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For the Enrichment of Jewish Thought

Zionism and Postzionism: Recent Re-evaluations of Ideology and Historiography

The Zionist Ideology
by Gideon Shimoni
Brandeis University Press

Zionism and the Creation of a New Society
by Ben Halpern and Jehuda Reinharz
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press

The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Cultural
by Laurence J. Silberstein
New York and London: Routledge

The books I consider in this review give us a history of Zionism as an unfolding of diverse and heterogeneous forces. All three discuss the vast chasm that often separated various factions and groups in the Zionist movement. But, while the first two books emphasize ideological diversity as strands in a generally positive development leading to the formation of a Jewish pluralistic state, the last book points to the blind spots that led to much distress and injustice in the new State. Shimoni's The Zionist Ideology explains basic differences and similarities among the various factions, while Halpern and Reinharz's Zionism and the Creation of a New Society focuses on the tortuous path that led from conflict to social consolidation. Both highlight problematic schisms that continue to bedevil modern Israel and its relations with the Diaspora, on the one hand, and with Arabs in the Middle East on the other. Laurence J. Silberstein's The Postzionism Debates focuses specifically on the fault lines in Zionist ideology, highlighting its hegemony as a discourse in public Jewish culture and in the academe. He introduces us to an exciting new trend in Israel that takes a critical stance toward traditional articulations of Zionism and its history. As such, his is both a brilliant analysis and the most radical questioning of Zionism as a movement and an ideology.

The Zionist Ideology, by Gideon Shimoni, Brandeis University Press. This book is a comprehensive historical survey and ideological analysis of major trends in the Zionist movement. It summarizes research already available in this field. Though it adds and refines some historical data, the book's major contribution inheres in its ability to re-conceptualize trends and alignments in modern Zionism. Shimoni argues for a consideration of Zionism in the context of general theories of nationalism and ethnic identity. The first part of the book deals with the social origins of Jewish nationalism and with proto-Zionist thinkers, or precursors. The second part deals with major trends in Zionist thought, political and spiritual Zionism, national-religious Zionism, labor Zionism, and revisionist Zionism. The third part consists of discussions of two major topics: Zionism as a secular Jewish identity and the right to the land of Israel.

Chapter One, "Social Origins of Jewish Nationalism," delineates the influence of the Haskala, the Jewish Enlightenment movement and Hibbat Zion, the Love of Zion movement on the early development of Zionism. It argues that the early precursors who advocated a return to the land, to Eretz-Israel, were ethnicists among the Jewish intelligentsia. These ethnicists responded to the unexpected wave of pogroms against the Jewish population that swept through Southern Russia in the early 1880s. What sparked the Jewish nationalist movement, according to Shimoni, was the turnover of the integrationists and assimilationists who joined the core of ethnicists. Chapter Two, "Ideological Precursors of Zionism," includes among the early nationalist thinkers of the 19th century Moses Hess and the traditionalist rabbis Yehuda Alkalai and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer. Shimoni notes that the importance of Alkalai and Kalischer lies in their ground-breaking reinterpretations that broke with a long tradition of passive messianism. They opened the door to the inclusion of Orthodox Jews in the modern secular nationalist movement.

Christian ideas of Jewish restoration—based on a millenarian belief in the necessity of a Jewish return to the homeland for the universal redemption of humankind—were also common and influential at the time. Most notable among such Christian Zionists are Benjamin Disraeli, George Eliot and Laurence Oliphant. Chapter Three, "General Zionism," goes on to discuss Theodor Herzl whose thinking is defined here as "the functional nationalist conception." Herzl analyzed modern anti-Semitism as the problem of the Jews and rejected emancipation as well as integration as a solution for this problem. Shimoni sees Herzl's contribution less in his theorizing and more in Herzl's ability to create the organizations and social mechanisms for the attainment of a Zionist objective. In addition, and most importantly, Herzl initiated political diplomacy as a means to securing an internationally recognized charter for the reestablishment of Palestine as a national home for the Jews. The functional nationalism of Herzl and Max Nordau differed from the organic nationalist conception of Ahad Ha'am. He conceived of a homeland as a spiritual center that will restore the self-respect of Diaspora Jews. Ahad Ha'am rejected any territorial compromise offered by the functional Zionists and insisted on the Land of Israel exclusively as the future homeland. The emergence of General Zionism, essentially a liberal orientation, developed a synthesis between these two approaches.
Chapter Four, “National Religious Zionism,” focuses on the emergence of Mizrahi, or the nationalist-religious orientation within the Zionist movement. To be sure there were strong haredi, ultra-Orthodox opponents to Zionism, who saw it as a satanic obstacle to messianic redemption. Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Ha-Cohen Kook, Chief Ashkenazi Rabbi for Palestine in the 1920s, on the other hand, insisted that the modern return to Zion be seen as a messianic-redemptive event. He was convinced that the secular nationalists were serving the revival of Torah Judaism. Another faction that emerged in Palestine in the 1930s, synthesizing socialism and traditionalism, was Ha-Poel Hamizrachi, or the Union of Religious Workers. Chapter Five, “Labor Zionism,” surveys the various socialist trends and groups in the Zionist movement. The cumulative influence of socialism on the Zionist movement was decisive. The first to attempt a synthesis between the tenets of socialism and Zionism was Nahman Syrkin, who insisted that only a socialist state will be the proper fulfillment of the Zionist dream. Another influential voice was Ber Borochov, who became the most respected theoretician of socialist Zionism. Berl Katznelson was admired as an educator and a leader of the Histadrut, the largest workers’ union in Palestine in the 1930s. But the most prominent leader of this influential organization was David Ben-Gurion whose leadership steered the workers union from the nucleus of a class to that of a nation. Ben-Gurion became the most powerful political figure in socialist Zionism but Aharon David Gordon was a charismatic thinker who was highly influential among the young socialists for his insistence on the individual. He demanded that each individual Zionist liberate himself from the burden of the Diaspora through productive labor. Ha-shomer Hatzair was the leftist faction of radical youths in Palestine that split from the mainstream labor party in the 1940s. But, despite the splits and schisms, Shimon notes that some ideas were common to all factions of labor Zionism, notable among them is the ideal of the Ha’alutz, or pioneer, and the idea of hagshama, or realization. Chapter Six, “Revisionist Zionism,” begins with a portrait of its founding leader Vladimir Jabotinsky. He rejected the idea of a political compromise with the Arabs and insisted on the rights of the minority, the middle class and entrepreneurs in Palestine. In the late 1930s, a radical right-wing group of poets (notable among them was Uri Zvi Greenberg) and political publicists became known as “maximalists,” who believed in establishing a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan. They espoused anathem of might and referred to the “kingdom of Israel” as the true objective of Zionism. This ideology was endorsed by small anti-British undergroups in the 1940s.

Having surveyed the major trends in Zionist thought and in the main factions in the Zionist movement, Shimon proceeds in Chapter Seven, “Zionism as a Secular Jewish Identity,” to delineate some of the common motifs and principles shared by all the various groups. He argues that one such principle is “the aspiration toward a renaissance of Jewish culture...predicated on the secularized understanding of Jewish identity as an outcome of imminent processes in the history of the nation” (p. 269). Shimon credits Ahad Ha’am with composing the most influential—albeit positivist and essentialist—ethos of a secular nationalist Judaism. He notes, however, that Ahad Ha’am was challenged by Micha Yosef Berdyczewsky who advocated individual spontaneity and freedom and rejected traditional rabbinic Judaism as constricting and unnecessary. Ahad Ha’am also was challenged by the radical secularism of Yosef Haim Brenner who believed that ethnic identity was the essence of modern Jewish identity rather than secularized, binding beliefs and observances. Aharon David Gordon was another challenger who sought to anchor Jewish secular nationalism in a connection to nature and human fellowship. But, in essence, all these thinkers sought to redefine traditional Judaism as a secular nationalism. Despite their vast differences, both Berl Katznelson, the socialist educator, and Vladimir Jabitowski, the revisionist leader, sought to create the same thing. The young Hebraists, or Canaanites, who rejected any and all affiliation to traditional Judaism represent yet another manifestation of the same effort.

Chapter Eight, “The Right to the Land,” focuses on yet another common denominator in the diverse body of Zionist thought: the claim to Eretz Israel, or Zion, as the national homeland of the Jews. The orthodox segment of the Zionist movement perceived this claim as part of the everlasting covenant between God and the people of Israel. The philosopher Martin Buber translated this claim into the more modern term of a national mission: the Jews were obligated to create a community based on the highest ethical values. But most secular Zionists spoke about a historical claim or a historical connection to the land. Others like Yehezkel Kaufmann referred to a “natural national right” to the land. Socialist Zionists preferred the “plea of greater existential need and the application of utilitarian morality” (p. 366). In other words, their approach would concede that the Arabs too had a right to the land but that the Jewish claim is more urgent due to the physical threat to their survival in the Diaspora. In contrast, the revisionist claim was that the Jews were exiled by force and stayed in the Diaspora against their will. The radical revisionists argued from the position of “might is right,” claiming that the Jewish majority must assert its authority over the Arab residents in Palestine. By contrast, the pacifist Reform rabbi, Judah Magnes of Brit Shalom, argued that both Jews and Arabs have a right to the land, though Jews have a dire spiritual need for a unifying center. Nevertheless, the fundamental belief that Eretz Israel belonged partially or entirely to the Jewish people was shared by all the factions of the Zionist movement.

In the Afterword, Shimon notes that contemporary Diaspora Zionism continues, in essence, the general orientation of the early 19th-century Jewish ethnicists who valued positively Jewish ethnie—religion, languages, historical memory, folklore and the connection to the land of Israel. He projects that the contrasting interpretations of Zionism as an obligation and a possible alternative to Diaspora life may be schismatic but leaves open the possibility that both communities will continue to co-exist: one as a nation, the other as a postmodern, largely religious ethnic group.

Zionism and the Creation of a New Society, by Ben Halpern and Jehuda Reinharz, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Like Shimon, Halpern and Reinharz have written an elaborate history of the ideological trends that led to the establishment of the State of Israel. The emphasis here, however, seems to rest on the social structures that emerged from the various conflicting ideological trends within the movement. Halpern and Reinharz trace the development of the Zionist idea from its earliest expressions to the end of World War II, setting their study against a broad background of political and social developments throughout Europe and the Middle East.

Chapter One, “The Social Sources of Zionism,” summarizes the major elements of Zionist ideology, elements that preceded the emergence of the movement in the late 1880s. These elements included Jewish emigration from Europe as a solution to anti-Semitism, the return to Zion, occupational retraining and redistribution, and the revival of the Hebrew language as a medium of secular culture. The chapter brings out the attractiveness of Zionism to both East and West European young Jews. Chapter Two, “The Setting,” focuses on Palestine under the Ottoman empire, which has become feeble and corrupt in the first half of the 19th century. The Jewish Yishuv was in decline and the growth of the Ashkenazi population...
worsened the congestion and unhealthy living conditions in the walled city of Jerusalem. When Zionist immigrants arrived in the 1880s, they came into a already troubled Jewish community largely dependent on donations from Jewish sources abroad. "The Yishuv, Old and New" sets the political scene that greeted the early Zionist immigrants. These immigrants who represented innovative and radical voices were not always welcome in the traditionalist Old Yishuv. Despite the difficult conditions against which the new immigrants labored and despite the compromises they were forced to accept, they continued to elaborate and better articulate the differences and divisions in the Zionist movement. Chapter Four, "Settlers and Patrons," sketches out the historical development of the Yishuv. In 1882-84, eight permanent Jewish settlements were founded in Palestine, then the movement came to a temporary halt under the pressure of Turkish opposition to the influx of Jews. The growth of the Jewish settlement in Palestine continued through the 1890s under conditions of balanced uncertainty. Chapter Five, "The Conflict of Tradition and Idea," attempts to clarify the difference between "proto-Zionism" and historic Zionism. Historic Zionism rests essentially on a commitment to seek a secular solution to the Jewish problem through the return to Zion. The emotional core of historic Zionism was expressed in the slogan of autoemancipation. Nevertheless, the Mizrahi movement sought from its inception to reconcile Jewish tradition and Zionism notably through the efforts of Rav Kook, who saw Zionist work in Palestine as a preliminary stage of messianic redemption.

Chapter Six, "Zionism and the Left," discusses the socialist groupings in the Zionist movement. Leftist Zionism had to contend with a Jewish opposition that did not propose to reshape the Jewish community as a Western-style religion. Leftist Zionism emerged as a synthesis between the Jewish Bund and the World Zionist organization. Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine focus on the growth and development of the labor party in Palestine, an orientation that shaped the history of the first crucial decades of the State of Israel. Chapter 10, "The National Home," deals with Palestine in the aftermath of World War I. The political turmoil of Europe in the 1920s, the world economic and political crisis of the 1930s, and the catalyses of the 1940s all left a deep imprint on the Yishuv's development. Yet the effect was more often inversely related to general world trends than it was a direct reflection of them. The decisive 1920s brought Hitler and the European catastrophe, placing Palestine under a pressure of Jewish immigration beyond anything imagined before. The political trials that accompanied these efforts were an even greater strain under which the established structure of the national home often buckled. The final chapter, Chapter 11, "The Transition from Yishuv to State," emphasizes the revolutionary or rapidly evolving conditions that framed the emergence of the State of Israel in the late 1940s. The sudden rise of the state machinery forecast possible conflicts not only concerning matters of social organization but also of values. The assumption of sovereignty meant the rise of social problems. The authors argue that Israel's problems were compounded to an extent considerably larger than other new states by blockades, boycotts and border clashes with its Arab neighbors. The Israeli policy of open doors for all displaced Jews presented unprecedented problems of economic absorption and social adjustment. The flight of a large portion of the Palestinian Arab population in the aftermath of the 1948 war also resulted in the new Jewish state with challenges and moral dilemmas.

The authors see the success of the Yishuv and the state as contingent on the ability to adjust its social institutions to new and evolving historical demands. To some challenges the state responded with rather rapid adjustment while to others the adjustment has yet to be made.

The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture, by Laurence J. Silberstein, New York and London: Routledge. In contrast to the previous books, this book offers a revision of Zionist ideology. The book draws our attention to current Israeli critiques and challenges to basic tenets and representations of national history, fact and memory. The postzionists of various schools and disciplines understand this critique as a necessary prerequisite to Israel's emergence as a true democracy.

In the Introduction to the book, Silberstein explains that the writings of postzionists stress the need to open spaces for the voices that have been defined as the "Other" in Israeli society, among them: Diaspora Jews, Jews of Middle Eastern origin, Palestinian Arabs and women. In its current usage, postzionism is the product of a crisis in Israeli life. The author emphasizes that he sees postzionism mostly as a space-clearing enterprise, an attempt to challenge the hegemony of Zionist discourse to make room in which to talk about Israeli history, culture and identity differently.

Chapter One, "Mapping Zionism/Zionist Mapping," explains how certain basic terms and concepts of Zionism as well as of Zionist historians imply a value judgment and a power struggle. Thus, the term "galut" (exile) implies a derogatory view of any place outside Israel. This use of terminology creates "a regime of truth" or discursive processes that present the knowledge they produce as truth. The binary opposition homeland/exile produces a devaluation of other Jewish homelands. The Zionist thinker Ahad Haam (Asher Ginsburg) presented the nation as a living organism driven by an innate will to survive. Embedded in these binaries are hierarchies of power that privilege the nation over religion. Chapter Two, "Critique of Zionism: Critics from Within," focuses on Zionists thinkers who have questioned basic political and ideological premises as well as positions within the movement. Martin Buber, for instance, criticized the conception of the Arab Palestinian as Other. Amos Elon and Amos Oz reject the representation of Zionism as an essential whole. Miron Benveniste is critical of what he calls the "cult of the homeland." Chapter Three, "Critique of Zionism: Critics from Without," presents the early Canaanite or Hebraic ideology that questioned the same connection to Jewish communities outside Palestine and sought to anchor the new settlement in the cultural framework of the Middle East. The chapter also discusses the political stance of Mazar, the radical socialist party. Chapter Four, "Postzionism: The Academic Debates," explains that this most recent critique emerged mostly as a scholarly debate led by social scientists like Gershon Shafir, Benny Morris, Baruch Kimmerling, Ilan Pappe and Uri Ram all of whom question the use of categories and constructs that determine the boundaries of discourse about the history of Zionism. This new generation of scholars call for a radical scholarly pluralism that would take the perspective of the Other into account. By utilizing comparative methods of interpretations these scholars are struggling to open the spaces of Israeli culture to new methodologies and intellectual positions. Chapter Five, "Palestinian Critics and Postzionist Discourse: Anton Shammas and Emile Habiby," reveals why and how the exclusion of Palestinian voices from Israeli cultural space occludes the complex and often contradictory character of Israeli culture and identity formation. The critic Hanan Hadar demonstrates that the Palestinian authors Shammas and Habiby problematize dominant notions of Israeli literature and culture. He sees them as minority writers who effectively subvert both the dominant Israeli political discourse and the dominant Israeli equation of Israeli culture with Jewish culture and Israeli literature with Jewish literature. Chapter Six, "Postzionism, Postmodernism, and Postcolonial Theory: A Radical Postzionist Critique," highlights the theoretical frame-
work of postzisionist critiques. These critiques focus on history as a discursive practice as much as they emphasize literature as a forum for cultural politics. Postzisionist critics reject essentialistic notions of identity. Instead, they highlight the fluid, hybrid and heterogeneous character of Zionist culture. An especially interesting postzisionist critique has emerged in the late 1990s in the context of Israeli feminist criticism notably in the journal *Theory and Criticism*. The final chapter, “Concluding Reflections,” points out that although postzisionism is a rarefied movement confined mostly to academics and intellectuals, the dissonance of which these critiques speak is broadly shared. The shift or change the postzisionists are trying to create is a pre-requisite for genuine peace between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East. After the political peace is achieved the cultural work will have to begin.

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Mirror Images?

**Mutual Reflections: Jews and Blacks in American Art**

by Milly Heyd

New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press

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A Review Essay
by Cliff Edwards

Have African American and Jewish American artists mirrored a shared sense of alienation and struggle for liberation through their images of one another during the past century? Milly Heyd, a specialist in Jewish art, teaching at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, seeks to demonstrate such visual mirroring in the first book-length study of the topic. More than a hundred black and white illustrations of paintings, sculpture, cartoons and installations, along with a text tuned to the psychological, work to make sense of Blacks and Jews depicting one another.

One might guess that some early African-American artists, following the lead of the “Negro Spirituals,” focused on the Bible as a code book employing Exodus liberation themes and Christ on the cross to mirror longings for freedom and the suffering of the violence of slavery and horror oflynchings. For example, the Black artist Henry Ossawa Tanner, whose father was an African Methodist bishop, visited the Holy Land in the 1890s, painting its landscapes and finding dark Yemenite Jews to pose for his Jesus and Nicodemus images. Tanner’s own studies in art reflect the alienation of the Black artist of his day. The memoirs of Joseph Pennell, a White student at the Pennsylvania Acad-
art or craft? On the one hand, like many products of craft, they were utilitarian and did not carry a signature; on the other, they were highly expressive, and a major theory of art holds that art is the transmission of emotion. In the end, many would say that to confer the status of art on an object involves making a decision rather than a discovery. And if this is true of the category of art, it is no less true of religion, as when individuals bestow the status of being spiritually evocative on, for example, a ritual artifact.

Like Tolstoy, the Zionist Boris Schatz (1866-1932) affirmed “art in the service of society”; and for both of these artists, the enemy was “art for art’s sake.” Tolstoy argued that just as genuine food can feed all people, genuine art can feed all souls. In short, if art is truly important to humankind, rather than a mere frill, then art should be accessible to all.

By 1919, Yosef Constantinovsky had imported the cubist revolution to Tel Aviv. And a few years later, Moshe Mokady (1902-1975) synthesized fauvist impressionism and cubist forms. At about this time, Yoel Teneh-Tannenbaum (1889-1973) painted idyllic images of kibbutz life in a serene expressionist style. Thus, there was great stylistic diversity but there also were thematic concentration points. In 1926, Nahum Gutman urged fellow artists to paint the country’s landscapes, not painting the [Western] wall with pathetic Jews... His work “Rest in the Field” shows two large figures at ease and agrees with the Taoist view that humans can only be serene when they are at peace with nature. Ironically, the two large principal figures prevail in this work rather than the landscape. By contrast, in a traditional Chinese landscape painting, the human figure appears but does not dominate the scene. One year earlier, Arieh Lubin painted his “Landscape in Sharona” with all the muscular contours of a painting by Hart Benton. In 1924, Yosef Zaritsky’s “Landscape in the Galilee” moved toward full-blown abstractionism. In the same year, Yitzhak Frenkel painted the representational work “Sacrifice of Isaac” but he went on to paint completely abstract paintings. Of course, abstract art can be highly religious as, for instance, when the geometric design of a Buddhist mandala promotes meditation.

Among 20th-century Western artworks, the paintings of Wassily Kandinsky provide a striking illustration of the abstract as numinous. Indeed, regarded as the father of non-representational art, Kandinsky entitled his classic monograph Concerning the Spiritual in Art.

By the thirties, the Israeli artist’s main focus was on urban rather than rural settings; the countryside was now less idyllic since there had been Arab attacks on Jewish settlements. Still, Moshe Mokady’s depiction of a street scene or portrait of a boy could be mystical as well as dark and expressionistic. Of Leopold Krakauer’s 1926 landscape painting of Jerusalem, the philosopher-theologist Martin Buber said: “Krakauer’s solitude encountered the solitude of the landscape and, under its influence, his solitude was transformed into something different.” In terms of Buber’s philosophy, Krakauer’s “I” met the “Thou” of the land and the result was that he was more fully actualized. That he left portions of his paper empty brings to mind the space of Chinese landscape paintings in which the void suggests the invisible Tao and invites the viewer to “enter.”

Mordecai Ardon, whose life spanned nearly a century, was another artist who some would claim was religious in his motivations since he was dedicated to humanity and social engagement; and religions find such commitment to be profoundly spiritual, for they teach that what one does for the least of humans he does for the divine. In addition, like Tolstoy and Schatz, Ardon condemned the “art for art’s sake” movement. Cezanne’s advice that the painter “treat nature by the cylinder, the sphere and the cone” found its counterpart in the prescription of the sculptor, Rudi Lehmann: “Familiarity with the laws of the cube, the cylinder, the pyramid, the cone and the sphere is a precondition for realizing sculptural sensation directly in various materials.” Both artists had religious leanings. There is room for a religious interpretation of Cezanne because he attacked impressionism as superficial and sought to penetrate surfaces to what was abiding or metaphysical. And Lehmann said that he was partial to the art of China, Japan and Persia, countries in which art and religion have traditionally been inseparable.

Many members of the sculptural school “Canaanism,” which flourished between 1939-1949, ostensibly rejected Judaism and Jewish art; instead, such sculptors turned to archaic art for inspiration (e.g., the Easter Island type sculptures, pre-Columbian sculpture, Egyptian figures, Assyrian and Babylonian sculptures). Of course, the aesthetic and the religious are interfused in such cultures. Thus, rather than remove themselves from religion altogether, the practitioners of Canaanism abandoned their own spiritual roots only to take up religious aspects of other traditions. Representing a minority, one Canaanite insisted that his art was inspired by “ancient Hebrew sources binding me to the foundations of the East, Sumer, Assyria and the Canaanites.”

In 1948, the birth of a new state was accompanied by artistic responses to war; painters such as Marcel Janco displayed an obvious debt to Picasso’s painting Guernica. His cubist style, which chopped objects into parts and fragments, was, after all, ideally suited to capture the horrors of combat. When bombs fell in 1949, Avigdor Arikha painted and asked: “What else could I do?” Here one recalls the musicians who continued to play as the Titanic sank. From 1948-1963, “New Horizons,” an art group that championed abstract art and pure artistic values, enjoyed great popularity. During the late forties, abstract meant representation stylized toward formalism. Full-blown abstractionism was, perhaps, inevitable, eventually appearing in the work of such artists as David Lan-Bar. Thus, Fritz Schiff wrote in a catalog: “No contemporary artist...is able to avoid the compulsion of the abstract.” Ofrat writes: “An issue more serious than ever was the ‘Israeli character’ of the art.” Naturally, artworks expressed subtle signs of their Israeli roots when the artist drew on the local light, flora, buildings, climate and geography. But social realists attacked the abstract works of the New Horizon artists as a corruption of humanism. Not surprisingly, the sculptures of such artists as Yitzhak Danziger was no less abstract than the paintings of Leah Nikel.

From 1948 to 1955, the social realism of the artist Ben Shahn prevailed and the painter Yohanan Simon declared: “We are required to raise an artist of a new type, integrated into the people and the working class,” a message that Tolstoy would surely have embraced. Predictably, kibbutz artists, who created abstract art, were harassed. After all, how can pure formalism communicate the spirit and identity of a particular people? Believing that art must be transformative of society and that the New Horizon movement was effete, the social realists caricatured the “New Horizons” as the “Narrow Horizons.” Hence, Nahftali Bezem painted Gravediggers, an immense depiction of a Jew digging a mass grave as Nazi troopers watch. Eventually, however, he also painted Sacrifice of Isaac in the abstract style of Picasso.

Born in 1938, David Sharir addressed Biblical themes such as the Song of Songs and the Tower of Babel. Moreover, religion became manifest in the religious-mystical symbolism of sculptures by Zvi Aldubi or the Jewish mysticism of etchings by Mordwich Moreh. Ofrat notes that the young avantgarde artists, known as the “Ten Plus,” yearned to end the stagnation of Israeli art in the 1960s. There was a corresponding movement in America as some critics declared that minimalism painting pointed toward banality and the death of art. During the same decade, American theologians were arguing that religion had run its course and that God was dead (i.e., no longer relevant to or significantly directive of human conduct). Nevertheless, in 1961, Raffi Lavie produced a childlike drawing that was compellingly appropriate because both art and religion encourage one to cultivate the sensitivities of the child. That same year the controversial monument Holocaust and Survival, created by Igal Tumarkin, demonstrated that art still was capable of addressing the most
In 1983, Yaakov Dorchin turned to an explicitly religious theme in his sculpture *Angel in an Irish Landscape*. And in 1991, he produced Vena Poteal, a piece that calls to mind Mu Chi's spiritual masterpiece *The Six Persimmons*.

Ofrat identifies Moshe Gershuni, who blended highly personal aspects of his life with quotes from prayerbooks and the Bible, as the most charismatic artist in the early eighties. The postmodern pluralism in Israeli art has a counterpart in the postmodern plurality of religions. Not only have modern communication and transportation made one aware of religions other than one's own but each tradition offers various alternatives within itself. In the last quarter of the 20th century, the variety that Ofrat superbly documents is a hallmark of Israeli art: from Joshua Neustein's politically-motivated photograph of his dog urinating to Asaf Ben Zvi's mystical studies to Yaakov Mishori's neoexpressionism. This diversity of aesthetic expressions is welcome, indeed vital, given Yitzhak Livenh's description of contemporary society as: "a world whose images are all dominated by the mass communications media and publicity firms."

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**Morality After the Holocaust**

The Banality of Good and Evil: Moral Lessons from the Shoah and Jewish Tradition

by David J. Blumenthal

Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press

A Review Essay by Herbert Hirsch

Blumenthal begins his analysis with Hannah Arendt's conceptualization of the "banality of evil." Arendt formed this concept as she witnessed the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. Observing Eichmann, Arendt was impressed with his "banality," with the fact that he appeared not to be a psychopath but a person who obeyed orders without question. Therefore, Arendt argued, the evil that Eichmann committed was done in the pursuit of his everyday job. While she did not believe that the evil was banal, the person who committed that evil she thought fit that categorization. Seizing this theme, Blumenthal argues that Arendt meant three things: first, "evil which is normal..."; second, "evil which is rationalized as good because it is obedient or because it serves a larger purpose;" and third, "evil which is trite..." (p. 5). But Arendt never meant to say or imply that the evil committed by Adolf Eichmann, head of Section IV B 4 of the Reich Security Main Office, was trite. In fact, she argued, as I noted above, that evil is committed by normal individuals following orders in pursuit of their everyday jobs. They are people who do not examine the implications of what they are told to do, they do not look at the outcome of their jobs and they do not accept responsibility for the results of their actions.

Following his brief summary of Arendt, Blumenthal states that the goal of his book is to examine a series of questions that have relevance for contemporary society. These include:

- "How evil is generated, and how one would shatter the pattern of evil? How is willing obedience generated and how would one break the cycle of authority and obedience? What sort of cultural teachings are necessary to prevent family violence and abuse?"

(p. 6-7)

To be sure, these are important questions but Blumenthal takes an already important, and ample. Early in the book he examines the same material but has more to say about the importance and the lessons to be derived.

To confuse matters even more, Blumenthal adds a concluding section to each chapter that he calls a "counter-text." Some of these are derived from traditional Jewish texts and, I must admit, it is not clear to me what they are supposed to add to the discussion. With these comments in mind, I am going to attempt to summarize his argument.

Blumenthal starts by attempting to ascertain the disciplines that are relevant to the questions he lists. He states that the range of disciplines is a pitfall because there are so many, including social psychology, experimental psychology, history, theology and personal psychology. This is, he thinks, "simply too vast for one person to encompass," but he has left out perhaps one of the most important, politics. It is no secret that many of the genocides of the last century were committed by the state or political groups attempting to achieve political goals. For example, the tragedies of both Bosnia and Rwanda were political genocides. This would not be a problem if the Holocaust were in some form "non-political" but it is very clearly the case that the Nazis used the Jews as scapegoats to achieve political ends. There are, of course, those who would disagree with this view but that does not negate the fact that Blumenthal omits its completely.

He then proceeds to list a seemingly endless catalogue of questions, some highlighted in bold print, which, one surmises, are designed to guide the reader through the morass of categories. I could not begin to enumerate all of them because I am limited by the amount of space allocated to this review so I will simply provide one example. Early in the book he examines the role of personal psychological history in leading to behavior that results in either killing or rescuing. He summarizes the results of other studies and, from these, he attempts to formulate some general principles to guide behavior so that people will stop killing one another and start helping each other.

For instance, at one point Blumenthal argues that when individuals are inserted into a hierarchy that tolerates or reinforces evil those inserted into that hierarchy will go along with the orders to hurt other people. If, on the other hand, they are inserted into a hierarchy that forbids evil they will, likewise, go along with that. In short, this comes dangerously close to arguing that positive behavior results from being inserted into a hierarchy that reinforces positive behavior while negative behavior results from being part of a hierarchy that reinforces negative behavior. If this is not a tautology it does ignore the possible dialectical nature of human behavior. Suppose, for example, that individuals choose organizations, hierarchical or not, to reinforce or support behaviors they wish to pursue. Moreover, there is the additional possibility, indeed the likelihood, that individuals do exist who simply enjoy or feel rewarded for committing acts of cruelty, just as there are those who are repelled by these same acts. In short, suppose all of our elaborate theories concerning why individuals commit acts of evil are rationalizations serving the purpose of diverting our attention from a reality we wish devoutly not to confront: namely, that there are people who, given the correct circumstances, will enjoy the opportunity to commit acts that others regard as evil. In addition, Blumenthal appears to argue (p. 43) that authority may sanction "both prosocial and aggressive behavior." The implication here is that aggressive behavior is necessarily negative. The problem is that not all aggressive behavior is negative. Behavior may, in fact, be aggressively prosocial; that is, may pursue the saving of life in an aggressive fashion. Depending on Blumenthal's definition of "aggressive," there is an even larger conceptual problem. When faced with the evil violence of destroying large numbers of people, aggressive behavior is required to counter evil. In short, aggressive behavior may very well serve the greater good of saving life.

Part One of the book involves primarily this type of discussion. In Part Two, he examines what he refers to as "The Affec-
What Blumenthal does is select those as the author believes they relate to these value-concepts of prosocial life. These are an examination of Jewish traditions as one might be boiled down to noting that if you behave morally you will be able to derive meaning from texts to support diverse and apparently contradictory arguments. What Blumenthal does is select those aspects of the psychological and historical literature as well as the Jewish tradition that supports the points he wishes to make and ignores material counter to his argument. For example, how does one reconcile the admonition by God to Joshua (Joshua 6:5): “Now the city shall be doomed by the Lord to destruction, it and all who are in it.” And the result of that: “And he utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, ox and sheep and donkey, with the edge of the sword” (Joshua 7:11). The point is not to argue what religious or historical texts “mean” but to note that one is able to derive meaning from texts to support divergent and apparently contradictory arguments. It is necessary, therefore, to ask whether it is essential to bring God into the discussion. Apparently not since Blumenthal proceeds to answer his questions by arguing that there are 11 aspects of prosocial life and 12 value-concepts of prosocial life. These might be boiled down to noting that if you behave morally you will be moral.

Essentially, then, there are two books here. The first is a review of the historical and psychological literature at the root of negative and positive behavior, and the second is an examination of Jewish traditions as the author believes they relate to these questions. Somewhere, hidden in this literature review and summary categorizations, there are important questions to be asked and answered. Unfortunately, this book does not accomplish that task.

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**New Directions In Jewish Ethics**

Jewish Ethics for the Twenty-First Century: Living in the Image of God
by Byron L. Sherwin
New York: Syracuse University Press

A Review Essay by Peter J. Haas

The first question that comes to mind in seeing Byron Sherwin’s new book on ethics is, what is wrong with the ethics we have developed in the 20th century? Why do we need a new ethics for the 21st century? Although the author never answers this question directly, it is clear from the content of the book what he has in mind.

Byron Sherwin is in fact in a unique position to answer this question. On the one hand, he is vice-president of academic affairs and distinguished service professor of Jewish philosophy and mysticism at Spertus Institute of Jewish Studies in Chicago. Thus, he is well aware of what is happening in the academic world in general and the world of Jewish studies in particular. On the other hand, he has published numerous books on Jewish ethics during the course of his career and so is aware as well of the ebb and flow of the academic studies of ethics and moral philosophy. In both arenas, Sherwin apparently senses that trends prominent in the late 20th century have come close to playing themselves out. There is a need to look for new directions.

Up into the 1990s, academic ethics was heavily informed by neo-Kantianism. The assumption was that contemporary thinkers could develop a coherent moral system independent of received religious traditions. It was not so much that the received morality was bad or wrong; in fact, most of what was written by people like Alfred Ayer, Roderick Firth, R.M. Hare, John Rawls and Philippa Foot was quite conservative in its content. The problem was that religious discourse was marginalized in the university and religion seemed in any case to be speaking to and for ever smaller constituencies. Academic philosophers saw it as their task to develop for ethics a new grounding that would have a more objective and universal appeal. Kant offered a strategy for building such a grounding out of pure reason and logic; and his approach became the foundation on which many late 20th-century professors of ethics built. To be sure, there were other streams of thought as well: moral theology was going strong in the seminaries and situation ethics was offering a significant alternative to rational, a priori ethics. But the notion that developing ethical norms was an inherently logical and secular enterprise was widely held.

By the late 1990s, however, this optimistic sense for developing a universally acceptable moral philosophy was fading. In part this had to do with the rise of postmodernism and the claim that any system of behavior was merely a cultural artifact. It followed that the assertion on the part of Western professors that they could generate a universal and objective ethic was just another example of Western intellectual imperialism. This generated a certain internal dissonance with the Academy. Alastair McIntyre, for example, argued that there are many different possible conceptualizations of, say, virtue and that the contemporary struggle to define a universal ethic was doomed to failure. He even called, at one point, for a return to the concept of virtue developed by the ancient Greeks.

The study of Jewish ethics was not immune to the influence of these developments. On the one hand, many writers were trying to show that Jewish ethics were just as reasonable and academically acceptable as “gentile” ethics, in fact, maybe even more so. So a range of writers was engaged in adding the rational and reasonable basis of Jewish ethics. In the end what made the contributions of people like Marc Kellner, S. Daniel Breslauer, Louis Newman, David Novak, Shubert Spero and Elliot Dorff Jewish was not so much their content, which was after all pretty much like everyone else’s, but the fact that the sources cited were Jewish sources—Tanach, Talmud, “the Halachah” and so forth. On the other hand, many of the authors trying to do Jewish ethics in a more traditional mode—that is, by addressing themselves to specific questions and articulating “the Jewish view” out of the traditional halachah. These tended to be the more Orthodox scholars such as J. David Bleich and Fred Rosner. For the growing number of college-educated American Jews, who wanted an ethic that was distinctly Jewish but yet not Orthodox, neither of these routes was producing particularly satisfying results.

In the book before us we can discern the first attempt to chart a third way, one that is both essentially Jewish but non-Orthodox. It is this that the author seems to be saying, that will (or at least should) characterize Jewish ethics and moral philosophy in the new millennium.
The central pivot of this new Jewish ethic, and what makes it different from accademic ethics, is that it “presupposes an objective foundation for moral behavior by rooting morality in the revelation of God’s will and in tradition’s interpretation...of the revelation” (p. 9). In short, Jewish ethics is Jewish precisely insofar as it does not de­euthanasia. Here, Sherwin tells us, the really central question is not so much the traditional one of when a golem becomes human. What haunts the author is when humans allow themselves to be reduced, in essence, to golems. In some sense, the whole point of Jewish ethics is to keep humans human and not let them become mere golems. There is a call here for a tikkun in what it means to be human in the modern, industrialized world.

It is this attitude that informs the other chapters of the book, dealing with parenthood, cloning, zedakah and repentance. In all cases, what is proper, according to Sherwin’s system, is not what happens to be allowed or prohibited in the tradition, which is in all events never so monolithic. What determines this ethical evaluation is whether the action in question affirms human beings as agents struggling to mold themselves in the image of God and allows that struggle toward tikkun to move forward. No new technology, like cloning for example, is prohibited a priori; it is how it is used in the larger human scheme of things that determines its moral evaluation.

So in the end, it is not specific actions or deeds that make for the moral life but an attitude. As Sherwin puts it at the very end of the book, “Ethical living offers each individual the opportunity of creating his or her life as a work of art, of molding oneself in the image of God” (p. 165).

The novelty of the book rests not only in its refreshing articulation of what Jewish ethics is all about but in the range of issues it explicitly addresses. Although this is never explicitly spelled out, the book takes as its central pivot the concept of “tikkun” or repair. The first substantive chapter (Chapter Two) addresses itself to “Health and Healing.” This sets the stage for what follows by asserting, reminiscent of Maimonides, that the health of the body is essential if the soul is to carry out its spiritual mission. The healing of the body, then, is a holy act done in concert, as it were, with God. The physician is not merely applying a technology but doing the Lord’s work.

The theme implicit here is addressed explicitly in the next chapter, devoted to euthanasia. Here, Sherwin tells us, that Jewish ethics is fundamentally different from Western ethics in that it is based not on the rights of the individual but on the individual’s obligations. After a careful look through the traditional literature, the author concludes that while active euthanasia is clearly condemned by traditional understandings of the halachah, passive euthanasia is not. With the advances in today’s technology, that tolerant attitude in the tradition toward passive euthanasia might well need to be expanded to cover some cases of active euthanasia. This is a startling assertion but one that is made to emerge from the discussions found within the traditional sources.

For me, the central image of the book emerges in Chapter Three, “In Adam’s Image.” The deliberations here flow around the concept of the Golem and the relationship between the Golem and the human. For Sherwin, the really central question is not so much the traditional one of when a golem becomes human. What haunts the author is when humans allow themselves to be reduced, in essence, to golems. In some sense, the whole point of Jewish ethics is to keep

write not only on Jewish sources but also on a wide array of political theorists. It offers the reader insights into the literature associated with the fields of Jewish political thought, classic Jewish texts, the writings of contemporary Jewish scholars and general political philosophy.

He reaffirms the significance of the covenantal relationship between God and the Jewish people. Judaism, he contends, must be seen as a “system of rights” and “correlative duties.” Novak’s principal thesis states that “there are no covenantal duties that are not backed by correlative rights.” It is Novak’s contention that most opponents of this model would accept the assumption that the concept of rights pertain only to individual persons because the individual represents “the smallest component in the covenantal system” since God and the community “have more claims on the individual person” than the individual has on them. He counters with the following: “Once it is shown that all duties presuppose correlative rights...this erroneous dismissal of a Jewish rights discourse can be refuted.” In his chapter on “Human Person, Covenantal Community,” for example, Novak outlines a series of “rights” an individual can find in any democratic society. He comments: “Although there is far less emphasis on this type of individual rights than of the other types of individual rights in the classical Jewish sources, these rights are not totally absent from the sources.” In identifying those individual rights, Novak cites some six examples, including the “right to protection from harm,” the “right to public assistance” and “the right to social inclusion.” Through an effort to combine traditional political theory with Jewish source material, he seeks to capture the core themes associated with the tradition’s emphasis. In these arenas his research is profoundly impressive and his insights particularly useful.

However, on a more careful reading, one realizes this is not a book truly focusing on the rights and duties of the individual in a modern context but rather a case for asserting the halachic position within Judaism. Novak addresses his arguments in several directions. From the outset, an attempt is made by Novak to challenge the ideas of both liberals and communitarians regarding their respective views on the relationship of the individual to the community.

Later this attack shifts when he asserts a traditionalist view on the issues of marriage, homosexuality and women’s rights. Here, he seeks to build a case against the “liberal” positions and practices of Reform, Conservative and Reconstructionist Judaism. Binding these constituencies together around the issue of the rights of women, for instance, he charges them collectively with having adopted a “simplistic egalitarianism,” which he sees as “totally at variance with the tradition.” He continues
NOTEWORTHY BOOKS

Editor's Note: The following is a list of books received from publishers but, as of this printing, have not been reviewed for Menorah Review.


The Juderia: A Holocaust Survivor's Tribute to the Jewish Community of Rhodes. By Laura Varon. Westport, CT: Praeger (Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.).

A Portrait of the American Jewish Community. Edited by Norman Limner, David J. Schnall and Jerome A. Chanes. Westport, CT: Praeger (Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.).


The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements. By Kevin MacDonald. Westwood, CT: Praeger (Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.).


Budapest Diary: In Search of the Motherbook. By Susan Rubin Suleiman. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.


Between Redemption and Doom: The Strains of German-Jewish Modernism. By Noah Isenberg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.


Problems Unique to the Holocaust. Edited by Harry James Cargas. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press.


Of Moses and Marx: Folk Ideology and Folk History in the Jewish Labor Movement. By David P. Shulkind. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey (Greenwood Publishing Group Inc.).


by stating: “This total disregard for the normative tradition will, sooner or later, make the practice of these new religious rights a hollow exercise, for it quickly calls to question just about everything the tradition has ever bequeathed...” As a result of the assault on tradition, he concludes, “the continuity of the community is lost and a new, ideological vision is substituted for it, one based neither on revelation nor reason.” Elsewhere, Novak proposes that God’s rights are “more foundational” than the rights of the individual or the community. But later, he would write even more directly on this notion when he says: “All power and rights are gifts from God.”

It is here where I feel a great discomfort with this approach. Novak, at the outset, argues that this effort is “not an attempt to provide any immediate solutions to the very real political dilemmas of either the Jews or the larger world in which Jews live today.” By using his theoretical model to define what sits outside acceptable Jewish practice, Novak is seeking, in fact, to prescribe conduct and behavior. It is here that one must raise the question of whether he realistically takes into account the availability of choices that exist in democratic systems. Arguing on behalf of the compatibility of Judaism with democracy, Novak leaves little room for accepting change within Judaism. As a result, he neither accounts for the impact or roles played by these liberal movements within Jewish life.

Early on, Novak suggests the following: “As long as there are Jews who look to the Jewish tradition for authority, the covenant between God and Israel is still operative, however partially.” By this statement is Novak suggesting that his model is not applicable to the rest of the Jewish enterprise? Since the majority of Jews may not fit Novak’s definition, one must ask how might he broaden the relevance of his philosophical treatise to incorporate those who sit outside this model? His principal intention here is to press for the “renewal of the covenant,” which for Novak implies the reassertion of rabbinic Jewish law and practice.

Theory is only meaningful when it is responsive to the realities of a culture. Novak’s brilliant analysis appears to fall short in this regard, as it fails to take into account social change and the democratic liberal tradition. From the beginning, he rejects the idea of the “fallacy of immediate relevance,” which Novak describes as “the simple location in the Jewish tradition of precedents for the modern democratic interest in human rights.” But Novak can not and does not offer the reader an alternative road.

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