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The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to present Volume 5 of *The Ramerican Political Science Review*.

The five papers featured in this volume ask normatively important questions that impact global affairs and domestic politics. In doing so, the authors of these papers offer important insights into problems that are often debate by policy makers worldwide, as well as those problems that are often overlooked.

We hope that these articles will not only help to provide better understanding of relevant questions concerning the state of our politics, but also that they help inspire new questions for our readers. Furthermore, we hope that the work of this volume’s authors will encourage other students to submit their own research for consideration in upcoming volumes of *The Ramerican Political Science Review*.

While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion. This year, over fifty submissions were received and reviewed by the editors. The featured authors went through a “revise and resubmit” process wherein they made content and style changes that were requested by the editorial staff. This final product is a testament to the editors’ and authors’ immense efforts working collaboratively throughout the summer in uncertain circumstances brought upon by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department of Political Science would, therefore, like to thank this year’s editorial board:

**Ross Atkinson**  
**Anna Connor**  
**Chava Evans**  
**Jasmine Frazier**  
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The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf for advising our student editorial board as they worked through the process of critiquing submissions and formatting this journal.
Analyzing the Accuracy of Early Warning Systems in the Field of Modern Genocide and Suggested Changes: A Comparative Case Study of Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur

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Abstract

This paper was written to explore the current Early Warning Systems in place for recognizing indicators of an impending genocide or mass atrocity. The research consisted of a comparative analysis of each system’s strengths and weaknesses in prediction. Specifically, the comparison focused on four well known Early Warning Systems in the field of genocide studies. The research showed quantitative systems of prediction were far less accurate than their qualitative counterparts, and that Dr. Gregory Stanton’s “Stages of Genocide” was a successful Early Warning System. After analyzing each system, recommendations for improvement were applied to fill the gaps in prediction. These recommendations were centered around creating a better predictive model for “modern genocide.” To do this, several subsections are recommended for Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System. These subsections include “Dehumanization and Propaganda,” “Extermination Using Mass Rape” and “Extermination Through Attrition.” The case studies for each, in the order stated above, were Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur. With these subsets, the predictive models become more descriptive; the subsections are meant to act as guides to show what some of these stages may look like outside of the general conception of the stages of genocide. These assumptions are likely informed by the well-known events of the Holocaust, though that is not representative of every genocide.

Analyzing the Accuracy of Early Warning Systems in the Field of Modern Genocide and Suggested Changes: A Comparative Case Study of Myanmar, Rwanda, and Darfur

Genocide existed long before Raphael Lemkin coined the term for it in 1944 (Mulligan, 2013). Though he gave the atrocity a name which almost everyone knows today, there are plenty of examples in ancient history where genocide occurred. The Romans with Carthage, the Athenians with Melos, and the several biblical occurrences are only some of the many examples provided by history. However, it wasn’t until the last decade or so that modern society developed the technology, knowledge, and awareness of genocide and its warnings that Early Warning Systems began to flourish. Many were created in the pursuit of preventing future genocide, but few have gained enough attention or accuracy to be widely considered or consulted by the
international institutions they would be useful to. This paper seeks to analyze which of these Early Warning Systems is the most accurate in predicting modern genocide, as well as how the most successful system might be further improved. To illustrate improvements to Early Warning Systems, three case studies and the ways they indicated an imminent genocide will be discussed.

Defining Modern Genocide

Many scholars have their own definition for what can and cannot be classified as modern genocide. For the purpose of this paper, genocide is any mass killing or purposeful erasure conducted on the basis of race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion with the intent to eradicate culture or people. Modern genocides are those atrocities which have occurred after the ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (heretofore referred to as the UNCG) by the United Nations General Assembly on January 12, 1951. The reasoning in this definition lies in several factors discussed below.

The systems of prediction considered in this paper did not come into being until the late twentieth to early twenty-first century, and therefore have mainly focused on genocides perpetrated before their creation. Secondly, this paper is concerned with genocides committed after the ratification of the UNCG, since the purpose of predicting modern genocide is to hopefully prevent or punish it. Mass atrocities which occurred before the ratification are unable to be punished, but everything which has occurred afterwards and falls within the bounds of the UNCG can be. Therefore, the cases discussed in this paper will have taken place since the UNCG entered into force in 1951. Lastly, the killing of people of a minority political ideology, known as politicide, is not included in this paper’s definition of genocide, not because it is considered less important but because it is excluded from the UNCG. Therefore, any cases of politicide mentioned within the Early Warning Systems addressed will not be included in the final ruling of their accuracy.

There are plenty of criticisms of the UNCG and its limitations and narrowness laid out by scholars, but—although many of the criticisms are well founded—this paper will rely on the boundaries set by the convention. Such emphasis is placed on the UNCG because of its legal capabilities to intervene in and punish genocide (which are both ultimate goals of Early Warning Systems). In a resource edited by Samuel Totten, the reasoning for using the UNCG as a standard is best illustrated when he states:

...definitions [created by genocide scholars as criticism of the UNCG’s definition] are irrelevant vis-a-vis international law, for only the definition in the United Nations
Concentration on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is used to prosecute the perpetuation of genocide (Totten, 2006).

The one issue with using the definition found in the UNCG and only viewing those cases of genocide which have been acknowledged and legally recognized by the United Nations is the rarity. For the purpose of this paper, any genocide—whether legally recognized as such or not due to the issue of realpolitik—that fits the definition of genocide in the UNCG will be considered when analyzing the accuracy of Early Warning Systems. This is because without this provision only a handful of genocides could be used to test the predictive capacities of the systems. Only three cases of genocide have been legally recognized and punished: Rwanda, Bosnia, and Cambodia (Burns, 2018). With this slightly modified application of the UNCG definition established, it can be applied to determine the accuracy of the Early Warning Systems considered in this paper.

Comparative Analysis

The 10 Stages of Genocide by Dr. Gregory Stanton

Dr. Gregory Stanton’s (2013) comprehensive list of the different stages of genocide takes a descriptive approach to the prediction of genocide. Originally, there were eight stages of genocide in Dr. Stanton’s 1998 version of his Early Warning System, but this was later expanded to ten stages in 2013 when more data was considered and gaps were found in the predictive capacity of the system. The system was created on the premise that an Early Warning System should exist in stages in order to reflect the progression of the situation. The stages act as indicators, broad enough to encompass many different events to better recognize and alert scholars when indicators of a potential future genocide arise. Dr. Stanton’s system holds the priority of flagging a developing situation as soon as possible so international institutions can protect against genocide in the long-term. After all, Early Warning Systems exist in order to prevent genocides from happening, but if adequate and efficient methods of responding to the warning signs of a genocide are not taken nothing will be prevented. In Dr. Stanton’s own words, “Early warning is meaningless without early response. But early warning is the necessary first step toward prevention” (Stanton, 2009, p. 319).

The original eight stages were Classification, Symbolization, Dehumanization, Organization, Polarization, Preparation, Extermination, and Denial (Stanton, 1998). Later, the list was expanded with the stages of Discrimination and Persecution. The stages don’t have to occur
in order, though it makes sense that events will progress to the next stage in the list as stakes rise and the situation grows closer to genocide (Stanton, 2013). The stages are as follows:

1. Classification: cultures naturally divide themselves into categories to provide an “us vs. them” mentality, which leads to an increase in scapegoating and conflict escalation. This is particularly damaging and can lead to genocide in a society where there is little-to-no merging between these strictly classified groups.

2. Symbolization: this stage further encourages classification of individuals and people into groups, marking them more starkly as an “other” and making them easy to identify. Symbols of status are not necessarily a trigger for this stage, but ones backed by hate, discrimination, or dehumanization are. An example of symbolization would be the yellow Star of David Jewish people were forced to wear under the Nazi regime.

3. Discrimination: beyond discrimination enacted by individuals (though that can certainly be a part of it), a regime revoking rights from a group (voting rights, civil rights, citizenship, etc.) can be a strong indicator of a possible future genocide.

4. Dehumanization: equating a specific people group to something sub-human. In this stage, propaganda is spread and the dominant or oppressive group is indoctrinated to believe the oppressed are undeserving of their rights and lives, and that they represent everything unholy or immoral.

5. Organization: similar to preparation, the organization is usually where state governments are seen arming militia groups—or militia groups are arming themselves—to organize for an eventual attack. State governments often find ways to arm militia groups instead of enacting the violence themselves so they can distance themselves from blame and punishment when the violence is over.

6. Polarization: a continued and concentrated effort to increase the distance between groups using the stages above is implemented either through formal means (passing laws limiting interaction between groups) or informal means, such as propaganda.

7. Preparation: the step up from organization, [this is when] actual attacks and plans for violence are laid out. Weapons are bought, troops are gathered and trained, and the coming violence is rarely referred to as genocide.

8. Persecution: victims are separated out to be killed or detained. Children are separated from their parents, genocide through attrition begins, segregation occurs, and concentration camps (or similar systems) may be constructed.
9. Extermination: the actual act of killing. Usually occurs very quickly in cases of mass killing (slowly in cases of genocide through attrition), mass rape, and destruction of cultural and ethnic artifacts. The goal is to eradicate every aspect of the people group.

10. Denial: the most enduring stage, denial can be a never ending struggle best fought by trying to punish perpetrators and fighting against the realpolitik that makes that process difficult. (Stanton, 2013).

Dr. Stanton believes genocide can be prevented at any stage before extermination, but different stages call for different actions. Necessary intervention becomes more forceful and potentially violent as the situation progresses. The benefits of a system dictated by qualitative stages is in its descriptive and broad nature. Many questionable and harmful actions taken by a government or [group of] people can be included in the stages. Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System has been vastly successful in tracking potential genocides, as will be explained later in this paper.

The ability to monitor an ongoing situation while applying broad parameters to unfolding events allows for continual monitoring in the field of genocide. Dr. Stanton’s system benefits from continual use and application through the associated site “Genocide Watch.” The site was founded in 1999 by the Alliance Against Genocide with the help of Dr. Stanton and several other scholars (Genocide Watch- Our Mission, n.d.). The site utilizes Dr. Stanton’s stages along with the accounts of reporters, journalists, humanitarian relief workers, and those conducting field studies in “at risk” countries to inform the decision of which countries should be placed on their “Countries at Risk” list. This countries on the list are placed into one (or sometimes two) of three levels of threat: Genocide Watch, Genocide Warning, Genocide Emergency. A Genocide Watch is in place when the conditions in the country align with one or more of the ten stages of genocide in Dr. Stanton’s early warning system. A Genocide Warning is added when it becomes clear that preparatory action is being taken to commit a genocidal event. A Genocide Emergency is when the genocidal event is being carried out; this is the hardest stage to intervene at, as it often requires the use of force. The status of countries is updated regularly (whenever new information is learned) and updating the status of states adds urgency to the call for intervention. As a situation is upgraded from a Genocide Watch to a Genocide Warning, the need for action is emphasized to stop it before it turns into a Genocide Emergency.
Barbara Harff

While Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System relies heavily on a qualitative approach to prediction, Barbara Harff places emphasis on quantitative analysis in her model. This is evident in both her methodology for creating the system and in her definition of what she considers genocide or politicide. Although Harff’s study does include politicides, any included in her research will be omitted from this paper where possible. The methodology for the creation of the system was based on a large-N comparative analysis of genocides and politicides from history. Harff states her scholarly definition of genocide and politicide as:

...the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents — or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities — that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal, political, or politicized communal group. In genocides, the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics... (Harff & Gurr, 1998).

Harff’s definition of genocide and the qualification for what she includes as a case is very quantitative. The quantitative nature in Harff’s definition is clearly seen in the language used when she states that a genocide involves, “the deaths of a substantial portion” of a communal group. However, no guideline is given for how many people or what percentage of a population is considered “substantial.” This is different from the approach of the United Nations definition which relies on the intent behind killings (in this sense, a specific number is not necessary) (“Convention on the Prevention and..., 1951). Barbara Harff addresses her choice to make her assessment more quantitative on the need for a stable variable; since intent is difficult to prove, numbers of deaths was a far more applicable variable for determining what could and couldn’t be considered genocide or politicide (Harff, 2009, p. 515).

As for predicting a genocide, Harff (2009) used systematic and quantitative research to propose a new Early Warning System which would consider the statistical patterns found in the events preceding past genocides. After studying more than 150 countries and their major historical/humanitarian events since 1955, Harff identified six preconditions for genocidal events: political upheaval, prior genocides, political systems with exclusionary ideology, ethnic and religious cleavages, low economic development, and how this genocide will impact international relationships (Harff, 2003). Harff made it clear in her findings that all of these preconditions appear to be necessary, but none are sufficient on their own (Harff, 2003, P. 70). Since all preconditions are necessary, the predictive threshold of the system needs to reflect this. Therefore, when Harff’s system is analyzed for accuracy, a truly successful prediction can only be claimed when the
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events match all the preconditions; an event exhibiting only a few preconditions would not trigger the Early Warning System.

The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Statistical Approach

Another system which uses a quantitative method in addressing the prediction of genocide is the one created by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. The methods used by the USHMM predictive model focus heavily on statistical analysis and algorithms. However, when considering the accuracy of the USHMM predictive model it is important to note the USHMM hasn't released the official document that explains how their algorithm works. The site makes references to the algorithm used to determine each country's likelihood of experiencing a genocidal event without ever fully explaining the details of calculations. This means the USHMM model is harder to reproduce for testing purposes.

According to the USHMM website, Barbara Harff’s research, as well as that of the Political Instability Task Force, was drawn on for the algorithms (Early Warning Project, n.d.). The USHMM used prior research and statistical clues gained from demographics and assigned numerical values to certain situations (the spread of propaganda, actual killings, redistribution of a minority population to “camps”, etc.) according to how much their presence indicated an impending genocide. Based on the compilation of this data, a system was created to rank countries from most to least likely to experience a genocidal event. Before 2017, the algorithm was only focused on the likelihood of state-sponsored mass killings. What was found was:

...factors associated with greater risk of mass killing include history of mass killing, large population size, high infant mortality, ethnic fractionalization, high battle-related deaths, ban on opposition parties, existence of politically motivated killings, lack of freedom of movement, repression of civil society, coup attempts within the last five years, and anocratic regime type (i.e., neither full democracy nor full autocracy) (Early Warning Project, n.d.).

Once these factors have been identified and countries have been checked for their presence, countries are sorted into risk categories based on where their risk percentage places them on a list of countries. One significant thing to note about this particular system is that during the creation of the algorithm, data from states with fewer than half a million citizens were not included (Ulfelder 2013). While cursory research proves that no modern genocides have been reported in these states, the exclusion may cause smaller states to be overlooked if or when violence does start to unfold. Despite this, the model presented by the USHMM boasts an alleged
80% success rate in determining which states will experience mass killings within the next year (later changed to within the next two years in 2017 [Early Warning Project, n.d.]). However, the technical paper outlining how they calculated this success rate has not been released for public viewing and therefore the success rate must be determined by its correct predictions. To determine the success of the system, this paper will instead view the rankings from past years and see whether the predictions of genocide were right.

The United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes

It would be a vast oversight to use the definition of genocide laid out in the UNCG without also including the framework they use to assess the risk of genocide happening. Because the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (FAAC) was made by researchers working in tandem with the United Nations, it uses the definition of genocide established in the UNCG. However, the framework goes one step further and expands the analysis to include crimes against humanity and war crimes (United Nations, 2014).

The FAAC has two levels of risk factors, separated by how applicable they are to each of the three categories of mass atrocities: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Risk factors common to all atrocities are included under the term “common risk factors,” while those only found in some atrocities are called “specific risk factors” (United Nations, 2014). The most important aspect to note from the report on the FAAC is that the assessment of a state being at risk of experiencing an atrocity is not dependent on the presence of all risk factors (United Nations, 2014, p. 6). Therefore, most risk factors can be present without the state experiencing an atrocity, or only a few could be present before an atrocity breaks out. The FAAC stresses the importance of taking notice of any situation where one or several risk factors are present, not just situations where all risk factors have occurred.

The risk factors stated in the FAAC include the following common risk factors: situations of instability or armed conflict, past records of serious international human rights violations, weakened state structure, clear motives or incentives to commit atrocities, capacity to commit atrocities, absence of mitigation strategies to avoid violations, preparatory action, and triggering factors (United Nations, 2014). As for the specific risk factors mentioned in the FAAC, this paper will focus only on the specific risk factors given for genocide. The specific risk factors include: tension between intergroups, discrimination against a protected group, or signs of harboring an intent to destroy a protected group (United Nations, 2014, p. 18-19).

One important thing mentioned in the FAAC is that “...although it is impossible to draw a direct causal relation between the presence of particular risk factors and the occurrence of atrocity
crimes, these crimes are rarely committed in the absence of all or most of the risk factors…” (United Nations, 2014, p. 7). Human behavior, especially thoughts and actions taken against others with the intent to do harm, is largely unpredictable. However, there are certain events that these systems can recognize and use to serve as indicators for international organizations that illustrate the need for mitigation.

A feature of the FAAC that makes it easier to use are the indicators (or subsections) of the risk factors. These indicators provide useful examples of what the risk factors may look like in practice. For example, one of the indicators under “Enabling circumstances or preparatory action” is “Marking of people or their property based on affiliation to a group” (United Nations, 2014, p. 16). This is similar to the stage of Symbolization in Dr. Stanton’s descriptive prediction model (Stanton, 2013).

**Determining the Most Accurate Early Warning System**

To determine the success rate of current Early Warning Systems, one must first look to the cases predicted in the past as well as cases predicted in the present. A successful Early Warning System must predict genocides before they occur, which means systems will become less accurate as they fail to predict or warn of a genocide that has since occurred. Failing to acknowledge current genocides also leads to lower accuracy. That being said, any countries considered to be “high risk” for a genocidal event by any system but have no reports of genocide as of the time of this paper (May 2020) will not be penalized. This is because of the changing nature of genocide and how quickly situations could dissolve in the future. Another factor to consider is the lack of updates and application given to Harff’s Early Warning System. Since the UHMM model was based in large part on Harff’s work, the UHMM model will be applied as both a representation of the application of her work and its own. With this established, the most accurate system must be determined based on case studies of current and recent genocides before suggestions can be made.

There are several areas of concern that have not been addressed by any of the aforementioned EWSs. Brazil’s growing risk of genocide—whether through targeted killing or attrition—against indigenous peoples under the policies of Jair Bolsonaro is an example of a crisis which has not been addressed by any of the systems (Branford, 2020). Brazil is not included on the map of at-risk countries or on any of the posted lists from the past two prediction cycles (Early Warning Project, 2018). The cultural genocide occurring against the Uyghurs in China is currently only being viewed as a cultural genocide with the potential to escalate. This issue has only been recognized in blog posts written by contributors to Genocide Watch and non-associated media...
sites like BBC that are referenced by Genocide Watch, the site associated with the application of Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System (BBC News, 2020). While China is on the top 30 list of countries at risk for mass killings created by the UHMM algorithm, it is at the bottom of the ranking of countries likely to experience a genocidal event and even experienced a 1% decrease in projected risk despite the increase in evidence pointing toward serious human rights violations happening in the Xinjiang region (Early Warning Project, 2019).

In many ways, both the Early Warning Project and the Alert List frequently updated by Genocide Watch have kept up to pace with the unfolding and turbulent situations of mass killing around the world. However, there is one case that went unpredicted by the Early Warning Project: the genocidal killings committed by Christian and Muslim militias in the Central African Republic. Most cases of non-state-led mass killings listed by the Early Warning Project are instead considered acts of terrorism by Genocide Watch and, as such, are not included in the alerts.

In the end, determining the most accurate Early Warning System comes down to a key factor: the timeliness of the warning. There are several disadvantages to the scholarly and statistical prediction systems. Mainly, the systems are rarely updated once created and they are often left to sit without actually being applied to unfolding situations. Though the Early Warning Systems may have a high level of accuracy, the algorithms are only run once a year. Given the rapid rate at which societies can change and the speed with which atrocities tend to occur when they reach the extermination phase, this is unwise. A helpful system should be constantly updated to fit the needs of a changing world.

The accuracy of the FAAC system has not been mentioned here because, other than the few cases of United Nations intervention in countries facing humanitarian crises which could lead to genocide, there is little to show for the FAAC actually being used by the UN (Burns, 2018). If it is being used, the methodology for how it is applied has not been shared. The FAAC claims to inform decisions on intervention (United Nations, 2014, p. 5), however this is hard to support without explicit proof. Therefore, although the system seems to be an advanced (or at least more descriptive) version of Dr. Stanton’s ten stages, it is hard to determine its accuracy without seeing it in action.

After considering the factors of applied accuracy and timeliness, the most useful and accurate prediction system appears to be Dr. Stanton’s. The Early Warning Project, though a feat of great statistical achievement in the field of risk assessment, needs to be tweaked to avoid the oversight of some cases. Steps for strengthening Dr. Stanton’s Early Warning System include adding more on-the-ground accounts to help determine if stages are being carried out despite the
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denial of a country’s government, and evaluating situations/applying the predictive measures more frequently.

Seeing as one of the greatest strengths of Dr. Stanton’s model is the level of descriptiveness it offers, it would be beneficial to focus on that further. Perhaps by adding indicators, like the ones found in the FAAC system, the ten stage model can provide policy makers and international organizations with the tools to spot what the different stages might look like. With a more descriptive system that points out examples of the past and what stages could look like in future genocidal events, it would be impossible for policy makers to point to the system and say “well, we didn’t know what we were seeing could lead to/be considered genocide”. It may force policy makers and the general public to confront the different manifestations of genocide and what precedes it. Since policy makers are the ones capable of enacting policies of intervention, it is important that they know the possible signs of genocide and are constantly updated on which countries are exhibiting those signs. Some possible indicators can be found by looking at examples of present and recent genocides, as is evidenced in the case studies discussed below.

Case Studies

Dehumanization and Propaganda: Myanmar (Burma)

Since 1978, the Buddhist led government of Myanmar (formerly Burma) has targeted the minority Rohingya Muslim population. The Rohingya have been subjected to a slow process of genocide through killings conducted by state-backed civilian populations and state institutions (Zarni & Cowley, 2014). Over the last decade or so, the violence in Myanmar has escalated, in part due to the increasing use of social media amongst the general public and the ease with which anti-Rohingya propaganda can be spread through technology (Facebook admits…, 2018). Propaganda has always existed, especially anti-Rohingya propaganda, but it has worn many faces. In an article written about the evolution of the crisis in Myanmar, Maung Zarni and Alice Cowley (2014) illustrate the prevalence of propaganda when they write:

In Myanmar’s state media, official policy documents, and school textbooks, the Rohingya are referred to as Bengali, a racist local reference, and are portrayed as illegal economic migrants from the colonial time, who are a threat to national security, a portrayal that the bulk of the Burmese have accepted as a fact over the past five decades (p. 683).

Though there is a historical record of the Rohingya residing within the border of Myanmar well before British occupation, they are portrayed as foreigners and second-class citizens (Sohel,
This has not changed in recent years, but the discrimination and dehumanization has shifted onto a new form of media: the internet. Modern advancements in technology have allowed for phenomenal achievements in fast and efficient information sharing and communication. However, this ease and innovation comes with drawbacks and these weaknesses are best seen in the use of Facebook in Myanmar.

Nearly a decade ago, Facebook didn’t exist for the general public in Myanmar. When the military dominated Myanmar, the internet was an inaccessible thing for most citizens. After the election of Aung San Suu Kyi, that changed: sim cards and phones became affordable for many citizens. Since Burmese script was largely unsupported by Google and other search engines but was supported by Facebook, the social media site soon became a must for anyone with a phone or internet access (Subedar, 2018). The site was a way to keep in touch with others and get useful news, but many of these new users were unprepared and untrained in the internet etiquette needed to avoid the propaganda and false reports put onto the platform by government officials and anti-Rohingya groups. Catching instances of false reports and hate speech was made more difficult by a lack of understanding about the nuances of the Burmese language as well as a shortage in oversight. In 2014, only one Burmese-speaking content monitor was employed by Facebook (this number has since risen, but is still well behind the number of content monitors for other languages) (Subedar, 2018).

Facebook has been used in Myanmar by military leaders to sow the seeds of discord and ethnic tension. Though there have been many efforts to combat this, the damage has been done. One prime example of Facebook’s impact was seen in 2014, when a false post circulated about a Muslim man raping a Buddhist woman. The report soon sparked a deadly riot that killed two men in the country’s second largest city of Mandalay (“False rape claim…” 2014). This and many other incidents led to the involvement of the UN, who began investigating hate speech in Myanmar and the role Facebook might have played in the unfolding genocide. As stated in an article posted by BBC News, “…UN experts concluded the inflammatory material Burmese people had been exposed to day in, day out had played a role in enabling the military's purge of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine state - an attack which the UN believes was genocide” (2018).

In this new age of technology, it is important that scholars studying state-sponsored violence and genocide recognize the changing face of propaganda and hate speech. The virtue of propaganda being posted on the internet means the source is much easier to trace in many ways. However, this is only the case if enough time and effort is put into making and supplying a system competent enough to find and report those posting false information and harmful propaganda. One suggestion that could be made after reading through this case study is the
implementation of a special “watchdog” team; content monitors could be hired strategically to monitor information coming from areas of unrest. With a significant enough workforce specifically trained to flag propaganda, hate speech, and inflammatory content, ethnic tension may be lessened. First, this new age of propaganda must be acknowledged in prediction systems.

**Extermination Using Mass Rape: Rwanda**

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 unfolded rapidly, birthed from the rising tensions between the Hutu minority ethnic group and the Tutsi majority. By the end of the approximately four-month-long killing spree, over 800,000 people were dead, and more victims would be added to the list as a result of mass rape (Sharlach, 2000). Mass rape is a tactic used by perpetrators of genocide as a way to erase a particular group of people. Sexual violence tends to be underreported both within and outside of the bounds of genocide, and it often goes undiscussed or ignored in scholarly analysis. Though rape is never explicitly mentioned amongst the list of genocidal actions in the UNCG, it could be considered a part of Article II subsections B or D. D is harder to argue without the presence of significant genital mutilation, but rape used with the intent of forced pregnancy should be considered. It has also been made clear through past precedent that rape can be charged at the international level when an individual is on trial for crimes against humanity/genocide (as was evidenced in the trial against Jean-Paul Akayesu) (Sharlach, 2000).

The pervasiveness of mass rape can be attributed to several different factors. It is a useful way to spread disease, genes, and shame (especially when mass rape is made into a public spectacle). While forced impregnation was one of the guiding intentions in cases of mass rape during the Bosnian genocide (Sharlach, 2000), the Rwandan genocide experienced this phenomenon in a slightly different way. Though there is little evidence of forced impregnation as a goal during the mass rapes committed in the Rwandan genocide, there is plenty evidence of intentional protracted genocide through the purposeful spread of HIV to victims. Most victims tested positive later and, because Rwanda doesn’t allow inhibitor medicine, later died an AIDS related death. Some rapists even explicitly stated this as one of their intentions during the assaults (Sharlach, 2000). There is also evidence that high-ranking government and military officials sanctioned and encouraged the rape of Tutsi women, as seen by those charged for such crimes by the international criminal tribunal (Sharlach, 2000).

Other than the spread of disease, there is another strong motivation for mass rape: shame. This is discussed in the work of Christopher Mullins: mass rape is a tool used (often in patriarchal societies where much importance is placed on virginity and the perceived purity of virginal women) to degrade women and their families (2009). In some cases, the women will be dismissed as a
choice for marriage or even expelled from their household and forced to turn to alternate and risky means of survival. In turn, these responses ultimately contribute to conditions which increase the death toll associated with a genocide.

Mass rape is almost considered an inevitable part of conflict (and, as such, genocidal crimes), and yet it is rarely discussed in most scholarly literature. Based on the many examples of mass rape being used to further genocide, including the intentional spread of HIV to victims in Rwanda, it is a meaningful factor which should be added to the subsection of extermination. Genocidal rape and attrition are two methods of genocide that need to be acknowledged by scholars so policy makers and the general public are aware that genocide is not just the killing of a people: it can take different forms.

*Extermination By Attrition: Darfur*

The genocide in Darfur has, for the most part, been a slow process. As mentioned above, genocide can take different forms and although what often comes to mind is the quick killing of a people group, attrition is one of those forms. It is a term best described by Sheri Rosenberg (2012) when she writes, "genocide by attrition essentially describes a slow process of annihilation that reflects the unfolding phenomenon of the mass killing of a protected group rather than the immediate unleashing of violent death" (p. 19). This is usually carried out by stripping away the basic human rights of a group of people, either by state or non-state actors. Genocide by attrition is most closely associated with the slow process of genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. While violent killings took place in the region before 2004, the violence since then has dwindled into something just as purposeful but less direct (Rosenberg 2012).

In Darfur, genocide by attrition has been observed through the systematic destruction of livestock and agriculture needed to sustain the tribal people. This destruction is a repeated offense according to Eric Reeves (2005), who claims a famine engineered by the central government in Khartoum during 1998 in the southern Bahr el-Ghazal Province mimics more recent events in Darfur (p. 21). The deaths of tribal people of Darfur cannot be considered a result of war. These deaths directly correlate with famine and disease caused by policies engineered by a regime with the intent to bring about the suffering of thousands. As of December 2004, more than 150,000 have lost their lives to starvation or disease, and many more have been displaced in the search for adequate food (Reeves, 2005). Throughout all this, the international community was slow to act (with the African Union eventually sending 3,500 troops to monitor the situation) (Reeves, 2005).
Darfur is not the only example of genocide through attrition, but it is the most well known and most explored example by scholars amongst the list of modern genocides. The example of attrition is brought up in this paper because it is a relatively new area of interest in the field of genocide studies, and has consequently not often been recognized as a form of genocide. It is important that systems of prediction acknowledge the different forms and methods of extermination to avoid missing cases where the process of genocide might not be clearly seen (especially since genocide through attrition is often covered up by any state using it as their method of mass killing). For this reason, it has been suggested as an indicator of ongoing extermination.

**Conclusion**

Of all the Early Warning Systems in place for predicting the onset of genocide and genocidal crimes, Dr. Stanton’s ten stages of genocide appears to be the most accurate. This is in large part due not only to the descriptive nature of the model, but also to whom it is meant to serve (the policymakers who have the power to advocate for the prevention of genocide). The timeliness with which it is updated as well as the continued contribution of people witnessing humanitarian crisis situations also lends it credibility where other systems are lacking. However, Dr. Stanton’s system is not perfect, and it is important to acknowledge different strategies to improve it so its predictive measures can be strengthened in the future.

To strengthen Professor Gregory Stanton’s Early Warning System further, one needs to make it more descriptive than it already is so the stages of genocide can act as a guide for spotting when and where genocide may be unfolding. By incorporating the concept of indicators from the FAAC system into Dr. Stanton’s descriptive model, one can achieve a useful guide to spotting what genocide might look like in various situations. The case studies mentioned previously in this paper are an illustration of what these indicators could look like: past examples with specific points of interest. By looking to past examples and trends in genocide, one can better spot the patterns unfolding in the present and future.

Predictive models may never be perfect. Even when they are created, they often go unused or unnoticed by the international community. However, it is important to keep creating and improving them with the hopes of creating a system with enough accuracy that it is impossible to ignore. Until there is an Early Warning System strong enough to catch every warning of genocide in enough time to enact meaningful prevention and intervention, those in the field of genocide studies will be left repeating the mantra of “Never Again.”
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The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

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Abstract

Game theory models have been applied to explain various Cold War crises. Scholars have often utilized game theory models to study the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. This thesis aims to model the crisis bargaining process of the Sino-American conflict over Taiwan within a game theory framework, arguing that the Chicken Game is the best available model to explain the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The principle of the Chicken Game asserts that while both players desire the opponent to swerve and avoid the worst outcome of a total crash, neither player wants to swerve and appear as a “chicken.” Both players can cooperate and swerve together, and then neither side will lose face. However, lacking effective ways to communicate, both players fear that the opponent might abandon cooperation. Therefore, both players are compelled to stay on course, increasing the possibility of a crash; they hope that fear will force the opponent to swerve. If neither player decides to swerve, then a crash, the worst outcome, is inevitable. In this paper, I introduce four variables that can change the payoffs of the Chicken Game. By using these four variables, I can evaluate the outcome of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. These four variables are military, stake, ability to take damage, and status quo. The essay finds that the United States had an advantage over China in three out of the four variables, and China only had advantage over the U.S. in the ability to take damage. Therefore, the four variables of the Chicken Game can successfully explain the result of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Introduction

In Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling (1966) declares that “Cold War politics have been linked, by Bertrand Russell and others, to the game of Chicken (p. 116).” The scenario for the Chicken Game is quite simple. Two teenage boys, Adam, and Barry, both have a crush on the school cheerleader Clara. Thus, they become increasingly hostile toward each other. Therefore, they decide to settle this love dispute through a dangerous “Chicken Game.” This game requires that both boys drive their car head-on toward each other on a narrow road. The first person that turns away (swerves) will become the loser; the winner will have the opportunity to ask Clara on a date. If both sides decide to swerve, then the game is nullified, and neither gets the chance to ask Clara out. In this case, they return to the pre-game situation and have to find a new way to solve this problem. If both Adam and Barry decide to continue driving, a car accident
The Chicken Game and the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

will happen. Thus, the game has four outcomes: Adam gets the date, Barry gets the date, neither gets the date, and a car accident. Therefore, both Adam and Barry view dating Clara as the best option and the car accident as the worst option. They also prefer that neither date Clara to the other person dating Clara. Neither boy wants a car accident; however, both Adam and Barry want to date Clara. Thus, they have to suppress their internal fear, continue driving, and become the hero by forcing the other person to swerve.

The tragic paradox in this silly story is that if both players decide to continue driving and wish the other player will turn away, then the car accident becomes inevitable. This tragic paradox happens because the Chicken Game is a simultaneous game with uncertainty and unpredictability. During the game, both players cannot predict the opponent’s action, so they decide based on the perception of the opponent and the assessment of the situation. If the two cars, instead of driving continuously, took turns advancing exactly fifty feet at a time toward each other, a point would be reached when the next move will inevitably result in a collision. In this case, the game loses its uncertainty; each player has the opportunity to take the appropriate steps to avoid catastrophe.

This essay aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Chicken Game model over the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt and explain the American victory of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis with the Chicken Game theory. In this essay, I introduce four strategic variables that are pertinent to the crisis. Through the four variables, the essay can formalize our understanding of the 1958 Crisis. Using the four variables also helps scholars to explore the results of varying payoffs. These variables also illustrate the characteristics of the Chicken Game model. The four strategic variables are the relative military power, the economic, strategic, and cultural stake for each player, the ability to take damage from the opponent, and the status quo.

Literature Review

Scholars use game theory models to evaluate the crisis management process during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis between China and the United States. Brett Benson of Vanderbilt University and Emerson Niou of Duke University (2001) demonstrated the effectiveness of the American strategic ambiguity policy towards the Taiwan Strait question during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Washington intentionally blurred the message to Beijing and Taipei to deter any effort to change the status quo. In practice, the United States stood against the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait while deterring Taiwan’s independence tendency (p. 2). Since President Eisenhower viewed both Taiwan and Mainland China as potentially the first movers, the United States had to achieve a dual deterrence objective. On the one hand, the United States needed to
deter potential attacks from Mainland China. On the other hand, the United States needed to prevent Taiwan's military provocations that might cause China to launch a large-scale assault against Taiwan. Through an extended deterrence model, Benson and Niou concluded that the United States could not achieve double deterrence simultaneously by sending out a clear message on the Taiwan Strait (p. 18). The United States could send out a statement to punish the first player for provoking the other. However, such a statement would restrict the US’s range of responses to unforeseeable circumstances or unexpected fluctuations in the status quo (p. 26). The policy of strategic ambiguity ensured dual deterrence by increasing the cost for both Beijing and Taipei for disturbing the current status quo and by reducing the possibility of excessive commitment.

Reymond Franck and Francios Melese (2003) of the US Naval Postgraduate School modeled the moves of China and the United States in game-theory terms and outlined seven possible outcomes. They allowed both countries to be four possible types of players, with each type corresponding to a distinct preference function. They concluded that China's policy on unification with Taiwan is a product of Chinese domestic politics (p. 15). When the Communist Party feels secure and enjoys broad support, steady economic growth, and social stability, Beijing is unlikely to take military action in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, the United States has an interest in providing a more secure international environment for Beijing (p. 17). Improving political and economic relations with China will boost Beijing’s sense of security and reduce the possibility of conflict.

In her game-theory analysis, Min Ye of Boston University (2007), unlike many other scholars, focused on the interests of individual leaders, rather than states, as the unitary. She combined the poliheuristic (PH) theory with game theory to evaluate the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and demonstrate the influence of domestic politics on Chinese decision makers. PH theory focuses on the why and how of decision making. It explains the foreign policy decision making process by combining rational choice and cognitive approaches in a systematic framework. In her essay, she simplified policymaking into a two-stage process. In the first stage, leaders eliminated irrational and impractical policy choices and reduced the complicated decision task to a set of viable options. In the second stage, leaders made a rational choice based on maximizing benefit and minimizing cost. Previous studies suggest that leaders evaluated their decisions based on four dimensions: political, military, diplomatic, and economic (p. 4). Ye argues that in the 1958 Crisis, Chinese leaders valued domestic politics more than military, diplomatic, and economic factors (p. 13). In 1958, a more manageable small-scale attack against the Jinmen Islands would have been more beneficial for Beijing than an all-out bombardment in the military, diplomatic, and
economic dimensions. However, Mao Zedong had an urgent need for domestic support for his ambitious Great Leap Forward movement (p. 15). A military conflict against Taiwan would mobilize the population and help Mao overcome the opposition within the Party (p. 16).

These three studies used game theory to guide their analyses of the Taiwan Strait situation. Benson and Niou evaluated the effectiveness of the United States’ strategic ambiguity approach toward China and Taiwan. Franck and Melese analyzed China’s foreign policies under different international environments. Ye demonstrated the influence of domestic politics on the Chinese decision-making process during both the 1958 and 1995-1996 Crises. These three studies explained why Chinese and American leaders made certain decisions that caused the Crisis to happen rather than crisis management processes. My research focuses on crisis management and crisis bargaining between China and the United States during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. My thesis studies how a specific game theory model, the Chicken Game, can explain the bargaining process and the result of the 1958 Crisis, along with predicting the outcomes of future crises.

The Four Variables in the Chicken Game

This section introduces the four variables in the Chicken Game. These four variables are relative power, stake, the ability to take damage, and the status quo. In the traditional Chicken Game, these four variables remain equal for both players. Alternatively, in this study, the four variables are not constant for both players. So, this essay compares the relative values of these four variables and explains the outcome of the 1958 Crisis.

The first variable is relative power: the comparison of the two players’ military power. The term “relative” is of central importance: it is the comparison of military power. The more powerful state is likely to stand firm. Meanwhile, the weaker side is likely to comply because it has a profound incentive to avoid military conflict against a stronger enemy. Nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the calculation of military force by increasing humans’ power of destruction to an unprecedented level. Seemingly, the possession of nuclear weapons instantly makes the player of the Chicken Game the more favorable side compared to the opponent who does not possess nuclear weapons and increases the chance of successful military coercion. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) happens when both states possess nuclear weapons; both states could deter the opponent’s nuclear attack with the second-strike capability. Under MAD, the direct exchange of nuclear weapons is highly unlikely. Therefore, leaders suppress their fear and try to manipulate the opponent through nuclear brinkmanship, a strategy of threatening a nuclear attack. However, it is difficult to succeed with nuclear brinkmanship. First, the cost of using
nuclear weapons is high, so leaders face difficulty in signaling the credibility of nuclear brinkmanship (Sechser 2017, p. 13). Second, psychological predispositions inhibit the use of risk manipulation as a coercive strategy (p. 13). During crises, individuals are inclined to maximize control and minimize random chance in decision making to avoid inadvertent wars (p. 53).

The second variable is the stake. Stake means how much each player values the importance of the prize in the Chicken Game. If player A values the prize more than player B, then A has greater incentive to obtain the prize than B. In the Chicken Game, A is more likely to stand firm while B will swerve to avoid a meaningless conflict (Cashman 2014, p. 322). Besides, since A has higher stakes than B and invests more into the prize than B, it will cost A more to give up the prize. Players evaluate the stakes of the prize through many factors, including its strategic value, resource value, and symbolic value. Strategic value is how the prize could enhance the projection of the military power of a player. Resource value means the potential or actual material gains for a player from the prize. The symbolic value ties to the culture and history of the player. A player might view the prize as highly crucial because it plays a significant role in their history, culture, or religion.

The third factor is the ability to take damage. The ability to take damage is a player’s willingness and ability to make sacrifices for the prize. In the Chicken Game, the player who is more able to take damage will stand firm while the player who is less able to take damage is more likely to swerve. The ability to take a hit is only one side of the coin, however; the other side is the ability to cause damage. A state might have a tremendous ability to take damage, but if it lacks the ability to hit back, the aggressor will keep hitting the target state until it cannot take any more damage.

The fourth and final factor is the status quo. Status quo means the player’s relationship with the prize prior to the game. It is the default distribution of the prize before the game starts. In a regular Chicken Game, the prize is openly contestable. In real-world cases, the prize may be more closely affiliated with one player than the other. In these unusual situations, the player with the status quo has more advantages than the opponent without it. As Robert Art (1993) summarizes, deterrence has a higher chance of success than compellence (p. 7). The player who owns the prize before the game starts practices deterrence in the Chicken Game, while the player who tries to seize the prize must practice compellence. In terms of game theory payoffs, a player who supports the status quo has a high incentive to stay cooperative.
The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Summary:

On August 23, 1958, China launched a surprise artillery attack against the Jinmen Islands. The Chinese military shelled 40,000 artillery shells onto these tiny islands. The next day, a Chinese navy unit tried to capture the small Tungting Island near Jinmen and the Chinese artilleries began to harass Nationalist supply ships in order to blockade the Islands (Sechser, p. 194). To address the blockade issue, the United States Navy began to escort Nationalist supply ships to the Jinmen Islands. At the same time, the United States signaled its assertive position and threatened to use nuclear weapons against China (p. 194).

As the military conflict continued, both countries started diplomatic maneuvers. The United States and China resumed the Warsaw Talks-- a meeting between the ambassadors to Poland from both China and the United States which was established in 1955 to resolve the issues in Indochina- in September to negotiate the Taiwan Strait issue directly. The United States attempted to end the crisis by pushing the demilitarization solution and forcing Taiwan to withdraw from the Offshore Islands. In exchange, the United States would protect the islands against any Communist assault. The Chinese side believed that as the tension continued, the United States would force Taiwan to accept the demilitarization plan, which would create a de facto two-state situation that would be unacceptable for Beijing. Thus, the Chinese leadership decided to de-escalate the conflict. In October, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai announced the suspension of bombardment (p. 194). The United States received the suspension of attack warmly. The Navy also froze the escort missions in exchange for the temporary cease-fire. The crisis gradually faded away when China lifted the blockade in November.

Role of Taiwan

Before investigating the two players in the Sino-American Chicken Game, the role of Taiwan during the 1958 Crisis will be evaluated. In the Chicken Game model, Taiwan is not treated as an independent player because of its lack of power to pursue its interests. In the 1958 Crisis, Taiwan was not the pawn of the United States; it pursued independent interests that did not align with the American policy, such as increasing American commitment to Taiwan’s security and avoiding Washington-Beijing cooperation. However, it could not realize its interests outside of the American constraints. Taiwan did not have sufficient military force to defend itself and had no choice but to depend on the protection of the United States. The United States, on the other hand, could disregard Taiwan’s interests and force its will through Taiwan’s opposition. Therefore,
even though Taiwan had the interests to become an independent player, it was not treated as such.

*Military Analysis*

The first factor in evaluating the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis under a Chicken Game model is the comparison of military power between the United States and China. There was no question that the United States, as one of the two superpowers in the world, had military superiority over China. With the presence of the American aircraft carrier battle group, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could not launch a successful campaign to capture the Jinmen Islands. The Chinese leader also recognized this fact. In a Politburo meeting, Mao said that “we only have hand grenades right now, not atomic bombs. Hand grenades could be successful for us to use in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], but not a good idea to use in fighting against Americans, who had nuclear weapons (Wu 1994, p. 5-11).” In addition, the United States was the biggest nuclear power in the world, and China had not yet joined the nuclear club. However, nuclear weapons did not play a significant role in the crisis. For the United States, nuclear weaponry was militarily useful but politically costly.

Due to the mountainous geographic features of the Fujian Province, there was “no satisfactory way to take out Communist guns by use of conventional weapons.(FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:204)” Only nuclear weapons could wipe out the PLA military installations. However, American leaders clearly understood the political costs of using nuclear weapons. Dulles estimated that the United States needed atomic weapons the same size as the bombs Americans had used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to knock down PLA gun emplacements sufficiently. Such weapons would certainly take the lives of millions of people (FRUS, p. 204). The goal of the United States, according to President Eisenhower, was to generate international support for American policy toward Taiwan (FRUS, p. 58.). The massive civilian death toll from nuclear weapons would undoubtedly damage the international reputation of the United States.

American’s allies, most notably Great Britain, feared that if the United States used nuclear weapons, “then the risks involved for all of us by a process of chain-reaction would be obvious (FRUS, p. 80).” British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan pointed out that if the United States attacked the Chinese air base, then the crisis could spiral into a nuclear world war (FRUS, p.80). Furthermore, Macmillan pointed out that members of the British Commonwealth, such as India, Australia, and New Zealand also opposed any American attack on Mainland China that could escalate the danger (FRUS, p. 70). During the crisis, President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State Dulles kept close interaction with the British government, demonstrating that the American leaders valued the British opinion heavily and did not want to split with its allies.

The Soviet Union also clearly opposed any possibility of an American nuclear attack on Mainland China. In a personal letter to Eisenhower, the Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev claimed that Washington’s attempt to blackmail Beijing with nuclear weapons, “did not have and could not have any success (FRUS, p. 74).” He further pointed out that, “in present conditions when the USA has long not been the possessor of a monopoly in the field of atomic armaments, attempts to intimidate other states by atomic weapons are a completely hopeless business (FRUS, p. 74).” Finally, he declared that, “an attack on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union (FRUS, p. 74).” This letter shows that the Soviet Union put the PRC under its nuclear umbrella; an American atomic bombing on Mainland China would have led to a nuclear war. The Soviet nuclear umbrella offset American nuclear supremacy.

A power comparison shows the American military advantage over China in 1958. The United States had sufficient military power to defend the offshore islands with its aircraft carrier battle groups. However, it failed to compel China with both conventional and nuclear weapons. China, on the other hand, could deter American attack with Soviet nuclear umbrella. However, its lacked sufficient military power to occupy the Islands.

American Stakes in Taiwan

Secretary of State Dulles compared the bombardment of Jinmen in 1958 to the Berlin Blockade and concluded that the Taiwan Strait Crisis was a test of America’s commitment to the Offshore Islands (FRUS, p.113). Therefore, American stakes in Taiwan and the Offshore Islands were critical for the American East Asia policy. As this section shows, these stakes were incredibly high for the United States.

Dulles believed that the loss of Taiwan would create a domino effect in the Asia-Pacific region. In a letter to British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, Dulles explained that the loss of Taiwan would certainly endanger the anti-Communist barrier and lead to the fall of numerous American allies in East and Southeast Asia; it would endanger Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and many other American allies in the Western Pacific (FRUS, p. 69). The Joint Resolution of Congress also authorized the president to use necessary military forces for the protection of the Offshore Islands. It concluded that, “the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the
vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean (FRUS, p. 68)."

Therefore, defending the Offshore Islands became key to protecting Taiwan. Dulles pointed out that the Islands were vital for the survival of the Republic of China (ROC) because the loss of Jinmen would trigger the collapse of the regime (FRUS, p. 69). He further emphasized that the United States would suffer a tremendous loss of confidence among its Asian allies if it could not stand against Communist China in Jinmen (FRUS, p. 84). Thus, the United States had high stakes in defending both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands.

*Chinese Stakes in the Offshore Islands and Taiwan*

China had low stakes in the Offshore Islands. Mao believed the islands themselves would have no utility for China. During a Politburo meeting, he told his colleagues, "for us, not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little impact on our construction of a socialist country. Jiang’s troops on Jinmen-Mazu alone could not cause too much damage (Wu, p. 5-11)." He believed that leaving the islands in the hands of Chiang would be more useful than seizing them. He said, "If we [China] took over Jinmen-Mazu, or if we [China] allow the Americans to force Jiang to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would lose a reliable means by which we can deal with the Americans and Jiang (p. 5-11)."

Mao believed that the liberation of Taiwan was important. However, he understood that this mission was difficult to achieve in 1958 due to the lack of military power. He admitted that the Chinese Communists, “were unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain period (Wu, p. 5-11).” Therefore, he did not see seizing Taiwan in 1958 as his priority. Mao’s true intention was to mobilize the population for the Great Leap Forward through a controlled military conflict. He said, “A tense situation can mobilize the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize the people in the middle, and can, therefore, promote the Great Leap Forward in economic construction (Central Party Literature Press[CPLP] 1994, p. 348-352).” Mao did not consider the unification of Taiwan when he ordered the attack; his main objective was domestic mobilization.

*The United States’ Ability to Take Damage*

The United States showed a limited ability to take damage during the 1958 Crisis. Public opinion constrained the President from hardline approaches. In a conversation between the Department of State officials and military leaders, Dulles stated that, “much of the United States’ public sees the Offshore Island situation solely in terms of two very small islands a long way off
which are not worth an atomic war. The people of the United States [were] not willing [to] support a war-like effort by the United States government in this situation unless convinced of all reasonable steps taken to try to avoid war (FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:116).” Therefore, public opinion urged American decision makers to reduce the possibility of military conflict.

China’s Ability to Take Damage

China, on the other hand, demonstrated a strong ability to take damage. Mao was known for his fearlessness against nuclear warfare (Renmin Chubanshe [RC], 1999). The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis tested Mao’s nuclear philosophy. Mao had a contradictory view on the loss of human life. On the one hand, he showed concerns about the massive loss of population, saying “A war of atomic and hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since many people will die. That is why we oppose a war (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352).” On the other hand, he downplayed the tragic effect of a nuclear war. He told other Politburo members: “I am saying that it is not so terrifying even if half of our population perishes. This is certainly talk in extreme terms. Thinking about the history of the entire universe, I do not see any reason to be pessimistic about the future. If the nuclear war eliminates a government, then “the people would form another one which could work out a peace (CPLP 1994, p 348-352).”

To unpack Mao’s philosophical view on the disastrous outcome of a nuclear war, one must understand Mao’s understanding of the nature of nuclear wars. Mao clearly believed that the nuclear war was an imperialistic war. China did not have the power to decide whether a nuclear war would happen. If nuclear war had broken out, the imperialists would be the aggressors (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352). Therefore, under such a situation, China would have no choice but to fight this undesired war.

What is behind Mao’s nuclear philosophy was Mao’s nuclear bargaining strategy under Chicken Game conditions. Mao clearly understood that the United States must bear a tremendous cost for launching a nuclear war. He said that the United States would face, “an issue of popularity” and receive little international support if it launched a nuclear attack on China (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352). China would lose millions of people in a nuclear war. However, China was the most populous country in the world, and Chinese leaders had long viewed China’s massive population as its biggest strength. When China disregarded the loss of human life, American nuclear supremacy would be nullified. While the cost of a nuclear war would be tremendous for the United States, in the mind of Mao, the cost of a nuclear war would be minuscule for China. With such thinking, China would achieve a mental parity with the United States under nuclear inferiority.
**Status Quo**

In *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling (1966) argues that deterrence is more credible than compellence (p. 73). The message of deterrence is clearer than the message of compellence. If the adversary cannot understand the vague objective of compellence, then it is less likely to do what it is being told. Art agreed with the conclusion of Schelling, but with a new set of reasoning. A compelled state suffers more humiliation than a deterred state; compellence requires a state to give up already acquired interests in responding to a force from another state (Art and Waltz 1993, p. 7). This is not the case for deterrence. Deterrence demands that a state gives up interests that it has not yet acquired (p. 7). Therefore, giving up something a state has not gained is undoubtedly easier and less humiliating than abandoning what it has already received.

The status quo was more favorable to the United States during the 1958 Crisis. The United States, as the defender, was on the deterrence side, while China, the aggressor, had a compellence objective. Thus, a return to the status quo means the success of American deterrence and the failure of Chinese compellence. As a result, it is more likely for the United States to practice hardline policy rather than swerving because it has a higher chance of success. As for China, it is more likely to swerve because hardline policy would inevitably lead to war.

Furthermore, the United States could reshape the status quo, and China could not. During the crisis, the United States demonstrated that it could move the pre-crisis status quo to a situation more unfavorable to China if China did not accept the pre-crisis status quo. Therefore, China was forced to take the less-preferred option, and reluctantly agreed to return to the pre-crisis status quo.

After China initiated the bombardment on August 23, tensions escalated quickly. On September 4, Dulles issued a nuclear warning in which he declared that the United States would defend the Jinmen and Mazu Islands by any means necessary (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:68). However, the Chinese side was unresponsive toward the American atomic threat. Mao did not discuss questions of nuclear weapons in any Politburo meetings. The behavior of the Chinese military also suggests that the nuclear threat did not drive Mao’s calculations. China’s most aggressive shelling occurred on September 8, when the PLA fired 53,310 shells, and on September 11, when it fired over 60,000 shells (Sechser, p. 199).

The Chinese side made a first attempt that seemed like an effort to de-escalate. On September 6, Premier Zhou En-lai issued a statement that said, “To make a further effort to safeguard peace, the Chinese Government is prepared to resume the ambassadorial talks between the two countries (FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:71).” The United States received this
proposal warmly, and the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks resumed at Warsaw on September 13 (FRUS, p. 71). However, the Warsaw Talks were not a Chinese effort to de-escalate. Mao viewed the strategic objective of the Warsaw Talks as a way to, “employ diplomatic means to coordinate our fighting on the Fujian front (Wu, p. 5-11).” Therefore, the Chinese side took an aggressive negotiation position during the Warsaw Talks and refused to make any concession.

It was the Dulles Speech on September 30 that opened the possibility for de-escalation. In the speech, Dulles proposed the mutual renunciation of force by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. He argued that, “this would be a fair arrangement, and it would be wrong to ask the Reds along to renounce force.” He said: “If there is a dependable ceasefire in the Formosa area, the United States will favor withdrawal of at least some of the large Chinese Nationalist force on the Offshore Islands (Newark Advocate, 1958).”

The Chinese leaders were alarmed by Dulles’s proposal of the mutual renunciation of force by Beijing and Taipei and the possibility of demilitarizing the Offshore Islands. During the Politburo meeting on October 4, Zhou En-lai pointed out that “Dulles’s speech indicated America’s intention to seize this opportunity to create two Chinas (CPLP 1994, p. 348-352).” The CCP leaders could not accept this change of the status quo. They believed that Taiwan was part of China, and the Taiwan Strait Crisis was China’s internal affairs. Therefore, as Zhou Enlai explained to Soviet representative S.F. Antonov, China could not “trade a settlement of Jinmen-Mazu for recognition of America’s occupation of Taiwan as legitimate and acceptance of the existence of so-called ‘two Chinas’ (CPLP 1990, p. 262-267).”

Mao understood that the intensive bombardment against the Jinmen and Mazu Islands pressured the United States to pursue the demilitarization plan. He believed that Chiang wanted to hold the Offshore Islands. However, the attack would give the United States leverage to pressure Chiang to give up those islands (Wu, p. 5-11). Thus, China should help Chiang resist American pressure by de-escalating the tension, and the ROC leaders could, therefore, “drive a hard bargain with America (Wu, p. 5-11).” Hence, Mao proposed to leave Jinmen and Mazu in the hands of Chiang (Wu, p. 5-11). He explained his decision during a Politburo meeting: “The advantage of this policy was that we could maintain contact with the Nationalists through this channel since these islands were very close to Mainland China (Wu, p. 5-11).”

At the end of this meeting, Mao concluded that China would lower the intensity of the bombardment. After the meeting, Mao issued an order to immediately suspend the shelling for two days (Wu, p. 5-11). On October 6, Mao published, “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. In the message, Mao suggested that Chiang should
resist American pressure and abandon the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. Mao also offered an opportunity for cross-Strait negotiations. Furthermore, the message announced the PLA would further suspend the shelling for another seven days. Within this period, the Nationalists navy would “be fully free to ship in supplies on condition that there be no American escort (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:156).”

The United States received this ceasefire from Beijing positively and agreed to suspend the escort mission. After the first ceasefire expired, China extended the decision to continue the ceasefire for another two weeks. The United States welcomed the extension. Dulles compared the situation of the Offshore Islands with the Berlin Blockade and thought the extension of the ceasefire would lead to the de-escalation of the Taiwan Strait (FRUS [1958-1960], p. 27:177). After the additional two weeks of the ceasefire, China took another approach of de-escalation. Mao extended the no shelling policy to odd days, so the Nationalists troops could resupply and “get some sunshine” on even days. The purpose of this new strategy was to ensure Chiang’s force could maintain their position on the islands (CPLP 1992, p. 437). As China moved away from the blockade, the Crisis officially ended on October 25.

As the historical documents have shown, in the case of the 1958 Crisis, the fear of changing the status quo against its favor drove China to de-escalate. China initially wanted to change the status to its favor by occupying the Offshore Islands. However, facing the overwhelming American military force, China realized that it could not change the status quo as it wanted. On the other hand, Beijing could not accept a permanent two-China solution to the Taiwan Strait problem. Mao realized that by pressuring the Offshore Islands aggressively, China allowed the United States to create two-China. The military pressure from China gave the United States leverage over Taiwan, and the US could use the bombardment to persuade Chiang to accept the demilitarization plan. Therefore, China’s assault could have helped the United States to move the status quo of the Taiwan Strait toward a two-China solution. Thus, Mao decided to de-escalate and continue the current status quo; he considered return to the pre-crisis status quo as a preferable outcome to the demilitarization plan. The United States was on the deterrence side of the status quo, so it needed to stay firm and not swerve. The demilitarization plan demonstrated that the United States forced China to swerve by increasing the cost China would suffer if it did not swerve.

**Theoretical Findings**

Game theory is a branch of mathematics concerned with decision making in social interactions. It applies to situations (games) where there are two or more people (called players),
where each attempt to choose between two or more ways of acting (called strategies). The possible outcomes of a game depend on the choices made by all the players and can be ranked in order of preference by each player (Brams, 2001). In a two-player game theory model, the preference of each player is recorded as cooperation (C) or defection (D). Therefore, there are a total of four possible outcomes: A forces down B (CD), B forces down A (DC), cooperation (CC), and war (DD). This section will explain why the Chicken Game model best explains the Taiwan Strait Crisis.

In game theory, the Chicken Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Stag Hunt are the three models that have been widely discussed by international relations theorists. These game theory models share a critical assumption. Each player makes a decision independently, and during the decision-making, no player can communicate with the other. If two players can communicate and coordinate their interests, then they will choose the best outcome every time and game theory models lose their purpose. In Prisoner’s Dilemma, the police arrest and interrogate two criminals. If one remains silent and the other cooperates with the police, the cooperator will be set free while the silent partner will suffer extra-harsh punishment. If they both cooperate with the police, then they both receive regular punishment. If they both remain silent, then they both receive light punishment. This model shows why two rational players fail to cooperate despite cooperation, serving their best interests (Oye 1985, p. 1-24). In Stag Hunt scenario, a group of hunters is hunting for a stag while a hare comes into sight. Everyone must act together to hunt the stag, and once the stag is killed, everyone can share the meat of the stag. If one hunter targets the hare, the stag hunt will fail, but he will have the hare. If everyone targets the hare, then everyone will share the hare’s meat. The Stag Hunt model demonstrates why cooperation serves the best interests of both parties (p. 1-24). Kenneth Oye (1985) compared and contrasted the three game theory models to identify the different preferences among each player in the three models. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player prefers DC > CC > DD > CD; in the Chicken Game, each player prefers DC > CC > CD > DD; in the Stag Hunt, each player prefers CC > DC > DD > CD (p. 1-24).

In the Stag Hunt model, cooperation is the best option for both players. However, neither party considered cooperation during the 1958 Crisis. On the one hand, the American leadership escalated the conflict by issuing nuclear threats at the beginning of the Crisis. This confrontational American position was in alignment with the massive retaliation policy that was widely practiced during the Eisenhower Administration. According to the massive retaliation policy, the United States would meet any military challenge with the threat of using nuclear force (Dulles, 1954). This policy aimed to deter any attack, but it would also drastically escalate any minor conflict into
a possible world war. Later in the Crisis, when American leadership was ready to resolve the conflict through negotiation, the Chinese leaders rejected any form of cooperation during the Warsaw Talks. The Chinese representative Wang Bingnan rejected the American ceasefire proposal and declared that “the question of a ceasefire does not arise” because the bombardment was part of the Chinese Civil War, not a conflict between China and the United States (FRUS[1958-1960], p. 27:93). One example that illustrates the lack of cooperative spirit between China and the United States during the Warsaw Talks was that the two sides could not agree on the location of the first formal meeting (FRUS, p. 87). The lack of cooperation demonstrates that neither side viewed mutual cooperation as the best option to resolve the crisis. Thus, it does not fit into the Stag Hunt model.

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both players preferred war over a concession. However, during the 1958 Crisis, both sides tried to avoid war. The United States faced anti-war pressures from allies, the Soviet Union, and even its own public. Therefore, the American leadership was unlikely to launch a war that might cause domestic opposition, a split with its allies, and possibly World War III. As a result, the president demanded a peaceful way out of the Jinmen problem (FRUS, p. 75). He saw the Warsaw Talk as an opportunity to negotiate a ceasefire in good faith (FRUS, p. 75). Similarly, the Chinese leaders did not seek to escalate the conflict into a full-scale war. The primary concern of the Chinese leadership in the fall of 1958 was the Great Leap Forward. Mao wanted a manageable conflict for domestic mobilization. He clearly did not want a war that might jeopardize the ongoing political movement or the construction of Socialism. Therefore, during the bombardment, Mao specifically ordered the avoidance of shelling American escort ships, which might cause American deaths and drag the United States to war (Dai 2007, p. 355). Neither side preferred war, and both sides actively avoided this even after realizing that cooperation was impossible. Therefore, the Prisoner’s Dilemmas is not a good explanation of the 1958 Crisis.

The Chicken Game is the most effective model to describe the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The Chicken Game model shows that each player prefers forcing the opponent to swerve the most and war the least. At the beginning of the crisis, both sides wanted to force the opponent to swerve. The United States issued a nuclear threat to demonstrate its overwhelming power to China. China, in return, blockaded the Jinmen-Mazu Islands to test the American resolve. As the crisis continued, both China and the United States realized that the opponent was unlikely to swerve. Without swerving, a war would become inevitable. Therefore, both sides actively avoided war, and China eventually chose concession and returned to the pre-Crisis status over launching
an attack. Both players’ preferences show that the Chicken Game is the best model to explain the 1958 Crisis.

The four variables of the Chicken Game effectively explain the outcome of the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The United States was clearly the stronger military power, but its military force was unable to coerce China. The United States had a higher stake over Taiwan. China had a high ability to take damage while the US’ ability to take damage was low. The United States had the advantage of the status quo because it was the deterrence side while China was on compellence. Among the four variables, the United States had an advantage over China in three: military, stakes, and status quo. China had an advantage over the United States in its ability to take damage. Therefore, the four variables successfully demonstrate China’s overall disadvantage and lead to the conclusion that China was likely to swerve. As the analysis shows, China eventually backed down from the Crisis.

Many believe that the military power is the most important variable in a Chicken Game, however, the American military advantage played a limited role in the 1958 Crisis because both sides could deter the opponent, yet lacked the necessary power of compellence. Therefore, neither side could coerce the other with credibility. The United States indeed had a more powerful military, but its military advantage could not translate into compellence power because it lacked effective conventional weapons that could be used on Chinese airports and gun fields; in addition, there were tremendous political costs of using nuclear weapons. China’s military inferiority was supplemented by its alliance with the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union would only act on its commitment to China when China was attacked; it would refrain from getting involved when China was the aggressor. Therefore, China could use the Soviet power in deterrence, but still faces military inferiority in compellence. As a result, lack of compellence power minimized the role of military power in the 1958 Crisis.

It is important to note that the status quo was the most important variable in deciding the outcome of the Taiwan Strait Crisis. When neither lacked the power of compellence, China’s position as compellence put itself at a natural disadvantage. China’s decision of ceasefire was not a product of American military superiority; the American nuclear threat did not influence China’s decision making. China viewed the American attempt to move the status quo through the demilitarization plan as unacceptable. The Chinese leaders could not accept the two-state solution under the new reality. Therefore, facing the difficult choice between old and new status quos, Beijing was forced to swerve and accept the return to the old norm.
Conclusion

This essay demonstrates that the Chicken Game was the most effective game theory model available to evaluate the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Through detailed empirical analysis, it shows that the other models, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt, had shortcomings. The lack of cooperation between China and the United States runs counter to the cooperate-first mentality of the Stag Hunt model. The massive cost of war made both Chinese and American leaders realize that war was their last option, and China’s decision to swerve rather than go to war contradicts the Prisoner’s Dilemma model.

The essay also introduces four variables of the Chicken Game that successfully explain the outcome of the Crisis. These four variables are military power, stake, ability to take damage, and status quo. These variables have critical future implications; they can be applied to project the outcome of any future two-party Chicken Game crisis. The pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen defended her presidency in the 2020 Taiwan election. While she pushes for her independence agenda, a new Taiwan Strait Crisis may occur in the next several years. As the American military superiority over China has shrunk to near parity and the American stake in Taiwan has declined significantly, the United States may need to admit its weakness and swerve to Chinese pressure.

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The Impact of VP Nominees: An Overview of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

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Abstract

This paper offers insight on two theories that explain the election of President Donald J. Trump in the 2016 United States presidential election. The election of Trump is considered one of the greatest electoral upsets in U.S. history: the last round of public polling preceding Election Day overwhelmingly favored Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton, with an edge of as much as seven percentage points (Mercer et. al 2016). However, the explanations as to what propelled Trump into the Oval Office are numerous. One theory explores the significance of the vice presidential nominees as they pertain to the Democratic and Republican tickets. Because American voters had to choose between two of the most unpopular presidential candidates in United States history, many voters carefully examined their respective running mates. This trend becomes especially notable in the Midwest and the Rust Belt, as the Trump-Pence ticket carried states that have traditionally voted Democratic (Lai and Parlapiano 2016). The second theory concentrates on the role of the Vice President, Mike Pence. Pence appeared to play an integral role in the electoral success of Trump: not only did Pence deliver his home state of Indiana, but the ticket was also able to secure a majority of the Midwest region of the country. Moreover, the historic levels of mass mobilization among Evangelicals who voted for Trump can be attributed to Pence, a staunch Evangelical himself. Shifting focus towards the impact of vice presidential choice and the role of Pence could shed light on the historic election that caught much of the country off guard.

Heightened Emphasis on the VP: Inside the Mindset of the American Voter

Trump and Clinton were considered by many individuals as the most unpopular, polarizing candidates to win their respective party’s nominations. In fact, they were historically unpopular: according to a Gallup poll, both candidates faced “the worst election-eve images of any major-party presidential candidates,” as Trump earned a record 62% unfavorability rating, followed by Clinton’s 52% unfavorability rating (Saad 2016). Trump was largely criticized for comments he made on the campaign, as they were lambasted as “sexist, racist, insulting, and offensive” (Wilson 2017, 235). Trump’s character repeatedly came into question, as demonstrated by his verbal
attack on a Gold Star father, his failure to immediately denounce Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, and the leaked “Access Hollywood” tape in which Trump bragged about being able to “do anything” with women (Haberman and Oppel Jr. 2016; Chan 2016; Farenthold 2016). Consequently, an overwhelming majority of polls predicted a resounding victory for Clinton (“Election 2016 - General Election”). Trump’s chances of winning the general election were so low that a GOP insider claimed “it would take video evidence of a smiling Hillary drowning a litter of puppies while terrorists surrounded her with chants of ‘Death to America’” for Trump to achieve victory (Shepard 2016). Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric projected an unfavorable image of himself and the Republican Party to the American public.

Meanwhile, the Democratic side presented its own problems. Clinton, the presumptive Democratic nominee, faced little competition in the Democratic primary. The only real challenge to Clinton was Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, yet Clinton was able to maintain her lead in delegates until she finally won the party’s nomination. However, details soon emerged of a “rigged” Democratic primary in favor of Clinton, as emails were released showing a “web of collusion” between Clinton’s campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and mainstream media outlets (Christiansen 2018, 199). This revelation exacerbated the “corrupt” label that Clinton was trying to shake off throughout the campaign. A good number of Americans believed she was an “economic elitist out of touch with average Americans,” especially after she made the remark that Trump supporters were a “basket full of deplorables” (Clinton 2017, 44, 47). Perhaps the most damaging feature of the Democratic nominee was Clinton’s use of a private email account on secure federal servers from 2009-2013 during her tenure as Secretary of State under the administration of President Barack Obama. These emails, some containing classified information, came to the forefront of the campaign eleven days before the election as the FBI announced it was examining newly discovered emails sent or received by Clinton (Zurcher 2016). In fact, Clinton’s shady history earned her the infamous nickname “Crooked Hillary” by Trump on the campaign trail (Geir 2016). As a result, Clinton was unable to escape the “corrupt” label that many associated her candidacy with.

The extreme unattractiveness of both candidates put the American electorate in a significant bind. Trump’s divisive rhetoric versus Clinton’s questionable political history established an election in which many voters viewed their vote as choosing between the “lesser of two evils” (Delkic 2016). A Pew study discovered that a voter’s dislike of the opponent was influential in their support for a particular candidate (“In Their Own Words”). Given this prevailing sentiment, Americans casting their ballots decided to place greater emphasis on analyzing the presidential ticket. As a result, the 2016 election was subject to an unprecedented phenomenon
in American electoral history: voters selected their president based on the strength of the presidential ticket, not the candidates themselves. In other words, the credentials of the vice presidential nominees determined the outcome of the 2016 election. Before assessing the background of both nominees to understand how they impacted their respective tickets, it is imperative to assess the history of vice presidential selections, as well as the impact of such selections on U.S. presidential elections.

**VP Selection: An Analysis of Variables**

Since 1940, conventions have no longer served as the means for selecting running mates, as presidential candidates and their advisors have been given autonomy in the process (Black 2016). Baumgartner (2008) constructed a model that illustrated the factors and their relative salience that presidential candidates consider when they construct a presidential ticket. Such variables include, but are not limited to: regional balance, demographic balance, and ideological balance (767). With regards to regional balance, a separate model focused on predictors of candidates’ state vote percentages from 1932-2000 discovered that vice presidential candidates received a 3% boost in their home states and fared better in their home regions (Powell 2004, 125). Therefore, geography is a prominent theme in the makeup of the ticket. Furthermore, the study found that a distinction exists between the electoral impacts of Democrat and Republican running mates: Democrat vice presidential candidates provide a home-state advantage, while their Republican counterparts enjoy an electoral boost not only in their home states, but in their regions as well (Powell 2004, 128). However, the “balancing” of tickets does not necessarily translate to electoral gains or victory. Adkison (1982) separated positive and negative feelings towards presidential and vice presidential candidates to highlight that people tend to vote against the vice president, contributing to the claim that vice presidents hurt the ticket more than they help it (333). After reviewing extant literature on the subject, Uscinski (2012) concluded that the vice presidential candidate has little, if any, influence over the general election outcome (61). A separate research design evaluating the impact of vice presidential selection on voter choice found that there was a small likelihood that supporting a presidential candidate corresponded to one’s vice presidential preference (Grofman and Kline 2010, 308). Although vice presidential nominees may offer electoral gains in certain states, their overall effect on voter choice is deemed negligible by many.

The 2008 presidential election appeared to challenge this notion. The 2008 general election provided an interesting case in which vice presidential candidates could have played an integral role in the outcome. More specifically, the pairing of Arizona Senator John McCain and
Alaska Governor Sarah Palin for the Republican ticket highlighted a ticket where the VP nominee was influencing how voters perceived the presidential candidate (Steinhauser 2008). According to the aforementioned variables that influence the VP selection process, the pairing makes geographical sense, as Palin secured Alaska, which was expected to be fiercely contested in the general election. Moreover, Palin provided an ideological balance to the ticket, as McCain represented the moderate faction of the party. Palin’s role was to shore up conservative support and rally voters behind McCain, whose relations with the far-right wing of the Republican Party “had been strained for much of his political career” (Cohen 2010, 205). However, Palin was an outsider with no real political experience in the nation’s capital, and she was heavily inexperienced with only two years as governor under her belt. In addition, she was viewed as a divisive and polarizing figure: Knuckey (2012) documents that roughly 34% of voters felt “cold” towards Palin on a “feeling thermometer,” a threshold that few vice presidential candidates have reached (277). Knuckey studied the “Palin Effect” and discovered that moderate and independent voters who felt cold towards Palin were less likely to cast a vote for McCain. Furthermore, the effect Palin had on voter choice was the most significant of any vice presidential candidate since 1980 (284). Elis, Hillygus, and Nie (2010) found that Palin’s “declining favorability cost McCain 1.6 percentage points on Election Day” (8). Brox and Cassels (2009) and Ulbig (2010) further substantiated the existence of a “Palin Effect” that impacted the 2008 election (as cited in Knuckey 2013, 961). Therefore, vice presidential nominees possess the potential to impact the outcome of a general election, as explicitly expressed by the results of an election eight years prior to 2016.

The VP Factor: How the Republican Ticket Prevailed over the Democratic Ticket

With the importance of vice presidential nominees in mind, it is necessary to discuss the background of both nominees in the 2016 election. The Republican vice presidential nominee to run alongside Trump was then-Indiana Governor Pence. Pence had served six terms in the House of Representatives from 2001-2013 before being elected as Indiana’s governor in 2012. During his tenure in the House, Pence rose up the Republican ranks, eventually securing the House Republican Conference Chair in 2009. Pence had a plethora of relationships with members of Congress, most notably the “grass-roots Tea Party wing of the party” (“Donald Trump Chooses Mike”). Despite the unfavorability of Trump, conservatives held Pence in high regard for his leadership of the “conservative movement in Washington” (Nussbaum 2016). Because Pence had a keen understanding of governing from the nation’s capital, the Republican ticket attained an outsider-insider balance. Pence offered regional balance to the ticket, as the Midwest represented an electorally-valuable region with the key swing states of Iowa, Ohio, and
Wisconsin. Pence’s state of Indiana was not considered to be a contest, as Republican candidate Mitt Romney carried the state by ten points in 2012. Indiana was one of the few states from the Midwest to vote Republican that year (Leip). Pence, a Reagan-like conservative, also brought ideological balance to the ticket (J. Graham 2017). FiveThirtyEight—a data analysis website that measures various political variables—conducted a projection model to measure the ideological orientation of Pence and former vice presidential nominees. Pence received an average score of sixty, making him the most conservative vice presidential nominee in the model’s database (Enten 2016). Although Pence did not provide racial or ethnic balance to the ticket, his standing as an Evangelical gave some semblance of a religious quality to the ticket and attracted Evangelical voters.

Clinton’s running mate, U.S. Senator Tim Kaine, was picked nearly a week after Trump’s selection of Pence (Karni 2016). Kaine was a former Governor of Virginia from 2006-2010 and had been serving in the U.S. Senate since 2013 (Hopper 2016). With political involvement at the local, state, and federal levels, Kaine offered more insider experience to the Democratic ticket. The selection of Kaine carried the semblance of a regional balance. His state of Virginia was a battleground state in the 2016 election, and a blue Virginia could influence the winner of other southern states, especially North Carolina, a state that Romney had won by just two percentage points in 2012 (Leip). As a moderate Democrat, Kaine did not provide an ideological balance to the Democratic ticket, which exacerbated the bitterness shared by the left wing of the Democratic Party and other voters who supported Sanders in the primary. Kaine’s record did nothing to assuage these voters’ concerns about voting for the candidate that “cheated” them in the Democratic primary. Kaine was a candidate who could appeal to the Hispanic and Latino constituencies in the country: in 2013 Kaine delivered a speech on the senate floor entirely in Spanish, the first of its kind (Matthews 2016). However, although he is Roman Catholic and speaks fluent Spanish, the Virginian senator did not deliver any demographic balance.

These unique attributes, intended to resonate with certain constituencies in the country, were reinforced during the 2016 Vice Presidential debate. The Vice Presidential debate provides a platform in which the vice presidential nominees showcase these personal traits, as well as influence public opinion on the presidential tickets. Because of the nature of the 2016 presidential candidates, the running mates were asked to make a strong case for their respective tickets, rather than for the presidential candidates, to the American people. The debate consisted of back and forth dialogue between Kaine and Pence, both lambasting the other side while praising their own. Kaine was very aggressive during the full ninety minutes, frequently interrupting Pence on a number of issues and exploiting comments made by Trump. He made strides to portray Clinton’s
career in a positive light, highlighting her time as Secretary of State under the Obama administration. Kaine also highlighted his history as a public servant. It was a solid performance by Kaine, especially as he went on the offensive, forcing Pence to defend Trump’s comments on immigration, releasing his taxes, and other issues. Yet, Pence was cool, calm, and collected throughout the debate as he carefully conveyed the message of the Republican ticket. The constituencies that Pence underscored during this debate are notable: he illustrated his upbringing in small-town America, cited the “War on Coal,” and emphasized the sanctity of life. Each of these issues appeared to target the Midwest and Rust Belt demographics. Pence attributed the decay of these regions to the Obama administration. Where Kaine indicated that Trump was a dangerous choice for America, Pence countered that a Clinton presidency would be a continuation of the Obama administration (POLITICO Staff 2016). Pence also did not interrupt as much as Kaine did, which in turn affected how favorably voters felt towards Pence. A poll released by POLITICO soon after the debate reflected this sentiment: 38% of registered voters believed Pence won the debate, while just 20% thought Kaine had won (Reid 2016).

After assessing the attributes of each vice presidential nominee, one can look to the results of the 2016 election to see their impact. The aforementioned constituencies that Pence highlighted during the debate delivered victories for Trump in a majority of the Midwest and the Rust Belt. Pennsylvania—another battleground state—and Michigan went red for the first time since 1988. Kaine, on the other hand, appeared to deliver no major constituencies other than his state. In fact, Kaine’s value to the ticket comes into serious question after looking at the results in Virginia: Clinton did not even secure 50% of the state vote. Obama, who did not have a Virginian as his running mate, won the state with 53% of the vote in 2008 and 51% of the vote in 2012 (Leip). As a result, Kaine did not appear to provide a significant electoral advantage for Clinton. Furthermore, Trump’s victories in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin can largely be attributed to a ticket that included a small-town American who grew up with “corn fields in his backyard” (Politico Staff 2016). Pence resonated with these voters, unlike Kaine. Therefore, the ticket that consisted of an outsider and a small-town America governor prevailed over the ticket with two Washington insiders.

What Clinton may have failed to realize was that her reputation was already on thin ice among voters who supported Sanders during the “rigged” Democratic primary. Instead of picking a running mate that could alleviate their concerns and repair the relationship with some of these voters, she settled for Kaine. This ultimately spelled disaster for the Democratic ticket: Wisconsin and Michigan, states that Sanders had won in the Democratic primary, went to Trump. As a precursor, both of these states had not voted Republican since the 1980’s. If the outcome of the
2012 election is compared to that of 2016, Clinton received almost 300,000 less votes than Obama in Michigan, and 240,000 less votes than Obama in Wisconsin (Leip). Furthermore, for the first time since 1980 the Republican ticket snatched an electoral vote in Maine, a state that also supported Sanders in the primary (Shaw 2016, 19). Minnesota, another state Sanders won in the Democratic primary, saw a decrease of roughly 180,000 Democratic votes from 2012 to 2016. The migration of these missing Democratic voters had a significant impact on the election. The most likely destination for these voters was the Green Party, the party whose ideology aligned the most with Sanders supporters. The 2016 election saw Green candidate Jill Stein win almost 1.5 million votes, surpassing the party’s total vote count in 2012 by more than one million votes (Leip). The Trump-Pence ticket also managed to take advantage of the disgruntled Sanders supporters, as 12% of those who voted for Sanders in the Democratic primary defected to Trump in the general election (Kurtzleben 2017). Ultimately, Kaine’s limited contribution to the Democratic ticket supports the belief that vice presidential nominees can only hurt the ticket, as he was unable to deliver any constituency other than his home state. Pence on the other hand refutes that belief, as the Republican ticket scored big among key demographic groups.

The “Pence Effect”: How a VP Nominee Won a Presidential Election

It is no question that Clinton and Trump were two of the most controversial presidential candidates to represent their respective parties. In the case of Trump, Republican politicians and voters alike were stunned by his sudden rise to the party’s nomination. The Trumpian takeover of the party left many conservatives mortified and disillusioned by thoughts of Trump in the White House (NR Staff 2016). Because doubt and uncertainty plagued the Republican ticket, Trump needed to find a running mate that could assuage concerns among conservatives. As such, it is imperative to examine the formation of the 2016 Republican ticket and assess the value that Pence brought to it; in other words, the explanation of why Pence was tapped as Trump’s running mate will clarify the role Pence plays in the 2016 general election.

As previously highlighted, political parties must take into account the potential home state and regional advantages of the vice president nominees when constructing a presidential ticket (Garand 1998, 85). Because the U.S. elects the president through the Electoral College, vice presidential nominees may represent regional advantages that can tip the electoral scales in a particular party’s favor. Moreover, VP nominees are subject to extensive media coverage due to their strategic implications for presidential elections. As such, media analysts and political junkies alike often refer to this selection process as the “veepstakes” (Devine and Kopko 2011, 1). Because of these reasons, Trump and his campaign saw a momentous opportunity to catch the
public’s eye. The Republican “veepstakes” was filled with high-profile names that included current and former governors, members of Congress, and presidential candidates. Despite the large number of perceived running mates and subsequent news coverage, the *Washington Post* eventually reported three individuals that made “Trump’s short list”: former speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and Pence, who was currently the governor of Indiana (Uhrmacher et. al 2016). In retrospect, it is easy to understand Trump’s logic in selecting Pence over Gingrich and Christie. The following reasons will underline how politically valuable Pence was to the Republican ticket and neatly explain what Pence delivered to Trump on Election Day.

Gingrich—the most well-known of the three individuals—served in the House for two decades from 1979-1999, holding the titles of Minority Whip and Speaker of the House in the latter decade (Zengerle 2007, 201). Credited with engineering the Republican revolution that overtook Congress in 1994, Gingrich won much acclaim among conservatives for his bombastic personality and combative approach towards President Bill Clinton. This combative nature, however, took a turn for the worst as Gingrich was later blamed for a twenty-seven day government shutdown, as well as a controversial impeachment process (Highton 2002, 4). These theatrics prompted a staunch rebuke of the Republicans in the 1998 midterms as the Democrats picked up seats in the House, marking the first time in fifty-eight years that a party in control of the White House accomplished such a feat in a midterm election (Ornstein et. al 2000, 54). Gingrich’s reputation suffered a major blow as his leadership was lambasted for the catastrophic election results it produced and the subsequent setback for the Republican Party. As a consequence, Gingrich did not seek reelection as Speaker and immediately resigned from the House (Zengerle 2007, 203). A staunch conservative with strong relationships in the South, Gingrich provided a route to securing the southern vote for Trump. This strategy could have garnered key electoral votes in the swing states of North Carolina and Florida. His state of Georgia was not considered a swing state for the 2016 election, as it had reliably voted Republican in every presidential election since 1992 (Leip).

The second potential nominee, Christie, was a governor from New Jersey who was in the middle of his second term when his name was floated as a possible running mate. Just earlier that year, he had ended his presidential campaign against Trump in the Republican primary. Although Christie had no prior experience in Washington, Christie became a national figure for his efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. However, the infamous Fort Lee lane closure scandal—also known as Bridgegate—exacerbated his declining approval ratings among New Jerseyans (Symons 2016). Although Christie was well-known when he ran for president, his
popularity was quite low (Hutchins 2017). It appeared very unlikely that Trump paired with Christie could carry New Jersey in the general election, as the traditionally blue state had not voted Republican in a presidential election since 1988 (Leip). Christie’s status as a moderate, however, could be seen as appealing to independents, and thus help Trump in swing states such as Pennsylvania, Florida, or Ohio.

Pence, unlike the other two potential nominees, had experience as both a Congressman and a Governor. As previously mentioned, Pence had served in the House for twelve years before being elected as Indiana’s governor in 2012. Towards the latter part of his tenure in Congress, Pence served as the House Republican Conference Chair in 2009 (“Donald Trump Chooses His”). When Pence was reported to be a potential running mate for Trump, he was in the middle of his first term as governor. Pence was not perceived to be a national figure by any means, and his tenure as governor was nothing outstanding. Pence’s approval ratings had dwindled due to a number of issues, including criticism for his lackluster response to an HIV epidemic that hit Indiana (Gonsalves and Crawford 2020). Although Indiana was a “safe” state for the Republicans in 2016, Pence was perceived as the candidate who could foster a Republican victory in the Midwest, an electorally-valuable region with the key swing states of Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

After assessing these candidates, the selection of Pence was a suitable one. As a political figure with plenty of experience in Congress, unlike Christie, Pence was well-known on Capitol Hill. Although Gingrich used to be a prominent member of Congress, it had nearly been two decades since he last served. Moreover, his popularity among conservatives significantly declined during his time as Speaker. Simply put, Gingrich was not popular enough and too alienating of a figure to be vice president. Unless Trump felt the South was in serious jeopardy, it would have made little sense to select the former congressman from Georgia. Christie was also not necessarily a popular candidate, as demonstrated by his low approval ratings in his own state. He could not carry any electoral region in the country and the only electoral implications of his selection was making Trump more viable in swing states. However, such a “balance” of a ticket did not guarantee electoral fortune, and the selection of Christie could potentially alienate the more conservative wing of Trump’s base. The most reliable person to deliver votes was Pence. The Midwest was a region that the Trump campaign was actively targeting, and selecting a strong conservative from that region made the most sense. Although Pence did not have the national profile that the other two possessed, a low-key pick was safer than selecting someone with an unpopular, polarizing background (D. Graham 2016). However, Pence not only brought the Midwest to the table, but also a much more valuable constituency in the form of the Evangelical community.
Perhaps the most important aspect that factored into Trump’s decision-making was not the candidate’s electoral strength in their respective regions, but their religion. Throughout the campaign, Trump vehemently promoted social conservative values, vowing to “break the influence of the immoral liberal elite” and “restore the true character of the nation” (Groitl 2017, 3). This appeal to social conservative values resonated with Evangelical voters, a central part of Trump’s base. Gingrich and Christie were both Catholics, whereas Pence was a staunch Evangelical. Pence’s track record as governor speaks for itself: his Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was criticized by many as a means to deny services to same-sex couples, although Pence opposed that interpretation and clarified that the bill’s intent was not to allow discrimination (Ortiz 2015). Pence was also responsible for state funding cuts to Planned Parenthood clinics and instituting some of the most restrictive abortion laws in the country (Foran 2018). As previously mentioned, a FiveThirtyEight projection model found that Pence was the most conservative vice presidential nominee in the model’s database (Enten 2016). Moreover, the Midwest is a region home to a prominent white, Evangelical community. For example, Evangelicals account for the largest religious group in Ohio (29%), Indiana (31%), and Michigan (25%). Iowa (28%) and Wisconsin (22%) are also home to a considerable Evangelical community (“Religion in America: U.S.”). Pence not only represented the Midwest on behalf of Indiana, but on behalf of the white, Evangelical community as well. No other candidate was better suited to complement Trump’s courting of the Evangelical vote than Pence.

The results of the 2016 election highlight the impact that Pence had on the electoral outcome. Other than Illinois and Minnesota, the rest of the Midwest voted for Trump. This underscored a massive flip in the electoral map in a span of four years. In the 2012 general election between Romney and the Democratic incumbent Obama, Obama carried six states from the region. Among those states that Trump was able to capture in 2016 were swing states Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Trump also flipped Michigan, a state that had not voted Republican in a presidential election since 1988. Moreover, Trump came up short in Minnesota by only 45,000 votes, a state that Romney lost by 226,000 votes in 2012 and that no Republican has won since President Nixon in 1972 (Leip). Trump also won a greater share of white Evangelical voters (81%) than any Republican nominee in the previous four election cycles. In 2012, Romney had only secured 78% of this voting bloc (Martínez and Smith 2016). If white Evangelicals are removed from the “White Vote,” exit polls showed that a majority of non-evangelical whites actually voted for Clinton (Wong 2018, 2). Therefore, the Evangelical vote was a major contribution to Trump’s victory. Outside of New England, Trump carried twenty-one of the twenty-two states whose voting populaces are majority white Christians, the one outlier being Minnesota (Cox 2016).
Feasible or Farfetched: The overestimation of a VP nominee?

The argument that vice presidential nominees have a profound impact on the electoral outcomes of general presidential elections is a difficult one to make. As seen in previously highlighted literature, many studies found that vice presidential nominees have little, if any, influence on the general election outcome (Grofman and Kline 2010, 308; Uscinski 2012, 61). Moreover, the 2008 election may be an exception to the rule, as one can underscore the high levels of media exposure that Palin received on the campaign as the reason for her influence (“The Palin Phenomenon Drives”). However, no evidence suggests that in 2016 Kaine or Pence did receive such media exposure on the campaign trail: an NBC poll revealed that both were largely unknown to registered voters (Hartig et. al 2016). Despite all of this, one cannot ignore the constituencies that both vice presidential nominees highlighted. The flipping of the Midwest from Obama to Trump cannot excuse Pence from the equation, as the Indianan was a staunch social conservative and Evangelical. Democrats failed to pick up any major geographic constituency, as Kaine could only deliver Virginia. The balance, or lack thereof, of both party’s tickets also made an impact on voter turnout. The Republican ticket featured an insider-outsider balance and ideological balance in which Pence’s experience on Capitol Hill mitigated the concerns of establishment Republicans about casting a vote for Trump. Moreover, if it were not for the “most conservative” vice presidential nominee, the right-wing of the Republican Party could have passed on Trump (Enten 2016). On the other hand, the Democratic ticket did not illustrate an insider-outsider balance nor an ideological balance. An “establishment Wall Street Democrat” like Kaine did little to convince the left wing of the Democratic Party, particularly Sanders supporters, to cast a ballot for the Democratic ticket (Scher 2016). As a result, the country witnessed traditionally blue states such as Michigan and Wisconsin vote Republican for the first time in three decades (Leip).

Although the above results prove that the Midwest and the Evangelical vote were conducive to Trump’s victory, it is difficult to measure the magnitude of Pence’s role on the outcome. Selecting a running mate from the Midwest was a failed strategy for Republicans in the past. Romney had selected Wisconsin Congressman Paul Ryan, a white Christian, to be his running mate in 2012 (Zeleny and Rutenberg 2012). As previously mentioned, Romney would lose Iowa, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Therefore, a running mate from the Midwest could not have been the sole reason for the sudden flip of the Midwest, nor can it explain the unexpected outcomes in Michigan and Minnesota, two states that have reliably voted Democratic for decades. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that throughout the campaign Trump sought the Evangelical vote.
By selecting Pence as his vice presidential nominee, Trump was able to solidify his support among Evangelicals, as demonstrated by the highest Evangelical turnout for the Republican ticket in the last four election cycles ("How the Faithful Voted"). Although it may be difficult to measure, the constituencies that Pence represented without a doubt carried the Republican ticket across the finish line.

Conclusion

The 2016 election continues to be examined through a number of angles to explain its outcome. However, in order to analyze this unexpected outcome, it is important to look at the parts of the country that exhibited surprising results. The outcomes in Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin created electoral shockwaves, as all of these states had voted Democratic just four years prior. Moreover, one must revert back to the 1980s to see the last time that some of these states voted for a Republican candidate in a presidential election. Therefore, this paper has proposed two theories that attempt to explain why these states suddenly shifted Republican, ultimately culminating in Trump’s victory.

The first theory explored the impact of vice presidential choice on the election outcome. Because of the immense unfavorability that voters expressed towards Clinton and Trump, vice presidential selection greatly influenced voter choice. Pence provided regional, ideological, and insider-outsider balance to the Republican ticket, while Kaine only provided limited regional balance. The balanced ticket of Trump and Pence prevailed in the parts of the country that proved essential to electoral victory. The outcomes in the Midwest and Rust Belt spoke to the strength of the Republican ticket and reflected the Democratic ticket's weaknesses. Moreover, the lack of ideological balance on the Democratic side reflected Clinton’s failure to recognize the fracture within her own party, as traditionally blue states that Sanders won in the Democratic primary became key losses for Clinton in the general election. By not selecting a running mate that was attentive to the Midwest or Rust Belt, she handed the election to Trump.

The second theory emphasized the role of Trump's running mate in terms of the constituencies that he represents. The Midwest was a region of the country with major electoral ramifications. Pence’s tenure as congressman and later as governor of Indiana influenced how citizens perceived Pence, especially among those who resided in the Midwest. More importantly, the Midwest is home to a large Evangelical population, the core of Trump’s base. Because Pence himself was a strong, socially conservative Evangelical, his nomination for vice president played into the Evangelical support that Trump was actively seeking. What Pence ultimately brought to
the table delivered one of the most historic upsets in U.S. presidential election history, as the Midwest and mass mobilization of Evangelical voters produced electoral victory for Trump.

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The FMLN and FARC as Diverging Models of Post-Conflict Integration

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Abstract

Civil conflicts sometimes end with militant groups transitioning into political parties and taking part in a state’s legitimate electoral process. This paper aims to determine factors that make some former militant groups more electorally viable than others. A comparative analysis is done studying the ideology, organizational structure and tactics of two cases from 20th century civil conflicts in Latin America: the FMLN in El Salvador and the FARC in Colombia. It is determined that the big-tent ideology, traditional structure and more selective use of tactical violence contributed to the FMLN’s electoral successes.

The FMLN and FARC as Diverging Models of Post-Conflict Integration

Bloody civil conflicts have shaped the modern world. Entire states, like Bosnia and Serbia, have been created as the result of civil war. Protracted civil conflicts, like the ongoing Syrian Civil War, continue to affect global politics. Few regions have seen as much civil strife as Latin America. Images of civil war in Latin America have permeated the global consciousness with figures like Che Guevara becoming symbols of popular revolution. Throughout the 20th and into the 21st century, civil war and revolution have repeatedly upended the politics of Latin America and rewritten the trajectory of nations. Many civil wars end in either government or rebel victory, while roughly a quarter end with a negotiated settlement that combine “disarmament and demobilization” with wider “social, economic, political and military reforms” with the goal of establishing the parties involved in violent conflict as contending non-violent political parties (Allison 2010, p. 104). Civil conflicts ending in settlement can give birth to democracies or widen the scope of an existing democratic regime by including opposition factions in the governing process.

This paper aims to analyze two civil conflicts that led to the integration of militant rebel groups as part of the democratic processes of their respective states: El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The challenges of post-conflict governance continue to haunt the international community, with many countries that have recently experienced civil wars facing instability (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001, p. 183). Identifying factors that may lead to the successful, peaceful political
integration of militant insurgent groups can help states, policymakers, and scholars better understand the process of post-conflict governance and how democratic stability can be maintained even when threatened by political violence. Several important factors will be considered, including the groups’ organizational structures, their tactics, and the responses of their states’ governments in order to determine what circumstances might lead to the most favorable electoral outcome for a newly integrated militant group.

The FMLN waged a civil war in El Salvador from its establishment as a left-wing multi-group coalition in 1980 until the end of hostilities in 1992 (Álvarez 2010, p.p. 17, 23). Five militant groups formed the FMLN at the outset of El Salvador’s civil war in May of 1980: the Popular Forces of Liberation-Farabundo Martí, the People’s Revolutionary Army, the National Resistance, the Revolutionary Party of the Workers of Central America, and the Communist Party of El Salvador (Chávez 2015, p. 1786). As the war escalated, it was estimated that the FMLN had more than 10,000 combatants and had “maintained the support of roughly 50,000 Salvadorans during the course of the conflict,” making it one of the largest guerilla groups in the western hemisphere (Allison 2010, p. 157). The FMLN, as both a militant resistance group and a future political party, embraced a coalition identity. The five constituent groups that initially formed the FMLN had agreed on left-wing political sympathies but varied greatly in organizational processes and ideological specifics (Chávez 2015, p. 1787). Joaquín Chávez (2015) noted that the FMLN’s leadership included not only Marxist-Leninists, but “social democrats, radicalized Catholics and eclectic intellectuals and activists” (p. 1786). This effectively made the FMLN a joint effort between El Salvador’s “New Left” and the country’s Communist Party (Chávez 2015, p. 1787). Chávez credits much of the FMLN’s post-war political success to the malleability of this coalition, writing that “the pragmatism the FMLN showed during the peace talks opened a path for unprecedented political reforms” (2015, p. 1785). Much of this flexible pragmatism came from the top. Before engaging in peace talks, the FMLN’s leaders had engaged in a civil war with perpetually shifting circumstances and objectives (Chávez 2015, p.p. 1787-1788). The same adaptability that allowed the FMLN to meet the changing conditions of war proved advantageous for its foray into electoral politics. By the late 1980s, the group had largely abandoned its roots in militant Marxist-Leninism and adopted a more moderate, democratic-socialist approach (Chávez 2015, p.p. 1787-1788). An end to the war was negotiated in 1992, and by the time elections were held two years later, the FMLN had established itself as a formidable opposition party, well integrated into the post-war political institutions of El Salvador (Sprenkels 2019, p. 7).

The FMLN borrowed tactical cues from leftist revolutionaries throughout the 20th century, adopting what José Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer (1995) observed as Ho Chi
Minh’s “Prolonged Popular War” (p. 14). This tactical methodology synthesized “guerilla warfare, maneuver warfare, and attrition warfare,” utilizing the different strategies across the conflict as necessary (Bracamonte & Spencer 1995 p. 14). The FMLN combined asymmetric guerilla tactics such as mines and ambushes with attacks on infrastructure and the fomenting of popular civil unrest, including protests (Bracamonte & Spencer 1995, p.p. 27-28). According to Bracamonte and Spencer, the civil protests served to legitimize resistance against the government while highlighting repressive state responses, which bolstered FMLN recruitment (p. 27). The tactics embraced by the FMLN highlight the group’s multifaceted and adaptable structure. By focusing on tactics that led to recruitment, the FMLN established a potent model for developing political capital and retained a meaningful level of popular support during the peace negotiations in the 1990s.

The government in El Salvador responded to the FMLN’s uprising by attempting to employ overwhelming violence that some scholars have designated as “state terror” (Petras 1987 p. 324). James Petras (1987) notes that state terror usually serves to strike down organized resistance movements and to “dismantle... political institutions” (p. 314). The Salvadoran government, backed by the United States, indirectly employed “civilian fringe” death squads who not only engaged the FMLN but committed massive acts of violence against the Salvadoran people (Petras 1987 p. 329). The conflict reached a virtual stalemate by the late 1980s, leaving the FMLN and the Salvadoran government open to peace talks (Chávez 2015, p. 1785). The government, seeing that the conflict was virtually unwinnable and that the FMLN were willing to negotiate, began seeking a meaningful compromise. Ultimately, an agreement was reached between the parties that shrank the Salvadoran military and created the National Civilian Police to replace existing militarized police forces in exchange for the demobilization of the FMLN and its integration into the democratic process as a party (Chávez 2015, p. 1792). The Salvadoran government responded to the FMLN with unbridled force first, and pragmatic negotiations later. While the government-sponsored brutality that marked the heights of the war helped foment popular support for the FMLN, the government’s willingness to negotiate towards the end of the war gave the FMLN a sizable opening to involve themselves in democratic governance.

The FARC followed a different organizational trajectory. The group was founded in 1964 by a handful of guerillas in the Colombian mountains and grew slowly: in 1982 the FARC boasted about 3,000 members (Molano 2000, p.p. 26-27). By the late 1990s, the FARC had grown to include about 18,000 active members (Petras and Brescia 2000, p. 134). The FARC was largely made up of peasants, although they initially attracted students and intellectuals to a lesser extent (Molano 2000, p. 26). Vera Eccarius-Kelly (2012) wrote at length about the organizational
structure of the FARC in an article entitled “Surreptitious Lifelines: A Structural Analysis of the FARC and the PKK.” Eccarius-Kelly claimed that the FARC’s commitment to Leninism predisposed the group to rigid ideological hierarchy, describing the leadership of the FARC in the late 2000s as “dogmatic and unbending… even though the organization experienced a tremendous loss of credibility” (2012, p. 237). The narcotics trade is deeply intertwined with the FARC’s structure, lending some members to relative self-direction (Eccarius-Kelly 2012 p. 237). At the outset of the Colombian civil war, the FARC found most of its funding from “revolutionary taxes” extracted from “landowners and peasants,” a system that some have compared to extortion (Eccarius-Kelly 2012, p. 240). The FARC later reoriented its organizational structure to focus on a more lucrative source of funding: narcotics. By the 1990s, the FARC had established a regime controlling drug cultivators and traffickers that Eccarius-Kelly described as a “shadow regime,” noting that the United States’s Government Accountability Office estimated that the FARC profited off of roughly 60% of cocaine on the U.S. market (p. 240). The FARC’s unwavering ideological commitments, combined with its structural reliance on the drug trade, presented serious problems to the group’s legitimization. The FARC failed to garner popular support despite challenging the Colombian state for decades: Eccarius-Kelly wrote that in 2008, only one percent of urban Colombians viewed the FARC positively (2012, p. 237).

The nature of Colombia’s civil war was in some ways more complex than that of El Salvador’s: the FARC was not only engaged in hostilities with the Colombian government, but also with paramilitary autodefensas of varying political affiliation, all while maintaining its share of the international drug market (McDougall 2009, p. 335). The FARC adopted a slew of often severe tactics to meet these needs. According to Chris Lee (2012), the FARC has been deeply involved in kidnapping and extortion (2012, p. 29). The group also routinely employed child soldiers, inviting harsh condemnation from the international community (Lee 2012, p. 35). FARC tactics frequently led to the deaths of civilians. Among these tactics were bombings of public spaces, the use of land mines, and violence targeting “entire villages” (Lee 2012, p. 36). As the FARC is a primarily rural group, these attacks often targeted urban areas, killing civilians and damaging urban infrastructure (Lee 2012, p. 37). Most Colombians live in the cities, and the FARC’s wanton approach to violence towards urban centers of power both hindered the group’s attempts at recruitment and bolstered the government’s image as peacekeepers (Lee 2012, p.p. 29, 36-37).

The Colombian conflict lasted for decades, a quagmire of government military forces, revolutionary guerilla armies, and local paramilitaries all vying for their preferred outcomes. Alex McDougall (2009) posited that this multiparty complexity made the conflict “intractable” (p. 322). McDougall ultimately pointed out that Colombia’s military attempts to stymie the conflicts within
its own borders were untenable because of the Colombian state’s “infrastructural weakness” (2009, p. 328). Because of this institutional weakness, the Colombian military adopted a counterinsurgency strategy that focused on the “containment, not eradication of guerilla forces” (McDougall 2009, p. 333). The weakness of the Colombian state led directly to the development of civilian militias, which eventually became controlled by paramilitary groups (McDougall 2009, p. 334). Colombia’s structural weakness affected its response to the conflict by encouraging repeated but tenuous attempts at peace accords. Molano noted that the FARC and the Colombian government have engaged in regular peace talks since the early 1980s, with little success (2000, p. 27). Since the Colombian government’s military response to the FARC was primarily defensive, acts of violence by the FARC were highly visible and could easily be interpreted as wanton aggression. The FARC’s ideological rigidity, excessive tactics, and unwillingness to work with the Colombian government failed to engender its appeal as a post-war electoral option.

El Salvador held elections in 1994, at which time the FMLN ran candidates and found almost immediate political success, capturing roughly 25% of the vote and establishing itself as the second largest political party in El Salvador (Allison 2010, p. 114). Since the 1990s, the FMLN has continued its record of electoral victories, with FMLN candidates winning presidential elections in 2009 and 2014 (Sprenkels 2019, p. 11). A 2016 peace accord, formally titled “Final Agreement for Ending the Armed Conflict and Building Stable and Lasting Peace,” was initially rejected by referendum but passed by the government of Colombia (Gomez-Suarez 2017, p. 466). This agreement led to the establishment of a political successor to the FARC, sharing the organization’s acronym, known as the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (Watson 2018). Colombia’s 2018 elections saw the FARC win a mere half of a percent of the vote, yielding them only the ten congressional seats guaranteed by the 2016 deal (Watson 2018). The FMLN has seen sustained and increasing political success after the conclusion of the Salvadoran civil war, while the FARC has struggled to integrate itself into the governing processes of Colombia. This paper argues that the FMLN owes its political successes to its inception as a broad coalition, its more popular tactical decisions, and the role and response of El Salvador’s government to the conflict.

The FMLN fostered a social and political image of collective struggle while engendering itself with El Salvador’s voters by moderating its ideology and seeking a tenable end to its conflict with the Salvadoran government. The unbending FARC, with its involvement in the international drug trade and proclivity for terroristic violence, failed to build a base of electoral support in Colombia. Salvadorans had another reason to throw their electoral support behind the FMLN: the relative institutional strength of El Salvador. The Salvadoran government, while unpopular enough
to experience a civil war, had a strong presence in negotiations and settled the conflict quickly and effectively. This was not true in Colombia, where peace talks collapsed time and time again. This relative institutional strength allowed the demobilized FMLN a smoother integration into post-war El Salvador.

It is worth noting that the FMLN’s comparative electoral success has not precluded the group from integration challenges. The 2019 presidential election in El Salvador ended with a decisive rout of the FMLN, who lost roughly seventy percent of their vote share when compared with the previous election (Sprenkels 2019, p. 1). Critics and former party members have attributed the party’s decline in support to practices including nepotism and corruption (Sprenkels 2019, p. 3). Activists, once the backbone of the FMLN’s rise to serious political contention, have abandoned the party, in part due to its cessation of internal democratic processes for electing officials. (Sprenkels 2019, p.p. 2-3). These intra-party elections were replaced with a central, elite hierarchy that filled out the party’s leadership (Sprenkels 2019, p. 2). Former FMLN minister José Luis Merino was, beginning in 2016, under investigation by the United States’ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for suspicion of drug trafficking, with some commentators noting his connections to Colombia’s FARC (Ávalos 2018). In light of the party’s growing reputation for corruption and connection to drug trafficking, it is not surprising that Nayib Bukele, the victor of the 2019 election and El Salvador’s current president, was propelled to victory on a promise to crack down on corruption (Palumbo and Malkin 2019). The FMLN’s integration success found through compromise has been challenged by institutional rigidity and the tolerance of unpopular political behaviors.

Peace negotiators involved in civil conflicts might look to the case of the FMLN as a successful model of initial post-war democratic integration. The mutual willingness of the FMLN and the Salvadoran government to meaningfully compromise is a vital reason for the lasting end to El Salvador’s civil war. Researchers analyzing electoral results can apply lessons from the FMLN’s relatively successful integration to other post-conflict democracies in order to foster a greater understanding of how newly demobilized resistance groups can find long-term democratic success. Groups embroiled in civil conflicts can likewise use examples like the FMLN to look towards a peaceful end to hostilities. The international community should pay attention to cases of lasting democratic integration and continuing post-conflict peace, as well as the situations in which those goals are not achieved. Navigating the potentially explosive landscape of post-war states requires all the tools available, and the comparison between the FARC and FMLN provides useful insights into what happens in the post-war era.
References


Censorship and Control in the PRC

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Abstract

This paper examines censorship and ideology in modern China, providing historical context in regards to the motives and goals of the Chinese Communist Party. The paper discusses how China's increasingly severe policies of Internet censorship are part of a prolonged effort to ensure "social cohesion" as part of the "Chinese Dream" - a longstanding goal of the Communist Party to bring about "National Rejuvenation" in China. Chronologically, the paper focuses on the emergence of virtual censorship in the 1990s, leading to increasingly severe restrictions throughout the 2000s emerging in tandem with new technologies such as facial recognition software, and culminating with contemporary China under Xi Jinping - which has sought to export its model of censorship to the wider world. The paper closes with details on Chinese influence in Western industry, specifically in Hollywood/Entertainment, and a brief overview of the emergence of COVID-19 and how China's censorship policies facilitated its global spread while allowing for China's (at least purportedly) "brutal, but effective" quarantine lockdowns.

Censorship and Control in the PRC

The extent of surveillance, censorship, and societal control that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exerts upon China is a subject of international criticism and concern. For as long as the Internet has been available in China, China’s political leadership has opted to systematically conceal and obscure any information perceived as contrary to its own values and ideals. As the Internet has become an increasingly ubiquitous aspect of modern life through the advent of mobile phones, social media, and more sophisticated data transmission, the CCP has similarly opted to increase the scale and sophistication of its censorship policies. Under the current administration of Xi Jinping, the CCP’s active involvement in determining what Chinese citizens see and discuss, as well as the scope of government intrusion in everyday life, has reached a new high. This paper places the ideological bent of Chinese censorship within a larger historical context, analyzes the underlying goals guiding the CCP’s policies, and examines the consequences of China’s blurred distinction between the real and the virtual. It will also explore the extent to which the CCP’s model may influence and spread beyond China’s borders as China seeks to reassert itself as a genuine world power.
China’s entry into modernity was tumultuous. The “century of humiliation” refers to a period of Chinese history represented by civil collapse, economic exploitation by Western colonial powers, and foreign invasion by Japan. These events brought about the end of Imperial China and the eventual rise of the People’s Republic of China, headed by Mao Zedong. For decades, Mao’s China remained insulated from international affairs as the revolutionary regime ushered in transformative policies across Chinese society. With the intention of reinvigorating China’s productivity, consolidating power and unity, and dissolving “antiquated” traditions supposedly without place in the new China, such policies carried immense consequences—bookending China’s century of humiliation with more destruction. The ethos of Communist China, instigated by Mao, remains fundamentally shaped by reaction to the century of humiliation (Miller 2017, 3-7).

Despite the Cultural Revolution’s efforts to do away with antiquated traditions and ideals, the notion that China’s “natural position” was firmly atop the sociopolitical hierarchy of Asia was one that never went away. In this context, national revival entails a reclamation of what had been lost. Chinese leadership from the time of Sun Yat-Sen to the modern reign of Xi Jinping has asserted revanchist ideals, oriented towards reclaiming the status of a world-power. It entails not only a consolidation and rejuvenation of stability and power within China, but a reasserted presence and influence in the affairs of the wider world (Miller 2017, 8).

This notion of national revival has experienced a new birth under the current reign of Xi Jinping, who has reasserted the sense that it is China’s destiny to reclaim its status as a world-power and realize the Chinese Dream. With a target date of 2049, the centennial of the PRC’s founding, Xi’s Chinese Dream represents the full realization of China’s restoration as a great power worthy of its ancient pedigree. Despite its forward-thinking orientation, the ideals underpinning the Chinese Dream are drawn from a self-perception of China being the center of the world. At its core, China’s neo-imperialism seeks to prevent foreign influence and power from metastasizing within China, while eventually exporting Chinese influence and power abroad (Miller 2017, 17-18). While actively participating in the interconnected world and espousing a sense of mutually beneficial globalism, the ideological base of modern China’s leadership remains isolationist and nativist.

This principle policy of projecting outwards while insulating within is well-represented by the reign of Xi Jinping. Since taking power in 2012, Xi has ushered in significant changes, shaped by “revolutionary impulses”, which have effectively made him “the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong” (Economy 2018, 11, 6-9). Xi’s reign has seen a reversal of decades of institutionalized bureaucratic collective decision-making, and an intense consolidation of personal authority which
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has seated him at the hexin, or “core,” of political leadership. This inclination towards despotism set the stage for the contemporary level of political repression, censorship, and “transformative” state involvement in peoples’ lives seen in China today (Economy 2018, 24, 5). China now has the power to exert more influence and play a larger role in international affairs as a state that has backslid further towards totalitarian despotism.

In April, 2013, the central committee of the CCP circulated a document to all party members entitled “A Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere.” This manifesto reasserted an emphasis on ideological cohesion and unity within China, aggrandizing the “spirit” of the Party’s Eighteenth National Congress and General Secretary Xi Jinping’s achievements in “unifying the thought of the entire party, the entire country, and the entire people enormously.” The manifesto also states “disseminating thought on the cultural front is the most important political task” and resolves to “promote unification of thought.” The document portrays an ideological struggle between the “false ideological trends” of the West and “socialism with Chinese Characteristics and the Chinese Dream.” It goes on to list seven perceived existential threats to the CCP (“Communiqué of the Ideological Sphere” 2013).

1. **Promotion of Western constitutional democracy**
2. **Promotion of “universal values”**
3. **Promotion of civil society/individualism**
4. **Promotion of neoliberalism**
5. **Promotion of the West’s idea of journalism, which challenges the Party’s principle that the media should be subject to Party discipline.**
6. **Promotion of “historical nihilism”** – Advocacy for historical revisionism and criticism of the CCP’s historical pedigree. Criticizing historical “revolutionary precursors”, “denying the historical inevitability in China’s choice of socialism” and seeking to undermine the CCP’s “historical purpose” as China’s true leadership.
7. **Questioning the nature of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in regards to China’s reform and opening** – Claiming that China has thoroughly abandoned its Marxist/Maoist ideology in favor of “state capitalism” or “new bureaucratic capitalism”. The CCP claims that these “reactionary” views hinge upon Western standards of reform that do not apply to China, and mentions the distinct role the Internet plays in disseminating these ideas and facilitating criticism of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

A call to fortify socialism with Chinese characteristics permeates the text, with an emphasis on recommitting to China’s extant socialist legacy while also introducing new concepts to the CCP’s ideological canon, such as Xi’s Chinese Dream. The document represents an effort
to bolster the cohesion of values within the CCP while rejecting influences from abroad, doubling down on pre-existing trends of authoritarianism and government censorship. It also represents a commitment to a Sinocentric view of the world, in which China’s political leadership dictates what is ideologically acceptable and what is not, and that foreign criticisms are unimportant as their perspectives and metrics are invalid. Crucially, the document makes note of the Internet’s capacity to serve as a virtual battleground of ideas inseparable from the physical world, and as a potential catalyst for the rapid dissemination of politically-sensitive information and foreign values. This perspective of the Internet serves as the justification for the CCP’s active involvement in and moderation of what Chinese citizens do online, as the Internet is not exempt from state power and law.

The theme of Internet censorship in the Communiqué is but a recent and emboldened manifestation of trends that have existed in China for some time. The CCP opened the Internet to the general public in 1995, and by 1997 had enacted its first set of punitive restrictions on content perceived as harmful to national security or state interests. This prefaced the technological efforts of software engineer Fang Binxing, who is largely responsible for developing the “Golden Shield,” a transformative software that allowed Party access to data channels and the ability to block destination IP addresses and domain names. This software was the progenitor to the set of restrictions and information regulations constituting China’s “Great Firewall,” and precluded further expansion of the limits placed on what Chinese citizens could legally view and discuss online. The majority of popular Western websites, frequently browsed everyday by people outside of China, remain categorically banned (“The Great Firewall” 2018).

Increasingly strict regulations were established throughout the 2000s, mandating that all internet use in China abided by the CCP’s rigid standards of conduct. Notably, China began to elicit participation and complicity from the private sector. In 2000, the issuance of state council order 292 mandated that Chinese Internet service providers enforce CCP regulations by assisting in the moderation of data sent out on their services. Google, which was banned in China around this time, would go on to introduce Google.cn, a censored version of the site which was tailored to suit the demands of the CCP. In 2002, more than a hundred companies, including Yahoo, signed the CCP’s Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China’s Internet Industry, based upon “patriotic observances of the law, equitableness, trustworthiness, and honesty” (“The Great Firewall” 2018). Western based websites were compelled to acquiesce to the censorship demands of the CCP or have their content blocked entirely within China. For the sake of profit and expansion, many Western companies were willing to oblige the CCP.
Two years after the pledge was introduced, Yahoo cooperated with Chinese officials in detaining and prosecuting Shi Tao, a journalist who used a Yahoo email account to leak information regarding CCP restrictions on reporting. Yahoo handed over access to Shi’s email account, which contained evidence used to prosecute and imprison Shi for 8 years. The information Shi had leaked was a CCP document regarding the suppression of press coverage of the 15th anniversary of the 1989 massacre of civilians at Tiananmen Square (King 2013). This incident, in which Chinese troops opened fire on unarmed pro-democracy protests, was a brutal demonstration of how far the CCP is willing to go in protecting itself and ensuring civilian compliance.

China’s concerns over the Internet’s ability to foster political dissent were not entirely unjustified. In 1998, China’s first “cyber-dissident” Lin Hai was arrested and imprisoned for forwarding 30,000 Chinese email addresses to an American pro-democracy magazine (“The Great Firewall” 2018). The following year, the spiritual organization Falun Gong used email and mobile phones to organize a silent demonstration of 10,000 adherents at the CCP’s central compound in Beijing. By then, the CCP had become seriously concerned with the emerging religious practice, estimating that Falun Gong ("Buddhist Law" or "Dharma Wheel Practice") had at least 70 million adherents. Their reasons for the demonstration hinged upon demands for government clarification on the legality of their practice and the easing of publishing restrictions on Falun Gong texts (Faison 1999). Despite these seemingly innocuous demands, the fact that virtual connectivity had allowed them to organize quickly and in large numbers, without detection, prompted immense government alarm. That same year, a 1999 decision by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee established a ban on “cult organizations,” giving the state the authority to imprison and punish Falun Gong adherents as well as any other spiritual or religious “dissidents” (“Resolution on Cults” 1999).

Although much of China’s censorship efforts have been oriented towards Western influences, the systematic persecution and repression of Falun Gong adherents demonstrates how even endemic Chinese movements and organizations are susceptible to government prohibition if their beliefs are perceived as a threat to the values and ideological unity of the CCP. The resolution on the banning of cult activity claimed “preventing and punishing cult activity” is necessary in order to “maintain social stability, protect the interests of the people, and safeguard reform.” The resolution goes on to purport a disparaging view of “cults” like Falun Gong, claiming that they are criminal organizations which seek to “deify their leading members” and “deceive people with superstitious ideals.” Special notice is given to Falun Gong’s leader, Li Hongzhi, who is portrayed as a self-serving zealot made rich by “brainwashing his followers with heretical ideas”
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(“Resolution on Cults” 1999). This text demonstrates a shift in the CCP’s efforts to ensure “social stability,” now actively crafting narratives of threats to the CCP as being more than just sources of political opposition to the government policies, but existential threats to the social fabric of China itself.

While perceived threats and transgressions from groups external to the CCP warrant government crackdown and suppression, any mistakes or abuses of power made by the CCP are usually kept hidden and whitewashed. The case of Shi Tao and the revelation China intended to directly suppress coverage of the 15th anniversary of Tiananmen Square is one such example. Suppression regarding annual commemorations of the massacre have since been established as the norm, with an increased effort to censor Tiananmen related material on the Internet as well as “dozens of activists and other critics” placed under house arrest or detained in runups to subsequent anniversaries (Branigan 2014).

Other notable instances include the 2009 case of Deng Yujiao, a Hubei woman who stabbed a Party official to death after he attempted to rape her. Deng was detained and committed to a mental hospital, where she likely would have stayed were it not for the actions of blogger Wu Gan. Wu collaborated with other web users to expose the incident in what is colloquially known as a “human flesh search engine,” a term describing cooperative efforts between Chinese web users to circumvent web filters and uncover censored information (“The Great Firewall” 2018). The revelation prompted public outcry, and local authorities were compelled to release Deng.

Similarly, the CCP’s efforts to suppress coverage of the 2011 derailment of a high-speed train in Wenzhou, which killed at least 40 people, were thwarted when local residents shared cell phone photos and videos of the accident. The CCP relented to popular pressure and conducted an investigation, issuing a report that blamed inadequate signal equipment and poor safety procedures, and subsequently disciplining “as many as 54 officials” for their complicity in the disaster (“The Great Firewall” 2018).

While these anecdotes reveal the persistent capability of Chinese citizens to use the Internet as a means to hold government officials accountable, the more sinister takeaway from these cases is that the CCP uses its own censorship policies as a way of covering up its instances of criminal misrule. Furthermore, these cases only reveal the instances in which the CCP has been plainly caught in the act. While the true extent of the CCP’s successful whitewashing is unknown, the cases that have been exposed created considerable damage to public opinion and revealed the enduring capability of China’s populace to circumvent government-imposed barriers to virtual information sharing. In the runup to Xi Jinping’s 2012 ascension as General Secretary, China’s leadership was faced with the issues of reconsolidating public support and adjusting to
technological developments hampering its ability to control the flow of virtual information. What has since followed is a two-pronged approach: publicly committing to increased government accountability while dramatically expanding the scope of government censorship.

Not long after assuming power, Xi ushered in a series of campaigns directed at curbing the excess and mismanagement of Party officials. As these cases revealed, China’s rapid growth in wealth and power had carried with it the consequences of the CCP’s ideological decay and rampant political corruption, which was publicly illuminated despite the already extensive level of government censorship. According to Elizabeth Economy, with the ostensible goal of culling government abuses of power in regards to bureaucratic mismanagement and the misuse of public expenditures for “vanity projects,” Xi’s reformation campaign has led to the “disciplining” of hundreds of thousands of Party officials since 2013. This has facilitated Xi’s consolidation of a “cult of personality,” with his anti-corruption efforts drawing a large measure of public support and approval for his personal consolidation of power. Despite this, doubts remain. Xi’s anti corruption campaign has rendered a “paradoxical dilemma,” in which Xi’s efforts to address extant criticisms of corruption and discipline crooked officials make him popular while further damaging the lasting legitimacy of the CCP as a whole (Economy 2018, 31-39). While this is likely the case, Xi’s contemporaneous efforts to solidify government control and statewide censorship have further hampered the ability of Chinese citizens to voice criticisms of government or organize resistance. While Chinese citizens may see corruption as an inherent issue within the CCP, their ability to do anything about it is now more unlikely.

Xi’s China has redoubled its commitment to ideological cohesion with documents like the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere. While Xi’s efforts to rectify the government’s public image can be seen as a legitimate addressment to years of growing dissatisfaction with incidents of misrule and corruption, the larger motivation is actively consolidating stability at home in order to realize the outward ambitions of the Chinese Dream. This is demonstrated by the sweeping and aggressive additions to Internet censorship and government presence in the lives of Chinese citizens. Xi’s commitment to repressing information and keeping the populace passive, stable, and ideologically unified has fostered a swath of expanded regulations, new technological systems of surveillance and control, and the reasserted view of foreign influences and ideas as existential threats to China itself.

The social credit system is a virtual construct, still undergoing development and expansion that is used to measure the individual “reputations” of Chinese citizens. It relies upon the National Credit Information Sharing Platform, established in 2015, which itself is the virtual culmination of sectoral social-credit database “trials” that began in 2009 and the old dang’an (dossier) system,
which records and archives information on individual citizens (Economy 2018, 78-80; Ding & Zhou, n.d.). The CCP’s system, centralized under the national People’s Bank of China in 2018, typifies China’s interplay of the private and public sectors engaging with retail and financial multinationals like Alibaba, as well as social media companies like Baihe, an online dating service, in order to collect information and promote the importance of reputation in the private sphere. Good behavior begets personal incentives, such as a premium spot on Baihe’s matchmaking list, access to better loans and general financial opportunities, or a favorable impression in the eyes of potential employers and academia (Hatton 2015). Bad behavior (criminality, a lack of financial or civic prudence, or a lack of work ethic and consistent employment, etc.) begets penalties in the form of travel restrictions, public shaming in interconnected media services, and denied access to the “rewards” for good behavior (Ding & Zhou). An official document circulated by the Chinese government in 2014 outlines the goals and progression of the system through 2020, advocating for expansion and eventual standardization. The outline is laden with language reminiscent of the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere, citing the importance of strengthening societal integrity, credibility, and cohesion (“Social Credit System Plan” 2014).

In 2018, US Vice President Mike Pence described the social credit system as “an Orwellian system premised on controlling virtually every facet of human life” (Hornsley 2018). What he is discussing, as it is generally portrayed, does not exist – at least not yet. China’s current system is immense and complex in regards to its scale and structure, which has fostered Western invocations of Orwell’s 1984 and the notion that China possesses a centralized totalitarian surveillance network. In reality, “there is no such thing as a national ‘social credit score’” (Hornsley 2018). The social credit system is not yet centralized under full CCP control, and remains distributed among an array of local authorities, multinational firms, service providers, and central government apparatuses (Hornsley 2018). Still, as a virtual framework that continues to evolve and expand, it is not unreasonable to consider it possible for the social credit system to eventually resemble Pence’s “Orwellian” nightmare. In examining the social credit system within a wider historical context of systematic censorship and control in China, the system has effectively transplanted a deeper burden of accountability onto Chinese citizens. It is difficult to imagine that citizens will be as eager to voice concerns or criticisms of the government if they know their reputation, mediated by a virtual system, is at stake.

The CCP’s efforts to facilitate the unification of ideological thought among Chinese citizens extends beyond ethnic Han-Chinese to include China’s regional minority populations. The CCP’s repression of the Uyghur Muslim population in Xinjiang is a persisting source of warranted international criticism, as the Chinese government has effectively rendered the region a police
state where homes are raided, religious symbols are banned, and Uyghurs are regularly detained under suspicion of “terrorism” (Miller 2017, 62). In what can be seen as part of a larger effort to consolidate stability and eliminate the threat of endemic uprising, not unlike the treatment of Falun Gong and other “cults,” the CCP has dedicated much of its technological advancements in surveillance and censorship towards China’s ethnic minorities. Xinjiang became the focal point for the eventual nationwide buildup of facial recognition technology, which became “part of the fabric of life in China in 2019” (Feng 2019). Technological advancements have allowed for a system of cross-comparison between different surveillance databases housing information from the hundreds of millions of cameras across China’s cities, indexing people by facial recognition data which can now identify people by ethnicity. While the technology is currently dependent on favorable lighting and weather conditions to render precise facial readings, its accuracy is quickly rising. The proliferation of facial recognition technology in China is used as a “blunt tool of intimidation” (Feng 2019). The fact that many Chinese cities now resemble a virtual panopticon is a powerful force in dissuading citizens from acting out of line, and ensuring the “strengthening of social integrity and cohesion” (Feng 2019). This is perhaps the greatest manifestation of the CCP’s view that there is no distinction between the virtual and the real.

Facial recognition technology, with its ability to discern ethnic identity, has played a significant role in the detention and reeducation of China’s Uyghur population. With the ostensible goal of deradicalizing potential terrorists following years of ethnic unrest and instances of violent conflict, at least 1 million Uyghurs have been detained and sent to prison camps that are officially referred to as vocational-training centers. Detainable offenses include “even the most innocuous” forms of religious piety, such as sporting long beards detectable by surveillance cameras with facial recognition technology (Simonds 2020). In these camps, detainees are subjected to mandatory indoctrination, forcibly compelling them to renounce their culture and religion and assimilate with the Han-Chinese under Chinese Communism. In the wake of international criticism and support from the US House of Representatives for sanctions against Chinese officials, the CCP launched a counteroffensive media campaign through social media, “blistering” editorials, and attacks on the validity of Western journalism to justify Uyghur internment and depict critics as “players in a Western conspiracy” (Buckley & Ramzy 2019). Chinese state-run media reframed detention as “rehabilitation,” repopagated footage of Uyghur militant attacks, and emphasized the return of stability to the region. Meanwhile, expatriate Uyghur activists and former detainees who have described the “numbing, harsh, and brutal” conditions of the facilities describe constant harassment and threats from Chinese authorities (Buckley & Ramzy 2019).
According to David Bandurski, China has also introduced more subtle methods of coercive self-moderation and self-censorship. In 2015, the CCP released a resolution on “the mutual building of a favorable (Internet) environment” with *qi tiao dixian*, or the Seven Base Lines, which stipulate standards of “acceptable online content.” The order in which these standards are listed “clearly define the political priorities of leadership.” Following “laws and regulations,” upholding the “socialist system,” and upholding “China’s national interests” respectively rank 1, 2, and 3. “Information accuracy” sits at the bottom of the list, suggesting that the CCP’s rhetoric of combating “rumors” does not reflect a genuine concern about factual accuracy and truth, but is instead a desire to suppress politically abrasive information and discussion (Bandurski 2013). These baselines have effectively created an unofficial code of conduct for internet use, a standard by which voices and ideas can be judged and evaluated. Furthermore, they suggest that individuals hold a personal responsibility to not only abide by the code of conduct, but to promote and openly advocate the CCP’s values.

The integrity of the CCP’s anti-rumor effort is further dispelled by the fact that they actively promote rampant disinformation across social media platforms. Colloquially known as the “Fifty Cent Party,” based on a rumor that they are paid 50 cents for each post, China has amassed a figurative army of paid posters to inundate Chinese social media sites with pro CCP propaganda. Research conducted at Harvard by Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts (2017) has found that the “50c party” produces an estimated 448 million posts per year. Their findings indicate that the overwhelming majority of the 50c party consists of government employees contributing part time as paid posters outside of their regular jobs. The majority of these posts utilize strategic distraction to disrupt collective action or the airing of grievances by giving the impression that government public support is pervasive and trendy (King, Pan, & Roberts 2017). Essentially, the posts are mostly pro-CCP platitudes, but some are anti-West spam, posted in large quantities to redirect criticism towards the West. The apparent goal here is to denigrate Western ideas and values, as well as to stir up patriotism and pro-Party sentiment by invoking China’s “bloody and tear-stained history” in which Western powers played a large part (Qiang 2011). The 50c party represents an effort to actively mold and shape the climate of Internet discussion itself, rather than just reactively censoring and suppressing it.

The modern culmination of the CCP’s efforts to go on the offensive with Internet censorship is the “Great Cannon,” a term coined by researchers at the University of Toronto to describe “a new tool for censorship” capable of “effectively rewriting the Internet on the fly” (Hern 2015). The Great Cannon is a distinct attack tool, which hijacks traffic to and from individual IP addresses and can replace unencrypted content with malware. This was demonstrated for the
first time in 2015, when the hosting site GitHub was temporarily shut down by a distributed denial of service (DDoS). In this attack, the Great Cannon intercepted web traffic sent to Baidu’s servers (servers run by China’s largest search engine) and, by using malware, was able to enlist unaware web users in redirecting traffic as fabricated content requests to GitHub, overwhelming and shutting down the site’s servers through an immense, concentrated traffic spike. Researchers from the University of Toronto concluded that the origin site of the attack is likely operated by the Chinese government, as it appears to be hosted on the same server and share the same source code used for intercepting communications as the Great Firewall (Hern 2015).

The attack on GitHub was significant as the site hosted pages run by anti-censorship organization GreatFire.org, which contained tools to aid Chinese users in bypassing the Great Firewall. The Great Cannon has also been implicated in DDoS attacks on the New York Times’ Chinese mirror and Mingjingnews.com, most likely in retaliation for promoting Western methods of journalism and for their “historical nihilism.” In late 2019, the Great Cannon was fired at LIHKG, an online forum used by Hong Kong residents to organize protests against the CCP and share stories and evidence of Chinese police brutality. According to LIHKG, the site received “more than 1.5 billion requests per hour” during the attack (Cimpanu 2019). These attacks are markedly distinct from the subversive insulation that previously characterized Chinese censorship, they are clearly visible, high-profile attacks on foreign sources of ideas in opposition to the CCP. In essence, the Great Cannon represents a geopolitical tool as much as it does a device for silencing opposition.

In 2015, the CCP’s leadership, Internet mogul Jack Ma, and the prime ministers of Russia, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan convened in Wuzhen, China for the second annual World Internet Conference. In his keynote address, Xi Jinping declared “We should respect each country’s right to choose their own development path and model of the Internet, and we should respect countries’ rights to participate equally in the public policy making of international cyberspace” (Zeng 2015). Ma later praised Xi’s vision as the “key to future Internet administration” (Zeng 2015). Xi’s notion of national self-determination for Internet policy has been reiterated at each subsequent conference, and serves as both a justification of China’s policies of systematic censorship and a rejection of the value of an open Internet exempt from government interference. Xi has presented this view of non-interference as a model for other countries to emulate. China’s censorship policies have become more aggressive, less insulated, and are now supposedly worthy of emulation by the wider world.

While Xi preaches a principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, there is mounting evidence that this is actually “non-interference with Chinese characteristics”
In October, 2019, the general manager of the Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, tweeted “Fight for freedom, stand with Hong Kong,” leading to a feud between China and the National Basketball Association (NBA) that resulted in NBA games being pulled from Chinese state television. The NBA quickly acted to appease the Chinese government, deleting the offending tweet the same week Apple removed an app used by Hong Kong pro-democracy demonstrators to evade police. Blizzard Entertainment, a videogame company, banned a Hong Kong-based esports gamer for expressing support for the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong. Marriott hotels and United Airlines acquiesced to pressure from Beijing when both recanted from insinuating Taiwan is a separate country (Rachman 2019). Evidently, Xi’s ostensible policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries does not extend to non-interference in the affairs of the international private sector.

Hollywood is perhaps the most visible and pronounced case of Western-based industry willfully self-censoring for the sake of access to the Chinese market. Disney’s 2016 film adaptation of superhero Doctor Strange made notable alterations to its comic book source material, changing Strange’s mentor from a Tibetan monk to a Celtic woman played by Tilda Swinton, avoiding Chinese backlash for any perceived connections to the Tibetan sovereignty dispute. MGM’s 2012 remake of Red Dawn originally depicted China as the titular Communist invaders, but after Chinese state-run media caught wind of this, MGM allegedly spent $1 million digitally editing out any mention of Chinese soldiers and replacing them with North Koreans. China represents a huge market for the international film industry, with Disney making over $1 billion from China’s box office in 2019 alone. As China only allows 34 foreign films to be screened per year, competition among Western movie studios for a spot in Chinese theaters is fierce (Bisset 2019). While it is clear that the Western entertainment industry is adhering to China’s standards primarily for the sake of personal profit, the notion that money ought to be prioritized over anti-censorship principles, and the fact that these films, tailored to the demands of the CCP, are watched and discussed on a global scale, is concerning for its long-term implications in legitimizing Chinese censorship and control.

In the wake of growing public outcry against the encroachment of Chinese censorship in the United States, in early 2020 a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the Preventing Foreign Censorship in America Act – primarily in response to the specific case of Daryl Morey’s pro-democracy Hong Kong tweets. The law is oriented directly towards Beijing and would prohibit any American-based companies from firing employees based on “China-related speech,” which would include topics such as “Hong Kong, the Uyghurs, or any of the Chinese government’s human rights violations” (Rogin 2020). Jim Banks, a bill co-sponsor and Republican
Representative for Indiana, stated “Congress will not stand idly by as China seeks to export its censorship abroad” and that “as long as you’re American or on American soil, you should have the right to free speech” (Rogin 2020). The irony here is that China has facilitated a US turn towards the sort of non-interference, steeped in national self-determination, that Xi has repeatedly espoused at Wuzhen’s World Internet Conference. Further, a US government mandate prohibiting companies from retaliating against employees who criticize China represents a deeper turn towards the CCP’s view of the Internet as a virtual battleground of ideas, where nation-states actively involve themselves and seek to assert their values and strength online. However, while China actions have influenced and molded both the geopolitical climate and attitudes toward the internet, the CCP’s growing litany of transgressions and abuses have resulted in a new highpoint in tensions between China and the United States. Xi’s bid to garner worldwide esteem and legitimacy for a rejuvenated Chinese state have likely been undermined by his own government’s aggressive policies of censorship.

In considering recent events, this is especially true in regards to the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Since emerging in late 2019, the coronavirus has gone from a localized outbreak of pneumonia with an unknown cause in Wuhan, China to a worldwide pandemic that has infected at least 177 countries. With millions of reported cases, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and the majority of the world’s population experiencing varying degrees of government lockdown, the outbreak has become an unprecedented global crisis (Taylor 2020). While early action and international cooperation would have likely stalled the spread of the virus, it has now come to light that the Chinese government opted instead to suppress early reports and even destroy samples of the virus obtained by researchers. As early as December 27, a Guangzhou-based genomics company had sequenced the coronavirus from fluid samples taken from a 65-year-old deliveryman, who worked at the wet market where the coronavirus seems to have emerged. The results revealed a striking resemblance to SARS, prompting alarm and immediate concern a viral outbreak was underway. However, on January 3, China’s National Health Commission ordered research institutions not to publish any information regarding the disease and ordered labs to either destroy their samples or transfer them to government-designated testing sites. The Chinese government continued to downplay the transmissibility of the virus throughout the month of January, as millions began Lunar New Year related travel and festivities. Finally, on January 20 it was announced that the disease was spreading from person-to-person, and two days later Wuhan was placed on lockdown (Denmang, Yuding, et al. 2020).

Not everyone was willing to follow the CCP’s gag-order. Chinese doctor, Li Wenliang, who has since died of COVID-19, was imprisoned by Wuhan police on January 3 for “spreading false
rumors” and “disrupting social order” after posting warnings of a “mysterious virus” rapidly spreading in Wuhan (Yu 2020). News of Li’s death on February 6 drew outrage from the Chinese public, who took to Weibo to voice anger and frustration amidst increasingly severe lockdown procedures. The CCP quickly began censoring posts criticizing the government and calling for public action, but by the time trending topics like “#we want freedom of speech” and “#Wuhan government owes Dr. Li an apology” were deleted, they had cumulatively amassed millions of views. Li was one of at least eight people, all believed to be medical professionals, who have been detained for “spreading rumors” in regards to the coronavirus (Yu 2020). In considering the resultant outrage both abroad and within China, COVID-19 has dealt a significant blow to the legitimacy of the CCP’s tight reign on information. The CCP’s efforts to consolidate societal cohesion and instill trust among Chinese citizens have been irrevocably hampered by the government’s insistence on suppressing information and their lack of appropriate action. It would seem that the coronavirus represents the best chance at the CCP opening up to the oft-vilified western value of free speech and free press.

However, while China’s lack of certain freedoms has drawn warranted criticism for contributing to the spread of the virus, it is by that same illiberal and authoritarian character of the CCP that China’s quarantine procedures have been relatively successful. In a matter of days, the Chinese government locked down multiple cities with populations in the tens of millions, effectively carrying out quarantines that had “never been tried on such an enormous scale” (Graham-Harrison & Kuo 2020). Within hours, Chinese cities shut down public transportation, barred private vehicles from roads without special permission, and closed all schools, universities, and non-essential stores indefinitely. Soon after, quarantine measures were intensified as Chinese authorities began going door to door for personal health checks and forcing anyone ill into isolation. Most buildings became staffed by security guards monitoring the temperatures of anyone coming or going, with residential compounds closed entirely to non-residents. Such methods, which reportedly resulted in the death of a disabled boy left without food or water after his father and brother were forced into isolation, have been described as “brutal, but effective” as China has reported an alleged halt in the rate of domestic transmissions (Graham-Harrison & Kuo 2020). It is difficult to imagine similar measures successfully being implemented in the United States, even as the scale of epidemic has increased dramatically. On this note, political commentator Slavoj Žižek’s statement that “it’s not hard to imagine that large bands of libertarians, bearing arms and suspecting that the quarantine was a state conspiracy, would attempt to fight their way out” seems prescient when regarding the rising unrest and anti-lockdown
protests in the United States, triggered by quarantine measures which pale in comparison to those seen in China (Žižek 2020).

Summarily, a somewhat paradoxical situation has arisen. On one hand, China’s repressive censorship capabilities, which opted to conceal and obscure the existence of the virus, contributed to the spread of disease during what ought to have been a critical time frame of containment. On the other hand, China’s brutal, but effective lockdowns have reasserted the capability of authoritarian governments to forcefully handle public crises more effectively than liberal, open democracies, leaving China, at least reportedly, in a better spot than much of the Western world. The dilemma faced by political leadership, depending on how the pandemic progresses, is one in which criticism of China’s illiberal censorship policies and authoritarian social control may have to be tempered by the realization that China’s model is better suited in dealing with long-term, disruptive crises like COVID-19. If we take the case of the Preventing Foreign Censorship in America Act as an indication of how future events might transpire; outrage and criticism of China’s wrongdoings will spur reactive policies in the name of security and non-interference while paradoxically bringing the U.S. closer to resembling the Chinese model of authority. The idea that the Chinese government, with its labyrinthian censorship network and advanced surveillance technology, which have blurred the distinction between the real and the virtual, may become an inadvertent political role model should worry anyone concerned about the erosion of personal liberty in the Information Age.

China’s adherence to insulating itself and consolidating the values of socialism with Chinese characteristics in opposition to Western influences can be seen as a historical holdover from an older age, which has persisted into the modern day as something tangential to national rejuvenation and a reclamation of Chinese eminence. While recent events, such as the coronavirus outbreak and Chinese censorship scandals in American media and industry, have helped facilitate renewed aggression between China and the United States, the deeper concern in the wake of global crises and public unrest is that China’s model of surveillance, censorship, and societal control will foster similar attitudes in Western governments as political necessities. The world is faced with a great deal of uncertainty, and as the appeal for technologically driven state repression grows in the wake of crisis, it becomes imperative that we begin to seriously consider how individual freedom can survive in a geopolitical climate increasingly geared toward censorship and control.
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Perpetual Neglect: An insight into the implications of a forgotten and neglected historic black cemetery.

Nardos E. Iyob

Abstract

Evergreen Cemetery in Richmond, Virginia’s East End neighborhood serves as a relic of sacred black space and history in Richmond as it is a resting place for the City’s historic black elite, including Maggie Walker and John Mitchell. However, in its current state the cemetery has become a haven for heightened amounts of trespassing, illegal alcohol consumption, littering, and vandalism. This has created immense challenges in its upkeep, and the lack of development provided to its surrounding area signals that it is a space viewed as profane, therefore disposable to the City. This plays a larger part in the contemporary development in Richmond. This viewpoint prevents spaces like these from proliferating by using the condemnation strategically and also deeming these spaces disposable because of crime, poverty, lack of upkeep, etc. It also leads the populations residing in these areas to be vulnerable to the wrath of this view, but also susceptible to over-policing, increased surveillance, etc. By exploring what the continuous desecration has done to Evergreen Cemetery communicates about the larger regard for sacred black spaces within the community, this project seeks to comprehend what this transition conveys about the larger struggles faced by sacred black spaces, and how this case illustrates a larger pattern of ignorance and mistreatment of black spaces.

Perpetual Neglect: An insight into the implications of a forgotten and neglected historic black cemetery

It may come as no surprise that if one were to stroll through the historic Jackson Ward in Richmond, Virginia, one would be exposed to a grave number of buildings with shuttered windows and empty storefronts. During a large portion of the City’s post-Civil War history, Richmond served as the backdrop for an emerging black elite that made great contributions to African American history, including Maggie L. Walker, John Mitchell Jr., and John Andrew Bowler. Despite the segregated atmosphere and being located in the former capital of the Confederacy, black people in Richmond flourished in a setting that was not carved out for such accomplishments (Belsches, 2014). Walker, who has been dead since 1934, is buried at Evergreen Cemetery, which was once an esteemed black cemetery for Richmond’s respectable black population.
Upon arrival at the cemetery, located in the city’s East End neighborhood, visitors are met with overgrowth from large trees and vines almost impeding the narrow and desolate roadway that leads past another black cemetery, the East End Cemetery. With overturned graves, a mausoleum that has been broken into several times, trash everywhere, and a recycling plant as its next door neighbor, the questionable presentation could leave a visitor wondering if they had put the wrong address into their GPS. Alas, that is not the case; the scene in disarray at Evergreen stands as a signifier of the endured treatment of black people and the spaces in which they existed for much of the city’s history.

On any given day, one could collect a myriad of archaic beer bottles and cans, tires, and condom wrappers, amongst the many other items that are dumped in the cemetery on a consistent basis. This fact was noted by the former historian for the site, Ted Marris Wolf, who participated in weekly clean-ups of the site since its acquisition in 2017 (Wolf, 2018). He also argued that the presence of such interesting trash tells its own story of the site, a story of a space that has served as the final resting place for many and setting for ritualistic practices in the black, Southern, Baptist community, has yet existed in disrepair and been subject to desecration for the majority of its existence (Wolf, 2018). In response to this, I intend to explore the significance of consistent degradation in the cemetery. Furthering my inquiry, I would like to explore whether the significance and the sanctity of the cemetery has been impacted since it was left to withstand the test of time by its previous owners. I plan to further validate the importance of Evergreen, not only as a city landmark for black space, but as a sacred black resting space whose treatment and upkeep is one that reflects on the perceptions of it throughout the City. Using supporting literature and a theoretical framework developed to support the space’s validity as a sacred black space, this project sought to answer the following inquiry: what does the continuous desecration of Evergreen Cemetery communicate about the larger regard for sacred black spaces within the community?

**Literature Review**

Richmond is historically and somewhat currently a “Chocolate City” (Clinton et al., 1975), which indicates that a majority of the population is black. Though a Chocolate City, Richmond has also seen a massive effort to revitalize the city by current and past City officials, which has also signified a displacement of the group with little benefit to them. In 2010, Richmond’s population was 51% black whereas the Census estimates that in 2020 the black population will make up 47.8% of the City’s population (US Census Bureau, 2020). In the past decade Richmond has seen a change in demographics, as well as a move to redevelop many of the City's unkempt and
bhifted areas to stimulate the City’s economy via hospitality, tourism, and larger institutions like Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). However, it appears that many of the spaces that the city seeks to redevelop are those occupied by or existing in the remaining black majority areas of the city. Such plans have been further complicated by the lack of beneficial opportunities these developments bring to the residents that occupy these spaces. One was a $1.5 billion plan to build a new stadium, retail spaces, a building for VCU, and affordable housing in Navy Hill, a historically black neighborhood that was disparaged by the construction of Interstate-95 in 1965 (Kollatz, 2019). The project became the center of controversy until it was voted down by the Richmond City Council, citing the lack of beneficial opportunities for residents (Meagher, 2020).

Evergreen Cemetery is a relic of a long and tumultuous relationship between Richmond and its black community, and visibly tells a tale of urban neglect. It is nestled in Richmond’s East End neighborhood, which is home to four of the city’s six housing projects, originally developed as “negro housing projects” (Holmberg, 2017). Nearby are two other cemeteries, Oakwood and East End. Oakwood is primarily known for the large number of white Confederate soldiers from the Civil War that are buried there (Hodges). In the same breath, there are some contested spaces within the cemetery that have been noted to be the unmarked graves of black confederate soldiers, probably because they were buried atop of. However, current maps of Oakwood do not confirm the existence of these graves; some do argue that they may even be in Evergreen’s current site (Hodges). Oakwood experienced its own period of deterioration as it became clear that some of its earliest burials, consisting of poor whites and freed black paupers, could not be located due to the overgrowth of plant life in the older sections of the cemetery (Huffstutler, 2014). While the reasons as to why these graves have gone unrecognized are questionable, the case could be made that they are reflective of the disposable label attached to black people, dead or alive. The value of black bodies in this space are not only shown to be disposable to Richmond’s spatial imaginary, but also become invisible as time passes. George Lipsitz (2007) explains racial spatial imaginaries as, “the lived experience of race has a spatial dimension, and the lived experience of space has a racial dimension...The racial demography of the places where people live, work, play, shop, and travel exposes them to a socially-shared system of exclusion and inclusion” (p.12). In this article, the term spatial imaginary will be used to identify the intersection in which race, space, and geography impact how people perceive and interact with each other and the spaces they occupy. For instance, when referring to the Richmond spatial imaginary, I am speaking on the ways in which the city comprehends space, race, and geography into its policies for its residents.
Another case in which this trend plays out is the uncovering of a massive African burial ground underneath the site of the former World Trade Center in New York City during the construction of the new One World Trade Center (Frohne, 2008, p.7). It required the work of scholars to validate the space as one important enough to even be allowed to collect and analyze remains from the site before the plans for construction continued.

The disposability of East End is not only evident in the people who occupy it, or even its upkeep, but also in its setting as a center of gentrification. The neighborhood has served as a central location for state sanctioned abuses, including the complete destruction of the entire neighborhood of Fulton Hill (Lombard, 2015). Home to institutions such as a courthouse, the city jail, and the city’s housing projects, the East End can be characterized as a setting for the city’s neglect. It is imperative to point out this also serves as an example of the discord in perception of safety between different spatial imaginaries that exist within the city. While the City’s spatial imaginary may understand the proximity of said institutions to East End residents as signifying a commitment to protecting its constituents, the East End spatial imaginary could see it as another effort to heighten surveillance and police presence in the community. This leads to the disenfranchised residents being condemned for their upkeep of the space prior to the arrival of this demographic, facing the risk of being pushed out of their own spaces. Rachel Sarabia (2013) argues that there is a culture of poverty that develops to the subjection of it, and that it remains in the space regardless of class mobility (p.15). Laura Kern looks at the glorification of ‘dirtiness’ of spaces undergoing elements of gentrification and how its previously stigmatized past is used as a tool to appeal to newer residents. This occurs under the guise of reworking the physical environment in these spaces but plays out in terms dictated by the white spatial imaginary values and norms (Kern, 2015, p.69). When discussing future plans, the site’s historian was adamant that they were considering building a yoga studio and a coffee shop on the site to enhance visitor experience (Wolf, 2018). This means that renovation can change the way the city views the space, not only pushing the white spatial imaginary into a black space, but also furthering the possibility of the space serving as another example of gentrification, which increases the disposability of the history and the graves in Evergreen.

Theoretical Framework

In further investigation, it is imperative to understand that Richmond was a chocolate city, or a city with a majority black population, that has been experiencing gentrification at an exponential rate which could provide insight in how to effectively navigate the issue of Evergreen (Lombard, 2015). Before delving into the semantics of what gentrification in Richmond looks like,
the significance of the presence of a chocolate city must be addressed. Chocolate City is the name of a 1975 album and song by the largely known funk band, Parliament. The song-turned-term was initially an homage to Washington D.C. and the dominant black culture that arose from its majority population at the time. The song reimagines the nation’s capital and institutions to be accessible to its surrounding residents, “They still call it the White House, but that’s a temporary condition too” (Clinton, et al., 1975). George Lipsitz (2007) uses his framework to identify the differences between “white spatial imaginary” and “black spatial imaginary,” which arise out of the performance of race in defining space (p.11). White spatial imaginary, which encompasses contemporary Western norms and social mores, values, and ideals, also further polarizes the spatial imaginaries of those who have traditionally and historically not found this to be accessible due to collective and communal values taking precedence. These values and ideals are favorable to the capitalist economic system, so it is reasonable to both argue that such ideals are also at the root of what success and development are and to condemn the practices and ideals that do not fit into the mold of the capitalist system. This condemnation also paves a way for spaces that do not adhere to the goals of the white spatial imaginary to create a system of sacred and profane (Lipsitz, 2007, p.15). Lipsitz’s argument about privileged geographies provides an ample means of examining the changes undergone in Richmond since the creation of Evergreen Cemetery to this present day.

When looking at Richmond during the years that it was an identifiably black city, whether it be through population demographics or flourishing Black culture that permeated the city from the Reconstruction to the current period, parts of the city did satisfy many of the economic ideals of the white spatial imaginaries. Richmond was home to a once booming Black Wall Street in the predominantly black neighborhood Jackson Ward; this is where Maggie Walker became the first woman to start her own bank, opening up St. Luke’s Penny Saving Bank (Campbell, 2016). This was in response to the fact that black people in the city were oftentimes barred from opening up accounts and securing loans from other banks in the city. St. Luke’s and the once flourishing Black Wall Street are no longer present in Jackson Ward; instead, they are replaced by Interstate 95 that cuts through the entire neighborhood and displaces much of the population that once occupied this space. This demonstrates how black bodies and spaces are constantly at risk of being taken advantage of.

This idea of disposability is one that I would like to expand on, in congruence with the Lipsitz theory of geographical privilege to illustrate the current condition of Evergreen Cemetery and the way that the city deals with its black population. Seeing Richmond’s black community and the different spaces that it occupies through a lens of disposability is just a response to the
desecration and dismantling that has occurred in the past. The case is even stronger when looking at the issue and taking the changing demographics within the city into account. Lori D. Patton and LaWanda W. Ward (2016) identified and argued this definition of disposability to make the case for the lack of media attention to missing black women in their piece, *Missing Black Undergraduate Women and the Politics of Disposability: A Critical Race Feminist Perspective*. They found that it was common for the stories of missing black women to go unacknowledged by the media, while the stories of missing white women like Natalie Holloway and Laci Peterson were picked up by the national media and became household names as they were followed by major news networks. Patton and Ward argued that race, class, and gender play a part in the lack of visibility from media and other avenues and lack of resources provided through legal avenues in seeing these matters through to resolution; at one point they went as far as to argue that many of the silenced victims are seen as deserving because of assumed narratives of black female criminality and sexuality (Patton & Ward, 2016, p.330-31). The idea that people and institutions, like the legal system and media, operate on these assumptions of traditional conceptions of black people, in general, are harmful, yet they are what contribute heavily to deeming such populations as disposable. It is important to note that this is not simply limited to this case study, but transmissible in most aspects of everyday life as a black American; it also serves as a valuable lens in examining the possible sexwork that occurs—could have occurred at Evergreen Cemetery. While Patton and Ward’s analysis provided a critical race feminist framework to examine the disposability of their population, I would argue that their work in combination with the aforementioned spatial theories from Lipsitz provide for a solid basis in inquiring further into the meaning of the desecration of Evergreen and what it signals for its surrounding community.

**Methodology**

The issue was then explored using a mixed methods approach that employed: field observations of Evergreen Cemetery completed between February 2018 and March 2020, a contextual analysis of photos taken at the cemetery taken from 2016 through 2018, and an oral history conducted with Kelly Pratt and James Shadoian, who are part of the cemetery’s staff. As the combination of methods to examine this issue is diverse, each method serves a purpose to adequately illustrate the extent to which Evergreen has been neglected and the larger implications that arise as it is a memorialization of black space in a city.

The first stakeholders in the examination of Evergreen’s presence are its owners, the EnRichmond Foundation. EnRichmond relies heavily on a committed volunteer presence that assists during the weekly cleanups at the cemetery, therefore the volunteers fall into this grouping,
as well. This group is the most crucial to the well-being of the cemetery as they are also on the frontlines of its restoration and assist in reinforcing the sanctity of the space (EnRichmond, 2020). The next group is the governing infrastructure of the city and even the state of Virginia. The Virginia state government has been financially involved in the cemetery’s restoration process after years of lobbying to receive the same funding that Confederate memorials do throughout the state (Schneider, 2017). To clarify, this group is inclusive of the Richmond City Police Force, the Richmond city government, and the state government, which is also based in Richmond. These individuals possess powers to produce and enforce laws that pertain to protecting the cemetery, as well as the power to validate its significance. Another group that has also been deemed integral in understanding the regard for Evergreen is the city population. This category includes residents that live in the East End, which has a notable concentration of the city’s black residents (Mitchell, 2019), as well as the residents from other parts of the city and surrounding counties. This category is also inclusive of local businesses and institutions, as there are three major universities that are based in the city who have also had encounters with the cemetery in its restoration effort. This category is essential to decoding what significance the cemetery holds to them, as well as gauging the significance of other black spaces throughout the city. The last group of stakeholders in this examination of Evergreen are the descendants of the individuals buried at the cemetery, as they serve as a form of representation to the thousands of individuals that are buried in the cemetery. Including this group is necessary to comprehend if and how they interact with the space and whether it validates its sanctity and significance as a black space.

Initially, this project aimed to use the damaged state of Evergreen to explain the city’s relationship with black space through utilizing field observations. However, from the time that this project began in the spring of 2018 to the present, the early months of 2020, the cemetery has undergone extensive weekly clean-ups that required a more expansive lens in exploring the issue and effectively capturing the data, thus the mixed methods approach. During the three years that observations were conducted, Evergreen had undergone a transition of 60 acres of overgrowth due to many previously lost graves being uncovered and cleaned. The field observations were conducted over the course of three visits made to Evergreen Cemetery, one in 2018, and two more in January and February of 2020. The visits lasted about 2 hours and aimed to explore what the cemetery’s desecration looked like and how it could be contextualized in the existing narrative regarding the cemetery’s significance. During the visits, I looked at any apparent trash that was near or around grave sites, including the two trash bins that were made recently available by EnRichmond. I sought to find out what type of trash was being left at the cemetery, what type of activity the trash indicated, how old it was, where it was left, and whether there were any indicators
as to who left the trash. These questions exist to categorize the desecration as to whether it was intentional or unintentional, as understanding this could build the narrative of how certain stakeholders view the cemetery and what value it holds in their own spatial imaginaries.

In lieu of Evergreen’s cleanup, the initial methodology needed to evolve to be able to capture the issue of continuous desecration occurring in the cemetery despite the weekly cleanups. To capture the timeframe in which this project was not actively being tended to, field observations and an interview were not enough to solidify the claim of continuous desecration in the years that the cemetery was under new ownership. Upon examining the issue further, it appeared that along with weekly cleanups, the new ownership of the cemetery introduced more visual representation of the cemetery digitally through posts on social media platforms and through a new website for the cemetery. This led to the development of the third leg of the data collection plan that aimed to examine the cemetery’s digital presence and whether the physical desecration that was being done to the cemetery was equally part of its online presence. In the early stages of this project, a simple Google search helped me realize that these photos could serve as formal and informal documentation of the significance that the cemetery held amongst those who frequent it. The photos of Evergreen on social media websites like Instagram and Flickr inadvertently had the power to communicate the purpose the cemetery served to them, which is portrayed by the photos that they posted of it. In response, I developed a secondary analysis to examine 25 photographs and any comments posted on Instagram and Flickr to understand how stakeholders portrayed any interactions with the cemetery. I evaluated the photos to gauge several things: what the photo showed, what the perceivable purpose of the photo and their visit was, and whether or not their photo detailed or highlighted any forms of desecration.

While it was feasible that the previously outlined methods would be able to illustrate a short-sighted view of desecration occurring at the cemetery, it was difficult to gauge the factors that resulted in the cemetery’s current condition. It was clear that there was as a gaping hole in the portrayal of the cemetery through the literature review and any preliminary research of the cemetery, that its significance was affirmed through those who recognized it, and many of the current sources that understand its original purpose are also those who are on the frontlines of the Evergreen’s restoration effort. In turn, the lack of current findings inadvertently determined it was necessary to conduct an oral history with a representative of the cemetery. Hence, I reached out to the EnRichmond Foundation and was connected with Kelly Pratt, who serves as Evergreen’s Family Services Consultant, and scheduled an interview with her at the cemetery, a modified version of the transcript of this interview can be found in the Appendix. In addition, I have
created a timeline using the photos from social media used in the secondary analysis to accompany the results, which can be accessed here.

**Results**

Despite Evergreen holding a presence throughout the literature as a sacred space in need of perpetual repair and maintenance, nothing can prepare one for the actual sight of disrepair the results indicate. There are piles of trash that have been disposed of, there is only one mausoleum in the cemetery which has been sealed after having been broken into several times throughout the past 20 years, broken headstones and metal grave markers blown far away from the graves they were intended to signify. It must be noted that while the space serves different purposes to different stakeholders, the data indicates that despite being the historical black cemetery, it is rarely treated as such by most of its stakeholders, except its owners, the volunteers who are part of the restoration effort, and a select few of the visitors. The last burial occurred in 2017 during the purchase of the site (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). However the space has been used in ways that are contrary to its original purpose. Along the lines drawn out by the theoretical framework, the space as a manifestation of the black spatial imaginary has been destroyed and impeded upon, while also watching social capital diminish in a way that in comparison to white cemeteries who contain historical figures have not. This cemetery has instead become a space where surrounding residents consistently enter to dump a variety of trash and a hotspot for trespassers and visitors who vandalize the space in a manner that is detrimental to its current renovation effort (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020).

In response to the original research question, the results of the field observations, the secondary analysis, and the oral history have constructed a complex narrative of sacred space in Richmond’s history. The results are displayed in a thematic order to fully contextualize the narrative; all themes answer the original inquiry that gauges what the continuous desecration being done to Evergreen communicates about the City’s regard for its value as a revered space.

**Sacred v.s. Profane**

When addressing the sanctity of Evergreen, it must first be noted that death in the black community, specifically in the black, Southern, baptist, community, is regarded in a ritualistic and former manner. The black, Southern, baptist is a culture founded in the lived experiences of slaves, places a large value on the role of ancestral guidance and intervention. When a person dies in the black community, they are given a “homegoing” rather than a funeral and once they have received the proper burial they are believed to reunite with ancestors and continue to the
afterlife (Mcilwain 2001). Evergreen, though a nondenominational cemetery, served as the resting place for an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 people, many of which were believed to go on to reunite with their forefathers (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). Within the black spatial imaginary, this space is valued to be a landmark achievement in one’s life as they pass to the next dimension. “After the soul has passed, another commonplace ritual is to visit the dead, clean up their graves, and to bring ancestral offerings as a means of ensuring that they are still in your thoughts,” (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). The levels to which profanity permeates the cemetery’s physical and digital presence ranges from small actions such as leaving non-biodegradable offerings to the dead that eventually become the litter scattered throughout the cemetery to aggressive actions, such as stealing and misplacing gravestones, which has been a recurring activity that is said to have happened throughout the years.

Evergreen’s sanctity is also validated through a continuous effort on the part of certain stakeholders, such as concerned visitors, locals, and the EnRichmond Foundation, who acknowledge the multilateral value of the space and consistently work to revive the space. This was especially apparent in conducting the secondary analysis. The majority of the photos were taken in desecrated parts of the cemetery and were often of recently uncovered trash and graves. These photos were obtained from an organization called Friends of East End Cemetery, whose work primarily focused on the restoration of the neighboring East End cemetery and often collaborated with EnRichmond in clean ups and research. During the interview, Pratt was adamant that despite the cemetery’s disregarded history, it holds many lessons that prove the restoration effort to be worthwhile work. “I think the more press that we get, the more positive images that are put out there, the more people will see yes, there’s work to do, but it’s not half as bad as it used to be” (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). While the restoration effort is small, it serves as a powerful force in relaying the significance and intended purpose of the space as sacred black space.

Despite the continuous effort to restore the cemetery to its original state, it has become clear that the purpose of the cemetery must be restored alongside the space itself. Evergreen has become a host to more than its own memorialization, as many visitors visit to use it in a manner beyond its original purpose, often in a profane manner. While the data sought to examine all representations of the cemetery, it was more than often that the data indicated some atypical activity that occurred within the space. Whether it be the amalgamation of the cemetery with the plant life of the cemetery or sexwork that has been noted to occur here, there is a narrative of disregard and carelessness for the Evergreen’s significance.
Prevalence of Criminal Activity

Several pieces of data have indicated that many of the profane and unsolicited activities that occur on the cemetery’s grounds cross into the realm of criminal activity. In an effort to quell this type of activity, the cemetery’s ownership under EnRichmond has introduced cameras throughout the cemetery, signs that warn trespassers that they are under surveillance, as well as a somewhat active police presence that drives through the area twice a day. My photographic observations (Appendix), indicated that the notable instances that illustrate criminal activity revolved around alcohol consumption on the premises and widespread littering. When visiting Evergreen, it is not uncommon to come upon a large pile of retired items such as toilets, hubcaps, and pieces of mattresses strewn about, mentioned in an interview (Appendix) with Kelly Pratt. Despite the precautions set to combat such activity, it still occurs frequently with little assistance from the police force that is tasked with preventing it (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). Visitors still perceive the space disposable, as many choose to use it as a dumping ground or a discreet environment in which they can congregate and consume alcohol. These findings indicate a larger issue that has been difficult to solve, despite the successful weekly cleanups.

The Braxton Mausoleum

One of the most vulnerable spaces in the cemetery, the Braxton Mausoleum has been the repeated victim of such atrocities. The mausoleum is the only one of its kind in this cemetery and was built to memorialize the Braxton family, a family that has been in Richmond since the Civil War era. In the past 20 years, the mausoleum has repeatedly been broken into, even after sealing its entrance shut twice. In one instance the caskets were opened and had items stolen from inside, disturbing the remains of the buried individuals. Photos used in the secondary analysis depicted the caskets remained opened, with the bones of Braxton family members strewn throughout the mausoleum until it was sealed. Pratt indicated that the mausoleum was broken into again and served as the setting for a music video for a local band (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). During my secondary analysis I included a photo posted on Instagram of a man at the cemetery, along with the caption, “BTS [behind the scenes] @bewareofbat vid shoot #bewareofthebat.” On Youtube, I found a music video from the band, BAT, that was set inside of the Braxton mausoleum. This music video was instrumental in establishing a timeline of desecration that could be traced through the methodology. In adherence to the theoretical framework laid out, this instance validates that the band’s spatial imaginary did not seem to recognize the value of the Mausoleum, or the cemetery.
Desolate v.s. Robust in Livelihood

Evergreen, though privately owned for most of its existence, experienced bouts of distinguishable activity and visits, yet still remains a space that is hidden in Richmond’s landscape. In the oral history interview, it was explained to me that aerial photos taken of the cemetery recently indicate that Evergreen began experiencing an increase in environmental overgrowth of trees and plant life during the 1930s, which has essentially continued until the present day (K. Pratt, personal communication, February 27, 2020). In a continuing effort to restore and identify the multitude of missing graves in the cemetery, consolidating the environmental overgrowth is one of the biggest challenges that has been posed to this effort, as the overgrowth has been a factor as to why there are so many missing or unidentifiable graves in the cemetery. The flourishing flora and fauna in the cemetery have also attracted an interesting subset of visitors to the cemetery to take advantage of the benefits of a thriving and undisturbed ecosystem; “we’ve had hunters recently come out” (J. Shadoian, personal communication, February 27, 2020).

In the years since Evergreen’s purchase, a large part of EnRichmond’s restoration project has focused on recovering graves that have been overturned or hidden by the flora. Trees have been determined to be a major issue in the clean up, as they are intrusive, difficult to remove, and have grown through many graves. The foundation has created a solution to this situation that works to the advantage of the restoration project. Larger trees are kept because they produce enough carbon dioxide to sell to the city as carbon credits; this serves as a profitable measure for which EnRichmond obtains funding to continue the restoration project. These carbon credits are sought out by businesses who, in an effort to offset their industry’s carbon emissions into the atmosphere, purchase these credits to balance out emission limits. Pratt and Shadoian explained that the carbon credits provide critical funding that supports the cemetery’s restoration effort (City Credits, 2020). Evergreen being underfunded heightens the disposability of the space. The overflow of desecrated and missing graves of an estimated thousands of bodies laid to rest cannot only be explained through the unresponsiveness and indifference of the generations that survive those who rest at Evergreen.

Discussion

Despite the continual efforts of EnRichmond, its collaborators, and its volunteer force, it remains that they are outnumbered in validating the sanctity of the space, letting it drive their effort, and ensuring that this is known. While the space itself serves a myriad of purposes to its stakeholders, the significance and history that is ingrained into the space does not appear to be
a guiding factor for the ways in which they choose to interact with the space. As indicated in the results, the degree to which the cemetery has been desecrated does not seem to keep locals from continuing to deface the cemetery. It is the case that Evergreen is actively denied a commitment to its upkeep that other rich historical landmarks in the city recieve. By mainly using its own limited resources, EnRichmond has managed a strong and successful effort to renew the cemetery to a state in which it can serve as an educational space to showcase elements such as the history ladden into the soil, a flourishing ecosystem full of plant and animal life, and a memorial for thousands of individuals.

During the years in which this project was conducted, the cemetery has seen a monumental improvement in the physical landscape and gained national attention for its still alarming state of disrepair. It continues to be a space in which locals feel comfortable enough to continue desecrating the space and using it in ways that are a detriment to its significance. While the findings of this project are nonetheless surprising and fascinating, it was disheartening to see that significant stakeholders refuse to acknowledge the purpose of the space as well as the effort being put into restoring it, while many of the instances portrayed tell a story of misuse of an important space, and many of the other instances reinforce the cemetery’s lack of purpose in the lens of the white spatial imaginary.

The fact that Evergreen is private meant that it provided some sort of safety from a police presence in an already over-policed area of the city; this has changed as the police have been called on to dissipate the amount of profane activity occurring in the space. However it doesn’t seem to be making a difference, as it is clear that residents who use the space for purposes outside of its intended use will continue to do so and not get caught for it. It is important to note that there are implications in trying to move forward without properly acknowledging the impact of a police presence in a black space that exists in a predominantly black part of the city. According to the theoretical framework, it heightens the reign of the white spatial imaginary while devaluing the sanctity that is prominent in the black spatial imaginary’s visualization of Evergreen. If the sanctity of this space and the people who understand its value continue to be denied visibility and humanity in the manner of this black space, not only will they be disposed of in a manner likened to the disposability of the black spatial imaginary, it would also a fuel a larger situation of a problematic memorialization of a black space within an area already weakened by the white spatial imaginary.

Evergreen’s continued existence is very important for a slew of reasons, and one that I hope was successfully discussed throughout this piece is that it serves as a vital relic of black prosperity in an environment that seems to actively disagree. It is my hope that the reader has
been able to understand the significant plights in which this historic memorial has endured and still faces to continue to serve as a memorial for black people and the spaces that they occupy in a city known for its oppressive history. As it has been pointed out, Richmond is no longer the “Chocolate City” it once was, but it still chooses to foster a passively strained relationship with its black population.

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APPENDIX

Photographic Observations

*Photos of desecrated sections of Evergreen Cemetery from observations conducted between 2018 through 2020.*

*Note.* Photos are in order of when they were first observed (Iyob 2020).
Interview Transcript

*Excerpt from the transcript of an interview with Kelly Pratt, Family Services Consultant at the EnRichmond Foundation.*

Pratt 1:46
You can see there's all kinds of burials back there. And then we have like this empty spot. And then we have this pile of markers. So theoretically, these markers are supposed to be spread out. And there's probably, you know, 30 or 40, more somewhere that are missing. So these are markers. So it looks like trash, right? But it's actually not. This was here when I started volunteering And it stayed here because we have yet to log any of the information there. As you can see, there's random names and dates and whatever, we just have to kind of have to dig through it and figure out what's what, right. But that's kind of what happens out here. Like a lot of times, especially the more recent burials were for people who couldn’t afford some of the nicer spaces at the time. And so they also couldn't afford headstones, so this is what they were given. And these don't last very long. I mean, their standard kind of across all the cemeteries, but after, you know, sometimes after a couple years, but they’re I think they’re made to last about 10 or 11 years. Just nature tears them up, lawnmowers tear them up, animals ,you know people riding their bikes, folks still drive their cars through here. Unfortunately.

Iyob 3:15
I mean it's not even a road to be driven on.

Pratt 3:25
Some days I'll come out and you can see where people have done donuts, in the grass here on the burials. It's very unfortunate but all of these things lead to this mess we have here.

Iyob 4:08
Has there been a decrease in the trash being left decrease since the increase in cleanups?

Pratt 4:15
Well we still have people dumping. Right when you came in at the entrance, I don't know if you noticed when you go around the curb, to the left , there is a ladder that has been left back there. It just happened in the past month or so. People still dump. I mean, we catch them on camera, we take the license plates and send it to the police but it doesn’t really stop people. Just this
month we had a guy come out and clean his car. He dumped all kinds of ash and stuff on the ground. He was like, “Oh, I do it all the time, it’s not a big deal.” It is a big deal.

Iyob 5:03
Do you think that it has to do with the recycling center that’s over here [next door]?  

Pratt 5:10
I don’t think it is directly related, right? In general, we’ve got, I don’t know, three or four African American cemeteries in Richmond. Well, more than that are currently undergoing cleanup. And those cemeteries are not all near the recycling center, and they still get dumped in. So I don’t think it’s that. We do get a lot of trash that kind of gets caught in between our place and theirs’.

Iyob 5:51
So what is the type of trash that you’re finding?

Pratt 5:52
In this area, the trash is for the most part built into the ground. We do find lots and lots of bottles.

Iyob 6:20
That’s also something that I noticed when I was here last. I’ve noticed a lot of alcohol bottles.

Pratt 6:27
Absolutely, a lot of alcohol bottles. Occasionally I’ve seen one or two really nice wine bottles, like cool designs on them and stuff. Okay, I plan on saving some of those and like posting the pictures online for people like you who like to do research.

Pratt 7:32
You see these metal scraps are leftovers from the wreaths. We get a lot of metal trash just from what people leave on site at the burials.

Iyob 8:13
How do you feel this plays into the desecration? Do you think that people [visitors] just don’t have any respect for this space, or do they acknowledge this is a very important space.
Pratt 8:28
I think there's multiple things happening here. On one hand, because it has been kind of neglected for so long. I think there are people who don't realize it's a cemetery, because there are areas that are really overgrown, you can't see the graves and there are areas where there are no graves. They've all been destroyed or they were paupers, and couldn't afford anything. So people do drive and dump in those areas, not realizing it's a cemetery. But we do also have the people I know who've been doing it for decades. And continue to do it. So I think we have both.

Iyob 9:06
There are dumpsters. I mean, there's like a big dumpster over there [at the entrance of the cemetery]. Why do people decide to drive in here?

Pratt 9:16
In the woods, there are dumping areas where people would bring bathtubs, toilets and refrigerators. Those are things that are supposed to be disposed of in a certain way. So just dumping them in a dumpster is not advisable, especially for refrigerators because they have chemicals. And also, a lot of people don't realize that there's dumpsters up here. Because they're the only dumpsters we have on site and this is 60 acres of land. So if you come in at the bottom section, there's no dumpster right there. It's just woods. But I mean, they're not open to the public to bring their trash.

Iyob 9:57
Where do you think that like, they get the idea [to dump], besides there being woods. I mean [there are many woods] that you could go to dump your toilet in. Why a cemetery?

Pratt 10:20
I don't have any facts. All I have is my thoughts on it.

Iyob 10:25
Please share anything, any of your thoughts out of your experience, because you have been here for two years. So you've seen quite a lot.
Pratt 10:32
Personally, I feel like this whole space has been disrespected in many ways. From the recycling plant, built next door, no other cemetery in the city has this noise volume that we have here. This is our newer section, So people still come here to grieve and mourn but you have that [the loud noise coming from the recycling plant next door] happening in the background. And some days, it's so loud, me and my co-workers try to talk and we can't even hear each other because it's so loud. So, you know, I feel like maybe the company maybe they didn't purposely do that. I feel like there's an unconscious thing going on here, where it's allowed. Personally, I feel like the city and all of these other people who deal with zoning shouldn't allow these things to be built around cemeteries. We have the Henrico Wastewater Treatment Plant back here. There's like a little hum you can hear on days when it's working in this area, and you can also smell the wastewater.
Latin American politics in the last century have shown just how powerful social movement-based parties can be. Santiago Anria’s book, *When Movements Become Parties: The Bolivian MAS in Comparative Perspective* focuses on Bolivia’s “Movement Towards Socialism” (MAS) to examine and argue that movement-based parties do not evolve into oligarchies run by elitists. Published in 2019, the evidence presented is not only historical in nature but also offers timely and relevant new data.

Anria’s driving question seems to be a simple one: how do movement-based parties overcome a hierarchical structure and remain accountable to the cause by not turning into an oligarchy? He argues that the link between social movements and civic organizations as developed by the MAS, in combination with an emphasis on grassroots efforts and minimal bureaucratization, led to the party developing a pattern of organization resistant to change. Essentially, a weak form of “path dependence” and the implementation of a bottom-down organization structure stops an oligarchy from evolving. This assertion was proven successfully utilizing a comparative within-case analysis of the Bolivian MAS.

Anria’s analysis demonstrated that the more control given to the grassroots of a movement, the greater ability and power they had to impose and influence. Specially power around the elections of party-aligned political candidates and political issues and policies to be reviewed and decided upon. The subnational analysis of the candidate selection in various Bolivian districts and among different electoral levels concluded that locations with strong MAS ties, there was more influence by its residents, whereas locations with weak ties were subject to the choices of the political and economic elite. The same study also highlighted that the better the ability to mobilize, the better political leverage grass-roots groups and movements had. These two major findings supported Anria’s initial hypothesis successfully.

Despite completing an in-depth case study, there is not enough evidence that would allow researchers to make broad generalizations about path dependence and bottom-down structs in regard to social movements. While case studies are necessary pathways of research and have findings that merit consideration, unless the same analyses are run on other social movements, there is no way to know is MAS’s success is related to its organizational structure or luck. Anria includes an
infographic of 12 other movement-based parties but glosses over them with minimal to no explanation other than to state that there are historical examples of social movements that then became parties. Any of those examples, particularly those that took place in Central and South America should be explored further and could likely serve to support the conclusionary findings of his original MAS analysis.

Although the findings may seem insignificant, in countries where unpaid voices are rarely heard, grass-root parties are not only influential, but crucial to democracy. While Anria’s analysis was successful, the methodical process could be greatly improved if additional case-studies of Latin American movements were reviewed. For an even greater understanding of “path dependence”, multicontinental exploration is ideal.