The National Association for Ethnic Studies

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Editor's Note

The ethnic studies project is a relatively new formation in post secondary institutions. As academic formations go ethnic studies has a life line extending over a little more than a generation on college and university campuses of this nation. During this brief span of time I believe we safely can assert that ethnic studies scholarship, that occurring both inside and outside the classroom, has made major contributions to the bodies of knowledge now existing about the diverse social and cultural experiences of ethnic groups.

A defining characteristic of ethnic studies scholarship is that it has filled significant voids in what we know and understand about how human beings live and experience living. Just as importantly ethnic studies scholarship has challenged and continues to challenge old myths, stereotypes, and outright lies about the life experiences of many human groups. This is especially the case when these excesses have been used to shape what is thought about people of color. Sadly this misinformation even has also affected what many folks of color know about themselves. The corrective and evolving reinterpretable mission of ethnic studies has made important challenges to misinformation and stereotypic racist and sexist representations of people of color. In this regard the products of ethnic studies scholarship have served to rescue the historical, cultural, and social experiences of people of color from the hegemony of lies, distortions, and omissions. And while not all eth-
nic studies scholarly production has been of the positive genre alluded to here—frankly some of it has been egregious—I would argue that much of what has been made public has been within the stream of an important mission of ethnic studies: expanding the depth, scope, and understanding of what we know about the national, transnational, and diasporic experiences of diverse human groups.

The articles in this volume are part of this continuum. They each, drawing from unique disciplinary and interdisciplinary methodologies, make a contribution to what is known and knowable about the experiences of ethnic groups.

The lead article, “Interethnic Antagonism in the Wake of Colonialism: U.S. Territorial Racial and Ethnic Relations at the Margins,” by Michael Perez frames and presents a theoretical model for better understanding the complex racial and ethnic relationships shaping the social experiences of indigenous peoples of Guam. The article by Livia Kathe Wittman, “Languages and Postmodern Ethnic Identities,” challenges us to investigate the ways that our ethnic identities are shaped by the languages, verbal and non verbal, we are taught.

The article by Stephen B. Isabirye and Kooros M. Mahmoudi, “Rwanda, Burundi and Their ‘Ethnic’ Conflicts,” is a critical examination of some of the institutional factors dating to the colonial domination of Rwanda and Burundi predicting the 1994 holocaust in this region of Africa. Joseph Conforti’s article, “White Ethnic: A Social Concept,” examines the concept of the white ethnic, its origins, and what it tells us about whom it describes. Importantly, Conforti advances thinking as to why the concept has currency among many social scientists.

David Briscoe’s article “Distinctive Features of the African American Family: Debunking the Myth of the Deficit Model,” revisits an ongoing discourse regarding how African American families respond to the challenges of living in a racist society. He urges social scientists, public policy makers, and others to adopt and utilize a more holistic perspective for understanding how African Americans develop the capacity to cope with the
rigors of living in the United States. In a similar thematic vein, Cynthia Kasee's article, "Patchwork and PR: Seminole-Constructed Public Image," examines the adaptability of Florida Seminoles to many cultural shifts from within and from their interfacing with the entities of this society, not the least of which is government. She argues that contemporarily Seminoles exercise their own agency in constructing their public image.

To be sure these articles are diverse. To be sure they each serve as interesting contributions to the growing base of theory, perspectives, and speculation shaping the body of ethnic studies scholarship.

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Interethnic Antagonism in the Wake of Colonialism: U.S. Territorial Racial and Ethnic Relations at The Margins

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Since the proliferation of scholarship on racial and ethnic antagonism following the Civil Rights era, neo-Marxist, colonialism, and other power-conflict theories reached popularity and have been widely applied to explain racial and ethnic conflict throughout the world, particularly in the United States. However there is a lack of scholarship on racial and ethnic relations in the U.S. territories in general and the Pacific Islands in particular. Although a few works exist in terms of interethnic antagonism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Puerto Rico, Melanesia, and Hawaii, there is a lack of research on interethnic antagonism in Micronesia; therefore comparative analyses of race and ethnicity in the context of U.S. territorial relations would contribute to the general body of knowledge in ethnic studies. In light of Micronesia’s complex colonial history and its contemporary political and economic context (i.e. immigration, labor exploitation, territorial relations, neocolonialism, indigenous sovereignty struggles, and garment, tourist, and construction industries), understanding of intergroup relations in Micronesia would also benefit from an analysis of interethnic antagonism.
As a territory of the United States the island of Guam is particularly situated within the eye of this political economic storm. Indeed Guam is the industrial center of Micronesia and a popular destination for capital, industries, the military, tourists, migrants, and labor. Compounding antagonistic racial, ethnic, and indigenous relations surrounding self-determination, sovereignty, military, and political status issues, Guam's colonial history is marked by political subjugation, military land acquisition, lopsided economic development, colonial immigration policy, and tremendous immigration. In particular given the lack of local control of Guam's economy and in-migration, these remain central issues surrounding intergroup conflict on the island. Yet how are these dynamics played out within a territorial possession whereby diverse cultures and political economic interests converge in the wake of colonialism?

In this paper, I offer an interpretive note on interethnic antagonism between the Chamorro population (indigenous people of the Mariana Islands) and non-Chamorros, particularly labor migrant groups in Guam. In doing so, I construct a theoretical model of interethnic antagonism derived from diverse perspectives (i.e. colonial, split labor market, middleman minority, cultural, and postcolonial studies) and critically analyze the political economic history of Guam.

Introduction

Intergroup conflict is an inextricable feature of diverse stratified societies. A heterogeneity of cultural, religious, historical, political, and economic interests lay the foundation for interethnic antagonism. The diverse complexion of the United States is an instructive case in point, whereby racial and ethnic conflict have marked intergroup relations from the discovery of the New World to the 1992 Los Angeles uprising. Many perspectives on intergroup conflict exist that range across psychological, cultural, and social explanations. Considering the capitalist and colonial contexts of intergroup relations, funda-
mental social sources of intergroup conflict are apparent (i.e. labor exploitation, divide and conquer maneuvers, splitting the labor market). In turn there has been a proliferation of scholarship on interethnic antagonism in the United States establishing a paradigm of ethnic studies scholarship beyond conventional assimilationist and biracial theorizing.² However, there is a lack of scholarship on interethnic relations in the U.S. territories in general and the Pacific Islands in particular. Although a few works on interethnic antagonism and anti-immigrant sentiment in Puerto Rico, Melanesia, and Hawaii exist, there is a lack of research on interethnic antagonism in Micronesia.³ Therefore comparative analyses of interethnic relations in the context of U.S. territorial relations would contribute to the general body of ethnic studies knowledge.

Because of Micronesia’s diversity, complex colonial history and contemporary political economic context, conflict is a common feature of intergroup relations there. As a territory of the United States the island of Guam is situated particularly within the eye of this political economic storm. Guam is the industrial hub of Micronesia and a popular destination for capital, industries, military, tourists, labor, and migrants simply searching for a better life. Compounding antagonistic racial, ethnic, and indigenous relations surrounding self-determination, sovereignty, military, and political status issues, Guam’s colonial history is marked by political subjugation, military land acquisition, lopsided economic development, colonial immigration policy, and tremendous in-migration. Guam represents an interesting context of analysis of interethnic antagonism given its state of being remote controlled by the United States. In particular given the lack of local control over in-migration, these remain central issues and sources of intergroup conflict between Chamorros and non-Chamorros. For instance, Chamorro-Filipino relations have historically involved conflict. Vicente M. Diaz describes the annual celebration of Chamorro heritage in Guam - Chamorro Week:

...In the 1970s, Chamorro Week in the public school system was as much an occasion—however ghettoized—to express pride in one’s Chamorro heritage as it was an open season to beat up individuals labeled
“Tagaloos”....Filipinos, on the other hand, are not innocent bystanders, poor helpless immigrants, who want only to live a life of dignity often denied back home. Many Filipinos look down on Chamorros as not as culturally rich as people in their mother country.4

In recent years there have been incidents of conflict, at times violent, between Chamorros and other non-Chamorros. Yet how do these dynamics play out within a territorial possession where diverse cultures and economic and political interests converge in the wake of colonialism?

For clarification Chamorros are the indigenous people of the Mariana Islands while Guam is the largest and Southernmost of the Marianas chain in Micronesia of the Western Pacific. Contemporary Chamorros are descendants of precontact inhabitants referred to as Ancient Chamorros, who settled the islands over 3,000 years ago.5 With the dramatic decline of the ancient Chamorro population due to colonialism, annihilation, and disease, the Spanish census began classifying Chamorros into a hybrid neo-Chamorro racial mixture in the late 1900s.6 Thus contemporary Chamorros are technically linked to this neo-Chamorro mixture, which culturally combines indigenous, Spanish, Mexican, and Filipino influences. Nonetheless Chamorros remain true to their roots as expressed in their ongoing cultural resilience and trace their origin to the precontact era.7

Given the influx of non-Chamorro groups through the years, Guam evolved into a diverse society. Based on the 1990 census of Guam, there were 133,152 residents made up of 38% Chamorros, 23% Filipinos, 21% other Asians and Pacific Islanders, and 14% Caucasians.8 Other than Filipinos the largest Asian group was Korean, followed by Japanese and Chinese respectively. Palauans and Chuukese made up the largest Pacific Islander groups from Micronesia other than Chamorros.9

In this paper I explore interethnic antagonism between Chamorros and non-Chamorros in the context of colonialism in Guam. I offer an interpretive theoretical note by drawing on diverse perspectives to critically analyze the political economic history of interethnic relations in Guam. In doing so this paper
Perez—Interethnic

provides an overview of Guam’s political history, constructs an
integrated theoretical model of interethnic antagonism, and his-
torically analyzes interethnic antagonism in Guam drawing
from the theoretical framework and literature.

An Overview of Guam’s Political History

Interethnic conflict in Guam is inherently rooted in a com-
plex political history. It is therefore important to clarify this polit-
ical historical context. Since my focus is on interethnic antag-
onism in the context of capitalism and U. S. colonialism, I refer
exclusively to Guam’s political history following U.S. capture
from Spain in 1898. I particularly discuss the beginning of the
American era in Guam, Japanese Occupation/Guam
Liberation, citizenship-decolonization, and U.S. neocolonial-
ism.

Beginning of the American Legacy and U.S. Territorial
Relations in Guam

Sparked by North American imperialism, the late 1800s
marked the beginning of United States’ occupation of Guam.
As the geopolitical arena became more complex and global-
ized during this era, the U.S. especially became interested in
expanding its military presence in the Pacific Islands, Asia, and
the Caribbean. Likewise Guam was intimately tied to U.S.
intentions to establish authority in the Philippines thereby
becoming the most strategic U.S. colonial outpost in the
Pacific. Also as the Spanish-American War was in motion, the
U.S. was interested in occupying Spain’s colonies in these
areas.10

Through a series of political mandates by the U.S. Guam
came under the military control of the United States for its
strategic location in the Pacific Rim and was officially annexed
via the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898.11 In addition to
the establishment of a military institution, the United States
transplanted other American social institutions (i.e. polity, law,
and education). Guam eventually became an extension of the
American normative structure, subjugating Chamorros to
American social standards which profoundly affected
Chamorro self-concept.12 Sovereign authority of Guam was
placed in the hands of the United States and was to remain
there for years to come with the exception of the Japanese Occupation during World War II.

Treaty negotiations between the U.S., Spain, and the international community set the stage for legitimate and paternalistic control of Chamorros in Guam. As control of Guam emerged out of the context of military interests, the Navy politically subjugated Chamorros for military interests. For instance naval administration in the late 1800s limited various local practices and activities through civil mandates.

The legitimacy of U.S. authority on Guam was sealed in 1901 with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Insular Cases. A major issue surrounding these cases was "whether constitutional restrictions (such as the Tenth amendment) on congressional authority over the U.S. states also served to check federal power over the new island acquisitions." In the case of Downes v. Bidwell the Supreme Court ruled that "insular territories" were not equivalent to the states; thus the U.S. Congress had unlimited authority over its territories since the Constitution of the United States was inapplicable. The political status of Guam remained obscure thus enabling unprecedented subjugation of Chamorros by the Navy and Congress during the early 1900s.

Japanese Occupation and Guam Liberation

World War II placed Guam in a precarious situation. The Japanese occupied Guam during 1941 and 1944 as a result of shortcomings on the part the U.S. to secure a sufficient military fortress and dominance in the Pacific. When Guam was "liberated" by the U.S. on July 21, 1944, the U.S. reestablished its authority on Guam. To prevent future military vulnerabilities the U.S. initiated an aggressive campaign to institute political and military dominance. Guam, thereby, was recognized for its strategic geopolitical value in a new light. Due to being "rescued" by the U.S. from Japanese occupation, the majority of Chamorros became highly patriotic and grateful for American rule in the 1940s as an extension of their appreciation with the generosity and reciprocity so characteristic of their indigenous culture.

The reality of American "rescue" became painfully obvious with the lack of concern for postwar civilian conditions. The
years following the War were again marked by political subjugation that boiled into discontent among Chamorros and escalated the political contestation of the 1950s and 1960s. For instance the fact later surfaced that Chamorros were not consulted as the United States waived Chamorro war claims against the Japanese as part of peace treaty negotiations. Furthermore numerous Chamorros who had been placed in refugee camps were not allowed to resettle on their lands and remained in unstable settings for nearly two years following Liberation. Some Chamorros were never permitted to move back to their land. The U.S. Government further seized land in the interest of national defense. Displacement of Chamorros from the land profoundly affected Chamorro identity. Rooted in ancient Chamorro society, land continues to be central to indigenous culture, for at one time Guam was seen as "a sacred place to the Ancient Chamorros who believed that all life Sprang from its soil." In the beginning of World War II the U.S. had acquired over one-third of the island. With revitalized post-World War II military interests in developing Guam into a military fortress, the U.S. claimed huge pieces of land with the goal of possessing over half of the island.

Likewise Guam's economy was subordinate to military interests and thus was underdeveloped. Although Guam experienced some economic progress following the War as a result of U.S. economic prosperity and military expansion, U.S. military policy in Guam was specifically aimed at restricting free enterprise for security reasons and to prevent labor exploitation. Ironically, the U.S. military exploited labor as well as land.

The United States presence in Guam was also aimed at promoting acculturation, with education as a major vehicle of Americanization. Compulsory public education that was immediately established following U.S. annexation in the late 1800s was intended to establish English as the official language replacing the Chamorro and Spanish languages. In addition to language other dimensions of cultural behavior were constrained. For instance local customs and celebrations were replaced with federal holidays through mandates requiring observance. As the process of Americanization escalated following Liberation, many Chamorros became highly mal-
leable and patriotic toward the United States to the point of feeling forever in debt to "America." 23

**Drive for Citizenship and Decolonization**

In light of the rapid changes brought on by Americanization Chamorros began a quest for U.S. citizenship and civilian government. 24 Various petitions for self-government and citizenship were filed in Washington over the years. What were initially docile efforts toward U.S. citizenship in the 1920s escalated. Chamorro leaders went to Washington to lobby and communicate Chamorro grievances and their desire for citizenship. 25

Other political developments fueled the Chamorro drive for citizenship and decolonization. With the emergence of New World politics after World War II, the promise of self-determination was articulated with the creation of an oversight council—the U.N. Trusteeship Council. 26 Additionally the Guam Congress was established and granted authority to legislate.

In 1945 land claims became a focal issue of political protest as Chamorro land rights were obscured and continued to be violated for military interests. Years of festering animosity towards subjugation by the military government converged at a heated confrontation between the Guam Congress and Governor Pownall in 1949, thereby culminating in the removal of naval government from Guam. President Truman formally transferred administrative control of Guam from the Navy to the Department of the Interior and appointed the first civilian governor of Guam, Carlton S. Skinner. 27 Civilian election of the governor eventually replaced executive appointment further empowering the people of Guam.

Following years of enduring political opposition the Chamorro drive for U.S. citizenship and to limited military control was codified with the Organic Act of Guam. The 1950 Organic Act led to a number of steps toward self-rule and decolonization. With the local government being placed in civilian hands, three conventional branches of democratic government were established along with a Bill of Rights. In 1951 the Guam Congress was replaced by the First Guam Legislature which enabled further local political control. Finally Chamorros could travel more freely to the U.S. mainland.
U.S. Neocolonialism

Despite landmark social and political changes surrounding the Organic Act, Guam's strategic value remained a primary concern to the U.S. Neocolonialism surfaced in subtle forms but with the same intention to remote control Guam and its people. This is related to the fact that Chamorros did not vote on the Organic Act yet are governed within its parameters. Although Chamorros obtained American citizenship, thereby transforming Guam from an "unorganized" territory to an "organized" territory, their newly acquired citizenship status remains second-class. The U.S. government in many ways continued to treat Guam as an unorganized U.S. possession under the rationale of the Insular Cases. As a result of being granted congressional versus constitutional U.S. citizenship, the Chamorros did not acquire many conventional constitutional rights of U.S. citizenship. They were denied full protection from federal and congressional authority, participation in national politics; federal, social, and economic benefits; and constitutional protection under the American legal system.  

Despite enduring efforts toward self-determination, the replacement of military government with civilian government, and transfer of authority from the Navy to the Department of the Interior, the Organic Act conferred limited self-government to the people of Guam with significant power remaining in military hands. Ironically the immediate tone of the Organic Act seemed to limit self-rule. The neocolonial intentions of the U.S. were confirmed at the onset as Guam was declared an "unincorporated" versus "incorporated" territory indicating a lack of intention to incorporate Guam in union with the U.S. as a state. The U.S. Congress maintained full authority to legislate and even amend the Organic Act without consent of the local people. The President of the United States also maintained authority to claim any portion of Guam's land for military purposes. In the meantime the military continued to control over 36% of the island.  

In addition, although a unicameral legislature comprised of many local leaders was well established, the traditional balance of power characteristic of the states was not the case on Guam. In actuality Guam's executive branch ranked above the legislative branch, thus limiting the voice of the people.
Although the formal goal of the Interior was to transcend the colonial aftermath of Guam, decolonization efforts were either lost within the complex bureaucracy of the Interior or remained a low priority in Washington D.C. In short the people of Guam were granted the label of American citizenship and self-government yet still lacked a fully legitimate voice. This set the tone for a new era of political subjugation. 

With a new tide of geopolitical interests and developments combined with Guam's obscure status subsequent instances of political subjugation surfaced. International political relations in the mid-1900s revitalized military interests in Guam. For instance anticommunist sentiment, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War plunged Guam into a new chapter of national defense. Over the years attempts were made to formally reestablish military control over civilian authority. Therefore Chamorros were subject to contemporary political maneuvers on the part of the military to act as it deemed fit for national security without consent of the people of Guam (i.e. storage of warfare products including nuclear warheads, bombs, missiles, further land acquisition, and construction of storage facilities).

With regards to land the U.S. military has retained an overwhelming possession of Guam in spite of Chamorro resistance; moreover the combined ownership of the military, federal, and local government is 50% of the entire island. With the downsizing of the military in the 1990s a huge proportion of Guam's land under military possession is in excess of military "need" yet remains off-limits to locals.

Compounding the situation, Guam's economy was absorbed into a new era of modern capitalism. In the heart of modern capitalism removal of restraints on private investment occurred, while Guam's economy experienced tremendous growth in the 1960s as a result of the rise of the tourist industry and other complimentary industries (i.e. construction, commerce, and imports). As Guam became positioned within the larger context of modern capitalist development in the Pacific, its economy was to experience fluctuating cycles of economic crisis and growth characteristic of capitalism in the years to come and hence to suffer the residual brunt of inconsistency, dramatic social, cultural and economic change, labor immigration, and exploitation.
By the early 1970s tourism had expanded with high-rise hotels sprouting up on Tumon Beach (Guam’s version of Waikiki). Japanese capitalist investments began to outweigh U.S. investments as Japan became the primary source of capital and tourists in Guam. Despite periods of economic growth Guam’s economy continued to fluctuate through the years. For centuries Guam had been a thriving independent society that was transformed into a dependent welfare economy as a result of outside intrusions and dependent development. These conditions induced push-pull factors involving subsequent waves of Chamorro migration to the mainland to seek the American dream thus establishing permanent Chamorro communities especially in Southern California for years to come.  

By the late 1980s and early 1990s Guam’s economy prospered while becoming increasingly dependent on Asian economies. An exodus of Filipino, Micronesian, Korean, Malaysian, and Chinese migrant laborers were recruited and began to pour in. These contemporary economic “developments” generated further exploitation of land, however more so at the hands of capitalists as opposed to the military.  

Once an independent self-sustaining society, Guam has become a dependent consumer society marked by urbanization. Inconsistent development of Guam’s economy, compounded with urbanization and exploitation of land and labor have exacerbated infrastructural, social, and cultural problems. These negative residual effects of haphazard capitalist growth are prevalent today and observed in local concerns for identity, infrastructural strains, environmental crisis, and in-migration which have ignited revitalized Chamorro sentiments toward political self-determination.  

Political Self-Determination  
Subsequent generations began to recognize the neo-colonialist relationship between the United States and Guam, and that in fact the return of the U.S. Liberation of Guam was not to save Chamorros but to save face and ensure U.S. military dominance in the Pacific. This consciousness served as an undercurrent of resistance that surfaced in the 1970s. Since the 1970s, there has been a proliferation of Chamorro resistance in response to the ongoing colonialist relationship
between the U.S. and Guam. Chamorro self-determination and political status became the centerpiece of the political climate.

In the late 1970s Guam's political status efforts involved ongoing drafts of a Guam constitution. Sparked by a fierce Chamorro rights advocacy, a series of Chamorro rights organizations emerged, therefore signifying the proliferation of Chamorro nationalism.

In response to neocolonialist conditions, Chamorro activists and leaders pondered alternative strategies toward self-determination. Prompted by decolonization efforts among other U.S. colonies, a new strategy emerged on Guam that recognized the need to transform the existing neocolonialist relationship between Guam and the United States. In light of seemingly “successful” decolonization efforts of the Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico, Guam's leaders pondered strategies toward decolonization and self-determination such as commonwealth, statehood, and free association.

Through the years Guam's political status efforts have been an uphill struggle due to the lack of incentive on the part of the U.S. to decolonize a possession of which they desire to maintain control. Division among Chamorros regarding the most feasible alternative towards decolonization added to the difficulty of to constructing a solidified strategy—not to mention the division between World War II generation Chamorros who remained highly patriotic to the United States and subsequent generations of insurgent Chamorros.

Nonetheless Guam's status quest raged on. Following a handful of constitutional drafts, status commissions, and public opinion polls, Guam finally possessed a status goal by the late 1980s, that of a commonwealth, which was believed to increase the level of self-government while remaining under U.S. sovereignty and reaffirming U.S. citizenship, although diverse sentiments surrounding Guam's Draft Commonwealth Act revealed ambivalence and division.

Combined with Washington's reluctance to grant commonwealth status to Guam the resurgence of interethnic divisions concerning political status obscured the issue. At the intra-group level the Chamorro Movement appears to be splintering. For instance there is a discourse of resistance concerning the
insufficient representation of indigenous Chamorro rights within the commonwealth proposal. At the inter-group level many non-Chamorros oppose Chamorro nationalism (which fueled the commonwealth movement) for its exclusionary connotations. Furthermore migrants (i.e. Filipinos, Micronesians) tend to oppose Commonwealth status on the grounds that it would shut off immigration by locating Guam outside the U.S. The Constitutional legitimacy of the Commonwealth proposal has also been questioned on the basis of “mutual consent,” and “local control over immigration.”\(^{37}\) The Commonwealth quest has been difficult because of these diverse perspectives and interests.

On October 29, 1997, the Guam Commonwealth Act finally achieved a long awaited Congressional hearing, only the second hearing on the act within a ten year span. After pleas and testimonies from numerous Chamorro leaders and advocates, Deputy Secretary of Interior and President Clinton's representative for Guam Commonwealth negotiations, John Garamendi, indicated that the Administration was not willing to agree to three main areas of the act, mutual consent, immigration control, and Chamorro self-determination, core elements of the proposal. Therefore as Guam's non-voting delegate in Congress, Robert A. Underwood, states: “The most significant outcome of the hearing was the clarification of the executive branch's official position on the draft Act.”\(^{38}\) The future of Guam's political status quest remains obscure and uncertain, but given the unclear course of affairs facing Guam, Joe T. San Agustin implies that despite the possibility of the Commonwealth quest not succeeding or at best being long and drawn out in the absence of a timetable, Chamorro commitment towards self-determination will persist, perhaps “even fuel the direction toward more radical forms.”\(^{39}\) Chamorro nationalism will continue to fuel indigenous political contestation. In fact current sentiments toward independence and statehood among activists and students who oppose Commonwealth have emerged in recent years.

**Historical and Contemporary Dynamics of Interethnic Antagonism in Guam**

Intergroup relations in Guam are evidently intertwined
in a complex political, economic, and colonial history. In light of the outcome of the congressional hearing on Guam's Draft Commonwealth Act in 1997 immigration control and Chamorro self-determination remain central issues. These issues are driven by concerns for the maintenance of Chamorro culture, infrastructural strains, and the fear that Chamorros are becoming minorities in their own land. Indeed once making up an overwhelming majority of the population in Guam, Chamorros made up only 39% of the population in 1990. Given Guam's demographic shifts and increasing cultural diversity there is an unprecedented heterogeneity of interests with significant proportions of constituencies; therefore interethnic antagonism in Guam has reached new heights within an increasingly complex political, economic, cultural, and neocolonial context. In an attempt to capture this complexity I draw on diverse perspectives toward a general model to explain interethnic antagonism in a colonial territorial context. Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual model of the historical and contemporary dynamics of interethnic antagonism in Guam, which forms the basis of historical analysis.

**Classical and Neocolonialism**

The neocolonial relationship between Guam and the United States places the people of Guam in a precarious situation whereby intergroup conflict is inevitable. The current

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**FIGURE 1: Dynamics of Interethnic Antagonism in Guam**

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political relationship is rooted in a colonial history, in which conditions of classical colonialism remain intact under the guise of territorial relations.

Colonialism perspectives identify and isolate central conditions that typify colonialist processes and colonizer-colonized relationships. Classical or external colonialism refers to colonization of less "developed" societies by outside nation-states in the past. Drawing primarily on Robert Blauner's classic concept, there are five conditions of colonialism which facilitate conquest and domination: (1) forced entry, (2) physical and cultural genocide, (3) political subjugation, (4) exploitation, and (5) racism. Forced entry involves intrusion by a foreign nation. Forced entry can also refer to the forced absorption of a group into a colonial social system. Physical genocide refers to the blatant annihilation of a population through warfare and disease. Cultural genocide is the annihilation of indigenous culture and social structure. Political subjugation is the process by which colonized people are subject to the governance and policies of an invading nation. Exploitation during the classical colonialist period primarily involved exploitation of natural resources and labor for colonialist interests. Racism is both an outcome and justification of colonial processes and entails a multidimensional process involving individual, institutional, and ideological levels.

The colonial history of Guam from the Spanish conquest in the 1500s to the American occupation in the early 1900s displays colonial conditions on all counts. In turn the contemporary neocolonial situation in Guam is linked to this history (path one). Although many European and American colonies of the past achieved independence, many colonized territories continue to be economically and politically controlled by powerful nation-states. This ongoing subordination and dependence in the contemporary context is referred to as neocolonialism. Neocolonial theories highlight the ongoing process of colonialism whereby the conditions of classical colonialism are maintained in contemporary times to subordinate and control colonized populations within (internal colonialism) and out (external colonialism) of the nation-state. For instance the internal colony model has been extensively applied to minority communities on the U.S. mainland, but application to the U.S. ter-
Territories is lacking. This analysis specifically highlights three colonial conditions—cultural erosion, political subjugation, and economic exploitation—as foundations of interethnic antagonism (paths four, five, and six). The simultaneous entanglement of these colonial processes perpetuates a complex condition of interethnic antagonism vis-à-vis (path eight), middleman minority and split labor market processes (paths eleven and twelve), colonial immigration (path nine), and indigenous nationalism.

**Industrialization and Capitalist Development**

A key source of interethnic antagonism throughout the globe is embedded in the historical development of industrialization and capitalism. Intergroup relations in Guam are no exception. Therefore neo-Marxist theories are indeed applicable to economic processes in Guam. Although colonial theories recognize economic exploitation as a common condition of colonialism, neo-Marxist theories highlight the inherent role of labor exploitation under capitalism as a fundamental feature of social organization. Likewise industrialization paralleled colonial expansion. As Lucie Cheng and Edna Bonacich reveal, modern capitalism is rooted in preindustrial imperialist expansion, which led to exploitation of land, immigrant labor and indigenous labor. Indeed industrialization of Guam is rooted in its colonial history. Without getting bogged down with the finer debates surrounding Marxist and postcolonial critiques, my point is to illustrate that common Marxist processes (i.e. driving down labor costs, exploitation of cheap labor, recruitment of immigrant and migrant labor) are crucial sources of labor immigration and ethnic conflict in Guam. In fact colonialism and capitalism are two sides of the same coin; therefore, economic exploitation is not merely a condition of colonialism as suggested by colonial theories but is essentially driven by capitalist development (path six) a key economic source of interethnic antagonism in Guam. Split labor market, middleman minority, and colonial immigration dynamics are therefore key features of interethnic antagonism in Guam.
Split Labor Market, Middleman Minorities, and Colonial Immigration

The interconnections of capitalism and colonialism are rooted in divide and conquer colonial tactics. Split labor market theory succinctly captures this divide and conquer phenomenon in the context of capitalism.\(^45\) Split labor market theory specifically highlights the segmentation of labor by capitalists to lower labor costs. By partitioning the labor market, potentially higher paid labor is undermined by introducing cheaper pockets of labor through labor immigration; therefore, competition and conflict are instigated between segments of labor to the support of capitalists and colonizers efforts to drive down labor costs and maintain control of the colonized. Labor segmentation often occurs across racial and ethnic lines, as certain minority groups historically occupy labor niches. In essence diverse racial and ethnic groups compete for meager resources, while the reality of their oppression is deflected away from the actual source. This often forms the economic basis of interethnic antagonism as racial and ethnic groups are pitted against one another.

Colonial immigration is, in turn, both a source of capitalist development and consequence of political subjugation (paths nine and ten). As noted labor immigration is a key characteristic of capitalism, whereby cheaper pockets of labor are continually sought to drive labor costs down. Capitalism also has an ideological effect by attracting immigrants who are in pursuit of the fruits of capitalism (path ten). Since Guam is “Where America’s Day Begins,” Guam has long been a popular destination for many immigrants in pursuit of the American Dream. Likewise since immigration policies are controlled by colonizers (path nine), the colonized often have no say regarding movement to and from their homeland. This is precisely the situation in Guam.\(^46\)

Although U.S. exploitation of Guam primarily involved land acquisition for military interests, thus diverging from the classic Marxist model, Marxist processes of economic exploitation of Chamorros and other minorities are nonetheless evident in Guam’s history. For example at the brink of the American takeover of Guam in the late 1800s a significant number of Chamorro men were absorbed into early waves of capitalist
labor migration to Hawaii. Attempts were also made to use Chamorros as cheap labor to help establish a military fortress in Guam. By the late 1940s, the U.S. began incorporating split-labor market tactics on Guam characteristic of Hawaii and the U.S. mainland. For instance due to labor shortages in Guam and to cut labor costs, American military and civilian contractors began recruiting large numbers of workers (especially from the Philippines) and constructing labor camps whose workers later became known as H-2 workers. This labor system exploited both local and foreign labor and fostered interethnic antagonism especially between Chamorros and Filipinos that persists today.

Divide and conquer colonial split labor market tactics further take on a contemporary life of their own in the context of neocolonialism and advanced capitalism. Contemporary economic conditions are likewise a result of both military and capitalist exploitation. Although the military presence in Guam has contributed to the local economy in terms of employment and military production, the military continued to exploit labor in the 1950s and 1960s, especially foreign Filipino labor for military construction. The military has continued to exploit land and perpetuate economic stagnation. In spite of Chamorro political resistance to land subversion, the U.S. military has retained an overwhelming possession of Guam, which is a clear source of Chamorro animosity towards military personnel (largely Caucasians and African Americans). Moreover the combined ownership of the military, federal, and local government remains 50% of the entire island, much of which remains off-limits to locals as noted previously. Guam's strategic location for national defense continues to be the rationale. In short not much has changed for over forty years of American rule. Although Guam's economic development remained stagnant as a result of limitations imposed on the private sector by the military, dramatic changes sparked in the 1960s transformed Guam's economy in the following decades.

In the heart of modernization removal of restraints on private investment occurred. Guam's economy experienced tremendous growth in the 1960s as a result of the rise of the tourist industry and other complementary industries (i.e. construction, commerce, and imports). The stage was set for a
new era of land and labor exploitation.

As Guam was absorbed into the larger world order of modern capitalist development, its economy experienced fluctuating cycles of economic crisis and prosperity characteristic of capitalism in general—and hence suffers the residual social problems associated with such inconsistency and dramatic socioeconomic change. As Laura Torres Souder states, Guam has become “a totally lopsided economy which is externally controlled.”

Neo-Marxist perspectives are further applicable to Guam’s economic (under)development, which is an additional dynamic of interethnic antagonism. In contrast to modernization perspectives neo-Marxist approaches suggest that this state of haphazard economic development is inherent to capitalist systems due to its short-term mentality and obsession with profit-maximization and labor exploitation. Modern capitalism has thus maintained its use of cheap labor rooted in preindustrial imperialist expansion which has led to exploitation of immigrant and indigenous labor. Splitting the labor market remains a major source of interethnic antagonism within advanced capitalism. During economic growth open-door policies commonly prevail to generate pull factors and promote labor in-migration. This has certainly been the case in Guam, especially in lieu of Chamorro resistance to being utilized as cheap labor. To complement the booming Guam economy in the 1960s there was a major shift in immigration policy and foreign labor:

...the “Aguino Ruling” (based on the Board of Immigration Appeals case) permitted certain categories of nonimmigrant alien workers admitted to Guam prior to December 1952, and still on the island owing to continuing contract employment, to remain as permanent U.S. residents under the 1917 Immigration Act.

Over one thousand Filipino immigrants obtained permanent residence and eventually American citizenship. With the influx of their relatives Filipino migration poured in. This tremendous pocket of labor was exploited by the military and private industries for years. Then during the early 1960s the Immigration and Naturalization Service allowed Micronesian as well as Filipino workers to enter Guam for reconstruction pur-
poses following the destruction of the island at the hands of Typhoon Karen in 1962. As Underwood states:

Karen was the first in a series of events and trends that facilitated the transformation of Guam into a multi-ethnic society.... After Karen, Guam's society became more complex and ethnically diverse. A multi-ethnic community grew within the context of an economic boom that featured tourism, foreign investment and enormous construction projects.53

This context further increased the tide and exploitation of foreign workers while also introducing new pockets of exploitable labor from southern islands of Micronesia. Anti-immigrant sentiment among Chamorros swelled as ethnic competition for limited resources escalated, especially as the Filipino population grew to become the second largest ethnic group next to Chamorros. The impetus of this sentiment included labor competition, threats to indigenous culture, and lack of immigration control.

By the early 1970s, tourism had expanded with high-rise hotels sprouting up on Tumon Beach. As Japanese capitalist investments began to outweigh U.S. investments, Japan became the primary source of capital and tourists as previously noted. But the economy took a crisis turn in the mid 1970s, as tourism faltered. Characteristic of economic crisis (i.e. inflation, unemployment, bankruptcy, and debt) the number of welfare recipients increased while investments dwindled. For centuries Guam had been a thriving independent society that was transformed into a dependent welfare economy as a result of outside intrusions and dependent development, this time in the form of capitalist invasion. Thousands of Filipino workers repatriated to the Philippines.

Consistent with the fundamental haphazard feature of capitalist development en route, Guam's economy prospered in the 1980s sparked in part by rehabilitation efforts following Typhoon Pamela in the late 1970s.54 Tourism experienced growth once again with the building of an international airport. The airline industry reached new heights. Meanwhile more and more hotels were being constructed. Duty free shopping was also introduced. Private-sector employment and property value skyrocketed, while commercial banks and savings and
loans corporations emerged. By the late 1980s and early 1990s Guam’s economic boom reached new heights. With increased Japanese capital investment Guam’s economic conditions became more dependent on Japan’s economy versus the U.S. economy. As Souder also notes:

With the emergence of Japan as a world economic power, Guam is experiencing a “third” Japanese invasion vis-à-vis Japanese corporate investors who are buying land at inflationary prices and through their investments control the tourist industry.55

As the Japanese community in Guam has developed through the years, anti-Japanese sentiment among Chamorros (perhaps traceable to the Japanese occupation) anecdotally seems to be exacerbated by Japanese capitalism. Robbery of and violence toward Japanese tourists is not unheard of.

In the midst of economic prosperity the need for workers increased once again, especially to perform construction and domestic service. In addition to Filipinos and Micronesians, Korean, Malaysian, and Chinese migrants were recruited and began to pour in. Exploitation became rampant as more pockets of cheap labor became accessible to capitalists. In 1986 pull factors attracting Micronesian migrants became especially profound when the U.S. established “free association” with the “new states” within the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).56 Under free association the TTPI evolved into the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republics of the Marshalls and Palau. As U.S. nationals their citizens were granted freedom of travel to U.S. territories, thus opening the door to an exodus of thousands of Micronesians sparked by Guam’s economic prosperity. Residents of Guam commonly refer to this situation as “Compact Impact,” that is the negative impact (i.e. infrastructural strain, cultural erosion, population growth, crime rates) of the Compact agreement on Guam’s infrastructure and culture.57

Guam came to experience cultural lag resulting from this dramatic economic and population boom combined with insufficient infrastructure. Social problems that plagued former periods of economic upturn and influxes of migration resurfaced to more telling degrees. Electricity, roads, medical care, education, housing, and the criminal justice system remained defi-
cient and increasingly strained. Anti-immigrant sentiment, interethnic antagonism, competition for meager resources, welfare dependency, and crime rates swelled. Capitalism has taken its toll on both migrants and locals, yet the true source of oppression continues to be clouded by interethnic animosity. Guam's communities seem to exhibit split-labor market characteristics similar to metropolitan cities on the U.S. mainland. Interethnic antagonism between Chamorros and Asians also seems to be enticed by middleman minority features of Guam, which are evident with an increasing tide of Asian migrants who bring entrepreneurial resources thus establishing mom-and-pop businesses throughout the island. The rationale of middleman minority theory is that ethnic entrepreneurs occupy an intermediary niche thereby serving the interests of capitalists by purchasing products from and distributing goods for capitalists. Middleman minorities are both an exploited and exploitative class. They are exploited by capitalists based on their dependence on commodities produced on a larger scale by capitalists, while they exploit locals in the name of petite bourgeoisie profits. Since Guam has transformed into a consumer society dependent on imports thus exploited by export-oriented growth in exporting zones, middleman minority dynamics are additional sources of interethnic antagonism as locals (Chamorros and non-Chamorros) are forced to purchase imported products at inflationary prices.

In light of the complexity of Guam's colonial history and territorial status the immigration issue in Guam seems to diverge considerably from the anti-immigrant sentiment that escalated in the 1990s in California. In terms of the latter anti-immigrant feelings are rooted in Euro-American nativist hysteria and racist ideologies of immigrants themselves. Although some of this sentiment certainly exists on Guam, the primary issue at hand is inadequate infrastructure to absorb dramatic population growth and lack of immigration control on the part of the local people. As Underwood suggests:

It is merely the fact of numbers, the capacity of a society to absorb those numbers, and the desirability of a society being able to plan its future. If the numbers come from other sources, the concern over immigration would still be there. Put simply, a discussion over
immigration cannot be dismissed as an expression of ethnic prejudice nor as an affront to the contributions of immigrants. These are not the issues at stake. The issue is, does a society have a right to control entry into its membership?60

The dramatic rise in the population and increase in social and economic needs of migrants has therefore tugged on Guam's already inadequate infrastructure. Guam has been transformed into a setting of urban decay. The negative residual effects of haphazard capitalist growth are prevalent today and observed in concerns regarding problems of the ecological environment, in-migration, welfare, crime, medical care, education, and self-determination. As Souder states:

The lack of control over who is allowed to reside on Guam is a critical problem for several reasons. Guam's finite resources cannot sustain a population which is inflated unnaturally through in-migration.61

In sum contemporary capitalism introduced a more complex system of exploitation and dependency that moves beyond its imperialist roots. In addition to reliance on the U.S. military, Guam is economically dependent on tourism, imports and other related industries, while lacking the control to determine entry. Furthermore the interests of major political economic core powers within the New World Order converge on Guam (i.e. Japan and the United States). Economic consequences of neocolonialism are evidently manifested in the form of modern capitalism as explained by neo-Marxist perspectives. Once an independent self-sustaining society, Guam has become a dependent consumer society marked by urbanization. These are the precise concerns among Chamorros that have fueled counterhegemonic indigenous nationalist movements since the 1970s, which are additional sources of interethnic antagonism.

Indigenous Nationalism, Inversion, and Otherness

In light of the colonial conditions (i.e. cultural erosion, political subjugation, economic exploitation, colonial immigration) imposed on native people, indigenous nationalist movements are inevitable (paths seven, eight, and sixteen). As noted this is the nature of the landscape in Guam whereby Chamorros
are particularly concerned with self-determination and becoming minorities on their own land. Rooted in an historical undercurrent of Chamorro resistance since contact, the 1970s marked a political and cultural movement of Chamorro nationalism. The “first island-wide grassroots political organization throughout the villages” was established in the early 1970s.62 In the late 1970s Chamorro rights advocacy escalated as political status and self-determination issues were brought to the fore. The neocolonial relationship between Guam and the United States was clearly recognized as a source of economic, political and cultural crises. Among the most active early indigenous Chamorro organizations to emerge was Na Para Y Pada Y Chamos-—“Stop slapping Chamos.”

In 1981 a subsequent nationalist grassroots organization, in turn, was formed, The Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R).63 As an influential source of consciousness the OPI-R has likewise played a significant role in protecting Chamorro rights, promoting political and educational campaigns, and advocating Chamorro self-determination. OPI-R has been instrumental in facilitating the discourse on the “Chamorro inalienable right of self-determination.”64

In the 1990s another grass-roots nationalist organization emerged, Chamoru Nation, which was formed on the basis of establishing a nation to promote the idea that indigenous people are self-sufficient. Seven fundamental elements of indigenous people in need of nurturing are identified that include language, culture, spiritual matters, water, air, land, and respect—indigenous elements that are threatened by the lack of self-determination, Westernization, and fast rates of in-migration. Other nationalist organizations have likewise surfaced in recent years.

Nationalist indigenous movements are grounded in self-determination efforts to reclaim one’s identity and destiny on cultural, political, and economic grounds. Such movements involve counter-colonial projects and have therefore resulted in ongoing resistance and gains among Chamorros in spite of seemingly dismal situations. Nonetheless indigenous nationalism is a source of interethnic antagonism in Guam.

Aside from political and economic sources of interethnic antagonism highlighted by colonial and neo-Marxist theories,
the complexity of racial-ethnic and indigenous relations in Guam may be further captured within the sweeping canon of multidisciplinary scholarship identified broadly as cultural and postcolonial studies. The concepts of culture and power are critically redefined in the context of colonial structures and binarisms. The concept of otherness is a central outcome of colonial binarisms that perpetuate and justify distorted representations of colonized groups. Without getting lost in the finer terminology and discourse, I merely introduce the concept of otherness as relevant to my analysis of interethnic antagonism.

An underlying assumption of cultural and postcolonial studies is that colonialism continues to operate through structure and discourse maintained by the West in the context of culture and power. Otherness is a marker of cultural differences, whereby the “powers that be” monopolize ideological representations of the other. Binarisms are hence fundamental structures of discourse, that dichotomize identities into antithesis relations between opposing groups; therefore binarisms reify and signify boundaries of colonizer-colonized or self-other.

In terms of indigenous self-determination movements from a postcolonial standpoint, indigenous nationalism is interpreted as a mere inversion of this dichotomy (as opposed to a transformation) within the existing colonial structure, discourse, and perspective. In other words although nationalist projects contest colonial conditions in the name of decolonization, the fundamental colonial binarism of self versus other is paradoxically maintained. In fact subsequent binarisms are constructed and thus instigate intergroup cleavages. In a sense Chamorro nationalism does not transform meaningfully the existing colonial structure, but rather notions of otherness are constructed and imposed on non-Chamorros (many of which are colonized people as well). Diaz articulates the colonial history of conflict between Chamorro and Filipinos by locating their antagonistic relations within Guam’s colonial history:

In fact, many “colonized” natives actually benefited and profited—and continue to benefit and profit—tremendously from the Euro-American colonization and neocolonization just as many suffer accordingly. This is precisely the story of the histori-
cal development of national and countercolonial consciousness that historians such as Renato Constantino (1975) have written about.

A latent national Chamorro consciousness is surfacing in Guam, and Filipinos and other non-Chamorros are very much a part of it, even if by opposition. The politics of culture and identity, and of national consciousness-in-formation, must be understood in relational and historical terms.67

Combined with the fierce notions of indigenous self among Chamorros it is probable that their perceptions of others are equally fierce. Negative sentiments toward non-Chamorros (path eighteen) are enticed hence further perpetuating interethnic antagonism (paths seventeen and nineteen). The irony of divide and conquer colonial tactics is apparent in the fact that non-Chamorro minorities in Guam are perceived by Chamorros as “others” who are sources of the colonial problem rather than colonized brothers and sisters who mutually experience the negative consequences of colonization. This is the ideological dimension of divide and conquest processes.

**Concluding Remarks**

Guam is intertwined in a complex political history that has inevitably shaped a colonial landscape conducive to interethnic antagonism. On the one hand U.S. territories such as Guam seem to display similar dynamics of racial and ethnic relations as the U.S. mainland, but the more telling tale of places like Guam involves a fundamental divide and rule process that takes on a distinctive contemporary life in the context of being remote controlled within an overwhelming world order of capitalism and neocolonialism. I sought to capture some of this complexity by constructing an integrative multidisciplinary framework derived from diverse perspectives. The aim of this paper is to spark subsequent scholarship and empirical investigation of the historical entanglements associated with territorial racial, ethnic and indigenous relations.

**Notes**

1 I wish to extend my gratitude to Edna Bonacich for her support, insights and feedback. I also would like to express my appreciation
for numerous discussions with Vicente M. Diaz, which sparked much of my thinking. However, any shortcomings are exclusively mine.


9 Although Guam is located in the Micronesian region of the Pacific Islands, "Micronesian" commonly refers to Pacific Islanders from the southern portion of the region, including Carolinians, Palauans, Chuukese, Kosraeans, Marshallese, and Pohnpeian.

10 Don A. Farrel, *The Pictorial History of Guam: The Sacrifice* (San Jose, Tinian, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands:


Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*.

Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 125.


Souder, “Psyche Under Siege.”

With this emergent Chamorro sentiment, following World War II, the Chamorro population became split between patriotic Chamorros who continued to celebrate U.S. affiliation, and a minority of Chamorro civil rights advocates who remained discontent in spite of the American recapture of Guam from the Japanese. Nevertheless, the majority of Chamorros converged in their interests to become U.S. citizens.

Roger, *Destiny's Landfall.*

Roger, *Destiny's Landfall.*


Statham, "U.S. Citizenship."

Roger, *Destiny's Landfall.*


Roger, *Destiny's Landfall.*


38 Robert A. Underwood, “Commonwealth at a Crossroad,” Asunton Kongresu: News from Congressman Robert A. Underwood (December 1997): 1. As one of Guam’s former activist scholars, Robert Underwood’s second career wave marks his position as Guam’s non-voting delegate in Congress. His works cited in this paper prior to this 1997 publication reflect previous publications as an activist scholar. As Guam’s representative in Congress, Underwood remains a crucial advocate of Guam’s future.


40 United States Bureau of the Census.


44 Cheng and Bonacich, Labor Immigration.

45 Bonacich, “A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism.”

46 By comparison, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (also indigenous to Chamorros) and the U.S. have recently been in dispute over immigration control. As a Commonwealth, the local people in the Northern Marianas have controlled their immigration policy. As a result of the emerging garment industry in the
Northern Marianas, the U.S. expresses a desire to impose its authority to control the Northern Mariana Islands' immigration in the name of protecting migrants from labor exploitation. However, the situation is paradoxical and highly charged in entanglements involving labor exploitation and paternalism.

47 Munoz, *An Exploratory Study*; Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*.


50 Souder, *Daughters of the Island*, 37.


52 Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 236.


54 Souder, *Daughters of the Island*.


56 Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 287.


61 Souder, *Daughters of the Island*, 34.

62 Rogers, *Destiny's Landfall*, 244

63 Cristobal, "The Organization of People."

64 Cristobal, "The Organization of People;" Souder, *Daughters of the Island*.


Languages and Postmodern Ethnic Identities

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Specific discourses of our mother tongue (which is not always our mother’s tongue) are supposed to decisively constitute our subjectivity. These discourses which are constituting us and are available to us offer possible identities. These identities carry ethno-culturally-specific meanings, which are symbolised within and by spoken, written, and non-verbal language/s. Are languages given the same relevance when giving meaning to postmodern ethnicity, if one understands postmodern ethnicity as a “stance of simultaneously transcending ethnicity as a complete, self-contained system but retaining it as a selectively preferred, evolving, participatory system?” Multilinguality, as it may correspond with aspects of postmodern ethnicity, seems to imply an interaction between different languages with their distinct understanding of self and the world which manifests in a kaleidoscopic view, temporarily creating new constellations of meaning.

As we learn to speak, that is, to name, we also learn about identity/ies allocated to us and to others around us in childhood. The first language we learn, our so-called mother tongue, interpolates us not only into a linguistic but also into a socio-historic symbolic and concrete order. Our mother tongue then constitutes us by its manifold discourses whose totality is a specific symbolic order. This symbolic order, which embraces the dominant societal structures, produces by its very nature
resistant forces and discourses to its established order as well. Could one count among those resistant forces to an overarching symbolic system the same phenomenon when one’s mother tongue is not one’s mother’s tongue? And what happens with that identity-constituting symbolic system when one is growing up bilingually or multilingually? George Steiner, who grew up trilingually, claims

I have no recollection of any first or bedrock language. Later attempts to excavate one from within me, psychological tests, the hypothesis that the tongue in which I cried out to my wife when we were in a car mishap must be the linguistic base, have proved vain (even in moments of panic or shock, the language used is contextual, it is that of the speech-partner or locale). Whether it is in daily usage or mental arithmetic, in reading-comprehension or dictation, French, German and English have been to me equally ‘native’ (Steiner 1997, 78).

Steiner further maintains that even when dreaming the language in which he ‘dreams’ is circumstantial: he “simply dreams in the language in which he happen to have spoken that day.” Would this statement imply that he feels at home equally in three symbolic systems? Steiner does indeed differentiate between the different symbolic orders or “worlds,” as he calls them, constituted in and by the distinct languages. In his view

no two languages, no two dialects or local idioms within a language, identify, designate, and map their worlds in the same way. The memories stored, the empirical surroundings inventoried, the social relations which the language organises and mirrors (kinship, for example), [...] differ, often radically, from tongue to tongue. Immediately neighbouring tongues, even in the same climatic-geophysical locale, will differ to the pitch of total mutual incomprehension, (Steiner 1997, 87)

Is Steiner saying that although through each language one experiences oneself and the world in a different way, he is able to change from one to the other without difficulty? Would such a seamless changeover imply, in his case, the possibility of
three performances of self, internally and externally, at variance with each other? To a certain degree I can imagine these performances, but only if the “performer” is able to alternate his/her living in all three-language environments for a similar length of time. Mostly this scenario is not people’s lived reality. Mostly one’s circumstances don’t allow for such flexibility, and one of the language environments becomes the dominant symbolic from within which one operates.¹

Homi Bhabha’s well-known dictum about living in interstices would be a different conception of dealing with the multiplicity in one’s language/symbolic. Gloria Anzaldúa’s description of her living in and through different languages seems to be positioned between Bhabha’s and Steiner’s observations. Not all languages she learned to speak fit into the clear-cut framework Steiner was operating with, like French, English, and German. Anzaldúa lists besides “standard English” and “standard Spanish” also “standard Mexican Spanish,” “North Mexican Spanish dialect,” “Chicano Spanish,” “Tex-Mex,” and “Pachuco” (Anzaldúa 1986:55). Yet Anzaldúa insists, not unlike Steiner, on the separateness and the autonomy of each of these linguistic systems. They all would then have their distinct symbolic order. “And because we are a complex, heterogeneous people, we speak many languages,” claims Anzaldúa, (Anzaldúa 1986, 55).

What then is the crucial difference between Steiner’s and Anzaldúa’s understanding of multilinguality apart from their obvious differences in the discursive constitution of their social, political, sexual, and historical self or identities? While Steiner still seems to believe in the possibility of positioning oneself through language performance in distinct worlds, Anzaldúa writes against such conceptions by mixing languages within sentences. This forceful didacticism goes far beyond hitherto established literary practices. Reading Anzaldúa’s text it is hard to escape from realising her intention. It is about “Life in the Borderlands.” And it is, beyond identifying with the historical vicissitude and hardship of the people known today as Chicanos, (“The New Mestiza”) about the life of women who live within the borderlands of the Borderlands:

Alienated from her mother culture, “alien” in the dominant culture, the woman of color does not feel safe
within the inner life of her Self. Petrified, she can’t respond, her face caught between los intersticios, the spaces between the different worlds she inhabits. (20)

In the following I shall attempt to engage with the role of languages in ethnocultural identity formation with specific regard to the interviews conducted with Jewish women living in New Zealand. Three intertwined phenomena seemed to be of relevance: the ethno-linguistic specificities of minorities; the contradictions and ruptures of conceiving oneself and one’s interaction with the surrounding world, and the realisation of the sex/gender specific divisions and allotments of the socio-symbolic. To look at them separately means simply to employ useful crutches for finding a path and temporary clearance in understanding.

The relevance of language in maintaining Jewish ethnoculture is well known. Indeed, as Benjamin Harshaw formulates it, Jews were in their “everyday awareness—as Jews—[...] connected to a universe of discourse, a ‘fictional world’ outside of history and geography, based on a library of texts and their interpretations.” (Harshaw 1993, 21) He regards the function of Modern Hebrew of similar significance for the state of Israel, claiming that “it was not only that Hebrew was established by the young Yishuv, but Hebrew also established the Yishuv itself.”

Language has been regarded as one of the most important symbols of ethnicity. According to Joshua Fishman the three distinguishing features of ethnicity are signified with it and within it: descendancy is recorded, customs and tradition explained and their meaning constituted with regard to understanding and interpreting oneself and the world one lives in. Because language has this complex function in constructing and representing ethnic distinctness, its symbolic value is often translated as the corpus mysticum of ethnicity itself (16). Indeed, as Fishman says, “...language is part of that corpus. It issues authentically from the body, it is produced by the body, it has body itself (and, therefore, does not permit much basic modification).” (16)

Why did I see the language issue as relevant when circumscribing Jewish identity in New Zealand? Specific discourses of our mother tongue (which is not always our moth-
er’s tongue) are supposed to decisively constitute our subjectivity. These discourses which are constituting us and are available to us offer possible identities. These identities carry ethnoculturally-specific meanings, which are symbolised within and by spoken, written, and non-verbal language/s.

What happens to bilingual or multilingual speakers? While the sociolinguistic theory of Joshua Fishman sheds light on the prerequisites for bilingual language maintenance (lasting minimally three generations), the potential differences in language-specific meanings of identities are not dealt with. What Fishman explores is manifold in itself. He suggests that only if there are institutionally established separate domains for the maintenance of two (or more) languages is the survival of those languages (past three generations) likely to be ensured. One of his examples, which is for my study of special relevance, is the role classical Hebrew (Loshn-koydesh) plays in religious services of Orthodox Judaism. Since classical Hebrew has its institutionally secured domain in the religious service, it did and does survive.

Several questions arise: what potential contradictions are contained in the differences of discursive sexed/gendered identity formation offered by this function-specific Hebrew and the English vernacular of Jewish women living e.g. in New Zealand?

And for secular Jewish women does Modern Hebrew, as the national language of Israel, have a similarly symbolic function? If yes, again, what potential contradictions may arise between the sex/gender specific discourses for possible identities?

Yiddish will not survive in New Zealand past three generations. The women who spoke it in their childhood or youth will find no institutional domain, which could guarantee the survival of this language. Many participants remember only that their parents or grandparents had spoken it.

However for a number of the interviewees the mother tongue was either other than English or they could claim a variety of languages whose differing discourses offered multiple ways of giving meaning to the world. Mara’s story is a good example for the implied complexity of living in different language environments and how it affects one’s own changing
positioning as a subject.

I was born in Poland where I lived until the age of five. Then I moved to Russia where I lived till the age of twelve. Then, in Israel where I lived through my later childhood through to adulthood. That’s where I went to school, to secondary school, to university and so on. I used to identify myself as Israeli but now I have been in New Zealand appreciably longer than any other country where I have lived before. In spite of my accent, would you believe I have been here for thirty-two years? So I have stopped introducing myself as Israeli, but I definitely have a very, very strong consciousness of being one. I switched languages several times in my life. I switched from Polish to Russian to Hebrew.” [After Hebrew she had to learn English.] Polish is the only language, which I speak like a Pole. But the Polish accent has stayed with me and overlays every other language I speak.

When asked in which language she is able to express herself best, Mara says:

It would have been Hebrew, but not any more. It's there, it's latent, it's dormant. If you don't use a language you forget it, it goes rusty. My active vocabulary lags behind my passive one. So I must say that the language in which I express myself with the greatest ease is English. But I still count in Polish. Counting somehow, even if I forget Polish altogether, counting still stays in the language in which it was first learned. It's almost reflexive. There are things I want to express in Hebrew because Hebrew was the language of my really important years between twelve and twenty-four. I went back to school in Israel, to secondary school, to university and then served in the army for two years. I was Israeli. I was developing while the Hebrew language was developing because the Hebrew language was developing at great speed, taking the old language from the Old Testament, from the Bible but of course building lots of new words which weren’t in the Bible, and abstract terms. So I really grew up with Hebrew because I was the gener-
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ation which was growing up during the war of Independence.
Mara claims that she expresses herself at present with the greatest ease in English and that her Hebrew became dormant. What would be the ramifications for the way in which her self, identity, identificatory modalities were constituted in the discourses of the Hebrew language? Did they become “dormant” as well, or did they become part of the complex process of postmodern ethnic identity? Are languages given the same relevance when giving meaning to postmodern ethnicity, if one understands postmodern ethnicity as a “stance of simultaneously transcending ethnicity as a complete, self-contained system, but retaining it as a selectively preferred, evolving, participatory system?”

Mara’s family belonged to “assimilationist” Polish Jews who constituted, according to Celia Heller, one-ninth to one-tenth of the Jewish population in Poland, which numbered over three million before the Shoah (Heller 1977, 188). These Jews were to have differed from the rest of the Jewish population not only in their degree of acculturation (Polonisation) but also in their conscious self-identification as Poles. Mara remembers that she had only learned that she was Jewish after the Germans invaded Poland. So Mara’s first language or mother tongue was Polish. She still counts in Polish, the language in which she obviously first learned to count. Counting is indeed a give-away of one’s first language/s because the mechanism of memorising in the learning process retains its functioning and springs to life beneath the surfaces of subsequent, later learned languages.

Mara acquired Modern Hebrew, one of the signifiers of symbolic ethnicity, only in her youth when she attended secondary school in Israel. Her example tells a cautionary tale about crediting the mother tongue with ethnic authenticity. Fishman gives a very different example when warning of making general assumptions regarding the ethnic authenticity symbolised by the mother tongue by drawing attention to the fact that Yiddish, although the mother tongue of generations of Ashkenazi Jews for centuries, has its origin in a non-Jewish language, namely in German.

Regarding Mara’s case: Polish is her mother tongue but
this mother tongue has no association with her Jewishness. Is Polish then a symbolic marker of a Polish ethnicity? Let me examine this question further.

Fishman, as referred to above, distinguishes three identifiable features of ethnicity: paternity, patrimony, and phenomenology. This terminology, as useful as it may be in certain ways, also highlights an unselfconscious androcentrism producing absurdities. How can the mother tongue signify "paternity"? And further, since for Jews descent is acknowledged through the mother, how can it be then called paternity? This semantic confusion throws light upon the power factor within the ethnic discourse and the discourse on ethnicity.

Fishman calls "patrimony" a dimension of ethnicity, which relates to the issue of how ethnic collectivities behave to express their membership. Language is also an important element of patrimony because it is recognised as a guide to "kinship-interpreted group membership," as a desideratum and demonstration of such membership. As referred to above, Fishman claims: "Language is among the conscious 'do' and 'don'ts' as well as among the unconscious ones, that is among the evaluated dimensions of ethnicity membership (whether consciously or not) (Fishman 28).

Fishman calls "phenomenology" the meanings that one attaches to one's descent-related being and behaving. He claims that one's ethnicity views inform one's views of history, of the future, of the purpose of life, of the fabric of human relationships. And since ethnicity often deals with very powerful, presumably irreducible, beliefs, feelings and bonds, it is all the more likely to be importantly related to all-embracing ways of viewing, to Weltanschauungen, to cosmologies. Since ethnicity is often part of a collectivity's highest (or deepest) cultural symbolism, a symbolism that is holistic and that serves profound integrative functions, it is vital that we grasp these meanings, for in doing so we are likely to grasp something truly vital not only about ethnicity, but about society or culture as a whole. .... Ethnicity is the 'cup of custom' (patrimony) passed on by one's parents (paternity), from which one drinks the meaning of
existence ... through which one envisions life (phenomenology) (30-31).

How would Fishman's categories help to define and clarify Mara's ethnocultural identities with regard to the relevance of languages in her life? Polish was her first language and, as she says, "the only language which I speak like a Pole." Would that mean that Polish is the only language of Mara's which can function as a symbolic marker of ethnic belonging? The contradiction between theory and practice in this case necessitates a revision of Fishman's observation about the main function of the mother tongue in defining one's outlook on life embedded in ethnicity. Indeed, one ought to make the connection to Fishman's view on postmodern ethnicity (18) reflecting a contemporary situation and very much that of diasporic conditions.

The most cherished and significant language in Mara's life, according to her own evaluation, is Hebrew. Modern Hebrew. Not only because she spoke it between the age of twelve and twenty-four which she calls the most important years in her life, but also because Hebrew as a vernacular became the language of Israel, a country (and nation-state) to which Mara belonged, whose citizen she became consciously and committedly: "I was Israeli." Indeed she draws a parallel between her own growing awareness of herself and the world around her and the development of modern Hebrew: "I was developing while the Hebrew language was developing." It was then Hebrew as a vernacular through which Mara learned to give meaning to the world. Her Jewishness became one with her Israeliness, an overlap of ethnocultural and national identities.

Mara has now lived for more than thirty years in New Zealand. The language in which she now expresses herself with "the greatest ease" is English. Her Hebrew became "dormant"; her active vocabulary lags behind her passive one, as she puts it. Her everyday life is conducted in English. Since Mara's husband is a New Zealander they speak English in the home. At her workplace, in her neighborhood, within institutions she has to deal with, it is the English language she has to use. In addition Mara was eager to acquaint herself with the culture of the country she was living in; as she says:

I am a tremendous book-lover, a very dedicated read-
and I believe that you can learn a lot by knowing people of a certain culture but there is a limit to it. Usually you will know people only from a certain circle. Therefore, I think a wonderful way to get to know a culture is from reading the literature of the country. I don’t mean non-fiction, I mean real literature. I have observed New Zealand culture quite a lot. I think I know quite a bit about New Zealand culture. I have lived it for thirty-two years, I definitely identify with it and having brought up three children and being married to a fourth generation New Zealander there is no escape from it.

Fishman calls this process language shift. Mara’s children were born and grew up in New Zealand, an English speaking country; their mother tongue is English. Mara herself is not only multilingual, she embraces multiculturality by choice but also by historical necessity. The three features distinguishing ethnicity in Fishman’s terms would, in Mara’s case on the individual level, most probably constitute a postmodern ethnic identity. This postmodern ethnic identity has to be imagined as a process. It is not so much an interaction between distinct ethnocultural identities, but rather it would consist of gradual changes, as the socio-cultural and political discourses of the dominant ethnolinguistic collectivity (white middle-class New Zealanders) would pervade and alter formerly established value systems and understandings. I imagine this process as preliminary clashes between value-systems, which deeply affect one’s formerly created conscious and unconscious identities. Gradually the clashes, experienced often as violation of one’s subjectivity, may give way to a kind of amalgamation and fluidity in one’s construction of self and one’s Weltanschauung. By this process I mean to indicate not so much a smoothness of the occurring changes through interacting as an ethnic minority individual with an ethnolinguistically and culturally different majority collectivity, as a kind of negotiation and permutation. As a result there may be areas retained with their ‘original’ emotive and sometimes cognitive attachment, and there will be other areas which undergo profound changes.

An example for me of what I mean by “areas retained for their ‘original’ emotive and sometimes cognitive attachment” is
how Mara regards Polish and Hebrew. She says:

Language colours your thought processes so much and words in certain languages carry such different connotations. If you say river to me in Polish, I don't see just water, I see a little child playing in her summer beachsuit. I see the clear pebbles, I hear the sound of the river, I hear the splash, I feel the touch of putting my foot in the water. From childhood, because that's what river meant to me then. If I say it in English or Hebrew it's just a technical word.

The study of the Bible was a core subject for UE, it was compulsory. We had to study the Bible but we studied it from a linguistic point of view, from a historical point of view, from a literary point of view. The poetics of the Bible in Hebrew are wonderful, the richness of the language. .... Because I learned Hebrew from this poetic, literary, historical point of view and not pure religion it has fired me tremendously. So, for me Hebrew is poetry.

Changes or rather interchanges may occur in areas where adaptability (not always and not necessarily consciously) would secure a certain degree of acculturation. This can take place on a cognitive (and perhaps also emotive) level of giving meaning to the world, but it can also take place on the level of performative interaction with others, whether within institutions and organisations or within social encounters. The process character of one's discursive positioning as a subject becomes more tangible for ethnic minority people for whom the above mentioned changes are part of a language shift. Eva Hoffman devoted a whole book describing ethnocultural changes experienced when as an adolescent she underwent the trauma of leaving her native Poland and having to adapt the to language and other features of a new ethnoculture/s in Canada. The title of her book, *Lost in Translation*, indicates the impossibility of transferring one's subjectivity from one set of discourses in one language (Polish) into another set of discourses in a new language (English). One has to change in one's interaction with others, suggests Hoffman, or one would remain unintelligible.

Another area where ethnocultural identification may take place and where meaning is created through language is liter-
I was interested in whether the women interviewed for my study were reading books specifically by Jewish authors or not, and if yes, what their motivation was for it and what enjoyment they got out of such texts. I assumed that it would give me an indication about aspects of Judaism, Jewish history, Jewishness, which the women would find appealing or relevant. Mara’s answer to the question whether she is reading literature by Jewish authors was the following:

Yes, but not consciously. Recently there was a book sale and my daughter and I went and rummaged around. I bought this and that and I bought it purely because I had read the author before, or the blurb made me think it would be my cup of tea, or by word of mouth recommendation. When we got home my daughter said, “do you realise that every single book you have chosen is something to do with Jewishness?” And it took me by surprise, you know. It was either a Jewish author, or a Jewish character or some Jewish connection and it was utterly unconscious or subconscious. Utterly non-deliberate choice from a Jewish point of view.

Asked, what she enjoyed about reading Jewish literature, Mara responded:

I like the gutsiness. I come from an emotionally anaemic family [secular Jewish family]. Things for them were just so and nobody went around flailing their arms, madly happy, or madly unhappy. Things were kept ‘in good taste’. When I read Jewish literature, I think oh God, I don’t think I could have survived in a family like this. But I love the emotional charge of Jewish families, utterly neurotic and utterly mad and maddening but here is part of my Jewishness. When they scream at each other they scream, stereotype perhaps, but I think it’s the gutsiness that appeals to me.

I strangely enough enjoy Jewish literature which is about religious families because it’s an aspect which I don’t know first hand and therefore it’s like peeping into an unfamiliar world.

What seems significant to me about Mara’s answer is her
unconscious but also conscious need to find out about aspects of Jewishness and Jewish life which she had had no part of. In her past she especially emphasises the appeal of emotional interaction among Jews and also her interest in gaining insight into the life of religious families as created within fictional reality. It is exactly that part of Mara’s ethnoculture of which she had been ‘deprived’ according to her own observations. By wanting to find out more about neglected or unrealised elements of her Jewish ethnicity (which belong to “patrimony,” the ethnocultural ways of behaving, the customs), Mara engages with them in a very intimate and private way. It is however an engagement, and an active one, since reading is always an active encounter between reader and text. It is only through the reader’s active involvement with the text that fictional reality comes into existence. And as our interest, empathy, and level of engagement will be always at variance with the constructed reality of books, the worlds of our identifying imaginations/ fantasies will also differ. This process is not crucially different from our “understanding,” that is, for our creating our lived reality. Our giving meaning to the world at large or our ‘belonging’ to any wider or closer cultural, political or ethnic community is as much based on what we want and need to believe as it is based on “objectively” measurable aspects of membership and interaction with others claiming the same membership.

Reading literature can additionally function as a source of knowledge. When Mara is reading about the joy and sorrow and their expression in religious Jewish families in the intimate space and timeframe of her encounter with them, she might not only follow and identify with the emotions of the fictional characters and the events which generated them but gain some knowledge about the premises of their existence.

However there is one crucial factor which should not be overlooked when acknowledging the relevance of fictional (and other, where it applies) literature for the women in affirming their Jewish identification. It is an andro-logo-centric worldview, which characterises the novels and short stories of the Jewish and Yiddish writers referred to in the interviews. The authors mentioned most were Bernard Malamud, I.B. Singer, Sholem Aleichem, Shalom Asch and Chaim Potok. The one female writer, who seemed to be popular with many of the
interviewees, Bernice Rubens, is hardly an exception to the gender-biased narrations of the above listed authors. By gender bias I don’t mean a necessarily overt sexist construction of female figures within the world of fiction but the use of traditionally established clichés of women in their psychosocial and sexual functions. Although such literary projections of male fantasy may have their Jewish variation, they don’t challenge in any profound way the basic construction of woman within the dominant male discourse which has the threesome variety according to Luce Irigaray: to conceive of woman as the opposite, the complement, or the same as (the unproblematic) man.

Kate, the other Israeli woman who participated in the interviews, seems to confirm this understanding of the written text. She says

I love reading. In Israel I read a lot. I read for pleasure and in English it’s a lot of hard work but I do want to educate myself to read because I think it’s important. I think books are the key to knowledge.

Kate belongs to a younger generation of Israelis than Mara. She was born in Israel. She had the good fortune of having her parents immigrating to Palestine before the Shoah. Although her first language is modern Hebrew, she has doubts whether it is her mother tongue because her mother’s ‘tongue’ was Yiddish, which she, however, did not pass on to her daughter. I’ll quote the whole passage in which this information is couched. It is Kate’s response to the question of what Hebrew means to her:

That’s the native tongue of the Israeli people. I think when you look at the Jewish people, those who came from Europe, many of them brought Yiddish with them. From the Spanish part they brought Ladino. When you talk about Hebrew, Hebrew and New Hebrew is the clear thing about the Israeli people definitely, it’s their native language. Not exactly my mother tongue because when my mother wanted to speak and for us not to understand she would speak in Yiddish. I don’t speak it; my mother never bothered to teach us. I think Yiddish is a very juicy language and it’s a foreign language. It’s a combination of German
with Jewish emphasis in it. You wouldn’t want it as a national language; you’d want Hebrew. There was the old Hebrew but I think a lot of things had to be renewed in the old language. Modern Hebrew is a new language. When I go to Israel there are things I’ve never heard because the language is coming along all the time. Even the slang, because I haven’t lived there since I was twenty-three, you miss out.

There are significant similarities and differences between Kate’s and Mara’s ethnic “paternity,” for neither constitutes their mother’s first language, their own mother tongue. But for both modern Hebrew is the symbolic signifier of a strongly felt national identity. This national identity takes priority over ethnic identity. They both claim to be Israeli first and Jewish second. The identification with the discourse of nationalism with regard to the state of Israel seems to have formed more crucially their positioning regarding a collective identity than the historic tradition of Jewishness. The issue of Jewish identity in all its possible manifestations became a diasporic phenomenon.

Most of the women who participated in my study have been to Israel at some time in their lives or had been living there for months or years. For some women going to Israel in their youth became part of their search for the meaning of their Jewish identity; for others visiting Israel means maintaining the link with other family members, and for some others again, it seems to be a need later in life to reconnect with the country of symbolic belonging. What part does the knowledge of the official language of the country, modern Hebrew, play in this symbolic belonging? For Jews in the Diaspora attending the synagogue, especially in orthodox congregations, knowledge of classical Hebrew (loshn koydesh) is a prerequisite for participating actively in the religious service. And there is Yiddish, the vernacular of Ashkenazim in the past, which still figures as an element of Jewishness in the narratives of many of the older women.

One of the aims of my research was to find out how far Hebrew and Yiddish were functional in generating an “authenticity” of ethnocultural identity. But also, what could be the domain of these languages for women living in a dominantly English speaking country like New Zealand? Further, how do
Hebrew and Yiddish interact with other mother tongues and languages? And how do the women who were not born in New Zealand create and re-create their ethnocultural identities?

If Jewishness is regarded as an ethnicity, how does this ethnicity interact with the participants’ other ethnicities? How do different languages as symbolic markers of subsequent ethnocultures interact in constituting one’s multiple identities or one’s postmodern ethnic?

My focus here is on the function of languages in creating ethnocultural identities. Within the languages relevant for the interviewees I can only surmise certain dominant discourses crucially affecting identificatory processes. It is the discourses, embracing customs, traditions and gender-specific ways of giving meaning to life within their discursive fields in any one language which contain the identificatory differences between people belonging to specific ethnocultures but also among people belonging to the same ethnicity.

Looking at the term ethnicity Fishman comes to define it as a historical process:

Ethnicity is not synonymous with all of culture, being merely the aggregative definitional dimension thereof, the overlap between the two being a function of societal modernization. At earlier stages of societal development, ethnicity tends to a greater overlap with culture as a whole and there are ethnic ways of dressing and building, ploughing and curing, worshipping and fighting, engaging in commerce and engaging in art, sports or study. Ethnicity may be less conscious but more pervasive. In more modern life, ethnicity retreats into a corner of social experience under the impact of international influences (influences whose ethnic origins are unknown or overlooked, and widely accepted across national boundaries), but, perhaps precisely therefore, it is often rendered more conscious and is more manipulated as a boundary mobilization mechanism. (Fishman 6)

Fishman concurs with theorists like Homi Bhabha when he elaborates on the permeable nature of ethnicity. As early as 1977 he talks about “postmodern ethnicity” for which he allows a lack of fixity. He compares this lack of fixity or rather inter-
active openness of ethnicity favourably with the hierarchical and rigid nature of racism and nationalism:

Characteristic of postmodern ethnicity is the stance of simultaneously transcending ethnicity as a complete, self-contained system, but of retaining it as a selectively preferred, evolving, participatory system. This leads to a kind of self-correction from within and from without, which extreme nationalism and racism do not permit. (1989:18)

What is being retained and what can change within one ethnicity by interacting with others? Are there within any ethnicity or ethnoculture distinguishable features which are more or less sensitive to possible changes? Are some features more constant and others more changeable? And where does the ethnoculturally most distinguishing feature of language fit in?

What Fishman calls "paternity" deals with "the recognition of putative biological origins." It refers to descent-related heritage like mentality. The kinship metaphor is often used which then can be extended to ethnic collectivities: the search for historical roots.

Through common, distant ancestry ethnicity experiencing individuals and collectivities gain a feeling of continuity, a sense of permanence across time, across death, from eternity to eternity. Through ethnic collectivities individuals feel augmented and come to experience immortality as an immediate physical reality. (26).

Because language is so often taken as a biological inheritance, its association with ethnic "paternity" is both frequent and powerful. Language then becomes the symbolic signifier of ethnicity. To speak a certain language is supposed to lend ethnic authenticity to the speaker. But only if it is her mother tongue. To this kind of ideology responds Hélène Cixous in her book, *Coming to Writing*, when she claims: "I have no legitimate tongue. In German I sing; in English I disguise myself; in French I fly, I thieve. On what would I base a text?" (Cixous 1991, 15) Fishman himself allows for cases where language can't be regarded as symbolic signifier of ethnicity. My own research confirms this, as with the above-introduced case of Mara. It may be of relevance here to cite Hélène Cixous' observations on the effect of languages—mother tongue and oth-
ers—on one’s understanding of self and the world. She engages with a phenomenon to which more and more people could relate in recent times. There are features in her multilinguality which seem to overlap with those of the formerly quoted George Steiner and others which differ in circumstance and interpretation markedly from his. Cixous' background of childhood and language learning was in her wider social surrounding French and Arabic spoken in Oran, Algeria, although, as she asserts: “I felt that I was neither from France nor from Algeria. And in fact, I was from neither.” (Cixous 1991, xix) At home her mother and grandmother, who were refugees from Hitler, spoke German; her father’s family, who came from Morocco, spoke Spanish at home. Cixous’ father himself taught his daughter French, Arabic, and Hebrew. In school she learned English. Despite these languages Cixous remembers that in Algiers, where the family moved after the war, she “didn’t belong to the European community and wasn’t admitted into the Arab community, [she] was between the two, which was extremely painful.” (Cixous, 1991: xx)

About the significance of the various languages for her Cixous reflects in a way which retains some of the mystical qualities of the so called mother tongue which is meant here as literally the mother’s tongue, combining it with a critical analysis of the socio-political meaning the other languages gained for her. The whole contemplation is couched in a poetic discourse. “I was raised on the milk of words. Languages nourished me,” writes Cixous. (Cixous 1991, 20) The metaphor, “milk of words,” plays on the association ‘mother’s milk,’ the first nourishment, which then turns into the half abstract, half concrete concept of languages. Her description of the inseparable unity of body and mind is not imaginary but becomes a surprising factuality:

I hated to eat what was on my plate. Dirty carrots, nasty soups, the aggression of forks and spoons. ‘Open your mouth.’ ‘No.’ I let myself be fed only by voice, by words. (Cixous 1991, 20)9

The voice Cixous refers to is spoken in German. Therefore she writes a few paragraphs later: “My German mother in my mouth, in my larynx, rhythms me.” (Is this rhythm not reminiscent of Kristeva’s semiotic/motherly rhythmning?10)
Cixous distinguishes between the language/s she speaks and the ones she writes. She names German her mother tongue as most influential for her own speaking voice because it was in fact her mother's first language and the one she perceived first:

In the language I speak, the mother tongue resonates, tongue of my mother, less language than music, less syntax than song of words, beautiful Hochdeutsch, throaty warmth from the north in the cool speech of the south. Mother German is the body that swims in the current, between my tongue's borders... (Cixous 1991, 21-22)

Note that for Cixous, however, "In the language I speak" is French. French is also the language in which Cixous has written most of her works so far; after all she does live and teach in France and has done so since 1955 from the age of eighteen. So then what was the function of the German language for Cixous' ethnocultural identity? It seems not more than the reason for being always aware of a foreignness but in a constructive, challenging way, since it prohibits any kind of fixity, "the agitation that will not allow any law to impose itself." (Cixous 1991, 21) If one accepts the axiom that language shapes reality and is, in turn, acted upon by local human experience, then for a multilingual creation and understanding of the world there can be only multiplicities of reality. In Cixous' formulation

Blessing: my writing stems from two languages, at least. In my tongue the 'foreign' languages are my sources, my agitations. 'Foreign': the music in me from elsewhere; precious warning: don't forget that all is not here, rejoice in being only a particle, a seed of chance, there is no centre of the world, arise, behold the innumerable, listen to the untranslatable. [...] Languages pass into my tongue, understand one another, call to one another, tenderly, timidly, sensually; blend their personal pronouns together, in the effervescence of differences. Prevent 'my language' from taking itself for my own: worry it and enchant it. (Cixous 1991, 21)

The above quote makes it clear that Cixous sees only the benefit of multilinguality, since it prevents a one-sided or
myopic view of the world. Steiner interprets his tri-linguality in equally positive terms and suggests that his polyglot matrix was far more than a hazard of private condition. It organized and imprinted on his identity the complex and resourceful feeling of Central European and Judaic humanism. “Speech was, tangibly, option, a choice between equally inherent yet alternate claims and pivots of self-consciousness. At the same time, the lack of a single native tongue entailed a certain apartness from other French schoolchildren, a certain extraterritoriality with regard to the surrounding social, historical community.” (Steiner 1998,121) Steiner claims a kind of mutuality in suspicion of the “other,” because to the “many-centred”, as he calls the multilingual/multicultural speakers, “the very notion of ‘milieu’ of a singular or privileged rootedness is suspect.” (Steiner 1998, 122) Narrowness versus openness? Or perhaps restricted versus wider knowledge base?

Cixous makes the distinction between the dominant discourses in different geo-political language environments as they came to affect her conception of self. She recalls how she saw herself and how she was seen in Algiers by having French nationality and how the emphasis of self-conception changed when coming to live in Paris where the dominant discourses were less anti-Semitic but more phallocentric:

The logic of nationality was accompanied by behaviours that have always been unbearable for me. The French nation was colonial. How could I be from a France that colonized an Algerian country when I knew that we ourselves, German Czechoslovak Hungarian Jews, were other Arabs. I could do nothing in this country. But neither did I know where I had something to do. It was the French language that brought me to Paris. In France, what fell from me first was the obligation of the Jewish identity. On one hand, the anti-Semitism was incomparably weaker in Paris than in Algiers. On the other hand, I abruptly learned that my unacceptable truth in this world was my being a woman. Right away it was war. I felt the explosion, the odour of misogyny. Up until then, living in a world of women, I had not felt it, I was Jewess, I was Jew. (Cixous, 1997:204)
Cixous developed first her feminist discourse, which shared its driving urgency with the writings of Irigaray, Kristeva, and other women in France. The significance of Jewish identity as part of the driving force manifest in her writing surfaces later but not separately from her feminist critical theory. It is in her above quoted books, Coming to Writing, and Rootprints, that the relevance of her Jewishness as an organic part of her writing, that is creating meaning in and through language, gains pertinent expression.

For Irena Klepfisz the Yiddish language itself has to become the carrier of her “secular Jewish identity.” (Klepfisz 1989, 32) I find her attempt to achieve this highly successful because not only do the title and the bilinguality of her renowned poems in the cycle, Di rayze aheyym/The Journey Home, embody the intention of the author whose language of living and writing is foremost English, but these texts affect the reader in an additional way. They succeed in teaching the reader the Yiddish words and phrases through the way the poems are constructed. The English translation of the Yiddish elements forms one part of the dialogic structure. Klepfisz engages both languages, English and Yiddish, with each other, in a way which marks her own “journey home,” to the Jewish past, to Yiddish as the “mame loshn” of her ancestors. The reader participates in this journey by learning the Yiddish words and phrases as they are repeated in English and again in Yiddish to form the interaction between past and present. I shall quote here the last two pieces of the cycle, 8 and 9, which illustrate the problematic and the method of its solution.

8. Di Tsung/The Tongue
Zi shvaygt.
Di verter fein ir
she lacks the words
and all that she can force

is sound
unformed sound:
a
der klang
the sound
o
das vort
the word
u
di tsung
the tongue
o
dos loshn
the language
e
di trern
the tears.

9. Di rayze aheym/The journey home
Zi flit
she flies
vi a foygl
like a bird
vi a mes
like a ghost
Zi flit
iber di berg
over the mountains
ibern yam
over the sea.
Tsurik
tsurik back
back

In der fremd
among strangers
iz ir heym
is her home.
Do
here
ot do
right here
muz zi lebn
she must live.
Ire zikhroynes
her memories
will become monuments
ire zikhroynes
will cast shadows.

For Klepfisz the “journey home” through the Yiddish language originates, indeed, from another (language) place. It is not the search of what one left behind but the desire to gain what one never had. In other words while Steiner and Cixous, and in another way Anzaldúa, contemplate the significance of the symbolic order manifest in and through the different language environments they live in and languages they speak, Klepfisz argues for the revival of Yiddish as a means of ethnic revival, which translates itself for her to maintaining Yidishkayt (Yiddishness). However Yiddish is for Klepfisz a language she learnt as an adult; it was neither her mother tongue nor did it belong to the languages of her early childhood. She remembers:

Yiddish was not my mame-loshn. Because I was born during the war and my mother and I were passing as Poles, Polish became my first language. I began hearing Yiddish only later in Lodz, though in the first kindergarten I attended, I began to write Polish. In 1946, my mother and I immigrated to Sweden, where we lived for the next three years. I attended school and learned to read, write, and speak Swedish. At home, I continued speaking Polish though I heard and understood the Yiddish of the other DPs living in our communal house. And then we came to America. I began speaking English and ever so slowly, over the years, started to think, to dream in English. Eventually English was the language I spoke with my mother. (Klepfisz 1989, 33)

Klepfisz became confident enough in the English language to introduce bilinguality into her poetry. This poetry has a readership in mind which could or would respond to the interaction of English and Yiddish in a variety of ways, emotionally, with intellectual or aesthetic appreciation. Yiddish corresponding to English and the other way around also generate satisfaction and awareness of a political nature bearing in mind the histor-
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ical relevance of both languages. The assumption in Klepfisz’
text for both languages and the socio-symbolic they represent
is that they would have a readership which was able to follow
different ethnocultural significations. In other words Klepfisz
can count on readers who, beyond being at home in English,
either understand Yiddish and/or appreciate the cultural and
historical memories which resonate in and are evoked by the
words.

Klepfsz’ clearly stated intention is to revitalise the Yiddish
language. Very different indeed is the aim of a number of mem-
oirs written by Hungarian Holocaust survivors. (Suleiman,
1998) They are not professional writers and live as emigrants
in countries with a “foreign” tongue. Suleiman refers to mem-
oirs written between 1978 and 1993 in English and French, lan-
guages which the authors had learned as adolescents or adults
since living in that new language environment. The autobiogra-
phical accounts of these Hungarians illustrate according to
Suleiman, that they are reader-friendly in their use of language:
they generally keep foreign words out (or gloss them
if they must use them), try no experiments in polylin-
gualism, and opt for traditional forms of narration,
description and dialogue. [...] At the same time, they
are all marked as “foreign” to the non-Hungarian read-
er by the presence of unassimilable linguistic ele-
ments, namely, an abundance of Hungarian proper
names. (405)

What is interesting for me is what Suleiman writes about
her reaction to these Hungarian proper names. Although she
acknowledges that some non-Hungarian readers “may dream
over the proper names precisely because they are foreign,” for
her, a Hungarian by birth, some of the names lend themselves
to “decipher” hidden stories of their bearers:
Magyar and Mosonyi are ‘Hungarianized’ family
names, signs of patriotism and a middle-class desire
to assimilate, typical of educated Hungarian Jews to
this day. [...] Dawidovitz, Glück, and Klein, by contrast,
are names that fit the modest lives of the religious
rural Jews who bore them, and who often spoke
Yiddish as a first language (generally, they spoke
Hungarian as well) (408).
While the meaning attached to name changes may share a commonality with similar assimilatory practices of Jews living in other countries, the referential reading for Suleiman of especially Hungarian first names would be most probably shared only by Hungarian speakers like Suleiman and myself. What works for her, writes Suleiman, is not the referent but the signifier because names/signifiers like Szombathely and Tolcsva signify Hungary, as Dezső and Imre (and Laci, Miklós, Ernő, Pista, Géza, Bandi, Jenő, and Béla) signify Hungarian men, and Manci, Joli, Rózsi, Magda, Marika, Ibolya, Évi, Zsuzsi, [...] signify Hungarian women. But it is not today’s Hungary or today’s Hungarians that these names evoke most vividly: to go to Szombathely is not my desire. (I have been to Nyíregyháza, my mother’s birthplace—once is enough.)(410)

What may be the pleasure that these signifiers generate, beyond the satisfaction that Suleiman (and I) know how to pronounce these names according to the Hungarian phonology? For Suleiman

A name written down, pronounced, can suddenly revive a forgotten or dead person not only for the writer who remembers the name, but also for the ‘autobiographical reader’ who associates a different person or group of persons with the name: the signifier, being identical, ‘floats’ over to cover the shifting referent. [...] The name resurrects the lost objects, but at the same time reinforces the sense of their pastness, their goneness. These people, these places (as they were, towns with many Jews in them) no longer exist. (410)

The Hungarian names within the context of these Holocaust memoirs may represent a last concrete trace in language of the symbiosis of Jewish-Hungarian ethnocultures as it existed once, before the Shoah.

For Franco-Maghrebians like Derrida, language, signifying a belonging by birth, which can be referred to if even only by evoking it in names, doesn’t exist. For him, as he claims, there has been always only the monolingualism of the other (Derrida 1996). As he begins to elaborate on the topic he posits a chal-
lenging statement: "I only have one language; it is not mine." (Derrida 1996, 1) How is this to be understood?

Derrida leads his readers back to the history of the Jews in Algeria: they were given French citizenship in 1840, but it was taken away from them by Pétain's government in 1940. Although the period of being deprived of citizenship lasted for the Algerian Jews a relatively short time, three years, its significance remained lasting. Derrida explains this with the "disorder" that had been created through this act for Franco-Maghrebian Jews' understanding of their identity. He writes:

I was very young at that time, and certainly did not understand very well—already, I did not understand very well—what citizenship and loss of citizenship meant to say. But I do not doubt that exclusion—from the school reserved for young French citizens could have a relationship to the disorder of identity... I do not doubt either that such "exclusions" come to leave their mark upon this belonging or non-belonging of language, this affiliation to language, this assignation to what is peacefully called a language (Derrida 16-17),

Leading to the heart of the matter Derrida verifies the psychoanalytic insight that the I in any "autobiographical anamnesis presupposes identification" (Derrida 28). In contradistinction to identity which Derrida claims is "never given, received or attained", the "interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures" (28). This identification process or "identificatory modality," always occurs in language; in fact, as Derrida argues, it must be "assured" of language, since it is in language that "all the models and identificatory modalities" are contained. He claims:

It is necessary to know already in what language I is expressed, and I am expressed. Here we are thinking of the I think, as well as the grammatical or linguistical I, of the me [moi] or us [nous] in their identificatory status as it is sculpted by cultural, symbolic, and socio-cultural figures. From all viewpoints, which are not just grammatical, logical, or philosophical, it is well known that the I of the kind of anamnesis called autobiographical, the I [je-me] or I recall [je me rappelle] is
produced and uttered in different ways depending on the language in question. It never precedes them; therefore it is not independent of language in general (28-29).

The point Derrida is making is that although he learned in French to say I and me, the assurance of this process was taken away from him in childhood as he relates it in the formerly quoted passage referring to the years between 1940 and 1943 when his French citizenship was taken away, and he was excluded from schools for French citizens. However to learn other languages like Arab, Berber, or Hebrew, although not prohibited, certainly was not encouraged in his years at the lycée in Algiers. The language through which he had to learn not only to position himself but also to identify with a socio-symbolic order was generated and authenticated in another continent, Europe. It could not be the mother tongue of people who were geographically (Algiers) and politically (as Jews) alienated from an assuredness of possible identifications with the French language. It is for this reason, because of a kind of double estrangement, that Derrida can claim, “I have only one language; it is not mine.” And from this axiom follows and becomes understandable the title of the book, Monolingualism of the Other. The Other is the defining socio-symbolic order of France, the former colonial power in Algiers where Derrida grew up. In Derrida’s formulation: “...the monolingualism of the other would be that sovereignty, that law originating from elsewhere, certainly, but also primarily the very language of the Law. And the Law as Language” (39).

From the belief and experience of a totality in language (Steiner) to names as language fragments and fragmented memories the span of identificatory modalities (and their lack) reflects 20th century diasporic variations in and through language. Steiner’s confidence in possessing several distinct identificatory modalities as a multilingual speaker and writer seems a kind of last testimony to an imaginary stability allocated to language and identity. Instead, multilinguality, as it may correspond with aspects of postmodern ethnicity, seems to imply an interaction between different languages with their distinct understanding of self and the world which manifests in a kaleidoscopic view, temporarily creating new constellations of
meaning.

Works Cited


Endnotes
1 Grosjean claims “Unlike bilingualism, where the two languages can be kept separate, biculturalism does not usually involve keeping two cultures and two individual behaviors separate. A true bicultural per-
son, for instance, someone who is fully French in France and fully American in the United States, is probably not very common.” (François Grosjean 1982 160)


3 Harshav notes the relevance of their adopted language for Jewish writers and cites Saul Bellow writing about Bernard Malamud: “Well, we were here, first-generation Americans, our language was English and a language is a spiritual mansion from which no one can evict us.” (Harshav 1993, 21)

4 Yishuv: meaning “a stable settlement” as opposed to the “Exile” of the “Wandering Jew”; the new Jewish society that emerged in Eretz-Israel before 1949 is called Yishuv (Harshav 1993, x).

5 And Fishman adds: “This leads to a kind of self-correction from within and from without, which extreme nationalism and racism do not permit” (18).

6 Fishman’s observation regarding the imaginary nature of boundaries within and between collectivities also may function for the individual. “Boundaries,” claims Fishman with reference to Barth, “whether between or within ethnic collectivities, are no more objective realities than are the ethnicity paternities, patrimonies or phenomenologies that they separate.” (Fishman 1989, 34).

7 University entrance examination.


9 Cixous adds “A deal was made: I would swallow only if I was given something to hear. Thirst of my ears. Blackmail for delights. While I was eating, incorporating, letting myself be force-fed, my head was enchanted, my thoughts escaped, my body here, my spirit on endless journeys” (Ibid.).

Rwanda, Burundi, and Their “Ethnic” Conflicts

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This paper demonstrably dispels the assumption that ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi is a chronic endemic phenomenon. It emphasizes the consolidation of the caste system during the colonial era, intra regional disparities within the two communities, high population densities, very weak economic bases, poverty, and international interference as some of the cardinal dynamics behind the current deadly contentions within the two states. An analysis behind the genocidal tendencies in the two countries is well illustrated, with special emphasis on the Rwandese tragedy of 1994 as well as its parallels and divergences with the Nazi Holocaust.

The reason for writing this paper was inspired by a question in the African History Affairs Paper at the Advanced School Certificate level by the now defunct East African Examinations Council in 1976, which asked why Rwanda and Burundi had frequently fallen prey to “tribal” wars. It is quite obvious that the situation in Rwanda and Burundi in 1976 was by any stretch of imagination “more tame” than the one in 1996. Nevertheless this examination question of 1976 was timely in that by that year Rwanda had experienced its first fully-fledged post colo-
nial military coup that had taken place in 1973, while Burundi had undergone its first mass scale pogroms directed against the majority-Hutu population, which had left up to 250,000 of them dead in 1972.

Upon reflection the events that have taken place in both countries since 1976 may make it easier in answering this germane question to the ongoing conflict between the so-called "two distinct ethnic groups," notably the Tutsi and Hutu. Why should we concern ourselves with "ethnic" conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi; after all, have not countries such as Uganda, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and many others undergone similar traumas in their post colonial history?

The "ethnic" conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, however tragic they may seem, are very interesting to analyze, because the two ethnic groups in both countries have virtually identical culture, language, names, religions and so forth, in addition to having almost the same percentage composition of the two groups in both countries, whereby the Hutu are the majority, while the Tutsi are a minority. Both countries have negligible small percentages of the Twa, Asians, and Europeans.

Various studies, such as those of Rene Lemarchand, Jacques Maquet, Van den Berghe, and Warren Weinstein have continued to base their reasons for ethnic strife in the two countries on countenances such as language barriers in the two countries, skin pigmentation, cultural characteristics and modes of productivity. These schools of thought base their assumptions on factors that militate against well-established ethnic boundaries.

Before we proceed with discussing the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, we need to elucidate on the terms, "ethnic solidarity" and "ethnic collectivization." "Ethnic solidarity" is defined as the strength or density of ethnic social interaction. Exploited ethnic populations do not automatically organize as cultural groups, although disposessed and socioeconomically "assimilated" ethnic populations do on occasions correlate as "ethnics." This can be demonstrated within the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy, which until the last century did not produce clearly delineated boundaries of ethnicity vis-a-vis competition for resources. This was because until the emergence of the colo-
nial regime and the subsequent capitalist system, pre colonial Rwanda and Burundi were not societies based on economic class distinctions. It is within this context that we need to look at “ethnic enclaves.” An ethnic enclave is a structure in which members of an ethnic population exploit an occupational niche, participate in common ethnic institutions and organizations as well as the formation of a very dense interaction of network communication, socialization, and marital endogamy. Consideration of the organizational base of ethnic enclaves presupposes that two types of boundaries are relevant. One set of boundaries is drawn around cultural markers, where typical criteria for membership are language, nationality, or other common characteristics. The second set of boundaries is drawn around productive activities, defined by occupations, sectors of the economy, or industry. When the two boundaries coincide considerably, ethnic solidarity is doubly reinforced and maintained by economic links that are also familial and personal (Olzak 20-1).

In pre colonial times this unequal relationship in both kingdoms was maintained through an ethos of ethnic superiority and the pervasive system of social and economic contracts that provided payoffs for most members of the society (Kuper 54). The two groups have often been stereotyped as follows: the Tutsi are predominantly cattle herders, while the Hutu are basically peasants. However this characterization oversimplifies the roles of the two groups. In fact many Hutu owned large herds of cattle, while many Tutsi were agriculturists. It was common for anyone that owned a lot of cattle, even “physiologically” resembling a Hutu to be labeled, “Tutsi,” while the poor agricultural peasants, regardless of their Tutsi or Hutu caste origins, were classified as “Hutu.”

Although both Rwanda and Burundi began as monarchical states the two kingdoms differed from each other. For example, in Burundi the kingdom did not develop strong unitary features as was the case with Rwanda. In Burundi the king did not have as much supreme power over the Tutsi chiefs as was the case with Rwanda. The despotic character of the Kinyarwanda monarchy was nowhere more evident than in its bureaucratization of subordinate political roles and the precarious tenure of its occupants. The political system was one in which a triple
hierarchy of army chiefs, land chiefs, and cattle chiefs were all recruited from the dominant stratum whose powers radiated from the provinces to the districts. Each province was entrusted to an army chief and each district to a land chief (who was also the cattle chief) who was responsible for the collection of tithes in produce and cattle. The powers of the chiefs were dependent on the blessings of the Mwami (king). Indeed we can confidently suggest that they were “bureaucrats” in a sense that they did not claim their position by right or inheritance or by virtue of any prior connection with the area to which they were appointed. In contrast Burundi looked like a cluster of warring principalities. The king’s absolute powers were at best very superficial in that the Baganwa (royal chiefs) were the actual power behind the throne.4 In both kingdoms, the ties of client ships ran like a seamless tenure of its occupants, linking men and women in a relationship of mutual dependence (Lemarchand 26-8). In fact, there has been speculation that at the time of colonial contact the Tutsi and Hutu were on the way to resembling a sub-homogenous ethnic entity. What German and subsequent Belgian colonial rule did was to reverse this process of amalgamation through the pre-existing system of kingship into a “neo-feudal” state, founded on a rigid dichotomy between “Tutsi lords” and “Hutu serfs,” which in turn lent legitimacy to an imaginary distinction between a so-called superior race of immigrant “Hamites” of either Egyptian or Ethiopian origins (Tutsi) and the so-called “primitive indigenous Negroes” (Hutu and Twa).6

In a summation the German colonial era in Rwanda and Burundi could be epitomized in three phases: (i) from 1899 to 1903 as a period of “non-intervention,” although interrupted in 1903 when German military expeditions were launched against insubordinate chiefs, (ii) 1903 to 1908 as the period of consolidation in which German colonial rule firmly established itself in the two territories through the curtailment of the powers of the chiefs; while the (iii) 1908-1915 period was an era of “Divide and Rule” in which the monarchies in the two colonies were prevented from gaining a permanent ascendancy over the chiefs and vice-versa.

German rule in Rwanda and Burundi was terminated with the end of World War I when all its colonies were taken over by
other European powers, first, under the League of Nations and later as the United Nations (U.N.) Trusteeship. By 1918, the Belgians who were prominent in the region had managed to drive the Germans out of the Ruanda-Urundi colony.

Belgian colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi in a way resembled British “indirect rule,” for with the assistance of the colonial government, the two Tutsi kings in this joint colonial kingdom consolidated their rule in the region. Although domestic slavery was abolished in 1923, the kings in both territories claimed not only “ownership” of the land, but also the Hutu who tilled it, thus reducing them to a form of a landless peasantry.

During the early colonial era, the Belgian authorities compelled every chief as well as sub-chiefs to enforce mandatory coffee-growing, which was to result in the reduction in the amount of arable land available for food cultivation. The Ruanda-Urundi colony also became a labor reserve for the Belgian Congo, especially for the mines of Katanga. These Belgian colonial policies resulted in the emigration of Banyarwanda and Barundi from their colonies to others such as Uganda in search of better living conditions.

In the late 1950s, in spite of the “winds of change” that were sweeping Africa, the Belgian authorities clung to an image of an ethnic state dominated by the Tutsi monarchies. In their attacks on African nationalism, they encouraged ethnic loyalties as a means of fragmenting an emerging African opposition to colonial rule. It is in this realm that the Hutu educated elite became the vanguard of the nationalist movement.

Unlike Rwanda, Burundi’s colonial experience was relatively brief, but it had a significant impact on the colony’s development. Initially, the Belgians had attempted to administer Burundi through what it considered to be the kingdom’s “traditional political structure.” Operating under the mistaken assumption that the Tutsi domination of the political system was as strong as in Rwanda, the Belgians gave preponderant power and educational opportunities to the Tutsi. In this context, Belgian favoritism of the Tutsi consolidated their political dominance. Despite efforts in the 1950s by the colonial authorities to democratize its administration under the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations, it did little to alter Tutsi political domination.
The spread of Western education as well as its emphasis on notions such as Democracy and Equality inspired many Hutu, especially in light of the underdog's status of their ethnic group, however, not before it had created separate political enclaves within the two ethnic groups. As in Rwanda, the Tutsi dominated the political and economic echelons, while the Hutu eventually came to dominate the educational sector in colonial Burundi.

This was the situation in both countries at the time of their Independence on July 1, 1962. While recent analysis of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is often seen in purely ethnic lenses, little attempts have been employed to look at the difference within the two ethnic groups. For example, in Rwanda, there were differences between the southern Hutu and their northern counterparts. For instance, the first President of Rwanda, Gregoire Kayibanda was a southern Hutu. The 1973 military coup which brought General Juvenile Habyarimana was seen as an attempt by the northern Hutu to dominate their southern correlates. In a similar manner, the Tutsi were divided amongst the Tutsi-Banyaruguru, who thought of themselves as being superior to the Tutsi-Hima. Consequently, a situation was created where regional difference affected and complicated the pattern of ethnic group relations as a result of these subunits within each society.

In Rwanda, independence created a new and ambiguous situation. The political system became inverted, with a small Hutu elite dominating the political power structure. Many of the hundreds of thousands of Tutsi who remained after the 1959 revolution (that ended the centuries-old Tutsi domination in the country) were wealthy and educated. In order to contain their influence, the new ruling Hutu elite developed a policy of systematic discrimination, especially in arenas that permitted upward mobility, namely modern education, jobs, and politics. So a quota system was installed that limited Tutsi access to higher education as well as state jobs. The post colonial regime in Rwanda even retained the Identity Card policy (which has since been formally abolished by the current Rwandese Patriotic Front [RPF] government) that had been introduced by the colonial authorities as a way of identifying Africans by their ethnic origins (the Tutsi had been the main beneficiaries of this
practice because of their social status in society during the colonial era). In addition to identifying one’s ethnicity, the government also forbade the return of more than 100,000 Tutsi refugees under the pretext that there was no more room for them in the country.

As far as Burundi’s post colonial history is concerned there have been marked efforts on the part of Tutsi factions to strengthen their control over the state and armed forces and to transform them into increasingly effective agents for the perpetuation and expansion of Tutsi hegemony over all aspects of Burundian society. There have been repeated attempts by Hutu factions, usually in the form of abortive coups or uncoordinated uprisings, to combat these Tutsi efforts. It is this conflict that has given rise to the various rounds of political and ethnic violence which Burundi has witnessed since Independence. The first major round of post colonial violence occurred between 1965 and 1966 when an abortive coup by Hutu military officers met with violent suppression by Tutsi forces. This led to the purging of numerous Hutu army officers and the execution of thousands of Hutu, including virtually every significant Hutu leader in Burundi. The Hutu-Hima-led government again carried out another bloody purge of the Hutu when another Hutu-led coup attempt was foiled in 1969.

The violence that broke out in 1972 represented a dramatic escalation of the conflict. In the wake of deepening intra-Tutsi tensions and increasing anti-Hutu provocation by local Tutsi officials, Hutu uprisings broke out in the capital and parts of the countryside. These uprisings, which were assisted by Zairean troops and Hutu refugees based in Tanzania, were quickly crushed by the armed forces. The insecure Tutsi-Hima regime in Bujumbura, however, used the opportunity to embark on a widespread and brutal slaughter not only of the rebels but also of almost the entire Hutu as well as rival Tutsi elite. Aided by Tutsi civilians and youth militias, the army is estimated to have massacred up to 250,000 Hutu and to have driven an estimated 150,000 of them out of the country (Abrams 37, 147-48). The events of 1972 consolidated Tutsi political, social and economic hegemony in Burundi and left the Hutu community traumatized and leaderless for quite sometime.

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The 1972 Burundi massacres and the subsequent flight of Hutu refugees was the chief catalyst for the military coup of 1973 in neighboring Rwanda. Then Defence Minister, General Juvenal Habyarimana, a northern Hutu from Gisenyi justified the coup d'etat by arguing that the ‘PARMEHUTU’ government of Gregoire Kayibanda was unable to protect the Hutu from a possible Tutsi political resurgence in the country.

At first the Habyarimana regime achieved much in the economic arena in the 1970s and 1980s: infrastructure and housing underwent great improvement; the civil service was modernized, and a new clean water supply system was installed in the country. His government policies attracted foreign aid, although much of it was spent on ill-advised insecure and short-sighted projects which were at times imposed by the aid donors.

As a result of such factors the mid 1980s saw an increase in poverty. A decade-long decline in coffee prices, the country’s major export, paralleled the devaluation of the Rwandese franc by forty percent in 1989. Coffee exports fell from $144 million in 1985 to $30 million in 1993. Aggregate GDP per capita decreased from $355 in 1983 to $260 in 1990. These declines substantially reduced the earnings of the state as well as the purchasing power of most rural households. In urban areas, wage stagnation and a dearth in employment opportunities was accompanied by a rise in food prices. Faced with such
mounting economic crisis, as well as increasing dependence on foreign finance, the Habyarimana regime saw no alternative but to accept an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Structural Program, that would freeze government salaries and devalue the Rwandese franc by sixty-seven percent (Uvin 11).

The Rwanda of the 1990s has been associated with genocidal disposition. Before we discuss the events of 1990s, we need to define and conceptualize the word, “genocide.” Contrary to the international media's assertion at the time of the Rwandese Genocide, the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is not an “age long” discord. Oral as well as written historical accounts do not support this assertion. Although the Tutsi overlords had exercised political hegemony over the Hutu for generations, which may have created a few tensions between the two, both groups had coexisted with each other through intermarriage.

Since issues of contention tend to be conducive to genocidal conflict in places such as Rwanda and Burundi, a small minor fray, for example, could easily set a chain of reactions such as reciprocal terrorism as well as political confrontation at the national level. This was the case in Burundi in 1988 when clashes between the Tutsi-dominated UPRONA party local officials and Hutu peasants over spoils from illicit coffee smuggling into Rwanda led to a bloody confrontation in northern Burundi in which about 500 Tutsi are known to have perished. Under the pretext of trying to restore “law and order” the Tutsi-controlled Burundi army moved in, inflicting a series of massacres, resulting in about 20,000 Hutu deaths and driving tens of thousands of them into exile in neighboring Rwanda, (Abrams 148; Dorwood 34). Burundi and Rwanda are therefore classic examples whereby a long history of protracted struggle, violent repression and its resultant memories for subordinate groups of past injustice and atrocity are most likely to translate such emotional impulses into destructive violence. *

At the beginning of the 1990s three striking factors con-

*A country such as Uganda has also had some conflicts that in fact resemble genocidal predispositions. These include the pogroms against the Langi and Acholi in the early 1970s, the Kakwa and Lugbara in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, Ugandan leaders have not always sought the Rwandese-Burundian type of genocide because of Uganda's more heterogenous and very autonomous ethnic configuration.
Isabirye/Mahmoudi—Conflicts

fronted the Habyarimana government in Rwanda, emanating mainly from the disgruntled Hutu elite. The regime had adopted increasingly harsh measures against its political opponents through ruthless means such as politically-motivated assassinations. Political opposition came mostly from the south and central regions, since most positions of power in the government were monopolized by people from the President's district in the north, which had also received a lion's share in public spending investment. Widespread corruption, geographical exclusion and disappointment, coupled with the slow pace of development (especially after the Structural Adjustment Program had reduced the efficiency of the state) fueled this discontent.

Another cardinal problem the Habyarimana government faced was the refugee problem, especially that of the Tutsi Diaspora that had fled the 1959 Revolution. The government's reluctance to permit these refugees back was in itself a problem. This had to do with Tutsi lands that had been confiscated by the Hutu-administrations. In this regard the government was very apprehensive of returning these refugees home lest they started claiming property such as land that had previously been seized during the 1959 tumult. Nonetheless, since the Tutsi diaspora in places such as Uganda faced consistent resentment and persecution in their host countries, the only alternative was to return to Rwanda by any means necessary.

It is against this background that on October 1, 1990, the Tutsi refugees in Uganda (who had also been active in the country's Uganda National Resistance Army [NRA] during the 1980s civil war in that country), decided to invade Rwanda en masse under the newly reconstituted Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF'). It is noteworthy that this had not been the first time that Tutsi refugees had launched invasions from neighboring countries after Independence, for they had impelled abortive ones from Burundi and Uganda between 1963 and 1964 as we have already noted. Yet, the 1990 invasion appears to have been better coordinated, taking into account the fact that many of the Tutsi fighters had acquired experience as military combatants in Uganda's NRA. The Rwandese government retaliated by detaining around 9000 Tutsi while massacring around 2000 of them. For the time being the Tutsi invasion united the southern,
central and northern Hutu who saw the invasion as a serious threat to Hutu political dominance. Despite this apparent display of unity the RPF invasion proved to be very formidable.

In response to the “RPF menace” the ruling Hutu authorities began contemplating genocide as the most viable solution to the Tutsi threat. In 1992, two death squads were formed by the names of Interahamwe (those who attack together) and Impuzamugambi (those with a single purpose”). The civil war went on unabated with atrocities committed by both sides. Despite the Arusha Peace Accord between the two antagonistic forces on August 4, 1993, the bloodletting between the two sides continued with undiminished ferocity. The assassination of the Hutu President, Melchior Ndadaye, in neighboring Burundi increased the urge for genocide against the Tutsi as well as the Hutu opposition.

So on April 6, 1994, when the plane carrying President Habyarimana as well as President Cyprian Ntaryamira of Burundi was mysteriously shot down over Kigali after their return from a second round of Arusha Peace Talks, the instruments of genocide that had been years in the making were implemented. The Rwandese Genocide has often been compared to the Jewish Holocaust under the Nazis. There are similarities as well as differences between the two. Like the Germans and Jews, the Hutu and Tutsi had lived together for half a millennium. However, unlike the German Jews and the Germans “Proper”, the Hutu and Tutsi were far more intertwined with each other in political, cultural, social and economic terms. This probably made it easier for the Hutu extremists to carry out their form of genocide with more speed than had their Nazi predecessors, which explains why they could have managed to kill more than a million people in just three months. Mobilizing thousands of Rwandese to slaughter tens of thousands of their own required effective organization. Unlike other African “failed states” the Rwandese state had been successful in maintaining political as well as relative economic stability until 1990 when the current upheavals commenced. It was not until July, 1994, when the Tutsi-led RPF’ seized power in Rwanda, that the genocide was halted. Just as the Holocaust redefined Jewish identity, the Rwandese Genocide has left a profound impact on the psyches of both Tutsi and Hutu.
While these events were unfolding in Rwanda, Burundi was also moving, but at a much slower pace, towards its own genocidal agenda. Although it is possible to argue that polarization in Rwanda and its fearful expressions were intimately related to the process of polarization in Burundi, the social appendages as well as the infrastructure of group relations were very different from those of Rwanda and seemed to offer real possibilities for national integration, but in the end, an even more massive holocaust seemed to await the Hutu majority (as opposed to the Tutsi minority in Rwanda) in Burundi. We have already looked at the Hutu pogroms of 1972 and 1988. As a result of international outcry and condemnation of the 1988 bloodbath, the Tutsi-led military government of Major Pierre Buyoya (who had seized power in September 1987) was compelled to initiate political reforms that would usher in the first democratically-elected government in Burundi in June 1993 under President Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, however hopes for everlasting peace were dashed when Ndadaye was assassinated by hardline Tutsi elements within the army on October 21, 1993, resurrecting Hutu-Tutsi' acrimony in the country. The two succeeding Hutu Presidents, Cyprian Ntaryamira (who died in the same plane crash as the Rwandese President in 1994) and Sylvestre Ntibantuganya, could neither control the unruly Tutsi-led army nor the Hutu guerilla rebel militias. This prompted Major Pierre Buyoya to stage his second military coup on July 25, 1996. The reaction to this coup was very swift: many surrounding countries imposed economic sanctions on the new regime. However they do not seem to have weakened Buyoya and his "mono ethnic" Tutsi-led army's rein on power. Meanwhile the Hutu guerilla militias have intensified their struggle with the government and by February 1998 the war was being fought on the outskirts of the capital city, Bujumbura, creating about 350,000 internal refugees as of March 2000 (Nutt). Nevertheless, as of this writing, the situation in Burundi remains very fluid, and there are still fears that the country could degenerate into the same genocidal holocaust as that in Rwanda.

In assessing the conflict in the two countries we may ask ourselves what the solutions will be to the current "tribal warfare" in the two states. The answers are not that easy to come
One proposition has been the partition of Rwanda and Burundi, whereby one country is awarded to the Hutu while the other one goes to the Tutsi. This type of denouement is impractical for the simple reason that the Hutu and Tutsi have been living in these two interlocking entities for generations, and neither of the two ethnic groups would be willing to relocate from their ancestral lands. Partition is not often the best solution for the simple reason that animosities between the two groups could intensify and crystallize hard feelings on both sides, if the Indian subcontinent Partition of 1947 and 1948 is any indication of an outcome.

The other problem that has been one of the key reasons behind the intensification of ethnic animosities within the two countries has been poverty as well as dense population in the two countries. At the time of the Rwandese Genocide of 1994 Rwanda was the fifteenth poorest country in the world while Burundi was the eighth according to World Bank statistics, (International Bank)

Indices since then suggest that the economic situation has deteriorated as a result of the ongoing civil strife in both countries. Land is a very important problem in Rwanda and Burundi. For example Rwanda is the most densely populated country in Africa. Each square kilometer of agricultural land supports more than 400 people. Eighty-five percent of the people live beneath the poverty line, and a third of the children suffer from malnutrition. There is no doubt that the war and the subsequent genocide, resulting in massive loss of life and population have only aggravated this problem. As a result, agricultural production in 1995-96 was only sixty-six percent of the 1990 level while in 1996-1997 it was still only seventy-eight percent. Population displacement in general has resulted in de-capitalization, due to lack of maintenance of terraces as well as a decline in soil fertility, due to lack of investments and deconstruction as a result of poor credit availability. The composition of production units has also changed, with a sixty-one percent increase in the number of female-headed households (from twenty-one percent of the total in 1992 to thirty-four percent in 1996) and a twenty-five percent reduction of males between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four over the 1990-1996 period (Massacring 24-7; Van Hoyweghen 357).
The Hutu-Tutsi conflict in the two countries is likely to have regional as well as international ramifications. A country such as Uganda as we have already noted has been sucked into the conflict by virtue of having had numerous Rwandese refugees over the decades. It is imperative to note that the Hutu-Yutsi conflict in the two countries spilled into the Congolese civil strife of 1996 and 1997, because the Banyamulenge ethnic group, which was on the verge of being politically and economically disenfranchised by the crumbling Mobutu regime, is ethnically affiliated to Tutsi. In a show of ethnic solidarity the current Tutsi-led governments in the two countries decided to back their brethren in their struggle against then Zairean government but not before inflicting severe retributions on the Hutu refugees that had fled Rwanda after the 1994 Genocide. Therefore what began as a Hutu-Tutsi conflict in the two countries eventually turned into a nationwide rebellion in neighboring Congo (formerly Zaire) causing the collapse of the longtime Mobutu regime.

There is no doubt that there will be an attempt to bring the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda as well as in Burundi to justice. However, this aspect misses the point of trying to redress the historical, political, and economic root causes of this bloody feud, many of which this paper has sought to address.

There is no outright win-win situation in this conflict. A negotiated settlement between the two adversaries that should involve the surrounding regional countries (which have been taking sides in this crisis for a very long time) is the only panacea to this seemingly internecine disharmony.

Endnotes


7 Ibid., 36.

8 Ibid., 47.


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White Ethnic: A Social Concept

Joseph M. Conforti

Why such a term as white ethnic or ethnic developed and what purposes it served guides this inquiry. Its origins in the wake of the Civil Rights Movement in a context of American immigration history are explored together with its adoption as a sociological concept. A survey of textbooks most likely to use such a term, particularly texts concerning race and ethnicity, inter-group relations, and sociology of minorities, together with related literature illustrates both its usage and the basis of such usage.

Introduction

This paper examines the noun white ethnic or ethnic, as a label for particular groups of people in the United States. This term has been used by American sociologists (and others) extensively enough to have entered the general vocabulary of the society, particularly as reflected in the mass media. The inherent logic of the term is elusive at best. It suggests that there are ethnics who are other than white and whites who are other than ethnic. Neither of these logical implications of the term have ever been addressed. While these nomenclature issues are intriguing, they will not be addressed here. The discussion here concerns why such a term developed in a particular time frame and what purposes it served.

It is difficult to determine precisely where, when, or by whom the term white ethnic was invented. It is probably safest
to say that it had no single point of origin, but can be attributed to a combination of mutually reinforcing origins. This paper places its emergence in the late 1960s on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement with which it was somewhat intertwined. It became a popularly used concept in the 1970s, extending through the 1980s with usage dissipating in the 1990s.

Self-Labeling

The origins of the term white ethnic are complex and reflect several different bases. One basis would be self-labeling, arising out of a self-consciousness that developed within some white ethnic groups in the United States, a self-consciousness stimulated by the Civil Rights Movement. The increased self-consciousness revolved around perception that the federal government was uniquely helping black people through a combination of judicial decisions and legislation in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly through The Civil Rights Act of 1964. This is the legislation that produced Affirmative Action as a policy, though this component received little attention until the early 1970s. Once it appeared that black people were receiving help from the Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, and much of the rest of the federal government to compensate for past oppression there arose several me too proclamations. In addition to the women's movement, several ethnic groups (or at least some of those individuals who claimed leadership of such groups) emphasized that their group had also been oppressed, and they also deserved some kind of reparation or compensation. These were the leaders of the people who were primarily the descendants of those who had long been called the new immigrants, the immigrants who had come to the United States from southern and eastern Europe after 1890 such as Italians and Ashkenazik Jews.¹

The argument was, in part, that the white population should be examined in terms of distinguishing those whites responsible for the oppression of black people from those whites who were not only not responsible for the oppression of black people but who had themselves been oppressed. While no arguments were made to suggest that there were any groups of whites in the United States that had suffered oppression comparable to that of blacks, the emphasis was that
groups other than blacks, including whites, had also suffered oppression. Since no such compensation or promise of such compensation was forthcoming to any white ethnic groups, a degree of resentment developed with some of their members. The resentment was complex. For some it was a simple resentment toward black people on the grounds that helping only one group was unfair. A second form the resentment took was that no group should have any easier a time than their own group had had in coping with such matters as developing job skills, getting through school or moving into decent housing in neighborhoods that had been closed to them.²

A third form the resentment took was toward assimilation, a particularly ambivalent form of resentment. It simultaneously stressed a pride in being American and a questioning of whether giving up one’s ethnicity and becoming American had been worthwhile.³

The press, eager to report conflict, tended to exaggerate both the depth of the conflict and the resentment on the part of the whites, which in turn became generalized to and interlarded with resistance to busing, hard-hat intolerance, and the embrace of right-wing politics.⁴ For some this fueled the resentment even further insofar as this characterization included the suggestion that it was these newer Americans who made up the ranks of racists in the United States rather than the older Americans.

That the term was being used by the media in such a negative fashion to label groups of people was one of the grounds for the defensive books that emerged in the 1970s, a second basis for the term’s emergence. Several authors took up the cause of the new ethnicity, as it was often initially called, with such titles as America and the new Ethnicity and The Ethnic Imperative: Examining the New White Ethnic movement⁵ To different degrees, they were advocates of the reality and desirability of an ethnic resurgence and of both the maintenance and enhancement of ethnicity among particular groups of whites. The best known were probably Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s Beyond the melting Pot,⁶ Andrew Greeley’s Why Can’t They Be Like Us? ⁷ and Michael Novak’s The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics.⁸ These authors tended to explain and often defend the new ethnicity and the people
they called white ethnics. Their defense was two-fold: to a lesser degree, a defense against assimilation pressures and to a greater degree, a clarification of who and what the presumably misunderstood white ethnics really were. At an even broader level these authors could be viewed further as proponents of ethnic pluralism in terms of arguing for its continued relevance, bemoaning its feared loss, or urging its resurgence.

An Ethnic Resurgence?

An unintended or unanticipated consequence of the term's use had been to call attention to the question of whether or not there had been an ethnic resurgence in the United States during the 1970s. Some people, particularly the self-proclaimed ethnic leaders, insisted that there was a resurgence and insisted upon reaffirming their ethnic ancestry, such as Italian Americans or Polish Americans. That they had to undertake such endeavors could, however, be taken to reflect the fact that without conscious effort the ethnic community or ethnic culture in which such people were interested and invested would die or that it had already died to a considerable degree and required their (often self-serving) concerted efforts to try to keep it alive.

Richard D. Alba in his research took up a challenge to the question of an ethnic resurgence in the United States with a theme that went back to the 1940s with Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy and to the 1950s with Will Herberg, the theme being that of assimilation and amalgamation through interethnic marriage, within the bounds of a common religion (common race being taken for granted). Kennedy and Herberg earlier spoke of a triple melting pot in American society, with ethnic barriers collapsing within religions and a corresponding shift in identity from ethnicity to religion. Alba's data challenged the idea of an ethnic resurgence by showing extensive intermarriage between members of different ethnic groups within the Roman Catholic religion. Alba emphasized college attendance and intermarriage as indicative of acculturation and assimilation. His phrase twilight of ethnicity captured the almost completed assimilation and the uncertainty of its ethnic residues.

Although Herbert Gans referred to people as ethnics (particularly Catholics), he also seemed to challenge the idea
of an ethnic resurgence in American society with his concept of symbolic ethnicity. Symbolic ethnicity was viewed as mostly a matter of selective self identity and comprised largely of nostalgia, generally devoid of content, presumably characteristic of the third, fourth, and later generations of an ethnic group. But the retention of ethnicity even in symbolic form suggests the retention of a fairly simple singular ethnic background. This does not fit well with the extensive interethnic marriage that has occurred in the United States and the complex ethnicity that such marriages produce. But carried a step further, such complex ethnicity would seem to lend itself to oversimplification, especially in symbolic terms, through the selective ethnic identification that Mary Waters identified through her research.

**An American Sociological Conceptual Term**

A third basis for the introduction of the term comes from the sociological literature. Sociologists have long been interested in race and ethnicity, going back at least as far as Max Weber or even further back to the early 19th Century Social Darwinists. Over the past century the sociological literature of the United States has dealt with ethnicity largely in terms of European immigrant groups. Robert E. Park, drawing upon the experience of early 20th century Chicago, set the tone with his race relations cycle. The flow of wave after wave of different groups of European immigrants to the United States accommodated such a theory, at least as much as the theory explained the flow. Park's theory focused on a sequence of contact, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Such a model stressed assimilation as both an ongoing process and the ultimate goal for each immigrant group. This model also suggested that distinctions could be made among the ethnic groups in terms of the degree of assimilation that each represented at any given point in time.

The easiest, and ostensibly most popular, approach to such distinctions in sociology textbooks involved dividing the immigrants, who had come to the United States from different countries at different times, into two broad groupings. The first grouping, called the old immigrants, had come from Northern and Western Europe during the late 18th and early 19th cen-
turies, such as the English, Dutch, Germans, and Irish. The second grouping, called the new immigrants, had come from Eastern and Southern Europe between 1890 and 1920, such as the Poles, Italians, and Greeks. 21

It was the first European immigrant group, from England, which ethnocentrically established the context for these kinds of distinctions, first by renaming themselves Americans and, second, by putting themselves forth as the model (of Americans) which all subsequent immigrants should emulate, a process that Gordon descriptively referred to as Anglo-conformity but which tended to prevail in the term assimilation.22 Such a process readily lent itself to distinguishing degrees of assimilation among immigrant groups. The old immigrants, having adjusted culturally and linguistically to the American model for the longest time, and especially in contrast to the more recent immigrants, were viewed as assimilated. They could be called American or referred to as native born. The more recent or new immigrants could, by contrast, be viewed as unassimilated and referred to as foreign born. Even the United States Bureau of the Census used to make such a distinction, including the offspring of immigrants in the category foreign-born. In such an approach it was not until the third generation that the grandchildren of immigrants would be defined as native born Americans.23

During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the sociology textbooks dealing with intergroup relations, race, and ethnicity or majority-minority relations took account of this distinction, though they focused mostly on race and often devoted at least one chapter to Jews.24 Insofar as account was taken of ethnicity, the old immigrant/new immigrant distinction was commonplace and consistent in these kinds of textbooks.

By the 1960s and 1970s a third generation, descended from the new immigrants, came of age, making it awkward to call them foreign-born immigrants or even new immigrants, and yet they were still perceived as somewhat foreign, not fully assimilated, or at least not assimilated enough to be called American. In terms of Park's race relations cycle they were perceived as being in a kind of limbo somewhere between accommodation and assimilation.25 The term white ethnic became a label to reflect this medial position and distinguish
them from those people descended from the earlier waves of immigration, who could be called American. That is, as used by sociologists, the term largely distinguished people who were perceived as not fully assimilated to the American model from those who were perceived as fully assimilated.

The basic content of the conceptual term white ethnic is obviously descriptive as a label. The label puts a group of people into one discrete category, assimilated in contrast to another discrete category, unassimilated, thus treating the concept as an attribute even though assimilation might be viewed more usefully as a variable representing degrees of assimilation. In this sense it also could be argued that the term represented a stereotype insofar as the same characteristics or properties were generalized including everyone in the ethnic group. This implied that everyone in a particular ethnic group assimilated at the same rate and had assimilated to the same degree.

It also served as an analytic term insofar as efforts were made (at least implicitly) to contrast and compare different ethnic groups or to compare white ethnic group members with those whites who were ostensibly not members of ethnic groups. That there could be Americans who are not members of an ethnic group initially sounds logically absurd. But if ethnic is being used as an adjective and then as a noun to distinguish some people, there would logically have to be other people who are not ethnic. Those so inferred would be, in this instance, the descendants of the earlier white immigrant groups, the Americans. The logic of such usage is supported by the observation that the United States contains growing numbers of white people whose ethnicity has been so obscured and diluted or is evolving in such a manner that they have no simple distinctive ethnic identity of which they are conscious other than American. 26

Implications

How the distinctions between the assimilated and unassimilated were made, by whom they were made, and on the basis of what criteria seem both reasonable and empirical questions. But little or no effort has been made to justify the distinctions in textbooks that use such terms as ethnic or white ethnic. It is essentially arbitrary; it is simply done with no expla-
nation of why. It is as if the meaning is taken to be so obvious and valid that it warrants no definition or explanation. It is what post-modernist critics would characterize as largely unchallenged, unexplained sociological canon.

This is not to say that such use has necessarily been benign or inconsequential. The manner in which the term white ethnic has been applied in the sociological literature largely has been to describe groups of people who are said to have maintained characteristics from their ancestral culture sufficiently so that they could be described as ethnically distinct groups of people. Such ethnically distinct groups are quite familiar in terms of ethnic ghettos, such as Chinatown, el Barrio, or Little Italy. These were areas characterized by people who came directly from China, Mexico, or Italy or by people who, being only a generation away from the experience of immigration, were very close to the people who came from those countries. It becomes a much more difficult and elusive concept to apply after such people moved out of ghettos and were distributed over various parts of metropolitan areas, as were the third and fourth generation descendants who usually grew up outside such ghettos and in the suburbs of the United States. In such cases sociologists have had to try to identify those aspects of their life style or cultural practices that sufficiently differentiated some groups of people in terms of their ancestry to justify such characterization. Such comparisons could focus on any number of things such as cultural residues, family organization, child rearing practices, ceremonies and celebrations, language usage, food, or political participation. In the absence of careful dating the descriptions and depictions could be outdated or obsolete. Thus Gans’ depiction of ethnic village neighborhoods or even Whyte’s depiction of street corner life could be projected and generalized to an ethnic group well beyond the times and places they reflected. This is particularly the case where there is a lack of more contemporary literature to counterbalance the outdated images of the group being depicted.

It is likely that, for at least some of the sociologists using the term white ethnic, it was a gentler, more generous term than might have been used in terms of social class characterization. The line between ethnic characterization and class characterization is obscure at best. As would similarly be the
case with religions, there is a reluctance to acknowledge the correspondence many hold between ethnicity and other dimensions of social stratification. Since immigrants coming to the United States have done so primarily on economic grounds, the very term, immigrant, tends to stimulate images not only of the foreign but also of poverty and desperation. The strongest images of immigrants over the past century have emphasized poor people crowded into city slums. In such a context the white ethnics, if not as desperately poor as their immigrant forebears, were most likely being seen as lower class. Even advocates of the new ethnicity, if eschewing an unacceptable label like lower class, did not hesitate to refer to them with the more acceptable term working class.

Ethnicity has been a dimension of social class in all socially stratified societies in which ethnicity has served as a relevant distinction among groups. That social class and ethnicity have been intertwined in American society can be seen in the familiar delineation of social class that ranges from the poorest inner city ghettos to the most affluent of suburbs in most metropolitan areas. In this regard the white ethnics being described in the literature were often in the cities, beyond the ghettos but not quite in the suburbs.

Still another perspective from which the concept white ethnic might be considered is in terms of race. Like social class, race has been viewed by a number of social scientists in recent years as a correlate of assimilation, at least in the case of the European immigrants and their descendants. This approach has been cast in terms of whiteness studies. In this regard the dominant Anglo-Saxon group defined itself as white, a property extended to the German immigrants but emphatically denied to the Irish. The Irish were viewed and characterized as an inferior race other than white. The new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were similarly disdained as inferior races. In this sense white ethnic may be taken to mean not quite white. It is ironic of course that the term ethnic is being used in this sense to modify the term white. But that white ethnic is thus distinguished from white would be equivalent, perhaps, to a more direct term such as quasi-white.
Conclusion

Insofar as American sociologists continued to make assimilation distinctions among white ethnic groups, in terms of which some were perceived as retaining distinct cultural patterns more so than others, it could be said that the term white ethnic has served its intended purpose for American sociologists, to replace the terms foreign-born or new immigrant. Insofar as members of white ethnic groups organized politically and culturally to embrace and celebrate their ethnic heritage, the term, white ethnic, served their purposes, too, as a term for a common identity that sometimes reflected a single group and sometimes reflected a grouping of ethnic groups that could be distinguished from other groups.

While it served the needs of American sociologists for more than two decades, it does not appear that the concept white ethnic has much of a future. There are at least two reasons for this. One is the increasing recognition that in the course of suburbanization, intermarriage, and their intertwine ment with assimilation as is reflected in the triple melting pot model the ethnic differences among white people in American society have significantly diminished, if not disappeared. The people who were distinguished as white ethnics are now being lumped together with previously assimilated people as Whites, European-Americans or un-hyphenated Americans.

A second reason is that there have arrived in the United States since 1965 large numbers of immigrants from throughout the world who are overwhelmingly not of European ancestry. These have included large numbers of Hispanic people from Mexico, Central, and South America; increasing numbers of Asians and smaller numbers of people from various parts of the Caribbean and elsewhere. As a result many of the current textbooks in discussing ethnic groups are not talking about Italians or Poles so much as they are talking about Chinese and Mexicans.

This further encourages treating all whites as a single dominating majority group. And that perspective brings us full circle in suggesting a situation very similar to the distinction made between old immigrants and new immigrants. Some textbooks in the field had already started focusing on such groups as far back as the 1970s. Such immigrants who can
be distinguished by phenotype and linguistic patterns have become characterized as the new new immigrants. This in turn fits well with the embracement of pluralism that has been growing in recent years in the United States, emphasizing diversity and multiculturalism. Multiculturalism stresses differences between groups, the value of these differences, and the importance of maintaining them; its particular focuses is on groups of color, although it includes a wide array of groups defined as minorities.40

As the term white ethnic served as a label for people of European ancestry perceived to be unassimilated or unassimilable, similar labels may be in formation in relation to the newest groups of immigrants. American sociologists have already introduced such terms such as segmented assimilation, the new assimilation, collective identity, and the new second generation.41 This nomenclature again seems to suggest that the members of some ethnic groups are not going to assimilate, are not going to assimilate fully, or even that they are unable to assimilate.

Endnotes
1 Irish-Americans, whose ancestors had come to the United States much earlier, were often included among the disenchanted white ethnics who did not receive compensation for their oppression in America.

2 This kind of resentment is not unlike one of the objections that people in the English Only movement have to the tolerance of foreign languages. It might best be summed up as: "If we had to learn English, why shouldn't they!"

3 Stanley Feldstein and Lawrence Costello. The Ordeal of Assimilation (New York: Anchor, 1974).

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10 Feldstein and Costello, 1974.


People would, for example, be expected to identify as Catholic or Protestant rather than as Irish or German.


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25 Park.


30 Glazer and Moynihan.


34 That some authors continue to include the Irish among white eth-
nics, despite seven to eight generations of assimilation, suggests that the term cannot be fully counted out yet.


36 Richard D. Alba had suggested the term Euro-American or European-American. While such a term would be descriptive and parallel to the terms African-American and Asian-American, it has thus far not caught on and white remains the more popular term in the United States.

37 Lieberson.


41 Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); M. Kelly,
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Distinctive Features of the African-American Family:
Debunking the Myth of the Deficit Model

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Throughout the 1900's, social scientists have debated the question of whether the African American family is an adaptative social system or whether it is pathological, perpetuating its poverty over the generations. This article examines the holistic perspective as the preeminent comprehensive approach in studying the African American family and provides empirical evidence of distinctive features of the African American family in support of the adaptation argument. The adaptation/deficit debate will probably continue as long as the scientific community fails to fully acknowledge and make the most of theoretical constructs that are holistic in principle and design.

An intense argument rages on whether the African American family is in a pathological sequence, perpetuating itself and its poverty over the generations. Lewis (1967b, 149) cites Frazier (1939) who states that the African American family unit "may take on protean forms as it survives or is reborn in times of cataclysmic social change."

Distinctive theoretical perspectives and approaches have guided this debate over the years, and many scholars have
chosen sides in support for or against these paradigms. This article has the following objectives: 1) to provide a brief discussion on previous and recent theoretical perspectives on the African American family and 2) to present empirical evidence on kin interaction and the exchange of mutual aid and the informal adoption of African American children in support of the adaptation argument.

**Theoretical Perspectives on the Study of the African-American Family**

Many misconceptions exist regarding the quality and nature of the African American family especially those concerning lower-class families (Taylor 1998, 19). Sweeping generalizations have been made without empirical evidence or the amount of systematic study given white families (Murray 1984; Loury 1984; Lemann 1986). It is interesting to note that although white family structure has been used as a norm by which black families have been compared, empirical evidence has not been forthcoming to support the assertion that white family structure and processes can be normative for the assessment of black family life.

During the twentieth century many models and perspectives were presented to describe and explain black family phenomena. Some of these perspectives were based on the work of notable scholars (Frazier 1939; Moynihan 1965; Allen 1972; Nobles 1978). One particular model that seems to have gained widespread support was the deficit model which paints a pathological portrait of minorities and other low-income groups (Hill 1993). It presumes that the crises they experience are innate rather than external. Valentine (1968) contends that this system of thought has a long tradition of presuming defects in the mentality of disadvantaged classes resulting from their internal deficiencies. According to Hill (Staples 1971b; Engram 1982), this perspective is known as the “blaming the victim” syndrome (1993, 4). This perspective is best highlighted in the work of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *The Negro Family: A Case for National Action* (1965). Moynihan’s work, based on the work of Frazier (1939) depicts low income African Americans as caught in “a tangle of pathology” because of the high rate of poverty, unemployment, single-parent families, welfare recipiency, and
crime. Moynihan asserts that the matriarchal structure of black families is at the center of the tangle of pathology and is responsible for the problems in the black community (Staples 1971b, 19-38).

To refute the deficit model, new conceptual frameworks and perspectives quickly emerged in the 1970s portraying another view of African Americans. Taylor (1998) states that during this time there was an increase in the quality and quantity of research on black families. He asserts that there was a "shift away from the social pathology perspective to one emphasizing the resilience and adaptiveness of black families under a variety of social and economic conditions" (21). According to Taylor (1998) Allen (1978) was one of several early scholars in this pursuit. In his analysis of African American families he proposes a typology of three ideological models—the cultural deviant, the cultural equivalent, and the cultural variant. The cultural variant model assumes that African Americans have distinctive family norms and values that set it apart from other family institutions in society and that the black kin network is a functional substitute for the two-parent family. This network serves functions usually associated with the nuclear family. In providing economic cooperation, childcare, and socialization it is particularly useful in adapting to poverty. Nobles (1978) introduces the African model that in several respects is a form of the cultural variant perspective. This perspective assumes that traits were transmitted by slaves brought from Africa to America and are manifested in the roles, norms, and values within the black family.

A current perspective that appears to be most promising in the study of African Americans is the holistic perspective. According to Hill (1993) the social and economic well being of African Americans can be enhanced based on a holistic approach. As a matter of fact this approach is not a current concept. W.E.B. DuBois introduced the concept as early as the late 1800s in his writing of *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), and *The Negro American Family* (1908). DuBois asserts, “A proper understanding of blacks in America could not be achieved without systematically assessing the influence of historical, cultural, social, economic, and political forces” (7). Unfortunately, Dubois’ recommendation to incorporate a holistic framework in
the analysis of African Americans has not been well received by mainstream contemporary social scientists. This comes as no surprise taking into consideration the historical legacy of African Americans in the United States and the implications of the holistic perspective.

The acceptance or rejection of the holistic perspective by mainstream social scientists does not imply that the conceptual framework is not a compelling model from which to study African Americans. According to Hill such a framework could be a guide to research and policy development related to African American families. Moreover it has the potential for bringing clarity to mainstream social scientists on the resiliency and adaptive characteristics of African Americans families. Hill states that the holistic approach places emphasis on five themes: diversity, dynamism, balance, solutions, and empiricism. It is essential to discuss each of these themes in order to fully appreciate the potential of this approach as a viable construct for the evaluation of African Americans.

The first theme is diversity. Hill asserts that there is much variation in black families. He contends that some research has made assumptions about the homogeneity of “underclass” values and lifestyles without empirical evidence (Murray 1984; Loury 1984; Lemann 1986). In contrast the research of other scholars documents much heterogeneity in values and life styles (Lewis 1967a, 1967b; Liebow 1967; Valentine 1968; Ladner 1971; Stack 1974, 1996). Hill argues that the deficit model seems too focused on the underclass therefore failing to examine other social classes. The holistic approach examines all classes, including the working-class, middle-class, and upper-class (Willie 1976, 1985; Danziger & Gottschalk 1986; Landry 1987).

...a basic tenet of the holistic paradigm is that effective policies for remedying the crisis among black families cannot be developed without sufficient knowledge of their structural, class, regional, religious/attitudinal, and behavioral diversity (Engram 1982).

The second theme is balance. Unlike the conventional or the deficit model, which concentrates only on the perceived weaknesses of the lower class family, this element focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of both the lower and middle
classes. According to Wilson (1978, 1987) balanced treatment of black families meant emphasizing the positive characteristics of the black middle class and stressing the pathology of the black lower class. Hill rejects this sort of balance treatment in favor of an assessment of strengths and weaknesses of both classes.

The third theme is dynamism. This aspect of the holistic perspective indicates that black families as well as white families are in a constant state of mobility. That mobility might be vertical, downward, or horizontal (Coe 1978; Duncan 1984; Bane 1986; Levy 1987). Traditional views of black families on welfare at a given point in time give the impression that recipients are forever on welfare and never experience upward mobility (Wilson 1978, 1987; Murray 1984; Loury 1984). As Hill states, “Social policies designed to reduce poverty and welfare dependency will not be effective if they are based on the erroneous premise that low-income families are static and monolithic” (12).

The fourth theme is solutions. The holistic model does not in any way downplay the challenges confronting black families; however it does emphasize the need for empirical studies in seeking solutions to these problems (Billingsley 1968; Engram 1982). According to Hill (1993) there has been an increase in research on well-functioning low-income and middle class black families (Cazenave 1979; Lewis & Looney 1982; McAdoo 1983; Willie 1985; Thompson 1986; Landry 1987). This research is significant in refuting the deficit perspective characterizing minorities and low-income person as pathogenic. It adds credibility to the adaptive argument that black families have coping behaviors, property, resources, support networks, and self-help techniques (Stack 1974, 1978, 1996; Hill 1993; Martin and Martin 1978; Taylor 1998; Jewell 1988; Staples, 1994).

The final theme is empiricism. This element is very important in helping to rid the stereotype of black families as pathological. It provides an opportunity as well as challenges for social scientists creatively to construct innovative conceptual frameworks and to design unique quantitative and qualitative methodologies that might yield useful insight into the nature of African American families. More importantly it would help dis-
ker if not settle the adaptation/deficit argument, perhaps forever.

**Kin Interaction and the Exchange of Mutual Aid Among African Americans**

There is much empirical evidence on kin interaction and the exchange of mutual aid among African Americans (Frazier 1932; 1939; Martin and Martin 1978; Stack 1972; Genovese 1974; Gutman 1976; Furstenburg 1975; Blassingame 1972). In addition, several studies document the pattern of strong family bonds among African Americans (Antonucci 1990; Bengton, Rosenthal, and Burton 1990; Hatch 1991; Hoyert 1991; Johnson and Barer 1990; Taylor and Chatters 1991; Taylor, Chatters, and Mays 1998; Hernandez and Myers 1993; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Tienda and Angel 1992; Staples 1994; McAdoo 1993, 1983, 1985; Billingsley 1988, 1992). According to Frazier (1932), the mutual aid system among African Americans is rooted within a larger cultural context evolving from African communities. And much of what is known about the extended African American family is based on ethnographic and historical research on African Americans (Martin and Martin 1978; Stack 1972; Genovese 1974; Gutman 1976; Furstenburg 1975; Blassingame 1972). Several other studies support the particular strength of family bonds among African Americans (Antonucci 1990; Bengton, Rosenthal, and Burton 1990; Hatch 1991; Hoyert 1991; Johnson and Barer 1990; Taylor and Chatters 1991; Taylor, Chatters, and Mays 1988; Hernandez and Myers 1993; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Tienda and Angel 1982; Staples 1994; McAdoo 1993, 1983, 1985; Billingsley 1988, 1992). An examination of the data shows that African American families have strong patterns of interaction and the exchange of goods and services. This research fits well with the solutions theme of the holistic perspective. Carol Stack (1972) offers a powerful argument that lower class blacks have adapted to poverty and the welfare system by a combination of flexible family patterns and strong kin networks performing many “nuclear family functions.” She defines the “family” as the smallest, organized, and durable network of kin. Kin interact daily and provide for the needs of children, ensuring their survival. The family network may
include several kin-based households. Any fluctuations within household composition do not significantly affect cooperative familial arrangements. The urban poor attempt to survive day by day with only a gleam of hope of overcoming poverty. The resources of a given residential family may not stretch from one month to the next. One way of surviving poverty is through swapping resources within kin networks. Stack found that "the most important form of distribution and exchange of the limited resources available to the poor are through trading, or what people call swapping"(33).

Stack argues that kin perform economic and socialization functions and that parenthood is scattered among kin. The urban poor have an intricate kinship network bound collectively through the exchange of goods and services and the obligation to give. The more goods and services exchanged, the more obligatory the network becomes. As one receives, one is obligated to give in return. The obligation to give is vital to the survival of the kin network. Although an obligation to give is important, an individual's reputation as an exchange partner is equally as important. The more a person gives, the more he obligates others to give. If one obligates a large number of individuals, he or she stands a better chance of receiving goods or services than one who limits his circle of friends.

Additional research findings accentuate similar patterns among kin. Aschenbrenner (1973) studied ten lower class black families in Chicago. Using interviews, more than fifty households were included in the data. Even though she does not present quantitative analysis of her findings, she found that her respondents described their kinship bonds as compatible, and that kin ties remained strong whether kin lived in nearby communities or in different states. And regardless of kin's social and economic status, kin ties remained unbroken. For example, little pressure was put on couples to marry because of the security offered by the extended households or matrifocal households. If individual family members relocated, they usually lived with relatives until they were able to get settled. Once established, they were expected to assist other kin who relocated into the community needing a helping hand. Rituals and celebrations are occasions for renewing kin ties and providing assistance. For example, funerals are significant occa-
sions in which relatives usually travel long distance to pay respect to the departed and to offer assistance particularly to the family of the deceased. Aschenbrenner (1973) describes a funeral as “a blending of somber ritual and lively sociability representing vividly the dual aspects of recognition of personal tragedy and renewing of relationships among the living (265).” These various functions of the kin network may add greatly to life’s meaning. McAdoo (1978) emphasizes the impact of kin interaction on socially mobile black families. Interviews were conducted using a sample of black families from both middle and working classes and those residing in urban and suburban areas in the District of Columbia and in the nearby town of Columbia. She found consistent levels of interaction between kin with no variation in families. Those in visiting distance claimed that “they enjoyed their interaction and indicated that they wished they had opportunity for more (775).” Two-thirds of all families felt it was easy for relatives to visit them and less than one-fourth felt they had some difficulty in visiting. Three-fourths felt it was easy to get in touch with relatives, with some claiming to have difficulty. Whereas Aschenbrenner’s (1973) research focused on lower class respondents, Tatum (1987) studied 10 middle class black families living in a white community. She states:

...9 out of 20 adults (45 percent) stated that such ties are relatively easy to maintain because they have parents and/or siblings living in the same county. Though most of the parents moved to the area in search of economic and/or educational opportunity, several had been influenced in their decision by “trailblazers,” family or friends who had already scouted out the area. For these individuals, kinship ties helped, rather than hindered, their mobility. For the others, even though at greater distances from their families, mobility has not required family cut-offs (90).

Mutran (1985) asks whether differences in kin aid between elderly blacks and whites are a matter of culture or socioeconomic location. The question is examined in regard to both giving and receiving aid. The types of aid received are aid when ill, running errands, advice, and receiving money or gifts. The types of aid given are taking care of children or grandchildren
when ill and offering advice. The independent variables are income, age, marital status, education, health, and respect or appreciation for kin over the generation. Using regression analysis, Mutran found that both giving and receiving aid are significantly higher for elderly blacks, even when income and education are controlled. The major effect of race on the giving of help is direct, but over half of the effect of race on receiving help is indirect, operating through education, income, health, marital status, and presence of children in the home. From these findings Mutran concludes that culture may account for black elders giving more aid, while the racial difference in receipt of aid is explained by socioeconomic factors and by need. Regression analysis shows women and higher-income respondents have a larger helper network. Older persons with children have larger helper network than older persons without children. Chatters, Taylor, and Neighbors (1989) studied the size of informal networks used during a serious personal problem. The sample is drawn from a national sample of black adults. They find that the most often used category of informal helpers during a serious problem is kin. Men have a greater likelihood of consulting brothers and fathers, while women more likely consult sisters. Men are less likely than women to utilize children of either sex (671). Ellison (1990) studied the relationship between kinship bonds and the subjective well-being of black adults. Using regression analysis, he finds that perceived closeness of kin ties has a positive effect on life satisfaction among elderly blacks. Similarly, Hughes and Thomas (1998) studied the subjective well-being of African Americans and report that the quality of life continues to be worse for African Americans, but evidence accumulated on several dimensions indicates that the subjective well-being of African Americans is equal to or better than for whites.

As for the exchange of mutual aid, three-generation households and localized kin networks are reported as being functional in the black lower class concerning the exchange of goods and services. Kin and three-generation households provide a variety of services to individuals, which support the adaptation argument. Research findings indicate that assistance from kin flows in two directions. First, parents provide both financial and social assistance to children during the early
years of their marriage. Subsequently, the younger generation provides financial and social support to older members of the kin network. Although the burden of providing support to the elderly has shifted somewhat from the family onto the government, kin still perform a crucial role. Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1991) examine black and white differences in intergenerational financial flow between parents and children after high school and beyond. Using multiple regression analysis, they find that black students receive significantly less income from parents for educational expenses than white students. Black-white differences in parental contributions are halved when differences between the two populations are controlled. Family income is significantly and positively related to the amount of income parents are able to contribute. Regression analysis indicates that when young adults make financial contributions to their parents, black-white differences remain significant (505). The more income young adults earn, the more they contribute toward their parents’ household expenses. The more income that parents have, the less income young adults contribute. After income effects are controlled, the effects of parental family structure are not significant. More recent research reveals similar findings.

The findings of Lee and Aytac’s (1998) research on intergenerational financial support among Caucasians, Africans Americans, and Latinos indicate that African American and Latino parents provide more to adult children with higher incomes and higher levels of education, suggesting stronger investment and exchange objectives. Furthermore African American and Latino parents are more likely than white parents to be concerned with the return on assistance, possibly in support of the well being of extended kin. Lee, Peek, and Coward (1998) studied race differences in filial responsibility expectations among older parents. Using bivariate analysis, they found that blacks have higher filial responsibility expectation than whites. They assert that some of this is attributed to aged black parents who might be less educated than whites, and that education is negatively related to expectations. After controlling for sociodemographic, health, and support factors, the effects of race remain. Similarly, Burr and Mutchler (1999) studied race and ethnic variation in norms of filial responsibility among eld-
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erly persons. Examining data drawn from the National Survey of Families and Households, they found that older African Americans and Hispanics are more likely than older non-Hispanic Whites to agree that each generation should provide coresidence assistance when needed. These generalizations are in line with Stack’s (1974,1996) research and imply a strong sense of filial responsibility. Correspondingly, Uttal (1999) studied thirty-one racially diverse employed African American and Mexican American mothers and found race and ethnic difference in the use of kin based care. The decision to use kin-based care is based not only on individual need but on how families with young children are embedded in the socioeconomic networks of the extended family. They note that black culture emphasizes informal support systems more than whites, and that formal support institutions viewed by whites as supportive might be view by blacks as exploitative. Therefore Blacks may feel a “cultural aversion” to formal services or less dependent on them because of their stronger informal networks.

The evidence suggests that frequency of interaction between kin and the exchange of mutual aid are significant for African Americans regardless of socioeconomic status. These patterns of interaction are adaptive responses to structural constraints. The evidence supports the idea that black American kinship is adaptive in the lower class, providing a fair segment of goods and services usually provided by nuclear families: making loans, cooking meals, giving clothing, providing housing, and child care. This network of kin may ease some of the role strain of solo parenting while contributing to the cohesion of the kin network.

Informal Adoption of African-American Children

In the past adoption agencies have not served non-whites because of regulations imposed on adoptive parents. The regulations for adopting a child require an adequate social and financial history of the adoptive parents; therefore poor blacks have had difficulty adopting children through agencies in part because of their low socioeconomic status. In the face of the failure of adoption agencies African Americans developed their own networks for informally keeping related children; however
the informal adoption of children is not a recent phenomenon. Johnson (1939) contends that during slavery, many children were estranged from their parents but were taken in by other families. Even after slavery the convention of informal adoption of children persisted. Johnson (1939) points out that informally adopted children are granted extraordinary status in their new-fangled families. This may compensate for their parents' absence. In addition many adopted children are pitied by their adopted parents, which may result in parents bestowing more affection on the child.

The informal adoption of the children of kin, or “child keeping,” appears to be even more frequent among lower class African Americans. Mitchell and Register (1984) found that after controlling for socioeconomic status and area of residence elderly blacks were more likely to take in grandchildren, nieces, or nephews than their white counterparts. Regardless of area of residence, blacks were more likely to take children into their homes (53). Furstenburg (1995) and Lempert (1999) show that family and kinship relations in the African American community are more likely to be behaviorally and functionally based, that is, you become a family member by acting like one, regardless of blood ties. Furstenburg (1995) studied fathering among African Americans in an inner city community and found a distinction between “fathers” and “daddies” that grants the sociological father an equal, if not an even more significant role than the biological father. Other researchers (Hairston & Williams 1989; Rompf 1993) indicate that patterns of informal adoptions and the acceptance of open adoptions are more frequent among African Americans than for whites. Additional researchers (Lovett-Tisdale 1996; Washington 1997; Jackson-White, Dozier, Oliver, & Gardner 1997) have explored factors that benefit the formation of African American adoptive families and found that the significance of community support and involvement in the adoption process is vital. Furthermore, Jackson-White and her colleague (1997) contend that the American child welfare system has failed to recognize and utilize the willingness of African Americans and the African American church in the adoption of children. If racial prejudice and discrimination and other aversive social conditions make life somewhat uncertain for African Americans, then informal
adoptions of children and strong community support are another adaptative strategy in support of the holistic perspective in the analysis of African Americans and the adaptation argument.

Conclusions

As stated elsewhere in this article, there have been many theoretical models constructed to study the African American family. Of these the holistic approach is the most recent and more plausible paradigm to guide research and policy development related to African American families (Hill 1993). This approach emphasizes the following themes: diversity, dynamism, balance, solutions, and empiricism. All of these are integrated to a greater or lesser extent in this article, especially the empiricism and diversity themes. The holistic approach is the foundation from which additional substantive conceptual frameworks might be initiated. This approach provides for a more thorough, and positive comprehensive analysis of the African American family as a culturally adaptive subsystem. An adaptive subsystem striving to survive within the American society whose core cultural values according to Robin Williams (1970) include racism and group superiority.

Furthermore this article empirically examines distinctive patterns of the African American family in support of the adaptation argument. These patterns include kin interaction and the exchange of mutual aid, and the informal adoption of children. Keep in mind that the adaptation and the deficit arguments are opposing systems of thought about the African American family. The "adaptation" argument holds that the kin network and extended families carry out many "nuclear family" functions, in addition to emphasizing the positive, cultural aspects of the African American family. In contrast the deficit argument assumes that African American behavioral patterns are pathological, especially in patterns of female-headed households where the socialization of children is viewed most negatively. As with any family the procreation and the rearing of children are significant functions not only for the continuation of the family and kinship network but also for the continued existence of society. Therefore the deficit model places much emphasis on the socialization of children, particularly African American
males. Gordon (1999) refers to Gibbs (1988) who contends that African American men and boys are “depicted as a homogenous, dysfunctional, alienated, and threatening subpopulation, which some have dubbed a threatened species.” He further asserts that the stereotype of “black males that dominates the popular media as well as the conceptualization that is generally advanced in the scholarly press is a picture of pathology bordering on hopelessness (ix). Whereas the deficit model views African American males reared in female-headed households as having no male role model, the adaptation model posits that the father or other males within and external to the household might assist not only in the socialization process, but in the socialization of identity for sons and daughters. According to Hill (1999) African Americans’ cultural heritage has fostered some degree of gender equality among African American sons and daughters; however research has been sparse. One reason for this is the gender roles of African Americans have been viewed as pathological (Hill 1999).

Hill states: “Culturally defined notions of the appropriate attitudes and behaviors for males and females shape parents’ expectations for their children and may even affect their perceptions of the parenting role” (104). Block (1983) studied sex role socialization and found that parents expect their sons to be “independent, self-reliant, highly educated, ambitious, hard-working, career oriented, intelligent and strong-willed” (134). Further research indicates that mothers view sons as more difficult to rear than daughters and that the mother of sons are more likely to believe that sons should work outside of the home (Downey, Jackson, and Powell 1994). Hill studied gender attitudes of a sample of 729 African-American and Euro-American parents. Overall she found a high level of support for gender equality among black and white parents; however black parents felt that gender would make their sons’ futures more difficult. She also found with less affluent and less educated black parents a tendency to emphasize happiness and self-esteem more for daughters than for sons and for affluent black parents to emphasize more respect and obedience for sons. As for the discipline of children all black parents emphasized the loss of privileges for sons more than for daughters. This pattern is more prevalent among affluent and educated black parents.
who are in a better social class position to make available more privileges and thus are capable of decreasing privileges to their children.

Although these data show similarities and variation by race and class in sex role socialization, black masculinity of African American youth cannot be omitted a crucial element in the socialization process. The vital question is: how do parents or kin socialize their sons to be black in American society as well as to acquire a masculine sense of self? Charles Horton Cooley (1962) contends that what we think of ourselves is linked to how we think others perceive us. In other words if African American males think that others see them in a certain manner, it is likely they will think of themselves as such. And from most indications, especially in the press, African American males are not viewed positively. In Nurturing Young Black Males: Programs that Work, Robert Minch (1998) states:

Young black boys need more. Historically, black males have had a difficult time in the United States. They have not been granted traditional masculine privilege or power. Social, cultural, and economic forces manifested in racism and oppression throughout American history have combined to keep black men from assuming traditionally accepted masculine roles. Black boys coming of age in neighborhoods surrounded by violence and poverty face insurmountable odds. Often this stressful and difficult environment is further compounded by educators with the predetermined negative views about black male youth and their learning potential (8).

Corbin and Pruitt (1999) state that the African American male identity can be shaped by a number of factors including ethnic influence, role models, and peer groups. Undoubtedly this means the influence of African American culture and role models in nuclear, extended families and the kin network. They contend that African American males compensate for insecurity in a Eurocentric society by redefining manhood. “For the most part this includes sexual promiscuity, machismo, risk taking and aggressive social skills” (72). Harris and Majors (1993) remarked that many of the academic problems of African Americans males are related to their rejection of academic
traits as European. The consequences of this rejection might include poor academic performance or pursuing other activities that may or may not be in their best interest. Taking into account the status of African American males, parents in need of mentors who would enhance the socialization process might enroll their sons in nurturing programs that serve young black males. More than seventy local and national nurturing programs through the Urban Institute are available throughout the United States for young African American males. Such efforts to assist African American young males embody the solution theme of the holistic perspective.

The role of the unmarried mother is not observed as pathological according to the adaptation argument. Instead, as Ladner (1971) points out, if an unmarried woman gets pregnant, she is likely to carry the pregnancy to full term and live off welfare. An unmarried mother living off welfare temporarily is no indication of that becoming a permanent lifestyle. Furthermore becoming a mother is viewed as a step up in status rather than an act of deviance. From this perspective the unmarried mother is looked at as a positive role model, at least in her capacity to bear children and receive public support in the face of economic hard times and the sex ratio imbalance. The unmarried mother may obligate herself to others in the kin network for child keeping during a crisis or hardship or overseeing children’s play. These examples and others revealed before young girls help to develop within them a sense of value toward motherhood and reinforce the notion of “obligation” to the kin network. These patterns do not suggest pathological behavioral on behalf of the unmarried woman but rather show that non-marital birth is appreciated as a cultural element.

The adaptation argument views the role performance of single parent mothers in African American families as it would any mother, single or married. Some single mothers may be overloaded with obligations and suffer role strain. The same could be generalized about mothers in two-parent families. Thus many single-parent mothers may move in with extended kin where obligations are shared by older sons and daughters, grandmothers, grandfathers, and other adults. These same persons may provide socialization, discipline, and other care giving activities. These patterns of interaction ease some of the
strain of a single parent mother and perhaps reduce her stress level. The large number of adult members counterbalances inadequate maternal supervision of children viewed by the deficit perspective, making the supervision of children less problematic. If a single parent mother is employed, very young children may be left with a resident grandparent who supervises their daily activities such as feeding, playtime, and other social activities while the mother works. The mother may in return assist with the payment of rent or house payments. Children may be taught domestic or social skills by a grandmother, grandfather, or an uncle. Kin may fully cooperate in childcare activities during times when children do not live with kin. Not only adults but also older boys and girls may be given the role of caretakers for young children. If a mother has several children and is employed, the oldest daughter or son becomes the leader of the “children’s gang” which is composed of younger brothers and sisters. The leader of the children’s gang cooks and prepares meals, supervises playtime, and safeguards the children from harm. Often children of non-residential kin are embodied in the children’s gang. Not all single-mothers have children old enough to care for younger ones. There may be a “family life cycle” pattern in which single mothers receive help at some point from their parents, from other kin, or from older children. (Antonucci 1990; Bengton, Rosenthal, and Burton 1990; Hatch 1991; Hoyert 1991; Johnson and Barer 1990; Taylor and Chatters 1991; Taylor, Chatters, and Mays 1988; Hernandez and Myers 1993; Rossi and Rossi 1990; Tienda and Angel 1982; Hill 1999).

In addressing frequent poverty of female-headed households the adaptation model asserts that kin swapping or exchanging goods and services alleviate poverty in single parent households and among kin. The larger the kin network the greater the potential for the exchange of goods and services. The exchange of aid among black families is a pattern of adaptation rather than deficiency and is viewed as a common pattern among African Americans. Because of these exchanges, kin are the most utilized category of informal helpers. Women and persons of higher income have the larger helper network. As individuals give they obligate others to give in return. The exchange is more promising if individuals have a reputation as
a good exchange partner. The adaptation model argues that kin may assist and take over the economic function and child-rearing functions of the "traditional" family among the poor. According to Hatchett and Jackson (1993), many researchers contend that the African American extended kin network is both an adaptive response to situational constraints in America (Aschenbrenner 1973; Stack 1972, 1996; Hill 1971; Billingsley 1968/1988; 1992) and an element of West African culture (Herskovits 1941; Nobles 1974; Sudarkasa 1980). The adaptation model has different evaluations and different empirical assertions of the African American family and kinship. It argues that the deficit model leaves out important "domestic structures"—the kin network. The adaptation/deficit argument is not a settled issue. Perhaps it will never be. However the empirical evidence presented in this article is a clear indication that the functionality of the African American family in the United States has been one of adaptation in response to numerous ills including slavery, Jim Crowism, and de jure segregation.

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Florida Seminoles represent a unique "response culture" among Southeastern Native Americans. An amalgamation of tribes, their history has been marked by their adaptability in the face of massive cultural change. Today the Seminoles are a major force in Florida’s economy and politics. The public face they present has largely been of their own making throughout their history, and now it is more consciously so.

Indians lacked certain or all aspects of white civilization and could be viewed as bad or good depending upon the observer’s feelings about his own society and the use to which he wanted to put the image. In line with this possibility, commentators upon the history of white imagery of the Indian have found two fundamental but contradictory conceptions of Indian culture (Berkhofer 1978:27-28).

To even the most casual of observers, it is apparent that the cultures of Native America are rich and diverse, adapted as they are to ecosystem, history, and contact with others, to
name but a few catalysts. It would be difficult to point out another indigenous group whose culture has been as creative in its response to these elements as has the Florida Seminole. Throughout much of its existence as a culture (separate from its many ancestral components) the public image of the Seminole has been structured by outsiders though. It has largely been in the 20th century, and as a response to tourism, that the Seminole of Florida have consciously constructed the public image they wish to project.

**History**

Unique among indigenous Americans, the Seminole and their kin, the Miccosukke, are a true “response culture.” That is, although they draw genetically from ancestors representing nearly a hundred tribes, what is today recognized as “Seminole” (as a lifeway) is the result of numerous adaptations made to changing environments, both physical and social. Although they descend from many people not native to the Florida peninsula, they are distinctly a culture born in this subtropical land.

The encroachment of Euro-Americans in the Southeast in the colonial period increased tensions with the Natives living there. In the coastal marshlands of the Carolinas and Georgia small groups of people speaking related Muscogulgee languages were displaced, died from war and contagion, and were generally disrupted culturally. These groups, including such people as the Guale, Yamassee, Yuchi, and members of the “Creek Confederacy,” responded in a variety of ways. Some resisted militarily, while others withdrew west, hoping to avoid the whites while still surviving their onslaught (Kersey 1975; Kersey and Bannan 1995, 193-212).

As the British colonies transformed into the United States wholesale settlement in the trans-Appalachians began. With the Mississippi River running through the heart of the land of the western “Creeks” they already had had prolonged exposure to the French, Spanish, and British, but the Americans were different; the Americans wanted their land and wanted the Natives “removed” to a far-off land west of the great river. When the Americans fought their English cousins in 1812, they sought alliance with the Muscogeans and the Cherokee. The
latter accepted the call, while most of the former either sided with the British or tried to remain neutral. The American victory would prove costly to the Natives of both sides (Covington 1993; Garbarino 1986).

This fight between the whites had two enduring negative effects on the Muscogee: it catapulted the “hero” of the Battle of New Orleans, Andrew Jackson, into the national spotlight from where he would go on to enforce Indian “removal” with his election to the presidency; it also drove a wedge into the “Creek Confederacy,” resulting in a long civil war, the “Red Stick War.” While militant “red sticks” fought pacifist “white sticks,” a third faction of the Muscogee simply walked away from the conflict. This third group, seeking distance from both their kin and the Americans, crossed the international border into Florida. Although Florida was divided into British and Spanish sectors, Spanish influence was still present in British West Florida. In Spanish, those Indians who “ran” away from the Red Stick War were “cimarrones,” runaways. Without a phonic equivalent of the Spanish double-r sound, the Natives approximated the term as best they could, finally settling on “Siminoli,” and later “Seminole” (Garbarino 1986; Covington 1993; Kersey and Bannan 1995).

Seminole recalcitrance to engage in regular contact with whites was therefore a result of a long history of being on the losing end of the proposition when Euro-Americans entered an area. The West Florida Seminole moved east, out of the panhandle, toward the more sparsely populated peninsula and northern savannah. Along the way they encountered the small remnants of Florida’s truly indigenous people, groups such as the Apalachee, Timucuan, Calusa, and others. Particularly on the northern savannah (present day Alachua County and its environs), they also met up with “cousins,” people like the Oconee and remnant Yamassee, themselves fleeing the Macon Plateau in advance of massive white settlement. Intermarrying, in both the literal and cultural sense, the West Florida Seminole incorporated the last of Florida’s first inhabitants, as well as their relatives, frequently called “Miccosukee,” a reference to their major settlement near present day Gainesville. Add to the mix African and African-American slaves escaping across the international line into Spanish
Florida, and the resulting cultural amalgam became the "Florida Seminole" (Covington 1993; Kersey 1996; Kersey 1975; West 1998).

From this nativity in the latter days of the 17th century, through the First (1817-1818), Second (1835-1842), and Third (1855-1858) Seminole Wars, this uniquely Floridian group was viewed largely through the American lens. They were portrayed as a danger to those (whites) brave enough to emigrate to Florida as well as an economic threat to the slave-based Southern society lurking just north of Florida (indeed, even after the U.S. acquired Florida, slave lore continued to point the way to a safe haven among the Seminole and Miccosukee in Florida).

The key event in the creation of this image of the Seminole as a dangerous, savage people was the onset of the Second Seminole War. In 1830 Congress had passed the Indian Removal Act, and it meant that Florida Native Americans were to be compelled to leave the state if they would not voluntarily leave. Already in the preceding decades the Seminole had made treaties and land sessions hoping to be left alone in the land they now considered home. Why, they reasoned, could the Americans not leave them alone in the state's swampy interior, a place so remote and hostile to white sensibilities? Of course the answer was that the fever of Manifest Destiny could countenance no holdouts, for if the Florida Indians stayed, surely others would protest and resist their own exile.

When a party of Seminole agreed to travel to "Indian Territory" to view the place, they believed they were being dealt with honestly. At Fort Gibson, Arkansas, they were tricked into signing a paper, having been told it was a voucher to get the federal government to cover their expenses; it was not. It was a "removal treaty." Upon their return to Florida, crestfallen and fearful for their people's future, the treaty party related the latest American subterfuge. Over the next three years, the U.S. tried to force the Seminole into negotiations for their exile, a mostly unsuccessful business, since the Seminole could rarely be coaxed from their inaccessible homes. When finally a parlay was arranged, the Americans encountered the first Seminole "media star," Osceola (Covington 1993; Garbarino 1986; Kersey 1996, 1975).
Even though the Seminole were a people whose culture was in a near constant state of flux in these days, they still retained many traditions from their ancestral tribes. Among these was a very specific method for determining chieftainships, a system based upon wisdom, age, and often war honors. As this group parlayed with the Americans at Payne’s Prairie (Alachua County), a young man decidedly not recognized as a chief of any type made a statement that would thrust him into the national psyche, creating Americans’ first clear image of the Seminole Indians. His name was “Asi-Yahola,” “Black Drink Crier,” a name Americans transliterated as “Osceola.” Osceola was that most unwieldy of national figures; he was at once seen as the embodiment of the implacably cruel and dangerous Indian savage and conversely as a hale enemy well met, one who was paid a measure of respect (Berkhofer 1978; Kersey 1996, 1989, 1975).

What had so indelibly burnt Osceola into the American sensibility? When faced with the confirming document of removal, the treaty which would doom his people to a long walk to cultural oblivion, he had stabbed his hunting knife into the parchment declaring “This is the only treaty I will ever make with the white man,” or dramatic words to that effect (Covington 1993:73). Today we can only imagine the effect this had when presented in the tabloids of the North and East, perhaps analogous to such famous phrases as FDR’s post-Pearl Harbor speech referring to the attack as “a day that will live in infamy.” Osceola’s words (or those attributed to him through a translator) were as clear a declaration of war but a declaration of a war against America. It must have colored the way in which Americans viewed the Seminole image.

A scant two decades before (1818) Creek and Seminole agent and attorney Alexander Arbuthnot had depicted his “clients” in the commonly bucolic “Noble Savage” mold:

These men are children of nature; leave them in their forests to till their fields and hunt the stag, and graze their cattle, their ideas will extend no further; (Arbuthnot’s journal cited in Covington 1993, 40)

By Osceola’s 1835 call to arms, few Americans held such an innocuous image of the Seminole. They believed the previous years had ushered in a phase in which the Seminole had
grown lazy on government largesse. Indeed in 1828 Florida territorial governor William Duval (for whom the county is named) called them “wanton and insolent” (Covington 1993:61), a curious choice of words given that the government rations were actually payment for Seminole lands. Regardless, America in 1835 was ready to cast the Seminoles, supposedly under the unanimously approved war leadership of Osceola, as ingrates, bloodthirsty and prepared to engage in the wholesale slaughter of blameless settlers (Covington 1993; Kersey 1975).

As with most media-created phenomena, Osceola couldn’t live up to the indestructibility Americans believed he possessed. Through fraud, he was enticed to his own capture from whence he and his kin (not charged with any crime) were sent to the military prison at Ft. Moultrie, S.C. From what media portrayed then and what U.S. history books have perpetuated, America learned that the fearsome enemy, both hated and admired, died there, unable to accept the shame of defeat and imprisonment. Most Florida schoolchildren are still not told that Osceola died from an untreated case of tonsilitis, an act of intentional malpractice. The physician, Dr. Weedon, was the brother-in-law of the late Wiley Thompson, a military commander Osceola had killed during the Second Seminole War. The Army didn’t view as a conflict-of-interest assigning this grieving relative to attend Osceola, and Weedon’s studied indifference cost Osceola his life. The final indignity, that Weedon decapitated the Seminole warrior and kept his head as a grotesque souvenir, is likewise rarely a part of official U.S. history books (Kersey 1975).

Though another “Seminole war” lay ahead for Florida’s Natives, by 1842, the common public image was that the Seminole were no longer dangerous. True, a few had been removed to Indian Territory, many had been killed, and some had withdrawn into the Everglades, beyond the reach of even the most ardent army. While America began to turn its attention to the growing chasm between pro- and anti-slavery factions, stalwart Seminoles in Florida were attempting to become as invisible as possible to evade removal. It was then with some surprise that America woke up to another Seminole war in 1855. In the previous decade Governor William Moseley had
petitioned President Polk, "The Indians must be removed peacefully if they can, forcibly if they must" (Covington 1993:112). Indeed, the Florida public had been kept in foment, if such portrayals as the following excerpt from the St. Augustine Ancient City (newspaper) of June 10, 1852, is representative:

Last fall, one thousand five hundred troops were sent here against Indians to coax one hundred thirty assassins to give up five of their number and used two months to deliberate. Nine months time was wasted. Millions of dollars [were used] to bribe 70-80 old men, women and children and three murderers out of Florida. The murderers are set free in the west. We can expect nothing from a Federal government committed to peaceful removal and [look] only to our state legislature. Florida Indians should be outlawed and [a] reward [offered] of $1,000 for [a] man dead or alive and $500 for [a] live woman and child. Thus, people could still hunt them...soldiers not worth $7 per month. We need thousands of hunters, (Covington, 1993, 121-2).

At this juncture a peculiar dichotomy developed. Outside Florida the remembrance of Osceola as a respectable (but doomed) warrior transformed public opinion toward the Seminole. As if a gift wafting from his grave Osceola's national image had bequeathed to the Seminole an intangible romance. Patsy West (1998) refers to it as a commodity called "unconquered" (26,31). Of course within the state the fact that Seminoles remained "at large" (as Floridians viewed it, seeing the Indians as federal fugitives) was not cast in the same romantic light. The Seminoles were competitors for land, water, game, just as later they would be competitors for tourist and gambling dollars. (Kersey 1996, 1970, 1975; West 1998).

The Third Seminole War was almost a non-event, at least as seen by the national audience. In fact with the Civil War, Reconstruction, and Manifest Destiny-driven westward migration the remaining years of the 19th century saw little public attention paid to the Florida Seminole (although the role of the Oklahoma Seminole in the Civil War as supporters of the Confederacy garnered them much negative publicity, and they
"paid" land reparations). In fact it would take a war of another kind to rivet America's attention on the Florida Seminoles again. This war would involve the Florida Land Boom and the battle for tourist dollars (West 1998, 1981, 1987, 1996).

During America's Gilded Age, robber barons of industry, men who were fabulously wealthy in an era before income taxes, were in search of new playgrounds. Their social seasons in residence in New York City or Newport, RI, could be chilly affairs, and they set their sights on warmer climes. With the initiative of railroad magnates Henry Flagler and Henry Plant, the east and west coasts of Florida (respectively) were coming under rail lines, and resorts were being built at various points of disembarkation. Furthest south along the east coast was the golden triangle of Palm Beach/Miami/Coral Gables. Soon it became de rigueur to "winter in Miami," and a riot of real estate speculation ensued. In the early 1920s, years before the fall of the stock market, but in the post-WWI economic boom, the growing allure of Florida drew two types of visitors: wealthy socialites who bought homes and modestly well-off folks who merely vacationed in the Sunshine State. It was this second group that would prove crucial to the development of a Seminole constructed public image.

Gold Coast millionaires might occasionally venture into the nascent tourist venues of Greater Miami, but it was the middle class visitors who flocked to such innovative attractions as Coppinger's Tropical Gardens and Musa Isle. These sites combined the exotic foliage of South Florida with the equally exotic fauna, including tropical birds, snakes, and alligators—oh, and Seminoles. By now used to viewing Indians as conquered museum pieces, tourists saw no irony in grouping these indigenous humans with zoo fare (West 1998, 1981, 1987, 1996).

It was the bane of the existence of "friends" of the Indians that these tourist "camps" operated. Indian agents, school teachers, missionaries, social workers, politicians, and wealthy matrons who took on the "saving" of the Indians as a hobby, all deplored Coppinger's, Musa Isle, and a host of other such attractions. As they saw it, Seminoles were lured to these places with promises of easy money, little hard work, and free lodging. None of the preceding elements were viewed as pre-
Kasee-Seminole Image

Curiously it was just this advent of tourist attractions that led the way to the Seminole seizing the reins of crafting their public persona. Largely due to the research efforts of Patsy West, this era is now seen as a very positive development in Seminole sovereignty. The operators of places like Coppinger's and Musa Isle saw the Seminoles as equals although also as employees. They generally paid them fairly for their residence at the attractions and were keen judges of who to approach among the Seminole to act as "headmen." They evidenced a willingness to incorporate Seminole cultural aspects in both the commercial depictions and the behind-the-scenes relationships with their "workers." Traditional religious rites, tribal jurisprudence, and historic alliances and divisions were taken in stride (Downs 1981; West 1998).

Not surprisingly then the attraction operators were also quick to see that, while culturally traditional, the tourist camp Seminole were innovators. These businessmen did not stoop to depicting their co-workers as "children of nature" nor as throwbacks to an earlier age. The tourist camp Seminoles liked their phonographs, occasional shopping trips to Miami department stores, and not a small measure of socializing with non-Indians. They became vocal opponents of the so-called "friends" of the Indians, pointing out that the tourist camp workers saw themselves as paid professional actors, not seeing an ounce of degradation in the transaction. They were savvy in recognizing that for some of the so-called "do-gooders" at least trying to keep the Seminole "innocent" and isolated was a pretty self-interested matter. Of course they readily admitted the self-interest they indulged in, raking in tourist dollars, but also sharing the bounty with the Indians (Downs 1981; West 1998, 1981, 1987, 1996).

While some of these tourist attraction purveyors may have been but a notch above snake oil salesmen, they also didn't harbor prejudice toward Seminoles "making it" in the tourist
trade. An early example is that of Willie Willie, who purchased Musa Isle, becoming the first Seminole to own a tourist camp, a distinction he held singularly until some “Tamiami Trail Seminoles” opened small roadside attractions in the 1930s. Willie became a millionaire (in 1920s money!), married a white woman, bought a luxury car, and became quite a clothes horse, even doing some modeling of fine menswear for Burdine’s department store in Miami. While some of the more stalwart Everglades traditionalists may have seen him as a “sell-out,” he was a role model for the tourist camp Indians. He cut an interesting public figure as well, this in a Miami with strict segregationist laws and mores; he was seated at fine restaurants and feted at mansions, his white wife by his side (West 1998).

Willie Willie is the first example of a Seminole consciously honing a public persona in the 20th century, at least “public” in the sense of projecting a crafted image to non-Indians. Many tourist camp Seminoles followed suit, with perhaps the next most accomplished image-maker being Jack Tiger Tail. Tiger Tail was a camp performer and an alligator wrestling, a virtual prerequisite for tourist fame among Seminole men. He was so compelling a figure that his likeness was used in the official seal of the new City of Hialeah, a likeness that was then adopted for a larger-than-life billboard advertisement for the town. He was mentioned in newspaper and magazine stories, photographed by the press and tourists alike, and made a local celebrity of sorts. In fact when Jack Tiger Tail came to an inglorious end, executed under tribal jurisdiction for adultery, the public wasn’t prepared to hear ill of their “star.” A white man was tried for the murder, a man known for illegally purchasing (federally protected) migratory bird plumes from the Seminoles, often paying them in rotgut liquor. Adroit Seminole men participated in the trial, giving eloquent testimony but never mentioning that everyone in the village knew who had killed Tiger Tail and why. It would take decades before white Miamians would hear the truth, and even then they resented the fact that the pristine image of Tiger Tail had been sullied with mundane facts (West 1998).

Willie Willie also met a sad end. Swindled out of ownership of Musa Isle, he died impoverished of tuberculosis. He was not
so publicly mourned though. For one matter he had long been out of the public eye when he succumbed to t.b.; for another his flaunting of social convention for people of color may have been just a bit too much for Miamians to embrace him as they had Jack Tiger Tail. After the era of Willie and Tiger Tail, it would be five decades before another Seminole would take center stage, actively creating a public image, both for himself and for his people (Downs 1981; West 1998, 1981, 1987, 1996).

From the Great Depression through the post-WWII era, tourist camps dwindled. They were largely seasonal attractions, and with poverty and gasoline rationing there were simply not enough tourists to make the camps going concerns. By the 1950s, though, America was again yielding the treasures of a boom economy, and affordable cars made a Florida vacation an attainable dream for the middle-class. The tourist attractions opened their doors again, joined as they were by many newer, smaller roadside Seminole camps on Tamiami Trail and Alligator Alley. Again Seminoles were in demand as paid performers, and this is precisely how they saw themselves. While government officials, teachers, and missionaries still bemoaned the practice as demeaning, and while many, if not most, of the paying tourists thought the Seminoles lived in abject poverty virtually “begging” for a living, the Indians themselves were proud of their efforts and pleased for the opportunity. A camp family might make enough money in a few months’ worth of accepting tips for photos or alligator wrestling (as well as the sale of their crafts) to see them through the off-season comfortably. Nothing the Bureau of Indian Affairs had to offer was that attractive; besides, the making of crafts and the “play-acting” of their daily chores for tourists’ eyes was a way of keeping these cultural elements alive, while still introducing them to the market economy (Downs 1981; West 1998, 1996; Kersey and Bannan 1995; Kersey 1996, 1989, 1970).

When Patsy West pulled together twenty years of research for her 1998 work, *The Enduring Seminoles: From Alligator Wrestling to Ecotourism*, she noted that she found not one Seminole or Miccosukee family that hadn’t had family members involved in the tourist camps whether the attractions were owned by non-Indians or by individual Seminole families or the
Likewise she found no one who wholly dismissed the experience as negative; indeed, many were quite nostalgic about their days as “performers” (xv).

While tourism is Florida’s major industry, it alone cannot be expected to support a modern Native nation, nor can it provide the social or economic impetus to diversify and remain economically sound. Therefore tribal council members in the post recognition phase (after 1957 for the Seminole, 1961 for the Miccosukee) were always on the lookout for economic opportunity, carefully cultivating the tribe’s public image to aid in this effort. They emphasized the Seminole quest for formal education and the tax advantages for companies that set up shop on the federal reservations. Sadly most of these ventures failed to pay off for the Indians, as industries wouldn’t live up to their promises to hire Seminoles for many of the jobs in these plants. When the reality of the transportation problems faced in the Everglades dawned on these businesses, most left. Still the Seminoles persisted in presenting themselves to industry as attentive, skilled workers, tax-break landlords, and brokers of a unique international trade status.

Truthful as this depiction may be, it failed to make the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. an attractive proposition to big business (the tribe is governed by a council, but business is conducted by a corporation!) The idea had long been held that the tribe needed to make its own “big business,” but how to go about that seemed to elude them, that is, until the political tenure of a man sometimes called “the second Osceola,” James Billie.

Chairman Billie is nothing if not a flamboyant public persona. It’s rare to see a newspaper or magazine article about him that doesn’t append the term “flamboyant” to his name like a formal title. Floridians, Native and non-Native, have had to choose sides about this dynamo, as there appears to be no middle ground; people either love or hate him. He is well aware of this dichotomy and equally well aware that his ability to rivet media attention is what has “bought” a public stage for his people. He makes no apologies for his high profile and takes no pains to hide the “rougher” portions of the image.

Born in a tourist camp, James Billie seemed destined to be
a Seminole showman of some sort. He was of mixed ancestry, and grew up in the mixed culture milieu of a tourist attraction. After early years that included stints in Vietnam and as an alligator wrestler, Billie finally came to the fore in Seminole politics. Beginning his first term as Tribal Chairman in 1978, he remains in that job in 2001, evidence that his people approve of the work he has done (West 1998).

Although his predecessor, Chairman Tommie, actually initiated the modern era of Seminole economics with his efforts to enter into a pact with casino managers to start a Seminole gaming hall, it was Billie who followed through on the dormant pact. He also “tribalized” the ownership of the first Seminole smokeshops in Florida, fighting federal and state court cases along the way. The effect of these lawsuits and federal cases was contemporary High Court re-approval of early 19th century decisions that Indian nations retained aboriginal rights and sovereignty. In the midst of these high profile legal battles, Chairman James Billie became a national figure, and the public image of the Seminoles as a fully modern, progressive, corporate-styled tribe was cemented (West 1998).

Gaming is a tricky issue in “Indian Country.” Many Natives deplore it, feeling it preys on people’s weaknesses and that it runs counter to cultural tradition. Looking back historically, we can see that many, if not most, indigenous nations had forms of gambling and these were accepted, fully-integrated elements of culture. Smokeshops are less controversial, perhaps because it is more readily acknowledged by contemporary Natives that smoking has long been part of indigenous cultures. Still, outside “Indian Country,” the Seminoles are seen as consummate purveyors of vice-for-profit, supposedly wealthy pashas of bingo and no-tax cigarettes.

Interestingly for a thorough understanding of this public perception, it must be remembered that Florida is a state without personal income tax. The tax base of Florida consists of Property Tax (which is not paid on federal reservation or trust land or buildings), Sales Tax (which is not collected on smokeshop goods), and Luxury Tax, such as on tourist-related purchases of goods and services (not paid on stays at tribally-owned lodgings, purchases from reservation-based restaurants, or from gift shops). Given this information, the Seminole
are re-cast as “villains,” again competitors for tourist dollars, much as they were in the 1920s. In much of the Florida press this image of the Seminole as aggressive competitors with unfair business advantage is cultivated, and the controversial Billie’s persona is extrapolated as a tribal character. Not a state election year passes without petitions being circulated to restrict Seminole gaming and other sources of revenue, items to be offered as referenda in ignorance of the federal nature of the laws governing the tribe. This rush to “expose” the aggressive, underhanded nature attributed to the Seminole reached its apex in recent events sometimes called the “Fourth Seminole War.”

Between December 19 and 21, 1997, the well-respected daily, the *St. Petersburg Times* ran a three article exposé of the Seminoles. Prior to the series publicity was already brewing about it so contentious were the events surrounding the research and writing of the articles. Drawn into the fray were the principals (the tribe and the newspaper), the Poynter Institute on Ethics in Journalism, the Tampa Bay local “free press” tabloid, *The Weekly Planet*, the Journalism department of the state’s flagship university, and countless media outlets around the state and the nation.

The crux of the controversy appears to have been a pre-conceived intent by the authors, Brad Goldstein and Jeff Testerman, to find evidence supporting a public supposition of tribal corruption and proof that such avarice was a result of Seminole economics. Strangely the original impetus for the articles had been a plan to look into billing irregularities within the Indian Health Service structure among the Seminole. While such information, if uncovered, would hardly be news in “Indian Country” (whether by dishonest intent or mishandled paperwork), the research quickly took a nefarious turn. In seeking to write an exposé worthy of Woodward and Bernstein, the authors (it was later proven by informant testimony) attempted to coerce a tribal health worker to steal confidential patient records to support their contention. The turn away from journalistic ethics escalated as the story idea shifted to a clandestine effort to prove widespread fraud and nepotism in the tribal government.

Goldstein and Testerman, both hired as free-lance writers
by the *Times* for the sole purpose of this series, began a cam­
paign of sending out unsigned, incendiary letters to tribal mem­
bers. The letters solicited stories of tribal government malfe­
sance and favoritism but did so couched in the terms of stating
dishonesty as a proven fact, goading recipients to confirm
these explicitly stated allegations. Word of the letters soon
spread outside the Seminole nation, and long before the *Times*
exposé could run other media were printing exposés of the
exposé! Copies of the notorious letter were reprinted in the
Seminole Tribune, and a flurry of editorials, articles, and
“Letters to the Editor” followed. The *Tribune* clearly took the
ethical high road avoiding the hyperbole and sensationalism of
Goldstein and Testerman. In a stunning about-face, the *St.
Petersburg Times* announced the writers had been fired and
their journalistic methods, if not their ethics, were publicly dis­
avowed.

The *Times* had little choice by this stage. Copies of the
articles (in original form) and research notes, with all identify­
ing information removed, had been forwarded to the
Journalism Department of the University of Florida
(Gainesville) and the St. Petersburg-based Poynter Institute on
Ethics in Journalism. UF’s journalism faculty (several of whom
were enlisted to review the material) reported on the poor qual­
ity of research done as well as the blatantly unethical manner
in which information had been solicited from informants.
Without knowing the source or intended outlet for the work,
they concluded that such would not be tolerated from first-year
journalism students.

The Poynter Institute’s remarks were equally scathing,
deploring the methods and preconceived motives. This analy­
sis was a little more difficult for the *Times* to accept in the pub­
lic arena; the Poynter Institute was founded by the Poynter
family who owns the *Times* and who fund the Institute to act as
an educational arm and arbiter of journalistic ethics for the
unschooled public! Perhaps understandably by the time the
December, 1997, articles ran, they had been edited to remove
much of the questionable material. By no means did the
Seminoles come off as blameless victims in the printed ver­
sions. There was still plenty of vilifying of James Billie and ref­
ences to how economically aggressive the tribe supposedly
is, but all the assumedly litigable material had been excised.

The "Fourth Seminole War" in many ways replayed earlier themes of the constructing of Seminole image. Goldstein and Testerman sought to enlighten naive liberals that the Seminole were no longer "Indian enough" because they were now successful in the market economy. As Office of Indian Affairs applied anthropologist Gene Stirling had decried in his 1936 Report on the Seminole Indians in Florida, "The Seminoles are still too primitive to be in constant contact with a resort city like Miami without it doing them immeasurable harm" (cited in West 1998, 100-101). Perhaps, as Margot Ammidown noted in Florida Anthropologist (1981), the reality was the white man's fear that the Seminoles would learn the game of American economics too well, beating the white man at this game. The opportunities that have presented themselves to the now image-conscious Seminoles are the reward for learning the game and carefully constructing the public image of being a winning team.

Works Cited


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These biographical profiles of well-known and not so well-known African Americans are presented from an Afrocentric perspective. At least one essay is about a South African Black, "Bessie Head: The Idealist" by Owen G. Mordaunt. Drawing from the writings of Maulana Karenga, Conyers sets forth the Afrocentric framework as presented in this anthology:

The Afro-American national community is in fact a unity-in-itself, a community of people with a common and distinguishing history (kinship in time and space; a common and distinguishing culture (kinship in life changes and activities); and a common and distinguishing collective self-consciousness...(10).

The African Diaspora is at the same time a complex cultural mix drawn by circumstances across several continents and over a wide historical time frame.

Conyers’ essay, “Maulana Karenga and Phenomenology—An Intellectual Study,” seems to set the tone for the other authors’ selections. Among the African Americans profiled are Toni Morrison, Daniel "Chappie" James, and Richard Allen,
founder and bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church. One may question to what extent the other contributors embrace the Afrocentric framework assuming there is even a loose consensus on Afrocentrism or Eurocentrism for that matter. Setting aside the matter of that broad subject, this reviewer found the following selections highly informative: Calvin McClinton's "Vinnette Carroll: African American Director and Playwright"; Gloria T. Randle's "Ourlaw Women and Toni Morrison's Communities"; and Owen G. Mordaunt's "Bessie Head-The Idealist." The line between art and politics always has presented a myriad of issues for analysis. McClinton and Randle both treat this topic. Mordaunt focuses on one ideological approach to Pan-Africanism.

In talking about Carroll's career as a director and playwright McClinton observes

Carroll believed in three basic fundamentals: 1) the total picture, one that is perfect in design and execution; 2) the total artist, the performer who can present ideas physically, intellectually, and artistically through dance, music, and poetry; and 3) the total theatrical experience, which not only seeks to entertain but to inform, inspire, and elevate the human spirit (25).

Obviously political events serve as only one facet of the human experience; however they can impact or be impacted by what takes place within the total social environment. Depending on the playwright the circumstances in which a play is presented and the time frame, they can serve as a link between art and socio-political insight and entertain at the same time. Given such complex interconnections one needs to define the concept of what constitutes entertainment. The question then becomes which factors serve as a link between art and politics and which do not.

Overall I found this collection of essays interesting, provocative, and likely to stir some debate. I suspect that Conyers' opening essay also might stir controversy, another reason I recommend it to thoughtful readers.

Calvin E. Harris
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It will not come as news to people familiar with Native American history the role the print medium has played in constructing public images of indigenous Americans. What is refreshing is the way in which Coward offers his insights on the matter. He has chosen the period of the United States' most feverish expansion into "the West," a time when newspapers and related print sources were most active in defining now-common stereotypes of both sides in the ensuing conflicts.

Referring early on to meta-theory (such as Edward Said's work on "orientalism" and the creation of "otherness"), the book proceeds to examine how this often deliberate process was expedited by newspapers. Author Coward chooses some specific events as examples of this process, among them the Second Seminole War, the Cherokee Removal, the Fetterman and Custer "massacres," and the rehabilitation of Sitting Bull's image. This technique of steering away from major trends in depiction and generalized eras of pro- or anti-Indian sentiment makes this a valuable read for historians, anthropologists, journalistic ethicists, and ethnic studies professionals. Although Coward notes these trends and shifts in perspective he does readers the service of referring to particular events and figures using many quotations and noting the newspapers from which they are culled. This allows readers not only to follow the reasoning of the writer but also to draw some of their own conclusions by seeing the original statements.

The Newspaper Indian also should be lauded for including the impact of the only consistently published Indian press of the time, that of the Cherokee. Coward shows how the Phoenix covered the Removal crisis and in turn was sometimes reprinted in the mainstream press. That the book does so recognizes the professionalism of the Indian press and gives what are often missing from such a volume: instances in which the "others" play the major role in constructing their own public image.
The illustrations are very helpful in capturing the non-verbal aspects of newspaper image-making. In a country where many non-Indians were illiterate thence immune to journalists’ pronouncements the engravings which often graced periodicals conveyed powerful messages. Some of these are printed in *The Newspaper Indian* along with political cartoons and photos of major figures of the time.

Most appealing to the scholar of Native American Studies is the wealth of notes following each chapter. The extent of Coward’s research is evidenced by the generous number of primary sources he cites. This gives the researcher interested in areas as diverse as “celebrity journalism” (Sitting Bull) or the growth of “wire services” (the singular power of the Associated Press in portraying American Indians as early as the 1850s), for example, a variety of directions to pursue. Coward’s discussion of the role played by personal letters that were often used as the basis for news articles demonstrates how little value was placed on objectivity in the 19th century.

*The Newspaper Indian* is a valuable addition to libraries interested in providing resources for ethnic studies.

Cynthia R. Kasee  
University of South Florida

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*Planet of the Apes* (1968) was such a hit movie that it spawned several sequels. They included *Beneath the Planet of the Apes* (1970), *Escape from the Planet of the Apes* (1971), *Conquest of the Planet of the Apes* (1972), and *Battle for the Planet of the Apes* (1973). In the 1974 television season CBS broadcast the series “Planet of the Apes.” NBC followed with the animated Saturday morning series (September, 1975-September, 1976), “Return to the Planet of the Apes.” Eric Greene clearly demonstrates that the *Apes* saga is little more
than the support of the American myth of triumphalism: "the conquest of 'savage' and 'primitive' non-Whites by advanced and civilized Whites" (84).

Greene's criticisms, combining political plus racial and sexual interpretations of ape films, are not new. Thomas Cripps in his book Slow Fade to Black noted that the movie King Kong (1933) had been billed in Germany as King Kong und die Weisse Frau—King Kong and the white woman. Whites kidnapped a mindless black brute from his jungle home and he dies because of his obsessive love of a white woman. Son of Kong (1933) and Mighty Joe Young (1949) continued that tradition. James Snead in White Screens/Black Images, for instance, informs us that Mighty Joe Young is the story of a white girl who barters for an ape and raises it to a giant. Joe is always under the control of his mistress who is not only white but also pretty. He barely escapes a lynch mob after destroying a nightclub, rescues a white child, and returns to an uncivilized Africa. Race is symbolically figured in these and similar films, including the Apes series.

Ed Guerrero in his book, Framing Blackness: The African American Image in Film, has also commented on The Planet of the Apes quintet. To him they demonstrate "the struggles and reversals between futuristic apes and humans for a sustained allegory not only for slavery but also the burdens of racial exploitation, the civil rights movement, and the black rebellion that followed it" (43).

Eric Greene, using scripts, interviews of the actors, writers, directors, photographs, and other material, is able to do more than merely support his thesis. In a rather chilling photograph in the book, a white supremacist is holding a sign that reads: "NAACP—Planet of the Apes" (177) It is obvious that the sign carrier had interpreted the Apes films "as prophetic fiction warning of racial revolution...should the United States not change its path" (72-73). In another part of the book, Greene quotes Conquest screenwriter Paul Dehn who said, "It's a very curious thing that the Apes series has always been tremendously popular with Negroes who identify themselves with the apes. They are Black Power just as the apes are Ape Power and they enjoy it greatly" (82). Some associated with the films, then, clearly understood their racial content, constructed
through cultural codes (stereotypes). Greene has presented an important scholarly discourse on racialist content in the Apes series, strongly confirming intentionality.

George H. Junne, Jr.
University of Northern Colorado

References


Drawing on her experiences as a teacher of writing for six years at Oberlin College, Wendy S. Hesford in *Framing Identities: Autobiography and the Politics of Pedagogy* addresses important and timely questions, such as "How do historically marginalized groups expose the partiality and presumptions of institutional histories and truths through autobiographical acts?" (xx)

Hesford adopts Mary Louise Pratt’s definition of the “contact zone” and applies it to sites of unequal interaction in the academy, ranging from composition classrooms to struggles over sexual offense policies, student activism, and professional conferences, among others. In the case of each of these contact zones, Hesford explores how autobiographical acts can be used by members of oppressed or marginalized groups
to challenge or subvert hierarchies and to negotiate positions of authority within institutional frameworks of discourse. Such acts, Hesford asserts, can ideally function as “transformative cultural practices” (141).

Hesford acknowledges, however, that autobiography is not without its risks. She warns for example, of the dangers of the kind of self-disclosure that can lead to the “witnessing” subject being recuperated as the object of voyeurism and of the importance of avoiding essentialism in terms of the self that is being disclosed as any given time. Uses of autobiography, she stresses (and this is particularly relevant with regard to her discussion of the feminist writing classroom), must take account of the social construction of the self by such factors as race, class, history, and culture and must avoid reinforcing existing binaries, including that of the student/teacher relationship while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of establishing false empathies. Clearly, then, [a]utobiography is not an unambiguously empowering medium, but it does have the pedagogical potential of initiating critical reflexivity about self positioning” (95).

Framing Identities does have its flaws. Hesford’s fundamentally cogent argument does in places threaten to sink beneath the weight of a ponderous theoretical framework—although on a more positive note, as a result of this framework she book provides the book with an extremely useful bibliography. Perhaps more importantly many readers (particularly those affiliated with academic institutions radically different from Oberlin) may wish for more suggestions as to how Hesford’s theoretical precepts may be employed in practice. What “travels” from Hesford’s Oberlin experience to that of others, she says in her conclusion, “is not the transmission of pedagogical truths but critical aims and goals” (155). Readers may grant this but still welcome the inclusion of more broadly applicable practical strategies whereby these goals may be made a reality.

Nevertheless, Wendy S. Hesford has written a useful and provocative book that focuses attention on the ways in which autobiographical subjects attempt to negotiate a position within broader cultural narratives. She makes clear that, despite the risks involved, one of the most important uses of the auto-
biographical stance is that it forces attention on and provokes questioning of the basic assumptions and configuration of the discourse of the academy: “A subject’s recognition of social, rhetorical, and ideological frames and constraints can enable the production of transformative cultural projects and subject positions”(xxxv). The risks, then, are worth the attempt.

Helen Lock
University of Louisiana at Monroe

Sandra Jackson and Jose Solis Jordan (eds.). *I’ve Got a Story To Tell: Identity And Place In The Academy.* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing Inc., 1999). 167 pp., $29.95 paper.

*I’ve Got A Story To Tell* is a “place and space wherein the contributors can momentarily unload the baggage they carry and speak incisively of the challenges associated with their success in gaining entry into the academy” (2).

This text is a collection of thirteen narratives written by faculty of color discussing their experiences in predominantly white institutions of higher education. The narratives discuss the marginalization and trivialization that faculty of color encounter in these institutions. The authors discuss their often painful experiences openly and without restraint or reservation. The issues discussed here are not ones usually discussed openly and may be offensive to some, but as Jackson and Jordan point out, “these narratives are not about feeling good nor about feeling bad; rather they are about feeling deeply and responding to the politics of constraint, suppression, repression, coercion, and conformity” (6). The narratives cover a variety of issues on many levels such as identity, relationships with administrators, peers and students plus curriculum and teaching style.

Regardless of the issues and levels, the most significant influencing factor in all the narratives was the perceived race and ethnic background of the professor. This factor elicited ethnocentric and stereotypical attitudes towards the professors
and classroom behavior. In the classroom, the students' behaviors resulted in questioning material and information presented by the professor of color. In some instances students challenged the professor's authority, credibility, and ability in grading procedures. This attitude toward the professor of color also included rude behavior, lack of respect, and some discipline problems in the classroom. This ethnocentric attitude toward faculty of color was also evident in some colleagues and administrators.

One narrator discussed how ethnocentric attitudes toward him influenced the decision of his colleagues and administrators when he applied for tenure. The narrator was highly rated as a teacher. He had “sixteen publications, two books in conjunction with other authors, two articles in journals, two chapters in two books” and five more publications in national/international newsletters;...nevertheless, he was denied tenure by some committee members and by the administration. Through support first from students of color and eventually from his colleagues, the narrator was granted tenure. This is just one narrative that speaks about the struggle that professors of color encounter in higher education.

*I've Got A Story To Tell* relates struggles and success of professors of color in higher education through narratives based on personal experience. I applaud the narrators for their courage in sharing their experiences. I thank Professors Sandra Jackson and Jose Solis Jordan for having the courage to undertake this outstanding project. These narratives provide good lessons for everyone in higher education. *I've Got A Story To Tell* could be used as additional reading for multicultural classes.

James Adolph Robinson  
Eastern Michigan University

The Encyclopedia of Native American Economic History offers a unique perspective on economic development in North America, primarily because it constantly reminds the reader of the fundamental contradictions that this process has entailed. A view of economic processes fundamentally different from orthodox scholarly analysis emerges in many of the volume’s entries. In total a picture of economic activity is projected that links consumption, cultural conflict, social and ecological reproduction, and the transformation of group identity. This volume takes exploratory steps toward the development of alternative explanations of economic growth and change in society, particularly as these processes relate to the meaning of race and ethnicity. The book’s strongest sections are those that offer a multi-faceted view of the overlapping effects of political, social, and economic institutions on Native American groups. The volume includes several entries of this kind dealing with topics such as the legal status of Native American lands, agricultural development, environmental degradation, and the manner in which Native American groups have organized cultural and economic life historically.

Nonetheless the book contains several weaknesses that require attention in future revisions. For instance much of the content is superfluous, offering somewhat trivial information about topics such as the linguistic origins of the names of various states and cities. This material needs to be more closely tied to the topic of Native American economic history or simply deleted from the text. Moreover some necessary topics are absent from the volume: more extensive coverage of topics related to occupational, employment, income, and consumption patterns is needed as they pertain to Native Americans as a group and to individual nations.

Overall The Encyclopedia of Native American Economic History is a valuable resource for students, instructors, and others interested in studying the economic side of the Native American experience. Important citations and conceptual material is identified in the text which does not appear collec-
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tively elsewhere are included. For this reason alone this book should be included in public and university library collections. More significantly the volume brings greater attention to a relatively understudied area related to race, ethnicity, and economic development. Hopefully its presence will prompt increased discussion of this subject and further the development of this field of study.

Robert Mark Silverman
Jackson State University


The aim of this volume is to illuminate various black and white boundaries in the United States through an examination of the “cultural dimensions of racial inequality.” Fourteen essays touch on a wide variety of subjects including African American corporate executives, fast-food workers in Harlem, Afrocentrism, single-parenting, rap music, and feminism, to name only some. The authors of these essays strive to move beyond a static structure versus culture dualism and to instead highlight the theoretical and empirical importance of cultural scripts, all without reducing discussion to the level of “blaming the victim.”

The chapters contain much compelling material, some of which is not often covered from the particular perspectives offered in this collection. For instance Katherine Newman and Catherine Ellis show that intraracial stigma facing African American and Latino fast-food workers in Harlem is super-added to the more generally recognized problems of working in a high-turnover, low-pay industry. Maureen Waller’s chapter on the separation of reproduction and marriage explores cultural motives that inform the differing decisions of low-income white
and African American single-parents regarding whether or when to marry. These sorts of issues are often avoided by researchers for fear of ascribing improper cultural values to their subjects. Yet this volume's authors have actively chosen to engage just these issues in ways both complex and sensitive.

Similarly Elijah Anderson's chapter on African American executives deals with difficult questions of group loyalty and intragroup conflict within the overwhelmingly white corporate world, laying out the complex cultural negotiating that goes on among Afro-Americans who interact with each other at varying levels within the corporate structure. In chapters such as this and in Mary Water's exploration of the differential treatment by whites of African Americans and West Indian immigrants, the relatively untapped nature of this volume's focus is made clear.

Beyond the emphasis on cultural analysis, another important factor tying these essays together is their reliance on survey data. The vast majority of the chapters are based directly on the survey research of the authors whose interview samples range from a low of four in one case to more than two hundred in another. Those few authors who relied on the published surveys of others had access to still larger data-sets. While reading the chapters and assessing the conclusions drawn from the survey research one is struck by the vast differences between them regarding the sample sizes. Readers who may be biased more toward the qualitative may wonder if this does not perhaps illustrate a limitation of this kind of research. For those, at least, the fact that there are relatively few charts and that much amplifying material is relegated to the copious endnotes of each essay, will be a plus. Methodological preferences aside, the singular importance of this work is its giving voice to issues and concerns that are not often heard in mainstream discourse.

Rainer Spencer
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

In this large volume of essays, general editor George J. Leonard aims to produce a “tool kit” for the multicultural classroom that will “unlock the greatest number of (Asian-Pacific American-APA) authors and artists” (xiv) for students and teachers. In many ways he hits the mark. Readers who once skipped over the Chinese phrases in Amy Tan’s *The Joy Luck Club* can now find them explained in Molly H. Isham’s “Reader’s Guide” to the novel. Those who want to know the meaning of “no-no boys” or “FOBs,” or “Mestizos” or the date when the “Queue Ordinance” was passed can find them in the book’s “Cultural Lexicon and Chronology.”

The section on literature is the most successful of the six parts. It features articles on canons, traditions, and developments as well as biographies of some of the important practitioners (though some, like Sui Sin Far, are glaringly absent). A fine example of how this volume may “unlock” APA works for students is Mary Scott’s article on *The Journey to the West,* which opens up texts like Kingston’s *Tripmaster Monkey.*

The book’s organization is problematical. For example a chapter on the important model minority myth is not only underdeveloped (only two pages long!) in its neglect of current trends that place Asian Americans as intermediaries to emerging Asian markets but is also oddly placed with long chapters on pinyin, Asian names, and ideograms. Eight chapters are about food (including a “list” of Filipino dishes that does nothing to explain their cultural significance), while the important story of Mu Lan is relegated to the lexicon glossary (strangely, a seven-page entry in a glossary of mostly three-sentence entries!). Some essential information on Asian literature, mythology, and heroes that appear in APA literature is either not included (e.g., a chapter on *The Water Margin* would help readers with texts like Frank Chin’s *Donald Duk*) or is submerged under other topics (e.g., “orientalism,” which deserves a chapter of its own, is only briefly explained under a chapter on David Henry Hwang).
Leonard’s article on Confucianism exemplifies some of the book’s philosophical inconsistencies. While he complains in his preface that most books on APA culture offer “arguments” rather than information (xvi), he presents in this long chapter his own arguments for Confucianism and against Christianity. He extols Asian American families as the site of an important synthesis of East and West (42), but he is unwilling to look at important questions about the attraction to Christianity of so many Asian Americans (most notably Koreans). Indeed rather than looking at how Asian Americans are synthesizing Confucian and Christian values, he prefers to believe that Christian values threaten Confucian ones and that deep beneath Asian American Christians are suppressed Confucians (44). Thus rather than “information” we get an “argument” that is prejudiced, superficial, and contrary to the aims of the book.

Thankfully there are numerous informative articles in the volume which make it a useful (though far from perfect) resource for the multicultural classroom.

Jeff Partridge
National University of Singapore


McBride’s book explores the disastrous effects of colonization on four courageous and idiosyncratic American Indian women of the Wabanaki tribes of the North Atlantic coast that include Abenaki, Maliseet, Mi’kmaq, Passamaquoddy, and Penobscot. The women considered are unrelated except by place, circumstance, and first name—all are named Molly. Their brief biographies span four centuries.

The stories of the four Mollies recount the devastating effects of European encroachment upon Native American culture as well as upon the personal lives of the protagonists. McBride describes the impact of European contact as seen
through the eyes of these women; these unique perspectives are one of the book's primary strengths.

*Women of the Dawn* is part of a virtual explosion of scholarship concerning Indian women whose lives and accomplishments were consistently ignored by those who compiled early Indian history. Missionaries, explorers, government agents, traders, and others who recorded the events of the time apparently believed that little about Indian women was worth recording. McBride's book is a welcome addition to a growing body of literature that attempts to discover and articulate significant aspects of Indian life that early historians neglected.

Bunny McBride is clearly a gifted writer. Her inclusion of cultural description and historical detail breathes life into the stories of these four women. McBride accomplishes this in part by the use of an "unusual structure" (126) in which she presents all four profiles as if they were written by Molly Dellis, the twentieth century Wabanaki woman whose life story concludes the book. This device is at once successful and problematical.

First, it is somewhat difficult to follow the narrative thread of McBride's "creative nonfiction" (138) as it evolves in the use of Molly Dellis' voice. The author's explanations concerning Molly Dellis' motivation to write are unconvincing as are those concerning Dellis' "decision" to include her own life story (written in the third person) "as though it were someone else's life" (97). A useful addition would have been a more forthright introduction to the author's identity and how she happens to be writing these life stories. It is also likely that a different approach altogether might have been more successful. Fortunately the "portages" between the sections (which connect the four pieces) are nicely crafted and assist the reader in making transitions across time and space.

Secondly, although we learn a little of McBride's techniques and methods in her last chapter (which the reader should probably read first), her inclusion of which details of the story are documented and which are not is vague. For example McBride (in the voice of Molly Dellis) provides intricate descriptions of her characters, but we are not told whether these descriptions are compiled from photographs or interviews or are a part of the author's "creative" nonfiction. McBride assures her readers that most of the scenes and
quotes are recounted from reliable historical sources (139); these references are included but are not footnoted. A careful reading of pages 139-52 does provide an overview of which sections are reconstruction and which are conjecture. Nonetheless this reader still is plagued with questions about the authenticity and sources of particular quotes, descriptions, events, and details.

Whatever its flaws this compelling book details the complexity of four individual Wabanaki women living in very different historical contexts: a peacemaker (Molly Mathilde, ca. 1665-1717), a healer (Molly Ockett, ca. 1740-1816), a bitter witchwoman (Molly Molasses, ca. 1775-1867), and a celebrated dancer (Molly Dellis, ca. 1903-1977).

McBride has written an engaging book that brings history to life. It draws readers into the worlds of these women and powerfully depicts their experiences, sufferings, and joys. I came away from reading Women of the Dawn with lasting impressions of four strong female personages of the Wabanaki nation.

Sally McBeth
University of Northern Colorado


*If They Don’t Bring Their Women Here* by George Peffer is another significant addition to the skimpy repertory of books on the history of Chinese American women, which includes Judy Yung’s *Chinese Women of America* (1986) and *Unbounded Feet* (1995), Benson Tong’s *Un submissive Women* (1994), and Huping Ling’s *Surviving on the Gold Mountain* (1999). Unlike the other volumes, Peffer’s book focuses on the debarment of Chinese women from immigration to the United States before
the 1882 general exclusion of Chinese laborers. He argues that the cultural constraints imposed by the traditional Chinese joint family structure and the male sojourner mentality did not suffice to induce the protracted shortage of Chinese female immigrants and that the Page Law of 1875 and its enforcement played a more pivotal role in restricting the immigration of Chinese women. Using data from U.S. government documents, court records, and newspapers, he documents with some measure of success that although the Page Law literally forbade only the entry of prostitutes (including Chinese ones), the broader application of this law resulted in a de facto exclusion of Chinese female immigrants during the seven years prior to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Peffer also demonstrates how California’s anti-Chinese press shaped and intensified the expanded application of the Page Law, how the anti-Chinese sentiment led to the possible overcounting of Chinese prostitutes in San Francisco in the 1870 and 1880 censuses, and how the de facto Chinese female exclusion engendered the lopsided development of the Chinese community. By piecing the scattered information together, this book enhances our understanding of the causes of the Chinese “bachelor’s society” as well as the experiences of Chinese female immigrants before the Chinese exclusion.

Peffer is more successful in proving the effectiveness of the Page Law in curtailing the immigration of Chinese prostitutes than in substantiating the effect of the Page Law’s implementation in debarring or reducing the immigration of non-prostitute Chinese women. The evidence for the latter is circumstantial, albeit not implausible. This weakness renders the de facto Chinese female exclusion assessment a bit shaky. Perhaps a more critical point that can be made is that the book offers few fresh insights into the subject beyond the key arguments and evidence already presented in Peffer’s two articles published in Journal of American Ethnic History in 1986 and 1992. This book is au fond an elaboration and slight augmentation of the ideas in those two articles, and the publication of the book may be deemed a belated recognition of his contribution in calling scholarly attention to the importance of the Page Law in restricting Chinese female immigration. In light of what had been established and the book’s claimed coverage of the
entire pre-exclusion era as couched in its subtitle, it would have been logical and fruitful to explore and document the role of legislation and government actions preceding the Page Law at the state and local levels in restricting Chinese female immigration.

These quibbles aside, this book provides by far the most systematic and detailed analysis of the effects of the Page Law and its enforcement on Chinese female immigration and makes a worthwhile contribution to the literature on the history of Chinese Americans in general and Chinese American women in particular. It is a book that no specialist in the field should miss.

Philip Q. Yang
Texas Woman’s University

References


This important book documents two areas, the history of the Vietnamese traumatic emigration to the U.S. from 1975 to the early 1990s and the central role of music in Vietnamese responses to diaspora. Because ethnographic studies of the Vietnamese diaspora are still limited in number, and this is the first focused on Vietnamese expressive practices, *Songs of the Caged* is a major contribution on both fronts. Unlike many accounts of the Vietnamese American experience, Reyes’ book is based on extended field research and addresses big issues with attention to history and to real people in real situations often conveyed through intimate portraits. The breadth of Reyes’ often difficult research (over many years and thousands of miles) grants this study a remarkable scope. She presents Vietnamese refugees as a diverse group of people with different histories and priorities. Reyes argues that music making is central to the ongoing construction of difference within Vietnamese American communities: she demonstrates how music, particularly singing, looks back nostalolgically to pre-1975 Vietnam as well as forward to new Vietnamese American identities and even optimistically to the reclamation of a non-communist Vietnam.

Reyes’s main argument is that forced emigration raises different methodological questions than immigration generally. She writes that “the theoretically and methodologically insignificant role assigned to forced migration in studies of migrant adaptation to the United States” has severely limited scholarship and political responses; she suggests that collapsing the plight of forced refugees into immigration generally is driven by an American tendency to romanticize immigration. As she puts it, “It was easy for Americans to believe that everyone came willingly, attracted by the prospect of belonging to a country that took pride in being a nation of immigrants. The image of the voluntary immigrant stood for all migrants and was ‘wisely accepted’” (xii(c)xiii).
Furthermore Reyes contends that music and expressive culture generally is an essential channel for understanding the experience of forced migrants. She cites other studies that point to how refugee camps around the world are often “replete” with music, dance, and theater and notes that her study thus opens up the study of forced migration even as it expands the questions asked by the field of ethnomusicology: “As part of expressive culture, music is a mirror that migration studies have yet to hold up to the refugee experience, and forced migration is a key that ethnomusicology has yet to turn to gain entry into another world that music inhabits” (3).

The book covers four different field sites, and the way they contrast is very effective. Just as the two refugee camps (Palawan and Bataan in the Philippines) represent different groups of relocated Vietnamese, the two Vietnamese American communities (Jersey City-Hoboken and Orange County, California) represent different social environments, and Reyes’s careful references back and forth bring out the complexities of Vietnamese/Vietnamese American resettlement. The movement though the book is clear and well crafted, and the final feeling is of good balance filled in with a lot of complicated data (e.g., facts and figures about immigrant populations, musical scores, etc.) that Reyes does not shy away from. She shows how the interplay between folk, classical, ritual (Buddhist and Catholic), and popular Vietnamese musics are central to Vietnamese expressive practices. Importantly she demonstrates that Vietnamese immigrant consumption of music (and participation via karaoke, radio, informal music-making, etc.) is as important a site of study as performers and composers. Over and over again she shows how Vietnamese distinctions between the communist and the non-communist, whether in music, politics, or understandings of history, drive immigrants’ conceptions of their life in diaspora. She moves between Tet celebrations, churches, Vietnamese malls in Orange County, dance clubs, refugee camps, and recording studios as she pursues the question of how communism and cultural nostalgia for a pre-communist Vietnam impel refugees’ musical activities. Reyes’ representation of conflicts within the Vietnamese community is both sympathetic and discerning. Her examination of how the end of American economic sanc-
tions against Vietnam in 1994-95 presented agonizing questions of loyalty and identity to Vietnamese Americans is particularly impressive.

Reyes makes virtually no reference to other work in Asian American studies. She makes a strong argument for her focus on Vietnamese traumatic relocation, but the study is a bit insulated from related work. Without suggesting exact parallels, I wonder if she could have connected her study to similar work on Hmong, Cambodian, and Lao refugees; her section on the psychological toll of traumatic emigration could also have been linked to work on the Japanese American internment and its psychological effect on succeeding generations. Similarly, Reyes' terrific work on the Vietnamese American communities in New Jersey and California would benefit from some reference to recent work in Asian American studies on other Asian American communities, e.g., Chinatowns on the east and west coasts, or Timothy P. Fong's book on Monterey Park. Reyes' central point—that traumatic displacement raises specific issues—would not have been lost by connecting Vietnamese resettlement to the history of other Asian American communities (both voluntary and involuntary); if anything, it would have brought out important differences.

Still, this is a remarkable book, and a remarkably accessible one at that. It will certainly attract the attention of readers in Asian American studies, Asian studies, immigration studies, and of course music, and it makes the point—resoundingly—that expressive culture is an essential site for scholarship in Ethnic Studies.

Deborah Wong
University of California, Riverside


This is an excellent book. In the writing of this edition the author has left little to be criticized. The only criticism that
could be made is that most of her analysis focuses on Latino media in Los Angeles and Miami and glosses over other U.S. cities with large Latino populations, however she provides valid reasons for this.

Her research methodology, forty-two open ended interviews with Latino journalists, audience researchers, and marketers in various cities with large Latino communities, is appropriate for this study. Central to her analysis is the construction of the Latino audience. She points out that "Latino journalism is one of the consequences of Latino audience construction, and Latino journalism is one of the producers of the Latino audience"(5). In her effort to explain what this means, she does a masterful job of clearly and concisely analyzing the similarities and differences among the various U.S. Latino groups, i.e., in race, language, class, and historical background.

In the author's description of the development of the "Hispanic audience" she has written one of the most lucid explanations for the evolution of the label Hispanic and a much more convincing reason for its implementation than other books on the subject. Most Latino histories, particularly those about the Chicanos, often credit the Nixon Administration with popularizing the term Hispanic. They also mention that broadcast and print media were quick to use it, but they seldom say why. Rodriguez' book answers that question. Although past explanations for the development of the term Hispanic are usually political, Rodriguez, coming from a media studies perspective, offers us an economic explanation—to sell products to an Hispanic consumer market.

In the author's description of the complex nature of the Latino community she covers what many non-Hispanics seldom understand in their haste to lump various Latino groups, the matter of class and how it is conflated with race in Latino communities in the U.S. Rodriguez uses data from a 1995 U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey to show this.

Ironically most interesting is her analysis of the work of Hispanic audience researchers and marketers and their attempts to promote a panethnic Latino identity in order to "transform U.S. residents of Latin American descent into a viable commercial product"(8) in hopes that Hispanic print and
broadcast media will attract marketing dollars from U.S. corporations. Thus they too, for economic rather than political reasons, want to lump the various Latino groups together. This is an interesting turn of events. In the not too distant past the distinctiveness of each Latino group was emphasized. Now, to encourage consumerism among the various groups, they are promoting a panethnic Latino identity.

In the final analysis the author’s discussion of Latino news-making chronicles the ethnic history of the various Latino groups that have immigrated to this country. As such the reader comes away not only with a detailed picture of the cultural and economic forces that shape Hispanic media production, but a more enhanced picture of the complexity of the Latino community in the United States. Rodriguez’ book is “must-reading”, for anyone interested in Latino media. It should be required reading for Latino Studies classes as well.

M.L. (Tony) Miranda
University of Nevada, Las Vegas


Eric Wertheimer convincingly argues that inaccuracy and omission in historical narratives made an indelible mark on American identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The ethnic diversity of America, even though sparingly portrayed in the historical writing of the time, also had an important effect on American identity. Wertheimer concludes that while American identity has a public concept, individuals determine the real meaning in private spheres. He examines five Anglo, male authors (Philip Freneau, Joel Barlow, William Prescott, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman) to ascertain what they thought of as American history and who should be
represented in it. These authors incorporated the glorious civilizations of the Incas and Aztecs to draw upon their republican precepts and counterbalance the United States against the imperial nations of Great Britain and Spain; however they erased these indigenous groups when the problem of race crept into the American identity and when the United States began pursuing its own expansionist doctrines of Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine (which resulted in the less than justifiable Mexican American War and annexation of Texas). Wertheimer argues that Melville was only one among the five to highlight the humanity of the vanquished, although Whitman should be included as well. Melville included the subaltern perspective through the use of silence as a means of their resistance. Melville along with Whitman did not allow glorification of the past to eclipse the reality of the agents and specifically the suffering of the victims.

Wertheimer aptly portrays the struggle these authors faced in writing nationalist historical narratives. At the same time the reader is left yearning for a more complete explanation of how the contemporary reality influenced these authors and, conversely, how their writings impacted public policy or a sense of American identity among the populace. Wertheimer fails to explore adequately the causal relationship between the historical times during which these authors were writing and their works.

The book relates to the ethnic experience only in its portrayal of how Anglo authors controlled its historical presentation; no ethnic voice is present. Nonetheless Wertheimer suggests that some the American authors distinguished between the civilized Aztec and Inca groups and the nomadic and uncivilized North American natives thereby justifying the colonization of North America while condemning Spain’s conquest of the New World and the Black Legend. Prescott is an example of one author who utilizes this dichotomy of barbaric and civilized and takes it one step further. He argues that while the Aztecs and Incas were civilized as a society, the individuals were in fact weak and irrational; reason was inaccessible to the Indians. Prescott also concludes that Mexico is not glorious like the Aztec civilization was because Mexicans are a conquered people (he fails to see the irony that most of the people
living under the Aztec civilization were also vanquished). Wertheimer picks apart this and other historical inaccuracies and omissions on the part of the authors. He also reveals how writers like Melville (through silence) and Whitman (through absence and erasures) made sincere and humble attempts to at least allow individuals to imagine a vanquished voice.

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ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

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