Affect, Identity, and Ethnicity: Towards a Social-Psychological Model of Ethnic Attachment

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Since the days of Shils and Geertz it has been common to refer to ethnicity as a bond, a tie, or an attachment. Shils used the term "tie" in the title of his seminal 1957 article to refer to a set of social relationships, including what he called "civil," "kinship," "sacred," and "primordial." The primordial tie was notable for the "ineffable significance" which social actors attribute to it and to the relationship which it engenders: "the attachment [is] not merely to the other ... as a person, but as a possessor of certain especially 'significant relational' qualities, which could only be described as primordial. The attachment ... is not just a function of interaction." Subsequently Geertz developed the notion of ethnic "attachment" as an affect and identity, or better yet, an affect-centered identity. The intention, often quite explicit, of these thinkers and the many who followed them was to emphasize the emotional quality of ethnicity as an explanation of its persistence and power. At the same time, as an emotional and not rational phenomenon, ethnicity was expected to decline and disappear under the onslaught of modern rationalizing social forces.

This essay returns to the issue of ethnicity as an affective relationship. It will argue that affect is indeed a critical element in ethnicity but that the theoretical treatment of ethnic affect has tended to be counterproductive. Simply put, the appeal to ethnic "bonds," "ties," or "attachments" has inhibited the analysis of ethnic attachment because

the terms are unarticulated and purportedly in no need of articulation. The unexamined use of affect or the use of unexamined affect as the base of ethnicity has led to the overestimation of its irrationality, underestimation of its variability, and disregard of its social construction.

Therefore, I will sketch a model of ethnic attachment as affect but as comprehensible affect. First, I will demonstrate that ethnicity is characterized by an emotional attachment. I will then show how the apparent ineffability of ethnic attachment has misled us. Finally, I will illustrate how conceptually-examined and socially-constructed affect can be brought to ethnicity by introducing two theories of attachment from psychology -- Bowlby's attachment theory and Tajfel's social identification theory -- and exploring in a preliminary way their implications for a social theory of ethnicity. This will contribute to the "psycho-cultural approach to social belonging" upon which a complete understanding of ethnicity depends.

Ethnicity as Affect

Most -- but not all -- theorists seem to agree that ethnicity is essentially or largely a "sentiment," "feeling," or emotion: "ethnicity is felt." From this perspective ethnicity is the feeling of being "attached" to some group and/or its symbols or "markers." Individuals experience a certain attendant affect which makes the group and its markers important to their own sense of identity, interest, and destiny.

What holds the individual to the ethnic markers and what makes of him or her an ethnic member and makes of the group an ethnic group is an emotional attachment. It is this emotional attachment, most theorists agree, which renders the markers and the group personally significant and which gives ethnicity its distinctive power, pervasiveness, and persistence (and in many eyes perniciousness). Individuals are deeply emotionally involved with or committed to the markers of their group and to other members of the group, and individual identity and action are accordingly based on this affective connection to group and symbol.

However, this being said, ethnicity theory has often not scrutinized this fundamental bridging concept which nevertheless is called upon to do such critical duty in the explanatory process. What is this emotion like? How is the emotional attachment formed? These are questions which are not adequately asked. In fact, in many formulations they are questions which do not need to be asked beyond the two assumptions that it carries a high -- an invariably high -- "emotional loading" for all individuals in all groups and that it is essentially primal, natural, unconstructed and not a function of interaction, that is, primordial.

It is well to remember, given that the subject of this volume is "Ethnicity: Family and Community," in looking for an analogy of ethnic attachment with the qualities of strong, natural, and primal feeling, a
number of theorists have settled upon kinship. Geertz identified a relation between family ties and ethnic "primordial sentiments," the latter arising naturally from the "givens...of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connections mainly" but also community and group social facts. Subsequent theorists have been more forceful: one writes that the "language of ethnicity is the language of kinship," while another asserts that ethnicity and race are "extensions of the idiom of kinship, and...ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection." In the kinship model of ethnicity kinship is natural, apriori, and ineffable emotion in need of no other explanation than its existence. And since many ethnic groups and members stake their ethnicity on idioms of birth, descent, and group history -- the same markers upon which kinship is staked -- the theorists are often led to conclude that ethnicity too is a natural, apriori, ineffable emotion. In other words, easily (but not necessarily) this appeal to the kinship idiom can lead theorists back again to primordialism (or the most extreme "naturalist" theory -- sociobiology) in a closed circle of logic.

For many ethnicity theorists, the centrality of emotion positively demands a primordialist reading. The very value of primordialism is its focus on "the great emotional strength" of ethnic attachment. In fact, some theorists have thought that primordialism is a necessary way if not the only way to incorporate emotions into ethnicity theory. For Stack without primordialism "the complexity, resilience, and even irrationality of ethnic bonds are likely to be underestimated," while Scott believes that "we need the primordial approach for a complete explanation," especially of ethnicity's "most extreme, strident, irrational aspects." For such theorists the only way they can understand "extreme," "strident," "complex," and "irrational" sentiments and behaviors -- or ones that seem so to them -- is by basing them on emotion construed to be apriori and in the blood, ineffable, ancient, unconstructed, and therefore beyond the pale of the modern world's more "rational" and restrained social organization.

In the end it seems that although emotion and attachment are invoked as critical to the nature (and explanation) of ethnicity in most cases, they are not developed as serious analytical tools; rather, they are taken as a sort of theoretical "first cause," at once overemphasized and undertheorized and overemphasized because they are undertheorized. What we need is an elaboration of the notion of attachment, how attachments form, feel, and function. This would necessarily entail a socialpsychological perspective. Toward this objective I now introduce two models of attachment which may have important implications and raise important possibilities for ethnicity theory.
Attachment Theory

Attachment theory has spawned both significant literature and significant experimental findings in psychology since its formulation by John Bowlby over thirty years ago. Although its original empirical interests (to explain a set of observations regarding the emotional behavior of institutionalized or otherwise parent-deprived children) and its theoretical intentions (to reformulate an area of psychoanalytic theory without reference to instincts, drives, gratification, or psychic energy) are far from the realm of ethnicity, it has developed concepts and understandings which may be helpful in comprehending ethnic affect.

In Bowlby's words, "attachment theory is a way of conceptualizing the propensity of human beings to make strong affectional bonds to particular others."11 Literally from the first months of life a human shows a preference for certain other individuals, initially and especially the mother. However Bowlby finds the classical psychoanalytic explanations for such phenomena, which emphasize need gratification and tension reduction, unsatisfactory. For one thing he observed that infants and children who had their relationship with significant adults interrupted presented negative emotional symptoms even when some other adult continued to feed and care for them; on a simple need-gratification model any adult should suffice equally well. Second he learned of the now-famous experiments with animals conducted by Lorenz and Harlow which suggested the presence and power of attachment phenomena. Impressed with these observations Bowlby introduced an "ethological" perspective to the theory of attachment. He posited a behavioral system in humans and other species which generates certain kinds of behavior in certain situations, "the outcome of which is an ongoing relationship, such as maintenance of a specified distance over a comparatively long period."12 Thus the attachment behavior system which is inherited produces behaviors with the goal of keeping proximity to certain preferred others; in his words, attachment behavior is goal-directed and goal-corrected. It operates by a kind of feedback process: if too great a distance is perceived between the individual and the attachment figure, behavior is elicited to restore proximity.

Bowlby conceived of the attachment system as a kind of adaptation, and he recognized the relevance of culture and society to his work and vice versa. The system developed in humans, he said, in response to the environment in which the human species evolved, what he called the "human environment of adaptedness" in recognition of the fact that in some ways this environment was or might be different from the contemporary human environment.13 In this early human environment there would be an adaptive advantage for an infant to keep a care-giver in proximity, so such a behavioral system aiming at attachment would be naturally selected. An attachment system would,
in his account, contribute to species survival.

So within a few months of birth humans begin to show signs of attachment and to perform attachment behaviors. In interaction with a significant care-giver, an "attachment figure", a relationship develops which includes not only instrumental care (like feeding) but an affective component; an "affectional bond" is formed which for Bowlby meant "the attraction that one individual has for another individual."

Attachment thus becomes a social relationship, our first, in which both adult and child are active participants (even if the child's behavior is at first "cybernetically programmed"). Initially through relatively simple interactions like gazing and smiling and then through increasingly complex interactions the two individuals form a bond which each, but especially the weaker partner, acts forcefully to preserve. Ultimately this bond evinces seven major features: specificity, duration, engagement of emotion, ontogeny, learning, organization, and biological function.

1. **Specificity.** The essence of attachment is a preference for one individual, or at most a few individuals, over all others. Even in everyday situations the child's preference for one individual (a mother or father, ordinarily) is easy to observe, as is the child's alarm at separation from her/him; no other individual will do as a substitute. Thus, the specificity of attachment is shown in "the association of the attachment figure with feelings of security" and in "the tendency... to attempt to ward off or to end separation from an attachment figure." Attachment depends upon the child's ability to discriminate among individuals and to value one (or a few) above all others.

2. **Duration.** As a relationship, once an attachment is formed it tends to persist. Attachments are not ephemeral bonds; an attachment may, in fact, last a lifetime or a large portion of a lifetime. Adolescents and adults also display attachment, sometimes to the same figures to whom they were attached as children, sometimes to new ones. Perhaps most interestingly, as will be apparent below, an attachment seems to need no particular reinforcement to endure. Attachment is actually difficult to extinguish once formed, and it "resists extinction even when there appears to be no positive gain from the relationship." It even seems to resist extinction if there are negative consequences. Its endurance, in other words, is not entirely "instrumental" or "rational."

3. **Engagement of emotion.** As we saw above, attachment has instrumental functions (primarily care and feeding) but is not entirely dependent upon or determined by these; it is also a behavior system with its own qualities, especially affective qualities. Maintaining such a bond is a source of pleasure in itself, renewing it "a source of joy," losing it a source of "grief" and fear. Attachment is a unique kind of affect, with its own constellation of positive and negative feelings, although it may be alloyed with other affects to produce different kinds of affective states and social relationships. It has sometimes been equated with love, and
at other times invoked as an element in the love relationship.

4. Ontogeny. Attachment, although its source is a behavioral system which is inherited and instinctive, has a genesis and a history, a course of development, for each individual. This ontogeny of attachment is evidenced in several different ways. For one, attachment is not the same at all stages of life or even all stages of infancy. A child normally goes through a regular set of phases: (a) from birth to about twelve weeks, orientation toward humans without a preference for any particular person; (b) from about three to six months, clear preference for one or more discriminated attachment figures; (c) from six months through the second or third year, active efforts in the form of movement and signals to maintain physical proximity to the attachment figure, and (d) after the second or third year, the formation of a "goal-corrected partnership" in which each party can anticipate and appreciate the actions of the other, and the weaker party can tolerate separation with the understanding that it is for some reason and some limited time. Accordingly, attachment behavior becomes more sophisticated over time, and the attachment itself becomes more intense up to a point, after which it becomes gradually less common and less intense.

Another evidence for the ontogeny of attachment is the fact that it can "go wrong," that it can develop in different directions with different kinds of affective outcomes. Several attachment theorists have reported that the attachments which infants form have different characteristics depending on the nature of the interactions with the attachment figure. It is possible in the end that if not enough quality interaction occurs at the critical time for young humans, no attachment may form at all.

5. Learning. Clearly, then, although the ability and propensity to form attachments is "natural," the precise "nature and the forms" of an attachment "differ in some measure according to the particular environment in which development takes place." Attachment as a kind of social relationship is learned and constructed in interaction, and the quality of the interaction will shape the quality of the attachment relationship. Neither the fact nor the form of attachment for an individual is a "given." However, the general sense in attachment theory is that the individual tries valiantly to attach to someone (just as Lorenz's ducklings try valiantly to "imprint" on something) and to get that figure to respond and reciprocate, even "despite repeated punishment" or other rebuke. However under such circumstances the attachment may be anemic or deformed by other contradictory affect.

6. and 7. Organization and Biological Function. I have combined these two features because of their systematic relation. As we have seen, attachment emanates from an inherited behavior system which operates toward a goal through feedback; Bowlby called it cybernetic. It is activated by certain environmental (social) conditions, including separation, "strangeness, hunger, fatigue, and anything frightening." Once
activated it draws upon a repertoire of "attachment behaviors," according to the developmental stage of the individual, the goal of which is to achieve and maintain proximity to another preferred individual. Upon reaching the goal, the individual ceases to exhibit attachment behavior and can direct attention to other matters, the most famous of which are exploration and play.

Significantly, this same organizational pattern -- activation, behavior, termination, and emotional "freedom" -- is observed in many other species, including Harlow's monkeys, although of course the particular activating conditions and attachment behaviors are species-specific. However, Bowlby found the attachment phenomenon to be common enough and similar enough to suggest a biological function for it: individual protection and species preservation. Attachment is an evolutionarily-developed, naturally-selected adaptation "the ultimate outcome for which...is neither more nor less than species survival."24

Social Identification Theory

Having demonstrated that a psychological theory may shed light on the attachment which many analysts believe underlies social phenomena like ethnicity, we must admit that Bowlby's theory does not provide a complete theory of ethnic attachment. The attachment which Bowlby describes, for example, is juvenile, dyadic, and concrete, whereas the ethnic attachment is adult, group- or community- or even nation-focused, and symbolic, that is, concerned at once with 1) symbols like flags, songs, and insignia, 2) symbolically significant characteristics like skin color, history, or customs, and 3) people whom we do not and probably never will know. A truly inclusive theory of attachment should be able to encompass such psychocultural phenomena within a perspective which is both affective and cognitive.

Social identification theory, henceforth referred to as SIT, which originated from Henri Tajfel's work on the social-psychological processes of group formation, specifically addresses the issue of group identities and group preferences. Tajfel begins by noting that "group" distinctions may exist whether or not relevant groups are actually in social contact and whether or not "clear-cut physical or behavioral cues...exist to facilitate discrimination."25 He therefore investigated the processes of group formation and group awareness with what he called "minimal group" experiments, which entailed assigning subjects to groups based on an arbitrary category or characteristic (such as "red" and "blue"). Subjects were then asked to make choices or judgments on some task which concerned the group; however, the other members of the group, if there actually were any (often the "group" was purely fictional) were never seen. With no more basis than this, subjects evinced a tendency to judge in preference of their supposed group-fellows, suggesting the
existence and operation of some sort of "group sense" and group attachment.

The conclusion drawn by SIT is that the "mere perception of common category membership may be ... necessary and sufficient for group formation." Social categorization itself, and even more so situations and activities (even weak ones, like the "minimal group" situation) which direct or compel the individual to think and behave in terms of social categories, lead first to identification with some category and second to attachment to it. Group membership in this view is "cognitive" or "perceptual" first and affective second: it is an emotional bond to a perceived social category and to membership in said category. In fact, the "personal", that is, person-to-person, attachment (bearing in mind that SIT does not specifically use the term attachment) is construed as less fundamental than the person-to-category attachment: "We may not, after all, tend to join people we like as much as like people we perceive ourselves joined to." In a real way the attachment to the category rather than to specific people makes the group.

The process of social identification as understood in SIT involves a three part sequence of social categorization, social identity, and social comparison. Social categories exist in virtually all human social situations and certainly in all societies. These categories may be racial, ethnic, local, or any number of others; in a certain sense they are "given" in the sense of social facts "existing prior to the interaction" but not necessarily apriori; rather, they are the constructs of earlier interactional patterns and outcomes. At any rate, in interaction individuals are exposed to the categories and their relevance for behavior; individuals learn which category "they are" and how that fact constrains their choices and the expectations which others have of them.

Under normal circumstances experience with social categorization leads individuals to identify with the category and with the others who share categorial membership. Recognition of and identification with a social category (such as an ethnic or racial category) enters into the individual's "self-concept," the "hypothetical cognitive structure" which mediates between the individual's personality and behavior and the external social world. In particular, social categorization and perceived membership in a category lead to the formation of an individual's "social identity," defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." The individual now "thinks like" and "behaves like" a member of the category or, now, group.

The final step in the sequence is social comparison. This has two different aspects, one objective or "socially given" and the other subjective. On the objective side society comes complete not only with social categories but with social evaluations of those categories a system
of relative prestige and power as well as particular images and stereotypes, which enter into and affect the interactional possibilities and the social identities of members. The system of groups and of social evaluations of those groups constitutes the environment, the "frame of reference," for social comparison and for the construction of positive or negative social identities which incorporate these evaluations. The subjective aspect is the individual's need for a positive social identity (for what we might call self-esteem) which entails both a sharp distinction from other groups and categories and a positive evaluation of one's own group on some valued criteria. Thus, it is in the interest of a group of this kind to emphasize or maximize the differences between itself and other groups in the social field and to find value in one or more of its own group characteristics; this also helps to account for the common need to denigrate or discriminate against other groups. In fact, on this basis SIT offers its "categorization law": "as category memberships become salient, there will be a tendency to exaggerate the differences on criterial dimensions between individuals falling into distinct categories, and to minimize those difference within each of these categories."29

It is critical to note that the theoretical sequence, social categorization-social identity-social comparison, and the entire social identification phenomenon described in SIT, while seemingly natural and easily accomplished, is quite explicitly learned. People are not born with a social identity, nor is it accurate to say that they acquire such an identity independent of social interaction by some process of cultural or spiritual osmosis. In fact the whole point of SIT is that people learn social identities, make social judgments, and exhibit social behavior as a result of participation in categorically-organized social interactions in situations in which social categories are a real and salient element of the cognitive and behavioral environment.

Tajfel specifically discusses how the learned aspect of social identity and group membership helps to account for the varying strength and even varying existence of group attachment and group oriented behavior for different individuals at different times. Most basically the presence of categories and relative evaluations of them does not necessarily compel the individual to recognize them nor to identify with them. At the same time some social situations allow or force individuals to perceive categorical differences and group identifications more than others and to consider those differences and identifications in determining their own identity and subsequent behavior. It is entirely possible that the perception of and identification with category and group may initially be absent or weak for any given individual, but if these situations are sufficiently frequent and serious then perception and identification may develop and strengthen. Tajfel says it best when he writes: *Social situations which will force the individuals involved to act in terms of their group membership will also enhance for them some group identifications
which had previously not been very significant to them, or perhaps even create or bring to life group memberships which were previously only dormant or potential."30

Correspondingly, once a categorically-based social identity is constructed in the individual, it functions as a lens through which to judge social situations and interactions and by which to organize behavior, as evidenced by the original minimal-group experiments. Turner writes that social identity "monitors and construes social stimuli,"31 finding or even imputing "group meaning" in social situations. Social circumstances are therefore interpreted in terms of social categories and the reigning evaluations of them making it possible to "read into" a situation or interaction a group significance. Furthermore, social identity also serves as a source of individual behavior, behavior which is also conducted in terms of perceived group categories, comparisons, and interests. Ultimately, SIT posits that "social identity is the cognitive mechanism which makes group behavior possible."32 Then, in more or less extensive fashion for various individuals at various times, social identities and, therefore, social categories as "social facts" can structure the perception, course, and outcome of social interaction. Social identity as premised on social categories and categorically-based group formation is thus an indefinitely elastic phenomenon which can expand and contract with changing social circumstances and changing interpretations of those circumstances.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, both attachment theory and social identification theory give us a view of affective bonds to specific others which are plastic and socially constructed or plastic because they are socially constructed. Attachment, in the first case primarily an emotional phenomenon and in the second case primarily a cognitive or identificational one, is seen in both theories as "natural" or "instinctive," but the actual attachments which form are unpredictable, uncertain, and flexible. The two characteristics of plasticity and social construction are crucial to any theoretical exposition of ethnic attachment, which though often powerful, pervasive, and persistent is not always equally so and must be a product of social interaction if it to be a useful social concept.

Thus a social-psychological conception of attachment has the potential to meet the "primordial challenge" of ethnicity for social theory, especially in regard to its apparent givenness, strength, and irrationality. If an attachment phenomenon such as the one described in the theories above underlies ethnicity, then ethnicity is not in fact a result of mere "immediate contiguity and kin connections" but is an artifact of specific and analyzable social experiences and psychological tendencies. Contiguity or kin connection provide the social opportunities to form
attachments and identities by providing contexts of social interaction, but those simple "primordials" are not coercive of either, not in fact nor in form.

First of all, though the propensity to form attachments is natural in humans, attachment is seen in both theories above as learned and situational. Certain specific interactions with specific others actualize the potential attachment and give it its particular characteristics for the individual in question. Though "natural" in principle for humans as a species, each actual attachment is specific to the individual and, more importantly, to the situations in which the individual experiences others and the wider social world. Attachment is "historical" or "biographical" in the sense of its being the product of the encounters between the person and his or her social environment. This realization actually opens up an area of research for ethnicity studies, namely the "socialization" of ethnic identities and attachments.

Second, attachment bridges the theoretical gap between primordialism and circumstantialism by combining affect and interest. Attachment, whether infantile or identificational, is instrumental in a sense; it is born of certain interests and continues to serve certain interests after formation. However, the affective character of the attachment is not totally defined nor limited by those interests, such that it can appear that the affect and the interest are independent or even contradictory for example, that the affect is irrational and perhaps counterproductive in relation to actual interests or that the interest is only a secondary consideration after the affect. But Bowlby notes that attachment arises out of an interest in safety and security and tends to endure once formed, regardless of subsequent experiences, even ones which might seem to extinguish it. Tajfel's appeal to social identity, on the other hand, suggests that the attachment becomes an integral aspect of the self emerging from an interest to know and value oneself but then determining in large part how interests are perceived and how behavior in pursuit of interests is conducted in the future.

Thus, attachment has a "function" which ultimately turns on the preservation or perpetuation or even advancement of the "group." Bowlby says so specifically, and SIT shows that socially-identified individuals tend to act in favor of the group. In a sense the group might be conceived not as a Darwinian population whose fitness is increased by attachment phenomena but as a symbolic population marked and isolated by symbolic boundaries (which may nevertheless become real in such forms as endogamy rules or neighborhoods or even states). As Anderson so rightly noted, such groups are "imagined communities" which emerge through boundary processes which are, in DeVos' words, "basically psychological in nature, not territorial." This is why, as SIT acknowledges in particular, there is no real correlation between the amount of "cultural" difference between categories or groups and the
intensity of the identity and boundary distinctions made by members.

At the same time this attachment does not function to the same extent for all individuals at all times. Both theories above agree that the phenomenon may ultimately be present or absent, strong or weak, and active or dormant in any actual case. Certain specific situational triggers may also activate attachment-oriented or identity-oriented responses or enhance the personal salience of these qualities for the individual, making such responses more likely in the future. Furthermore, the elasticity of its affective and cognitive qualities makes it possible for it to expand and contract, intensify and subside, as circumstances warrant. New terms or situations may become imbued with group significance, and the very boundaries and qualities of the category or group may shift over time.

In the end ethnicity is not just attachment and nothing else; it is one of the many human affiliations based on attachment. Various scholars have noted that ethnicity exhibits multiple aspects of which the affective tie or bond is one. However, to the extent that an attachment is implicated in the psychosocial alloy which is ethnicity, the theories presented above have much to offer in explicating one important facet of the phenomenon. Even more, each theory in its way allows for such an alloy. Attachment theorists after Bowlby have commented on the tendency for attachment to enter into mixtures of psychological processes, resulting in various affective states such as adult love and perhaps even nationalism. SIT very explicitly situates group identity and preference within a field of social categories, social evaluations, and social interactions which opens the social identification process to symbolic and political forces. The particular kinds of categories, groups, and markers which compose ethnic attachment and ethnic identity will distinguish it from other relationships and identities which also contain an attachment at their heart. However, a psychosocially articulate conception of the attachment underlying ethnicity returns this critically important modern phenomenon to the fold of socially-constructed cultural processes.

NOTES

1 Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties," The British Journal of Sociology 8: 142.


10 Scott, 157.


13 As a characterization of this environment and the social adaptation to it Bowlby invoked the work of Washburn, DeVore, and Turnbull, the latter for a description of the hunting-gathering way of life which he accepted as a model of early human life and culture.

14 Bowlby, 1979, 87.

15 Bowlby, 1979, 130-1.

16 This is illustrated by the famous "stranger situation" experiment, in which an attached child is exposed to an unfamiliar adult; normally, the child shows attachment behavior such as returning to the attachment figure and touching or clinging to her/him.

18Weiss, 181.


20Ainsworth (1982) describes three kinds of attachments - "secure" or "normal," "anxious," and "avoidant" - each with its distinct interactional ontogeny and behavioral characteristics.

21Although the debate continues, it is generally agreed that a kind of critical period exists for forming attachments, so that if no figure presents itself for attachment or acts consistently enough to permit an attachment to form in this period then the whole behavioral system of attachment may go "unactivated."

22Bowlby, 1969, 45.

23Bowlby, 1979, 131.


27Turner, 17.


29Turner, 28.


31Turner, 21.

32Turner, 21.

33DeVos, 6.