2021

Ramerican Political Science Review (Vol. 6, 2021)

THE RAMERICAN



WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS TO BE SELF-EVIDENT,
THAT ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL.
THAT TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS,
GOVERNMENTS ARE INSTITUTED AMONG MEN,
DERIVING THEIR JUST POWERS
FROM THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED

WHENEVER ANY FORM OF GOVERNMENT BECOMES DESTRUCTIVE
OF THESE ENDS, IT IS THE RIGHT, IT IS THE DUTY, OF THE PEOPLE
TO ALTER OR TO ABOLISH IT ,
AND TO INSTITUTE NEW GOVERNMENT.

SIXTH EDITION

2021

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

The Department of Political Science at Virginia Commonwealth University is proud to present Volume 6 of *The Ramerican Political Science Review*. This journal presents some of the best undergraduate work produced by students at VCU during the 2020-2021 academic year.

While the journal is supported by the Department of Political Science, the final product is the work of a student editorial board that solicits and reviews manuscripts in a double-blind fashion.

The Department of Political Science recognizes the hard work of this year's editing staff and thanks them for their time and effort:

Megan Rickman Blackwood

Emily Downs

Gabrielle McGeachy

Jordan Roberts

Jasmine VanDyke

The Department of Political Science would also like to thank Dr. Alexandra Reckendorf for advising our student editorial board.

The Effectiveness of Political Violence in Social Movements

Angelica Tsvetkov, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract

This paper will be assessing the effectiveness of utilizing political violence versus nonviolence to attain political goals for groups within social movements with a particular focus on disadvantaged insurgent, opposition, and secessionist movements. To do so, it will examine the non-violent and violent schools of thought in political philosophy to assess the moral and pragmatic considerations of both strategies. It will also examine how the utilization of these opposing strategies can affect the likelihood of a social movement achieving its political goals. Political goals are the goals social movements are working to achieve through protest and mass mobilization so that they may impact policy or achieve the social change they are hoping to enact (i.e. regime change, implementation of public policy, abolishment of an institution, the protection of civil rights, etc.). In order to comprehensively assess whether political violence is a more effective tool to achieve political goals for social movements than nonviolent strategies, this paper will not limit itself to the trends of the United States. Instead, it will utilize a comparative approach to ask: is political violence a more effective strategy for groups within social movements to attain political goals than nonviolent strategies?

Introduction

Much of the previous literature on studying political violence has largely focused on determining why groups rebel, why political violence has increased, how radicalization has been addressed, and how social movement theory can be used to de-exceptionalize violence by locating it within broader contexts and complex processes (Breen-Smyth, 2012). However, there is a lingering question that has been posed and examined for a long time but not yet answered in a manner that is complete: is political violence a morally justifiable and effective strategy for attaining political policy goals for groups that are a part of social movements?

We have all heard the popular phrase: “violence is not the answer.” Although this phrase appeals to our moral sensibilities, it stands in juxtaposition with a large array of literature which suggests that for justice to come to fruition for disadvantaged groups, sometimes violence must be the answer for them, as they utilize it as a strategy to achieve their political goals. For a long time, there was a growing consensus that violent methods were being selected by opposition movements because they were much more efficient than non-violent strategies at achieving political goals (Pape, 2005).

However, despite this perspective temporarily taking on the prevailing view, a new perspective soon began to emerge and combat it, one of non-violence. New studies began to emerge suggesting that non-violence was more efficient at achieving political goals than violent methods. Although the philosophy of non-violence was not new, new data had shown that it was more efficient than violent strategies at achieving political objectives (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). However, there is not currently one prevailing view that either is more effective. While theoretical and empirical research has been growing extensively on this topic, there has been little attention given to the outcome and effectiveness of political violence as a strategy for groups to attain political goals.

There are several reasons as to why this research is valuable. First, the study of asymmetric conflicts is valuable to nation-states, like the U.S., which need to be able to assess the risks of groups within social movements that may potentially utilize nonviolent or violent strategies to protest against it (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). This research will help such nation-states and political institutions identify which groups and movements possess the highest threat to their security and interests. Second, groups that utilize non-violent or violent methods within social movements do so because they are in a disadvantaged position within their society (Ginsberg, 2013;Koos, 2014). Historically, these material, social, and political disadvantages have created the assumption that these disadvantaged groups are bound to lose against powerful political institutions and nation-states with or without political violence. Lastly, answering this research question will show the realistic capacity these groups will have at achieving political goals based on statistical advantages and disadvantages found in this research literature. This research can be a resource to oppressed groups that are a part of insurgent movements so that they may know whether the methods of political violence or non-violence are more effective in achieving their desired political goals.

Literature Review

This paper will first define the relevant concepts that are related to the study of political violence and nonviolence. Then it will discuss the common moral and philosophical arguments that are used to justify political violence versus nonviolence. Afterwards, it will review the existing body of literature that has explored the topic of whether political violence has been efficient and effective at achieving political goals for opposition movements.

When referring to political violence throughout this paper, the distinction should be made that I am not referring to random acts of violence committed by non-political groups. Instead, political violence will refer to violence that is enacted by groups who are a part of an existing social movement(s) that have broad political goals that they aim to attain. It is the strategic use of violence against nation-states, political bodies, and institutions with the intended purpose of enacting political change in a way that aligns with their principles, values, or calls to action for policy change.

Nonviolence, sometimes called non-resistance, refers to a strategy emphasizing not utilizing violence during political action and protest (Howes, 2013). There are two branches of nonviolence: principled and strategic. Advocates of principled nonviolence will suggest that there are times where violence can be utilized to protect innocent people. Advocates of strategic nonviolence are pure pacifists; they suggest that there are always better alternatives to violence even in the most extreme circumstances. Examples of different activities that encompass the term nonviolent action include social noncooperation, boycotts, strikes, political noncooperation, nonviolent intervention (Howes, 2013). While there are distinctions which exist amongst advocates of nonviolence, the most important difference that needs to be known for this paper is that even when advocates of nonviolence utilize violence it is only used as a defense tactic. On the other hand, advocates of political violence utilize it as a strategic tool against their opposition.

The Philosophical Implications of Political Violence

Before we explore the efficiency and the effectiveness of political violence, it is important to first examine the moral arguments that exist for and against it. I must point out that if a political strategy is not morally justifiable in practice then it must not be used, no matter how efficient or effective it is. Assessing whether the use of political violence is morally permissible is important because it allows us to establish whether this is a strategy that should even be utilized

in practice, even if I conclude that it is highly effective in my research. That is why in this section I will explore some of the common moral arguments that are often made for and against the use of political violence.

There are three main moral arguments that are often made against political violence, even when political violence is necessary for proper political communication and protest (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). First, violent protesters fail to respect others within the opposition party, regime, or institution and unfairly target people who are not individually responsible for all the injustice that has been dealt through an institution that they are a part of. Second, protesters fail to respect these individuals because they use them as a means to an end. Third, those who utilize political violence to achieve their political goals within social movements unfairly disadvantage non-violent protests by putting them at risk of violence at the hands of the opposition party.

This paper will briefly lay out the arguments that have countered the legitimacy of those arguments. In regard to the first claim, even if individual members of an unjust regime, party, or institution have not committed unjust acts themselves, if they are a part of an unjust system they have then forfeited their rights to safety and security. Being a part of an unjust institution means that they are not innocent bystanders but instead that they are active members of an oppressive institution and regime (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). However, it is important to make the distinction that assaulting and harming actors of oppressive institutions is only justified if these actors are furthering an injustice which is at issue within a social movement group.

For instance, let us use the example of the Black Lives Matter movement that has had demonstrations all across the world to protest police brutality and systemic racism. It is morally permissible for protestors (especially Black protestors) to use violent strategies against the police, strategies that would not usually be morally acceptable to use against ordinary people.

It is appropriate for protestors to view the officers as morally responsible for the threat that they impose on the Black community. Because the oppressive institution of policing directly threatens the bodily integrity of Black citizens, the protestors targeting oppressive actors (law enforcement) is fair (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Even if individual police officers are ignorant and unaware of law enforcement's injustice towards all Black Americans, they are still morally complicit because they are acting on behalf of the oppressive institution.

Furthermore, it is important to note once again that this argument only allows violent protest against those who are reasonably viewed by the protesting social movement group as furthering the injustice of the issue that is the reason for protest. This argument does not suggest that it is morally permissible to randomly kill individual law enforcement officers. Killing individual law enforcement officers is not necessary for political messaging purposes or for achieving the political goals of the social movement group (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). In this case, the goal of ending police brutality and systemic racism. Not only is lethal violence unnecessary but it can also do more harm than good. While non-lethal violence can sometimes enhance communication, lethal violence rules out the possibility of political communication in a way that non-lethal violence does not (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Therefore, not only is lethal violence not effective but it is also not morally permissible in most cases of political protest.

In response to the second claim, the use of limited violence against unjust oppositional actors is not a failure to respect their individuality or humanity. The unjust oppositional actors are not being used merely as a means to an end for political communicative purposes. In actuality, protestors are respecting and acknowledging the power and autonomy individuals possess by holding them responsible for their unjust actions. I will continue to use the example of the Black Lives Matter movement protests to illustrate this point. When protestors engage in certain non-lethal acts of violence against police officers they are treating the officers as agents who are capable of acting with discretion. Police officers make a conscious decision to join and continue to be a part of an oppressive institution. Protestors are holding officers responsible for the unjust institutions that they have chosen to be the arm of which pose an unjust threat to Black communities (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). They are being fair because they are accurately targeting an unjust threat and they are being respectful because they are holding people responsible for actions that they have chosen to do.

In regards to the third claim, nonviolent actors are already at risk of provoking violent retaliation because they intentionally utilize protest tactics - strikes, demonstrations, boycotts, etc. - to create political and social disruption, they often anticipate that there will be violent responses from their opponents (Ginsberg, 2013). For instance, this was the case with nonviolent movement leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi in their use of peaceful protests. Additionally, it is not the fault of violent protesters that an opposition party would respond with violence, this would put blame onto the victims of unjust violence. The

opposition group, often an unjust nation-state or institution, has the capacity to utilize de-escalation strategies (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Therefore, the moral blame of non-violent protestors being harmed through the use of violence is not on violent protestors but rather the opposition group.

The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Political Violence

Now that I have laid out the different moral groundings which lay at the foundation of these different protest strategies, I will explore whether insurgent movements are ever able to win in asymmetric conflicts against stronger actors. For a long time people believed that if there was a military, material, or power imbalance between state and insurgent movement that the state would always likely win. However, in 1975 a research article by Andrew Mack countered this prevalent assumption. Mack (1975) was the first to develop a general theory on why strong nations lose small wars and developed the concept of 'asymmetric conflict,' it took over a quarter century for there to be a rival explanation to his claim. His study showed that weaker actors have won fifty one percent of all asymmetric wars since 1950 and it suggested that there are three elements which explain how weak states can win asymmetric wars (Mack, 1975). These three elements include: (1) relative power explaining relative interests; (2) relative interests explain relative political vulnerability; and (3) relative vulnerability explains why strong actors can lose to weaker actors (Mack, 1975). The first element suggests that stronger actors often have a lower interest in winning asymmetric conflicts because their survival is not at stake while weaker actors have very high levels of interests because their ability to win secures their ability to survive.

The second element, political vulnerability, explains why weak actors can win in asymmetric conflicts. Weak actor's have a high interest and this causes them to have high political vulnerability while the strong actor's low interest is related to low political vulnerability. If conflict between these two actors prolongs for too long, it eventually causes political elites and the public to become weary and to oppose the government's involvement in such conflicts which in some cases forces them to withdraw because of internal dissent (Mack, 1975). This makes stronger actors more vulnerable relative to insurgent movements. Mack (1975) draws upon anti-war movements within the U.S., specifically the Vietnam war, to show that while social movements can have many short-term failures they can be incredibly successful in the

long term (p. 177-189).

In 2005, a research article written by Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft (2005) solidified Mack's major claim; it showed that weaker actors have won fifty one percent of all asymmetric wars since 1950. However, Arreguín-Toft was also the first to offer a rival explanation to what the key causal mechanism is in conflicts. While Mack (1975) suggested that interest asymmetry is the key causal mechanism in the outcome of such conflicts, Arreguín-Toft (2005) suggested that the real causal mechanism is strategic interaction. He suggested that when strategic interaction causes an unexpected delay between the commitment of armed forces or the attainment of political objectives, strong actors tend to lose for two reasons. First, strong actors in asymmetric conflicts tend to have inflated expectations of victory. However, in many cases as protest and war drags on strong actors tend to look incompetent and it causes there to be a domestic pressure which asks governments to end the conflict (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). An abandonment of opposition to political protest is a win on the part of insurgent movements and it causes strong actors to have to concede, often with policy changes.

Additionally, strong actors lose asymmetric wars because as they try to avoid the increasing costs of conflict, they employ barbarism, which is the violation of laws of war in order to attain a political or military objective (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). Barbarism enacted by a strong actor not only creates internal domestic pressure to end the conflict, but it also increases the chances of external (international) intervention to support insurgent movements. Therefore, Arreguín-Toft's (2005) research not only supported Mack's (1975) central claim, but it further legitimized it through a more substantive and logical theory. This research among political scientists created the prevailing view that opposition movements select violent methods because they are more effective than nonviolent strategies because they are better at achieving political goals.

However, this prevailing view was challenged by a study in 2008 which suggested that non-violent resistance methods are more successful than violent methods at achieving political goals, utilizing large-n comparative case studies of nonviolent campaigns in Southeast Asia (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). This study filled a gap in the literature at the time by exploring the strategic effectiveness of violent and non-violent campaigns in conflicts between state and nonstate actors by evaluating data on major violent and nonviolent campaigns from 1900 to 2006. Their findings showed that major nonviolent campaigns were able to be successful fifty three percent of the time, compared to the twenty six percent of

successes of violent resistance campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). When the researchers stated that certain campaigns were successful they were suggesting that these campaigns were able to achieve their strategic political objectives. For example, widespread and decentralized mobilization for their movement, producing meaningful loyalty shifts among opponent elites, security forces, and civilians, and policy or regime changes that aligned with their movements demands and political goals.

Two examples that are referenced that fall under these parameters of success in their research are the nonviolent campaigns in East Timor and the Philippines. From 1988-1999 nonviolent protests in East Timor were able to set the stage for mass mobilization, demand an end to the corrupt Suharto military dictatorship, and force the Indonesian government to withdraw from East Timor under supervision (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Violent campaigns were only able to mobilize a maximum of 1,500 fighters while the nonviolent campaign produced thousands of participants. Similarly, The nonviolent campaign in the Philippines in 1986 was able to result in mass mobilization, civilian and security force loyalty shifts, and international pressure for the regime controlled by the Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos to concede defeat (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

This study suggested that there were two major reasons as to why nonviolent resistance campaigns have a strategic advantage over violent resistance. First, when a state actor, the opposition group in relation to the resistance group, represses a nonviolent campaign it often backfires both internally and externally on the state actor. Internally, members of a regime - civil servants, the courts, etc. - are more likely to be loyal to nonviolent opposition groups than violent opposition groups. The power of a resistance campaign is its ability to defect members of a regime and to create mass mobilization towards its intended political goals, building allegiance and loyalty among its ranks (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Therefore, nonviolence is more successful as a strategy because it is able to create divisions amongst regime supporters when there is a mass nonviolent civil resistance movement.

Externally, other countries are more likely to denounce a repressive regime and use sanctions on it when a state is oppressing nonviolent campaigns than for violent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns are also more likely to receive external aid from the international community. However, this support may not advance the cause of the campaign. On the other hand, when there are violent campaigns within a state, there is also a higher chance that

external actors from the international community may actually help repressive regimes combat the work of violent groups (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).

The second reason is that nonviolent campaigns seem more willing to compromise and engage in negotiation because they are not threatening the health and lives of individuals of the oppressive regime (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). This factor makes nonviolent campaigns more appealing to those within the regime and to the mass public as well. This crucial factor gives an advantage to nonviolent resistance strategies over violent resistance strategies because public support and the possibility of loyalty shifts is crucial to the success of any resistance movement. As proven by the previously mentioned studies, when there is internal dissent of a state's repression tactics towards an insurgent movement there is a higher chance that the state will have to concede to the insurgent movement's demands (Arreguín-Toft, 2005; Mack, 1975).

Studies have shown that groups that utilize violent political protest are perceived as less reasonable and the mass public is less likely to identify with the group (Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg, 2018). This of course results in less public support for the violent group which lessens the chance of success for the group to achieve its political goals. Additionally, when violent campaigns threaten the lives of regime members and law enforcement, they reduce the possibility of loyalty shifts (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Moreover, violent campaigns that threaten civilians lose even more public support when they are compared to campaigns that limit their violent targeting to the police or the military. (Abrahms, 2006).

Since this study was published, researchers have built upon its foundation to further substantiate and legitimize the claim that nonviolent strategies are more effective than violent strategies. Kurk Schock conducted a comparative study of unarmed insurrections in the Philippines, Burma, Thailand, South Africa, and Nepal (Schock, 2013). He found that nonviolence campaigns are able to maintain and increase political leverage more than nonviolent campaigns, furthering the claim made by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) that they are able to mobilize and draw support from their opponents and build a more expanded network which weaker actors depend on in order to remain powerful in asymmetric conflicts (Schock, 2013). He also suggests that among nonviolent campaigns there will be a diversity of tactics utilized, but the success of each will depend on the specific oppressive conditions insurgents movements face (Schock, 2013). Furthermore, one study with the specific focus on violent secessionism showcased that violence does not increase the chance of success when

type is controlled for, this is because different legal and institutional structures create very different strategic playing fields (Griffiths & Wasser, 2018). When taking all this into consideration, this body of research has shown that violence does not increase a movement's likelihood of success in comparison to other similar movements.

The culmination of all these conclusions in connection with one another showcases that nonviolence still has a distinct advantage over violent strategies when it comes to creating increased participation and shifts of loyalty. Nonviolent campaigns are far more likely to gather more participants and this creates varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance, which often leads to them utilizing a more diverse range of successful tactics against the oppressive regime, creating a more comprehensive approach (Howes, 2013). For instance, nonviolent campaigns can gain support from participants who help from home by participating in strikes or boycotts or conversely from people who are willing to take more extreme approaches like putting their lives on the line through direct action campaigns. So while nonviolent campaigns pull together more people in their ranks which increases their rate of success, violent campaigns have lower rates of success because they have less public support which leaves them with less diversified strategies to protest.

Despite the growth of research which suggests that nonviolent movements are more likely than violent movements to achieve their political goals, there has been a lot of research which has come out and claimed that this is too strong of a conclusion. Especially when one considers the fact that all of these studies admit to the fact there are violent movements which do succeed at achieving their political goals. They instead propose that making a declarative statement that “nonviolent movements are more successful than violent methods at achieving political goals” lacks nuance because in reality it is often very difficult to determine what actions count as a part of social movements and which do not (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). In reality, protesting groups within a social movement are not a monolith, instead there are usually multiple protest groups who work independently or at times in collaboration with each other to achieve their political goals (to end unjust laws, policies, practices, etc) (Kling & Mitchell, 2019).

Many nonviolent movements that are often cited as being successful in research led by people like Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. always seem to exclude violent elements that have co-existed alongside them that have helped them achieve successes for the

overall social movement. Let us take a look at the civil rights movement within the United States. Although this movement is often cited as a successful nonviolent movement because of its utilization of peaceful protest, strikes, and boycotts as a strategies for protest, it would be false to suggest that these were the only strategies that led to this movements success at achieving political goals (political goals being civil rights). One has to take account of protests which created an alternative for Black Americans who did not agree with messages of nonviolent resistance like Malcom X, the Black Panthers, and the work of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (Kling & Mitchell, 2019).

Additionally, there was also a long history of Black southerners who engaged in armed self-defense and who had armed confrontations with white supremacists during the Civil Rights Movement (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). The work of both the violent and nonviolent factions of this social movement led to the eventual acquisition of civil rights legislation. Therefore, much of the previous research covered in this paper which claimed that nonviolent movements are successful fails to show the complicated historical record of social protest. It would be more valuable to conclude that violent protest should not be ruled as ineffective and instead research the pros and cons of violent protest based on pragmatic context-dependent questions.

Others have also criticized that although some researchers may suggest that nonviolent campaigns are more effective, they are not accessible or even a viable strategy for certain opposition groups. Wendy Pearlman (2011) added a nuanced and fresh take to this perspective through her research. Pearlman (2011) suggested that there is an organic relationship between the degree of internal cohesion within insurgents movements and the likelihood and ability for them to even consider and use nonviolence instead of violence. She utilized her analysis of the Palestinian national movement to create the theoretical framework the “organizational mediation theory of protest.” This theory indicates that movements down exist solely in one point history, but rather that movements are cycles of resistance that often utilize both violent and non-violent methods (Pearlman, 2011). This framing of movements as cycles therefore means that no movement can be characterized as either solely violent or nonviolent in nature. Therefore, even if data suggests that nonviolence is overall more effective, insurgent movements will have to make decisions about what strategies they will use depending on how limited or expansive their choices are and sometimes violent strategies are the only viable option (Pearlman, 2011).

Furthermore, newer research has also suggested that even if rebel and insurgent movements' success is unlikely to defeat state actors and achieve all political goals comprehensively it is still valuable for politically deprived groups to utilize violent political protest against stronger state actors (Koos, 2014). Carlo Koos (2014) was able to showcase that in the case of ethnic rebellion, qualitative evidence has demonstrated that the processs chain of ethnic discrimination, state repression, violent rebellion, and civil war leads to political rights (p.21-22). The struggle of the Ijaw ethnic minority group in Nigeria is an example of this, through their use of a violent campaign the Ijaw minority was able to drop Nigerian oil output drop by 30 percent (reducing environment damages due to oil was one of their political goals), they overcame their deprivation, and they saw one of their representatives be appointed as vice president (Koos, 2014). There are several other cases that showcase this trend, for instance the violent insurgent movements in South Sudan, the Tuareg rebellion movement in Niger, and the violent uprisings of Mande and Voltaice in Côte d'ivoire (Koos, 2014). In short, this new body of literature reframes prior research and showcases that violent protests are still an effective option for obtaining political rights and they help end discriminatory practices aimed at disadvantaged groups, particularly because oppressed groups have limited options to counter oppression.

Research Questions

Despite there being extensive research on whether political violence is a more effective strategy for groups within social movements to attain political goals than nonviolent strategies, there are still many gaps within the existing literature. Utilizing the knowledge of existing literature described above, this paper will now explain some of the existing gaps in the literature and list several research questions that can be addressed in future research. Here are several possible research questions:

1. How does the degree and nature of mass mobilization over time affect the degree of unity in nonviolent campaigns versus campaigns which utilize political violence?

In the Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) study mentioned earlier, which focused on why nonviolent strategies are more successful than violent strategies, one of the main arguments as to why they were more successful rested on the fact that they were more effective in creating larger mass mobilization movements (p. 40-44). Despite them making this claim there is still a

lack of research on the specific conditions necessary to create a successful mass mobilization movement for resistance campaigns (nonviolent and violent). Therefore, this research question will be particularly useful for understanding how successful nonviolent opposition movements are able to create larger mass mobilization movements based on the unique conditions they face within their social movement. To examine this phenomena there needs to be more research conducted that will measure levels of broad based resistance in nonviolent campaigns and violent campaigns. Additionally, it would be beneficial to measure how geographical region, ideologies, political culture, and demographics can all affect a nonviolent and violent movement's ability to mass mobilize and create stronger internal unity.

2. Has political violence in social movements historically helped nonviolent movements attain political goals (even without the intentional collaboration between the two groups)?

The Griffiths and Wasser (2018) research article examined above pointed out that in most of the literature that has concluded that nonviolent resistance strategies are more effective in achieving political goals than those that utilize political violence, they fail to recognize the contributions of violent political campaigns to their successes (p. 1328-1329). This research article mostly focused on the Civil Rights Movement within the United States to showcase that the efforts of nonviolent and violent resistance groups have worked, without in many cases with intention, jointly to acquire political goals within a social movement (Griffiths & Wasser, 2018). In addition, Wendy Pearlman (2011) suggested in her research that no social movement is solely nonviolent or violent, instead movements operate in cycles and therefore that is why both groups unintentionally are able to achieve their shared political goals. I believe that this foundation of research provides an opportunity for future researchers to deconstruct prior claims that nonviolent or violent campaigns are effective because of their individual strategies. Instead, future research can focus on depicting how nonviolent and violent campaigns within social movements work in tandem with one another to achieve political goals, even if it is done unintentionally.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the campaign and protest strategies that social movement groups utilize across the world in order to assess whether nonviolent or violent strategies are more effective at achieving a group’s political goals. Based on my research, I could try to make

the claim that non-violent strategies are overall more effective. I could suggest this because they have higher rates of increased participation and shifts of loyalty, they are far more likely to gather more participants, they have higher levels of commitment and risk tolerance, and they are capable of utilizing a more diverse range of successful tactics against oppressive regimes (Howes, 2013).

However, by assessing the literature which currently exists I have concluded that neither strategy is more effective than the other on the broader level for two reasons. First, because the assessment of effectiveness should be context based and one strategy will never be universally more effective than the other. Even if nonviolent strategies have higher rates of success, they are still not a viable option for all social movements groups. There will always be a need for some politically deprived groups to utilize violent political protest against oppressive actors (Koos, 2014; Pearlman, 2011). Therefore, in practice it would be much more useful to practitioners, protestors, organizers, and social movement groups if researchers assessed which strategy is more effective in specific contexts (ex. specific social movements, regions, political regimes, economies, cultures, etc.).

Second, the research question of this paper and the literature that has come before it is inherently flawed. Much of the literature which had previously researched this question had failed to understand the cyclical nature of social movements and progress (Pearlman, 2011). Therefore, the literature had failed to ground its research in the understanding that political goals are achieved in social movements because of the use of both violent and non-violent strategies, even when the groups using these strategies were not working in collaboration with one another. It would be a lot more useful to research how the use of both violent and nonviolent strategies have been utilized to achieve political goals in social movements, even if the collaborative effort was unintentional. Then researchers could have a better understanding of when social movement groups should use violent or nonviolent strategies and in what context either is more effective at achieving their political goals.

I believe that in order to accurately continue to explore which methods are more effective, it would be necessary to build a comparative body of research that showcases in a nuanced manner how political violence has in many cases been an underlying factor as to why non-violent campaigns are able to achieve political goals. Even if nonviolent campaigns refuse to publicly ally or support violent campaigns, they still benefit from the pressure they put on

oppressive regimes. This would require future researchers to utilize a fine-grained and context-based research approach in order to gain a more systematic understanding of how nonviolent and violent strategies work in tandem with one another in social movements to attain political goals.

Bibliography

Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security, Vol. 31*, pp. 42-78. Retrieved from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_gale_infotracaca demiconefile_A155326475

Ahluwalia, P., & Miller, T. (2019). Violence. *Social Identities, 25(2),* 107-109. https://doi-org.proxy.library.vcu.edu/10.1080/13504630.2018.1559477

Arreguín-Toft**,** I. (2005). How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict. *New York: Cambridge University Press. International Security, Vol. 26,* p. 93-1128. Retrieved from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_gale_infotracaca demiconefile_A79750571

Breen-Smyth, M. Social Movement Studies and Political Violence. (2012). The ashgate research companion to political violence. *Taylor & Francis Group.* Retrieved from https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.library.vcu.edu/lib/vcu/detail.action?docID=5208303

Della Porta, D. (2013). Political Violence and Social Movements. *Clandestine Political Violence, 1-31.* Received from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_cambridge_cbo_9781139043144_xml_CBO9781139043144A007

Ginsberg, B. (2013). *The value of violence*. New York: Prometheus Books.

Griffiths, R., & Wasser, L. (2018). Does violent secessionism work? *Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63(5)*. Retrieved from https://doi.org.proxy.library.vcu.edu/10.1177%2F0022002718783032

Hollander, P. (2000). Contemporary political violence and its legitimation. *Society, 46(3),267-274.* https://dowesi-org.proxy.library.vcu.edu/10.1007/s12115-009-9204-y

Howes, D. (2013). The failure of pacifism and the success of nonviolence. *Perspectives on Politics*, *Vol. 11(2),* pp. 427-446. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/43280797

Kling, J., & Mitchell, M. (2019). Bottles and bricks: rethinking the prohibition against violent political protest. *Radical philosophy review, Vol. 22 (2),* p. 209-237. Retrieved from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_5840_radphilrev20197997

Koos, C. (2014). Does violence pay?: The effect of ethnic rebellion on overcoming political deprivation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol 33,* pp. 3-24. Retrieved from http://proxy.library.vcu.edu/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26271409

Mack, A. (1975). Why big nations lose small wars: the politics of asymmetric conflict. *World Politics, Vol. 27 (2),* p. 175-200. Retrieved from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_proquest_journals_1301462817

Nepstad, S. (2011). *Nonviolent Revolutions: civil resistance in the late 20th century.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Pape, R. (2005). *Dying to win: the strategic logic of suicide terror*. New York: Random House.

Pearlman, W. (2011). *Violence, nonviolence, and the Palestinian national movement.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pinker, S. (2011). *The Better Angels of Our Nature: why violence has declined*. New York: Viking.

Porta, D. (2008). Research on social movements and political violence. *Qualitative Sociology, 31(3),* 221-230. https://doi-org.proxy.library.vcu.edu/10.1007/s11133-008-9109-x

Rosebraugh, C. (2004.) Logic of political violence : lessons in reform and revolution. *Arissa Media Group, LLC*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.proxy.library.vcu.edu/lib/vcu/detail.action?docID=655683.

Schock, K. (2003). Nonviolent Action and its Misconceptions: insights for social scientists. *Political Science and Politics, Vol. 36 (4),* pp. 705-12. Retrieved from http://proxy.library.vcu.edu/login?url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3649265

Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg. (2018). Does violent protest backfire? Testing a theory of public reactions to activist violence. *Socius: sociological research for a dynamic world, Vol. 4.* Retrieved from https://vcu-alma-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/permalink/f/1shm02o/TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1177_2378023118803189

Stephen, M., & Chenoweth, E. (2008). Why civil resistance works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict. *International Security, Vol. 33,* pp. 7-44. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40207100

Violence, Exclusion, and Innovation: A Comparative Case Study of Medellín and San Salvador

Anna Connor, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract

This paper compares two cities from Latin America—Medellín, Colombia and San Salvador, El Salvador—in an effort to show how integrative social urbanist policies lessened violence and inequality, while less holistic approaches failed to have the desired results. I analyzed the policies that each city used to address violence and inequality, with an additional focus on the transportation system. I found that the physical upgrading of Medellín neighborhoods and investment in transportation led to reductions in violence and inequality, while the Mano Dura policies of San Salvador did little to reduce homicide rates and combat exclusion. My findings indicate that to combat urban violence, a cohesive policy is needed that focuses on improving access and combating the underlying factors of violence, while accounting for the various needs of the community.

Introduction

Latin America is a rapidly urbanizing region, with 80% of the population living in urban areas as of 2013 (Yañez- Pagans et al. 2019, 4). Although cities can connect individuals to jobs and opportunities they might not otherwise have access to, Latin America has "the highest levels of inequality worldwide," leading to poverty and social exclusion (Strocka 2006, 158). Often, urbanization creates a pattern of "segmentation and fragmentation," with lower-income areas forced to deal with sub-par amenities and less access to transportation (Glebbeek and Koonings 2015, 5). Where urban growth occurs, violence and crime also tend to increase, with an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report establishing a "direct correlation between crime and urban growth" as seen through rising homicide rates (Center for Latin American [CLALS] 2017, 4). However, some cities have managed to battle inequality and violence through collaborative policies which focused on overcoming legacies of exclusion through neighborhood investment and expanded transportation access.

The city of Medellín, Colombia has often been touted as one of the most successful examples for lowering homicide rates through such methods, shedding their title of "most violent city" in the 1990s for the "most innovative" in 2012 (Dolan 2018, 106). Other cities have taken a

different approach, focusing on repressive tactics to resolve issues of violence without addressing underlying causes. This paper will compare two cities from Latin America—Medellín, Colombia and San Salvador, El Salvador—in an effort to show how integrative social urbanist policies lessened violence and inequality, while less holistic approaches have failed to achieve the desired results.

Methodology

I will use a comparative case study (n=2) to determine how the cities differ in their approach and what the resulting outcome of their methods were. As the purpose of this paper is to investigate which policies had a greater effect on decreasing inequality and violence, I selected the cities of Medellín and San Salvador. Both of these cases had high homicides rates per capita at some point in the last two decades, with both rising to the top five most violent cities in the world during this period (Sotomayor 2017, 77; Cruz 2019, 555). I will primarily analyze the policies that each city used to address violence and inequality, with an additional focus on the transportation system. The inclusion of transit is important in the context of social exclusion, as exclusion can be mobility-based, wherein individuals have “limited accessibility to opportunities" (Cordoba, Stanley, and Stanley 2014, 2). As the Medellín government focused on a holistic approach to combating inequality and poverty, it is impossible to divorce the policy itself from the effects of transportation. To be fair to both cases, the public transit system in San Salvador is also included. Social exclusion is when individuals face significant barriers to employment, education, and opportunities, with extreme exclusion precluding “any prospects of achieving wellbeing” (CLALS 2017, 6).

When individuals find themselves cut off from the ability to improve their livelihoods, they can sometimes turn to violence. As a result, there is a strong correlation between exclusion and violence, as cut-off households turn to criminal activities to earn money and create a sense of community (CLALS 2017, 6). The conception of social exclusion has been found to be “a more powerful indicator of violence than poverty or inequality alone,” so this paper is studying both violence and inequality in an effort to fill in missing data in relation to socioeconomic data for the cases (CLALS 2017, 3). There are different forms of violence; apart from direct violence, there is also indirect structural violence, which is caused by “forces such as poverty, marginalization, and exploitation” (Dolan 2018, 109). Direct violence—the most easily quantifiable measure—will be primarily defined as X homicides per 100,000 people, as was used in multiple studies (Cerda et al. 2012; Canavire-Bacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016). Because of the difficulty of measuring indirect violence, socioeconomic data and reductions in inequality will be used where possible. Exclusion can also be fear-based, defined in relation to transportation as some

members of society being “fearful of certain public spaces or transport facilities"; this is especially key in the case of San Salvador for understanding how exclusion works in relation to transportation (Qamhaieh and Chakravarty 2017, 466).

Medellín

The city of Medellín is the capital of the Department of Antioquia and the second largest city in Colombia, with a population of approximately 2.34 million people as of 2015 (Ferrari et al. 2018, 354; Sotomayor 2015, 378). Beginning in 1984, Medellín witnessed a wave of violence as the result of conflicts between paramilitary groups (notably under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]), leftist guerillas, drug cartels, and, at times, the military (Dolan 2018, 111-114; Ferrari et al. 2018, 358). The fighting caused the homicide rate to skyrocket, climbing to 433 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, with Medellín becoming “the most violent city in the world” (Sotomayor 2017, 77). *Operación Orión* (Operation Orion), launched in 2002, was an intense military takeover of some of the more violent areas; the peace negotiations between 2003 and 2004 led to the demobilization of the paramilitary groups (Sotomayor 2017, 81). Before the intervention of social urbanist policies in 2002, the murder rate was still 185 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, accounting for 28% of deaths in the city (Cerda et al. 2012, 1045). In addition, Medellín has been called “the most unequal city in one of the most unequal countries in Latin America,” with the top 10% of the city earning 50.7 times the income of the poorest 10% of inhabitants (Dolan 2018, 114). It is therefore of little surprise that the new social urbanist policies begun by Mayor Sergio Fajardo Valerrama in 2004 were referred to as addressing “an accumulated historical debt that needed to be remedied” in the poorest and most violent areas of Medellín (Arteaga 2020, 84).

Social urbanism is the investment in historically underfunded and spatially fragmented neighborhoods with the aim to “reduce locational disadvantages through comprehensive neighborhood upgrading” (Sotomayor 2017, 81). In Medellín, the policy is operationalized through the use of *Proyectos Urbanos Integrales* (Integral Urban Projects, hereafter referred to as PUIs), which “incorporate physical, social and institutional aspects” in an effort to improve specific areas of the city, with a concentration on marginalized areas (Arteaga 2020, 84). Using a multidimensional method, the PUIs focused on upgrading infrastructure, providing social and educational facilities, and creating a sense of community and local identity within the targeted neighborhoods (Brown-Luthango and Reyes 2018, 301). The focus on increasing human capital, improving educational outcomes, and providing alternatives to gang recruitment were seen as “central to reducing…much of the violence” which plagued the lower-income areas (Dolan 2018, 123).

One of the more noticeable aspects of the new policy was the use of "flashy architectural statements…to challenge old stigmas associated with violence" in the neighborhoods—the Spain Library Park, winner of the 2012 Ibero-American Architecture award, is perhaps the most well-known example (Sotomayor 2015, 374). Notably, instead of simply redesigning the communities to fit a standard design, the Medellín government took a more collaborative approach to upgrading the neighborhoods, with community input playing a key role in the renovations. By approaching the different projects on a "case-by-case basis," the planning department was able to "[adapt] its interventions to the requirements of each neighborhood," allowing for greater flexibility in addressing the varying concerns of residents (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 124). Between 2004 and 2011, Comuna 13 alone received an estimated 376 million USD in services and programs (Sotomayor 2017, 82). As of 2015, two PUIs had been finished and three others were in varying stages of completion (Sotomayor 2015, 386).

Another integral part of the PUIs was a focus on overcoming spatial exclusion resulting from the neighborhoods' locations on steep slopes on the outskirts of the city. Medellín's primary form of mass transit is the metro system, first established in 1995, that serves as the backbone of transportation for the city (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). It is additionally served by a system of buses and a bus rapid transit (BRT) system known as Metroplús, the latter of which was awarded the esteemed gold rating for BRT standards by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (Center for Transatlantic Relations 2017, 112). Currently, two companies, backed by the city government, have managed to reorganize the "poorly organized bus system" by centralizing fares and paying drivers on a per-kilometer basis, thus offering services 24/7 and avoiding unproductive competition (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49; Ardila 2008, 13). The downtown area is excluded from their monopoly, but this does show the government's interest in creating a cohesive, streamlined transit system.

At the outset of renovations, the "lack of adequate connections with the metro system…produced important spatial inequalities" in the poorer neighborhoods, as they were less able to access high-employment centers in the city (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). To overcome the barriers of steep slopes, Medellín implemented the first cable car-based transit system in 2004, allowing access to the metro in 10 minutes and to the city center in an additional 20 which connected "one of the poorest and most violent zones of the city to the rest of the urban fabric" (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). Although the cable cars are not technically a mass transit system because they cannot transport more than 3,000 passengers per hour, they were an ingenious way to supplement the existing transportation network and combat social exclusion (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). With a variety of transit modes, including bikes, BRT, metro, and the new cable

cars, Medellín “has been widely used as a benchmark for its transit development,” especially in relation to its planning in marginalized areas (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 121; Hidalgo and Huizenga 2013, 73).

The results of the social urbanist policies have garnered a list of more than forty awards for Medellín, including the 2013 Harvard Design Award and the title of “most innovative city” in 2012 from the Urban Land Institute (Sotomayor 2015, 374). It is difficult to disentangle the results of the physical upgrading from those of the implementation of new transit connections, so the majority of studies into the outcomes of the social urbanist policies consider them both together (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 123; Brand and Dávila 2011, 654; Cerda et al. 2012, 1051). Apart from reducing travel times from 2.5 hours to seven minutes, the cable cars had an impact on reducing violence and inequality in the target areas (Canavire-Bacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016, 2). Cerda et al. (2012) compared areas that had been subject to social urbanist interventions and areas that had not to determine if violence declined. They discovered that the homicide rate declined by 84% in the treated areas and only 60% in the control neighborhoods; the drop in “violent events” was 74% higher than in the control group (1047-1051). Their studies were supported by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016), who focused more closely on the cable car stations and their effects, discovering that homicide rates declined by 61.8% the year after the Metrocable was opened in 2004 (19). The effects spilled over into nearby territories, with crime reduced by 49% more than the control in the target area and 43% in the nearby areas (Canavire-Bacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016, 27).

Other notable results include the increase in use of transit by women in the target areas, indicating a “great success…for low- and middle-income women” as they are better able to access opportunities using transportation (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 127). Access by the lower-income strata as a whole also increased, indicating that social urbanist policies, with their main focus being to improve the access of poor areas, had “been a success where [they] had been implemented” (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 128). The results of these studies show that policy focused on addressing underlying issues of social exclusion and marginalization, coupled with flexibility and an integrated approach, can reduce violence in outlying areas and the city as a whole. Furthermore, the improvements helped residents overcome hurdles to improving their quality of life, with the provision of educational and cultural facilities and transportation allowing them greater access to opportunities they might otherwise be unable to access. Improving equality gives them alternatives to criminal activities that they can harness to increase their own wellbeing.

San Salvador

San Salvador is the capital of El Salvador, with a population of roughly 1.8 million people in 2017 (Son, C. R. Chen, and C. F. Chen 2020, 2). The country suffered a civil war from 1980 to 1992, where killings occurred at "the astonishing rate of a thousand per month" as the sides battled for control (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2018, 100). After the signing of the peace accords violence continued, with homicide rates throughout the state climbing to 138.9 homicides per 100,000 individuals. Rates entered a slow decline during the beginning of the 21st century, reaching 72 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009 (Richani 2010, 441). A majority of the violence in El Salvador is the result of gang warfare; the three major gangs operating in the state are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the Eighteenth Street Gang Southerners, and the Eighteenth Street Gang Revolutionaries (Cruz 2019, 547).

In 2012 a national ceasefire was calledbut the peace did not last, despite the murder rates declining by over 40% in its aftermath. In 2013 the fragile truce began to fall apart, and by 2015, El Salvador "had the highest homicide rate in the western hemisphere," with 104 murders per 100,000 inhabitants (Cruz 2019, 555). Although the preceding numbers are for El Salvador and not San Salvador specifically, by 2008 "most of the homicides were committed in the metropolitan area of San Salvador" and other urban areas, allowing for some extrapolation (Richani 2010, 433). Between 2000 and 2010, the majority of urban growth in San Salvador had occurred on the extreme outskirts of the city, with some slopes measuring over 30 degrees (World Bank 2012, 14). The "problem of protracted social exclusion" is often cited as one of the main causes of the unceasing violence, with the gangs writing in their 2012 truce statement that "violence was…a result of the complex problems of social exclusion, lack of opportunities, and institutional repression" (Van der Borgh 2010, 10; Cruz 2019, 553).

In an effort to combat the tide of gang violence, the Salvadoran government turned to *Mano Dura* (Iron Fist) policies that centered around repression and zero tolerance. It began in 2003, with a further iteration—known as *Super Mano Dura* (Super Firm Hand)—being implemented in 2004 under President Antonio Saca. Under these policies, "thousands of young people...[were] detained" as the government attempted to curb the size and influence of youth gangs by imprisoning potential members or placing them in "rehabilitation centers" (Hume 2007, 745; Strocka 2006, 141). Children as young as twelve were arrested for displaying gang-related tattoos or signs in public, with the law allowing for up to five years of imprisonment. Between 2003 and 2004 approximately 20,000 individuals were arrested, although 95% were released without charge and the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers 2009, 382).

There have been alternative initiatives throughout the years that take a softer approach to the prevailing issue of youth violence. Two, known as *Mano Amiga* (Friendly Hand) and *Mano Extendida* (Extended Hand), focused on a preventative logic, with such interventions as "targeted education and public health initiatives focusing on 'at-risk' youth" and voluntary weapons collection (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers 2009, 385). An external approach, called the Municipal Citizen Security Plans, was undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme in an effort to promote social capital and community cohesion (Sáinz, Duarte, and Schaulsohn 2019, 144). Unfortunately, the ending of the truce threatened the stability of the policy and the preventative plans have "been completely superseded by the repressive component" of national policy (Sáinz, Duarte, and Schaulsohn 2019, 146).

The insecurity of public transit and the extortion of bus drivers also influences social exclusion by preventing residents from safely accessing areas of opportunity (Qamhaieh and Chakravarty 2017, 466). The transportation system of San Salvador is made up entirely of buses, which are owned by private companies and receive authorization from the Vice-Ministry of Transport to provide services on specific routes, with a maximum charge of 25 cents (Natarajan et al. 2015, 1). As of 2005, buses were between 25-40% over capacity and moved more than 1.8 million passengers per day; the fleet had 5,467 buses, with an average of 329 passengers per day per bus (Ardila 2008, 10). A key difference from Medellín is that the bus owners pay a monthly rent to operate on their routes, causing the companies to "maximize profits by maximizing the number of routes and the number of buses affiliated" with them and leading to an oversupply of buses on the streets (Ardila 2008, 8). The extortion of bus drivers is a common feature in San Salvador, and 692 transportation workers were killed in El Salvador between 2011 and 2016 (Martínez et al. 2016). This, combined with the fact that between 2008 and 2013 3.3% of all homicides occurred within a public transit vehicle, understandably leads to an aura of fear around public transportation, which in turn feeds into fear-based social exclusion (Natarajan et al. 2015, 1).

In addition, buses frequently make unauthorized stops at "unmarked and often dangerous locations" and skip mandatory stops, further disrupting the passengers' journey (Natarajan et al. 2015, 4). A six-kilometer BRT system was proposed to modernize the transit system, but "the absence of a strategic plan" and the scale of the project were not enough to spark a structural change; the 2015 Supreme Court ruling allowing the use of the segregated transit lanes by other modes of travel was the final nail in the coffin (Flores and Díaz 2019, 7). Natarajan et al.'s (2015) findings on the high levels of crime and chaos on San Salvador's bus system indicate that part of the problem is "poverty, discrimination, and corruption" and that although the bus system itself

might be unable to make massive structural change, the use of environmental design and situational prevention could "powerfully influence the situational factors that promote crime" (2). It is important to note that the transportation system is currently designed in a silo format, with a distinct lack of integration between the modes, which was a significant reason for why the BRT failed and why buses must compete for money, leading to overcrowding. The focus on repressive policies has been explained as the inability of the state to "deal with the ongoing problem of social violence and protracted social exclusion," with the preference being on repressing criminal actors instead of preventing the crimes themselves (Van der Borgh 2010, 13). *Mano Dura* and its subsequent iterations were deemed "not just highly ineffective…but essentially counterproductive," as gangs recruited more members from the crowded prisons and reorganized their structures to be more effective (Schuberth 2016, 5). When softer policies were introduced, they were often underfunded and "lacked serious commitment from the government," while the preferred hardline policies acted to the detriment of long-term prevention and rehabilitation policies (5). Even the truce was a short-term measure, with no "consistent and sustainable plan to address structural causes of violence" materializing, despite mounting evidence that addressing social exclusion and the underlying factors of poverty were key (Roque 2017, 502).

The lack of community involvement and the conceptualization of violence as a distinct phenomenon, divorced from surrounding contexts, resulted in the failure of *Mano Dura* policies to drastically reduce homicide rates in San Salvador and to help integrate the poorer communities into the urban fabric. Youths who were vulnerable to gangs were not provided with alternative options to crime, hindering their ability to access opportunities that they could use to gain valuable skills and improve their chances of success in the urban economy. In addition to the policies, the transportation system was not leveraged to help address longstanding inequalities and aid the residents in overcoming the barrier of spatial exclusion, especially on the steeper outskirts of the city. Riders often cite worries over lack of security at bus stops and in the buses, where the majority of crimes were said to occur (Natarajan et al. 2015, 7). The dangerous atmosphere surrounding public transportation contributes to fear-based exclusion and, as buses are the only means of public transit in San Salvador, causes worried individuals to be less able to access employment, further contributing to inequality and lowered incomes that are detrimental to quality of life.

Comparison

Violence is built into systems that "perpetuate a lack of access to resources and unequal chances in life," so a holistic approach is necessary for addressing the prevalence of homicides and crime in cities (Dolan 2018, 109). As gangs form alongside a "rise in injustice, inequality, and

social exclusion," it is necessary to tackle these underlying causes instead of simply repressing the violence in the hopes that it will resolve itself (Strocka 2006, 137). Medellín's approach was able to reduce levels of violence in the targeted areas because they took an integrated approach to combating inequality, upgrading the infrastructure, cultural facilities, and transit access in an effort to minimize long-standing deficiencies that the community faced. Their flexible approach was able to "adapt to the changing dynamics of the city," allowing the government to address the unique needs of each neighborhood (Sotomayor 2015, 375). In contrast, the Salvadoran government favored repressive, one-size-fits-all policies that sought to eradicate crime without addressing underlying concerns; it is therefore unsurprising that they were ineffective and that homicide rates continued to remain high (Schuberth 2016, 5). To prevent the extortion practices of the gangs "alternative sources of income were crucial," but the socioeconomic projects that they had hoped for as part of the truce failed to materialize due to a lack of funding and interest on the part of the government (Van der Borgh 2019, 15).

In addition, the struggles to reform the transit system perpetuated social exclusion and violence. The cash-based fare system contained "too much opportunity for corruption and theft," and the lack of investment in lighting and security for bus stops escalated crime (Natarajan et al. 2015, 9). Even the BRT, which improved the quality of life for nearby residents in Medellín as part of the integrated system, failed to materialize due to the patchwork nature in which it was implemented (Gómez and Semeshenko 2018, 122). Without working on improving social inclusion and equality with the participation of the community in which the policies are being implemented, it will be much harder to successfully lower homicide rates in urban areas. Medellín provided opportunities in the target neighborhoods to aid residents in increasing their skillset and accompanied the approach with transportation, allowing greater access to jobs outside of the neighborhood that the residents might not otherwise be able to reach. San Salvador limited opportunities for growth and underfunded the few initiatives that provided alternatives for youths, forcing them to turn to gangs to provide income.

Limitations

There are some limitations to the research and results of this paper. I did not attempt to analyze the potential influences that gangs have to suppress violence and their involvement in managing violence within their territories, because the purpose was to analyze government policies. Unfortunately, there have been few studies into the socioeconomic effects of transportation in Latin America and fewer specifically focusing on violence; the majority focus on North America, which has different transit and land use approaches that make extrapolation difficult (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 123; Yañez- Pagans et al. 2019, 1). In addition, socioeconomic

data and homicide rates for San Salvador were difficult to find and verify, resulting in the use of El Salvador's homicide rate as a proxy measure. It is highly possible that the inability to find solid data and research on the chosen topic was the result of linguistic barriers. The use of a translator was obtained for one promising article, but she had limited time and the majority of articles that I discovered were beyond my own abilities. In the case of Medellín, there is the possibility of confounding variables as "precise measurement of the social and economic consequences of the Metrocables is difficult" because of the interconnectedness of transportation and the neighborhood redevelopment, resulting in measuring them together (Brand and Dávila 2011, 654). There has also been a recent decline in homicide rates in San Salvador, falling from 108.5 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 to 35.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019. Although the government has argued that this is because of their policies, there is some evidence that it is because of an agreement between MS-13 and Barrio 18, who can reduce the homicide rates at will (Navarrete and Austin 2020).

Conclusion

Although the "social capital approach is probably the most promising" method to handle gangs and violence, it is the "least frequently adopted" policy in Latin America (Strocka 2006, 142). Social exclusion and the inability of individuals to access opportunities to improve their lives is a strong contributor to violence and investing in social capital is a key method of improving communities where it is prevalent (Ardila 2008, 6). In order to overcome this hurdle for residents, substantial investment into historically underserved areas is necessary to connect residents to the city and provide them with alternatives to gangs and criminal activities. This paper has shown how Medellín's integrated policy approach was able to reduce violence and inequality, moving Medellín from the most violent city to the most innovative city in the span of two decades. San Salvador, which also suffers from high homicide rates, failed to implement a collaborative approach and instead focused on repression to deal with the gang violence dominating the state. As a result, the city's homicide rates remained high and their public transportation system was not adequate for aiding lower-income residents in overcoming social exclusion. San Salvador can learn from Medellín's policies and implement them in their city to combat extortion and assist their marginalized neighborhoods. The role of the community is key, as one of the reasons for the failure of the softer policies in El Salvador was the lack of engagement of local actors. Other cities in Latin America can also benefit from this research, as the rates of urbanization and inequality in the region are among the highest in the world; by focusing on improving access and combating the underlying factors of violence, state and local governments will be able to build safer cities that serve the needs of all residents.

References

Ardila, Arturo. 2008. “Limitation of Competition In and For the Public Transportation Market in Developing Countries: Lessons From Latin American Cities.” *Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board* 2048: 8-15. DOI: 10.3141/2048-02

Arteaga, Armando. 2020. “Medellín, Urban Renewal of Informal Settlements Through Public Space: The Case of the North-Eastern Integral Urban Project (PUI).” In *Resilient Urban Regeneration in Informal Settlements in the Tropics*, eds. Oscar Carracedo García-Villalba, 83-99. Springer.

Bocarejo, Juan Pablo, Ingrid Joanna Portilla, Juan Miguel Velásquez, Mónica Natalia Cruz, Andrés Peña, and Daniel Ricardo Oviedo. 2014. “An Innovative Transit System and Its Impact on Low Income Users: The Case of the Metrocable in Medellín.” *Journal of Transport Geography* 39: 49-61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2014.06.018

Brand, Peter and Julio D. Dávila. 2011. “Mobility Innovation at the Urban Margin: Medellín’s Metrocables.” *City* 15(6): 647-661. DOI: 10.1080/13604813.2011.609007

Brown-Luthango, Mercy and Elena Reyes. 2018. “Urban Upgrading to Reduce Violence In Informal Settlements: The Case of Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) in Monwabisi Park, Cape Town, South Africa.” In *The Routledge Companion to Planning in the Global South*, eds. Gautam Bhan, Smita Srinivas, and Vanessa Watson, 298-309. New York, NY: Routledge.

Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo, Juan Carlos Duque, and Joaquin A. Urrego. 2016. “Moving Citizens and Deterring Criminals: Innovation in Public Transport Facilities.” *Development Bank of Latin America*, working paper. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312940544_Moving_Citizens_and_Deterring_ Criminals_Innovation_in_Public_Transport_Facilities

Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS), American University. 2015. “Violence and Community Capabilities: Insights for Building Safe and Inclusive Cities in Central America.” Working Paper.

Center for Transatlantic Relations. Edited by Paul Isbell and Eloy Álvarez Pelegry. 2017. “Energy and Transportation in the Atlantic Basin.” https://archive.transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Energy-and-Transp ortation-in-the-Atlantic-Basin-Text-FINAL-final.pdf

Cerdá, Magdalena, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Ben B. Hansen, Kimberly J. Tessari Hicks, Luis F. Duque, Alexandra Restrepo, and Ana V. Diez-Roux. 2012. “Reducing Violence by Transforming Neighborhoods: A Natural Experiment in Medellín, Colombia.” *American Journal of Epidemiology* 175 (10): 1045-1053. DOI: 10.1093/aje/kwr428

Cordoba, Diego Zapata, John Stanley, and Janet Stanley. 2014. “Reducing Social Exclusion in Highly Disadvantaged Districts in Medellín, Colombia Through the Provision of a Cable-Car.” *Social Inclusion* 2 (4): 1-13. DOI: 10.17645/si.v2i4.127

Cruz, José Miguel. 2019. “The Politics of Negotiating with Gangs: The Case of El Salvador.” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 38 (5): 547-562. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.12847

Dolan, Martin. 2018. “Radical Responses: Architects and Architecture in Urban Development as a Response to Violence in Medellín, Colombia.” *Space and Culture* 23 (2):106-128. DOI: 10.1177/1206331218770368.

Ferrari, Soledad Garcia, Harry Smith, Francoise Coupe, and Helena Rivera. 2018. “City Profile: Medellín.” *Cities* 74: 354-364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2017.12.011

Flores, Onesimo and Rodrigo Díaz. 2019. “Transportation Governance in Latin America: BRT as a Tool for Structural Change or as a Tweak Over Existing Conditions?” *VREF* Research Synthesis Project.

Glebbeek, Marie-Louise and Kees Koonings. 2015. “Between *Morro* and *Asfalto*: Violence, Insecurity, and Socio-Spatial Segregation in Latin American Cities.” *Habitat International* 54: 3-9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2015.08.01

Gómez, Yadira and Viktoriya Semeshenko. Translated by Michaela Artavia-High. 2018. “Transporte y Calidad de Vida Urbana: Estudio de Caso Sobre El Metroplús de Medellín, Colombia.” *Lecturas de Economía* 89: 103-131. https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n89a04

Hidalgo, Dario and Cornie Huizenga. 2013. “Implementation of Sustainable Urban Transport in Latin America.” *Research in Transportation Economics 40*: 66-77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.06.034

Hume, Mo. 2007. “Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs.” *Development in Practice* 17 (6): 739-751. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25548280?seq=1

Jütersonke, Oliver, Robert Muggah, and Dennis Rodgers. 2009. “Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America.” *Security Dialogue* 40 (4-5): 373-397. DOI: 10.1177/0967010609343298

Martínez, Óscar, Efren Lemus, Carlos Martínez, and Deborah Sontag. 2016. “Killers on a Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador.” *The New York Times*, November 20. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/americas/el-salvador-drugs-gang-ms-13.html

Milan, Blanca Fernandez and Felix Creutzig. 2017. “Lifting Peripheral Fortunes: Upgrading Transit Improves Spatial, Income and Gender Equity in Medellín.” *Cities* 70: 122-134. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2017.07.019

Natarajan, Mangai, Ronald Clarke, Carlos Carcach, Carlos Ponce, Margarita Beneke de Sanfeliú, Dolores Escobar Polanco, Mario Chávez, and Mauricio Shi. 2015. “Situational Prevention and Public Transport Crime in El Salvador.” *Crime Science* 4(29): 1-15. DOI 10.1186/s40163-015-0043-4

Navarrete, Maria Alejandra and Anastasia Austin. 2020. “Capital Murder: 2019 Homicide Rates in Latin America’s Capital Cities.” *InSight Crime*, March 5. https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2019-homicides-latin-america-capital/

Qamhaieh, Abdellatif and Surajit Chakravarty. 2017. “Global Cities, Public Transportation, and Social Exclusion: A Study of the Bus System in Abu Dhabi.” *Mobilities* 12 (3): 462-478. DOI: 10.1080/17450101.2016.1139805

Richani, Nazih. 2010. “State Capacity in Postconflict Settings: Explaining Criminal Violence in El Salvador and Guatemala.” *Civil Wars* 12 (4): 431-455. DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2010.534630

Roque, Sílvia. 2017. “Between New Terrains and Old Dichotomies: Peacebuilding and the Gangs’ Truce in El Salvador.” *Contexto Internacional* 39(3): 499-520. DOI: 10.1590/s0102-8529.2017390300003

Sáinz, Juan Pablo Pérez, Mario Zetino Duarte, and Florencio Ceballos Schaulsohn. 2019. "Social Exclusion, Violences, and Urban Marginalization in Central America." In *Reducing Urban Violence in the Global South: Towards Safe and Inclusive Cities*, eds. Jennifer Erin Salahub, Markus Gottsbacher, John de Boer, and Mayssam D. Zaaroura. Routledge. https://www.crdi.org/sites/default/files/openebooks/reduce-urban-violence/97813512546 49.html

Schuberth, Moritz. 2016. "Beyond Gang Truces and *Mano Dura* Policies: Towards Substitutive Security Governance in Latin America." *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 5 (17): 1-20. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.450

Skidmore, Thomas E., Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. 2018. "Central America." In *Modern Latin America,* 9th edition. Oxford University Press.

Son, N. T., C. F. Chen, and C. R. Chen. 2020. "Urban Expansion and Its Impacts on Local Temperature in San Salvador, El Salvador." *Urban Climate* 32: 1-14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.uclim.2020.100617

Sotomayor, Luisa. 2015. "Equitable Planning Through Territories of Exception: The Contours of Medellín's Urban Development Projects." *International Development Planning Review* 37 (4): 373-397. DOI: 10.3828/idpr.2015.23

Sotomayor, Luisa. 2017. "Dealing With Dangerous Spaces: The Construction of Urban Policy in Medellín." *Latin American Perspectives* 44 (2): 71-90. DOI: 10.1177/0094582X16682758

Strocka, Cordula. 2006. "Youth Gangs in Latin America." *SAIS Review* 26 (2): 133-146. DOI: 10.1353/sais.2006.0045

Van der Borgh, Chris. 2010. "The Practice of International Interventions in El Salvador: Problems of Building a Liberal Peace." Manuscript for the Max-Planck Institut für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht.

Van der Borgh, Chris. 2019. "Government Responses to Gang Power: From Truce to War on Gangs in El Salvador." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 107: 1-25. http://doi.org/10.32992/erlacs

World Bank. 2012. "El Salvador Country Land Assessment." Report Number: 82312-SV.

World Bank. 2012. “El Salvador Country Land Assessment.” Report Number: 82312-SV

Yañez- Pagans, Patricia, Daniel Martinez, Oscar A. Mitnik, Lynn Scholl, and Antonia Vazquez. 2019. “Urban Transport Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Lessons and Challenges.” *Latin American Economic Review* 28 (15): 1-25. DOI: 10.1186/s40503-019-0079-z

Dimensions of Power: Women's Liberation in China and Japan

Naomi Miller, Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract

Both China and Japan have been subject to criticism not only for widespread gender inequity, but for either state failures to adequately secure the rights of women or active sabotage of domestic women's movements. The goal of this paper is not to compare the severity of inequities, but to examine what movements have arisen to combat them and the ways the state has used its power to curb their efficacy. The comparison of state strategies will rely on Steven Lukes' tripartite model of the dimensions of power: decision-making, non-decision-making, and ideological. China has leveraged mostly decision-making and non-decision-making power, as in its overt crackdowns on protestors, formal restrictions on political organizations unaffiliated with the state, and legislation that criminalizes provoking trouble. The Japanese state, meanwhile, has relied heavily on non-decision-making and ideological power to win victories in the cultural sphere that necessarily impact public policy rather than passing legislation that directly bars women from exercising their rights to speech or petition. The ultimate impact of these strategies has been a Chinese feminist movement that is more popular but less effective in its pursuit of altered policy. In Japan, meanwhile, women's advocacy has been broadly co-opted, and the Japanese state has provided concessions that maintain the status quo while failing to address the root of gender inequality in the nation.

Introduction

Both China and Japan have been subject to criticism not only for widespread gender inequity but for either state failures to adequately secure the rights of women or active sabotage of domestic women's movements. The goal of this paper is not to compare the severity of

inequities, but to examine what movements have arisen to combat them and the ways the state has used its power to curb their efficacy. The comparison of state strategies will rely on Steven Lukes' tripartite model of the dimensions of power: decision-making, non-decision-making, and ideological.[1]

While not a formally single-party state, Japan has been described as a "One-and-a-Half Party State" due to the practical control one party wields over the function of government. The power of the LDP is nowhere enshrined in law, but due to the clientelist ties between the LDP and the Japanese bureaucracy, the private sector, and the variety of smaller parties that often join its coalitions, the LDP have become the head of a "one-party state" in practice, losing control of the government only twice since 1955.[2] In this respect, the Japanese state bears similarities to China, where the Communist Party of China (CPC) has remained the nation's sole governing party since the founding of the current government in 1949. Both the LDP and the CPC have effectively cemented their control over domestic politics, allocating position and influence based on systems of patronage. Not only do these parties wield formal control over legislative and executive processes, but they also exercise additional informal power by setting agendas, constraining the bounds of discourse, and popularizing rhetoric that preempts conflicts or keeps them in a state of latency. The repercussions of these political norms are comprehensive but have particular ramifications for women's liberation movements in either nation.

Despite Japan's position as a "developed nation" per the World Bank/IDF and China's status as the second-largest economy in the world, neither nation scores well in assessments of gender equity compared to similarly wealthy countries. In the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index (GII), Japan ranks 47th in female political representation and 45th in labor force participation.[3] 45.4% of Japanese women hold the equivalent of a bachelor's degree, but compose only 18.2% of the Japanese labor force and only 6.4% of the managerial class. Only 58.7% of Chinese women had completed secondary

[1]Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[2]Ethan Scheiner, *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). Junnosuke Masumi, 現代政治 : 1955年以後 / Current Politics: 1955 On (Tokyo:
[3]"Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2020," Human Development Reports (United Nations Development Programme, 2020), http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII.

education, compared to 71.9% of men. As of 2019, China was ranked 39th globally in the GII, while Japan came in 24th. In both nations, rates of domestic abuse exceed 25%.[4] While implicitly illegal since the 1980s, the first piece of Chinese legislation to name domestic abuse and provide recourse for battered women was not introduced until 2001 with an amendment to China's Second Marriage Law. In Japan, domestic violence is still governed by civil codes rather than criminal law. Victims have limited avenues to pursue redress, and offenders face neither criminal charges nor mandatory rehabilitation. Domestic women's liberation movements have attempted to address gendered inequalities in their respective nations, but in doing so, they have faced indifference or hostility from their governments.

China has leveraged decision-making and non-decision-making power, as in its overt crackdowns on protests, formal restrictions on political organizations unaffiliated with the state, and legislation that criminalizes "provoking trouble."[5] The Japanese state, meanwhile, has relied heavily on non-decision-making and ideological power to win victories in the cultural sphere that necessarily impacts public policy rather than passing legislation that directly bars women from exercising their rights to speech or petition.[6] The ultimate impact of these strategies has been a Chinese feminist movement that is more popular but less effective in its pursuit of altered policy. In Japan, meanwhile, women's advocacy has been broadly co-opted and the Japanese state has provided concessions that maintain the status quo while failing to address the root of gender inequality in the nation.[7]

Decision-Making Power

The definition of power Lukes proposes is the ability of one party to act in their own interests against those of another party, and decision-making power serves as its most easily identifiable facet due to its visibility.[8] Lukes argues one-dimensional perceptions of power focus solely on "the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of

[4]Kanoko Kamata, "Civic Lawmaking: The Case of the Domestic Violence Movement in Japan," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 16, no. 22 (November 1, 2018), https://doi.org/https://apjjf.org/2018/21/Kamata.html. Cecilia Milwertz, "Activism against Domestic Violence in the People's Republic of China," *Violence Against Women* 9, no. 6 (June 1, 2003): pp. 630-654, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801203009006002.
[5]Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted 2nd Session 5th Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, rev'd 5th Ses. 8th Nat'l People's Cong., March 14, 1997, promulgated March 14, 1997) Art. 293, 1997 P.R.C. Laws (China).
[6]Ayako Kano, "Womenomics and Acrobatics: Why Japanese Feminists Remain Skeptical about Feminist State Policy," *Feminist Encounters: A Journal of Critical Studies in Culture and Politics* 2, no. 1 (March 19, 2018), https://doi.org/10.20897/femenc.201806. 2-3.
[7]Kano, "Womenomics and Acrobatics," 8-10.
[8]Lukes, *Power*, 17-19.

(subjective) interests," and that securing interests through observable conflict is only one of multiple avenues to exercise power.[9] Nonetheless, Lukes incorporates this power - decision-making power - into his three-faced model, arguing not that the decision-making power does not exist or does not deserve examination, but that it is not the sole expression of divergent interests in society, and that theoretical frameworks built upon it in exclusion are incomplete.[10] In the context of gender equity in China and Japan, this paper will view decision-making power as predominant policy preferences and the willingness to enforce them.

Despite the dissimilarities between the situation of women in these nations, the basic goals of feminist movements in China and Japan are broadly aligned: cracking down on sexual violence, securing greater representation in government, and curbing gender discrimination in the school and workplace. The distinction in state action concerning these requests is not unilaterally negative - both nations have modified sexual harassment law in response to recent domestic and international scrutiny - but neither rank well internationally in terms of gender parity, partially as a consequence of policy. In Japan, this manifests as policies that are either weak or nonexistent. Legal definitions of violence or harassment are limiting, standards of proof in civil cases are closer to that of American criminal law, and criminal cases often go unprosecuted, all of which contribute to the prevalence of violence against women.[11] Despite having one of the worst gender gaps of any developed nation per the World Economic Forum, political representation and public policy have moved sluggishly to combat most issues, sometimes backsliding altogether.[12] This inaction contributes to the extant struggles of women.

It is, however, in contrast to the Chinese response, which is more active and hostile towards women who highlight the necessity of greater equality. The Chinese state engages in censorship of rhetoric it considers threatening, and in this respect, agitation against existing gender and sexual hierarchies is no exception. With the words "Me Too" subject to censorship, Chinese feminists attempting to share their experiences and discuss gendered violence used

[9]Lukes, *Power,* 19.
[10]Lukes, *Power*.
[11]Kevin M. Clermont, "Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States," *Cornell International Law Journal* 37, no. 2 (2004), https://doi.org/https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol37/iss2/1. Kasumi Ogasawara, "Current Status of Sex Crimes and Measures for the Victims in Japan," *Japan Medical Association Journal* 54, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): pp. 164-167, https://doi.org/https://www.med.or.jp/english/journal/pdf/2011_03/164_167.pdf.
[12]Saadia Zahidi, "How to Narrow Japan's Widening Gender Gap," World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, March 8, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/international-womens-day-japan-gender-gap.

the homonym "mi tu" (米兔) in order to circumvent censors.[13] As more keywords become subject to monitoring or restriction, however, some women's rights activists have attempted to transition to primarily offline organization. While in-person networks are necessarily more difficult for the state to surveil, physical organizing comes with its own substantial risks.

In 2015, in commemoration of International Women's Day, a variety of Chinese feminists in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hangzhou planned to distribute stickers and informational material on gender equity and sexual harassment. Before they even began their demonstration, dozens were arrested by the Chinese government for "picking quarrels and provoking trouble," considered a crime in China since 1997 that bears a maximum sentence of five years.[14] Most of the women were released, but Li Maizi, Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan, Wu Rongrong, and Wang Man remained imprisoned. The "Gang of Five," or "Feminist Five," as they would become known by the media, were subject to daily interrogations. One of them was denied her hepatitis medication, while another is alleged to have had a minor heart attack in custody.[15] After 37 days and substantial international outcry, the women were eventually released. By this time, many members of their organization had retreated into hiding.[16] In light of this incident and other instances of state hostility, some Chinese activists have elected to organize overseas, which has only contributed to the attempts of the CPC to suppress them. Accusations of "separatism" and hatred of men have expanded to include the claims that Chinese women's rights activists are puppets of foreign powers, acting not to secure their own rights but to sow divisive, dangerous rhetoric and weaken Chinese social harmony.[17]

[13]Mingming Yuan, "Ideological Struggle and Cultural Intervention in Online Discourse: An Empirical Study of Resistance through Translation in China," *Perspectives* 28, no. 4 (2019): pp. 625-643, https://doi.org/10.1080/0907676x.2019.1665692.
[14]Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted 2nd Session 5th Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, rev'd 5th Ses. 8th Nat'l People's Cong., March 14, 1997, promulgated March 14, 1997) Art. 293, 1997 P.R.C. Laws (China).
[15]Andrew Jacobs, "Taking Feminist Battle to China's Streets, and Landing in Jail," The New York Times (The New York Times, April 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/asia/chinese-womens-rights-activists-fall-afoul-of-officials.html.
[16] Emily Rauhala, "China Jails Five Feminists for Activities the Communist Party Supports," Time (Time, March 20, 2015), https://time.com/3750389/china-feminists-international-womens-day-wu-rongrong-wei-tingting-wang-man-zheng-churan-li-tingting/.
[17]Nicola Spakowski, "'Gender' Trouble: Feminism in China under the Impact of Western Theory and The = Spatialization of Identity," *Positions: Asia Critique* 19, no. 1 (January 2011): pp. 31-54, https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-2010-023. Leta Hong Fincher, "Body Is a Battleground," *Betraying Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China* (London, UK: Verso, 2021).

Non-Decision-Making Power

Non-decision-making power departs from decision-making power in that it describes not merely an action, but the range of potential actions available. If the power is the capability to act against the interests of another, then decision-making power describes scenarios in which an interest, expressed as policy, strengthens one group's position while damaging that of the other; non-decision-making power goes further by removing the ability to express an interest politically. Lukes argues that while the two-dimensional model misses what he sees as the third vital means of analyzing power, it expands its understanding of conflict from the solely overt to the covert, allowing for an examination of "*potential* issues over which there is an observable conflict" and taking into account the grievances of "those who are partly or wholly excluded from the political system."[18] Through their predominance in the halls of government, both the Communist Party of China and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan are able to excise certain kinds of discourse from political dialogue entirely, limiting discussions of gender to what they consider the appropriate purview. In their exercise of non-decision-making power, they bear marked similarities, even if their uses of decision-making power show variations.

Constraints on dialogue are evident in the kinds of debate on gender equality that these states are willing to sanction. While both the Chinese and Japanese governments do endorse feminist activism that they see as reasonable, they allow for debate only when it is compatible with their other political goals, does not damage the security of the party, and is unthreatening to what the CPC or LDP consider the "traditional" national understanding of femininity. In China, this state-sanctioned feminism primarily takes the form of the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF). The ACWF was established in 1949 as independent of the CPC, but many of its founding members were prominent within the Party itself and therefore subject to its influence and oversight. Over time, these links were cemented, and the ACWF was often utilized by the CPC as a mobilization tool, achieving Party aims by facilitating a connection with women specifically.

[18]Lukes, *Power*, 24.

The present-day ACWF has aimed to work within the acceptable boundaries of public discourse, which has frequently placed it at a crossroads. While still formally independent of the CPC, it retains a dual responsibility both to the women of China and to the Chinese state, serving, in its own words, "as a bridge linking the party and the government with women and as an important social pillar of the state power."[19] These obligations have often come into conflict, as was the case during China's One-Child Policy. The ACWF's response highlighted the disproportionate burdens borne by Chinese women in family planning but characterized the issues of female infanticide and coerced sterilization as a matter of socialist modernization rather than individual rights or the rights of a particular group. The order, the ACWF argued, was deleterious to "a collective pursuit that supposedly benefits everyone, including both women and men," and was therefore objectionable for the damage it did to "national modernization," adopting a framing in which "individual and state are organized not in separation and opposition."[20] When the interests it represents come into conflict with extant policy, those interests must be made compatible, altering the focus of discourse and constraining it to a particular set of arguments that present women's liberation as necessary to national well-being rather than the well-being of women as a discrete group with their own goals.[21] Rather than actively pursuing an abolition of the order, the ACWF focused primarily on alternative means of population control instead of its wholesale abandonment.

In more recent years, as the impacts of the One-Child Policy have led to a dearth of marriageable women and a declining birth rate, the ACWF has coined the term "leftover women" to describe women of childbearing age who have yet to find a husband. Of women who are highly-educated but still single as they near the age of 30, the ACWF said "The tragedy is, they don't realize that as women age, they are worth less and less, so by the time they get their M.A. or Ph. D, they are already old, like yellowed pearls." It exhorted women - especially "girls with an average or ugly appearance" - to marry as soon as possible in order to maximize their chances of securing a husband, advising women to drop their romantic standards and start a family as soon as the opportunity arose.[22] The basic principles of the ACWF are clear, but the ways in

[19]"About the ACWF," All China Women's Federation (All China Women's Federation, n.d.), http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/about/1503/2333-1.htm.
[20]Yuk-Lin Renita Wong, "Dispersing the 'Public' and the 'Private,'" *Gender & Society* 11, no. 4 (1997): pp. 509-525, https://doi.org/10.1177/089124397011004007.
[21]Wang, *Finding Women in the State*, 50-53.
[22]Leta Hong Fincher, *Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China* (London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016). 3,19.

which they may be expressed have been limited by the organization's proximity to power. Regarding reproductive agency, the ACWF's position has varied based on whether or not it is able to reconcile its dedication to women's liberation with the expressed aims of the Chinese state. In its opposition to the One-Child Policy, the ACWF made this stance compatible with state aims, and in its condemnation of unmarried women, it has elected not to advocate for a particular right (to choose to remain unmarried) that has been defined out of the range of acceptable discourse. A survey of 494 women workers in the Guangdong region found that only 5% identified the ACWF as "the most effective body in resolving their problems at work," citing the "pragmatic and gradualist" approach of the ACWF as deleterious to its efficacy.[23] These complaints and others suggest that state-sanctioned organizations like the ACWF are limited in their responses by the non-decision-making power of the state.

While election to Japan's Diet is not legally restricted to members of the LDP, the LDP's strong, longstanding hold on its parliamentary majority has likewise allowed it to restrict the purview of debates on gender equity. The internal politics of Japan's Diet operate on a complex web of links between bureaucrats, politicians, and influential private citizens based partially on ideological similarities, but just as frequently on political mentorship. Ascension in the ranks is typically achieved by tying oneself to a particular mentor or patron, with the implication that present-day support will lead to future gains in influence.[24] Despite maintaining a degree of ideological diversity through the process of allying with or absorbing smaller parties, the LDP keeps a hold of the government, and gender discourse in politics has been driven primarily by its leadership, including former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

In 2013, as part of an attempt to address some of the criticisms his administration had faced with regard to their policies on gender, then-PM Shinzo Abe launched a collection of economic initiatives, nicknamed "Womenomics," designed to bolster Japan's aging workforce by taking greater advantage of working-age women. These policies were designed to encourage female participation in the Japanese labor force and led to a roughly two-million-person increase in the number of working women, but failed to address many of the opposition's concerns about women and labor. Like its political system, the business system of Japan is reliant on perceived

[23]Cooke, "China: Labour Organizations," 44, 47.
[24]Masumi, "Current Politics," Scheiner, *Democracy Without Competition,* 64-89.

loyalty and patronage. Promotion in a firm requires commitment and constant availability, with the potential and willingness to put in overtime as a prime marker of a promising employee. 44.2% of Japanese working women hold part-time positions with little opportunity for promotion, and only 6.4% of those in management positions are female.[25] Selecting for variations in time spent at a particular workplace and rates of education, the International Monetary Fund found that being male increased the chance of a promotion tenfold while being a college graduate increased it by a factor of only 1.65.[26] This verifies many cultural analyses of Japan, as well as the anecdotal experiences of workplace discrimination reported by many Japanese women, wherein even highly-educated and qualified employees in exacting fields - medicine, economics, teaching - are expected to defer to less-experienced male colleagues.[27]

Female undereducation, the inability to secure reliable childcare while at work, prioritization of the family, and the tendency of women to pursue lower-paying jobs of their own volition were all phenomena targeted by Abe's Womenomics policies, but the idea that Japanese women might be discriminated against has been broached most loudly by private citizens. Masahiko Uotani, CEO of popular cosmetics manufacturer Shiseido, called Japan's 110 ranking on the Gender Gap Index "completely unacceptable," touting his own company's quota of 40% female management as a noble goal other businessmen should strive to meet. Uotani's interests, however, align fairly closely with those of women; as the head of a Japanese cosmetics company, the market to which he must appeal is almost entirely female.[28] An alteration in the political order - concessions for female activists, greater political representation for women, concrete changes in policy - threatens the establishment and the system of mentorship it relies upon. Changing the internal structure of Shiseido alone is both easier and less threatening - if anything, as a move that demonstrates respect for its primary clientele, it has the potential to breed an increase in sales.

[25]Pamela Boykoff and Cardiff Garcia, "6 Years After Japan Launched Its 'Womenomics' Policy: Is It Working?," NPR (NPR, May 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/23/726294619/6-years-after-japan-launched-its-womenomics-policy-is-it-working.
[26]Kazuo Yamaguchi, "Japan's Gender Gap," Finance & Development (International Monetary Fund, March 2019), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/gender-equality-in-japan-yamaguchi.htm.
[27]Joanna Liddle and Sachiko Nakajima, *Rising Suns, Rising Daughters: Gender, Class and Power in Japan* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000). 267.
[28]Walter Sim, "Japan PM Shinzo Abe Touts Strides in Gender Equality despite Poor Global Rankings," The Straits Times, March 23, 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-pm-shinzo-abe-touts-strides-in-gender-equality-despite-poor-global-rankings.

In keeping with Lukes' analysis of non decision-making power, there are segments of the Japanese public who have advocated for comprehensive rather than gradualist reforms, and the LDP's success in keeping them from the exercise of decision-making power does not imply they do not exist. Of the parties that have pushed for greater representation for women in government and policies more favorable to women's rights, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), current leaders of the opposition, have risen as the most notable. Rather than approaching low workforce participation as a consequence of undereducation or individual choice, the CDP platform focuses more heavily on addressing gendered discrimination and material obstacles to workforce participation as a means to increase the number of Japanese working women. While the opposition's stance has provided an alternative to voters, this alternative is unacceptable to the "political coalitions between conservative policymakers, politicians, large firms, and core regular workers" that ultimately determine which factions remain in power.[29] The LDP is able to maintain its position by "not offending these key constituencies," but in doing so, it has not addressed the inequities Womenomics was designed to reduce.[30] The CDP, meanwhile, has placed itself at odds with the traditional patron-client system through which power is allocated, preventing it from including its platform as even one of a range of potential options. In the 2019 Parliamentary election, the LDP fielded 12 female candidates, of whom 10 gained seats. Despite offering almost double that number, only six female candidates who were run by the opposition were actually elected.[31]

Ideological Power

Lukes' primary revision of previous understandings of power is the addition of a third facet: the ideological. Prior models of power that incorporated only the decision-making and non-decision-making facets struggled to identify the differences between the successful utilization of non-decision-making power and "universal acquiescence in the status quo."[32] The idea of power upon which these models rely is designed to analyze conflict, but if a conflict is

[29]Mark Crawford, "Abe's Womenomics Policy, 2013-2020: Tokenism, Gradualism, or Failed Strategy?," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 19, no. 4 (February 15, 2021), https://doi.org/https://apjjf.org/2021/4/Crawford.html.
[30]Crawford, "Abe's Womenomics."
[31]"Record Number of Women Win Seats in Japan Election, but Female Voters Wary of Government's Empowerment Pledge," The Japan Times (株式会社ジャパンタイムズ/Japan Times Ltd., July 22, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/07/22/national/politics-diplomacy/record-number-women-win-seats-japan-election-female-voters-wary-governments-empowerment-pledge/.
[32]Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): pp. 947-952, https://doi.org/10.2307/1952796, 949.

not observable, it cannot be distinguished from an agreement. The inclusion of non-decision-making power in this framework is designed to take into account the desires of those who fall outside extant systems, not merely those who act within them. Even within the dual framework of power, however, Lukes identifies a potential flaw: an agreement that is forced is difficult to distinguish from one that is genuine if any grievance would be covert regardless.

The challenge Lukes attempts to address in his revisions to single or dual-dimensional frameworks is in determining the difference between a peace that has been enforced by the more powerful actor and a peace that is the product of genuine complacency. Lukes concludes that when left with only two dimensions, the model of power has failed to address "the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups."[33] Power, Lukes argues, is not an individual phenomenon, but a group of people acting in concert to secure shared interests. The third dimension of power, where conflicts go unacknowledged even by the party under the power of the other, is the ideological. Despite the innate conflict in interest between one group and another, neither may even be aware it exists. It never enters the political realm not because it has been expelled by force or defined out of the range of acceptable discourse, but because normative principles are embraced even by those who are most negatively affected by the distribution and use of power. Lukes references gender politics explicitly in his analysis, claiming that while female compliance with orders that do not benefit them is often coerced, it can often be the consequence of self-policing and the internalization of norms.[34] With regard to gender norms and female political participation, the Chinese state is fighting a headwind it is partially responsible for. The losses Chinese women's liberation has faced in concrete policy change and acceptability of discourse run counter to its success in the realm of popular perception.

The argument that the use of ideological power against women's liberation movements has been more successful in Japan than in China seems, on its face, a difficult one to make, as the Chinese state has historically leveraged coercion and persuasion in conjunction. The Chinese state's endorsement of women's liberation under Mao has, however, led to an alteration of norms that allow Chinese women greater self-advocacy, even if they must contend with the struggles of organizing when most common forums are routinely censored or purged. The ideal basis of comparison between China, a state that regularly utilizes censorship tools to

[33]Lukes, *Power*, 28.
[34]Lukes, *Power*, 99.

counteract feminist organizations, and Japan, where free speech rights are more robust, is the success of the Me Too movement in China and the failure of its Japanese equivalent.[35] Ideological power, when well-exercised, is indistinguishable from voluntary choice, and the absence of observable conflict in Japan, when compared to China, is a consequence of the use of ideological power to force conflicts into latency.

The best-known "face" of the Me Too movement in Japan is journalist Shiori Ito. In 2018, Ito met Noriyuki Yamaguchi, an influential journalist and a friend of Shinzo Abe, for dinner with the intent of discussing a job opportunity. According to Ito, Yamaguchi drugged her, took her to a hotel, and assaulted her. After facing pushback from law enforcement, who variously made her re-enact her assault, told her she did not seem like a victim, and ultimately declined to prosecute, Ito went public with her claims.[36] Due to inconsistencies in Yamaguchi's story, the court eventually awarded Ito 3 million yen ($30,000) in a civil suit.[37] Rather than replicating the Me Too movement as it took place in the United States, however, the response was relatively hushed. When Alyssa Milano accused Harvey Weinstein of rape, 87 subsequent women came forward with allegations of harassment and assault against him, and hundreds more took to social media to share stories of painful personal experiences with unrelated assaulters.[38] While other public accusations of assault have taken place in Japan, the scale has not been comparable to that of similar movements abroad.

Japanese law allows for the conviction of rape only if the victim can provide proof that physical violence or threats were involved, and this narrow perception of sexual violence is supported by polling. In a poll conducted by Japan's public broadcasting network Nippon Hoso Kyokai (日本放送協会, NHK), 11% of respondents said that if two people agreed to have dinner alone with one another, consent to sexual activity had been provided implicitly, irrespective of later accounts. In the same poll, 27% said that having a drink would constitute consent, and

[35]Linda Hasunuma and Ki-young Shin, "#MeToo in Japan and South Korea: #WeToo, #WithYou," *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 40, no. 1 (March 2, 2019): pp. 97-111, https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2019.1563416.
[36]Shaun O'Dwyer, "What Lies behind Shiori Ito's Lonely #Metoo Struggle," The Japan Times (株式会社ジャパンタイムズ/Japan Times Ltd., January 28, 2020), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/01/26/commentary/japan-commentary/lies-behind-shiori-itos-lonely-metoo-struggle/. Shiori Ito, *Black Box* (S.l., Japan: Tilted Axis Press, 2021).
[37]"Shiori Ito: Japanese Journalist Awarded $30,000 in Damages in Rape Case," BBC News (BBC, December 18, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50832524.
[38]"Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded," BBC News (BBC, April 7, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672.

35% believed drinking to intoxication would constitute consent, even though the formal ruling in Ito's case held that extreme intoxication removes an individual's ability to provide informed consent.[39] A separate poll by anti-sexual assault advocacy organization WeToo saw 64.4% responding that kissing qualified as consent to sexual activity.[40]

Comparatively, in the United States, the Me Too movement that began with the outing of figures like Harvey Weinstein and Bill Cosby as serial sexual predators relied on an outgrowth of public support. While the backlash against potential victims was and remains substantial, the Me Too phenomenon was reliant on a pre-existing willingness to engage in broad dialogue. The fact that Shiori Ito's story was perceived differently by the Japanese public than Alyssa Milano's was by the United States demonstrates the impact of ideological power. If power is the behavior of groups to secure their interests, then the widespread consequences of Milano's accusation against Weinstein cannot be understood merely as one woman precipitating a sea change, but as an individual riding an existing wave. The movement that followed Milano's claim expressed a collective desire to address sexual violence in general. Yamaguchi's conviction for the assault against Ito was touted as a victory for Japanese women's liberation but is speculated to have been largely the product of international backlash.[41] Ito had been instructed not to come forward for the good of the nation, but the time she did, it was already too late; to save face internationally and combat the perception of Japan as hyper-traditional and hostile to women, it was necessary to convict her abuser. Milano's victory (and that of the 87 other women) was symbolic of a broader change in norms that had already taken place, while Ito, by coming forward, was faced with the impossible task of provoking one.

In contrast, despite crackdowns against feminist organizations and the promotion of rhetoric that holds Chinese feminists to be man-hating, separatist tools of the West, the Me Too movement in China has nonetheless gained ground. The Great Firewall system of online censorship and information restriction often scans for particular keywords, but rather than posting under a "#MeToo," campaigners against sexual violence have used the hashtag "#米兔," (*mi tu*), a homonym that translates to "rice rabbit." The new hashtag served both as a means to

[39]9時台の企画 みんなで話そう！性的同意のコト," NHKあさイチ (NHK, October 19th, 2019), https://www1.nhk.or.jp/asaichi/archive/201019/4.html
[40]Aizawa Yuko, "Lifting the Lid on Japan's Harassment Problem," NHK WORLD (NHK, December 20, 2019), https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/361/.
[41]O'Dwyer, "Shiori Ito's Lonely Struggle."

organize and as a way to demonstrate linguistically that Chinese feminism was, in this respect, homegrown. The initial catalyst for Me Too within China had been Western, but concerns around the safety of women were an expression of domestic realities.[42]

The Chinese state treats most political organizations outside of the Party as a potential threat, and Chinese feminism is viewed particularly dimly not only as a form of resistance but as one that already has a substantial historical antecedent within Chinese culture generally and Chinese communism specifically. Despite the modern-day promotion of neo-Confucianism, the Marxist-Leninist roots of the present-day state held the feudal order to be an unjust hierarchy and viewed traditional gender roles as an outgrowth of it. Many elements of Maoism and Maoist propaganda can be seen as pseudo-feminist, and the thought of contemporaries like his wife, Jian Qing, are particularly overt in their glorification of the female revolutionary.[43] By demanding adherence to socialism with Chinese characteristics, the state risks its legitimacy by coming into conflict with women's liberation activists. As the popular embrace of #米兔 has shown, the promotion of the state ideology has laid the groundwork for thought that is anti-hierarchical, even if the hierarchy being opposed is that which has been erected by the state itself. The primary danger of Chinese feminism to the state lies in its potential popularity, and despite the efforts to repress it, some of that popularity has already been realized.

This contrast is rendered even more notable by virtue of the fact that many of the underlying bases for Chinese and Japanese gender norms are shared. Prior to the fourteenth century and the importation/adoption of Confucian role ethics and gendered expectations, Japanese society was comparatively egalitarian. Women exercised the right to own property, marriages were understood to be voluntary and potentially impermanent, and while women never achieved the kind of political and especially military status held by Japanese men, they

[42]Spakowski, "'Gender' Trouble: Impact of Western Theory."
Yuan, "Ideological Struggle and Cultural Intervention in Online Discourse," 625-643.
[43]Zheng Wang, *Finding Women in the State a Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People's Republic of CHINA, 1949-1964* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017), 303-308.

were nonetheless assumed to hold a spiritual and intellectual potential on par with that of men. Japan's medieval transition - described by Keirstead as a "sex change" from the"luxurious, fluid, feminine era" to the "staunchly masculine" feudal period - aligned it more closely with the Confucian concepts that had already taken deep root in neighboring China.[44]

In intervening years, the backlash against feudal ideas under the Mao regime led to the alteration or abandonment of many of these role structures, while the "ideal of Japan" remains reliant on the perception of the nation as it existed in the medieval period. Neo-Confucian concepts in China are an attempt to return to prior conceptions of gender that were explicitly rejected by its more recent state ideologies, while the concept of Japanese "traditional" gender, reified during the Meiji Restoration and re-enforced during the Showa period, has been a constant element of the state ideology for centuries.[45] The idea of a China divorced from Confucian gender norms is one that has been adopted by some of its most visible leaders in the political and civil realms; the same is not true for Japan, where the popular conception of the Japanese woman has for centuries diminished her socioeconomic and political power.

Conclusions

China places more formal restrictions on political organization, but the exercise of decision-making power belies mounting losses in the ideological realm. Between the material conditions of the Chinese woman, wherein she is outnumbered by men and therefore exercises more control in when and who she marries, and the political history of the nation, where female political participation and the subversion of gender hierarchies were once explicit elements of the state ideology, women's liberation has made gains in popular support. Japan, in contrast, has a comparatively weak Me Too movement, fewer extant women's liberation organizations, and an opposition that risks its power each time it attempts to push for more comprehensive gender-equity measures. The use of decision-making power by China has led to greater visibility for female activists both domestically and internationally but has made organization

[44]Thomas Keirstead, "The Gendering and Regendering of Medieval Japan," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 9 (1995): 77-92, https://doi.org/http://www.jstor.org/stable/42772086.
[45]Takashi Fujitani, *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 171-195.

both difficult and dangerous. In Japan, meanwhile, the reliance on ideological power, rather than overt power or coercion, has sapped popular support for women's liberation in both the civil and political realms.

This is not to say that change in either country is an impossibility. Despite the substantial political obstacles that stand in the way of Chinese gender equality, the growing popularity of feminist thought and its significance to Chinese political history may eventually make crackdowns a less practical option than compromise. While this paper attempts to chart the behaviors of large groups and institutions, a substantial diversity of political thought exists in Japan, and altered policy remains a possibility - either through the weakening of the clientelism that makes Japanese politics so change-resistant, or however unlikely, by an internal shift in the LDP itself.

While the one- and two-dimensional models of power are antecedent to Lukes and his third dimension, it is the introduction of the ideological angle where Lukes has faced the most substantial criticism and where he has mounted the most vigorous defense of his central arguments. In a 1997 response to *Power*, Colin Hays claims the introduction of ideological power as a third facet effectively removes the potential of individuals to recognize their circumstances or attempt to alter them. According to Hays, with the addition of an ideological element of power, Lukes "resurrects the specter of false consciousness," and promotes a "deeply condescending conception of the social subject as an ideological dupe."[46] If Hays' reading is applied, then while the Chinese woman, aware of her circumstances and eager to change them, may eventually make progress in the decision-making or non-decision-making realms, the Japanese woman has no such potential. This is an application of his argument that Lukes takes pains to refute.

Decision-making power, while efficacious, is unignorable - both those it has been utilized against and onlookers with no specific interest can recognize and respond to its use. Non-decision-making power forces conflicts to the margins of political dialogue, but cannot extinguish them fully. Ideological power, as Lukes describes it, "is always focused on particular

[46]Colin Hay, "Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept of Power," *Politics* 17, no. 1 (1997): pp. 45-52, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00033.

domains of experience and is never, except in fictional dystopias, more than partially effective."[47] To clarify his position, Lukes returns again to gender politics, noting that women who have internalized normative attitudes may not press their interests through overt or covert conflict, but retain their ability to accurately evaluate their position and behave rationally under those circumstances. Even when the expression of interests has been disincentivized, this does not preclude the recognition of those interests or plans to pursue them in the future: "One can consent to power and resent the mode of its exercise."[48] The derailment of women's liberation in China or Japan is not indicative of a lack of motivation or capability on the part of the women affected, but of a lack of power - and even when power is utilized to substantial effect, its balance has always been shifted by time.

[47]Lukes, Power, 150.
[48]Ibid., 150.

References

Bachrach, Peter, and Morton S. Baratz. “Two Faces of Power.” *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 947–52. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952796.

Boykoff, Pamela, and Cardiff Garcia. “6 Years After Japan Launched Its 'Womenomics' Policy: Is It Working?” NPR. NPR, May 23, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/05/23/726294619/6-years-after-japan-launched-its-womenomics-policy-is-it-working.

Clermont, Kevin M. “Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States.” *Cornell International Law Journal* 37, no. 2 (2004). https://doi.org/https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol37/iss2/1.

Cooke, Fang Lee. “China: Labour Organizations Representing Women.” Essay. In *Women and Labour Organizing in Asia: Diversity, Autonomy and Activism*, edited by Kaye Broadbent and Michele Ford, 1st ed., 52–67. London: Routledge, 2008.

Crawford, Mark. “Abe’s Womenomics Policy, 2013-2020: Tokenism, Gradualism, or Failed Strategy?” *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 4, 19, no. 4 (February 15, 2021). https://doi.org/https://apjjf.org/2021/4/Crawford.html.

Fincher, Leta Hong. *Betraying Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China*. London, UK: Verso, 2021.

Fincher, Leta Hong. *Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China*. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.

Fujitani, Takashi. *Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998.

“Gender Inequality Index (GII) 2020.” Human Development Reports. United Nations Development Programme, 2020. http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GII.

Hasunuma, Linda, and Ki-young Shin. “#MeToo in Japan and South Korea: #WeToo, #WithYou.”

Journal of Women, Politics & Policy 40, no. 1 (March 2, 2019): 97–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2019.1563416.

"Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded." BBC News. BBC, April 7, 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672.

Hay, Colin. "Divided by a Common Language: Political Theory and the Concept of Power." *Politics* 17, no. 1 (1997): 45–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9256.00033.

Jacobs, Andrew. "Taking Feminist Battle to China's Streets, and Landing in Jail." The New York Times. The New York Times, April 5, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/world/asia/chinese-womens-rights-activists-fall-afoul-of-officials.html.

Kamata, Kanoko. "Civic Lawmaking: The Case of the Domestic Violence Movement in Japan." *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 1, 16, no. 22 (November 1, 2018). https://doi.org/https://apjjf.org/2018/21/Kamata.html.Kano, Ayako. "Womenomics and Acrobatics: Why Japanese Feminists Remain Skeptical about Feminist State Policy." *Feminist Encounters: A Journal of Critical Studies in Culture and Politics* 2, no. 1 (2018). https://doi.org/10.20897/femenc.201806.

Keirstead, Thomas. "The Gendering and Regendering of Medieval Japan." *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 9 (1995): 77–92. https://doi.org/http://www.jstor.org/stable/42772086.

Liddle, Joanna, and Sachiko Nakajima. *Rising Suns, Rising Daughters: Gender, Class and Power in Japan*. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000.

Lukes, Steven. *Power: A Radical View*. 2nd ed. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Masumi, Junnosuke. *Gendai Seiji: 1955-Nen Igo*. Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985.

Milwertz, Cecilia. "Activism against Domestic Violence in the People's Republic of China." *Violence Against Women* 9, no. 6 (June 1, 2003): 630–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801203009006002.

O'Dwyer, Shaun. "What Lies behind SHIORI Ito's Lonely #Metoo Struggle." The Japan Times.

株式会社ジャパンタイムズ/Japan Times Ltd., January 28, 2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/01/26/commentary/japan-commentary/lies-behind-shiori-itos-lonely-metoo-struggle/.

Ogasawara, Kasumi. “Current Status of Sex Crimes and Measures for the Victims in Japan.” *Japan Medical Association Journal* 54, no. 3 (May 1, 2011): 164–67. https://doi.org/https://www.med.or.jp/english/journal/pdf/2011_03/164_167.pdf.

Rauhala, Emily. “China Jails Five Feminists for Activities the Communist Party Supports.” Time. Time, March 20, 2015. https://time.com/3750389/china-feminists-international-womens-day-wu-rongrong-wei-tingting-wang-man-zheng-churan-li-tingting/.

“Record Number of Women Win Seats in Japan Election, but Female Voters Wary of Government's Empowerment Pledge.” The Japan Times. 株式会社ジャパンタイムズ /Japan Times Ltd., July 22, 2019. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/07/22/national/politics-diplomacy/record-number-women-win-seats-japan-election-female-voters-wary-governments-empowerment-pledge/.

Shiori Ito, *Black Box* (S.l., Japan: Tilted Axis Press, 2021).

“Shiori Ito: Japanese Journalist Awarded $30,000 in Damages in Rape Case.” BBC News. BBC, December 18, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50832524.

Sim, Walter. “Japan PM Shinzo Abe Touts Strides in Gender Equality despite Poor Global Rankings.” The Straits Times, March 23, 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/japan-pm-shinzo-abe-touts-strides-in-gender-equality-despite-poor-global-rankings.

Spakowski, Nicola. “‘Gender’ Trouble: Feminism in China under the Impact of Western Theory and The Spatialization of Identity.” *Positions: Asia Critique* 19, no. 1 (2011): 31–54. https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-2010-023.

Wang, Zheng. *Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People's Republic of CHINA, 1949-1964*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2017.

Yamaguchi, Kazuo. "Japan's Gender Gap." Finance & Development. International Monetary Fund, March 2019. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/03/gender-equality-in-japan-yamaguchi.htm.

Yuan, Mingming. "Ideological Struggle and Cultural Intervention in Online Discourse: An Empirical Study of Resistance through Translation in China." *Perspectives* 28, no. 4 (2019): 625–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/0907676x.2019.1665692.

Yuko, Aizawa. "Lifting the Lid on Japan's Harassment Problem." NHK WORLD. NHK, December 20, 2019. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/361/.

Zahidi, Saadia. "How to Narrow Japan's Widening Gender Gap." World Economic Forum. World Economic Forum, March 8, 2020. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/international-womens-day-japan-gender-gap.

Review of *The Collision of Political and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Court's Transformation of Executive Authority* by Kimberley L. Fletcher

Emily Downs, Virginia Commonwealth University

In political science scholar Kimberley L. Fletcher's study *The Collision of Political and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs and the Supreme Court's Transformation of Executive Authority* the law and American Political Development (APD) to "reexamine foreign affairs cases to illustrate how the Supreme Court created a new constitutional order in 1936 and redistributed the balance of power between Congress and the executive" (2018, p. 10). She hypothesizes that the Supreme Court acts as an "agent of change" and creates new constitutional orders for the other branches, but particularly the executive, to follow. Each chapter breaks down an example of the Supreme Court doing this, in chronological order along the developmental timeline. Fletcher begins with the case of the *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936), moves on to the period of the Japanese internment cases (1940s), then carries on to the case of *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer* (1952), before moving to the cases of *Dames & Moore v. Regan* (1981) and *Regan v. Wald* (1984), and finishing with the detainee cases during the Bush administration and a strong conclusion on "constitutional change instigated outside the legalized constitution" (p. 179). She explains the cases' roles in changing or shaping the executive's role in foreign and domestic affairs, the historical, political, and legal context of each ruling, and the logic and mindset of each justice involved in each decision. Fletcher frequently reiterates the importance of the Supreme Court's role and the profound impact it has had on the roles of the branches of government. In doing so, she makes a compelling case for the Court to be seen as an active member of the government rather than a reactive or passive voice.

Fletcher's work is well-researched, and she discusses many other researchers' theories and frameworks, such as Kahn's constructive model, and their applicability and relevance to her own research. She makes each point of her logic convincing and draws them together to form a cohesive whole, tied back to her overarching thesis at every possible juncture. The result is a beautifully crafted argument with

compelling reasoning and an intricate discussion of every aspect of each case.

Fletcher does an excellent job creating a narrative that keeps the reader engaged and curious, actively interested in the next steps the Court will take and the resulting impact it will have on the executive branch. Her language choices are impeccable and it is clear that she spent an extensive amount of time thinking about both the structure and the formatting of the book. Fletcher's ability to turn broad, sweeping claims about the role of the Court in U.S. government and policymaking into bite-sized examples in the form of easy-to-follow cases is astounding and, frankly, admirable. At times, her attempts to write in the language of academia result in word choice that is a bit beyond the reach of most readers, but this is the only criticism this book managed to garner. Fletcher made her points and plan so clear at the beginning of the book that the chapters to come were easy to follow and, instead of feeling like new territory, reminded this reader of a warm welcome home. Despite this clarity eradicating any need for reintroduction, Fletcher made a point to provide a road map at the beginning of each chapter and connect back to her primary thesis multiple times throughout the text. The outcome is a strong reinforcement of her main points and a clear understanding of the timeline she established and the impacts that it had.

The Collision of Political and Legal Time is one of, if not the, most comprehensive and informative case reviews on the impact of the Supreme Court on the executive's role in foreign affairs in today's academic market. Going into it with little to no knowledge of the subject, this reader can confidently say that it is an excellent source of information for any level of prior experience, as she introduces almost all concepts on an elementary level and elevates them to the highest extent possible during the duration of the reading. For anyone interested in the Supreme Court's role as an agent of change in the executive's role in foreign affairs, *The Collision of Political and Legal Time* is an excellent place to start and finish your research, as you will receive the answers to almost any questions you could possibly have in those pages. Another researcher looking to take up her torch could expand on the present day situation, covering all cases that may have had an impact since the publishing of the study, and discussing future implications.

Review of *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism* by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart

Jasmine VanDyke, Virginia Commonwealth University

The expansion of populist political rhetoric in the 21st century has sparked an imminent threat to international politics and democratic practices. In Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart's 2019 study, *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism,* the researchers seek to rationalize the growing trend of Authoritarian populism in Western democracies. Norris and Inglehart question why individuals embrace authoritarian values, and how this embracement manifests in electoral politics. The authors hypothesize that acceptance of authoritarian values and populist rhetoric is rooted in a cultural backlash within socially conservative groups. This authoritarian reflex by socially conservative groups is manifested through "us versus them" populist rhetoric that is exacerbated by perceived economic insecurity and grievances that have come about as a result of globalization. The tipping point of the backlash is generational; the authors structure the Interwar and Baby Boomer generations as materialist generations more likely to adopt authoritarian values and Generation X and Millennials as post-materialist; less likely to support authoritarian values. Ultimately, this hypothesis proves to be only a partial understanding.

Norris and Inglehart utilize European Social Survey data to develop populism and libertarian/authoritarian scales highlighting issues of immigration and economic grievances. With this measurement, socially liberal parties lean libertarian, and socially conservative parties lean authoritarian. Both sides of the political spectrum are subjected to populist rhetoric and politics. This scale is then utilized to categorize European political parties and leaders. Following this organization step, the researchers analyze electoral data from generational cohorts. The results support Norris and Inglehart's theory of older generations being more likely to support authoritarian-leaning parties and younger generations in support of more libertarian parties. Notably, populist appeals cross-generational differences. Regarding economic grievances, the research shows social issues trump these concerns, making them minute in understanding the embracement of authoritarianism. Furthermore, the correlation established

through European Social Survey data is extended in case studies of the 2016 election of President Donald Trump
in the United States and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. The authors focus on the socially conservative perspectives and the subsequent authorization values that were presented through populist frameworks. Similar results are seen as with the survey data: the electoral results show older generations in support of Trump and Brexit due to the perceived threat of cultural changes fostering an embracement of authoritarian values. Younger generations are less supportive of these values but are also found to be less likely to participate in electoral politics. As a result, the older generation's values are more represented in government.

Norris and Inglebert supply substantial evidence in support of their thesis but fail to establish proper cause and effect. There remains a distinct correlation between the embracement of authoritarian values and generational cohorts, but the researchers fail to fully prove their cultural backlash theory. Social issues are clearly important to voters based on survey data, but Norris and Inglebert fail to fully address differences in generations outside of their scale. This includes educational access, political activity outside of electoral politics, and social cleavages. Additionally, the application of the model based on European Survey data is subjective to the questions asked in the survey. Implementation of this scale to other states is also disputable because of differences in political cultures.

Despite the in-depth creation and analysis of their collected data, there is not enough evidence to fully support the cultural backlash theory. Still, the differences that were seen in the generational embracement of authoritarian values remain crucial in understanding trends of democratic backsliding. Norris and Inglehart's research is a starting point and the cultural backlash thesis remains plausible, but the methodological approach must be more thorough.