Inclusion/Exclusion
The National Association for Ethnic Studies

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# ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW

The Journal of the National Association for Ethnic Studies

## Volume 27, Issue 1 2004

### Inclusion/Exclusion
General Editor: Faythe Turner

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EDITOR'S NOTE

In this election year, 2004, people are grappling with the various forces that make up these United States. What forces encourage inclusion and which exclusion? Who is to be included and who excluded? Is this to be a country with wide discrepancies between the rich and the poor? Is this to be a country where public education is poorly funded and a good education depends upon private resources? Are we going to forget that discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnic origin, and economic status still exists and needs to be perpetually, vigilantly addressed? There is a deep division in the country over the proper and fair use of our resources that constitutes concern in all our citizens.

Ashton Wesley Welch in “Law and the Making of Slavery in Colonial Virginia” shows how despite denials and claims of origins in Roman law the concept of legalized slavery has its basis in the traditions and customs of the English legal system. The earliest courts in Virginia set about to make slavery for Africans legal because economic conditions controlled by the wealthy landholders demanded it, and unlike the limitations placed upon the length of indentured servitude for many white immigrants there was nothing to protect Africans from servitude for life. Barring the Native American genocide this is the most extreme case of exclusion on the North American continent.

Stanley O. Gaines, Jr. in “W. E. B. Du Bois on Brown v. Board of Education” addresses one aspect of the results of a system of slavery. His main focus is on the great scholar and African American leader, W. E. B. Du Bois. He laments the fact that more attention has not been paid this vitally important leader
and debunks the myth that DuBois rejected the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, pointing out that as early as 1903 in *The Souls of Black Folks* DuBois in discussing the condition of black people in the United States stressed the importance of education and of the absolute need for Blacks to be included in the system of education in the broadest sense so that they could choose their paths in life as Whites were able to. Rather than rejecting Brown, Dr. Gaines tells us, Du Bois rejected the “all deliberate speed” portion of Brown knowing how such vagueness could be finagled by those who would exclude African Americans from the educational system.

Keith M. Kilty and Maria Vidal de Haymes interestingly illustrate how much we can learn from examining the language of the census over a period of years. In “What’s in a Name? Racial Classifications and the Meaning of Hispanic/Latino in the United States” they show how names and categories used in the census reflect the political climate of the time and point once more to complex ways of including and excluding.

Reinaldo Silva’s “Thomas Braga’s *Portingales: A Celebration of Portuguese American Culture*” discusses the syndrome of assimilation in American life. Immigrants have long been urged to throw off their native cultures and embrace “American” ways to succeed in this country. Imagine, if you will, how much poorer this country would be if the various ethnic groups had in fact done that and we were left without their separate contributions to the aggregate culture. Dr. Silva shows while early Portuguese writers and artists (John Dos Passos and John Phillip Sousa are two examples) ignored their Portuguese heritage for various reasons not the least of which was ease of existing in America, later writers such as Thomas Braga have been able to celebrate their Portuguese heritage while still embracing their adopted country.

We leave the United States in “How and Why Islamophobia is tied to English Nationalism but not to Scottish Nationalism” in hopes that the observations of Asifa M. Hussain and William L. Miller with respect to the phenomenon of Islamophobia from a distance can be helpful to citizens here in dealing with the same phenomenon.
Finally, with this issue I leave Ethnic Studies Review as Editor. It has been a great pleasure to work with all of the writers and a delight to read and learn from their manuscripts and book reviews. I wish to thank those who have contributed and especially those who have used their expertise acting as jurors.

I am grateful for the various remarks I have received on the worth of the journal and hope that the membership of the National Association for Ethnic Studies and others as well will keep the work coming.*

Thank you.

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*Information concerning editorship can be found inside the back cover.
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LAW AND THE MAKING OF SLAVERY IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA

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Some authorities from the antebellum period to the present have located the source of the American law of slavery in continental civil law codes and hence in Roman slave law. They have been unable or unwilling to connect the brutal system of institutionalized racial slavery that emerged in Virginia and elsewhere in the American slave kingdom with what they have perceived as an open, freedom-favoring Anglo-American legal system and have thus sought an explanation of its legal underpinnings in other jurisdictical standards. Both the absence of chattel slavery in English law and the common law's claimed bias in favor of liberty have often been cited as reasons why it is impossible that English law could be the source of such an abomination.1

The slave law that developed in seventeenth century Virginia fits squarely within the broad English legal tradition, however. The common law represents only one aspect of that tradition, which
also includes equity, ecclesiastical courts, and, most important in this context, the less formal conciliar law used to govern areas on the edge of England, such as Wales, the Marches, and Ireland. Upon study of the early decisions of the Virginia Council sitting as a judicial court, it becomes apparent that the swift, summary justice of these outlying councils was a clear and direct antecedent of the system of justice that sanctioned racial slavery in Virginia. Once the early Virginia Council had helped impose slavery, the maturing legal system could then use the common law as a tool to regulate it.

Slavery and the Law in Virginia before 1670
Prior to the 1660s the Virginia legal system oscillated between tacit recognition of the relative equality of Blacks and an avowed declaration of their inferiority. The earliest law of slavery in Virginia served to cut off routes of escape to freedom for a people already enslaved through custom. This law developed in an atmosphere of unconstrained legal authority and in response to compelling economic and cultural circumstances. Its legal underpinnings were firmly rooted in English legal and political traditions. There was no legal declaration that Africans were to be slaves, but rather a series of cases, followed by legislation, that dealt with the practical problems arising from the custom of holding Africans as slaves.² The effect of these laws and decisions was to make it increasingly difficult for Blacks to be anything but slaves. The paths of escape from this condition were gradually narrowed until choked off nearly altogether.

This early Virginian slave law came about to clear up ambiguities in customary practice. Custom and law recognized the existence of property interests in people. Black labor was treated differently from its white counterpart almost from its beginning in Virginia. The legal basis of white service was contract. Ordinarily white laborers had indentures that specified that their labor would be the property of their master for a particular period of time. Most Africans, however, having arrived as involuntary immigrants, were not parties to any contract limiting their term of service nor were their services regulated by the law. Moreover statutory provisions that limited the terms of service for white laborers who arrived in Virginia without indentures were
not used to similarly protect Africans, who could thus be held for life. The customary practice of holding black servants for a term of life began the legal process of converting people, who possessed both rights and duties, into chattel property. Not all Africans who entered Virginia in the early 1600s were held for life. Some enjoyed a measure of freedom. Some were treated as indentured servants and released when their term was over. More gained their freedom through manumission. The case of Anthony Johnson, a free Black who claimed headrights for Africans he imported himself, illustrates the lack of uniformity in the status of Blacks in the early decades of their presence. Legal records from the first half of the century reveal instances of Blacks who earned wages and bought land and of black males testifying in trials of white men.

Still, even though there was some degree of fluidity in their status in the early decades, Blacks, without the protection of written contracts or statutory provisions, were uniquely vulnerable. The early case law suggests that their vulnerability was quickly exploited. The legal dehumanization of black Virginians was aided by a series of decisions handed down by the General Court beginning in the 1620s. These cases make it clear that black labor was treated differently from white, and validate and regulate many of the elements of this customary difference.

The earliest reported cases involving Blacks are quite brief and are not especially revealing about their status or circumstances. This ambiguity can be seen in cases of the mid-1620s. “John Phillip, a Negro Christened in England,” testified in the 1624 debt trial of Symon Tuchinge, a white man. Phillip seemingly was permitted to testify because he was a Christian. The following year, 1625, in a case involving a black man named Brase, the court ordered that “the negro yt cam in with Capt Jones” serve Lady Yeardley until further order but granted him what amounted to wages for his service. The next month the court ordered that this same man, “ye negro called by the name of brase shall belonge to Sr Francis Wyatt Gournor &c., as his servant” despite Captain Jones' alleged sale of him to another man.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, court decisions and statutory acts more clearly indicate a debased status for
Blacks. In 1630, in the case of Re Davis, the court ordered Hugh Davis “to be soundly whipt before an assembly of negroes & others for abusing himself to the dishon[o]r of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in lying with a negro. . . .”9 Ten years later, in Re Sweat, the court heard the case of Robert Sweat, a white colonist charged with having impregnated an unnamed black woman. The court ordered Sweat “to do public penance for his offence...getting [the] negroe woman with child” and “the said negro woman...be whipt at the whipping post”. The circumstances surrounding the cases of Davis and Sweat are unknown, but the decisions make it quite clear that “negroes” were regarded as separate and inferior. Like Hugh Davis, Sweat “defiled his body” and shamed God by having sexual relations with a lower form of humanity.10

This impression is reinforced by Act X decreed by the legislature in 1639 that “[a]ll persons except negroes to be provided with arms and ammunition to be fined at pleasure of the Governor and the Council.”11 This was the first legislative enactment to mention Blacks specifically. The requirement that all Whites, including servants, bear arms while all Blacks, including free men, were forbidden to do so, reveals the continuing evolution of a distinct, and lesser, position for Blacks.

A series of cases in the early 1640s demonstrate that black labor was not subject to term restrictions. In July 1640, three runaway slaves were caught and tried before the court. All three were whipped, and while the two Whites, a Dutchman and a Scot, had several years added to their indentures, the third, a black man named John Punch, was ordered to serve his “master or his assigns for the time of his natural life here or elsewhere.”12 In October of the same year, another group of runaways was caught in a skiff on the Elizabeth River and punished similarly. Emmanuel, the one Black recaptured, received the same harsh punishments meted out to the others, with three exceptions. He alone received no additional years on his term of service, presumably because he was already a servant for life. He was also branded with an “R” on his cheek and was required to wear shackles for a year. 13

The question of the heritability of enslavement rose concomitantly with the drift in equating blackness with slavery.
Several cases over the twenty-year period from the 1640s to the 1660s concern themselves with the hereditary nature of slavery and the effect of white parentage on a Black's slave status. Uncertainty is definitely evident in the early legal record. The 1641 case of John Graweere, for example, clearly suggests his status as a slave but reveals confusion about exactly how that status might be transmitted to children. Graweere was a servant of William Evans, who allowed him to raise hogs provided that Mr. Evans received half of the profit. Graweere fathered a son to a black slave owned by Lieutenant Robert Sheppard. Mr. Graweere purchased his son's freedom from Lt. Sheppard in order to raise him to be a Christian “taught and exercised in the Church of England.” After the sale, Evans asserted title to the child. In upholding Graweere’s right to his son, the court recognized that Sheppard's claim to the boy lay in the lieutenant's ownership of the mother, but it also ordered that the boy would be free from any claim of Evans and his heirs, whose only possible right to the boy would arise from their ownership of the father.14 Early in the next decade, the court rejected a challenge to a 1652 sale, by a Virginia planter of a 10 year old black girl “with her issue and produce duringe her (or either of them) for their Life tyme” and “their Successors forever.”15 This is obviously a case where children inherited their slave status from their mother with no thought given to the race or ownership of their father.

The case of Mihill Gowen, who was freed by the will of Christopher Stafford, illustrates another aspect of this issue. In the York County court in 1657 Stafford’s sister, Anne Barnhouse, formally renounced any claims to Gowen. She then gave a boy “born of the body of my negro Rosa being baptised” to Gowen. She referred to the boy as Gowen’s “Sonne William.”16 By making the gift, Ms. Barnhouse clearly acted as if she believed that otherwise she would have had lawful possession of William, and the basis for that must have been that she owned William’s mother.

The case of Elizabeth Key, decided in 1656, advances the issue of the effect of white parentage on slave status. Elizabeth was found by the county court to have been the child of a slave woman by a white man, Thomas Key. In fact, shortly after
Elizabeth’s birth, Mr. Key had been fined “for getting his negro woman with Childe which said Negro was the Mother of the said Molletto.” As an adult, when about to be sold as part the estate of Colonel John Mottram, Ms. Key claimed her freedom on the basis of her birth to a free white father. This case went to the Virginia assembly which returned it to the county court for reconsideration because no one appeared before the Burgesses to speak against Key’s petition for freedom. Despite the inconclusive result, the assembly’s report showed that the Burgesses believed she was entitled to freedom. One possible ground behind their thinking was her acceptance of Christianity. Prevailing legal practices provide another possible explanation: Common Law held that “the Child of a Woman slave begott by a freeman ought to bee free.” The end result was that Elizabeth Key was declared free in Northumberland County, and then married the white attorney who had represented her.17

The uncertainty about the status of Blacks born from miscegenous relationships was cleared up 1652 by a statute which provided that: “Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by an Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or free . . . That all children born in this country shall be held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother . . ."18 Thousands of Blacks, including “Mulattoes,” would have been entitled to freedom had the legislature followed the English legal doctrine that the status of the child was determined by the status of the father.

During the same time period, when the question of race and slavery was reaching solution, confusion also surrounded the issue of the effect of Christian baptism on slave status. This was a vexing problem, which presented itself with some frequency, resulting from the pull of two competing notions. Not surprisingly up until 1680, Virginia, and some other English colonies, often followed the English and Spanish custom of extending the privileges of a free person to baptized Blacks.19 For several decades, white Virginians were undecided whether blackness or Christianity was more important on the status of Blacks. Some Africans who had become Christians before arriving in Virginia were accorded a higher status than other Africans. In the same uneven fashion, a few of the Africans who converted after their
arrival in the colony also gained additional rights. Black Christians were allowed to testify in court and could even bring suit. Other Blacks could not. The acceptance of Christian baptism was a powerful symbol to white Virginians, who saw it as crucial evidence of the development of civility and rationality. Since these qualities were seen as incompatible with slave status, conversion sometimes brought manumission, or at least some degree of greater personal freedom. As noted, the decision in the case of Elizabeth Key also rests at least in part on her claim that she was entitled to her freedom because she was a Christian. In the 1667 case of Fernando, however, a black man's suit for freedom on the grounds of Christian baptism failed. This lack of clarity produced anxiety and a drive for resolution, reflected in confusion in the judicial decisions, and ultimately, in the passage of a law that resolved the problem.

In the meantime, several court cases concerned with the problem were adjudicated. In 1644, the General Assembly heard the case of Manuel, who was purchased as a “slave for Ever”, but later became a Christian and demanded his freedom. The court judged that, as a Christian, Manuel was not a slave, and should “serve as other Christian servants do.” Still, it ordered him to serve ten years, a longer term than white Christian servants were required to serve; the sentence reflected the pull of forces that saw all Blacks as slaves. Significantly, immediately after this decision, Manuel's owner sought compensation from the government, strong evidence that there was an expectation that Blacks would be held in perpetual servitude.

Again, statutory law was used to decide the matter once and for all, clearing up any confusion by declaring in 1667 that baptism had no effect on the status of Blacks as slaves. After Fernando initiated his case, but before the court rendered its decision, the Virginia legislature enacted a statute which read in part:

Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children that are slaves by birth, and the charity and pity of their owners made partakers of the blessed sacrament of baptism, should by virtue of their baptism be made free, it is enacted that baptism does not alter the condition of
the person as to his bondage of freedom; masters freed from this doubt may carefully propagate Christianity by permitting slaves to be admitted to that sacrament.23

In reality through the act, slaveholders were now encouraged to convert their slaves, since they no longer risked any loss of property thereby. The assembly followed its declaration on baptism with a decree that non-Christian servants brought to colony “by shipping” were to be slaves for life.24

Hence, although status in the first half of the seventeenth century was not rigidly fixed by race, the effect of the legal decisions and statutory enactments of that period was to make it more likely that Blacks would be treated as slaves, and that once slaves they would remain so. The custom of holding black laborers for a term of life was reflected in, as well as accepted and validated by, early case decisions. Routes of escape from this condition were firmly closed off by legislation in the 1660s. Any doubt that the law recognized slavery by the end of decade could be seen in a 1669 statute, An Act about the casual/ killings of slaves:

Whereas the only law in force for the punishment of refractory servants resisting their master, mistress or overseer, cannot be inflicted on negroes [because the punishment was extension of time], Nor the obstinacy of many of them by other than violent means supprest. Be it enacted and declared by this grand assembly, if any slave resist his master … and by the extremity of the correction should chance to die, that his death shall not be accompted Felony, but the master (or that other person appointed by the master to punish him) be acquit from molestation, since it cannot be presumed that propensed malice (which alone makes murther Felony) should induce any man to destroy his own estate.25

The Cultural and Economic Environment of the Development of Slave Law in Virginia

The practice of holding Blacks as slaves and the legal decisions
that gradually institutionalized that custom were connected to cultural and economic conditions that existed in England and in Virginia in the seventeenth century. The widespread availability of free land in Virginia, coupled with the boom in tobacco prices that lasted through the 1620s, fueled an extremely high demand for labor in the colony. Since land that could grow tobacco was abundant, the key to amassing wealth was the acquisition of a stable, and large, supply of labor to work that land.26

As the demand for workers in Virginia rose steadily, planters increasingly turned to indentured servants to fill this demand. These servants arrived in Virginia bound by contracts that exacted long terms of service in exchange for their transportation from England.27 The long periods of required service led to the development of a market in men unlike anything seen in Britain, where labor contracts seldom exceeded a year. Masters in Virginia could freely buy and sell servants at any time for any period of years covered by their contracts, and servants could be sold without their consent.28 Servants, without the desire to be rehired or the inclination to be pleasing, had little reason to be productive or conscientious or even respectful. Masters holding little hope or expectation of rehiring their servants for another term alternated between leniency and despotism with their workers, attempting in the former to bribe the hires and in the latter to extract the full measure they believed was their due. The latter became the norm. The Council regularly supported masters' cruelties to their servants. Probably the worst example is the case of Elizabeth Abbott and Elias Hinton, servants of John and Alice Proctor. Both servants died after receiving a series of brutal beatings. A witness testified that Proctor had beaten Hinton with a rake, and after one especially bad beating Abbott ran away to some neighbors who “fownd she had been sore beaten and her body full of sores and holes very dangerously raunkled and putrified both above her wast and uppon her hips and thighs.” Still, they returned her to her master, begging his pardon, and he was apparently never punished for either death. Mistreatment was thus common, and although it was constrained to a limited degree by the judiciary, it was generally accepted and even expected.29

Labor was not the only commodity in short supply. Severe
food shortages were also a major problem for the Virginia Company and its dependents during the 1620s, as cornfields were neglected in favor of tobacco.\(^3\) Even after the labor shortage was alleviated, population growth coupled with meager increases in the cultivation of food crops kept prices relatively high.

These economic conditions, however, did provide many opportunities for the most powerful men in the colony to enrich themselves. One of the ways they did this was to acquire most of the black workers that arrived in Virginia, which they took great pains to do. Black labor was cheaper and more valuable to the Virginia planters, especially as the costs of white indentured servants also began to rise, simply because Blacks could be kept longer than white servants.\(^3\) The desire of the leading planters for slaves was strong, even when white labor was neither scarce nor unruly.\(^3\) The high demand for slaves in the British Caribbean islands, however, left few for Virginia from British suppliers, but some regular trade was established with the Dutch, and some unsuccessful attempts to go directly to Africa were made.\(^3\) Though only a small number of slaves trickled into Virginia until the Caribbean islands were stocked, the demand for black labor continued to increase in the mainland colony long before then. By 1660, Virginia had enacted a law offering special inducements to Dutch shippers to bring slaves to the colony.\(^3\)

Because it was relatively difficult to get slaves and because their purchase required a relatively high initial outlay of capital, slave owners tended to be the wealthiest, most powerful people in the colony.\(^3\) This economic reality can be seen even in the very first account of an arrival of Blacks into Virginia, John Rolfe's 1620 letter to Sir Edwin Sandys, treasurer of the Virginia Company.\(^3\) These first “20. and odd Negroes” were bartered by the Governor of Virginia, George Yeardley, and a merchant, Abraham Piersey, in exchange for food, at a time of chronic food shortages. By 1625, these two men owned 15 of the 23 Blacks in the colony.\(^3\) Both also sat on the Virginia General Court.

Demand for labor explains why Blacks were brought to Virginia, but not why they were enslaved, or even why, regardless of their social rank in Africa, they were placed on a lower
social stratum than that of white servants. Cultural factors, particularly English racial attitudes, help provide this explanation. Here, it can be seen that the underlying reason for the discrimination that took place in seventeenth-century Virginia was the pervasive English prejudice towards Africans that existed before 1619.

The Tudor-Stuart antipathy toward black Africans has been well documented. The evidence is fairly clear that the notion that Africans were fundamentally different from, and inferior to, Europeans arose in sixteenth-century England in response to a number of circumstances. England’s insularity before the middle of that century and the English sudden interactions with people quite different from themselves in appearance and culture coupled with their simultaneous discovery of the great apes and the emotional impact of the color black in their culture led to a pervasive belief that black Africans were both biologically and culturally unworthy of being treated as equals. Ignorant of the history of Christianity in Africa, including its survival in Northeastern Africa, Englishmen asserted that Africans were not Christians, and their dark skin was a curse from God. They were strangers; they were black; they were heathens. They qualified to be slaves on all counts, and the prejudice against them seems to have been widespread in both England and America.38

Thus, in the Virginia of the early and mid-seventeenth century those who held power had both an economic need for cheap labor and a moral justification for treating a vulnerable people badly. In this context it is not surprising that the legal decisions made by the powerful men who sat on the court served to legitimize and institutionalize hereditary racial slavery.

The Legal Environment of the Development of Slave Law in Virginia
The early decision of Whites in Virginia to treat Blacks as property rooted in English racial attitudes, the economic context of Virginia, and the unconstrained nature of judicial power in the colony, led to the development of laws designed to protect the slave owners’ rights in their black property. Conciliar justice, swift, arbitrary, and brutal, was instrumental in creating the atmosphere of profound disrespect for individual liberties that
enabled masters to abuse white servants at will and to hold black servants for life. Later, as the need to regulate slavery began to replace the need to impose it, the Virginia legal system came to protect this particular type of property in much the same way all property was protected in England -- though the application of the ordinary concepts of the common law. Thus, two different aspects of the English legal tradition were drawn on in the creation of slavery as a legal institution.

The development of slave law in Virginia was contemporaneous with the development of Virginia's legal system itself. The 1606 and 1609 charters of the Virginia Company both contain vague guarantees of traditional English rights for the colonists, but are entirely unclear as to the practical meaning of this guarantee. The 1606 Charter, for example, states only that inhabitants of Virginia “. . . shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises, and immunities . . . as if they had been abiding and borne within this our realm of Englande . . . .” The supplemental instructions do little to make this any clearer. They order the colonial council to govern “as neare to the Common Law [of] England and the equity thereof as may be.”

Nor do the English legal commentators and theorists provide any elucidation of the practical relationship between English legal doctrine and colonial justice. Blackstone includes a very brief discussion of these issues in his Commentaries, concluding only that the general claim that all English laws accompany colonists to an uninhabited country “must be understood with very many and very great restrictions.” He does not, however, say what those restrictions might be. Otherwise, there is nearly total silence from the English legal community. No real theory of colonial jurisprudence was articulated.

In the absence of direction from home, then, colonial jurisprudence evolved on its own. The dominant explanation of that evolution has been that the language of the Charters transferred to Virginia the general legal framework of the mother country— its traditional legal customs and practices— rather than the entire developed body of common law principles. Aspects of this system were then changed, replaced or dropped under the influence of Virginia's economic, social, and political environments. A similar transformation took place in the devel-
Welch–Law

dvelopment of a uniquely American body of substantive law.42

The transfer of English law to Virginia, in this view, was a process of adaptation to meet colonial needs. This adaptation took place in a variety of ways. Sometimes change was wrought by deliberate dissent from English legal customs, sometimes by an imperfect understanding of those customs, and sometimes by a lack of any applicable English precedents. It is acknowledged that such a transition would have been halting and painful, but it is seen in a larger way as a logical, coherent, and essentially orderly process that gradually brought the principles of the common law to the colonies basically intact.43

This view, however, ignores or at least downplays the actual operation of the early Virginia legal system, which bears almost no resemblance to its counterpart in England, and fails to acknowledge its powerful relationship with another, less benign, type of English justice that had its roots in the social disorder and official suppression of the lower classes in sixteenth-century England. The social, political, and economic turmoil of Tudor England was met with increasingly severe treatment for the lower classes who, displaced by the convulsions, were seen as violators of public order, their dislocations proof of moral failure rather than illustrations of the deterioration of the social fabric. Greater authority was given to the courts and far-reaching poor laws and measures against vagrancy were enacted, using compulsory labor, galley servitude, and colonization as ways to deal with disorder.44

Tudor methods of suppressing dissent were harshest in the areas farthest from London. In the northern and western hinterlands and on the Irish frontier, local nobles were placed in control of governing councils which had responsibility for enforcing justice in these areas. While these bodies were theoretically bound, to one degree or another by the protections of the common law, in practice they were free to ignore those restraints and to issue whatever summary justice they chose as long as they kept the unruly poor under control. Common law procedures designed to protect individual rights and liberties were meaningless.45

In Virginia, an analogous situation existed. Whereas the Charters were vague about common law protections for the
colonists, they were quite specific in setting up a ruling council, which functioned as a judicial body just as powerful as the other conciliar courts. The council came into existence with the creation of the colony. The Company of London appointed the members of the council. The general court was the colony’s highest judicial body; however, for a number of years, it shared jurisdiction concurrently with the legislature. Criminal cases were tried in whichever body convened first. After 1640, the civil jurisdiction of the assembly was limited primarily to appellate cases. And, in practice, the Council in Virginia was just as unconcerned with common law procedures as were authorities in England. The common law was not the only law in England, and on the frontiers summary justice was the rule.

Examples of the unconstrained nature of judicial power in early Virginia are abundant and are found in every period from the First Charter through the Third and continuing well after Virginia became a Royal Colony. The reported cases demonstrate a complete lack of concern on the part of the court for individual liberties, procedural protections, or even jurisdiction. Clearly, the agenda of the Council acting as court was to control the potentially unruly lower classes who made up Virginia's laboring population and to guard the power and wealth of its members.

For example, in May, 1624, one Richard Barnes was accused of uttering “base and detracting” speeches against the governor. The court ordered that he “be disarmed, and have his armes broken and his tongue bored through with an awl. [He] shall pass through a guard of 40 men and shalbe butted by every one of them, and at the head of the troope kicked downe and footed out of the fort: that he shalbe banished out of James Cittye and the Iland, that he shall not be capable of any priviledge of freedome of the countrie, and that (before he goe out of the Iland) he shall put in suretyes of 200 bond for the good behav­ior.”

At about the same time, members of the Council became aware of grumblings of discontent against the execution of a shipmaster named Richard Cornish for sodomy. Edward Nevell encountered Cornish's brother on a ship off the coast of Canada and voiced his dissatisfaction with the execution. The Council
learned of the conversation and charged Mr. Newell with blasphemity. For this offense, over which it certainly lacked jurisdiction, the court sentenced Nevell to “stand on the pillory with a paper one his head shewing the cause of his offence . . . and to loose both his Ears and to serve the Colony for A yeere, And forever to be incapable to be a free man of the countrey.”

In handing out punishments the court did not hesitate to consider the economic advantage of its powerful members. For example, his criticism of the same execution got Thomas Hatch, a servant whose seven-year term was almost finished, a sentence of a whipping and the loss of one ear. The court also ordered that “his service to Sir George Yeardley for seven yeeres shall begin from the present dye.” When Luke Eden sought payment of a debt owed him by Sir Edwin Sandys, he wound up “laid neck and heels” for his “unreverent speche” and in debt to Sandys for two hundred pounds of tobacco.

The only justice in Virginia, then, was the unmitigated authority of the Council, which was not especially concerned with protecting anyone’s traditional rights, much less those of the common laborers and servants who came before them. The context of the development of the early law of slavery was thus deeply authoritarian. In this atmosphere of unconstrained legal authority the councillors made their decisions concerning the customary practices of slavery. Lack of respect for the rights of the lower classes, cultural contempt for Blacks, and economic self-interest combined to produce case law, and ultimately legislation, that reinforced the institution of slavery at every turn, lack of English legal precedents notwithstanding.

A clear example of the operation of this process is found in the development of the legal rule that the status of a black child descends from its mother. Many interpreters have explained this rule by arguing that as cases concerning the status of children with black mothers and white fathers came before the court, the court first looked to English law for precedents. Although the general rule of English law of status is that status is derived from the father, there is no category of “slave” to be found in that body of law, and, rather than apply the general principle to a slightly different circumstance, this argument contends that the jurists on the Virginia council turned to continen-
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tal civil law codes, which addressed slavery directly. Here they supposedly found an answer to the legal issue raised by miscegenation that was directly on point: the doctrine of partus sequiter ventrum—that the status of a child with mixed slave and free parentage follows the status of the mother. This, then, was the law that was eventually adopted in Virginia, in 1662, after the initial confusion over the issue. The statute’s wording that “Children got by an Englishman upon a Negro woman shall be bond or free according to condition of the mother, …” failed to address the reality that black men fathered children with white Christian women. In fact, the child of a white woman and black male became a servant or slave according to the status of father.53

It is extremely unlikely, however, that the source of partus sequiter ventrum is the continent. Its true source is no legal doctrine at all but rather is the same logic of domination by force that guided all of the court’s decision-making in this early period. Neither the councillors nor, later, the Burgesses were equipped to make their way through arcane English status law or complex foreign civil codes, even if they had access to them, which they probably did not.54 The real legal problem was that the familiar legal doctrine that status derives from the father would not work to maintain a growing system of racially based chattel slavery.

The logic of slavery required that the slave be reified, treated as a thing, not as a person, and the decision to make slavery descend from the mother makes the most sense when seen as a matter of determining the ownership of something rather than the status of someone. Given the social, racial, and economic context of seventeenth-century Virginia, once the custom of holding Blacks as slaves had become established, it must have seemed natural to the wealthy, powerful men who controlled the colony and the court, to conceptualize a slave woman as a piece of livestock. And English law had clear rules about livestock. If a litter of pigs belongs to the owner of the sow, then obviously a black woman’s child belongs to its mother’s master. That this outcome would also increase their personal wealth as well as avoid complicated and unpleasant personal entanglements could not have escaped the decision-makers’ notice either.
Thus, once it was established that concern for the property rights of slaveholders was the key factor in determining legal doctrine, there were simple, well-known rules available to protect and preserve those interests. English law contained in the common law one of the most developed and effective schemes for the protection of property ever devised, and there was absolutely nothing to prevent the court from applying it to Blacks.55

The legal institutionalization of slavery, then, was not an aberration or an exception to the general pattern of early legal development in Virginia. Once racism and greed had impelled the practice, the unrestrained conciliar judicial system, with its utter disregard for the individual liberties of the lower classes, permitted it to continue, and the common law provided the means to regulate it and to close the loopholes left by custom. English legal tradition thus forms the basis of both the later, more developed law of slavery and the society created by and for white Virginians. The institution that favors freedom in one context can also be the means of the continued oppression of an entire ethnic group. The foundation stone of liberty can be used as the instrument of complete loss of liberty. The English tradition of representative government, a bulwark against tyranny, enabled the Virginia legislature, full of slaveholders, to complete the job begun by the early court and completely strip Blacks of their legal humanity. Between 1680 and 1682 the legislature completed the task, enacting the first major slave codes. It not only synthesized the judicial rulings and statutory provisions of the previous four decades but also introduced others incorporating some of the strict customs and traditions that had developed to control Virginia’s indentured servants. Had it chosen to do so, Virginia could have referenced developments in England. Two years before the centennial of the 1569 Cartwright56 decision, in which it held that slavery was inconsistent with English traditions, the English court, in Butts v. Penny,57 ruled that black slavery was legal within England.
NOTES


Welch–Law


10 Higginbotham, *Shades of Freedom*, 20-22; McIlwaine, Minutes, 552.


24 Hening, Statutes, II, 260.


27 Morgan, “First Boom,” 175-176.

28 Ibid., 197-98; McIlwaine, Minutes, 82.

29 McIlwaine, Minutes, 22-24.

30 Morgan, “First Boom,” 170-76.


34 Hening, Statutes, I, 540.


40 Barbour, Jamestown Voyages, I, 35-36.


43 Ibid.

This argument is advanced by David T. Konig in “‘Dale's Laws' and the Non-Common Law Origin of Criminal Justice in Virginia,” American


46 Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color, 23.

47 Ibid., 363-75.

48 McIlwaine, Minutes, 14.

49 Ibid., 85.

50 Ibid., 93.

51 Ibid., 57.

52 Hening, Statutes, II, 170.


56 Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color, 321

57 Ibid.
The 1960s have been described as the “civil rights decade” in American history. Few scholar-activists have been identified as strongly with the legal, social, economic, and political changes culminating in the 1960s as has African American historian, sociologist, psychologist W. E. B. Du Bois. Inexplicably, in 2003, the 100-year anniversary of Du Bois’ classic, The Souls of Black Folk (1903), came and went with little fanfare within or outside of academia. However, in 2004, the 50-year anniversary of the initial U. S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) presents an opportunity for ethnic studies in general, and Black studies in particular, to acknowledge the intellectual and political contributions of Du Bois to the civil rights movement in the United States. In the post-Civil Rights Era, some authors have suggested that Du Bois opposed the initial Brown v. Board of Education (1954) ruling. In contrast, I observe in the present paper that Du Bois (1957) opposed the U. S. Supreme Court’s subsequent (1955) ruling that invoked the much-criticized term “with all deliberate speed,” rather than the initial (1954) ruling that rendered the “separate but equal” doctrine unconstitutional. Moreover, I contend that Du Bois’ own values and attitudes were fully consistent with his position on the (1954, 1955) decisions.
The year 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Around the time that Brown v. Board of Education was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court, a liberal white psychologist named G. W. Allport argued in The Nature of Prejudice (1954/1979) that federal laws should be changed to ensure social equality for all persons, regardless of individuals' so-called racial group membership. However, fifty years before The Nature of Prejudice was published, a progressive Black sociologist named W. E. B. Du Bois similarly argued in The Souls of Black Folk (1903/1969) that federal laws should be changed to ensure social equality for all persons, regardless of an individual's race.

In the present paper, I shall consider W. E. B. Du Bois' perspective on Brown v. Board of Education. Specifically, I shall attempt to debunk the notion (e.g., Patterson, 2001; Scott, 1997) that Du Bois took issue with the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. As his (1986) own words reveal, Du Bois faulted the U. S. Supreme Court for failing to specify when states must comply with Brown v. Board of Education – not for deciding in favor of Brown.

From Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education: The Rise and Fall of "Separate but Equal"

In order to appreciate the historical context in which the U. S. Supreme Court delivered its decision in Brown v. Board of Education, one must acknowledge the earlier U. S. Supreme Court decision that Brown overturned – namely, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). In Plessy v. Ferguson the U. S. Supreme Court declared that individual states could legally segregate the races, at least in public railway carriages (Hayes, 2000b). Throughout the United States individual states interpreted Plessy v. Ferguson as permitting state-sponsored segregation far beyond the realm of public transportation (Wright & Morrison, 2001). Especially relevant to the present paper is the legal justification that Plessy v. Ferguson gave individual states to segregate the races within the realm of public education (Hayes, 2000b).

At the time that the U. S. Supreme Court delivered its decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), psychology was a fledgling science (see Harrell, 1999). By the time that the U. S. Supreme
Court delivered its decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), psychology had matured sufficiently for the U. S. Supreme Court to use the results of psychological experiments as evidence that within the realm of public education, state-sponsored segregation was inherently harmful to the social-psychological development of members of stigmatized racial groups (Jones, 1997). Despite subsequent critiques of (1) the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision itself and (2) the psychological studies that the U. S. Supreme Court cited in *Brown v. Board of Education*, the importance of *Brown v. Board of Education* in changing the sociopolitical landscape of public education in the United States cannot be underestimated (Zirkel & Cantor, 2004).

**Impact of *Brown v. Board of Education* on the U. S. Civil Rights Movement**

Taken at face value, the scope of *Brown v. Board of Education* was limited to state-approved racial segregation in public elementary schools (Dorsey, 2001). Virtually from the outset, however, the significance of *Brown v. Board of Education* transcended the sphere of education (Wright & Morrison, 2001). According to Dittmer (2001), *Brown v. Board of Education* galvanized the modern civil rights movement in the United States.

Many social scientists view the 1960s as the “Civil Rights Decade” (Jones, 1997). At one time or another during the 1960s, every major branch of government within the United States actively promoted civil rights. For example, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965; President Lyndon Johnson signed Executive Order 11246 (Affirmative Action Order) in 1965; and the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision in *Loving v. Virginia* outlawing all state antimiscegenation legislation in 1967. All of these instances of civil rights activism by the federal government owe a legal and political debt to *Brown v. Board of Education* (Dittmer, 2001).

**Du Bois on Civil Rights Activism in General**

In *The Souls of Black Folk* W. E. B. Du Bois (1903/1969) protested segregation and racism within the United States (Hayes, 2000a). While Du Bois’ status as a scholar-activist is legendary, his tireless efforts in co-founding the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and in editing the NAACP journal, *The Crisis*, place him at the forefront of advocacy for social equality (Jones, 1997). Nowhere is Du Bois’ commitment to scholar-activism more evident than in his own posthumously published writings on the role that Black intellectuals ideally should play in securing social equality for African Americans as a whole:

Men of America, the problem is plain before you. Here is a race transplanted through the criminal foolishness of your fathers. Whether you like it or not the millions are here, and here they will remain. If you do not lift them up, they will pull you down. Education and work are the levers to uplift a people. Work alone will not do it unless inspired by the right ideals and guided by intelligence. Education must not simply teach work – it must teach Life. The Talented Tenth of the Negro race must be made leaders of thought and missionaries of culture among their people. No others can do this work and Negro colleges must train men for it. The Negro race, like all other races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men. (Du Bois, 1986, p. 861)

Although Du Bois’ (1986) concept of the “Talented Tenth” might initially strike readers as elitist, it is clear in his later writings that the establishment of Black intellectual leadership should not be an end in itself but rather a primary means toward the end of wresting social equality from the blood-soaked hands of White America (Zamir, 1995). Du Bois contended that those African Americans who had attained relatively high levels of intellectual development had an obligation to fight on behalf of the entire African American race.

**Du Bois on Brown v. Board of Education in Particular**

Publicly, Du Bois did not support the NAACP’s legal battle in *Brown v. Board of Education* (Gaines, 2004); however I believe that his lack of public support for the NAACP’s legal battle had more to do with well-documented interpersonal conflicts with fellow NAACP leaders (see Harrell, 1999) than with genuine antipathy toward the fight against racial segregation. In a posthumously published broadside against the phrase “with all
deliberate speed” that the U. S. Supreme Court used in its follow-up decision, *Brown v. Board of Education II* (1955), Du Bois (1995) suggested that the initial *Brown v. Board of Education* decision essentially would be worthless as a tool for securing black civil rights in the absence of a specific deadline for states to desegregate public schools:

From 1619 to 1957, the Negro in the United States has been the central thread of American history. In three periods in particular this thread has so entangled itself with the web of our history that the knots have threatened our very existence. They are:

- The African Slave Trade, 1774-1808
- Negro Slavery, 1850-1863
- Negro Citizenship, 1876-1957

These crises—which involved (1) uniting 13 colonies into one nation, (2) Civil War over the powers of the Federal government and slaver, and (3) the status of Negro citizens—we have tried to solve “with deliberate speed,” arguing repeatedly that “morals” could not be advanced by legislation. Our “speed” twice became so “deliberate” that we made little or no progress and left to our children an aggravated burden of social reform. Thus our failure to abolish slavery when we tried to stop the slave trade, left the slavery problem to be solved by Civil War. When war freed the slaves, we neglected to make the freedman citizens and this task now faces us in the midst of a rising colored world. It is difficult to conceive what the problem will be if we do not face and settle today the accumulated problems of the last 338 years. (Du Bois, 1995, p. 419)

Revisionist critiques of Du Bois as opposing the NAACP’s fight for desegregation (e.g., Patterson, 2001; Scott, 2001) not only fail to acknowledge Du Bois’ lifelong pursuit of racial equality but also fail to acknowledge Du Bois’ own words in the aftermath of *Brown v. Board of Education* (Gaines, 2004). Ultimately, Du Bois became so disillusioned with the United States’ persistently anti-Black racism that during the final years of his life, he emigrated to Ghana. Sadly, Du Bois did not live long enough to see much of the social change in the United States that he had helped engineer; he died in Ghana in 1963 (Gaines, 1996).
Reflections on Du Bois: “Dual Consciousness” and the Multicultural Ideal Fostered by Brown v. Board of Education

Throughout his scholarly life, Du Bois commented on the “two souls” that characterize the psyches of African Americans (Harrell, 1999; Jones, 1997). The title, The Souls of Black Folk (1903/1969), reflects Du Bois’ concern with the need for African Americans to reconcile the European and African influences on their conscious experience. According to Du Bois the dual aspects of African Americans’ consciousness are not inevitably in conflict. Rather, one of the primary social-psychological effects of racial discrimination in the United States is a forced divergence between the European and African streams of African Americans’ consciousness (Gaines & Reed, 1994, 1995). Du Bois believed that in order for African Americans to resolve apparent conflict between their “two souls,” they would need to be recognized as social equals by European Americans in a United States that respects the cultural contributions of all racial groups (Zamir, 1995).

The multicultural ideal that is evident explicitly in The Souls of Black Folk (1903/1969) also is evident implicitly (if not explicitly) in the U. S. Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision. The concept of the “jigsaw classroom” developed by Aronson and his colleagues (e.g., Aronson, Blaney, Sikes, Stephan, & Snapp, 1974; Aronson & Bridgeman, 1979) in which students from various ethnic groups engage in cooperative learning was directly inspired by the fitful efforts at desegregation that occurred within and outside the American South in the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education I and II (Brown, 1986). Unfortunately psychologists rarely note the congruence between Du Bois’ multicultural ideal and post-Brown public education in the United States (for an exception, see Gaines & Reed, 1994).

Conclusion

Considering he (1995) posthumous first-hand account, I see no justification for the premise that Du Bois somehow opposed the U. S. Supreme Court’s reversal of the “separate but equal” doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education. The emergence of revisionist critiques regarding Brown v. Board of Education is by no
means limited to a set of reinterpretations of Du Bois’ perspective (see Zirkel & Cantor, 2004). Nevertheless, I view revisionist critiques of Du Bois (e.g., Patterson, 2001; Scott, 2001) as especially troublesome in that his entire career as a scholar-activist was so obviously devoted to dismantling state-imposed barriers to social equality for African Americans (Harrell, 1999; Jones, 1997).

At the outset I mentioned that 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education. We should also remember that 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of The Souls of Black Folk (Du Bois, 1903/1969). Just as scholars in ethnic studies (especially within Black studies) should reflect on the pivotal role of Brown v. Board of Education in ushering in an era of civil rights activism by the federal government, so too should scholars within ethnic studies (especially within Black studies) reflect on the role of Du Bois as a catalyst for Brown v. Board of Education.

References


Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896).


WHAT'S IN A NAME?
RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATIONS
AND THE MEANING OF HISPANIC/LATINO
IN THE UNITED STATES

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The first national census was conducted in 1790, and has been repeated at ten year intervals ever since. While census taking has been consistent, the way individuals have been counted and categorized on the basis of race and ethnicity has varied over time. This paper examines how the official census definition of Latinos has changed over the twenty-two census periods. The modifications of the official definition of this group are discussed in relation to changes in national borders, variations in methodology used for census data gathering, and shifting political contexts.

One of the most common scientific activities is classifying different objects into categories. In fact, classification is not only a scientific activity but a common human activity in general. "Sorting things out," as Bowker and Star (1999) put it, can be quite informal and part of our everyday lives as well as more formalized and organized as part of the scientific enterprise. In fact, classification is fundamental to science (Babbie, 2001). Observation and measurement require at a minimum the identification of categories to describe concepts, with the categories of a particular concept defined in such a way as to allow for non-ambiguous sorting of objects into categories. That is the nature of the most basic level of measurement, the nominal, where all
objects must be classified into one (and only one) category, and all objects must be accounted for by a category.

Since at least the advent of modern science, people calling themselves scientists have engaged in the act of sorting things out. That includes the modern social scientific concepts of race and ethnicity. In fact, during the nineteenth century, when European expansion and imperialism dominated most of the world, racial classification became a critical issue, leading to what is now referred to as “scientific racism.” Beginning with Thomas Malthus’ *Essay on the Principle of Population* in 1798, European and American social scientists elaborated a wide variety of racial classification schemes, always leading to the conclusion that whites were the most advanced racial group. The French aristocrat Count Joseph Arthur de Gobineau was the first to distinguish white and black and yellow in 1853. The Social Darwinists, led by Herbert Spenser, used these ideas to justify European domination of the Americas, Africa, and Asia, while Francis Galton was the first to clearly argue that the superior inherited their superiority while the inferior inherited their inferiority. All of these ideas were cloaked in the legitimacy of “science,” particularly through the tool of “classification.” Yet, as Bowker and Star (1999) note, classification is not merely an objective process. It is shaped by the values and beliefs of those doing the classification.

All the same many social scientists have continued to argue that racial and ethnic classifications reflect nothing more than innocuous demographic processes. While race and ethnicity have political overtones, those dynamics are independent of the scientific process of classifying and counting. Is that an accurate portrayal of social science? Nobles (2000) argues that it is not, that, in fact, racial classification systems are inherently political processes. In the United States we can see how race infuses our ideas of who is part of the American community in examining the nature of citizenship. The first immigration legislation in this country was the Naturalization Act of 1790, which allowed only whites to become naturalized citizens (Kilty & Vidal de Haymes, 2000; Takagi, 1989). African Americans were not given citizenship until the post-Civil War era through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Native Americans were not recognized as citizens until 1924 (Deloria & Lytle, 1984); while it was not until the 1950s that Asians born outside the U. S. could become naturalized citizens (Takagi, 1989). Racial classification, then, has been and continues to be a fundamental issue in our society, limiting how different groups have been allowed to participate in it. Hispanics or Latinos are currently recognized as one of the most rapidly growing non-white groups in this country. But what exactly is a Hispanic or Latino? The Bureau of the Census identifies Hispanics as an “ethnic” group whose members can be of any “race.” At one time, though, it also identified Mexicans as a racial group. There has been a Hispanic presence in the U. S. virtually since its beginning as a nation-state (Kilty & Vidal de Haymes, 2000). While the purchase of Florida in 1819 may be considered the starting point, the numbers of Hispanics rose rapidly during the nineteenth century through U. S. colonial expansion, including the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848 and the Spanish-American War of 1898. A century later, the numbers escalated even more dramatically. Yet what does it mean to be Hispanic? Who becomes labeled and why?

Classifying (and Defining) Race and Ethnicity

For the most part race is no longer identified by social scientists as a biological variable. In fact, some argue that race is no longer as meaningful a force in American life as it once was (e.g., Wilson, 1978), and there is an ambivalence on the part of many people, particularly whites, to deal with race. Other social scientists have taken to using the term “ethnicity” in place of race. In a way this may be a broadening of the concept and a return to the nineteenth and early twentieth century when race itself was used in reference not only to skin color but also to such characteristics as nationality. Use of ethnicity as a substitute for race may also be a way for whites, whether social scientists or ordinary citizens, who are uncomfortable with race and racism to downplay the power of those forces in modern life. As Nobles (2000, 14) points out, “Scholars treat ethnic categorization as a beniginly descriptive marker—albeit one sometimes used for politically objectionable ends—but race has always had political
meanings and uses.”

All the same, most members of this society still identify race (whether labeling it as “race” or as “ethnicity”) as a social construct that has some continuing significance in people’s lives (Farley, 2000). The question is the extent to which race is important. Most whites have accepted the idea that racism is largely a thing of the past. Yet, as Feagin, Vera, and Batur (2001, 13) note, “The substantial white consensus on the decline of racism is not based on empirical evidence.” People in this society look upon and act toward each other based on their perceptions of other people in terms of racial and ethnic categories. Media images of certain groups as “criminal” or “welfare cheats” have affected social policy in terms of sentencing provisions for possession of particular illicit substances and changes in public assistance legislation (Kilty & Joseph, 1999). Racism and discrimination cannot exist without the acceptance of racial classification. Clearly, there is a broadly-based consensus on specific racial categories in the U. S. and, for better or worse, an acceptance of these categories as having an “objective” reality, as being “natural.”

What, then, is race? What does it mean to those of us living in this society? How does it affect our sense of group membership as well as self? To answer those questions we need to look at this concept somewhat differently, perhaps as a kind of “dis­course.” According to Nobles (2000, 13),

Today, although scientists reject race as a scientifically meaningful concept, whether race was (or is) viewed as “natural” is, in certain ways, quite beside the point. Scientific racial thought has never simply meant “proving” the biological reality of race. Equally important has been the role of scientific ideas in shaping political discourse and public policies.

In other words, scientific conceptions of social issues affect not only how scientists but also the rest of society understand and act on those issues. Scientific ideas are part of a social, political, and economic context (Meenaghan & Kilty, 2004).

As noted earlier, race has played a prominent role in the history of the United States. Race was used to justify the enslavement of Africans and the destruction of Native Americans. The
Constitution of the United States adopted in 1787 justified removing citizenship from “non-free” persons but counting them as “three-fifths” of a free person for purposes of apportionment. It appeared in the Naturalization Act of 1790, where naturalized citizenship was made available only to white persons (Takagi, 1989). Not surprisingly, then, race has figured prominently in every U. S. census.

The fact that a “variable” is included in an “enumeration” is not the whole story. What is perhaps more important is how that “variable” is conceived by those doing the research. According to Nobles (2000, 15-16),

Census bureau statisticians treat racial enumeration as the task of devising appropriate categories and counting by them. Race and its use as a counter have been regarded as self-evident in a way that belies the conceptual and political wrangling surrounding the production of racial data. Most scholarly and popular books on censuses present racial categorization as a technical procedure in need of little explanation. An institutional history of the U. S. Census Bureau written by a former bureau director never mentions racial categorization’s contentious history.

If those who are collecting the data see what they are doing as merely an objective task, then they are suggesting that they are impartial. Such impartiality provides a sense of legitimacy for their activities, making what they do more credible and acceptable to the rest of society, including political authorities. This is especially important now that census taking has come to be seen as an important activity in modern society, one endorsed and encouraged by such organizations as the United Nations (Nobles, 2000).

Simply because an activity is accepted as objective and impartial certainly does not mean that it is. That includes science. While most scientists now acknowledge that science is a human enterprise that takes place within a social, political, and economic context, most probably still believe that there is a greater degree of objectivity and impartiality than is actually the case and have substituted terms such as “scientific realism” to
respond to their critics (Meenaghan & Kilty, 2004).

In the same way census taking has maintained an aura of impartiality and objectivity. According to Nobles (2000, 17), "Social scientists, who have long recognized the role of other state institutions in shaping racial politics, have all but ignored census bureaus and censuses." Yet, census taking has played a crucial role in shaping conceptions of race in the U. S. and elsewhere. Racial categories have changed over time, reflecting the prevailing scientific beliefs of particular eras. Nobles (2000) shows how between 1850 and 1920 the conception of "mulatto" affected census racial categories as a reflection of a commitment to the concept of polygenism by American social scientists (i.e., the notion that humanity consists of several unequal species). Later changes in racial thinking, such as Social Darwinism in the early decades of the twentieth century (1990 to 1930) and then the so-called "one-drop rule" that dominated racial ideas between 1930 and 1960 and which supported segregation, were reflected in varying census categories. More recent years have reflected what Nobles (2000) characterizes as the post-civil rights era, as well as the 1977 Office of Management and Budget Statistical Directive No. 15, which created a uniform set of categories for race and ethnicity. The goal of Statistical Directive No. 15 was to help federal agencies ensure compliance with civil rights legislation, by requiring the use of standard racial and ethnic categories across all federal bureaus, including the Census Bureau. This directive created four "racial" categories (American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, and White) and one "ethnic" category (Hispanic). The latter category of Hispanic may be of any race.

Since the first U. S. census of 1790, racial (and ethnic) categories have been important facets of the information collected by the Census Bureau. Yet these categories themselves have helped to define what race is in America. For the first six censuses, the primary categories were White and Black. Then Mulatto, the mix of White and Black, started to show up, as well as Native Americans and particular kinds of Asians (e.g., Chinese). By the twentieth century, a wide array of racial cate-
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gories were included in the census, but, as noted, within the context of racial theory of the time. As Nobles (2000) shows, the census classification systems helped to create the concept of race and what it means in this society.

Census authorities deny what Nobles is arguing: that they are engaged in creating definitions of race. They assert that they are merely applying objective categories for statistical and programmatic purposes. Their statements reflect institutional racism, which refers to institutional forms or practices that systematically benefit one racial group over another (Kilty & Joseph, 1999). Institutional racism can be conscious and deliberate, but it can also be unconscious and indirect. Those in the dominant group often fail to see that their practices are discriminatory and may even deny that discrimination exists. Sentencing provisions, for example, for possession of cocaine vary substantially depending on the form of cocaine (crack vs. powder), which has led to racial bias in prison sentences between Blacks and Whites. Yet the U. S. Sentencing Commission has flatly denied racial bias, arguing instead that there is simply an appearance of bias (Kilty & Joseph, 1999).

The Meaning of Hispanic and Latino

What it means to be white or black or red or yellow or brown in this society is at least partly constructed by the social scientists and bureaucrats and public officials who endorse and carry out the census. Part of the experience of a particular minority of color, then, is shaped by these “official” definitions of who we are and who we are not. In fact, part of that experience is reflected in whether one is even defined. The numbers of Hispanics or Latinos generally remained low in census counts until the 1960s. Is that, indeed, due to small numbers, or to the ways in which population groups have been identified, labeled, and counted?

Hispanics occupy a unique place in the racial and ethnic history of the United States. Unlike American Indians, they were not treated as a menace that needed to be removed. Unlike Africans, they were not formally enslaved. Unlike Asians, they were not legally excluded or denied citizenship. For the most
part, they represent a group that was acquired through imperialism and empire-building, particularly the conquest of the American southwest. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, which concluded the Mexican-American War in 1848, ceded the northern half of Mexico to the United States. That treaty granted all residents of the area U. S. citizenship and continued rights of ownership of their lands. While the terms of the treaty were never enforced, questions about formal citizenship never were raised, nor was there concern about passage back and forth across the U. S.-Mexican border until the Great Depression era (Kilty & Vidal de Haymes, 2000). Future land acquisitions by the U. S. involving territories inhabited by Latinos were also generally resolved by granting the peoples of those occupied territories formal independence (e.g., Cuba and the Philippines) or U. S. citizenship (e.g., Puerto Rico).

That certainly does not mean that Hispanics were thought of as the equals of Anglos. For the most part, they were treated as different—as outsiders and inferiors. One of the most poignant historical examples of their treatment in racial terms occurred in Arizona in the early 1900s. A group of forty Irish orphans were brought by Roman Catholic nuns from New York to a mining town in Arizona where they were to be placed with Mexican-American families. When they learned of the families with whom these children were to be placed, Anglos in the community were outraged that “white” children would be given to “Mexicans.” The children were seized and the nuns and a priest nearly lynched. Ultimately, the situation would be resolved in the Arizona and United States Supreme Courts in racial terms as Gordon (1999, 296) notes, fundamentally in terms of “whiteness.” As Gordon goes on to say,

No matter that particular Mexican mine workers made individual, free choices to “immigrate,” their experience in the United States was structured by that of earlier Mexican residents who were involuntarily incorporated. Mexican American identity and discrimination against Mexican Americans were shaped by the U. S. conquest of Mexico and the consequent supremacy of Anglos. Correspondingly, the Anglo identity and expe-
These early experiences by Mexican Americans would be repeated throughout the twentieth century, including the deportations of supposed “Mexicans” in California during the Great Depression (Schaeffer, 2000) and mass deportations of Mexican migrant laborers in the 1950s, when there was no longer the need for laborers that led to the creation of the bracero program (Garcia, 1980). Other groups of Hispanics have also been identified in racial and ethnic terms and faced discrimination and oppression (Gonzalez, 2000).

The experiences of any racial or ethnic group, then, are shaped by how they are defined. Racial categories not only vary from one society to another, but they can also vary from one era to another within the same society. Looking at the racial categories identified in U. S. censuses since 1790 clearly shows such change (Nobles, 2000). Currently, there is a racialization process occurring regarding Hispanics (Vidal de Haymes, Haymes & Kilty, 2001), where racialization refers to the attachment of racial meaning to a group (Omi & Winant, 1987). While such meaning may be imposed upon a group, it may also be sought by members of the group. In response to demands from various advocacy groups, the U. S. Office of Budget and Management allowed a public review of the 1977 Statistical Directive No. 15 beginning in 1993. This led to a revision in the race and ethnicity categories in the 2000 census (Nobles, 2000), with the addition of “other race” and “multiple-race” categories. Latinos were particularly responsive to these changes:

In accordance with a well-established pattern, 42% of Latinos identified themselves as ‘other race,’ and 97% of all respondents who declared themselves “other race” were Latino—a significant trend not emphasized in the press. In addition, 6% of Latinos took advantage of the new ‘multiple race’ option, compared with only 2% of the non-Hispanic population. In fact, of all the multirace combinations made possible by the new option, the most common was ‘white’ and ‘some other
race,’ which census officials said was checked mainly by Hispanics (Morales, 2001).

To understand what it means to be Hispanic or Latino, one needs to understand how a group has been defined within the context of a particular society. One way that a group is defined is through some “official” process, such as how it is codified by a census bureau. That is the focus of this paper: how the U. S. Census Bureau has (or has not) defined “Hispanic” and/or “Latino” during the past two centuries. Categorizing members of a society and then counting (or not counting) them clearly affects their sense of group identity and citizenship.

There are other ways of looking at how groups are identified as well. In addition to “official” Census Bureau categories, social scientists have long conducted population surveys, which include racial and ethnic categorizations. While these may be consistent with those established by the Census Bureau and other government agencies, they may also vary substantially. This represents another source of information reflecting “official” (or expert) definitions of groups, including “standard” definitions used in periodic surveys, such as the General Social Survey or opinion polls (e.g., Gallup) and definitions used in surveys focused on particular groups, such as Hispanics.

One could also examine racial and ethnic categories described in social science textbooks. Since at least the late nineteenth century social science texts have existed, and these compilations may be used as reflections of the knowledge in particular fields that is accepted during a particular era (Meenaghan & Kilty, 2004). This information also represents a type of “official” knowledge.

Racial and ethnic categories exist outside of these “official” sources. The popular media detail how public officials and the general public identify different groups. Throughout the history of this country the mass media has been used by those in power to raise concerns about the nature of particular racial and ethnic groups. Efforts to limit immigration, to remove certain public benefits, to challenge educational activities, to keep different groups separated from each other – all reflect attempts to maintain existing social hierarchies or to establish new ones. It would
be useful to examine how popular categorizations are correlated with so-called official designations.

A final source of information on racial and ethnic group categorization is to be found in the writings and activities of advocacy groups. Social movements have influenced ideas about and images of groups throughout U.S. history. Such movements have often led to the development of civil rights organizations, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Council of La Raza. How such organizations have accepted or challenged prevailing ideas is an important matter to consider. As noted earlier, advocacy groups had a significant impact on the racial and ethnic categories used in the 2000 U.S. census.

Classifying Latinos: Latinos and the U.S. Census

The first national census was conducted in 1790, a little more than a year following the ratification of the Constitution. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution calls for an enumeration of the nation’s population every ten years at a minimum. The requirement emanates from a compromise that emerged at the Constitutional Convention that gave all states, large and small, equal representation in the Senate, but tied representation in the House to population size. In addition to the need for enumeration for House representation purposes, since the 1960 Supreme Court “one person, one vote” ruling the Census is needed to insure the rulings requirement that congressional districts within a State and State and local legislative districts to be of nearly equal population. Furthermore, the allocation of Federal and State funds is also, in part, related to census figures. Racial data collected in the census provide the basis for implementing equal opportunity, affirmative action, and some employment legislation. While the official purpose of the Census is related to the representative nature of our government as established in the Constitution and Supreme Court rulings, its contemporary uses greatly exceed this narrow application. The census has tremendous utility for market studies, academic research, affirmative action programs, and public and private planning activities (U.S.
In short, being counted and how one is counted, or classified, is of tremendous import. As noted earlier, one of the ways in which the census classifies individuals is by race. A “race” or “color” question has been asked in each census since 1790. Other than “sex,” it is the only other population item that has been consistently asked of all respondents since the first census. In the 210 years that the census has been conducted, however, racial categorizations have changed from decade to decade. The first census was quite crude, only producing separate counts for white males sixteen years of age and older, white males under the age of sixteen, free white women, all other free persons, including any American Indians who paid taxes, and slaves (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1992). In 1850 the category of Mulatto was introduced to distinguish the “color” of slaves and in 1870, the first census to follow the Emancipation Proclamation, enumerators were instructed that the “Color” column was always to be completed, since one could no longer assume “White” for “Free Inhabitants” and “Black” for “Slave Inhabitants” since the free and slave designations were no longer relevant. Furthermore, enumerators were instructed to be careful to designate any individual with any “perceptible trace of African blood” as Mulatto. Also in this census year, “Chinese” was added to the racial categorization scheme. Since this time the census has always included some type of “White,” “Black,” “Asian”, and “Indian” category.

While Whites, Blacks, and Native Americans have been counted in one way or another, albeit imperfect and incomplete, in each census since its inception, and some Asians since 1870, Latinos have not been counted in a systematic and uninterrupted way. In 1930 “Mexicans” were counted. Enumerators were offered the following choices in response to the item “Color or race:” White, Negro, Mexican, Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, Hindu, or Korean. Instructions to enumerators read “In order to obtain separate figures for Mexicans, it was decided that all persons born in Mexico or having parents born in Mexico who were not definitely White, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese, would be returned as Mexicans” (U. S. Department of Commerce 1979, 52). In the 1940 census “Mexican” was
dropped from the list of responses, and enumerators were instructed to classify Mexicans as White unless they were “definitely Indian or some race other than White” (U. S. Department of Commerce 1979, 61).

In 1960 these instructions were expanded: “Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, or other persons of Latin descent should be classified as ‘White’ unless they were definitely Negro, Indian, or some other race” (U. S. Department of Commerce 1979, 70).

Interestingly, while the 1950 and 1960 census did not have a racial or ethnic population item or category to identify Hispanics, and enumerators were generally told to list them as “White,” ex post facto attempts were made to classify them as a distinct group. The identification of Hispanic individuals was done after census questionnaires had been completed based on Spanish surnames of householders. Identification of Spanish surname was first used by the census in 1950 and later in 1960 and 1970. This was done only in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas and involved a manual coding operation based on an U. S. Immigration and Naturalization compilation of Spanish surnames. For the 1970 census the list was expanded by adding surnames that had twenty-five or more listings in the Havana, San Juan, and Mexico City, telephone directories, as well as surnames reported as Spanish-ethnic backgrounds in the 1968 October-December Urban Employment Survey and surnames taken by a study titled “The Romance of Spanish Surnames.” Coders were directed to code as Spanish any surname ending in a, es, n, no, os, s or z in which the preceding part of the name appeared on the official list. Surnames with a prefix of De, Del, De La, De Las, or De Los were also coded as Spanish. “Martin” was coded as a Spanish surname if either parent of the individual bearing that name was born in a Spanish speaking country or the person indicated that Spanish was their native tongue or that s/he was of Spanish origin (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1980). The 1970 census also generated Spanish Surname data using the ex post facto coding method for the five southwest states to provide historically comparable data with that of the 1950 and 1960 census.

The 1970 census, however, asked a five percent sample of
the total U. S. population if their "origin or descent" was "Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, other Spanish, or none of these." This item was followed by the color or race question, but not immediately (nine items in between). In cases where individuals had responded affirmatively to the Spanish origin item and had written in "Chicano," "La Raza," "Mexican-American," or "Brown" on the race item, the census bureau recorded the latter as White (U. S. Department of Commerce 1979, 75). This marked the beginning of the continuous inclusion of a Hispanic/Latino indicator in the U. S. census.

The 1980 census included a similar Spanish origin item, but collapsed the "Central or South American" and "Other Spanish" categories into one: "other Spanish/Hispanic." This change introduced the term "Hispanic" into the official census form. Furthermore, the 1980 census extended the Hispanic identifier item to all households, rather than a sample of households. Also, the response "No, not (Spanish/Hispanic)" was moved up to the first response option to clarify that this question pertained to all respondents. This question was also placed closer to the race item in the questionnaire, now following it after two other items. New instructions for enumerators did not allow them to enter race by "observation" rather they were directed to report the race with which the person most closely identified. In the case of racial mixture, the mother's race, or the first racial group given was to be reported. Also in contrast with the 1970 census, responses such as Mexican-American, Chicano, or Brown, were to be coded as "Other" for the race item if one of the listed categories was not selected. Furthermore, if a person indicated more than one ancestry in the Spanish-origin question and only the second ancestry mentioned was Spanish (e.g. Irish-Mexican), the person was to be marked as "no, not Spanish /Hispanic" (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1979, 81).

In 1990 the Spanish origin question remained essentially the same as the 1980 version with one exception. Individuals indicating "Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic" were asked to write in which group (e.g. Argentinean, Colombian). However, the write-in responses were only reviewed and coded for the sample or long-form questionnaires (20%).
Effective with the Census 2000 the Revised Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity changed the aforementioned 1977 Statistical Directive No. 15 of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in several significant ways. First, the revised standards detailed five categories for data on race: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White. The Bureau of the Census was also directed to allow for the reporting of more than one race. Furthermore, two categories for data on ethnicity were specified: “Hispanic or Latino,” and “Not Hispanic or Latino.” The OMB defined Hispanic or Latino as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.” For the purposes of the 2000 Census and a few other federal data collection activities, the OMB approved the inclusion of a sixth racial category, “some other race,” for respondents unable to identify with any of the five preceding categories (U. S. Department of Commerce 1997, 15).

The question on Hispanic origin for the 2000 census was similar to the 1990 census question except for its placement on the questionnaire. For the 2000 census it immediately preceded the question on race, reversing the order from the 1990 census. This placed the race and Hispanic origin items next to each other, a change from earlier censuses that separated the two with other questions such as age and marital status. The most significant change on the race question on the 2000 census was the option of selecting one or more race categories offered to respondents (U. S. Department of Commerce, 2001).

Within this categorization scheme, 48% of Latinos responding to the 2000 census question on race reported that they were only “White,” 42% reported only “Some other race,” 2% indicated Black or African American alone, 1.2% indicated American Indian and less than 1% indicated Asian or Native Hawaiian alone. Of the 15.4 million people who reported “Some other race” alone, 97% were Latino. Furthermore, some 6.3% of Hispanics reported two or more races, in contrast to less than 2% of non-Hispanics (U. S. Department of Commerce, 2001).
Racial Observations and Self-Identification: Changes in the Census

The numerous definitional changes regarding racial and ethnic categorization previously discussed have all occurred in changing social and political contexts. For example, the Civil War replaced the “Free Inhabitant” and “Slave Inhabitant” categories with “White, Black, Mulatto, and Chinese” categories. The Civil Rights and Black and Brown power movements led to a substitution of “Negro” with “Black” and an introduction of the term “Chicano” on the Census forms. Technical innovations also transformed the way the census has been conducted. Up until the 1960s enumerators that canvassed door-to-door conducted the census. The 1960 census began a shift towards the use of the mail system and computerized coding and analysis of forms. The 1960 census was the first to be tabulated entirely by computer and introduced a self-enumeration method on a limited basis and the first in which the mail system was used extensively. By the 1970 census approximately 60%, those who resided in large metropolitan areas, were sent the census questionnaires by mail and were asked to return completed forms by mail. Enumerators were only used to contact households that had failed to return a completed form (U.S. Department of Commerce 1980, 30-33). By 1980, 90% of household received their census form by mail. Again enumerators were only visited homes that did not return completed surveys.

This period of transition from enumerator-completed forms to self-enumeration methods had significant implications for racial categorizations as it also represented a shift from enumerator “observed” race to racial self-identification. In 1980 enumerators were no longer allowed to enter race by “observation.” This shift is more than a practical one, driven by changes in methodology. It also represented a paradigmatic shift in some ways in that it moved from “objective” observational categorization to subjective “self identification of race, from “scientific or biological ” to “social or political” notions of race. This alteration is reflected in the various official census related publications released over the 210 years the census has been conducted. For example the instructions to enumerators for the 1870
Census directed them to take special care when reporting race, particularly with respect to the class of “mulatto,” because “important scientific results depend upon the correct determination of this class.” The “mulatto” category was to be used for any individual having “any perceptible [i.e. observable] trace of African blood” (U. S. Department of Commerce 1979, 18). Years later, in the 1990 Census of Population and Housing Guide (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992, 11), the Bureau of the Census notes that “the concept of race used by the Census Bureau is not intended to provide any clear-cut, scientific definition of biological stock, rather it represents the self-identification of the respondents” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992, 11). More recently in the Office of Management and Budget revisions of Statistical Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting states that the categories in the classification scheme are “socio-political constructs and should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature” (U.S. Department of Commerce 1997, 15).

This statement is a clear change in intent from earlier periods where the census identified its categories as concrete and objective to a situation where the census bureau is acknowledging that race and ethnicity are not “scientific” ideas. Omi and Winant’s theory of racial formation presents race as a social construction. By this they mean that race is neither a fixed, concrete, objective reality, nor is it a pure illusion, fiction, or ideological construct. They argue that it has elements of both in that race is “a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies” (Omi & Winant, 1994, 55). From this vantage point, racial categories are created, lived, and transformed through a sociohistorical process of “racial projects” that ideologically link structure and cultural representation. As Nobles (2000) points out, understanding racial and ethnic concepts means treating them as “discourse,” a point of view that the U. S. Census Bureau now seems to be adopting.

In the particular case of Latinos Winant (1994) asserts that the social category of “Hispanic” resulted from the racialization
Kilty and Haymes-Classifying

of the various Latin American ethnic groups in the U. S. context. Latin American groups with distinct identities, national origins, histories, cultures, and antagonisms were amalgamated into one group through a process of panethnicity. This amalgamation emanates from the dynamic relationship between the group being racialized and the state. The intellectual and political elite of the group strategically uses the numbers and resources that a panethnic bloc can wield to make political demands, while the state benefits from recognizing and responding to a large bloc, rather than an unmanageable multitude of ethnic interest groups. According to Munoz (1987, 36), the term Hispanic emerged in the corridors of the federal government in the 1970s after the decline of the Chicano Power Movement. For federal bureaucrats, it provided a convenient category to group all immigrants from Latin America and their descendants in the context of social welfare programs. For the five elected congressmen of Latin American origins (one Puerto Rican and four Mexican-Americans), it provided a vehicle to promote coalition politics amongst their respective Spanish-speaking constituents as well as aiding them in forming a caucus which elevated their power in the U. S. Congress.

Changes in the Census and “Other Race” Constructs

The census move towards self-identification of race has led to an observable difference or ambivalence in how Latinos view themselves racially and how others outside of the Latino community view them. More specifically, nearly half (or 48%), of Latinos indicated that they were White alone while an equal number indicated that they were “some other race” alone (42%) or mixed-race (6%). Of the Latinos reporting more than one race 81% reported only two races with one being “some other race.” Two percent indicated that they were Black, 1.2% American Indian alone, 0.3% Asian alone, 0.1% Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander alone. “Other race” or “mixed race” constructs have commonly been associated with Latinos. La Raza, the cosmic race, mestizo, Creole, and the rainbow race are all terms that have been applied internally by Latinos to describe the racial-hybridity that has characterized the people of Latin
America. As an internal-racial project, the rainbow race has meant something different to Latinos than it has to white Americans. As an external racial project it has meant a non-white racialization process for Latinos in the U. S. (Grosfoguel and Georas, 1996)

In the context of the U. S., the in-betweenness of the rainbow race has been engaged in two contradictory ways as advanced by different political tendencies within the Latino leadership. The ambiguity regarding the question of race inherent in the rainbow race construct, when inserted in a binary understanding of race which characterizes the U. S., has created a situation in which Latinos can make claims at either end of the rainbow spectrum: White or Black. In other words two distinct racial projects have been advanced by Latino political elites, one racial project attempts to align Latinos more closely with whites, while the other attempts to do so with nonwhite groups.

In his analysis of Chicano politics, Munoz (1987) argues that middle class Mexican-American political organizations, such as the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA) and the Political Alliance of Spanish Speaking Organizations (PASSO) have all pursued a politics of assimilation and accommodation, choosing to identify with Whites in exchange for acceptance. More specifically, Munoz (1987, 39) asserts that while some groups have not rejected their Mexican culture, they have fostered a white identity outside of the Chicano community as a political strategy. In other words, pan-ethnic, rainbow race, cultural identity and solidarity is advanced internally while a white assimilationist strategy is advanced outwardly.

In contrast Munoz argues that the Chicano Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s attempted to “shape a politics of Chicano unification on the basis of nonwhite identity and working class interests.” This movement had its beginnings in the farm workers struggle lead by Cezar Chavez and the Chicano student movement, which produced several organizations across the nation, such as MECHA, El Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlan. Later non-student youth groups such as the Brown-Berets and other community organizations formed to support the
same political trend. These reformulations of Latino identity, in this case specifically Mexican American, directly challenged middle class Mexican-American political organizations. While aforementioned organizations such as LULAC and MAPPA sought incorporation into the dominant institutions, the central objectives of the Chicano Power Movement were a “quest for a non-white identity and the struggle for political and economic power through the development of independent Chicano institutions and community control over existing institutions” (Munoz, 1987, 42).

Official Classification and Latino Identity
More recent maneuvers around the fixing of census categories continue the exploitation of the racial ambivalence of Latinos for varied political projects. Goldberg argues that major purpose of the census “has always been to manage effective resource distribution and voting access” and “these economic and political mandates in the United States have always been deeply racialized” (1995, 245). He also asserts that due to the racial hybridity of Latinos, their racial self-identification in the census is vulnerable to the changing interest of those who have the power to define the categories. As the Latino population in the U.S. continues to rapidly grow, Goldberg argues, the political stakes are heightened in regard to which end of the rainbow spectrum Latinos will identify with in the census:

One of the subtly silent ways remaining available to dilute blacks’ voting rights, perhaps one of the only permissible alternatives now, is to set them against “other” statistically dominant “minorities,” minorities whose racial configurations are precisely ambiguous. Blacks are marked hegemonically as politically and socially liberal (and in the 1980s liberal came to be cast as literally un-American); Hispanics (and perhaps also Asian Americans) are often cast as socially (and perhaps economically) conservative...78 percent of black voters support the Democratic Party compared to 54 percent of the “Hispanic” voters, and only 34 percent of
Whites. In the managed tensions between liberals and conservatives that characterize U. S. politics, the drive to bring Hispanics under the “right” wing is on...A social statistics that purports to report the truth may be party to the next big lie, the new racialized dynamics. This new dynamic of racialized fabrication may be fueled paradoxically by the very instrument designed to democratize the social body count, namely, racial self-identification (Goldberg 1995, 246).

One of the most remarkable findings from the Census 2000 was the tremendous growth of the Latino population. National Census figures indicate that the Latino population grew by 58% since the previous census, reaching 35.3 million by the time of the 2000 census. In just two years later, the Latino population had grown by an additional 9.8%, reaching 38.8 million or 13.4% of the total U.S. population (Ramirez and de la Cruz, 2002). This number marked the Latinos as is the nation’s largest minority community, a demographic shift that many are predicting will have broad implications for the political landscape of the U. S. True to Goldberg’s predictions, political jockeying to gain the Latino vote has heightened. At issue here is how the “Latino” vote is seen by various groups, including the dominant “white” or “Anglo” group in this country or by other minorities who may attempt to develop coalitions.

What it means to be Hispanic or Latino is a complex issue. The numbers seem to have skyrocketed in the recent past. In 1930, 1.3 million Mexicans were reported in the U. S. census, while 2.3 million “persons of Spanish surname” were reported in the 1950 census. Then in 1970, 9.1 million were counted, followed by 14.6 million in 1980 and 22.4 million in 1990 (U. S. Department of Commerce, 1993). The 2000 census reported 35.3 million Hispanics (U. S. Department of Commerce, 2001).

One of the critical questions here, though, is the extent to which Hispanics have been counted accurately in the past. By not being specifically identified, it would be a simple matter for authorities (and most members of the dominant racial/ethnic group) to ignore them – and therefore not to count them at all.
Throughout the first century of their presence in the U. S. (i.e., from 1850 to 1950), there seems to have been little formal identification by the Census Bureau. Yet as we showed earlier, Anglos clearly saw and related to Hispanics in the U. S. Southwest (formerly the northern half of Mexico) in racial terms i.e., in a discriminatory manner (e.g., Gonzalez, 2000; Gordon, 1999). Not identifying makes it easy to ignore a group, potentially limiting group awareness and the emergence of group solidarity, while ensuring institutionalized biased treatment.

Now the existence of Hispanics is being established in the form of racial and ethnic categories, particularly since Statistical Directive No. 15 and its modification for the 2000 census. There is still the issue of whose interests are being served by this codification process (i.e., the racial project). Population growth has shifted to new areas of the country, affecting apportionment and redistricting as well as the allocation of federal funds and the potential enforcement of civil rights legislation. Further, identifying groups through census categories can be a tool for separating and dividing minorities of color. Racialization, then, can serve the interests of a minority (particularly an emerging group) by providing a mechanism around which social action and group solidarity may develop. At the same time, it can be used by the dominant group as a wedge to split potential allies, thus helping to maintain the superiority of the dominant group.

References


THOMAS BRAGA'S PORTINGALES: A CELEBRATION OF PORTUGUESE AMERICAN CULTURE

Reinaldo Silva

Profoundly fascinated by and connected to the ancestral culture, Thomas Braga in Portingales (1981) believes he can best express his condition as a so-called hyphenated American if he expresses himself in English rather than in Portuguese. Fully aware that English, as opposed to Portuguese, will connect him with broader audiences so as to convey his ethnic experience, Braga's poems are subtle reminders to mainstream America of the enormous contributions of the peoples of Portuguese descent to the building of the United States of America.

While focusing on the complexities of being born and growing up as a hyphenated native of the United States, Braga is also eager to celebrate Portuguese American heroes, express the Portuguese reaction to mainstream values and beliefs, and show how Portuguese values and traditions are kept alive within a dominant culture, particularly through his grandmother, whom he views as a connecting bridge for the country and culture of Braga's ancestors.
In “‘The Poor, Shiftless, Lazy Azoreans’: American Literary Attitudes Toward the Portuguese,” published in 1979, George Monteiro noted that “perhaps the Portuguese in America will get a fairer shake from that first-rate novelist of Portuguese descent who has yet to make his appearance.” At the time no one knew “what that first-rate (or second-rate or tenth-rate) writer will write about the Portuguese, if that writer deigns to write about them at all.” Monteiro goes on to state, “If the writer chooses to ignore the American Portuguese he or she will not have been the first one to do so, for the sad fact is that the United States already boasts in its cultural history two writers of Portuguese descent” (Monteiro 186). Before embarking on a detailed analysis of why Thomas Braga’s poetry in Portingales should take its place as Portuguese American literature, a brief outline of the few writers who preceded him might prove helpful. In other words, this category within American Literature, how it evolved, and the ways in which these voices responded to American culture and traditions need to be addressed.

The first two authors under consideration are John Dos Passos (1896-1970), a writer who is well known for his novels about America, and John Phillip Sousa (1854-1932), a renowned composer and concertmaster. It is less recognized that Sousa was also the author of three novels and an autobiography. In the fiction, The Fifth String, a novelette published in 1902; Pipetown Sandy, a novel published in 1905 for young readers; and The Transit of Venus, which appeared in 1919, Monteiro notes, there is “nothing...that remotely touches on Sousa’s ethnicity” (187).

John Dos Passos was the grandson of an immigrant from the island of Madeira. He did not acknowledge let alone celebrate his Portuguese ancestry. Monteiro notes that Dos Passos felt uncomfortable with Salazar’s fascist dictatorship in Portugal (1926-1974) and that he had identity problems from the beginning since he had been born out of wedlock and his father was considered a “Dago.” His magnificent major work, USA (1930), composed of three volumes or novels—The 42nd Parallel, Nineteen Nineteen, and The Big Money--does not include any reference to his Portuguese background. Nor does Mid-Century (1960) in which Dos Passos chronicles the mid-twentieth centu-
ry in the United States as USA does the 20s and early 30s. Nor does Mr. Wilson's War (1962), a selection from, ironically, the Mainstream of America Series, covering the time from the assassination of McKinley to the defeat of the League of Nations. With the exception of the later phase in his career, when he wrote books about Brazil and Portugal as was the case with The Portugal Story: Three Centuries of Exploration and Discovery, published in 1969, Monteiro notes that his Portuguese ancestry "was more of an encumbrance to be suffered quietly than a proud heritage worthy of proclamation" (196).

Although we find ethnic literature early on in American Literature, for example Abraham Cahan's The Rise of David Levinsky (1917), Anzia Yezierska's Bread Givers (1925), and certainly as early as 1845 in the slave narrative, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas, these were works written by immigrants still familiar with their native country and customs or in the latter case in response to the institution of slavery. Sousa and Dos Passos must be understood in the context of the times and culture which shaped them. First of all, both Sousa and Dos Passos were born in the United States and viewed themselves as Americans; this meant denying one's ethnic background, viewing it as an obstacle to breaking into the Anglo cultural mainstream. They stand as symbols of ethnically dispossessed people due to the pressures mainstream American culture placed on its non-Anglo citizens, especially those with artistic yearnings and especially in the first half of the century.

Fortunately, more recent writers have not felt so alienated from their ethnic background. Instead they more often have seen in their heritage a richness worth celebrating and writing about. With Thomas Braga (and more recently Frank X. Gaspar and Katherine Vaz) Portuguese American literature has matured to the point of aptly being classified as such. Gaspar's Leaving Pico (1999) and Vaz's Mariana (1997) are two examples of Portuguese American fiction that have kicked open the door to mainstream American Literature and are widely read and appreciated in America and abroad. Their appeal to a wider audience is obviously greater than those of the former emigrant/exile or immigrant generation of writers such as José Rodrigues Miguéis (1901-
1980) and Jorge de Sena (1919-1978), who wrote mostly in Portuguese.

The major difference between Migueis and Sena and emergent Portuguese American writers such as Gaspar, Vaz, and Braga is that the voices composing the latter group write in English. Neither Gaspar nor Vaz know Portuguese well enough to write in the language their writing. In addition, these are three voices among a few others whose arrival may counteract the absence Monteiro complained about nearly a quarter of a century ago.

In an interview conducted by Nancy T. Baden and published in 1981, one of her interviewees, Onésimo Teotónio Almeida, when asked about the possibility of the emergence of a Portuguese American ethnic literature, he observed that if it ever emerged, it certainly would be written in English and would be classified as belonging to American Literature (Duarte 26). Such is the case with the poetry in the work under consideration. In Portingales (1981), however, Braga does not completely dismiss the language of his ancestors since at least four poems have Portuguese versions. Once in a while he will also sprinkle some of his poems with a word or two of Portuguese. What this seems to indicate is his strong attachment to the culture of his ancestors. Braga has also published the following volumes: Chants Fugitifs (1981), poems written in French and reflecting the poet's graduate school days; Coffee in the Woodwinds (1990), a work inspired by the habitués of a coffee shop in Plattsburgh, New York, where the poet got to hear the concerns and sounds (accents) of the locals; Crickers' Feet (1992), poems where the poetic voice views the activities of locals from the "catbird's" seat; Borderlands (1994), where Braga collected his foreign language poems in French, Portuguese, and Spanish to fathom the "borderlands" of the heart; Litotes (1997), poems written in a subdued sensuous style; Motley Coats (2001), poems departing from the purely ethnic theme to embrace a wider world view; Inchoate: Early Poems (2003), containing the poet's very first attempts while an undergraduate and graduate student. He has just completed Amory: Six Dialogues and Six Poems, a prose piece interspersed with poetry, which is still awaiting publication. It consists of six short dialogues between Amory, an eighty-
one year-old Portuguese American man near the end of his life, and Tony, a thirteen year-old Portuguese American lad. They talk about a number of controversial topics including sexuality, love and marriage, poetry and literature in general, God, religion and death, and homosexuality. My analysis of Braga is limited to his Portuguese American experience to *Portingales* since this is the only one dealing exclusively with that experience. In this volume, Braga claims to have expressed his obsession with a bilingual childhood and ethnic identity, aspects that do not emerge as strongly in his other volumes.

But who is Braga? We learn the following in George Monteiro’s preface to *Portingales*:

Thomas Braga is of Portuguese ancestry. Born in Fall River [Massachusetts], on Columbia Street (still very much at the heart of the city’s Portuguese community), he remains—willy-nilly—a hyphenated American. As a tenured university teacher, his primary field is the French language and its literature, with, officially, secondary interests in other romance languages, including the language of his parents and ancestors (11).

Although Braga’s poems should not be described as being essentially Portuguese American, Monteiro is of this opinion:

[It is] absolutely right to call them the poems of a poet who happens to be a Portuguese-American. That is not to say that his poems never touch upon the complexities of being born and growing up as a hyphenated native of the United States. On the contrary; for although some of the poems actually center on that complex experience, all the poems, in my estimation, derive from that same experiential situation (12).

Further evidence that Braga thoroughly partakes in the culture and language of his ancestors is his dedicating *Portingales* to “Vovó,” that is, his grandmother. As we shall see in some of his poems, this woman is an emblematic figure because she represents the ties with the culture of the Azores islands in the Atlantic nearly a thousand miles west of mainland Portugal.

*Portingales* is a collection of twenty-seven poems, namely: “Friendship” or “Amizade”; “Solitude” or “Solidão”; “Azorean
Portingale” or “Açoriana”; and “In the Glass Dome” or “Na Redoma.” The poems can be grouped into one major category, with two subgroups: the celebration of Portuguese American heroes and the ancestors. The first group deals with writings that touch upon matters related to ethnicity: the celebration of Portuguese American heroes as part of a Portuguese reaction to denigrating mainstream values, beliefs, and practices. It also focuses on Portuguese values and traditions and how they are kept alive within a dominant culture that has traditionally encouraged ethnic minorities to assimilate and forget their ancestral culture. The poems in this group also highlight what is quintessentially Portuguese. The second group deals with Braga’s ancestors and how they relate to retaining their ethnic culture.

What is perhaps the most interesting aspect of “Below the Hill,” a poem from the first subgroup, is how Braga views his city of birth and its clannishness and schooling as a stifling wasteland during one of his

Digressions
through haunted Ghetto
and stagnant streets
ramble once again
in the Psyche
of a too reflective
Ego (17).1

Braga’s command of written Portuguese shows that he took lessons in Portuguese. In the following quote, he touches upon an aspect of Portuguese American life in the United States. Parents who wish to maintain their ties with their country of origin often enroll their children in the community’s Portuguese school in the evening. His childhood recollections of the school he attended are so vividly imprinted on his mind that he even refers to them during one of his strolls through the streets of Fall River:

On the other side,
Escola,
where crucifying
hours taught
Subject to “have”
Knowledge,
but not to love
Truth (19).

The poem also contains a few snapshots of the people in this community, the poet’s house of birth, the church he attended, and the city, which is compared to a wasteland. In addition this poem also stresses how learning the language and clannishness are ways of retaining ethnicity even if at times Braga makes these sound negative. Perhaps the most important feature of “Below the Hill” is the way that the poet views himself in relation to this ethnic community and how it has shaped his personality and outlook on life. With such a background it is obvious he would see life with Portuguese American eyes:

It is I – ‘Guee who speak,
inviting Anyone
to walk with me
and peek at Corners
of Obsessions’
Soul (17).

The phrase “I – ‘Guee” may also mean something else. If we isolate it from the rest of the poem it may not only represent the emphasis he places on himself as someone who has been shaped by Portuguese culture. In a broader sense he may be hinting at how a hyphenated American spends most of his life shifting back and forth from the private sphere of his ancestral culture and that of the public, official mainstream represented by school or one’s profession, an aspect Richard Rodriguez has touched upon in *Hunger of Memory: The Education of Richard Rodriguez*. Moreover, Braga might be pointing to his status as a “‘Guee” whose other self is constantly being challenged by the demands of a mainstream culture based on the principles of self-reliance and individualism, here represented by the “I.”

The poem, “Independence,” is Braga’s reminder to mainstream culture of the Portuguese presence, here symbolized in the figure of John Phillip Sousa during the celebration of a key date in American culture, Independence Day:
With Sousa marches we parade
through city streets, parks and suburbs,
pageantries democratized, e
pluribus, we have an unum.

Can anyone, Braga asks, imagine a Fourth of July parade (or any parade in the United States) without patriotic marches? The irony this poem uncovers is that mainstream culture has often neglected the contributions of its ethnic minorities, but on Independence Day it cannot do without the music of Sousa, a Portuguese American. Compared to the quoted excerpt, the second strophe is longer. While the first one stresses Sousa's contributions to American culture, the second one deliberately presents mainstream culture more forcefully so as to show how it dilutes its ethnic component:

We civilize with bubble gum,
soda, libations Amerindian,
England's laws made new Saxon constitution, space's self-reliance.
But man in every state remains
What his species earns, compliance,
and builds upwards a politic,
a striped cause for identity.
Adam calls home earth endemic,
all governments disassociate,
all master plans proliferate –
metamorphic conformity (53).

It is in the complexity of these lines where Braga's argument actually lies. When alluding to Emerson and Whitman through the references to "self-reliance" and "Adam," Braga is certainly elevating Sousa to a similar status. With Sousa there is certainly a little bit of Portugal in Independence Day. Instead of referring to these festivities as Fourth of July parades, Braga deliberately alludes to them as "Sousa marches" so as to acknowledge his ancestry. Apart from this poem's stress on ethnic allegiance, Braga is also expressing the pride he feels in sharing the same ethnic background as Sousa especially when he and other fellow Americans proudly parade "through city streets" at the beat of "Sousa marches." In addition, this poem is a reminder of what
has gotten lost, that is, one's ethnic identity, at a time when the official discourse in America urges ethnic minorities to assimilate as quickly as possible and forget their ethnic background. In Braga's words, Americans have been urged to adopt the values of "compliance" and "metamorphic conformity," while showing us how this philosophy leaves ethnic minorities completely depersonalized.

A quick glance at the poem, "Judith Melo," suggests a criticism of the practice of Anglicizing foreign names, but an in-depth analysis reveals that it is more than an affirmation of one's ethnic background. Below a surface reading lie important historical matters other than the marriage of a Portuguese Jew and a Portuguese Catholic:

Judith Melo,
come, make litanies
with Luso Manuel
and let sullen
Providence
smile, sneer, smite
your dark Semite
countenance.

The priests and I
remember dolefully
Judy pouting,
whispering reverently:
'I hate the name
Judy;
my name is Judith
Melo.'

In this poem what Braga aims at uncovering for mainstream readers is the role of Portuguese Jews in America and how much they have contributed to the grandeur of this nation. According to Pap:

Portuguese Jews [were] driven from Portugal, first by the forcible conversion order of 1496 and then by the continuous persecutions (even of those who had forcibly embraced Catholicism) throughout the six-
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teenth and seventeenth centuries. Other Jews of Portuguese descent, together with many originating from Spain had found refuge in England and in eastern Mediterranean countries. During the second half of the seventeenth century, and through the eighteenth, many of these Spanish-Portuguese (Sephardic) Jews made their way to the American colonies (Pap 9-10).

One particular group settled in Newport, Rhode Island, where they “laid the cornerstone of what is now the oldest extant synagogue in America, the Touro Synagogue in Newport.” Moreover, Portuguese Jews were instrumental in introducing the sperm-oil industry to America:

...The development of Newport under Aaron Lopez and his associates helped pave the way for the leading role which New England was to take in whaling in the nineteenth century, with New Bedford as the center. It is likely that the whaling ships operated by Lopez, like those going out from Nantucket and New Bedford in later years, recruited part of their crews in the Azores, and thus provided the ‘jumping board’ for some of the earliest Azorean settlers in the American colonies (Pap 11-12).

Not only have the Portuguese Jews founded the oldest synagogue in America they also have contributed with their expertise to one of the most financially-rewarding industries in nineteenth-century America, especially in New Bedford and Nantucket. That is why words such as “Newport,” “Sephardic,” “candles” and “Converso” (a Jew or Muslim who has converted to Christianity) in Braga’s poetry are meaningful, as the following lines show:

Judith at Mass
celebrated at Newport
heard the non sum dignus
echoing with the candles.
Judy sighed and giggled
While the choir, incense,
temple lisped Sephardic chants, melo-dias.

66
Judith Melo,
forget the tribe,
forsake the tiles
Converso,
mememtoes of crucified
Book – Azulejo.
Call me your spouse
Ecclesiastical (57-58).

The whales and the sperm oil, after all, were all transformed into the “candles” that this poem alludes to and which illuminated the nation’s homes. Moreover, this important New England industry was located not too far away from “Newport.”

Braga’s “Judith Melo” wishes to convey not only to mainstream readers but also to Portuguese immigrants, Portuguese Americans, and other ethnics that there is certainly more of Portugal in American culture than people often wish to acknowledge or perhaps know about. In addition, the lines “Providence/ smile, sneer, smite/ your dark Semite/ countenance” are ironical. It is not Providence or God, says Braga, but rather mainstream America that has viewed Jews as possessing dark complexions, often comparing them to blacks as Karen Brodkin has shown in *How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America* (2). In other words, it is the city of Providence, Rhode Island, where members of the dominant culture would sneer at her despite her people’s contribution to their culture.

Other poems within this subgroup also stress how firmly Braga is rooted in the culture of his ancestors. Not only are such poems as “Ash Wednesday,” “Codfish Cakes,” and “Bacalhau” a substantiation of this, they also highlight how specific Portuguese beliefs, traditions, and ethnic foods are preserved within these “ethnic enclaves.” While “Ash Wednesday” attests to the Catholic fervor of the Portuguese, the poem “Codfish Cakes” points to the Catholic observance of a fish diet on Fridays during Lent:

No meat today, don’t ask!
No red sacrifice, instead the sea
will confess our sins in white
make us pure in a frying pan.
It’s Fri-day, herbs, black aprons
dress friends – mackerel, flounder, cod
Parsley, onions, green sauce anointed
fill our souls with sanctity marine.

In this poem Braga touches upon quintessential aspects of life in a Portuguese fishing community. In addition it highlights the gender roles in this fishing town. Whereas the men are the ones who risk their lives at sea to provide for their families, the women, in contrast, are depicted as housewives, routinely cooking and raising their children. Traditionally, the widows put on “black aprons” or “shawls” so as to mourn their shipwrecked husbands. Others simply wear dark clothes all the time since there is no joy when a loved one is away for days or months at a time. Fishermen, their wives believe, only come back to life when coming ashore. The mood in this poem is marked by a certain feeling of fate (“fado”) and nostalgia (“saudade”), aspects which some believe characterize the Portuguese temper. The perils involved in catching codfish in Newfoundland for about half a year, the storms and the imminent shipwrecks, and the wives or mothers who long for their husbands or sons are aspects this poem touches upon—even if indirectly. With the sea possessing such a symbolic value in Portuguese culture (epitomized by Portugal’s role in the age of European explorations and its fishing subculture and traditions), the sea has, indeed, shaped the Portuguese outlook on life: that of a people subject to its whims. Not only does this poem attest to this fish diet during Lent as a community ritual, it also stresses the cultural and religious roles of women:

Codfish cakes sizzle in holy oils
greasy hosts dished out to each
in kitchens of briny Ports
shawls chanting waves of the catch.

Salty patties, water, poesy, place
make the sea our sod, sanctuary
as we sail through centuries, grace,
eating codfish cakes, kale, statuary (29).
The poem’s religious diction in such phrases as “red sacrifice,” “confess our sins in white,” “pure,” “holy oils,” and “sanctuary” further attest to these women’s Catholic beliefs and how they cling to God since He is the only One capable of bringing their loved ones ashore. The religious imagery contained in the line “greasy hosts dished out” associates women with the holy Eucharist and, presumably, Christ’s Last Supper, given the time of the year, but also attests to their role within the Roman Catholic Church. Women, more than men, found in the Church an outlet for a more meaningful life. A poem centering on a popular Portuguese foodstuff also has the effect of highlighting the Catholic fervor of the people living in this Portuguese American community—especially the women.

“Bacalhau” is a hymn to all the fishermen who sail to Newfoundland to capture codfish:

In search of hallowed cod,
all salted, all preserved,
in high rubber boots shod,
‘Guees sail, for brine reserved.

Hauled into port, the fish,
loyal friends sacrificed,
dressed in oils, eggs, the dish
in garlic, onions diced

with olives, potatoes,
lemon and paprika,
for some with tomatoes,
Bacalhau America

in ethnic savours best.
With memories repast,
dark seaweed spirits rest
by sirens lured, barques past.

Although codfish cakes are a Portuguese delicacy, their taste, as the poem reminds us in the last strophe, is often bitter if we recall those unfortunate sailors whose “spirits” and bodies were trapped in the “dark seaweed.” By capitalizing “Bacalhau
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[codfish] America,” Braga wishes to stress its importance in Portuguese gastronomy and how these traditions are kept alive in the Portuguese “ethnic enclaves” of America, a land that has often been hostile towards Otherness. As in the previous poem, “Bacalhau” brings to the fore quintessential aspects of Portuguese culture and ways, namely the Catholic fervor of the Portuguese, Portugal’s nautical culture, and the unpredictability of life—all of which have shaped the people under consideration.

Moreover, Braga wishes to attach a sense of sacredness to the lives of these fishermen and their catch since there is so much at stake. The poem is also replete with religious overtones. While Braga is stressing the Catholic fervor of the Portuguese through the Eucharistic connotation embedded in the poem, it is possible that he may also wish to establish a parallel between the lives of these men and the quest for the Holy Grail. Whether they will or will not encounter what they are looking for lies in the hands of God.

The other subgroup of poems stresses Braga’s fascination with, pride in, and knowledge of the culture of his ancestors. “Cravo” is a homage to the Democratic Revolution that took place in Portugal on April 25, 1974, and that marked the end of a forty-eight year Fascist dictatorship. It is also known as the carnation (“cravo”) revolution since there was little shedding of blood. With Marcello Caetano’s (the successor of Salazar) fascist régime offering little resistance, the military quickly took control of the situation as the bystanders and sidewalk florists in Lisbon cheered them on. Instead of bullets, the soldiers placed the red carnations from the florists’ stands on their rifles as a token of peace and victory. Braga is fully aware that this episode is a cornerstone in twentieth-century Portuguese history since it brought a sense of hope for the future. Moreover, it represented the downfall of the Portuguese colonial empire:

A baroque calyx stirs in my cup as I read the headlines: April 25, Captains’ Coup. My morning festooned with serrated cravos,
hopes, awaits dawning
vermilion phallus Portingale
While the phallic images contained in “calyx,” “cravos,” and “vermilion phallus Portingale” attest to the energy and determination of these soldiers, the poem pays tribute to those who partook in this revolution. It also celebrates Portugal’s glorious past represented by the Discoveries in the sixteenth century. In addition, it stresses the role of Luís de Camões (“one-eyed poets”), the author of *The Lusiads* (1572), Portugal’s great epic poem that celebrates Vasco da Gama’s discovery of the sea-route to India in 1498:

Melodiously
like a field of blue
Azorean hydrangeas,
One-eyed poets bloom
in verdant, sombre humus,
Afric blossoms, violet hues
of crucified sails in late
spice-scenting sun,
voyages, navigation of lost
caravel assimilated in Cristo.

Not only is Braga proud of his Azorean heritage represented by the emblematic “Azorean hydrangeas,” he is fascinated by Portugal’s role in uniting the world with its “caravels,” that is, Europe with Africa (“Afric blossoms”) and India, with its “spice-scenting sun.”

Portugal’s moment of glory, Braga reminds us, came to an end when King Sebastian, anxious to capture Portugal’s former strongholds in North Africa (Morocco), was captured in Al-Kasir al-Kabir:

The afternoon caresses
the monocled Dom Sebastian
in the blaspheming ruddy sun
of Maroc sands, Alcasar-Kebir;

Never returning to Portugal and without a legitimate heir to the throne, Philip II, the Spanish monarch, immediately stepped in so as to claim the Portuguese throne in 1580. This “madness,” Braga claims, cost the Portuguese their independence for sixty
years. While aiming to establish a parallel between both moments in Portuguese history, that is, during the Spanish annexation of Portugal and during the forty-eight year fascist dictatorship, the Portuguese, Braga claims, experienced oppression, misery, and poverty. During both periods, the Portuguese had to wait for better days:

Lusian Cravo and Tome
sown by Antonio
burst forth in the mud puddle
perfuming my saucer
with revolution, empire’s freedom.

While Antônio de Spínola became one of the emblematic figures of the revolution, Mário Soares and Álvaro Cunhal had lived in exile due to their leftist political views. With the revolution under way, however, Cunhal supported a more radical Communist commitment whereas Soares was more moderate and eventually thwarted Cunhal’s influence after the first months of the revolution when Portugal, in 1975, was on the verge of becoming a Soviet-satellite country. Both, however, are now regarded as emblems of resistance and their aid in bringing down the dictatorship cannot be overlooked, as Braga tries to remind us in the lines “Spínola, Soares, Cunhal/but where is the dark, light/ demure Manueiline Rosa?” (46-47). Braga’s interest in these matters is his way of acknowledging the extent to which first and second generations of Portuguese in America were aware of—and interested in—the political situation in the old country. Their break with the Old World was never complete. Not only does this poem reflect the author’s pride in his ancestral culture, it also reflects the ways in which he identifies himself with the heroes he has listed. He truly admires their heroism and determination, especially in times when the nation was plunged in uncertainty and despair.

“"In the Glass Dome" touches upon the notion of a past that is crystallized in the poet’s mind, replete with stories that had been conveyed to him by his grandmother and from which he draws spiritual sustenance. As in so many ethnic literatures, the figure of the grandmother is emblematic, for she is the liaison between the ancestral culture and the grandson. A very religious
woman, she is the one who caters to his need for ethnic materials. He, in turn, is the one who gives shape to the stories she had narrated to him much earlier. The fragments of life in a fisherman's community such as the ones alluded to below are a fine substantiation of the poet's indebtedness:

It's all in the glass dome:
hours with Grandmother all alone,
the saints, the candles, the neighbor woman,
teas, nights saying the rosary –
It's all in the glass dome.

It's all in the glass shade:
angels, youth's streets,
hushed voices, holy water,
high Masses sung in the temple –
It's all in the glass shade.

It's all in the glass cover:
old ladies, fishmongers, bakers:
– "Tell us what you ate today."
– "I ate fried fish and hot bread" –
It's all in the glass cover.

In Grandmother's glass dome 'tis
All there born in bloom, mourning –
gardens, smiles, sunflowers,
little birds, autumns, suns –
It's all in the glass dome (42).

While this poem attests to Braga's Catholic upbringing, the religious fervor of his grandmother, and the evenings spent with her as she fingered the decades on the rosary, it also casts a brief glance at the time when the poet used to hang out with his friends in what he refers to as "youth's streets," an aspect he dwells on more at length in "Below the Hill." The reference to the "old ladies, fishmongers, bakers" allows us to peek at moments in an ethnic community. Buying fish at the fishmonger's or Portuguese rolls and sweet bread at the local bakery is yet another opportunity to listen to the latest news and gossip.
Not only these but the lavish flower and vegetable gardens the Portuguese grow—and, presumably, his grandmother as well—in their backyards are a source of materials from which the poet can draw from to write poems and stories. As Fred L. Gardaphé has shown, the grandparent figure is at the heart of ethnic writing (120). For the ethnic writer the grandmother figure and her grasp of the ancestral culture are the modern day equivalent of the muses of classical antiquity.

At first, “Portuguese Lullaby” may look like the poet’s recollection of the bedtime lullabies his grandmother used to sing to him, but the poem is an important one because it attests to Braga’s skill in pulling together different allusions to Portuguese history and culture. Its most intriguing aspect, however, is the poet’s ability to hear his Azorean ancestors calling to him, reminding him of his cultural and ethnic background:

Sleep, child. It’s late. You must go out to sea.
O lo-lo-ro chiar do mar, nanar.

Aquamarines, ancestors, pearls
I hear across generations
Blowing my paralytic sails
Calling me with divinity’s
Ebb and flow, conscience, age’s conch:

Sleep, child. It’s late. You must go out to sea.
O lo-lo-ro chiar do mar, nanar.

Whalers, fishermen, company,
Black beards, no land, no island home,
Maids, enclaves, baroque progeny
Newfoundlands, colonies, flotsam
Steer blood’s briny imperative:

Sleep, child. It’s late. You must go out to sea.
O lo-lo-ro chiar do mar, nanar.

Vovo’s breasts, waves, feasts, lullabies
Chant like crucified caravels
Lapping soul’s circumference, shells.  
Our crusader winds, cradles, kin  
Tow azurely with sirens’ ring:  

Sleep, child. It’s late. You must go out to sea.  
O lo-lo-ro chiar do mar, nanar.  

Not now but soon blue poesy,  
Indies’ rites, spirit’s absolutes  
Will bear me back from heresy  
Drowning Thomas sacraments, roots  
With pater noster’s elements:  
Sleep, saint. It’s late. We must go out to sea.  
O lo-lo-ro chiar do mar, nanar (63-64).  

Like Whitman’s “Out of the Cradle Endlessly Rocking,” where the poetic voice recalls a childhood episode of a bird singing to him, which he later, as an adult, interprets as his role of solitary singer, in “Portuguese Lullaby” Braga has also come to the realization that his role consists in celebrating Portuguese American culture. A poem that on a first reading looks more like the call of the ethnic (to adapt Jack London), it also evokes other matters such as Azorean fishermen, their contribution to the local and New England whaling industries in the nineteenth-century, as well as the feeling of isolation typical of island life. On the one hand the image of the “crucified caravels” (sails stamped with Christ’s cross) takes us back to the sixteenth century while on the other hand “circumference” echoes the age’s desire to circumnavigate the world and reach uncharted lands as was the case with Magellan (Fernão de Magalhães), a Portuguese at the service of the Spanish crown. As readers, we notice how Braga felt compelled to pay tribute to the most remarkable woman in his life, his grandmother. Had it not been for her and her stories, one wonders if Portingales ever would have seen the light of day—at least in the form that we know.  

With Braga, Portuguese American ethnic literature is evidently beyond an embryonic stage. The poems in Portingales are a far cry from the writings about America of José Rodrigues Miguéis and Jorge de Sena, which I have outlined at the begin-
ning of this essay. Whereas these writers expressed their interest and, most of the time, dismay, frustration, and anxiety about what America represented to them mostly in the Portuguese language, Braga’s choice of English enabled him to “light out” for what these writers perceived as “uncharted land.” Moreover, his status as a native speaker of English allowed him to reach out to greater audiences, which, in turn, made him a credible source when conveying to mainstream America what it means to grow up in America as a hyphenated Portuguese American.

Notes

1 In viewing Fall River as a “haunted Ghetto” where the Portuguese live their own ethnic experience, deeply entrenched in their own “ethnic enclave” (Gordon 227), Braga’s perception calls into question Nancy Baden’s contention that “the Portuguese have not been concentrated in the ghetto-like situation in which one lives exclusively the ‘ethnic’ experience as have blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Chicanos” (Baden 27). Portuguese Americans do tend to stay together and even avoid the mainstream, especially the first and the second generations. But with the third and subsequent generations, the process of assimilation of Portuguese Americans is quicker. As the historian and sociologist Leo Pap has pointed out two decades ago, assimilation of the Portuguese into the mainstream has been unsteady: It has been said that immigrants from the Azores have been quicker to identify with America than those from mainland Portugal, and those from the western Azores quicker than those from São Miguel (Pap 220).

References


HOW AND WHY ISLAMOPHOBIA IS TIED TO ENGLISH NATIONALISM BUT NOT TO SCOTTISH NATIONALISM

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Muslim minorities throughout Europe are under threat of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush ‘War on Terror.’ In Scotland they also have to cope with the added possibility that Scottish nationalism might develop an ‘ethnic’ as well as a ‘civic’ dimension. But is Scottish nationalism part of the problem or part of the solution? Paradoxically, Muslims are under less pressure in Scotland than in England, despite Scotland’s move over recent decades—psychologically as well as institutionally—towards nationalism.

The aim of this paper is to explore the connections between Islamophobia and sub-state nationalism within Britain. Muslim minorities in Britain and throughout Europe are now under threat of collateral damage from the Blair/Bush ‘War on Terror.’ But within Scotland, traditional Scottish self-consciousness, the long debate over devolution, rising nationalism and the eventual creation of a Scottish Parliament (inaugurated in 1999) all pose a potentially additional challenge to Scotland’s Muslims.

In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that racial and cultural minorities identify with (inclusive) ‘Britain’ rather than (exclusive) ‘England.’ Ethnic minorities within England are notably reluctant to describe themselves as ‘English’
rather than ‘British,’ their modal preference being ‘equally British and ethnic-group’—implies, it is claimed, that ‘Britishness’ is ‘inclusive.’ And conversely there is evidence to suggest that English nationalists—those members of the white majority in England who describe themselves as ‘English, not British’—are particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural minorities. If race, culture, and identity were linked together in a similar way within Scotland, we might expect that the position of any racially and culturally distinctive minority might have been undermined by the growth of Scottish nationalism—even without the added shock of Sept 11th.

Paradoxically our research shows that in almost every particular the opposite is the case. It shows that Muslims in Scotland identify with Scotland rather than the supposedly more ‘inclusive’ Britain; that the Blair/Bush ‘War on Terror’ has committed Muslims far more strongly to Scotland than ever before; that despite (or perhaps because of) the growth of Scottish national identity and the advent of a separate Scottish Parliament, Islamophobia is significantly lower in Scotland than in England; that although Islamophobia is clearly tied to English nationalism within England, it is almost uncorrelated with Scottish nationalism within Scotland.

This may imply that English nationalism is more ‘ethnic’ while Scottish nationalism is more self-consciously ‘civic.’ But Scottish nationalism does have an impact on phobias within Scotland, though on Anglophobia far more than on Islamophobia. The tendency of Scots to define themselves negatively as ‘not-English’ may provide some shelter for other ‘non-English’ groups within Scotland. Scottish Muslims gain some advantage from being a ‘double-minority’—a minority within a minority.

But the relative weakness of all anti-minority ethnic phobias in Scotland also reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of Scottish political elites—critically including the independence-oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish National Party) as well as the merely devolution-oriented Labour and Liberal-Democrat elites. The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-cultural as these elites. But Scottish elites work harder to moderate public prejudice than do English elites. So at the elite level there is a
coalition of Muslims and Scottish Nationalists, which has been strengthened by a common antagonism towards Blair and his international policies. That elite coalition does not reach down to the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to control and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims and nationalists—of the kind that exists within England.

Minorities in Scotland and England

The largest racially and culturally distinctive minority in Scotland consists of ethnic Pakistanis. But the numbers of ‘visible’ ethnic minorities in Scotland are low. According to the 2001 Census ethnic Pakistanis (almost all of them Muslim) constitute less than one percent of the population. And altogether the 2001 Census shows that Muslims as-a-whole constitute just over one percent in Scotland.

Nonetheless Pakistani Muslims in Scotland are ‘visible’ – unlike for example the very much larger English minority (defined by birth) in Scotland. And the Muslim Pakistanis are particularly visible because they are concentrated in the Glasgow area of west-central Scotland where one of them represents the Govan constituency in the British Parliament.

In England ‘visible’ ethnic minorities are more numerous and Carribeans, Africans, Indians, and others constitute a larger share. According to the 2001 Census there are just over one percent Pakistanis but slightly over three percent Muslim in England. Again the Asian minority are more visible than their numbers might suggest because they are concentrated in particular industrial areas of the North and Midlands of England.

Scottish Muslims feel Scotland is a relatively safe-haven

As part of a wider survey of minorities in post-Devolution Scotland we carried out six focus-group discussions with (self-described) ‘ethnic Pakistanis’ in late 2002 followed by 759 telephone interviews with ethnic Pakistanis in 2003. Using a multilingual research team we were able to encourage both focus-group participants and survey respondents to use English, Urdu or Punjabi (or any mixture of these languages) as they preferred.

In the focus-group discussions we asked participants specifically about Sept 11th and its impact on their lives in the intervening
year. Sept 11th had been as traumatic for Muslims as for Americans, and a year later their memories of the time were still sharp.

There was shock, disbelief and some shame: ‘shock... horrified ...numbness’[PK4-E]; ‘unbelievable’[PK6-G]; ‘ashamed that Muslims could be involved in this crime’[PK5-B], ‘it upset me that my faith was being used’[PK4-E]. But there was also some resentment: ‘They seem to associate terrorism only with Muslim countries’[PK2-A]; ‘Look at what is happening in Ireland, Belfast’[PK2-B]; ‘If someone is going to carry out an act of terrorism, they don’t need to be a Muslim... there are all sorts of factions around the world representing different ideologies’[PK4-E]. And fear. Fear of an anti-Muslim backlash: ‘My mum and dad said don’t walk outside the house with a headscarf... someone will shoot you or something, kill you on the street... It was scary... very scary’[PK1-G]. But also fear of terrorists: ‘Terrorism can happen anywhere’[PK4-D]; ‘We saw Pan Am crashing in Scotland’[PK4-E].

British people had become ‘more unfriendly’ towards Pakistanis and Muslims: ‘It has made a difference...people look at us with suspicion’[PK4-D]; ‘I heard of many physical attacks made against Muslims... my husband warned me not to go to the Mosque after Sept 11th’[PK5-E]; ‘I blame the media’[PK6-F]. But amongst participants in our Scottish Muslim focus groups direct personal experience of greater anti-Muslim attitudes in the aftermath of Sept 11th was limited in scope and intensity: ‘Not really directly but people can be cold, you can detect the anti-Muslim feeling’[PK5-A]; ‘Some people may say that we are imagining anti-Muslim feeling, but we are not; we can feel it’[PK4-E]; ‘racist looks’[PK2-B]; ‘cold stares... worse in the early days after the attacks’[PK2-A]; ‘I have been called Osama Bin Laden a couple of times’[PK3-E].

There was some disagreement about whether Scots in particular (as distinct from other Britons) had become more unfriendly towards Pakistanis and Muslims after Sept 11th: ‘I don’t think there have been any great differences between Scotland and England’[PK3-D]; ‘It affected everybody in Scotland and in England’[PK3-E].

But most thought the problem had not been so bad in
Scotland as in England: ‘I don’t think there were too many problems in Scotland’[PK5-G]; ‘It was only natural to have some problem here but it could have been much worse’[PK5-A]. There was: ‘more trouble in England’[PK4-A]; ‘a lot of trouble in England’[PK2-D]; ‘a lot more racism in England’[PK1-E]; ‘more organised groups in England which cause trouble against ethnic minorities’[PK1-C]; ‘The National Front party [now called the BNP British National Party] has always been very popular in England’[PK2-A].

A few felt nowhere was safe in the aftermath of Sept 11th: ‘After Sept 11th no place in the world felt safe’[PK5-E]; ‘If this horrible thing had happened in Britain, I really don’t know how people would react here...no place is really safe’[PK2-C]. But for a variety of reasons, including both fear of anti-Muslim reactions and fear of terrorism, most were glad to be living in Scotland rather than in England or anywhere else. To them Scotland for all its faults seemed to be a relatively safe-haven in a very dangerous post-9/11 world: ‘I was glad to be living in Scotland’[PK6-G]; ‘much safer in Scotland’[PK6-D]; ‘Scotland was a more comforting place to be than any other part of Britain’[PK2-B]; ‘most safe in Scotland...if we were in Pakistan or America, we might have been accused and attacked’[PK3-C]; ‘Living in France would be bad at the time and Holland would be quite bad as well...I wouldn’t like to be in America at the time’[PK1-C]; ‘It is safer being in Scotland than in Pakistan’[PK5-D]; ‘Even when the IRA were bombing, they never came to Scotland. It was always Manchester or London that got attacked’[PK6-C]. It is quite a list. It seemed safer to be in Scotland than in England, Europe, America – or Pakistan.

At the outset we hypothesised that Scottish self-consciousness, the long debate over devolution, and the eventual creation of a Scottish Parliament after the 1997 Referendum could have posed an added challenge to Muslims in Scotland. So in the focus-group discussions we asked participants to compare the impact of Scottish nationalism, culminating in the creation of a Scottish Parliament with the impact of Sept 11th on Scottish attitudes towards Muslims. Both could have encouraged anti-Muslim feelings.

The response of focus-group participants was unequivocal –
not only was the Scottish Parliament less of a problem, it was in their view part of the solution. Some even found our question shocking: ‘You cannot compare Sept 11th and the Scottish Parliament in the same way [expressed in shocked manner]’[PK5-D with agreement from rest of group]; ‘Sept 11th was a lot worse... and I do not think the Scottish Parliament has been a negative thing’[PK1-D]; ‘The only person [adversely] affected by the making of the Scottish Parliament is Tony [Blair]. Every ethnic minority is fine [i.e. happy] with the Parliament in Scotland’[PK2-B]; ‘There was a peace statement made in the [Glasgow] City Chambers from all the faiths wanting to work together and overcome the difficulties. The will is there [in Scotland] to improve things’[PK4-E].

The only criticisms directed at the Scottish Parliament concerned its lack of power, authority, influence, or effectiveness: ‘I am glad to be in Scotland, but there is a question about what the Scottish Parliament can do’[PK1-D]; ‘Foreign policy is dealt with by [British] Central Government; the Scottish Parliament has got nothing to do with it’[PK6-E].

The attitudes expressed in these focus-group discussions were corroborated by our large sample survey. We asked Scottish Pakistanis about their perceptions of conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims—in Scotland, in England, and ‘across the world’. Although considerable numbers of Scottish Pakistanis (39 percent) do rate conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in Scotland as at least ‘fairly serious,’ almost twice as many Scottish Pakistanis (77 percent) believe such conflict is ‘fairly serious’ south of the border in England. And 93 percent of them believe such conflict is ‘fairly serious’ around the world.

At far lower levels, there is an even more striking variation in Scottish Pakistanis’ perceptions of ‘very serious’ conflict. Only six percent think conflict with non-Muslims in Scotland as ‘very serious.’ But 32 percent believe it to be ‘very serious’ in England, and 68 percent feel it is ‘very serious around the world’. They may be wrong of course, but looking out from their Scottish vantage-point, Scottish Muslims see Scotland as a relatively (if only relatively) safe-haven.
A coalition of Muslims and (Scottish) Nationalists?

The Muslim perception of Scotland as a relatively safe haven is at least plausible. Scottish political elites, both devolutionists and the more independence-minded nationalists, have consistently proclaimed a non-ethnic, inclusive, ‘civic’ concept of nationalism. With the possible exception of the Conservatives all significant political elites represented in the Scottish Parliament have taken an unambiguous and self-consciously multiculturalist position.

In particular the ‘First Minister’ [head of government] in the Scottish Parliament, Labour’s Jack McConnell, has declared that Scotland needs more immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities. On the opposition side, the SNP (Scottish National Party) leader John Swinney has accused Labour of ‘racism’ in its ill-treatment of Muslim asylum seekers, repeatedly describing it as a ‘national shame’ or a ‘national disgrace’—despite the fact that a large majority of Scots favour detaining asylum-seekers. For the SNP this is a courageously and in narrow short-term party-political terms costly position.

Conversely Muslim Pakistanis readily identify with Scotland while asserting their own culture and traditions and paying scant regard to traditional Scottish culture. Their Scotland, like the SNP’s, is ‘Scotland Future’ not ‘Scotland Past.’

In our survey of ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland we asked them to place themselves on the standard 5-point Moreno identity scale that runs from exclusively Scottish to exclusively British. Very few refused. But when faced with this forced choice between British and sub-British identities, Pakistanis in Scotland—unlike their counterparts in England—reject British identity. Even amongst those Pakistanis now living in Scotland who were born outside Scotland, three times as many describe themselves as ‘mainly or exclusively’ Scottish as opt for ‘mainly or exclusively’ British.

Of course, that is partly because their primary identity is ‘Muslim’ rather than any territorial identity—be that Scottish, British or Pakistani. Nonetheless insofar as ethnic Pakistanis in Scotland have a territorial identity (and they do, even if it is secondary) it is overwhelmingly ‘Scottish’.

And this is matched by their constitutional and party prefer-
Hussain and Miller—Islamophobia

ences. They now support Scottish independence far more than average Scot. And in terms of voting Pakistanis in Scotland swung decisively towards the SNP (Scottish National Party) at the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections so much so that by 2003 Pakistanis in Scotland were over twice as likely as the average Scot to vote for the Scottish National Party.

No doubt they were responding to the SNP’s line on the Iraq war, which the SNP opposed at the 2003 Scottish Parliament election (and intend to make the centre-piece of their campaign for the 2004 Euro-election). Various Muslim groups, including the Lothian Muslim Voting Committee and the Muslim Association of Britain called upon Muslims to switch to the SNP in 2003; and the SNP had long ago set up an affiliated organisation ‘Asians for Independence.’ The Nationalist welcoming committee already existed: all it needed was an event that could loosen Asians’ traditional ties to Labour.

But whatever the reason, the significant point is that this racially and culturally distinctive minority is not alienated from the party of Scottish nationalism (small ‘n’ or large ‘N’) but actually far more favourable to it than the average Scot! Setting aside the BNP (the extreme right-wing British National Party which is far too easy a target), it is almost inconceivable that any English National Party, however moderate, could win twice as much support from Blacks and Asians as from the average voter in England.

**But are Scottish Muslims right? Is Scotland really a relatively safe haven?**

Scottish Muslims are clearly attached to the inherently plausible view that Scotland is a relatively safe haven – even in comparison with neighbouring England. But they might nonetheless be wrong: it might be merely an outsider’s perspective. Perhaps England and the English are not so bad as they look from the outside. One test is to look at the perceptions of the majorities in England and Scotland. How do they rate the level of conflict with their own Muslim minorities?

We use a tight definition of ‘majorities’ in England and Scotland. Not surprisingly Islamophobia (and in Scotland Anglophobia also) is lower amongst the minorities than amongst
the titular majorities, and it would be misleading to include the views of the minorities themselves in our calculations of anti-minority-phobias.

We define ‘majority England’ or the ‘majority English’ as ‘White,’ non-Muslims, living in England. And ‘majority Scotland’ or ‘majority Scots’ even more tightly as ‘White’, non-Muslims, born in Scotland, with Scottish-born partners (if any). It is important to exclude English immigrants in Scotland because they are (proportionately) so numerous and so distinctive. It is unnecessary to exclude Scottish immigrants in England because they are neither (proportionately) numerous nor distinctive. This asymmetry is a consequence of the fact that the population of England is ten times that of Scotland.

The perceptions of ‘majority Scots’ and ‘majority English’ suggest that conflict with Muslims is indeed much greater in England than in Scotland. Only 42 percent of majority Scots think Muslim/non-Muslim conflict is at least ‘fairly serious’ in Scotland. But 61 percent of the majority English think Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in England is at least ‘fairly serious.’ That suggests Scottish Muslims are indeed correct in their view that Scotland is a relatively safe haven. A significantly greater number of the English feel in conflict with Muslims.

**Why is Scotland a relatively safe haven? Better Muslims or better Scots?**

It does not take two to make a conflict however. One is enough. Perhaps conflict with Muslims is greater in England because Muslims themselves are different there. The numbers are different. There are more Muslims in England – though still only three percent. Or perhaps Muslims in England are socially different. One Muslim participant in a Scottish focus group claimed that ‘Asian people in Scotland are more productive than Asian people living in England. You get a lot of Asians in England that are uneducated, unemployed and involved in crime. In Scotland Asian people make something of themselves, in England maybe not’[PK6-E]. Or perhaps Muslims in England lead more segregated lives. The same focus-group participant continued: ‘In Oldham [England] there were riots. One side of the town is totally White while the other side is totally Asian. The Asians there [in
Oldham] are the scum of the earth... nothing to do but watch television all day, so they are out causing riots’[PK6-E]. And another agreed more diplomatically: ‘It is better to live in a mixed area than to be segregated’[PK6-G].

But another possibility is that conflict is greater in England because the English are different from the Scots. If the people of England are more Islamophobic than the Scots then Scottish Muslims’ perception of Scotland as a relatively safe-haven would owe something to Scotland and to majority Scots, irrespective of any differences between Muslims themselves. We can test that directly. We use five strictly comparable indicators of Islamophobia in England and Scotland:

- **M1:** feeling that Muslims ‘take jobs, housing and health care from other people in Britain/Scotland’
- **M2:** feeling that Muslims ‘could never be really committed to Britain/Scotland’
- **M3:** feeling that Muslims ‘are more loyal to other Muslims around the world’ than they are to ‘other people in this country’
- **M4:** feeling that ‘England/Scotland would begin to lose its identity’ if more Muslims came to live in England/Scotland’
- **M5:** saying they ‘would feel unhappy if a close relative married or formed a long-term relationship with a Muslim’

Following familiar English usage, some of these questions in England use the term ‘Britain’ instead of ‘England.’ In Scotland they use the term ‘Scotland’ without exception. These five questions provide a comparative index of Islamophobia in England and Scotland.

In addition within Scotland we repeated these five questions but re-wording them to focus on English immigrants rather than Muslims:

- **E1:** feeling that English immigrants ‘take jobs, housing and health care from other people in Scotland’
- **E2:** feeling that English immigrants ‘could never be really committed to Scotland’
- **E3:** feeling that the English immigrants ‘are more loyal to England’ than they are to Scotland
E4: feeling that ‘Scotland would begin to lose its identity’ if more English immigrants came to live in Scotland
E5: saying they ‘would feel unhappy if a close relative married or formed a long-term relationship with an English person now living in Scotland’

These five questions provide a strictly comparative index of Islamophobia and Anglophobia within Scotland.

Beyond that we have one indicator that applies only to Muslims: M6: feeling that ‘Muslims living in Britain have not done a great deal to condemn Islamic terrorism’ And there are indicators of anti-minority-phobia that do not specify either Muslims or English immigrants explicitly, though some may apply more to one than the other:

P1: feel that ‘to be truly British you have to have been born in Britain’
P2: feel that ‘to be truly English/Scottish you have to have been born in England/Scotland’
P3: feel that ‘to be truly British you have to be White – rather than Black or Asian’
P4: feel that ‘to be truly English/Scottish you have to be White – rather than Black or Asian’

Large numbers insist that birthplace is an important criterion for nationality and relatively few stress race. But there is no significant difference between Scotland and England in the extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to be born in the country in order to be ‘truly’ British, ‘truly’ Scottish, or ‘truly’ English, and only a small difference between Scotland and England in the extent to which the majority feel it is necessary to be White in order to be ‘truly’ British, Scottish or English. In these respects attitudes in England are only very slightly more racist than in Scotland if at all.

But very consistently across a whole range of issues from economic resentment and nationalist distrust to fears of threats to national identity and especially social exclusion, Islamophobia is greater in England than in Scotland. We should not overstate the extent of Islamophobia. Our more detailed SSAS data show that majority Scots overwhelmingly support cultural variety. They overwhelmingly support laws to ban discrimination against Muslims (race discrimination has long been illegal in Britain, but
religious discrimination has not), and they are sensitive to the lack of any Muslim or Asian MSPs in the Scottish Parliament. Nonetheless around a third of majority Scots feel some economic resentment towards Muslims and express socially exclusive attitudes towards them. Many feel Scotland would begin to lose its identity if more Muslims came to live in Scotland. Many doubt Muslims’ commitment to Scotland. And most Scots feel Muslims’ first loyalty lies outside Scotland.

On most but not all of these points majority Scots are rather more Islamophobic than Anglophobic though most of them doubt the loyalty ‘to Scotland’ of both the Muslims and English immigrants. And while almost a fifth of majority Scots feel a person has to be ‘White’ to be a ‘true Scot,’ two-thirds feel they would have to be born in Scotland (implicitly excluding the English immigrants but not the Scots-born Muslims). In the event of independence one third would withhold Scottish passports from those they felt were not ‘true Scots.’

So without overstating the degree or intensity of Islamophobia or Anglophobia in Scotland, we have clear evidence that both phobias exist. We also have clear evidence that Islamophobia is greater in England than in Scotland.

Excluding those with no opinion or mixed opinions, an average of 63 percent of the majority in England agree with M1.5 (i.e. Islamophobia in England = 63%). By contrast only an average of 49 percent of majority Scots agree with M1.5 (i.e. Islamophobia in Scotland = 49%). An average of 38 percent of majority Scots agree with E1.5 (i.e. Anglophobia in Scotland = 38%). So on strictly comparable indicators Islamophobia in England runs 14 percent ahead of Islamophobia in Scotland, and as a measure of its political significance we note that this difference is greater than the difference between Islamophobia and Anglophobia within Scotland.

Only five percent of Scots would be unhappy if a close relative ‘married or formed a long term relationship’ with an English immigrant, but 32 percent of majority Scots and 52 percent of the majority in England would be unhappy if a close relative ‘married or formed a long term relationship’ with a Muslim.

So very few feel socially exclusive towards the English, but a third of Scots and half the English feel socially exclusive towards
Table 2: Impact on phobias of knowledge about Muslims

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<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamophobia: average</td>
<td>41% [51%]</td>
<td>44% [60%]</td>
<td>66% [78%]</td>
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<td>Muslims not condemn</td>
<td>46% [59%]</td>
<td>55% [62%]</td>
<td>64% [73%]</td>
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To be ‘truly’ British / English / Scottish must be:

- born in Britain: 58% [53%] 64% [63%] 78% [81%] 20% / 28%
- born in Scotland/England: 55% [50%] 61% [62%] 77% [78%] 22% / 28%
- White (to be British): 13% [17%] 12% [15%] 24% [36%] 11% / 15%
- White (to be Scottish/English): 12% [18%] 14% [20%] 31% [38%] 19% / 26%

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [ ] are for England.

Muslims. The difference, however, between Scots and English attitudes towards Muslims is striking, and any suspicions that answers to this question are affected by political correctness cannot explain why the responses are so very different in Scotland and England. Indeed the intensity of happiness and unhappiness varies between Scotland and England: 26 percent of majority Scots but only half as many majority English go far beyond political correctness and claim they would actually be ‘very happy’ to have a Muslim relative.

By common agreement, whether viewed from inside or outside England, there is more perceived Muslim/non-Muslim conflict in England, and that is linked, whether as cause or effect or both, to greater Islamophobia in England.
How strong is the connection between Islamophobia and sub-state nationalism?
The usual explanation of racist or ethnic phobias is simply ‘small-mindedness,’ parochialism rather than cosmopolitanism, brought on by living a physically, intellectually, or emotionally restricted life.

Social background can affect parochialism. Lack of education, especially lack of higher education, is a key variable underlying parochialism. Generation rather than age itself also could be significant since the development of mass media and cheap mass transport have globalised the world of the average person to an unprecedented degree. Globalisation may have eroded differences between the educated and uneducated even as (higher) education itself has become more widespread. By contrast globalisation may intensify class divisions: the working class operating in a relatively local employment market and engaged in relatively routine activities are not only likely to have restricted parochial outlooks but are more exposed to economic competition from immigrants and incomers whether these come from other cultures or not. Gender plays a potentially significant but ambiguous role since women have traditionally (but perhaps no longer) had more parochial perspectives yet at the same time a more sympathetic outlook.

Both Scotland and England have National Churches ‘Established’ by law, the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland and the (Episcopalian) Church of England. Their connection with the state is now relatively weak and indeed obscure but they remain, to some of their adherents at least, an expression of the nation. In both countries the public divides into only three large religious groups (plus many much smaller ones): the National Church (‘C of S,’ or ‘C of E’), Catholics, and most numerous of all, the irreligious. It seems reasonable to ask whether adherents of the national church take a distinctive view of Muslims (and within Scotland, of English immigrants also).

But whatever its social foundations, parochial nationalism goes naturally with racist and ethnic phobias. ‘Multicultural nationalism’ is an oxymoron. Despite the conscious efforts of political elites in Scotland including the leaders of the SNP (Scottish National Party) there is an inescapable tension between
nationalism and multiculturalism and a historic tendency for them to prove incompatible. Pulzer argues that nationalism is often ‘inspired... by the urge to emancipate’ but that its ‘logical conclusion’ is very different: ‘a paroxysm of destructiveness.’ The genuinely inclusive ‘civic’ nationalism of the Scottish political elite may not apply down ‘at street level.’ And in England there are no equivalent ‘civic’ English nationalists, no leaders of an English National Party with a multiculturalist agenda. So in England the natural connection between parochial nationalism and anti-minority-phobias is not consciously restrained by a ‘civic’ nationalist political elite. It seems essential therefore to investigate the connection between ‘street-level’ nationalism and racial or ethnic phobias and with the expectation that the connection will prove stronger in England than in Scotland.

Tabulating the attitudes of majorities towards minorities by personal contacts and knowledge, class, education, age and generation, gender, religion, nationalism, and partisanship suggests that education is more important than class, that gender and religious sect (Established ‘national’ church versus Catholics) have no impact, and that the impact of religiosity merely reflects the generational decline in religiosity a generational rather than truly religious impact. So we focus on just five key factors: (i) contacts and knowledge, (ii) age and generation, (iii) education, (iv) national identity, and (v) partisanship or ‘political nationalism.’

The impact of contacts and knowledge

Compared to those who say they know at least ‘quite a lot’ about Muslims, those who say they ‘know nothing at all’ are around 25 percent more Islamophobic (24 percent more in Scotland and 27 percent more in England). In Scotland, the ‘know nothings’ are also 14 percent more Anglophobic as well. The ‘know nothings’ are also around 16 percent more likely to criticise Muslims for not sufficiently condemning terrorism, around 20 percent more likely to cite being ‘White’ as a necessary condition for being ‘truly’ English or Scottish, and up to 28 percent more likely to cite being born in the country as a necessary condition for being ‘truly’ English or British (rather less so in Scotland however).
Table 2: Impact on phobias of knowledge about Muslims

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<td>46 [59]</td>
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<td>64 [73]</td>
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To be 'truly British / English / Scottish' must be:

- born in Britain: 58 [53] 64 [63] 78 [81]

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside ( ) are for England.


The impact of age and generation

Age and generation have a significant impact on Islamophobia in both England and Scotland (though very little impact on Anglophobia in Scotland). On both sides of the border our composite measure of Islamophobia varies by 20 percent across the age cohorts though age has more impact on simple racial acceptance in England than in Scotland, and on both sides of the border there is evidence of a sharp generational shift at about age 55, rather than a progressive impact of steadily increasing age.

By margins of 29 percent in England and 21 percent in Scotland, the old are more apprehensive than the young that Britain (or Scotland) would begin to lose its identity if there were an influx of Muslims. By margins of 30 percent in England and 24 percent in Scotland the old are more likely to feel that to be
‘truly English (or Scottish)’ a person must be White. By smaller margins of 23 percent in England and only 14 percent in Scotland, the old are more likely to feel that to be ‘truly British’ a person must be White – ‘rather than Black or Asian’. And by huge margins of 55 percent in England and 48 percent in Scotland the old are more unhappy than the young at the thought of having a Muslim relative.

In Scotland all these indicators reveal a ‘step effect’ at around age 55 – a generational shift rather than a progressive age effect. And the same is true in England except on the question about a Muslim relative.

The impact of education

Comparing university graduates with those who have no educational qualifications it seems that education has more impact on Islamophobia (and on Anglophobia) than almost anything else.

From graduates down through levels of school qualifications Islamophobia (and Anglophobia) increase steadily. So by mar-

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<th>Table 3: Impact on phobias of Age &amp; Generation</th>
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<td>Anglophobia: average E1-5</td>
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<td>Islamophobia: average M1-5</td>
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<td>Muslims not condemn terror</td>
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To be ‘truly’ British / English / Scottish must be:

- born in Britain 59 [64] 70 [60] 59 [61] 71 [67]

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [ ] are for England.

gins of 49 percent in England and 34 percent in Scotland those without qualifications are more Islamophobic than graduates. In Scotland they are also 25 percent more Anglophobic.

The pattern is very consistent but not quite monotonic: those with 'higher education below degree level' are slightly more Islamophobic (and Anglophobic) than those with the highest level of school qualifications.

Similarly, by margins ranging from 27 percent to 46 percent in England, and from 19 percent to 36 percent in Scotland, those without qualifications are more likely than graduates to cite race or birthplace as a necessary condition for being truly English/Scottish or British.

Only newspaper choice (closely linked in Britain to education) has a greater apparent impact on Islamophobia, and there the causal direction is ambiguous. English readers of the high-

Table 4: Impact on phobias of Education

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<td>Islamophobia: average M1-5</td>
<td>28(31)</td>
<td>44(57)</td>
<td>38(51)</td>
<td>54(68)</td>
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<td>Muslims not condemn terror</td>
<td>36(41)</td>
<td>50(63)</td>
<td>52(64)</td>
<td>70(87)</td>
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To be 'truly' British / English / Scottish must be:

...born in Britain | 42[37] | 67[56] | 39[55] | 69[68] |
...born in Scotland/England | 41[34] | 64[51] | 55[53] | 68[72] |

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside () are for England.

Table 5: Impact on phobias of National Identity

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<td>54 [78]</td>
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Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland, % inside [ ] are for England.

To be 'truly' British / English / Scottish must be:

- born in Britain
- born in Scotland/England
- White (to be British)
- White (to be Scottish/English)

Excl Brit #1

Brit #2

More Equally More Excl #3

Brit #4

England/ Scotland #5

Notes: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside [ ] are for England.

Comparative Impact #5 - #3

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Comparative Impact #5 - #3

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One measure of national identity is provided by answers to the 'Moreno' question: Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More English/Scottish than British</th>
<th>Equally English/Scottish and British</th>
<th>More British than English/Scottish</th>
<th>British not English/Scottish</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English/Scottish not British</td>
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Table 6: Impact on phobias of Partisanship (Vote in 2001 General Election)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CON</th>
<th>LAB</th>
<th>LibDem</th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th>DNV</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
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<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Anglophobia: average Ed. 5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>SNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia: average M1 5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48(63)</td>
<td>35(42)</td>
<td>48(48)</td>
<td>51(63)</td>
<td>CON (CON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims not condemn terror</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>47(65)</td>
<td>45(41)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64(65)</td>
<td>DNV (CON)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be 'truly' British/English/Scottish must be:
- born in Britain: 64(66) 69(65) 55(61) 65 70(70) DNV (DNV) LD (LD)
- born in Scotland/England: 59(67) 66(64) 54(50) 67 67(69) DNV (DNV) LD (LD)
- White (to be British): 22(24) 12(19) 13(19) 21 16(19) CON (CON) LD (LD)
- White (to be Scottish/English): 23(28) 17(25) 15(12) 22 19(21) CON (CON) LD (LD)

Note: % outside brackets are for Scotland; % inside () are for England.

The term ‘English’ is used for interviews within England, the term ‘Scottish’ for interviews within Scotland.

In the 1980s the Moreno scale was originally conceived as a 5-point symmetric scale. But by 2003 only a quarter of majority English and less than three percent of majority Scots identified more with Britain than with England/Scotland. Identification ‘more with Britain’ was much more popular amongst the bulk of the minorities – including English immigrants in Scotland as well as Blacks and Asians in England (though Asians in Scotland identify very strongly with Scotland, not with Britain). The consequence is that the numbers in categories 4 and 5 (more British or exclusively British) are now too small to provide a basis for any analysis in Scotland and must be used with care even in England. Nearly all majority Scots and most majority English are spread across an effectively 3-point scale running from ‘exclusively’ English/Scottish through to ‘equally British and English/Scottish’ – that is on a scale that (effectively) runs from ‘exclusive’ to ‘dual’ identities.

Compared to dual identifiers, the exclusively English are 20 percent more Islamophobic. But the exclusively Scottish are only a negligible four percent more Islamophobic. Indeed exclusive national identity as measured by the Moreno scale of national identity makes people in Scotland more Anglophobic (by 13 percent) rather than more Islamophobic (a mere four percent). Furthermore, the majority English (unlike majority Scots) do spread themselves all the way across the full 5-point scale. So arguably the proper measure of the impact of parochial nationalism on Islamophobia in England is 28 percent rather than 20 percent – the difference between the exclusively English and the exclusively British in England, rather than between the exclusively English and those who are equally British and English. But by any measure parochial nationalism has a significant impact on Islamophobia in England – yet not in Scotland.

The contrast between the impact of parochial nationalism in England and Scotland is perhaps even greater when we assess its impact on citing race as a necessary condition for being truly English/Scottish or British. Compared to those who identify equally with Britain and England/Scotland, the exclusively
English are 27-30 percent more likely to cite race (being ‘White rather than Black or Asian’) as a necessary condition for being ‘truly British’ or ‘truly English’. In Scotland the exclusively Scottish are scarcely any more likely (only two to four percent) than those who identify equally with Britain and Scotland to cite race as a necessary condition for being ‘truly British’ or ‘truly Scottish.’

Although its impact is not great, such as it is the impact of Scottish nationalism in complete contrast to English nationalism seems almost irrelevant to Islamophobia. Instead it is specifically Anglophobic, focused on the ‘Auld Enemy,’ the ‘significant other’ that helps to define Scottish identity, rather than on minorities that differ far more in terms of race, religion or culture from majority Scots.

**Political nationalism: the impact of partisanship**

Political nationalism, especially support for the SNP (Scottish National Party) can be measured by voting behaviour. We use the voting choices (and abstention) of majority English and majority Scots at the 2001 General Election. The only parties that had enough voters to provide a basis for analysis in England and Scotland are the Conservative, Labour, and Liberal-Democrat parties plus, in Scotland only, the SNP. (The extreme racist BNP, British National Party, won considerable publicity in England but very few votes.)

Taking the seven parties separately (e.g. distinguishing Conservative voters in Scotland from those in England) the level of Islamophobia is lowest of all amongst Scottish Liberal-Democrats (27 percent), and highest of all amongst English Conservatives (67 percent). They differ by a full 40 percent on Islamophobia.

Within each country, both Islamophobia and Anglophobia are lowest amongst Liberal-Democrats. But while Anglophobia is highest amongst SNP voters, Islamophobia is highest amongst Conservatives – both in England and also in Scotland. Non-voters come a close second to SNP voters on Anglophobia in Scotland, and a close second to Conservatives on Islamophobia both in England and in Scotland.
Conclusions

In England there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that racial and cultural minorities identify with supposedly-inclusive ‘Britain’ rather than supposedly-exclusive ‘England.’ And conversely that exclusively English nationalists, those members of the White majority who describe themselves as ‘English, not British’, are particularly antagonistic towards racial and cultural minorities. If race, culture, and identity were linked together in a similar way within Scotland, we might expect that the position of any racially and culturally distinctive minority might have been undermined by the growth of Scottish nationalism even without the shock of Sept 11th But paradoxically we have shown that in almost every particular the opposite is the case. Our research shows that Muslims in Scotland identify with ‘Scotland’ rather than ‘Britain’ and the ‘War on Terror’ has committed Muslims far more strongly to Scotland than ever before.

It is a rational response. Despite or more probably because of the growth of Scottish national identity and the advent of a separate Scottish Parliament, Islamophobia is significantly lower in Scotland than in England.

Insofar as Scottish nationalism has an impact on ethnic-phobias, it has more impact on Anglophobia than on Islamophobia. So Islamophobia is not only significantly greater in England than in Scotland, it is also much more closely tied to English nationalism within England, than to Scottish nationalism within Scotland. That reflects the tendency of Scots to define themselves negatively as ‘not-English’ and to define the English as their ‘Auld Enemy.’ More important, it implies that English nationalism is more ‘ethnic’ while Scottish nationalism is more ‘civic’.

There are other factors, notably age and education, that have more impact than nationalism on Islamophobia. We have focused on the impact of nationalism not because it is so great but because, especially in Scotland, it is so very weak. Like Sherlock Holmes, we have focused on the importance of ‘the dog that did not bark’, or as Peter Pulzer might say, ‘the tiger that did not snarl.’ The impacts of age and education are large but not unexpected, while the impact of nationalism in Scotland is unexpectedly small or even, by some criteria, the reverse of expectations.
That reflects the consistently multi-cultural strategy of Scottish political elites – including the devolutionists of Scottish Labour, the federalists of Scottish Liberal Democrats, and especially the independence-oriented leadership of the SNP (Scottish National Party) who were determined that Scottish government – and Scottish people should not only be more independent but more virtuous. They were minded to replace Gandhi’s claim: ‘Good government is no substitute for self-government’ with its inverse: ‘self-government is no substitute for good government’ and add ‘nor an excuse for self-indulgent citizens.’ Hence SNP leader John Swinney’s claim (cited above) that ‘racism’ is a ‘national shame’ or a ‘national disgrace’, a claim echoed in one of our Muslim focus-groups by the participant who asserted ‘90 percent of the people here are nice but the other ten percent are racist which is a shame for the image of Scotland’[PK3-D]. For these high-minded liberal elites, independence meant responsibility rather than freedom.

The Scottish public is not so naturally multi-culturalist as Scottish elites. We have evidence of a very slight tendency for the exclusively Scottish to be just a tad more Islamophobic as well as significantly more Anglophobic. But Scottish elites, critically including Scottish Nationalist elites, work harder to moderate public prejudice than do English elites, even English mainstream elites that make no claim to represent English nationalism. The Scottish Nationalist elite’s multiculturalism does not reach down to the street, but it has sufficient influence on the street to control and moderate the street-level antipathy between Muslims and nationalists, of the kind that exists within England.

Consequently Muslims in Scotland are not mistaken when they conclude that Scotland, for all its acknowledged faults, its prejudice and its harassment of Muslims, is nonetheless a relatively safe-haven in a very dangerous world, the best place for them to be in the aftermath of Sept 11th.

This important volume attempts to evaluate and measure the impact of equal opportunities in the National Health Service and in part, on higher education (4) (i.e. the progress of ethnic minorities through their respective career hierarchies). The major dynamics at work are the desire on the part of excluded social groups to try to gain access into other occupational areas and the success of dominant social groups in closing a particular niche. Those of us who are interested in or confronted by ethnicity in our professional spheres should read this book.

The book consists of eight chapters. The first, “Ethnicity, Employment and Exclusion,” looks at employment fortunes of ethnic minority groups in the UK and US, “to assess the extent to which they can be said to be upwardly socially mobile” (9). Chapter 2, “Equity, Policy and Outcomes,” examines the construction of equality and affirmative action policies and their impact on employment opportunities. In “Strategies of Social Closure and Professional Cultures” he discusses forms and theories of social closure and demonstrates that strategies used are not only gendered but racialized, given the “hierarchies within and between occupations” (65). In “The Racialization of Nursing” he traces historical processes that led to certain types of nursing labor becoming ethnic enclaves or “occupational ghettos—that is, spaces within nursing profession abandoned by White labor and characterized by lack of occupational mobility, poor working conditions and poor pay” (85). Chapter 5,
“Ethnicity, Segregation and the National Health Service,” explores the practices associated with recruitment and promotion. Chapter 6, “The Policy in Practice at Unicorn Trust,” analyzes how the dual concepts of acceptability criteria and suitability criteria influence recruitment and promotion at Unicorn Trust. Chapter 7, “Racism, Institutional and Otherwise,” presents a glaring picture of racism within different organizations “and... how unconscious assumptions about ethnic origin are rarely challenged” (161). In Chapter 8, “Conclusions,” Carter condemns the skewed understanding of ethnic minorities as unqualified or not “fitting in.” He reminds us that “no one should doubt the impact of ‘race’ within professional spheres and that it continues to exert a powerful influence over occupational mobility...” (176).

Ultimately, to appreciate how and why ethnic minority groups are confined to specific parts within professional organizations requires an understanding not only of the concepts of “race,” racism, discrimination and segregation but, critically, a socio-historical understanding of the way any given profession constructs and reconstructs itself.... Simply put, it is crucial for policy-makers to understand the way that notions of “race” and the dynamics of racism are built and institutionalized into the structure and fabric of professional spheres.

To do so, the author applies ethnographic methods to classical survey methods. Tables and an index are a plus. Indeed, the richest parts of the book are the excerpts (unfortunately too short and sparse) from interviews with ethnic minority nurses and academics. It is more from the words of the marginalized than from the arguments of the author that the meaning of discrimination in the workplace for those who experience it emerges in all its glamour. In all the volume has furthered the debate about the racialization of the labor market by showing on the one hand the shortcomings of contemporary equal opportunity measures in UK and on the other that the forms of racism and discrimination that ethnic minorities experience differ across occupational or professional cultures.

Reviewed by: Bridget A. Teboh
University of Wisconsin-La Crosse

Islam in Urban America: Sunni Muslims in Chicago is a well-researched, carefully nuanced, and timely contribution to our understanding of Muslim Americans and an excellent corrective to the all-too-common tendency to homogenize both Islam and Muslims. This study stresses the multiple elements of diversity in American Islam by focusing on how ethnicity, class, gender, class, age, and ideology have influenced the presentation and practice of Sunni Islam among immigrant communities in Chicago during the 1990s. Garbi Schmidt is currently a researcher in the ethnic minorities program at the Danish National Institute of Social Research in Copenhagen. This book is a revision of her Ph.D. dissertation and is the result of fieldwork among immigrant Muslim Americans that she conducted in the Chicago area over the course of a year and a half in 1995 and 1996.

Schmidt portrays a Sunni Muslim community in Chicago that is torn between two powerful conflicting impulses. On the one hand, many Chicago Muslim immigrants and their children have been deeply influenced by the pan-Islamic ideals of such twentieth century Islamic revivalist movements as the Muslim Brotherhood and Mawlana Mawdudi's Jama'at-i Islami that vigorously promote a transethnic and transnational Islamic identity. Indeed, some American Muslims see their experience in the United States as a golden opportunity to create a form of Islam in America "that transcends differences and ethnicity (77)." On the other hand Schmidt points out that the Chicago Muslim community is nonetheless deeply fragmented along ethnic and even racial lines. For example when Chicago Muslims choose which particular mosque that they will attend, this choice is almost always based on the individual's ethnic affiliation. Bosnian Muslims will go to the mosque whose membership is predominantly Bosnian and Arab Muslims will go to a mosque with a predominantly Arab membership. Schmidt's research also shows that the Chicago Muslim community exhibits profound cleavages along racial and social class lines. Thus she notes that even though around forty percent of Chicago's Sunni Muslims at the
time of her research were African-American, contacts and alliances between African-American Muslims and the immigrant Muslim communities were surprisingly infrequent. Indeed, despite lip service to transethnic Islamic ideals, the more affluent suburban Arab and South Asian Muslim immigrant communities displayed an almost complete indifference to the economic and social plight of their poorer inner-city co-religionists and some even justified this indifference by claiming that African-American Muslims were responsible for their own misfortunes because they had not practiced Islam correctly.

*Islam in Urban America* is valuable not only because of its carefully nuanced treatment of this tension in American Islam between transethnic ideals and persistent elements of ethnicity and class but also because it presents the reader with a detailed look at a wide array of American Muslim institutions such as mosques, Muslim full-time schools, Muslim children's experiences in the secular public schools, Muslim student associations, Sufi orders, and informal women's study groups. Since about sixty percent of Schmidt's informants were women, the reader has the additional advantage of learning about an American Islamic community and its institutions through the voices of its women.

There is one major flaw in this book. Schmidt admits that she does not cover intra-community relationships between African-American Muslims and immigrant Muslims (10). She also leaves out any detailed analysis of African-American Muslims and their experiences. Although Schmidt does seem to have gained a high degree of trust from and access to the immigrant Sunni Muslim community in Chicago, her access to the African-American Sunni community appears to have been much more limited. Since African-Americans constitute about forty percent of the orthodox Sunni Muslim population in Chicago this is a serious omission.

In spite of this significant omission, *Islam in Urban America* is still an important contribution to the study of Islam as it is practiced in the United States. Those who teach courses on contemporary Islam, American religions, or the immigrant experience in the United States will find this book a valuable addition to their course preparations and their syllabi. It contains a very good

Hmong Americans are a diaspora group that came from Laos after leaving southern China in the early 1800s. The U.S. C.I.A. recruited a Hmong army during the 1960s to assist with the American military campaign against communism in Southeast Asia. Hmong refugees began arriving in the United States in 1975 following the collapse of the pro-American Laotian government. There are now about 200,000 Hmong Americans.

One of the biggest challenges in understanding the adaptation of Hmong Americans is the dearth of knowledge about their traditional way of life. Since the Lao People’s Democratic Republic remains inaccessible to social scientists, one avenue for investigating the pre-migration culture of Hmong Americans has been to examine contemporary Hmong settlements in Thailand. Patricia V. Symonds’ *Calling in the Soul* is a welcome addition to this line of inquiry. The book is an anthropological study of traditional Hmong gender roles as they are manifested in birth and death rituals.

Symonds is superbly qualified to write about the Hmong. She spent over a year living in a remote Hmong village in Thailand and became fluent in Hmong. The book is further enhanced by photographs and drawings of Hmong families, homes, ceremonies, and alters. Another unique feature is the inclusion of long ritual songs and chants in both English and Hmong.

Symonds directly addresses one of the most salient aspects of Hmong social life: it is "a very strictly gender-stratified culture"
(173). She skillfully explains how in Hmong culture "women's role is to be private and silent, men's is to be public and vocal" (163). Yet she also notes the ways in which Hmong culture acknowledges women's power. Women are valued for their reproductive capacity because new life enables ancestors' souls to reincarnate. Hmong women are also acknowledged for their skill in sewing "flower cloth" (embroidered garments) that protects against evil spirits and is used to dress corpses for their journey to the afterlife.

Although Calling the Soul only covers the Hmong in Thailand, traditional Hmong definitions of masculine and feminine have proved to be an especially important topic for understanding their cultural adjustment in the United States. They continue to define kinship through patrilineal clans and practice arranged marriages and bride wealth. Gender roles are also relevant for social problems in the Hmong community such as early marriage for female teenagers, polygamy, and domestic violence.

In addition to addressing gender roles, Calling the Soul adds to our understanding of Hmong religion and spirituality through its study of birth and funeral ceremonies, illness and medicine, and shamanic rituals. These are important topics because Hmong Americans are one of the few groups in the United States to practice animism. They have also experienced very high rates of conversion to Christianity, ranging from one-third to one-half in different Hmong communities. For both topics, gender and religion, Calling the Soul provides information that previously required consulting the decades old research of French anthropologists, some dating from the colonial era.

Reviewed by: Jeremy Hein
University of Wisconsin--Eau Claire

xi, 318 pp, $69.95 cloth..

Andrew Pilkington’s Racial Disadvantage and Ethnic Diversity in Britain (2003) is a comprehensive and systematic study of race and ethnicity in contemporary Britain. The
approach taken is decidedly sociological but incorporates an inter-disciplinary perspective, drawing upon areas such as History, Politics, Geography and Cultural Studies. In Chapter 1 the author makes a fine conceptual distinction between core concepts such as race and ethnicity and theoretically subscribes to the more dynamic social constructionist approach to ethnicity as an acceptable alternative to previous models. Racialization is invoked as an alternative problematic of racism to alert the reader to the dangers of reification that the ‘race’ concept engenders. A relevant socio-historical sketch of the impact of post-war migration and development of racial discrimination in Britain follows. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 focus on forms of institutionalized racism in the labor markets, housing and education, and their impacts on the life chances of Britain’s ethnic minority groups with specific attention paid to Britain’s two prominent ethnic minority groups, South Asians and Caribbeans. Chapter 6 focuses on identity transformations as a result of globalization, demonstrating the idea that identities are not ‘fixed’ but essentially hybrid. The book’s anti-essentialist perspective on racial and ethnic identities adds to its overall theoretical and analytical currency, illuminating the way in which globalization dissolves boundaries and its impact on the destabilization of established identities. The last two chapters address managing diversity such as Britain’s policy on racial inequality, specifically the interaction between citizenship and ethnic minority status and further the debates regarding how Britain can become a genuine multi-ethnic society.

The book’s most significant contribution, embodied in its title, is in its endorsement of a new theoretical framework for understanding diversity in the socio-economic positions of different minority groups. It represents a theoretical advance over the more hegemonic model, i.e. racial dualism – an approach that emphasized “race” or skin color, rather than ethnicity. A key theme in the book, supported by empirical research, is the idea that the diversity among the various ethnic minority groups in Britain is not the same. It argues that the positions of ethnic minority groups are not always structurally determined but may be related partially to their own actions. The differentials in socio-economic status among minority groups may be exempli-
fied by some opting for self-employment or by taking advantage of educational opportunities to achieve upward social mobility. The current position of South Asians, particularly Indians, is a case in point. Compared to their Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Caribbean counterparts, Indians can no longer be considered economically disadvantaged. Significantly, these findings debunk the underclass thesis that Asians and Blacks in Britain constitute a “Black” underclass.

Methodologically, the overall mood is quantitative, evident from the national data sets used: PSI, LFS, and YCS surveys. The author claims that they are based on large samples, yet their N's are not given. Also, qualitative ethnographic studies explicate the position of ethnic groups in the education system. Measuring “ethnicity” in Census data is again problematic in contexts where one broad “ethnic category” is used to define geographical/national origins. The heterogeneity associated with ethnicity entails significant commonalities and differences within these broad ethnic categorizations. Thus the use of the census category, “Black Caribbean,” to describe the various Caribbean ethnic groups residing in Britain tends to privilege the experiences of Afro-Caribbeans while simultaneously ignoring the experiences of say, Indo-Caribbeans. As a result the empirical findings are, at best, limited to a particular segment of the Caribbean community in Britain.

The book’s main limitation is its lack of comparative focus. Though it paints a solid picture of the current ethnic situation in Britain, it ignores useful global comparisons such as the similar “ethnic experiences” of Caribbeans and South Asians in Toronto, Canada. The book's target audience is unstated, but given its theoretical, conceptual, and analytical sophistication, it may be appropriate for upper-level undergraduate courses in Sociology, Ethnic and Migration Studies and related areas, or as a reader in a graduate seminar in race and ethnicity.

Reviewed by: Simboonath Singh
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This small volume deserves to be read by those engaged in the study of modern South Africa. It also has interests for students of biography. *The Assassin: A Story of Race and Rage in the Land of Apartheid* is the first biography of Demitrios Tsafendas. Were it not for his assassination of Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, the South African Prime Minister, Tsafendas most likely would not have merited even a historical footnote. The Assassin saved Tsafendas from the historical anonymity accorded to the assassins of 20th century notables such as the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Princess Sophie, Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and John F. Kennedy.

Van Woerden reminds his readers that race was an issue in Southern Africa long before the rise of apartheid. Tsafendas was born in Maputo in 1918 to a Greece-born father who formerly lived in South Africa. His father refused to marry Demitrios’ Euro-Swazi mother because she was not white and was not Greek. Officially Demitrios was classified as Greek, and therefore white. Yet to prevent "the half-blood" from becoming "a shackle around his legs," the father shipped the infant Demitrios to his grandmother in Egypt where skin color was less of an issue. At the age of nine, because his grandmother was too frail to continue to care for him, he was reunited with his father in Mozambique who had married appropriately in the meantime. The wife did not want the "colored" Demitrios in her house, and he was sent to a boarding school in Pretoria for English and Portuguese speakers. It was at the boarding school that a teenaged Tsafendas learned of his African heritage. He became ashamed of that heritage. An adult, though apolitical and having sought more than once to have his classification changed to colored, he still advantaged himself to positions and opportunities which were barred to non-whites. Tsafendas wandered over Western and Southern Europe, the Americas and Africa. He was deported or denied re-entry by a number of countries, including South Africa and the United States. He was treated for mental
illness on a number of occasions in different countries. Tsafendas was able nonetheless to re-enter South Africa and acquire the low level messenger job—in part because he was not seen to be a non-white—which provided him with proximity to stab the Prime Minister to death in the chamber of the South African Parliament.

Like Henrik Verwoerd, van Woerden was born in the Netherlands. He lived in South Africa for twelve years, beginning at the age of nine and until his re-emigration to the Netherlands in 1968, six months after the murder of the Prime Minister. He visited South Africa in 1989 specifically to meet Tsafendas and to learn what had happened to him in the twenty years since the assassination. For van Woerden, a celebrated artist and novelist, the quest became a passion to discover “the real” human being who became a murderer and his motivations and “to render something of the South African trauma.” The resulting book, an “attempt to achieve an anamnesis, a bringing back to memory of that which has been forgotten,” is a fascinating account of a scholar as detective. His passion for what might be judged a rather minor actor in history is captivating.

A methodical researcher, van Woerden seemingly examined all of the possible information, buttressing thin areas with interviews with Tsafendas and others and with psychological deductions. Part of van Woerden’s task was not difficult. In seeking to answer what motivated the assassin, what the death of Verwoerd would mean for the nation, and in preparation for the expected trial, authorities had gathered a massive quantity of documents on Tsafendas. After Tsafendas was adjudged insane and incapable of trial, the material went unused until van Woerden consulted them. Van Woerden fashions an urgent tale that in real life unfolded in fragments spread out over many years and four continents. His book deserves to be read not only by students of history and biography but also by anyone with an interest in the sociology of race. Jacobson’s translation from the Dutch reads well.

Reviewed by: Ashton Wesley Welch
Creighton University
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