputes dictate their relations.

Speaking on Russia, Modi describes the partnership as “truly strategic,” stating that Russia is a “strong and reliable friend of India.”^[63] It is Russia’s relationship with Pakistan that begs questioning. Throughout the cold war period, Pakistan was on the side of the US, particularly in the Soviet-Afghan war. It was recently, when the US engaged in a covert operation within Pakistani territory to kill Osama Bin Laden, combined with publicly decrying alleged human rights abuses, a CIA operation killing two Pakistanis, and the bombing of a military base in Pakistan, that the narrative in Pakistan shifted away from the US. Media outlets proclaimed “the end of American hegemony” being near, and that Pakistan should move towards a “G-Zero world.”^[64] Perfectly resonating with Russian statements to similar effects, the two have begun working together in multiple trade arenas.

The final point of concern with the simultaneous joining of India and Pakistan is their rivalry with each other. The sale of military equipment, for example, to Pakistan by Russia has been a cause for concern with Indian leadership.^[65] Chinese leadership have called on both states to uphold the

“Shanghai Spirit,” where common development trumps all else, as well as indicating the two states’ “important role in the SCO’s development,” adding that their simultaneous accession will “play a constructive role in pushing for the improvement of their bilateral relations.”^[66] It is through the use of the SCO, diplomacy, and the pursuit of partnership that Russia and China have overcome differences with each other, India and Pakistan, and have set a roadmap for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences with each other. Lavrov reminds the world of when the US “ignored international law by invading Iraq in 2003,” or when in 2011, the US “distorted UN Security Council resolutions by overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi’s regime by force in Libya”^[67] as examples of the US putting military might above all else, a tactic against which the SCO stands in contrast.

Conclusion and Concerns

The two main powers of Eurasia, Russia and China, have taken great pains to forge a new alliance that will be strong and enduring. President of Russia Vladimir Putin has made special efforts with Xi Jinping, the leader in Beijing, to accelerate and solidify the relationship. The two states have embraced their common history and objectives and broken barriers in trade and military cooperation. The growing power of international organizations centered outside of Washington, such as the BRICS group and the SCO, is providing other states who are disillusioned with American hegemony the opportunities to grow economically and pursue their individual development on their terms. Indeed, the guarantee of state sovereignty is enshrined in the United Nations charter, but moving forward

the defense of this principle will be headquartered further east, with shared leadership among multiple parties.

Perhaps some of the biggest concerns for the future in this regard include redefining current international relations theories and terminology. First, as of right now the widely accepted system under which states exist is actually no system at all, but anarchy. If the long-term vision of Russia and China as outlined in this article were to come to fruition, would a stronger United Nations emerge, and would the 193 member states, not least of all Russia and China themselves, be ready to cede a certain level of autonomy, under the premise of ensuring global peace and stability? At the time of writing, it should be noted that the UK is scheduled to hold a referendum on whether or not to stay in the EU,^[68] which could set precedence for other states to leave, or at least redefine the nature of the Union's control. This drive towards increased sovereignty, rather than more organizational oversight would stand in stark contrast to Eurasian ambitions to bolster the status of such institutions. Second, there is a case to be made for a new type of hegemony emerging, namely in regards to China as an economic powerhouse. As detailed above, China is investing massive amounts of resources in infrastructure through the One Belt, One Road project (importantly, increasing connectivity to and from China,) as well as holding major power in two new alternatives to the IMF, there is a distinct possibility of China exerting control in a more unilateral manner, albeit of a financial nature rather than a military one.

The primary goal for Russia, then, is to ensure that China stays on the path of embracing multipolarity and global governance. Moscow must also continue to diversify Russia's economy away from energy, as it found itself being forced to do under western sanctions beginning in 2014, lest China

use its role as a primary buyer in this sector as leverage. Dmitri Medvedev has already announced that over 60% of total state revenues come from non-energy sectors, noting that some of this change is related to low oil prices, but also to indicate successful growth in other sectors, such as agriculture, an overall reform that will “remain essential for us in the coming years.”^[69] Russia must also develop a stronger sense of continuity in leadership. The importance of Eurasianism must extend beyond being tied to Putin himself, and form the basis for Russian political identity, both within the United Russia party and without. Truly, Russia need not look farther than China itself, for as has been seen; the Chinese leadership extending from Deng to Xi continuously embraces the ideas of harmony, multipolarity, and connectivity. Should future Russian leadership move away from China and seek to realign with Western powers, the Chinese would have incentive to abandon an equal partnership, and continue large-scale economic pursuits in the Eurasian region on their own terms. Thus, while the “axis of convenience” may be disparaging in its original tone, it might also be a misnomer in that continued partnership is not simply convenient, but essential in ensuring the stated goals of multipolarity and global equality.

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How the Tsetse Left Africa and Why the Rwandan Nightmare put the World to Sleep

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Abstract

In 1894, the exploration of Rwandan territory and its control begins; but by 1994, no one seemed to care. The Rwandan genocide went under the radar, with crucial world powers turning their heads away from the crisis. Key international leaders, including the UN, claimed the genocide happened so quickly that it could not have been prevented; we will test this claim by examining the history behind the genocide, laying out the facts chronologically. In a span of 100 years—colonization to genocide—we witness the state of Rwanda turn from a harmonious civilization to a barbaric desert, in which tensions were often documented by groups like the Human Rights Watch and served as early-warning signs for the genocide to come. This paper will delve into the various aspects of Rwandan history which created the ideology that sparked the gruesomely pronounced destruction of an African nation.

In rural Africa, there is an insect known as the Tsetse—a large bloodsucking fly that bites humans and other mammals. The Tsetse can transmit African trypanosomiasis, more commonly known as “African sleeping sickness”; a fatal disease if not treated properly (Centers for Disease Control, 2012). For all intents and purposes, this paper is relating the actions of European explorers to that of a Tsetse transmitting African sleeping sickness. This particular Tsetse latched on to Rwanda and transmitted colonization, leaving the pathogens to fester and the people to deal with the symptoms.

The 100 years of colonization led to the 100 days of a primitively systematic genocide of five hundred thousand to one million Tutsi. Although Rwanda is an established state, its genocide is often described as primitive because of the rudimentary tools used (such as machetes, clubs, and hoes) hence the nickname “the machete genocide.” It is interesting to question if these rudimentary tools are truly what gained the genocide its nickname—was the

genocide considered primitive in comparison to the high-tech weaponry used by other groups like the Nazis or Serbs, or was the genocide considered primitive simply due to the fact that it took place in Africa? This paper aims to trace the symptoms of Rwandan history to see how the ideology that led to the genocide was created: where did it come from, how did it get there, and what affect did it have?

What Do You Mean, 'What Do You Mean'? The Understood Process of Genocidal Ideologies

While there is no official 'designed ideology' for genocide, more often than not, a main factor leading to its emergence is an ideological basis designed against the victims. Ideologies often vary, yet specific concepts that support such drastic measures remain constant and serve as a basis to the designated group who will likely commit the crime.

Ideology is the collection of individual and societal conceptual arguments that are the ideal ways of life for those who created them. Though there are many forms of ideology, there are two primary forms that result in genocide: *nationalist* ideologies revolving around power, wealth, influence, and frequently the purity of a group/nation; and '*better world*' ideologies offering ideal social arguments for all of humanity, quite like communism (Charny, 1999b, p. 347). Numerous ideologies specify particular enemies, which can result in genocidal tendencies as well as societal destruction/catastrophe, as these specified enemies must be "dealt with" in order to proceed with implementing the ideology. The ultimate goal, however, is not always to kill. When the goal is not to kill, discrimination and violence are used against the opponents, nonbelievers, and outsiders (Charny,

1999b, p. 347). Nevertheless, this will eventually lead to genocide due to the evolution of events:

Discrimination > Sporadic Violence > Genocide

Even though there are two primary sources of an ideology, it is possible for both to be used together. This combination of nationalist and ‘better world’ ideologies can be seen in Nazism through “lebensraum”—the belief by a state that it has the natural right to claim more territory. In other words, a German desire for more territory joined with a desire for the ideal race led to genocide. The concept of these two ideological sources mixing together is also evident throughout the Bosnian and Armenian genocides, as well as the “auto-genocide”, or the extermination of a country’s citizens by its own government, in Cambodia.

What precisely tweaks an ideology and causes it to follow a more destructive path? In these cases, intense social conditions and the frustration of basic needs, mixed with fear and confusion, will easily do the trick. These conditions are followed by the creation of a future that seems brighter than the present; enter scapegoating. When current conditions are dreadful and a more positive future seems possible, scapegoating becomes the rationale to explain why the present is not as glorious as it is perceived it could be. People tend to feel better about an undesirable present if they can understand why it is as such and if they are able to see a brighter tomorrow with the source of their problem eliminated. When scapegoating comes into play, the enemy tends to be the group on the other side of a cultural/national rift. Due to a vicious frenzy of dehumanization, antagonism, and propaganda, this image of the ‘enemy’ often escalates quickly. Through various genocidal studies, we see that the increasing

tension between those struggling and those blamed for the struggle ultimately leads to the notion that the enemy must be killed, ironically, in order to avoid complete destruction of society. The foundation of the ideology in the end becomes, “they deserve to be and must be eliminated” (Charny, 1999b, p. 347). Ultimately, it is psychologically easier to blame than it is to accept.

Same Difference: Rwanda’s Theoretical Fraternal Twins

In the lush grasslands of pre-colonial Rwanda, three groups of people coexisted: Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. The harmonious living between these three groups [in pre-colonized Rwanda] stemmed from the primary lack of difference between the people. The three groups were not Rwanda’s individual clans, tribes, or races. In order to be classified as such, the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa would have had to show separate interests from one another, which they did not. This society can be described as “tribalism without a tribe” (Burns, 2014, p. 9).

Stories passed down through family generations tell us that Rwanda’s Hutu and Tutsi stem from the same parents, or clans in this case, and share many traits, but developed as two separate eggs. The members of either side can be identified as individuals in the sense that despite having very similar internal makeups, they have their own ‘physical’ traits that distinguish them from the other group, as seen with fraternal twins. The only observable difference between the two groups is related to castes determined by occupation, with Hutu being agriculturists and Tutsi being herdsman.

The idea of Tutsi as herdsmen came from the arbitrary concept of possessing at least ten cattle. A whole family was labeled Tutsi if the father owned said cattle, or was otherwise labeled Hutu. This classification was not permanent so long as the Hutu family acquired more cattle to achieve a Tutsi label; this

concept began working in reverse with Tutsi trying to achieve a Hutu label once the Hutu gained power (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 6). The Belgians, who believed there is and should be a clear difference between the two groups, implemented this labeling rule. Again, there was essentially no difference present between the two; even the Belgians, who conducted experiments and applied theories for proof, could not maintain an obvious divide. Unable to separate the groups from one another, the Belgians introduced identity cards in the 1930's which stated all of the information needed to distinguish the two groups from one another. Belgians, along with the Hutu and Tutsi themselves, would have to check these cards continually for confirmation of individuals' identities (Klinghoffer, 1998, p. 6).

Swiping Right: The European Infatuation with Rwanda

In 1856, British explorer John Hanning Speke wrote journals analyzing the civil dynamic between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. He focused his attention in areas known today as Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda, making his first analysis of the indigenous African people in a time and space separate from modern day Rwanda. Speke justified his research with the biblical character of Ham and after a few months was so enamored with his conclusion that he then wanted to share it with the Tutsi African King Kamrasi of Unyoro. Speke expressed to the king that his people come from white European descent, hence their tall slender build and thinner noses; ultimately meaning they should reign supreme over their Black counterparts in Africa. This introduction of racism and white supremacy to Rwanda had laid the foundation for the genocide. Speke spoke with such confidence of his findings that they became the perceived truth of the Rwandan people by the explorers that followed.

In the late 19th century, European explorers continued to search for unclaimed African land. Rwanda's second explorer, Count Von Gotzen of Germany, arrived in 1894, two years after the first explorer Dr. Oscar Baumann of Austria. Von Gotzen stressed that due to the Berlin Declaration of the Congo Free State of 1885, which gave control of the bulk of The Congo and its people to the King of Belgium (Leopold II), the Rwandan people had been living on German land (Burns, 2014, p. 15). Von Gotzen's intentions were not to explore, but to make sure the inhabitants of the land knew of and accepted this declaration; leading German forces against those who did not accept colonization, as he did against the Tanzanians in the Maji Maji War. His work to force German ownership over the Rwandans and their land made Von Gotzen responsible for the first official step in Rwanda's colonization by European powers.

The era of 1876-1914 was an intense and rapid hunt for territory, becoming known as the *Scramble of Africa*. This era's chaos only continued when Belgium invaded Rwanda in 1916 and gained control after Germany lost its overseas territories following World War I. Explorers had kicked off the colonization process through the submission of previous inhabitants; now, European influences could be implemented by separating the cohesive civilization into a more suitable segregated society. Taking advantage of past efforts, Belgium's ultimate goal was to have an African trading partner for Belgium's economy and society to grow and benefit from. The racial divide worked as intended as the Belgians continued the belief that the Tutsi were more intellectual, beautiful, and all around more European than the Hutu—therefore superior. Belgian administrator, Count Renaud de Briey, declared that the Tutsi were actually descendants of the lost continent of Atlantis: "The [Tutsi] were meant to reign. Their fine presence is in itself enough to give them a great prestige

vis-à-vis the inferior races which surround...It is not surprising that those good [Hutu], less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting, have let themselves be enslaved without ever daring to revolt" (Burns, 2014, p. 19).

If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck, Then It's a Duck...Right?: The Forced Identity of a Rwandan Elite

The colonization of Rwanda by Belgium was far more aggressively executed than Rwanda saw by Germany. The Belgians, seeing Rwanda as a necessary part of their government, focused on implementing Belgian standards in order to essentially get Rwanda up to speed. Catholicism was named the national religion, and French the national language. With African riches such as gold, ivory, and diamonds being less plentiful in Rwanda than elsewhere on the continent, the Belgians decided to "civilize" the people of Rwanda and introduce them to Belgian society so they would have to pay taxes (Burns, 2014, p. 27). If Belgium couldn't get African riches, they would get rich from the Africans.

In order to prove the hypothesis of Tutsi superiority first posed by John Hanning Speke correct, Belgium began conducting experiments and applying Social Darwinism Theory in 1933 to prove that those with certain specified traits were more likely to succeed. From this, such "evidence" was found which "confirmed" the hypothesis: "Anatomy, consequently, shows [sic] how it comes that individuals affected with dropsy of the brain may manifest all their intellectual and affective faculties", stated by Dr. Johann Gaspar Spurheim after conducting many cranial comparisons of Hutu and Tutsi (Burns, 2014, p. 28). In sum, it was believed that the size of one's head was directly related to their intelligence. Other studies took place contributing to the belief of Tutsi superiority; comparisons of European and non-European humans concluded that

the Tutsi were more similar to Europeans than the Hutu. The Twa were often dismissed from experiments and theories because their population was so small; the ultimate goal was not necessarily to decipher every individual's race, but to determine what made someone Tutsi.

The Belgians conducted fraudulent research solely to confirm what they already believed, forcing evidence out of their experiments in order to support their previous claims. They believed that the Tutsi should reign supreme, so they manipulated the status quo to create a neatly packaged society which could be added to their empire. Once the Tutsi were considered superior, it only seemed fitting to place them in governmental jobs and leave the rest of the work for the others. Having established Rwanda as "New Belgium", the Tutsi were thrust into national leadership due to the mentality of Belgium at the time: if you look like us and [if we make you] act like us, then you are as such. After years of brainwashing, the Tutsi believed so as well.

I'll Take That: The Hutu Flip the Script

After a couple of decades of Tutsi ruling, nine Hutu, with help from Belgian Flemish priests, banded together to change Rwandan political power in 1957. The *Hutu Manifesto* stated that if the cultural history of Rwanda was true, and the Hutu were the original occupiers of the land which was invaded by the Tutsi, then the Hutu are the rightful rulers of the land (Burns, 2014, p. 35). November 1, 1959 is believed to have been the start of the violent tug-of-war over political power after a Hutu political activist, named Dominique Mbonyumutwa, was beaten to death by Tutsi political activists. This event sparked rampant killings of Tutsis and the destruction of their homes.

Multiple tugs of the rope never quite changed the majority of Rwandan political rule, although there were slight advances here and there for both sides. The Belgians saw, however, the progress Hutus had made in changing the system; they switched their allegiance and began an assisted election more favored to Hutus.

Rwanda officially was under a Hutu political majority after receiving its independence in 1961. Belgium left as suddenly and chaotically as it came in. The umpire's exit from the match prompted the tables to turn, the rules to twist, and the teams to play dirty. The result of the election was a powerful backlash on the part of the Hutu against the Tutsi. The Tutsi had been yanked off their pedestal and the Hutu, who had been oppressed for years, now had the power.

For the purpose of this paper, we will not go back and forth between slight political gains and losses of the Hutu and Tutsi for the following 30 years from the Hutu election victory to the genocide, because by that point, the damage had already been done; time had allowed ideas to fester in the minds of the Rwandans, eventually becoming ideologies. Having discussed the background information regarding where beliefs came from, why they were implemented, and how they began to twist Rwanda on a national level, we will now look into how all the nation's people got tied into the genocide.

“It's Alive!": The Further Growth of the Rwandan Majority

From July 1993 to July 1994, the Hutu majority in Rwanda relied on radio broadcasting to proselytize their vision of an ideal society. *Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLMC), mainly broadcasted in the native language of Kinyarwanda, was a broadcast network which revolutionized Rwandan broadcasting, largely being known for its rowdy nature and street language.

Similar to radio broadcasting in western nations, RTLMC relied on the use of DJs who played pop music and held phone-ins. There is a difference, however, between the broadcasting known in Western nations and that of 1993 Rwanda. At times, announcers would broadcast while inebriated, causing their jokes to become vulgar, offensive and crude. Although, this seemingly disastrous stunt actually helped the station appeal to its niche audiences. Due to its lack of factual material, RTLMC depended on the use of running commentaries and lengthy interviews as entertainment. This led to continued interest from listeners as it was different from more formal radio stations like *Radio Rwanda*. Ironically, according to its documents of incorporation, RTLMC was designed to “‘create harmonious development in Rwandese society’, contribute to the education of people and transmit true, objective information” (Melvern, 2000, p. 71).

Who is behind this ingenious one of a kind radio station, you may ask? This is threefold—creative, political, and financial. Creatively speaking, Ferdinand Nahimana worked as the brains of the operation, while *Radio Rwanda's* Joseph Serugendu provided technical support. As a historian and a propagandist—quite contradictory—Nahimana inspired the style of RTLMC to integrate planned news bulletins that would instill fear and incite murder (Melvern, 2000, p. 70). Politically, there was the Rwandan government. Studios for RTLMC were connected to generators of the presidential palace and programs were played to the entire country via transmitters owned and operated by the government’s *Radio Rwanda*. Financially, there were Hutu extremist shareholders. For 5,000 Rwandan francs each there was a total of 20,000 shares, but no one could own more than 1,000. The list of shareholders, some twenty-five pages in length, contained names of people in various professions from businessmen to journalists and bank managers to government officials; most notably listed was

the president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, owning the largest amount of shares. Félicien Kabuga, the president of RTLMC's board of directors, was an industrialist and financial advisor to President Habyarimana, who graciously helped fund the Interahamwe and *Kangura*, a Hutu paramilitary organization and a weekly newspaper that supplied anti-Tutsi propaganda supported by influential military and government officials, respectively. *Kangura* published mandates with potentially fatal consequences: 'Let us learn about the [Tusti] plans and let us exterminate every last one of them'. *Kangura* essentially released the Hutu Ten Commandments with instructions to mistreat and discriminate against Tusti (Melvern, 2000, p. 72).

As a fantastic weapon for propaganda by use of commentary, pop music and phone-ins, a strategically unique approach to broadcasting ultimately camouflaged itself to suck people in; RTLMC prepared Rwandans for genocide.

Please Sir, May I have Some More: A Renewed Interest In Rwanda

Trying to persuade diplomats in Kigali to take RTLMC seriously was practically impossible. Due to the West's influence and a consequent belief in freedom of speech, they saw RTLMC as being open to various interpretations. This is not to say that those who were against RTLMC did not believe in freedom of speech, but that ultimately the station took it too far. It is relatively safe to say that a deliberate witch-hunt should not get to curl up under the cozy blanket of free speech. Such a hunt incited fear into society in just the way Nahimana intended:

I listened to RTLMC because if you were mentioned over the [radio], you were sure to be carted off a short time later by the

Interahamwe. You knew you had to change your address at once
(Melvern, 2000, p. 71)

Not all officials, however, conveniently ignored the public threats from RTLMC. Johan Swinnen, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, warned Brussels of the destabilization being caused by the radio station. It is agreed by many that not enough was done to nullify the broadcasts, even considering those who bothered to look at the national destabilization. Lieutenant Mark Nees, a Belgian military intelligence officer, believes that if the broadcasts had been managed the genocide may have never taken place. Surely there is no way to know this for sure, but it seems to be an appropriate hypothesis as the RTLMC's national access and its high levels of favorability assisted in the ideological communication of the nation: 'Stand up, take action...without worrying about international opinion' (Melvern, 2000, p. 72).

The insanity of RTLMC in 1993 sparked the return of international interest in Rwandan affairs. Whether you were for or against RTLMC, it seemed that the genocide could not have been prevented because of the speed in which things escalated—seeing as this radio controversy took place in the year leading up to the genocide. RTLMC, however, was not the start of rising tensions. The international community marked RTLMC as the catalyst to the genocide when in actuality it was the last straw. When looking at the history behind the genocide it is clear to see not only the effect colonization had to erode the Rwandan civilization, but also the effect of the continual abandonment from world powers. Years later, these same world powers claimed that tensions rose so quickly that the genocide could not have been prevented; we have discussed 100 years of Rwandan history to showcase this claim as fraudulent. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the impact foreign powers had—with their arrival to and departure

from Rwanda—in creating the ideology that then led to the genocide. This paper aims to take the blame off of the Rwandan people for their apparent self-destruction, and place it on that of the Europeans, whose colonization was the beginning of Rwanda’s slow collapse. After all, you wouldn’t blame the victim for getting bit by the Tsetse, would you?

The Chicken or the Egg: The Wrap Up

From initial contact to long after the Tsetse had left to find its next meal, Rwanda showed symptoms from the bite and, with no medical staff to prevent conditions from worsening, fell victim to the disease. It is just as important to understand the key historical moments that create an ideology, as it is to understand how an ideology itself leads to genocide. The difference in the Rwandan tale of genocide versus others around the globe is its lack of treatment. There were multiple periods in which international powers could have stepped in to settle things down and attempt to cure the disease. It may be easily defensible as to why they did not step in as expected; perhaps they didn’t see their responsibility in the case, or simply just did not want to intervene out of pure self-interest. So, which came first: international negligence or Rwandan chaos?

In this paper, we discussed key periods throughout Rwandan history that would have led to such a destructive ideology; therefore the argument stands that it was in fact international negligence that preceded Rwandan chaos and if certain events which created destabilizing tensions had not taken place, the genocide may not have occurred.

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Review of “As Others See Us: The Causes & Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America” by Stephen Brooks

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“As Others See Us: The Causes & Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America” by Stephen Brooks is an analytical study depicting how the world views America: our policies, our people, and our presence in the world. This analysis published in 2006, while thorough isn’t satisfying for the political world of 2017. With the United States being such a dominant actor in the global political arena, it’s important to understand how other countries view our diplomacy and intervening actions. The way foreign countries perceive what the United States government does gives us an idea of how they will interact with us in a diplomatic sense.

In 159 pages, Brooks reveals to the reader that not many perceptions of America are positive. In fact, positive perceptions are few and far between and are seldom discussed in the book. According to Brooks, perceptions of the United States in foreign locations are solidified in their negative light due to interventionism outside of our borders (i.e. Iraq War), the hyper-globalization of American culture, and constituents of other countries feeling as though there’s an inability for other countries to have a say in international political matters. These various categories of perception are analyzed through understanding the

three “I’s” of “cognitive ignorance” (ignorance, insularity, and indifference) that Americans are perceived to fall into by foreign countries, and by analyzing value gaps between the United States and foreign states. The values taken into consideration include: religion, moral absolutism, civic-mindedness, individualism, and patriotism. Based off Brooks’ argument, all of these are critical players in the overwhelming Anti-American perceptions that he gathers in this study. He mentions that some governments regularly manipulate their respective state’s media, which their citizens actively digest, in a way that makes the United States appear villainous. While the analysis is validated through Brooks’ consolidation of studies from various political scientists including their case studies on a few key countries including but not limited to England, German, and France, there’s a glaring issue within his analysis and his method in unfolding the information that he has gathered. Certain countries, primarily Canada and prominent members of the European Union, are used to defend Brooks’ argument that most of the world has an Anti-American sentiment towards the United States; however, he seldom brings up any counter argument using American-favoring countries such as the Philippines. In fact, the only time Brooks mentions any countries outside of his stock five-to-seven case study countries is when he aims to emphasize his point and further sway the reader that Anti-Americanism is an ideology the rules the planet outside of our borders.

The name of the book and its opening pages gave a false perception of what the analysis would actually focus on. Brooks' idea that the vast majority of the world preaches Anti-Americanism is supported by the viewpoints of a handful of countries in his study. Ultimately, in order for this study to be completely valid, it needs to be expanded and take more countries into consideration---at least one country from every major region on Earth (The Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, etc.)

Brooks' argument has the opportunity to be exponentially strengthened by including more case studies that survey more countries. Doing this would offer a far more coherent idea of the world's perception of the United States, which is what this book aims to do. Essentially, Canadians will have a different viewpoint opposed to someone from Yemen, but the way

Brooks' analysis is currently set up gives the impression that foreign perception of the United States is monotonous and doesn't alter based on geographical location. In addition, the argument altogether needs to be updated to accommodate the ease of information gathering due to the influx of technology. Much of how people view the world has changed in the last 11 years with the normalization of social media and heightened access to the Internet in many parts of the world. Even those who do not have readily access to these luxury items still have easier access to Internet cafes than they did 11 years ago. Information from all around the world is far easier to disseminate. Those who might have had little to no opinion on American domestic and foreign policies in 2006 may now be fully aware of all that is happening within our borders in 2017 due to this and that directly affects perceptions that foreigners have regarding the United States.

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