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The Nexus between the Ballot and Bullet: Popular Support for the PKK and Post-election Violence in Turkey

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The Nexus between the Ballot and Bullet: Popular Support for the PKK and Post-election Violence in Turkey

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of degree Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by

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DEDICATION

TO

My family; Nuray, Zeynep and Kerem Gergin
Acknowledgment

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Abstract

THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE BALLOT AND BULLET: POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE PKK AND POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN TURKEY

By Nadir Gergin, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of degree Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010.

Major Director: William W.Newmann, PhD, Professor, L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs

This study examines the relationship between popular support for the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which is an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization mainly operating in Turkey, and its terrorist activities during the pre- and post-election periods in Turkey. Popular support has been measured through popular votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK in 1999 general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Two leading theories of social movements, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Relative Deprivation Theory (RD), were used as theoretical approach.

The study uses secondary data and constructs a longitudinal design. An advanced statistical analysis technique, a generalized hierarchical linear model:
time nested within subjects (or GHLM repeated measures) was employed in this study.

Findings indicate that popular support is positively related to terrorist attacks of the PKK in Turkey. More popular support for the insurgent leads to more terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the pre-election period of general elections. However, terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the election but then subsequent terrorist attacks decline over the post-election periods.
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Introduction

For over 30 years, Turkey has suffered from the effects of terrorism that has resulted in over 30,000 casualties attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (hereafter the PKK). Founded in 1978, the PKK is an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization that originated in the Diyarbakir province of Turkey with the main goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East covering parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The terrorist organization has adopted the “protracted war strategy” of Mao and Marxist-Leninist ideology.

One of the most significant reasons why the PKK remains in existence is due to the popular support for both sides (government and insurgent) that is acknowledged and viewed by both scholars and practitioners alike as being the determining factor in defeating counterinsurgency warfare. Among other reasons, popular support is credited primarily to logistical concerns, the nature of guerrilla warfare strategy, and legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). First, in terms of logistics, supporters provide insurgents with safe havens, freedom of movement, logistical and financial support, intelligence, and new recruits (U.S. Army, 2006). Second, the existence of insurgency indicates at least some degree
of popular support for the insurgent; otherwise, there would be no insurgency. Finally, popular support generates a feeling of legitimacy that may attract foreign help and thus afford the insurgent an opportunity to major safe heavens abroad and receive support from Diaspora.

In brief, popular support relates to resources that increase the insurgent’s capabilities. For these reasons, the insurgent must make every effort to obtain popular support in order to win the population over to its side. Insurgency and social movement literature indicate that if popular support is nonexistent or is not voluntarily given, it will be acquired through the use of political violence (Galula, 2006; Jordan, 1962; Sarma, 2007; Trinquier, 2006).

In this study, the primary hypothesis assumes that the insurgent’s need for popular support may lead to committing political violence. In addition, it is hypothesized that political violence varies depending on the degree of popular support. Similar to other studies that have measured popular support for insurgent groups through electoral or polling data (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guelke & Smyth, 1992), this study measures the support for PKK through popular voting for its political party and examines the influence that this support has had on PKK terrorism over pre- and post election periods.

The findings of this study could help get insights into the PKK terrorism in Turkey and how it is related to the elections. In 1990, the PKK established its first legal political party known as the People’s Labor Party (HEP) and has continued
to engage in electoral politics ever since. Until the local elections the general elections of 2007, votes for PKK’s legal Democratic Society Party (DTP) steadily increased; however, the vote share dramatically shifted in favor of the government’s party. For example, the vote share of PKK’s political party declined across the country from 6.2% in the general elections of 2002 to 3% in the general elections of 2007. In other words, PKK’s political party lost its popular support by almost 50% in the general elections. Similarly, vote shares of the insurgent’s affiliated DTP party declined from 26% to 21% in the Kurdish dominated regions. If popular support is actually of crucial importance for insurgent groups, this relative decline should affect PKK’s political violence. Thus, it would be of interest for the Turkish government to understand how the relative decline in votes affects the violence characterized by the PKK.

Two leading sociological theories, relative deprivation theory (RDT) and resource mobilization theory (RMT) were used to address how changes in vote share of the PKK’s political party are related to the PKK terrorism. Although their theoretical backgrounds differ and lead in different directions, they can still shed light on the various aspects of political violence.

The relative deprivation theory (RDT) is based on grievances and views the differences between an organization’s achieved and expected results as a source of relative deprivation that leads to political violence. Derived from this approach, in this study the relative decline in popular votes for the insurgent’s political party is considered as the source of relative deprivation that is expected
to increase political violence. On the other hand, resource mobilization theory (RMT) views an organization’s resources rather than grievances as being the most important determinant factor associated with an insurgency in reaching its goals. From the perspective of RMT, a positive relationship between popular support and insurgent violence is expected; therefore, it is hypothesized that as the PKK achieves more popular support, the group will acquire more resources and will consequently be able to carry out more terrorist attacks. Similarly, when the PKK loses popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are expected to decrease due to lack of resources. Similarly, when the PKK loses popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are expected to decrease due to lack of resources. Although the assumptions of both theories differ, they still offer insight that can assist in understanding where the insurgent will direct its violence in an effort to mobilize the population.

The dependent variable of the study is the “number of PKK’s terrorist incidents” that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey, and the main independent variable is the vote share of the political party affiliated with the insurgent (PKK), which is assumed to represent the degree of popular support from the province. In addition to the vote share variable, there are three time variables to determine whether the elections have any impact on the terrorist attacks.

This dissertation has a longitudinal study design, and employs a “discontinuous growth model” using a random coefficient model (RCM) with a
repeated measures design. Within a longitudinal design, RCM is an intuitive and efficient way to estimate individual change curves as well as capable of separating changes over time within individual provinces and differences in-between provinces at initial status (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). According to Lang and Bliese (2009), discontinuous growth models represent a specific form of multilevel mixed-effects models with multiple time variables to model transition processes over time and individual differences in transition processes. Thus, by employing this model, the researcher will first be able to analyze terrorism patterns in each pre- and post election period and across provinces by testing whether terrorism significantly increases or decreases as a function of time during these election periods. Second, the researcher will be able to examine whether there are identifiable differences in patterns of terrorism over time during the pre- and post election periods (e.g., some provinces may worsen whereas others may remain the same).

Briefly, the insurgent’s political violence is expected effected by the election and vary depending upon the level of popular votes in a constituency (province). If evidence is found suggesting that a relationship exists between popular votes and political violence, this may help to better understand the insurgent group’s internal dynamics in terms of political violence as well as identify vulnerable provinces that may be prone to terrorist attacks during election periods. If findings suggest that the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, then the researcher will conclude that insurgent violence varies according to the degree of
popular votes in support of the PKK political party. In this case, the government should then focus on “winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population over to its side and thus erode popular support for the PKK. Furthermore, the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular votes.

On the other hand, if findings suggest that the relative deprivation (RD) theory is correct, the researcher will assume that a decline in popular votes generates relative deprivation that leads to political violence. If this is the case, then the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined, because this would indicate that failure in elections generates relative deprivation. In this way, not only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict where the most vulnerable provinces would be located. Finally, the findings of the study could be applied to other countries that suffer from ethnic insurgent violence, namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA in Spain, and others that engage in electoral politics.

Problem Statement

Existing literature related to insurgencies suggest that popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare. The majority of researchers in this field have focused on the terrorist’s choice of target and type of attack plan (Galula, 2006; Sarma, 2007; Trinquer, 2006), whereas others have focused on whether the population supports or disapproves of insurgent violence (Hayes & McAllister;
Basic, scholars argue that selective terrorism against selected targets, namely, soldiers, police officers, and informants, increases the popular support of insurgency amongst the population while indiscriminate terrorism erodes its popularity. Although difficult to quantify, various researchers have measured popular support for the insurgent through electoral data or polling data on its particular political party and examined the influence of political violence on electoral outcomes (Bali, 2007; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008). However, there remains only scant literature regarding the opposite direction that examines the impact of the electoral outcomes on terrorism during the post-election period (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Guelke & Smyth, 1992). Furthermore, most research concerning the link between popular votes and terrorism is cross-sectional that does not take heterogeneity among the subjects and changes over time into consideration. Therefore, this study is an attempt to thoroughly examine this linkage between election outcomes and political violence through longitudinal data by using a discontinuous model with random effects, or the random coefficient model (RCM) repeated measures.

Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether there is a relationship between popular support for the insurgent (PKK) and terrorist incidents carried by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. And a secondary purpose is whether elections have any impact on those terrorist incidents. In order to do so, the researcher tests whether terrorist attacks significantly increases or decreases
as a function of time during pre- and post election periods, and whether popular votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK is related to these terrorist attacks.

Research Questions

In order to reach its goals, this dissertation seeks answers to two main questions:

1) Is popular support associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in Turkey?

2) Are the elections associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in Turkey?

Hypotheses of the Study

Two main hypotheses and several sub-hypotheses are proposed to answer these questions:

H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.

With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses:

H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.

H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.

The second main hypothesis of the study is that:

H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.

H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.

The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes, and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population.

As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe, 1989). Therefore we expect an increase soon after the election and a decline in a short period of time and propose the following hypotheses:

H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.

H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.

Significance of the Study

From theoretical approach, if the study finds evidence to support that popular votes and elections influence terrorism, this may help to better understand the insurgent group’s internal dynamics in terms of political violence and identify possible vulnerable provinces during election periods. If findings support the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, indicating insurgent violence varies according to the degree of popular votes in support of the PKK political party, and it will be suggested then the government should then focus on “winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population over to its side to erode popular support for the PKK. In addition, the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular votes.
On the other hand, if findings support the relative deprivation (RD) theory, indicating a decline in popular votes generates relative deprivation that leads to political violence, thus the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined. In this way, not only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict where the most vulnerable provinces would be located.

Finally, although this study focuses on the PKK in Turkey, due to the fact that ethnic insurgencies share some features and all need for popular support, the findings of the study could be provide some insights into other countries that suffer from ethnic insurgent violence, namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA in Spain, and other insurgent organizations that engage in electoral politics.

**Definitions of the Terms in the Study**

*Insurgency:*

‘Insurgency’ is defined as the attempt an attempt to overthrow or oppose a state or regime by force of arms (Joes, 2004). U.S 2006 Counterinsurgency doctrine defines an *insurgency* as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (p:13). Since the PKK is an armed organized movement that aims to create an independent Kurdish homeland in the Middle East, the PKK is viewed as an insurgent organization; and because of using terrorism strategy that targets
both civilians and security forces to achieve its goal, the PKK is identified as an insurgent terrorist organization.

_Dominantly Kurdish Populated Region (here after the DKPR):_

The PKK considers certain provinces as a part of “Kurdistan” that its claims to fight for its independence. These provinces are located in the Southeastern and Eastern regions of Turkey. However, not all provinces in those regions are considered as a province of Kurdistan by the PKK. In this study, these provinces are named as “_dominantly Kurdish populated region_” (here after the DKPR).

_Province:

Currently there are 81 provinces in Turkey. They are governed by appointed provincial governors. Each province has certain number of districts, which are governed by district governors, governmental employees appointed by the Ministry of Interior. Districts have certain number of villages and might have certain number of towns.

The PKK Terrorism in Turkey

Good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent where poor ones contribute to popular support (Parker, 2007). Thus, it is in the interest of this study to determine whether Turkey’s current or past counterinsurgency policies helped the PKK inadvertently gain popularity amongst the Kurdish population or eroded a considerable proportion of it. The main purpose of this section is to review what the government did and did not to
acquire support from the population. Having chronologically explored the history of the PKK, this section investigates on the past and current counterinsurgency policies of Turkey against the PKK in terms of their ability to acquire popular support from Kurdish population. Finally, its experience on electoral politics will be chronologically surveyed.

History, Strategy, and Structure of the PKK

The PKK was founded during a meeting of Abdullah Ocalan and his associates in the city of Diyarbakir on 27 November 1978. This meeting is more commonly known as the First Congress of the PKK, and in its Foundation Statement the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a “Greater Kurdistan” (see Map 1) in this region as its long-term objective (Roth & Sever, 2007).

Map 1: the allegedly Kurdistan that the PKK aims to establish.
The statement also suggested that in order to reach its goals, the PKK adopted Mao's "Protracted War Strategy" and Marxist-Leninist Ideology. Mao's formula of the people's war consisted of seven components of which three are directly derived from Lenin's strategy of revolutionary insurrection (Joes, 2004): (1) the people's war must be led by a Communist Party, 2) must have a military force strictly controlled by the Party, 3) must have a united front to broaden the people's war base of support, 4) must champion the mass line to gain the people's support, 5) should set up base areas for support, regrouping and pilot demonstrations of the revolutionary future, 6) must, to every extent possible, be self-reliant lest it lose touch with the people—its ultimate source of strength and support, and 7) the people must rely on three-staged military strategies of protracted war: defensive, stalemate, and offensive stages. During each phase, a particular form of warfare drives the dynamic (Marks & Palmer, 2005). During the strategic defensive, terror and guerrilla actions lead. During the strategic stalemate, mobile warfare is dominant and sees insurgent main force units, equivalents of government formations, take the field, but not seek to hold territory. At the strategic offensive or 'war of position', seeks to hold what is gained. Mao's protracted war strategy insist that guerrilla is only an interim phase of the struggle, intended to enable the insurgents to build a regular army which will, eventually, win through conventional warfare (Merari, 1993). Mao's strategy attaches great importance to popular support from the population and guerrilla
warfare strategy. The foundation statement explicitly declared that as the protracted war strategy requires it has adopted a party-front-army approach as his organizational structure and has chosen ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy as his main activity.

The PKK publicized itself eight months after his foundation, on July 31st of 1979 through an armed attack on a Parliamentary Member, Mehmet Celal Bucak. It declared its foundation and his goals across Turkey to attract the Kurdish population to join and support the PKK. In order to reach his goals, the PKK sent its selected members into the Palestinian training camps to get military training. First terrorists to have arrive in Palestine and started their training under the supervision of Palestinian instructors in September 1979 (Kalkan, 2007). Sending its militants to be trained in Palestinian camps has continued until the PKK establish its own camps in Beka Valley in Syria.

Turkey’s unstable situation, which the PKK and various Turkish left wing terrorist organizations were a part of it, resulted in a military coup in September 12th 1980. After the military coup, Chief of General Staff of Military, Kenan Evren took over the presidency; the National Security Council ruled the country until the parliamentary elections held on November 6th of 1983. Right after the military coup, under the military command, the Turkish army launched an offensive counter terrorism campaign against all type terrorist organizations which resulted in arrest of thousands of people. Under these strict military conditions, the PKK organized its Second Congress in Damascus, Syria from 20–25 August 1982. It
was during this meeting that the group decided to initiate a violent armed campaign in order to establish a Kurdish state (Roth & Sever, 2007); and the following month, September of 1982, the PKK began sending its trained militants to Turkey (Kalkan, 2006).

Having completed its military cadre, the PKK also declared the foundation of its first guerrilla army named People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) through very sensational simultaneous attacks on two gendarmerie stations on August 15th of 1984 in Semdinli and Eruh districts of Turkey. Kalkan (2006) stated that those stations were intentionally selected because they were small enough to succeed and would represent the PKK’s war zone. The impact of the terrorist attacks was huge on the public, the government and other countries. The PKK still argues that these attacks have determinant impact on aware of Kurdish problem at the international level (Bayik, 2007).


According to Duran Kalkan (2006) at the beginning, government had considered it as a military problem and expected to suppress the PKK within a couple days, therefore preferred to respond to these attacks with a three-day military operation in 1984 and then with a comprehensive military operation in 1985. Furthermore, it was after the 1987 third congress of the PKK that the Turkish government realized that it would take longer than expected to defeat PKK terrorism. Then the government implemented a comprehensive counterterrorism campaign which is derived from the British counterinsurgency
experience in its colonial countries during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Malaya and Kenya: 1) single leadership; 2) turned insurgents; 3) resettlement; 4) village guards; and 5) winning hearts and mind policies (Hoffman & Taw, 1991). These counterinsurgency policies lasted until the early 2000s.

Turkey gave little attention to the winning hearts and minds policies, which refer to social, economic, health, education and other policies to acquire popular support from the population through promoting living conditions of the population that the PKK relies on. And unfortunately some counter terrorism policies, in particular a resettlement policy backfired and alienated a considerable proportion of the Kurdish population from the government and contributed the cause of the PKK. These poor counterproductive policies could be the main underlying reasons behind the relative increase in popular votes for the PKK’s political party in the elections between 1995 and 2002. In his reply to a legislative inquiry submitted by parliamentary member M. Riza Yalcinkaya, on July 14, 2008 Ministry of Interior Besir Atalay reported that resettlement policy was implemented in 14 provinces. As a consequence of the resettlement policy, 386,360 individuals left from a total of 62,448 households due to PKK terrorism. However, it seems that these are numbers are much more than the government’s claims. According to a recent survey published by Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (2006) found that the number of individuals, who immigrated from those 14 provinces, is estimated at between 953,680 and 1,201,000. The number is at best three times higher than the official numbers
stated by the Government. The study also provides the estimated numbers of immigrants according to years. The study reports that 300,000-380,000 (31.6%) during 1986-1990, 585,000-735,000 (61.3%) during 1991-1995, 47,000-60,000 (5%) during 1996-2000, and 20,000-25,000 (2.1%) individuals voluntarily or involuntarily left their homes due to security reasons during 2001-2005 years. Figure 1 indicates these numbers and percentages during those periods. As seen, 93% of individuals left their homes between 1986 and 1995.

Figure 1: Number and percentages of individuals who left their homes

Winning hearts and minds policies: Cohesive period (2000-present)

The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish Security Forces in Kenya in 1999 and the PKK declared a cease fire which lasted till 2004. During this period, a new government led by the Justice and Development
Party (hereafter the AKP), came to the power in Parliamentary elections of 2002. New government opened a new era in counter terrorism. The government did not favor early coercive counter terrorism and implemented a series of cohesive counter terrorism policies. When the government stopped implementing them and has implemented new policies in 2000s, the popular support shifted from the PKK to the government. Although these new policies are not direct counter terrorism policies in their nature, they helped to generate a considerable amount of popular support for the government and eroded a considerable proportion of the popular support for the PKK. These types of policies are referred as “winning hearts and minds policies” in the literature. The most distinguished feature of the new government’s policies is that they targeted the population rather than terrorists themselves, and sought non military solutions such as health, social welfare, education and others while securing the local population from the terrorism.

With regards to new counterterrorism policies, the first effort of the new government was to repeal the state of emergency and regional governorship policy, which was being implemented in two provinces. This action removed the strict rules being implemented in those cities and pressuring on the population living within eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, which the PKK considers them as parts of “Greater Kurdistan.” The government also repealed the resettlement policy. After 2002, not a single a village has been evacuated due to security reasons. In 2002, and 2008, the government took further steps to
promote cultural diversity and made several legal adjustments and removed the barriers in front of broadcasting in other languages (Dundar, 2006). Furthermore, in December of 2004, legislatures passed a law which permits the teaching of local languages; after January 19th of 2004, many courses started to teach Kurdish language, however, most of them were closed in a short time due to lack of demand.

The new government’s comprehensive counter terrorism policies have been identified and described in the “Counter terrorism Action Plan” and approved by Counter Terrorism High Council (Terorle Mucadele Yuksek Kurulu) on December 29th of 2005. The consequences of the plan have been evaluated after two-year implementation period in December, 2007. Although the document is classified and the entire document is not published, some parts of the report have been leaked out. The plan is consisted of 61 clauses to be implemented in 23 cities located in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. According to the plan, the government adopted a long term, unarmed counter terrorism policy alongside the armed one; however, the armed counter measures are subordinate to long term and unarmed policies. The action plan identifies the counter measures in education, health, sports, employment, immigration, religion, and other fields. The results of the action plan are pleasing and give hope for the future. Şen (2007) reported the consequences of the plan as follows: To promote the living conditions of the Kurdish populated regions, the government has spent one billion dollars for KOY-DES project (Support Villages-Project) to establish a
drinking water system in 8,000 villages, and built 8,500 kilometers of stabilized roads, and asphalted 13,500 village roads in the regions.

In the education field, only in 2007, 24,500 of new teachers have been assigned to and 292 schools built in the designated provinces. Furthermore, quota of successful students without any costs in private teaching institutions offering university preparation courses was increased from 2% to 3%. As a consequence 5,500 students attended these courses with no cost.

In the health field, the number of doctors and other health professionals were redoubled compared to 2002-2007 period. Only in 2007, more than 1,200 medical doctors and 8,100 health professionals have been assigned to those provinces. Recep Akdag, the ministry of health, reported that only in Sirnak, which is a poor city located at the border both with Iraq and Syria, the number of specialist doctors increased by three times compared to 2002.

Regarding economic measures, the Government has implemented a law to encourage economic investments such as tax reduction, appropriation of land with no cost, exemption from worker's insurance premiums and others. Only in 2007, approximately 3 billion US$ (3 Billion 217 million 105 thousand 696 YTL) and 11,103 new employment were projected in those regions through this law. Within the last four months of 2007, 950 cattle and 2,600 small cattle have been donated to individuals in need. The government also has implemented a program to compensate those individuals who have suffered from terrorist acts or activities undertaken during the fight against terror through passing the Law No.
on the “Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight against Terrorism” in July 2004 (Brookings, 2009). According to ministry of interior records, between 2004 and July 30th of 2008, 341,429 individuals applied to the government to benefit from the law. Commissions have revived the applications and decided to pay 89,695 of the applicants (EkoNews, 2008). Furthermore, a total of 280 million US$ (390 million YTL) was paid as of 2007 and was decided to pay extra 270 million US$ (374 million YTL).

In addition to these winning hearts and mind efforts, the government made some adjustments in the criminal justice and diplomacy field. For instance, the government abolished the state security courts, which trials suspected terrorists under more restrict criminal procedures. The government also increased the cooperation between the EU and U.S. The U.S is supporting Turkish security forces through providing timely intelligence against the PKK targets. This study argues that it was these cohesive, good counterinsurgency/counterterrorism policies since 2000s that eroded the popular support for the PKK and generated the popular support for the government. On the other hand, early counterinsurgency/counterterrorism policies between 1985 and 2000 have eroded the support for the government and alienated the Kurdistan population from the government. The electoral data reflects the impact of these poor policies on Kurdish population. During early counterinsurgency policies, which corresponds the elections of 1991 to 2002, the votes for political party of the PKK were on the rise whereas it has declined in the general elections of 2007 after the
new government redesigned its policies. In conclusion, the new counterinsurgency/counterterrorism approached shifted popular support from the PKK to the government.

Electoral Politics and the PKK

The PKK acknowledges the importance of popular support since the beginning, in 1970s, but in early 1990s, did become aware of potential of a legal political party in generating popular support and control over the population. Therefore it began to engage in electoral politics as soon as it formed its political cadre and obtained sufficient popular support. It formed his first legal party named HEP (People’s Labor Party) on June the 7th of 1990. The main purpose of the PKK in engaging electoral politics is to acquire popular support for its cause, to gain legitimacy and to control over the population. However, this was neither the ultimate goal of the PKK nor super ordinate to the PKK. Instead, it is only a tool to help reach its goals. As declared in the foundation manifesto of the PKK, the ultimate goal was to create ‘Greater Kurdistan” and this could be achieved through only armed struggle.

Due to the fact that the government has intentionally rearranged the date of general elections to be held a week earlier than the actual date the HEP was caught unready for the elections, therefore made a coalition with the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party). The HEP candidates ran for elections under the SHP within the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, which dominantly Kurdish populated provinces and considered as the “Kurdistan” by the PKK.
However, the PKK’s candidates won the elections and 22 HEP candidates became parliamentary members in the parliamentary elections of 1991. HEP’s candidates almost obtained 50% of vote proportion of each province that they ran for the election. This was a political victory for the PKK as well as the SHP. The SHP became the third party in general elections and came to the power through a coalition government with the DYP (True Path Party). In other words, with the help of SHP, the PKK became an invisible partner of the government. However, the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a banning case against the HEP party claiming having links to the PKK. Then another party was founded named DEP (Democracy Party) in 1993 and all parliamentary members of the HEP joined into the DEP. However, this electoral victory was ended by the Constitutional Court’s decision those parliamentary members were convicted and incarcerated due to the party’s affiliation with the PKK.

Upon the Constitutional Court banning decision, again another new party, the HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was founded in 1994 and ran in the general elections of 1995 and 1999 and local elections of 1999. As seen in the Figure 2, at the national level, HADEP obtained 4.2% in 1995 and 4.7% of all votes (Turkish Statistical Institute, General Election of Representatives). Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a case against the HADEP on January 29th of 1999 then the Constitutional Court decided to shut down The HADEP Party in March 2003 (Bal, 2003). The PKK again formed a new political party which was named as the DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party). The DEHAP
party ran for the parliamentary elections of 2002 in which he increased its vote rates from 4.7% to even 6.2% across the country (see Figure 2). This was the highest vote rate that the PKK’s political party has ever had; however due to a 10% proportional barrier in front of political parties in general elections, unlike the general elections of 1991, which its coalition party the SHP got 20.8% and passed the barrier, none of the his candidates became parliament members and took seat in the General Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). However in the 2007 general elections, the PKK has lost some proportion of electoral support both in the dominantly Kurdish and non-Kurdish populated regions (see figure 1).

Figure 2: Vote rates for the Political Party of the PKK at corresponding election.
In April 2003, the Supreme Court of Appeals prepared another report and submitted it to the Constitutional Court to shut down the DEHAP. However this time, the DEHAP dissolved itself before the Court’s decision and immediately transferred all of its resources to the DTP (Democratic Society Party), which was established in October 2005 on an order from Abdullah Ocalan (Gundem, 2008). It was argued that the actual reason of the new party was not the fear of banning by the Constitutional Court, but it was because of the fact that DEHAP did not compete enough with the AKP, the ruling party, and did not receive sufficient votes from the Kurdish population in municipality elections in 2004 (Gundem, 2008). In the parliamentary election of 2007 only 3.4% of the electorate voted for the DTP, which indicates a clear defeat of the PKK in terms of popular support; it was 6.2% in the previous general elections in 2002. Both the municipality elections of 2004 and parliamentary elections of 2007 signaled that the PKK has lost a considerable proportion of his popular support. However expectations in elections were higher than the achieved results. In an interview with his lawyers in May 2007, two months before the 2007 parliamentary elections, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan stated that their votes for the DTP were 6% across Turkey in the 2002 parliamentary elections therefore expecting at least 6.5% of popular votes in 2007 elections. Due to the fact that the popular votes for its political party, DTP has declined from 6.2% to 3.4% across the country and 22.86% to 16.17% in the Kurdish populated regions in the general elections of 2007. Election results of this election were shocking; it was the first time that the vote
share of the PKK’s political party has moved backward in a general election. Electoral preferences of the Kurdish population definitely disappointed the PKK. This dissatisfaction was declared soon by top leaders of the PKK. After the general elections of 2007, both the Kurdish population and incumbent government (the AKP) were blamed for the election results. For instance Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and current leader of the PKK, stated that “the incumbent government bought votes of the Kurdish electorate” (ANF news agency, August 11th of 2007). Likewise, A. Haydar Kaytan, another top leader and one of the founders of the PKK, called newly elected Kurdish parliamentary members of the ruling party (AKP) as “betrayers”; furthermore stated that “for those who voted for the incumbent party, it means that leaving their rights to live and dishonoring themselves” (ozgur gundem newspaper, August 6th of 2007).

Thus this study argues that both the election outcomes of general elections of 2007 and intimidating statements to the public by PKK leaders indicates that a significant gap must have occurred between PKK’s expectations and achieved results of the elections. Since a gap occurred between the previous and current parliamentary election results this decline may cause a relative deprivation and thereby lead to an increase in the level of the PKK violence in the post-election period. However from the resource mobilization theory (RMT) perspective, the election outcomes indicate support of the Kurdish population for the government rather than the insurgent PKK. According to the RMT approach success of the
insurgent depends upon ability to mobilize resources of the population to sustain a social conflict (Zald & Berger, 1978). Since popular support is essential for insurgent groups in terms of logistics, nature of the insurgency and legitimacy, from the RMT perspective it would mean a decline in resources of the insurgent thereby lead to decline in terrorist attacks across the country but to more surgical use of violence in certain provinces. Thus this study considers both situations and examines the PKK terrorism over the time.
INTRODUCTION

The main focus of the literature review addressed popular support, use of political violence for obtaining popular support, and debates concerning the resource mobilization theory (RMT) and relative deprivation theory (RDT) as well as political violence related to elections. The researcher reviewed three main sources of literature consisting of insurgency, social movement and political science for the following reasons: first, the PKK of Turkey is viewed as an ethnic insurgency using terrorist tactics, second, insurgencies are categorized in the literature as revolutionary social movements (Locher, 2002); and finally there are valuable literature on elections in the political science field.

The literature review consists of four sections. In the first section, literature that addresses the importance of popular support in an insurgency situation is discussed. In the second section, use of political violence to acquire popular support from the population is surveyed. The third section establishes the study’s theoretical framework by analyzing RDT and RMT, two leading theories related to the social movement literature. The final section investigates why insurgent organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature regarding elections and political violence as well.
The main purpose of the literature review is to examine the importance of popular support for the insurgent organizations, and what they do to acquire popular support and how they react to a relative decline in their popular support. The existing literature argue that due to especially needs for logistics, intelligence and other organizational resources, popular support is vital important for the insurgent organizations, without sufficient popular support from the local population, the insurgent would not achieve its main goals, therefore if they do not have sufficient support from the population, they often resort violence to acquire it.

**Popular Support**

Importance of popular support of the insurgency has been pointed out by both scholars (Galula, 2006; Taber, 2002) and practitioners (Guevara, 1962; Mao Zedong, 2000). Popular support is vitally important for three main reasons: (a) Logistical concerns (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). (b) Nature of the insurgency (Jordan, 1962), and (c) Legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006).

**Logistical concerns**

In order to reach political goals, the insurgent must have logistical support that is typically provided by the population, namely, safe heavens, freedom of movement, financial support, logistics, information, recruits, supplies, food, and funds (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). For example, intelligence regarding the movement of counterinsurgent forces is a necessary element for successful
guerrilla operations given that the element of surprise and raids against the counterinsurgent are achieved through a sympathetic population (Jordan, 1962). However, when the local population withdraws its support from the insurgent, this new situation is most likely to result in not only lack of logistics for the insurgent, but also providing aid in government’s counterinsurgency/counterterrorism efforts, thus it would increase the efficiency of the government and diminish of the insurgent’s control over the population (Mesquita, 2005). Furthermore, it may lead to abandon the struggle and end the insurgent violence (Weinberg, 1991). For instance, when the Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) launched a bloody campaign against the Nepal government to achieve communist revolution, due to lack of popular support, especially from urban middle-class— which the insurgent identified them as the main source to tap their resources in to insurgent organization— it ended its violent strategy and joined the mainstream political parties upon an agreement between the insurgent and government on November 21\textsuperscript{st} of 2006 (Gobyn, 2009). In other words, if the insurgent lacks logistical support, successful guerrilla warfare against the government cannot be carried out effectively.

Nature of the insurgency

Since the guerrilla fighter is a civilian who has taken up arms and alienates himself from the people, the insurgent must have popular support (Jordan, 1962). Without the consent and active aide of supporters, the guerrilla would be merely a bandit who could not survive; therefore, if the government could claim this
same popular support, the guerrilla would not exist, because there would be no war, and thus no insurgency (Taber, 2002). In other words, if there is an insurgency, there must be some degree of popular support for the insurgent

Legitimacy

Popular support can provide the insurgent movement a feeling of legitimacy (Gerrits, 1992, as cited in Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008), and such legitimacy for the insurgent can be generated by political goals (Hayes & McAllister, 2005; 2001). For instance, when the IRA’s political party Sinn Fein won the British Parliamentary elections of 1918 on a separatist forum in Ireland it represented the popular mandate that justified the Irish War of independence (1919-1921), establishment of an independent of Republic and other IRA’s campaign against the British rule (Neumann, 2005).

As a consequence, an insurgency that has broad and popular support with legitimate political goals can attract international public attention to the issue and thus obtain support from abroad, especially from the Diaspora living overseas. For instance, The PKK has received reliable support from the Kurdish communities in Western Europe, especially from German and a lesser degree from Sweden (Cornell, 2001). In addition to the Kurdish Diaspora, the PKK was also supported or tolerated by several foreign countries due to various reasons. During the 1980s, the Soviet Union supported the PKK due to its Marxist-Leninist ideology; the Syria supported it and provided safe havens due to border dispute
over the Hatay province of Turkey; and Greece, Iran and Greek Cyprus are among other countries that supported or tolerated the PKK (Cornell, 2001).

In his book, *Beating the Goliath*, Records (2007) viewed external support as one of the determinant factors in defeating powerful, strong governments. For example, the Kosovar Albanian insurgency led by the UCK guerrillas in Yugoslavia during the 1990s was able to attract great popular support from both Albanian natives as well as the international community because the insurgents were clever enough to convince their internal and international audience that their goals were legitimate. As a consequence, with help from the international community and broad popular support, within a few years the UCK won the insurgency warfare in the political field, even though not on the battlefield.

Muller (1970, 1972) pointed out the perception of 'legitimacy' in government and examined how it relates to political violence. Muller views it as one of the main and dominant factor in explaining political violence. In his study titled “A Test of Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence”, Muller (1972) measured legitimacy with trust political authorities and found an inverse correlation with political violence. Furthermore, he suggests that belief in the illegitimacy of the regime and belief in the utility of violence by the “dissidents” (insurgent) in the past have a substantial impact on individual's readiness for mobilization to engage political violence against the government. In his earlier study, Muller (1970) examined the support linkage between citizens (represented) and political authorities. His findings suggested that although the performance of political
authorities certainly has influence on support, the much of this effect depends on legitimacy sentiment. In other words, if people think the ruling government is illegitimate, no matter how good the political authorities work, they will not support the government and its political authorities. By the same token, if the insurgent’s political party, which won the national and/or municipal elections, is perceived as legitimate, then its performance would not be important in terms of popular support. If this is the case, the population would vote for the political party associated with the insurgent unless it changes its opinion about the legitimacy.

Types of Popular Support

The importance of popular support is not only a scholarly discussion but also an operational and political goal for the insurgent. For example, Che Guevara (1962), an insurgent leader, viewed popular support as an indispensable condition of guerrilla warfare, and Mao Zedong (2000), another insurgent leader, famously noted that due to the fact that guerrilla warfare derives basically from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. Similarly, Galula (2006), a counterinsurgency practitioner and analyst, viewed support of the population as the “first law” of the counterinsurgency warfare, and Ney (1962) also concurred that the insurgent cannot survive or function without popular support. Although both scholars and practitioners of insurgencies have pointed out the importance of popular support, few have explicitly mentioned the type that
is vitally important for the insurgent or the key determining factor in insurgency warfare.

Current literature divides popular support into “active” and “passive.” Active support includes people or groups who join the insurgency and provide critical assets to the insurgent including, for example, logistics, intelligence, transportation, and safe havens, and carry out actions on the behalf of the insurgent (U.S. Army, 2006).

Passive support refers to tolerance or acquiescence and includes those individuals who quietly sympathize with the insurgent but are unwilling to provide material assistance; however, they do allow insurgents to operate, but do not provide information to counterinsurgents (O’Neill, 1990). Passive support often has a great effect on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness (U.S. Army, 2006).

As Taber (2002) pointed out, without the sympathy, cooperation, and support of the people, the insurgent would be merely a bandit and inevitably fail. Lawrence (1929) underlined passive support and argued that the insurgent must have a friendly population—not actively friendly—yet sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Galula (2006) divided the population into three groups: an active minority against the insurgent; a neutral majority, and the active minority supporting the insurgent. Resource mobilization theory (RMT) better describes the groups in a population. For example, in their resource mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald (1977) added one more group and divided the population into four major groups and subgroups: (a) constituents
(active supporters), (b) adherents (passive supporters), (c) public bystander (neutral majority), and (d) opponents. The RMT approach also distinguishes these active (constituents) and passive supporter (adherents) groups by whether or not they will directly benefit from the insurgent’s accomplishments. The term “beneficiary” refers to those who would benefit directly from the insurgent’s accomplishment of goals, whereas “conscience” refers to those who are direct supporters of the insurgent but do not stand to benefit directly from its success in accomplishing goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).

Dividing popular support and the population into groups could have important practical implications in an insurgency. In order to defeat the opposing party, each side (government and insurgent) must carefully analyze these portions among the population and develop an effective strategy to win these groups over to their own sides. However, there is no consensus relating to this matter in the literature; rather, there are different suggestions pertaining to the groups that should be addressed. For example, according to Galula (2006) the insurgent focuses on the “neutral majority” and aims to mobilize it against the government with assistance from the supportive minor population. However, Sluka (1989) stressed the “opponent” group by arguing that the insurgent can survive even without active support from its population but cannot survive in a hostile population against support. Both Galula (2005) and Sluka (1989) suggested that the government should focus on the insurgent’s “opponents” and mobilize them against the insurgent.
From the insurgent’s side, RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) suggested that the insurgent focuses on passive supporters (adherents) as well as active supporters (constituents) rather than the public bystander (neutral majority). The reason derives from RMT’s concerns regarding the mobilization of potential resources into the insurgent organization. Since the main concern of the RMT is how to acquire support from the people and mobilize their resources into the organization, depending exclusively on mass beneficiary active supporters (constituents) would reduce the potential size of the resource pool that could be used for goal achievement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Similarly, depending upon beneficiary passive supporters (beneficiary adherents) would severely restrict the amount of resources the organization could raise (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Therefore, the RMT approach suggests focusing especially on non-beneficiary passive supporters and both active and passive supporters who are “isolated” from the insurgent. The term “isolated” refers to individuals who do not meet face to face with the insurgent and are not bound to the insurgent through solidarity selective incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In order to do so, McCarthy and Zald (1977) suggested that effective media campaigns would be the best means to obtain resources from isolated constituents, and attractive “political goals” would work best for the isolated passive supporters (adherents).

Similar to RMT theorists, Funes (1998) divides their audience into four major sectors and describe the theoretical framework. First is “operative base” of ETA (active supporters). They effectively support the violence. Second is “area of
influence” of ETA (passive supporters). They may not directly support violence, but they tolerate it and offer a kind of emotional support that may be transformed into active support at any moment. Third are “indifferents” (neutral population). They do not support ETA violence; they do not share their goals. Finally, “passive opponents” of the ETA. They reject ETA violence under any conditions and do not agree with the ETA. However, due to fear, they keep their opinions to themselves. According to Funes (1998), although these citizen groups target all of those sectors of the society, their first priority, is the ‘passive opponents” against the insurgent. Second, is “neutral population”. Third is ‘passive supporters” of the insurgent. Because it is very difficult to influence the active supporters; citizen groups strive to influence the people who are close to the violent group. In contrast to the traditional insurgency theorists, such as Galula (2006), Trinquer (2006)— who suggests mobilization of the mass against the insurgent—, Gesto por Paz and Elkarri of Spain is a good model of civilian-led mobilization against the insurgent.

Although most scholars points out the importance of eroding popular support for the insurgent, they do not clearly describes how to practice it. In her study titled Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country: Peace Movements and Their Audience, Funes (1998) describes how citizen groups, Gesto por Paz (“gesture toward peace”) and Elkarri (“among all of us”), that have been formed in mid1980s against the ETA violence in Spain was able to create a social pressure against ETA’s active and passive supporters, thus eroded
popular support for the insurgent. These two groups have more than a hundred subgroups that are consisted of thousands of supporters spread throughout the Basque country and autonomous community of Navarra. The main of these citizen groups is to end the violent conflict. Their members organize meetings; bring together people with different viewpoints to convince one part of society, which supports ETA violence, to give up violence and the government to help end the violence. If any person becomes a victim of terrorism due to ethnic conflict, regardless of whether a policeman, civilian, or terrorist, the following day, these citizen groups organize periods of silence for 15 minutes. Each local group chooses one specific venue, a very central place where these silent periods are observed. Supporters of these citizens groups know where and when, they need not be summoned to attend. Or if someone is kidnapped by the ETA, they come together at the same time, on the same day, every week until the terrorist organization release the victim.

With regards to theoretical framework, according to Funes (1998, p.507) these citizen groups adopted the McAdam (1983) process of cognitive liberation process. The first step is loss of legitimacy. In this step, use of violence as a means to reach political goals is delegitimized and a people are aimed to be isolated from the violence. When this isolation succeeded, it increases the costs of remaining a member of ETA supporter. The second is “the abandonment of fatalism”. This step helps to culminate it and gives a new sense of efficacy. In the
final step, a new consensus is formed based on enhanced feeling of group political efficacy.

Political Violence for Popular Support

Although the literature points out the importance of popular support for both sides, it neither explicitly explains the possible actions that the insurgent would take when it senses losing a considerable amount of popular support nor the relationship between political violence and popular support. Furthermore, there is no consensus regarding whether violence against civilians increases or erodes popular support for the insurgent. In this dissertation, we argue that the need to secure survival forces the insurgent to use political violence even against its own native population.

Rationale of Political Violence against Civilians

Under what conditions do insurgent groups either gain or lose popular support is a complex issue that remains inadequate. The question of when political violence generates or erodes popular support for the insurgent is typically explained by two similar categorizations: (a) *combatants* and *noncombatants* (*civilians*) and (b) “*selective or discriminate terrorism*” and “*indiscriminate or blind terrorism*.” Indiscriminate force refers to the application of force against a target without limiting the force, whereas discriminate force refers to the limited use of force (Martin, 2009). Martin developed a political matrix
depicting the relationship between the “quality of force” used by terrorists and “characteristics of the victim” of the attack (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Political violence matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Discriminate</th>
<th>Indiscriminate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>Total War</td>
<td>Limited War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Martin (2009) suggested that when force is used against combatants, it characterizes a warfare environment. However, when force is used against noncombatants or passive combatants, it occurs in a terrorist environment. Although Martin’s model indicates the type of conflict involving the terrorist and the victim, it can also be used to understand when a terrorist attack can either generate popular support or backfire. As shown in Figure 3, the insurgent has the best chance of obtaining support from its own population if it discriminately attacks only combatants.

Although terrorist attacks can appear random, some scholars argue that they are usually highly selective in target selection and serve a distinct goal (Boyle, 2009). Because the insurgent is rational in its terrorist attacks, most terrorist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational; instead, it plays a quite strategic role in insurgent’s overall direction, and can be surprisingly effective in achieving its political aims (Kydd & Walter, 2002; 2006; Enders & Sandler, 1993; Barros, Passos & Gil-Alana, 2006; Lake, 2002). Thus, if the insurgent is rational,
then it should follow a specific pattern (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006; Hewitt, 2000).

Despite these categorizations, whether indiscriminate violence against the population can generate popular support remains a controversial issue. Some researchers argue that indiscriminate violence erodes popular support for the insurgent (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guevara, 1962; Abrahams, 2006), whereas others claim that the insurgent still obtains passive support due to discouraging the population to cooperate with the government through intimidation (Jordan, 1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006). Taking the former approach, Guevara (1962), an insurgent theorist and practitioner, was opposed to attacking civilians and stated that “terrorism is a negative weapon and in no way produces the desired effects. It can turn people against a revolutionary movement, and brings with it a loss of lives among those taking part which is much greater than the return” (p. 35).

Thornton (1980) distinguished selective terrorism from indiscriminate terrorism by arguing that if the insurgent carefully selects its targets and discriminately commits terrorism against only those selected targets, the population does not feel anxiety; however, totally indiscriminate attacks are not desirable for the insurgent. Stated differently, these attacks are not desirable because the insurgent has a political goal, and attacks must be directed toward fulfilling that goal. Abrahams (2006) approaches target selection from terrorist success perspective—which is defined as success as achieving the group’s
declared political goals—rather than from a popular support perspective. He focuses on foreign terrorist organizations only and their terrorists attacks on target government’s civilian population only. He concludes that the key variable for terrorist success in achieving political goals is the ‘target selection’; groups who attacks mostly civilians rather than combatants systematically fails to achieve their political objectives (p.52), because the government’s population interpret the consequences of a terrorist attacks targeting civilians as an attack to destroy the society, its core values or both rather than the group’s limited political objectives such as control over a piece of territory or national self-determination.

His analysis is based on the social psychologist Edward Jones (1976)’s study which found that observers tend to interpret an actor’s objective in terms of the consequence of the action.

Similar to Thornton (1980), Douglass and Zulaika (1990) acknowledged the difference between selective and indiscriminate violence as exemplified by two ETA bombings in 1987 at a shopping center in Barcelona and military barracks in Zaragoza that indiscriminately killed many bystanders. These attacks prompted enormous public demonstrations that involved hundreds of thousands of participants against the violence. As a consequence, the ETA then stated that it had not intended to produce civilian casualties in the Barcelona case and claimed that the authorities had worsened the situation by giving advanced warning (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990). Likewise, Funes (1998), Bueno (2005), and Mesquita (2005) argue that despite the advent of political freedom and
constitutional guarantees, during transition from dictatorship to democracy and in its first years of democratic stability, the ETA increased its violence and carried out bloodier and indiscriminate terrorism against civilians. The ETA also attempted but failed to kill Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Aznar in April 1995, and King Juan Carlos in August 1996 (Barros, 2003). As a consequence of its sustained bloodier, indiscriminate terrorism campaign, its idealist image as freedom fighters fighting against the dictator began to erode and the ETA began to lose the popular support it had been enjoying (Funes, 1998; Barros, 2003), and as a negative consequence of these attacks, Aznar’s Popular Party, which adapts a hard-liner approach, was elected in the elections of May 1996 (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).

Similarly, when a landmine targeting the military exploded near a passenger bus and killed six children and 32 other civilians, and wounded 72 others on June 6th of 2006 (the U.S Counterterrorism Center, 2006 report), the leader of the insurgent group issued an order to the military wing, the PLA, to stop all ‘physical actions’ against unarmed people (Gobyn, 2009).

Thompson (1966) likewise argued that after a certain point, indiscriminate terrorism will shift the support in favor of the government. For instance, when the Chechen insurgents bombed three apartments that killed 229 Russian civilians in 1999, it eroded a considerable amount of popular support from Russian population for the Chechen insurgency. Russian sympathizers who used to favor Chechen’s war for the independence shifted their view and became opponents.
According to Abrahams (2006), from the onset of military operations until the ceasefire in August 1996, some 70% of Russian opposed the war between the military and the Chechen insurgents; according the Public Opinion Foundation, 71% of Russians were willing to trade the land for peace. However, the following terrorist acts, these numbers were reversed; 73% of Russians supported Russian Army to advance into Chechnya whereas only 19% of Russians wanted peaceful negations with the insurgents.

Researchers of the latter approach adopt more rational and convincing arguments. For example, since popular support is vitally important for insurgents, by terrorizing the population, the insurgent will still be able to obtain passive support because of their ability to discourage supporters from cooperating with the government (Jordan, 1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006).

Although these categorizations are certainly useful, they are still insufficient in capturing the dynamics of political violence against civilians. In order to clarify this vague explanation of violence against the population, this dissertation offers an additional dimension in categorizing the population. The researcher divides the population into two categories and then integrates a new concept into “selective” and “discriminate” terrorism. Thus, this study suggests that violence against civilians should be analyzed under two categories: (a) the insurgent’s native (own or local) population and (b) the government’s population. Without distinguishing between them, one cannot reach an accurate conclusion regarding the relationship between political violence against the population and popular
support, because violence against each group has different dynamics and pursues different goals. Few researchers (Boyle, 2009; Goodwin, 2006; Hewitt, 1990; Ney, 1962) have analyzed the distinction between the government’s population and the insurgent’s native population.

Violence against insurgent’s own population

As a main principle, Mao Zedong (2000) disapproved of violence against the insurgent’s own population by stating that “… in a war of counterrevolutionary nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from the population” (p. 44). However, the literature indicates that on many occasions, the insurgent breaks Mao’s rule and uses political violence against its own population.

In contrast to Mao Zedong (2000), O’Neill (1990) suggested that in order to gain popular support, insurgent organizations will use coercion against their own people when other non-coercive methods do not work. Likewise, Ney (1962) suggested that terror is the insurgent’s most potent weapon used to extort the support of its “own” people. Alonso (2007) further argued that the insurgent often attempts to acquire such support through fear, because this method stresses that any opposition to its objectives will come at a price, and Sarma (2007) considered the use of terrorism as a tool to ensure that necessary conditions will prevail in which such support can thrive. Trinquier (2006) argued that unconditional support of the population is a necessary factor of victory in guerrilla
warfare; if it does not exist, it must be secured by every possible means, of which the most effective is terrorism. Similarly, Jordan (1962) suggested that when popular support is not always given voluntarily, it is acquired through terrorizing the population. Similarly, Ney (1962) argued that when voluntary support cannot be sustained at the desired level, the insurgent will almost inevitably resort to terrorism in an effort to compel this support, and when used against an insurgent’s own people, political violence establishes the needed popular support.

Although the use of political violence against an insurgent’s own population for the purpose of obtaining popular support has been pointed out, little information is provided regarding the logic, dynamics, or how it works or generates popular support. This constitutes one of the weaknesses of the insurgency literature that should be strengthened. We argue that if the insurgent lacks the desired level of popular support, it will apply political violence against its own people to ensure that secure survival of the insurgency as well as the organization is secured. As mentioned previously, it is believed that success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves greater popular support (U.S. Army Stability Operations and Support Operations Manual of 2003), and as the insurgent group gains support, its capabilities grow (U.S. Counterinsurgency Manual of 2006). On the other hand, when the population strongly supports and believes in its government, then chances for the insurgent are remote (Jordan, 1962). Therefore, popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare.
Due to this determining feature, popular support is viewed as a zero-sum commodity given that a gain for the insurgency is a loss for the government, and a loss for the government is a gain for the insurgency. This is the reason why the insurgent resorts to political violence when it does not have sufficient popular support.

As RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) pointed out, once insurgent organizations are formed, organizational survival becomes their primary goal. Consequently, they pursue their goals only if they secure organizational survival. Since popular support is crucial for survival, if the insurgent senses that support is being threatened, any means to protect its survival will be used, even violence against its own native population. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), this is because without securing survival, the insurgent cannot pursue its goals at any rate. Stated differently, if the insurgent cannot obtain the population’s support and resources (e.g., intelligence, recruits, and logistics) and does not use violence to obtain them, it will not survive and not reach its goals anyway. However, even if the population does not willingly choose to provide any support, the insurgent will still secure its organizational survival by using violence against the civil population to acquire the necessary resources. Although the insurgent will not obtain “active support,” by terrorizing the population it can still convert the people who do not cooperate with the government into “passive supporters” with “blind eyes.” As a consequence of this violence strategy, regardless of whether the people have sympathy or not, if they wish to live, they have no other choice
than to provide all kinds of requested materials and resources to the insurgency. If this is the case, the first important mission for the insurgent becomes survival, not one of being liked by the population. Without a doubt, however, this is the insurgent’s worst scenario and its least desired situation.

On the other hand, after securing survival, the insurgent still has the chance to gain the population’s hearts and thereby reach its goals. Popular support is not continuously given to one political side (Galula, 2006) but rather is conditional and can change with time (Janos, 1980: Galula, 2006). This is because the population weighs the level of threat and its party’s chance to win before choosing a side and is thus more likely to be on the side of the party whose popularity and effectiveness are combined. In the initial stages, even if the people view the government as being more powerful, as the insurgent increases its threat against the population, and/or wins some battlefield victories against the government, the insurgent acquires more support from the people. For example, Kalyvas (1999) found that the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) of Algeria killed many Algerian civilians who supported the country’s secular government or simply refused to support the organization. According to Ney (1962), this intimidation technique usually works. Ney argued that when the Algerian insurgency commenced on November 1, 1954, the number of insurgents was estimated to be a few hundred to 3,000 but sharply increased to 20,000 full-time guerrilla troops by the beginning of the 1960s. This growth in strength was
attributed primarily to the widespread use by the FLN’s leadership of political violence against the Moslem population (Ney, 1962).

The rationale to resort to violence requires secure survival of the insurgent and insurgency. Although without support the insurgent cannot not achieve its goals anyway, by frightening and forcing the people to support the organization through new recruits, information, logistics, and other means may appear to be the most rational and effective choice. As a result, for a population that is involved in insurgency warfare against a foreign power, the insurgent’s threat may possibly be envisioned greater and closer than the counterinsurgent government’s threat of imprisoning anyone who supports the insurgency.

Violence against the government’s population

Hayes and McAllister (2005; 2001) stressed the importance of the insurgent’s political goals to generate popular support by suggesting that political ends justify the violence. Furthermore, if violence is perceived as having the greatest chance of achieving the required political goals, then it will be used. Thus, by employing violence against the government’s population in order to achieve political goals can be viewed as legitimate by the insurgent’s own population and even generate support. According to Boyle (2009) carefully planned selective terrorism against the government’s population indicates the capability of inflicting pain on the government and protecting the insurgent’s own population. Furthermore, such violence is a way to boost the insurgent’s
reputation for toughness and indicate its nationalist, ethnic or sectarian credentials as well as its willingness to fight in local power contests (p.218). Likewise, Hoffman (2004) argues that terrorism against enemy population is a message directed towards the insurgent’s own constituents and can be used to stimulate popular activism, bolster the insurgent’s base of support, help mobilize the population and achieve a self sustaining rate of organizational growth (as cited in Boyle, 2009). For instance, during so-called second Palestinian Intifada public support for terrorist suicide bombings stood at 70% of Palestinians (BBC News, 28, June, 2002, as cited in Neumann, 2005, p.947). According to Neumann (2005) support for terrorist attacks not only depend on nature of targets but also time and circumstances of the attacks. In his cross national study, Hewitt (1990) found that popular support for insurgent violence does not decrease due to terrorist violence against the government’s population (“ethnic enemy”) (p.166).

Goodwin (2006) distinguished the insurgent’s own population from the government’s population and proposed three key contextual factors that strongly influence groups to adopt indiscriminate terrorism as a political strategy: (a) a perception that large numbers of civilians benefit from, support, or at the very least tolerate the use of repressive measures by the state against militant groups and their constituents; (b) a large and relatively unprotected population of “complicitous” civilians; and (c) “social distance” between the terrorists, their constituents, and the target population. Likewise, Hewitt (1990) divides the population into two main categories: insurgent’s constituency (“fellow ethnics”)
and its enemies (p.147). Similar to the RMT approach, he argues that insurgent’s constituency consists of both potential and actual supporters. Hewitt concludes that “nationalist ideology” legitimates terrorist violence and generates a positive image of the insurgent as long as terrorism campaign uses proper tactics and does not kill “fellow ethnics”. Using a similar analogy, from an ethnic conflict perspective, Bruce (2001) suggest that when the society is divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’, they become ready to deploy violence against the other. From this perspective, we argue that when the insurgent used violence against the government’s perspective, it would be tolerated or even generate support.

Similarly, Mack (as cited in Record, 2007) focused on the government’s population and argued that success of the insurgent arises from the “progressive attrition” of the government’s political capability to wage war, not a military victory. In Mack’s view, attacking the government’s population would erode the government’s “political will” to continue to wage insurgency warfare and thus lead the insurgent to victory. Enders and Sandler (1993) argue that the main logic of massacring innocent civilians is to bring pressure on the government to accept their demands. From a similar perspective, by considering Palestinian terrorism that gains since the early 1970s, Dershowitz (2002) argues that terrorism works and is an entirely rational choice to achieve to achieve political goals (as cited in Abrahams, 2006, p.44). Although targeting government’s civilians generate more concerns among the government’s population and erode the political will of the government, targeting governmental targets may also erode its political will under
certain conditions. For instance, the Lebanese-based Shiite terrorist group, Hezbollah’s terrorism campaign successfully compelled the United States and France to withdraw their military forces from Lebanon in 1984 (Atran, 2004, as cited in Abrahams, 2006, p.45), because they successfully eroded the government’s political will to continue the wage against the insurgent. Similarly when the violent attacks by the insurgent LTTE against the Indian Peace Keeping Force, or the IPKF — Indian army troops that were deployed in Sri Lanka to disarm the insurgent LTTE and enforce the Accord that was signed between the India and Sri Lanka government on July 30th of 1987— increased and caused over 1,500 casualties, it eroded popular support among the Indian population for Gandhi government’s Sri Lanka policy and political will of the new government. From the autumn of 1988 there was little public support for the government’s Sri Lanka policy. Due to lack of political will of the new National Front government, as soon as it got elected in the elections of December 1989, it agreed to the prompt withdrawal of the IPKF by March 1990 (Crenshaw, 2000,p.151).

Comparable to Record and Mack, Enders and Sandler (1993), and Galula (2006) believed that despite FLN’s military defeat on the battlefield, due to the lack of political will in Paris, the French withdrew all troops from Algeria and granted independence to Algeria in 1962. Therefore, we argue that unlike violence against the insurgent’s own population, insurgency violence against the government’s population might be more tolerated and even have a more positive
effect on the native population and generate popular support among the insurgent’s population, especially if the insurgent’s population believes it would erode the political will of the government or bring the government to its knees.

Conclusion

To sum up, the insurgent must depend on the population due to its logistics, intelligence, new recruits, financial support, food, and other requirements needed to wage guerrilla warfare and reach its political goals. Therefore, the level of popular support among the population should always be assessed by the insurgent. As Galula (2006) pointed out, popular support is not continually given to one political party but rather is conditional and can change with time. Because popular support is conditional and can shift from one side to the other, the insurgent cannot risk losing this important support and therefore must take necessary steps to retain or regain popularity. Insurgency leader Che Guevara (1962) acknowledged the possibility of changes in conditions and the importance of a popular support level in insurgency warfare and further suggested that the guerrilla must analyze the popular support. Likewise, Mao Zedong (2000) pointed out the changes in local conditions and suggested making modifications if necessary. In short, both insurgency leaders warned other insurgency leaders for possible changes in the environment. Taking this approach in this study, the researcher examines the insurgent’s responses to relative changes in its popular support level.
Two leading theories of sociology, relative deprivation theory (hereafter, RDT) and resource mobilization theory (hereafter, RMT), have been widely used in the literature to explain political violence and the occurrence of social movements. These theories constitute the principal theoretical framework of this dissertation for two main reasons. First, we view the PKK as an insurgent organization that uses terrorism as a tool to reach its goals; and insurgencies are categorized as “revolutionary social movements” in the social movement literature. Second, each theory is based on different assumptions and emphasizes various aspects of insurgencies that could shed light on the PKK’s use of political violence.

Relative deprivation theory assumes that the difference between achieved and expected results generate relative deprivation that frequently leads to collective action (political violence) in order to achieve goals of the social movement (insurgency). This theory views discontent or grievances as the source of political violence. Although RDT’s main focus is on individuals, in this study its concept is applied to (insurgent) organizations.

As a reaction to RDT, resource mobilization theory does not view grievances and inequalities as sufficient factors for the occurrence of social movements but rather considers them as a precondition for the occurrence of social movements. Furthermore, the RMT approach suggests that without
forming a social movement organization and resources available to the organization, social movement conditions cannot lead to collective action. The resource mobilization theory assumes that social organizations compete for resources to be flowed into the organization, and sometimes this competition or lack of resources available to the movement leads the social movement organization to use violence to obtain them. Resources may consist of financial assistance, equipment, land, information, and intelligence, among others. Since almost all of these resources are usually provided by the population to the insurgent, taking the RMT approach, in this study, popular support is viewed as the potential resources available that could be transferred to the insurgent. Although the theoretical grounds of each theory differ, both shed light on different issues that could influence post-election terrorism.

Relative Deprivation Theory

The relative deprivation theory became a dominant theory in the social movement literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The term “relative deprivation” was initially introduced in 1949 by Stouffer and Merton (1949) (as cited in Locher, 2002). In social science literature, the term refers to a situation in which individuals have less than they believe they deserve (Locher, 2002; Muller, 1972). Gurr (1970) expanded its meaning to the discrepancy between achievement optimum and achievement. Using the notion of reference groups, Geschwender (1964) defined relative deprivation as the perception that a
person's membership group is in an advantageous position relative to other group or groups (as cited in Muller, 1972) (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4:** RDT Model 1: Comparison to reference group

Opposed to Geschwender's (1964) notion of reference groups, Wilson (1973) and Runciman (1966) argued that there need not be an objective referent corresponding to the perception (as cited in Muller, 1972). Similarly, Gurr (1970) conceptualized relative deprivation and argued that the position of one's own group (or one's own standing) in the past, present, and/or future can be used as a reference point (see Figure 5).
The main assumption of RDT is that relative deprivation is caused by a gap between expectations and achievements (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Goodwin, 2006) that can and often do lead to anger (Zimmerman, 1983). According to Morrison (1978), there are two different kinds of relative deprivation that can lead to anger. The first is *decremental deprivation*, or when people believe that their opportunities have been suddenly reduced, it leads to decremental deprivation. The second is *aspirational deprivation*, or when people’s expectations and ambitions increase but their opportunities do not increase, it leads to aspirational deprivation. Both types of relative deprivation create similar feelings: something that is desired, expected, and demanded by a large number of people does not appear to be available to them.
Gurr (1970) developed a “theory of collective violence” based on the concept of relative deprivation theory. He argued that the potential for violence depends upon the discontent held by members of a society, and discontent is caused by a perceived gap between what they have and what they think they should have. Gurr referred to this gap as “relative deprivation” and argued that this gap frequently leads to violence. His causal mechanism that underlies the deprivation-violence relationship was derived from frustration-aggression theory (Muller, 1972). In this explanation, frustration produced by one’s perception of discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is considered as the source of potential for political violence, and the magnitude of political violence will vary strongly and directly with the degree, or intensity, of relative deprivation (Muller, 1972). In this study, by taking the RDT approach, the researcher assumes that a proportional decline in popular votes that presumably reflects popular support for the insurgent should generate relative deprivation in the insurgent group. As Ross and Gurr (1989) suggested violence may increase when the insurgent perceives an existential threat to itself. Thus, it is reasonable to expect such relative deprivation because of at least two reasons: First, popular support is vitally important for the insurgent and a determining factor in defeating the adversary. Losing such support threatens the insurgent’s survival due to logistics and other previously mentioned concerns. Second, the insurgent would lose its chance to achieve its goals. Due to the fact that the insurgent is weak against the government in terms of both materials and tactics, it employs guerrilla
warfare strategies and aims to mobilize the population against the government. However, failure in 2007 general elections indicates that the population supports the government rather than the insurgent; therefore, the insurgent’s opportunity to defeat the government by mobilizing the population would be remote anymore.

Resource Mobilization Theory

The resource mobilization perspective was introduced with the publication of *Social Conflict and Social Movements* by Oberschall (1973) and later improved by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Oberschall (1973) stressed the importance of organizations and leadership in social movements. Similarly, McCarthy and Zald (1977) acknowledged the importance of organizations in social movements but pointed out the necessity of organizational resources for the movement. Furthermore, according to the manner in which an organization uses and allocates resources as well as the amount of activity directed toward goal achievement is a function of the organization and influences the success of a social movement (MacCarthy & Zald, 1977). A movement’s organizations are important because they serve as sites to bring people together and as resources that sustain the movement (Reger & Dugan, 2001). Although theorists of the RMT approach exclusively consider resources as time and money, they also include knowledge, meeting space, communication networks, media, labor, solidarity, legitimacy, and internal/external support from the power elite (Reger & Dugan, 2001).
Unlike the RDT approach, the resource mobilization theory (RMT) challenges theories that are based on a person’s dissatisfaction and suggests that movements (insurgency) cannot be effective without proper resources (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The RMT approach views strain or discontent, key aspects of insurgency and social movement theories, as an insufficient cause for a movement and emphasizes the importance of resources in a movement organization. Organizations are viewed as key components in the emergence of movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & Berger, 1978). Similarly, Galula (2006) suggested that in the insurgent’s cause, popularity alone is insufficient to transform sympathy to the population’s participation. This, however, can be achieved by an insurgent living among the population and being backed by guerrilla forces that will eliminate the open enemies, intimidate the potential ones, and rely on those among the population who actively support the insurgency. Correspondingly, the RMT approach argues that continuous availability of resources and the ability to mobilize these resources have an impact on the capability to maintain a conflict. Additionally, immediate outcomes depend upon this ability to mobilize resources in order to sustain a conflict (Zald & Berger, 1978). Because the resources of movement are vitally important for success, social organizations compete with one another in an effort to acquire them (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). According to Boyle (2009) terrorist violence against the government’s population tend to be concentrated in high-value, resource rich, or contested territories, where multiple parties have conflicting stakes on territory
and stakes. Likewise, Höglund (2009) suggests that parties with ‘close races’ have strong incentive to use violence. From the RMT perspective, this competition to obtain resources as well as a lack of resources may sometimes lead the movement to use coercive measures (Zald & Berger, 1978).

Similar to the traditional insurgency approach, the RMT approach assumes that individuals are rational. In other words, they weigh the costs and benefits of participating in a movement and then decide to join only if the benefits outweigh the costs. Galula (2006) suggested that the population weighs the level of threat and the chances of a party’s victory before making a decision. The population is more likely to be on the side of the party whose popularity and effectiveness are combined. Therefore, by taking the resource mobilization theory, in this study we argue that as an insurgent group gains support from the people, its capabilities and resources to generate violence will expand, or, as McCarthy and Zald (1977) suggested, as the flow of resources increases, the movement organization will be able to hire more full-time professional personnel (e.g., full-time guerrillas, political officers, et cetera) and increase the potential size of the resource pool (e.g., new recruits, intelligence, logistics, financial support, et cetera). According to Mesquita (2005) increasing the level of resources invested in terror would increase the probability of defeating the government. As a consequence, the movement will be more likely to accomplish its goals. From the insurgent’s perspective, the more resources available not only mean more tangible materials, namely full-time guerrillas, weapons, and ammunition but also
intangible materials, for example, intelligence relating to the counterinsurgent and sheltering insurgents among the population.

By the same token, as the insurgent group loses support, its capabilities and resources to generate violence will diminish. When the insurgent becomes unable to recruit new members and some segments of the population express its hostility against the insurgent, the insurgent may end its struggle and violent activities (Weinberg, 1991). The insurgent are subject to resource constraints that limit the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or resources (Enders & Sandler, 1993). In his study using a game theoretic approach, Mesquita (2005) clearly explains the underlying logic why the insurgent violence decreases its political violence and supports his argument by the describing the violence in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday accords. To him, since the insurgent is endowed with resources, withdrawing support the insurgent some percentage of the resources available to the insurgent will be lost and remaining resources will accrue to terrorist activities As a consequence, there will be a decline in violence despite increased militancy, because the insurgent will lack the resources to engage in the amount of violence they would like. According to Mesquita (2005) decline in resources of the insurgent describes the situation in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday accords. After the Good Friday accords, the splinter groups such as “Real IRA” increased its militancy and engaged in terrorist attacks such as bombing of Omagh, a missile attack on the UK’s Secret Intelligence, M6, the assault on
Ebrington Barracks in Derry, and the bombing of the BBC. Despite these terrorist attacks were qualitatively more violent than anything which the Provisional IRA had engaged the splinter groups had small size and lacked resources to actually the overall death toll from the IRA violence. Similarly, by the late 1990s, the ETA lost most of its popular support and as a result it changed its violence strategy. Since then ETA activity and number of killings substantially decreased; however, the type of killings has become more specialized such as politicians, journalists and etc (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).

Ease of access to the resources and perception of risk also do matter for the insurgent. Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) found that the proximity of a terrorist base or an international border both substantially increase the frequency of attacks because of lowering the costs of a terrorist attack and risk of supplying resources and material for the attacks.

In conclusion, by taking the RMT approach, the researcher hypothesizes that the insurgent will be more likely to increase its level of violence when there is more popular support and decrease its level of violence when there is less popular support from the population.

Conclusion

In sum, the literature and RMT approach were found to reach similar conclusions regarding the insurgent’s dependence on resources that are expected to be provided by the population. However, if the population does not willingly provide resources, as a last resort the insurgency may use political
violence against its own native population in an effort to acquire them (Zald & Berger, 1978). Thus, the primary stimulus for violence is the need and capability to gain resources. Because the insurgent considers popular support as a zero-sum game, its primary rival is the government that strives to obtain support of the people as well. Although the insurgent might possibly attack its own native population due to a lack of popular support in obtaining resources, by attacking selective targets (e.g., military soldiers, police officers, and other governmental agents), insurgents will typically generate more popularity among the population. As a result, most terrorist attacks should be expected to occur within areas that are supportive of the insurgent due to the availability of resources supplied.

Taking the RMT and insurgency approach, through popular support the insurgent will usually be assumed to have more freedom of movement, recruits, financial resources, logistics, places to hide, and intelligence to successfully carry out a selective terrorist attack. In contrast to the RMT approach, the relative deprivation (RD) approach assumes that a considerable amount relative decline in an insurgent’s support level will create a gap between its expected results versus achieved results. This gap is considered to be a relative deprivation that usually leads to political violence, the major issue in the proposed study. By taking the RDT approach, in this study, we expect that as a vote share of the insurgent’s political party declines between two elections, political violence also increases.
Elections and Insurgency

Introduction

This section reviews the political science literature to understand why insurgent organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature regarding elections and political violence as well. The underlying reason is that there is some literature on the ‘election violence’ which is considered as a special type of political violence in the political science literature, therefore literature on election is reviewed to understand the dynamics and the linkage between election and violence. Briefly, existing literature points out that in democracies elections are tools for transferring the political power; therefore sometimes they can be viewed as an opportunity to increase their popularity among the population by insurgent organizations or discredit the incumbent government. In order to do so, the insurgent may resort violence over the pre-election period. Most of the literature on election violence focused on the pre-election violence and examined its effect on election results, however still there is scant literature on post-election violence and why the insurgent use violence over the post-election period. Furthermore existing studies attempt to explain post-election violence from a relative deprivation approach; they argue that the insurgent launch a violence campaign because of poor election results; although an RD approach provides a logical and reasonable explanation, still they ignore the alternative approach, resource mobilization approach.
Functions and Importance of Political Parties in Democracies

Elections and political parties play an important role in democratic states. Political parties are considered as indispensable components of a democratic political order and institutions serve as means to solve economic and social differences peacefully (Weinberg, 1991). Geddes (1996) referred to political institutions as “weapoms” in the struggle for political power (as cited in Finn, 2000) because political institutions are vehicles to make trade-off among competing values and to establish the rules for obtaining power (Quandt, 1998). Elections allow for the “peaceful” transfer of this power (Höglund, 2009). Furthermore they provide legitimacy through direct popular participation, and, in turn, legitimacy creates legitimate governments enjoying popular support for their policies (Elkit & Svensson 1997, as cited in Sisk, 2008) and capacity for effective governance (Brown 2003, as cited in Sisk, 2008). From this perspective, electoral process is an alternative way to violence because of being a means for governance (Fischer, 2004). For instance, the Nicaraguan election in 1990 was the ‘first peaceful transfer of power from a revolutionary government to its opposition (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a). Finn (2000) lists four important functions in democracies: First, “legitimating” function by coupling political obligation with consensual participation. Second, “integrating” function by binding citizens and political parties to the state. Third, “socializing” function by teaching and transmitting democratic values to the citizens. Finally, “transferring political power” by providing a certain and conventionalized means (p.52-53). However,
at the same time, they are also vulnerable to political violence, because elections are means of achieving or retaining political power and governance (Sisk, 2008); and violence can be used as a tactic in political competition (Fischer, 2004).

Understanding the Importance of Elections for the Insurgent

Briefly, since the elections can provide insurgent political power and access resource, the insurgent has good reasons to engage in electoral politics. Namely, when political parties won the power, they will be able to organize campaigns, mobilize masses, and oversee policies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, p.28). In other words, the insurgent can intentionally use its political party to gain sympathy from not only its native or government’s population but also from the international community. By this way, it can also make their armed struggle with the government legitimate. In addition, when the insurgent’s political party took office, it would expand the pools of its supporters through providing benefits to them thus strength their loyalty. Furthermore, it could also destabilize the political system and even achieve self rule or independence from the government (Weinberg 1991).

Neumann (2005) describes seven reasons or advantages of the insurgent’s participation in elections: First, it can exploit the democratic process to strengthen the insurgent’s military wing. Second, insurgent’s political wing may facilitate insurgent recruitment and radicalization by providing “vetting mechanism”, or providing a possibility of “legalized fundraising” (p.946). Third is to obtain official recognition and legitimacy. Fourth is to mobilize the mass and
broaden the movement—that is, to tap into resources and mobilize sections of community that had not been available previously, which RMT theorists name isolated adherents and constituents. Fifth, is to secure continuity both in terms ideology and personnel. Sixth is to neutralize the government’s military superiority. Finally, the insurgent can realistically assess consequences of the terrorism campaign and demonstrate its popular support with the election results.

The reasons to engage in electoral politics can be group under three categories: 1) increasing popular support for the insurgent; 2) gaining legitimacy and respectability; 3) increasing the pool of its resources and role of the military wing.

Increasing popular support

The most scholars focusing on this issue points out the importance of participating elections in obtaining popular support for the insurgent thus broadening the movement and increasing the organizational resources to achieve insurgent’s goals. The insurgent may emphasize the ethnic and cultures differences, and use political competition in calling for mobilization of large sections of the population, because conflicts are commonly used to gain popular support for its political party (Höglund, 2009, p.420).

Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) purported that elections are mechanisms for generating popular support for the government and its policies as well. Taber (2002) argued that “political mobilization” is the first task of the insurgent, and Richardson (2001) pointed out the importance of electoral politics as a means for
political mobilization. According to Richardson, the issue is two-fold: (a) First, electoral politics is used by the insurgent as a means of building popular support for the purpose of political mobilization, and (b) second, electoral results are considered as an indication of the success or failure of that effort, because obtaining a seat in the national or local government is viewed as a success and reinforces the terrorist organization’s influence over the population. For instance, until the Westminster election in April 1981, the IRA’s political wing the Sinn Fein used to follow an “absenteeism policy”, which prevented their elected candidates from taking their seats in the parliament. However, the president of Sinn Fein Gerry Adams and others realized that by remaining isolated from the political negotiations, they cannot mobilize the population towards their political goals, therefore, they rescinded their absenteeism policy at 1986 Sin Fein conference (McAllister, 2004, p.128).

Drake and Silva (1986) viewed votes as a “trade” to gain tangible benefits from the government. In order to get elected the insurgent could pledge the delivery of resources to its supporters and once elected, through providing “domestic rewards” such as distributing resources and key positions of the government to its supporters (Boyle, 2009, p.217), the insurgent would be able to win population on its own side, and consolidate its control over the population. Similarly, Höglund (2009) explains such mechanism through ‘patron-client relationship” for political power, in which the ‘protection, services or rewards to the clients are provided by the ‘patron’. Due to this mutual benefit oriented
relationship, ‘clients’, who are usually individuals of low status, become the patron’s political followers. As a consequence of such relationship, since the political power is very important for the patron, and his/her followers, they can strive to keep the patron in power, even with violence (p.420).

**Legitimacy and respectability**

The insurgent may gain democratic legitimacy through elections (Weinberg, 1991; Höglund, 2009). The election outcomes may encourage the insurgent to demand secession and concessions (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a), thus would gain domestic and international legitimacy. On the other hand, when it happens, the supporters of the government may oppose the insurgent group’s demands and resort to violence against the insurgent and its supporters. A desire to gain respectability in domestic or international politics may lead the insurgent to end its violent activities and engage in electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).

**Increasing the resource pool of the insurgent and role of the military wing**

Weinberg (1991) found that terrorist groups with linkages to political parties are more successful in persisting and waging their armed struggle than those groups lacking these linkages. He suggests that terrorist groups with political party links have an easier time in recruiting new members and obtaining logistical aids from the population (p.434). Furthermore presence of military wing makes it easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.420), therefore it would be wiser strategy for the insurgent not to demobilize all of its armed forces.
Competition in elections may complement rather than replace the insurgent’s military activities, and reduces the risk of major splits within the organization over tactics (Höglund, 2009). For instance, with 1981 election, the popular support encouraged the Sinn Fein, for the first time, to contest in 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections under the Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein won 10.1% in 1982 election; this percentage increased to 13.4% in the Westminster election, (McAllister, 2004, p.127). The insurgent interpreted this results that they could fight an armed struggle and win the elections at the same time (O’Brien, 1999, p.126, as cited in McAllister, 2004). In 1986, the IRA adopted an electoral strategy combined with a military campaign and sought to transform its military success that generated popular support into electoral success, which could be used to legitimize the continued use of threat of force (McAllister, 2004, p.128). Similarly, as Neumann (2005) argues that when the IRA’s political party Sinn Fein received a substantial vote share in 1981, Gerry Adams, the leader of the party, expanded its political wing, however giving importance to the political activities did not diminish the importance of military wing of the IRA and armed struggle, instead, it legitimized the armed struggle, demonstrated popular support for the IRA, advanced the movement. As Gerry Adams, the president of the Sinn Fein, stated “Elections have helped to develop the party, and experienced bunch of political workers” (Neumann, 2005, p.967). Furthermore, it argued that electoral success also gave the political wing a kind of veto power which would make any constitutional accommodation between the main moderate parties in Northern
Ireland, because by taking seat in the Irish parliament, they reached a political power to force a minority government to adopt a more intransigent manner vis-à-vis Britain and to refrain from introducing harsh counterterrorism measures in the IRA’s most important areas (Moloney, 2002, as cited in Neumann, 2005).

Election Violence

‘Election violence’ is considered as a special type of political violence in the political science literature, therefore literature on election has been reviewed to understand the dynamics and the linkage between election and violence,

Dhanagare (1968) defines “election violence” as “use of force in the struggle for scarce power positions and statuses between two or more individuals or political parties and their supporters (p.151). Lewis (1964) focuses on the political rivals and defines the aim of election violence as to “neutralize, injure or eliminate rival or rivals” (as cited in Dhanagare, 1968, p.151). Unlike Levis, Fischer (2004) focuses on the election process and the electorates rather than perpetrators. Fischer defines election violence as a means to determine, delay or otherwise influence the results of an election (p.6). Sisk (2002) stresses the “election process” and “election outcomes” and argues that election violence aims to vitiate the elections all together by undermining the integrity of the results, or to influence voting behavior through threat or intimidation (p.1).

Although these definitions underline different components, they describe election terrorism during the pre-election violence. So, in this study, we hypothesize that “terrorist attacks increase during the pre-election period”.
Similarly, much of the past literature on election violence has focused on the effects of terrorism on electoral process and election results (Guelke & Smyth, 1992; Neumann, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bali, 2007; Gassebner et al., 2008; Rose & Murphy, 2007). Although the past literature provides some insights about under what conditions recourse terrorism and how it affects election results, it offers little information how the election results affect terrorism in the post-election period. Furthermore, the scant existent literature on post-election violence usually explains from a relative deprivation approach and lacks a resource mobilization perspective. Thus, it is important to ask not only how the terrorism influence elections, but also how the election results influence terrorism over the time as well. This is one of the strength of this study. After surveying the literature on election violence, this study focuses on post-election violence.

Dimensions of Election Violence

Scholars (Dhanagare, 1968; Fischer, 2002; Sisk, 2008) addressed and described various dimensions of election violence. These dimension can be categorized under five groups (see figure): 1) Perpetrators; 2) Victims or targets of electoral violence; 3) Types of election Violence; 4) Time Periods, and 5) Aims, or Motives of Election Violence (Figure 6).
**Figure 6: Dimensions of Elections Violence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th>Aims/Motives</th>
<th>Targets/Victims</th>
<th>Violence Type</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Individuals  
• Political Parties  
• Party Supporters | • Unfairness in the election process (cheating, fraud, etc.)  
• to disrupt,  
• to delay,  
• to diminish the democratic process  
• to influence election results | • Electorates  
• Candidates  
• Political Party Workers  
• Polling Stations  
• Party Buildings  
• Campaign materials  
• Vehicles  
• Ballot boxes  
• ethnic, geographical, hot spot communities | • Terrorist campaigns.  
• Abductions  
• Killings  
• Riots  
• Demonstrations  
• Military coups  
• Civil wars  
• Destruction of property or vehicles. | • Pre-election  
• During the Election  
• Post-election |

**Perpetrators**

Election violence can be committed by various actors. Dhanagare (1968) includes only individuals, political parties and their supporters into his definition of election. Fischer (2004) expands them and divides the perpetrators into five categories: **First, Voter motivated conflict:** This type election violence occurs when voters challenge the state and claim ‘unfairness’ in the election process. Massive cheating or fraud – such as conspiracies to bribe voters, tampering with ballots, fallacious counting, or other measures (such as releasing large numbers of prisoners to vote) – can be the stimulus for a voters (Sisk, 2008). For instance, in Thailand elections on January the 6th of 2001, the voters believed that local officials were biased in their counting procedures therefore organized protests and burned police vehicles to disrupt vote counting. **Second, State-motivated conflict:** It occurs when the State initiates conflicts with electorates who challenge
the results of elections. *Third, Rival-motivated Conflict:* Political rivals may conflict with each other for political gains. The Fischer (2002)'s study findings suggest that rival-motivated conflict is the most common election type but also most responsive to mediation among the others. Rival motivated election violence may stem from history of intense rivalry among political clans, stark competition for government posts that carry the potential for power and access to resources and state largesse (Sisk, 2008). Sri Lanka elections of 2001 set up an example of a pre-election violence performed by the governing political party. As deSilva (2002) pointed out, in 2001 Sri Lanka elections, in Hambantota district of the Southern Province, a senior cabinet minister and his close associates sought to terrorize the electorate by attacks through armed groups on opposition candidates and their supporters (deSilva, 2002). *Fourth, Insurgent-motivated conflict:* The insurgent capitalizes on the visibility of an election to promote the insurgency. Fischer (2002) found that insurgent-motivated conflicts are growing and the most difficult to prevent because of being unresponsive to governance or other electoral objectives, and seeking only to disrupt, delay and diminish the democratic process. Fifth is a combination of those categories above.

Scholars include different actors into their definitions, but most of them conclude that election violence is a collective, purposeful and instrumental action; so, if it is collective, and instrumental, then it requires an extensive organization, leadership, and resources (Sisk, 2008, p.13); because only with an effective leadership and organization, the rank-and-file can be bridged, logistical needs to
carry out violent act can be created, and associational or population representation dimension can be generated. Thus, organizational resources allow the leaders and organizational structure to foment violence (Sisk, 2008, p.13).

Although election violence can be performed by various actors, from the perpetrators’ perspective, the insurgent-motivated conflict is the primary interest of this study. This type of violence requires an organization, leadership and resources. Thus, both resource mobilization approach and relative deprivation approach can be useful to explain election violence.

Victims or Targets of Election Violence

Election violence includes various type of victims or targets. They can be people such as electorates, candidates, political party workers, places such as polling stations, offices, party buildings, campaign materials, vehicles, vehicles or data such as ballot boxes; and victims can be resident in target ethnic, gender, geographical, or political “hot spot” communities (Fischer, 2002).

Forms of Election Violence

Election violence can be committed through various ways. It can be random or organized act, or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder or stakeholders (Fischer, 2002). Types of violence may also include riots, demonstrations, terrorist campaigns, military coups, civil wars (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.33), abductions, direct or targeted killings,
terrorist attacks on rallies, destruction of property and vehicles, and the like (Sisk, 2008). Although there are various forms of election violence, this study includes only terrorist incidents.

Aims and Motives of Election Violence

Like other dimensions, aims and motives vary and highly depend on the time period of the election. In general, pre-election violence aims to influence electoral process and election results whereas the post-election violence generally is argued to stem from a relative deprivation caused by dissatisfaction with the election results.

Some scholars stress (Finn, 2000; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Sisk, 2008) pointed out the influence of fair democratic process on election violence. Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) argue that when the “electoral process” is fair, legitimate and works well, the ballots can silence the guns, as the Namibia election of 1989 did end a 30-year war. Furthermore if the parties accepted that winning possibility is too low and costs are too high, the elections can reduce the violence (p.18). Likewise Finn (2000) argues that the “election structures” and “rules” are among the possible sources of election violence. Similar to Finn’s argument, Hewitt (2000) argues that if certain groups or individuals feel that the political system is “unresponsive” to them, they become frustrated, thereby resort to violence (p.326).

To explain reasons for or motives of election violence, usually scholars focus on the benefits—political power, access to resources etc— that would be gained
through the elections. In his analysis of election violence, Sisk (2008) emphasizes the *stakes* of political competition, *expectations* about winning and losing in election contests, and the *incentives* that the electoral process creates. He argues that election violence is most likely to occur: when the *stakes* of winning and losing valued political posts are very high and those political posts are scarce; when winning the elections is the key to livelihood for an entire clan, or ethnic group; depending upon the expectations, when the winning the elections are highly uncertain about the ultimate outcome of the electoral process, especially when margins of victory very close, they may resort violence to affect uncertain outcomes; or when losing the elections are almost certain, they may use violence to affect voter turnout through discouraging the opponent’s supporter electorates; or when the losing elections are almost certain, they may use violence to prevent the election’s success.

**Time Periods**

Höglund (2009) divides election periods into three periods; 1) Pre-election; 2) during the election; and 3) Post-Election periods. Sisk (2008) includes even more time periods into the pre-and post-election periods. He divides election violence period into five time phases and defines most likely types and targets election violence: Phase I: The Long Run-Up to Electoral Events; Phase II: The Campaign’s Final Lap; Phase III: Polling Day(s); Phase IV: Between Voting and Proclamation; and Phase V: Post-Election Outcomes and their Aftermath.
Scholars have used different time scales in analyzing the election violence ranging from two-week periods (Dhanagare, 1968) to four years (Klor & Berrebi, 2008). Dhanagare (1968) used biweekly periods and focused on only 60 days-period prior to release of the Fourth General Elections of 1967 in India. He divided the election period into four phases of 15 days. The fourth phase covers the election that started on February 15th and ends when most of the poll results were announced. His study mainly covers pre-election period and election days but excludes the post-election period. He found that election violence increases as closing to the election day(s) and the violence varies across the constituencies. Sisk (2008) considered election violence time period as cycle, which often conceived of in terms of at least one year prior to an actual election event (Wall, et.al. 2006, as cited in Sisk, 2008, and p.13). Like Sisk (2008), in this study, we considered the election period as a one year period prior to an election, and like Höglund (2009) we have thought election period also covers the post-election period because of posing a risk generated by the perpetrators due to their dissatisfactions with the election results. So, in this study, an election period covers 24-months period (12 months before and 12 months after the study).

Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence in the Pre-election Period

Sisk (2008) divides pre-election periods into two periods: Phase I (long run-up to electoral events) and Phase II (the election campaign’s final lap). According to Sisk, often objective of election violence in the Phase I of the pre-election
period— is to *affect the electoral process, and to establish a dominant position within a particular district* by eliminating or threatening potential adversaries (p.14). Thus, it is highly selected rather than indiscriminate violence; the main targets are not innocent, or neutral civilians, instead *electoral process* and the *political rivals* are the most common targets. Therefore, common targets of violence in this period are incumbent state officials or emerging candidates from political parties (Sisk, 2008, p.14).

During the Phase II—the election campaign’s final lap—the pattern of violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging candidates from political parties to potentially adversary electorates and candidates. The main common aim of the election violence during this period is *to intimidate* or *influence voters* through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential supporters (Sisk, 2008; Höglund, 2009). As the Election Day approaches, the violence intensifies. Common types of violence in final weeks of the election include clashes between rival groups of supporters; attacks on election rallies, candidates, bomb scares; attacks or intimidation of election officials; and attacks on domestic/international observers (Sisk, 2008).

Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence during the Election Days

During the polling day(s), usually perpetrators cease their acts of violence when the voting begins (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2001). However when election violence occurs on the Election Day, it commonly aims *to disrupt the polling and to limit turnout* and targets security forces, election
administrators, observers; and materials such as destruction of ballot boxes (Sisk, 2008). For instance on the Election Day, January 30th of 2005 in Iraq, the insurgents carried out 260 attacks that resulted in at least 44 people, including 26 Iraqi civilians, eight Iraqi troops, ten British servicemen, and one American soldier. 100 of the attacks were carried out at or near the polling stations. Furthermore, although there was a traffic ban on the Election Day, the insurgents sent at least eight suicide bombers on foot, wearing suicide vests, into voting stations (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Similarly in Sri Lanka presidential election of 1988, at least 46 people were killed on the poll day (Sunday Times, January 1, 1989, as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989). In this study, the Election Day has not been included into neither the pre-election nor post-election day.

Possible Consequences of Violence in the Pre-Election period and during the Election Days

There are four possible common consequences of the violence prior to the Election Day or during the election days: 1) Postponing or disrupting elections from taking place; 2) Effecting voter turnouts; 3) Forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process; and 4) Influencing electorates’ political preferences.
Postponing or disrupting elections from taking place

The insurgent may attempt to postpone or disrupt elections from taking place by resorting violence prior to or during the election days. This aim may stem from three main reasons: a fear of losing political power, opposing elections at all, and electoral system.

In some cases, a fear of losing power could lead the insurgent to undermine the integrity of elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a) and result in forcing the governments to abandon elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009). Or in other cases, elections or political system could be source of election violence. Or, the insurgent may oppose to any sort of elections and view them as an “illegitimate” method to transfer political power, or oppose to the ruling system under which the elections are held, therefore it may try to prevent elections from taking place or postpone the elections (Höglund, 2009). For instance, the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso opposes the elections and even targeted other left wing groups that compete in the elections (Höglund, 2009). Similarly, in order to disrupt the elections, insurgent groups in Iraq increased their violence prior to the Election Day. Within the first week of the New Year, which was just three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, at least 90 people were killed across the country including Bagdad’s governor, Ali Al-Haidari and his six of his bodyguards (Ever bloodier.2005). Upon increase of the violence prior to the election, Ghazi al-Yawer, the president, Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister, and some other high level political officials gave voice to
possibility of postponement of the election by the United Nations (UN). Chechen’s pre-election violence in Russia is another example. The Chechen insurgents carried out bomb attacks just two days before the Election Day to disrupt the 2003 Duma elections in Russia. They exploded a bomb attack on a train resulted in more than 40 killings and over 150 wounded in Yessentuki station in Russia’s southern fringe (Oates, 2006). Although the insurgents often attempt to disrupt the electoral process, they rarely succeed in postponing or preventing the elections from taking place, however, their violent acts can be effective in influencing election outcomes through affecting voter turnouts, forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process, and changing electorates’ political preferences.

Affecting voter turnouts

In some cases the insurgent may intentionally employ violence against rivals’ potential supporters to get them refrained from casting their votes due to fear of violence (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008). The aim of voter intimidation is to produce a self-imposed loss of freedom on the victim. If intimidated, the victim will vote or behave in a certain fashion (Fisher, 2002). For instance, the insurgent LTTE and other extremist groups in Sri Lanka group usually resorts violence prior to the elections. Although Sri Lanka used to have high voter turnout rates in the last nationwide election in 1970 (85.2%), 1977 (86.7%) and 1982 (81.1%), due to high volume political violence that JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People’s Liberation Front—the Sinhalese
nationalist extremist organization) and the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya or Patriotic People’s Front launched three months before the elections; as a consequence, only 55.32% of the electorates casted their votes in the Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). According to Amerasinghe (1989) the main aims of this pre-election violence was to create fear that would lead to a compulsory boycott of the election by the electorate (p.349). For instance, in Matara in Sri Lanka, on the morning of the poll people were intimidated by a set posters warning voters that "the penalty for voting was death". Only and even after the security forces created suitable condition very small portion of electorates casted their votes (Matara 23.84%, Moneragala 17.1% and others (Amerasinghe, 1989). Similarly, Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) imposed violent nationwide protests that resulted in only 20 percent voter turnout across Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). A similar strategy was implemented prior to Iraqi Elections of 2005. In order to intimidate the voters into not voting, the insurgent groups in Iraq launched a terrorism campaign before the election of 2005 that resulted in low turnout rate due to the fact that hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and did not cast their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Chechen insurgent’s terrorist attacks in a Russian constituency two days before the 2003 Duma elections in Russia succeeded too in discouraging the Russian voters and resulted in only 55.75% turnout rate. As seen in the literature, violence prior to the election affects turnout rates, in most cases it lowers the turnout whereas in
few cases, it increases the turnouts as Madrid terrorist attacks did in Spaniard Elections of 2004.

Forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process

In some cases, by use of violence, the insurgent can successfully force the rival political contenders to leave the electoral process Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009), thus eliminate political rivals and win the elections. For instance the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) launched a violence campaign against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLS) that resulted in the OLF to leave the elections of 1992 (Pausewang, Trondvall & Aalen, 2004, as cited in Höglund, 2009). Likewise, the LTTE, which is linked to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), attacked the political activists of other political parties and local election monitors to force its political rivals to leave the elections. As a consequence of these attacks, several candidates from other political parties left elections (Höglund, 2009). Similarly, in the 2005 Iraq elections, due to fear of terrorist attack, many political parties have not announced their candidates, and some parties, including the country’s most prominent Sunni group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, did not contest the election (Ever bloodier.2005).

Influencing electorates’ political preferences

Winning votes through use of violence is neither a new technique nor only peculiar to insurgents. As Charles and Frary (1918) points out violence and
intimidation were regarded as the most effective way of winning votes by 1715 and political parties carried on them for more than 150 years (as cited in Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a). Sisk (2008) acknowledges the existence of efforts of coercive methods on gaining votes and considers them as “a form of election fraud” (p.6).

As explained in previous sections, violence can be an effective means of increasing popular support for the insurgent. We propose that it applies to the election violence in terms of obtaining popular votes as well; therefore the insurgent might resort to violence to win electoral support for its political party. However effectiveness of election violence and its impact on election outcomes is open to discussion. In some cases terrorist attacks against civilians may suppress the mass mobilization whereas in other they may increases votes by that population (Sisk, 2008, p.6).

Discussion on Consequences of Violence in the Pre-election and during the Election Days

Pre-election violence may serve for various purposes and produce different outcomes in pro-insurgent areas than pro-government areas. If the insurgent is not strong in some constituencies, as Sisk (2008) argued, it may use indiscriminate violence against government’s civilians in areas where the insurgent is most likely to lose the election in order to discourage electorates for voting; or target rival party candidates to force them to contest elections in pro-insurgent areas, or use selective terrorism against carefully selected government
targets/combatants to increase its support among the insurgent’s own population. Although existent studies on election violence provide valuable insights into election violence, there is still scant literature on this field and still many questions remain unanswered. Under which conditions pre-election violence produce desired results is still not known clearly; in some cases it may backfire and be counterproductive at the ballot box. For instance, unlike presidential elections of 2005 in Sri Lanka, or 2005 Elections in Iraq, in East Timor militia groups backed by the Indonesian army employed violence prior to the 1999 referendum in order to intimidate the electorates into not voting for the independence, however, contrary to their expectation, it generated a massive turnout (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.19). Similarly, the 2004 Madrid Bombing just few days before the elections in Spain indicated that a successful terrorist attack can provoke a sharp change of mood in the electorate (A winning streak for zapatero.2007) and can increase the turnout rates against governing party (Bali, 2007). Furthermore, in some cases, as a response to pre-election violence, the electorates may punish the governing party and replace it whereas in others the governing party even increases its vote share even more than previous elections. For instance, Madrid bombings of 2004 in Spain just three days prior to the Election Day replaced the governing PP party with a soft party, the socialist PSOE party, whereas the terrorist attacks just two days before the 2003 Duma Elections brought a hard-line party, the United Russia. Furthermore, similarly, Hamas terrorist campaign from April to February of 1996 before the
Israeli elections of May 1996 damaged the incumbent government and replaced the incumbent Labor Party government of Shimon Peres with the more hard-line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud. As seen in the literature, the question of when or why the electorates would punish the governing party and replace the government with the election is still not clear. Given the existent literature, we point out five important factors that could be useful to anticipate whether the governing party would be replaced or increase its vote share as a response to pre-election period.

Position of the governing party on terrorism

Terrorism prior to the elections affects the electorates’ preferences and usually brings a hard-line government. Terrorism can change public opinion and in general this change is likely to favor the most right-wing and militaristic forces in the electoral arena rather than the advocates of international law, peace and negotiations (Fishman & Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2005, p.13). Similarly, Hewitt (1990) suggests that usually majorities or pluralities in all countries favor hard line policies. If the people believe that governing political party does not have a harsh position on terrorism, they are more likely to vote for a more hard-line party and replace the current governing party. However, if the governing party is a hard-line party and has already harsh policies against terrorism, then other people who had not vote for it also would vote the governing party thus increase its vote share in the upcoming elections. Israeli elections of May 1996, February 2001, Spain elections of May 1996, and 2003 Duma
elections in Russia, and provincial elections of 1988, and 2008 in Sri Lanka set good examples of it.

In Israel, Hamas launched a massive bloody pre-election terrorist campaign from February to April 1996 against the Israel. On February the 25th of 1996, a suicide bomber carried out a suicide bomb attack on a travel bus that killed 26 and injured 48 people. Another suicide attack on a travel bus was carried out on March the 3rd of 1996 and killed 19 and wounded 7 people. Other pre-election terrorist attacks occurred in Ashkelon and Dizengoff Center which killed 59 people (Suicide bombings scar Peres’ political ambitions CNN, May 28 1996). As the polls taken in mid-May indicated Peres was ahead by 4-6%, however due to these terrorist attacks, two days before the election Peres declined to 2% (CNN, May 28, 1996). As a consequence, Labor Party government of Shimon Peres lost the elections (49.5%) and was replaced with a hard line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud (50.5%). Kydd and Walter (2002) examined the impact of Hamas’s terrorist campaign and reached the same conclusion that these terrorist attacks damaged the incumbent government and replaced it with the more hard-line government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud in Israeli elections of May 1996 (p.280). Likewise, Bloom (2004) concludes that these attacks were intended to influence the election outcomes and as a consequence they brought a hard-line, the right wing Netanyahu government into power. The Hamas’s next terrorism campaign against Israel began in December 2000, two months before the Israeli elections of February 2001. Again, the Hamas intestinally increased its terroris
attacks prior to the election. As a consequence, the terrorism campaign has again reached its goals and Barak lost the elections (Kydd & Walter, 2002).

The Berrebi and Klor’s study (2008) findings are consistent with the Kydd & Walter study (2002). They analyzed five national electoral data from 1988 to 2003 and examined two-way relationship between terrorism and electoral preferences by employing differences-in differences (DID) methodology. They found that terrorism has a strong impact on the electorate’s political preferences. A terrorist attack regardless of where it was perpetrated increases the support of the right bloc of political parties, which have strict policies against terrorism; additionally, its electoral impact increases as it occurs closer to the elections.

Likewise, the governing party, the PSOE, lost the elections and was replaced with a more hard-line political party, the Partido Popular (Popular Party, hereafter the PP) in the Spanish general election of 1996. Barros, Passos, and Gil-Alana (2006) attributed this electoral turnaround to ETA’s pre-election terrorism campaign. They suggested that the ETA’s failed terrorist attacks against the Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Maria Aznar, and King Juan Carlos in August 1995 brought a more hard line government, Popular Party. The PP presents itself as a party to control and eradicate the terrorism; according to Rigo (2005) 9/11 attacks in the U.S had provided the PP an opportunity to present itself a hard-line party through taking a strong position against the terrorism.

Chechen pre-election terrorism that killed more than 40 and injured more than 150 people in Russia brought a hard-line party too, the United Russia, pro-
Vladimir Putin party with largest number of votes and seats. Oates (2006) found that indirectly, Putin’s position on terrorism was relevant in voting behavior because many of the participants perceived Putin as a strong, decisive leader, a man would ‘flush’ the Chechen terrorists down the toilet (p.288).

In Sri Lanka, the bomb attack by the LTTE just one day before the provincial election of May 2008 election, which killed 11 and wounded 29 people, has brought a landslide victory to the hard line governing party, United People’s Freedom Alliance or the UPFA. According to the UPFA General Secretary Susil Premjayanth the electorates viewed the elections as the referendum on war against terrorism, and voted for their hard line governing party, which they favored their counter terrorism policies (Ferdinando, 2008).

As seen in these examples, usually pre-election terrorism brings a hard-line government. Thus it is important to ask why people vote for a more hard-line government.

Most scholars (Höglund, 2009; Michavila, 2005; Indridason, 2008) explain calling a hard-line government through an increase in personal security concerns. Pratkanis and Aronson (1996) propose that recourse to fear as a propaganda tool is most effective when: “1) there is a serious shock; 2) a specific recommendation is offered to overcome the problem; 3) the proposed measures are perceived as effective to deal with the threat; and 4) the person who receives the message believes he or she can carry out the recommendation” (as cited in Michavila, 2005,p.16). To put differently, a terrorist attack increases personal
safety concerns, and people seek a political party that would effectively provide
them the most secure environment.

Likewise, Gassebner et al. (2008) pointed out the impact of terrorism on
increasing people’s personal safety concerns thus affecting their political
preferences. Their study examines the impact of terrorism on the replacement of
incumbent governments by analyzing 800 elections in 115 countries, and found
that terrorist attacks increase the probability of government replacement after an
election by revealing the government’s incompetence of protecting its people
from terrorism; furthermore, they suggested that this probability increases with
the severity of the attack.

Höglund (2009)’s study stresses a relationship among pre-election violence,
personal safety concerns and electorate’s political preferences. Höglund
suggests that electoral violence may polarize the electorate along conflict lines,
thus lead to new outburst of violence, and replace the incumbent with a hardliner
government, because when people feel they are insecure, they give more
importance to law and order than the peace and reconciliation, thereby call
alternative than call for reconciliation (p.412-413).

Michavila (2005) examines how and why people support government’s
harsh countermeasures. Michavila argues that people more concern their
personal security than collective security, whether national or international,
therefore to the extent that a citizen feels that the state guarantees his or her own
security, he or she supports the measures it adopts (p.17). Similarly, through
analyzing the polls, Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) found that 9/11 terrorist attacks increased concern about their personal security among the Americans that they or a family member would become a general victim of terrorism. Furthermore, the attacks also increased their support for the government and its counter terrorism measures. Similarly, Indridason (2008) argues that terrorism may influence electorates’ concerns about their safety, and such concerns influence the electorate’s preferences. In other words, the electorates tend to cast their votes for the party that would provide more security, especially the ones who have been affected by the violence. Amerasinghe (1989) found pre-election violence carried out by extremist groups in Sri Lanka lowered turnout rates and those affected from violence voted against the opposition candidate, Bandaranaike, rather than governing party’s candidate.

When the leftist insurgents increased their violence, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took power in 1953 through a military coup in Colombia and number of killings under his tenure declined in the short run. And not surprisingly, the next year, in 1954, due to his initial success, the national assembly elected him as the president (Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004). By the same token, since providing security of its population is one of the primary responsibilities of government, the electorate may hold the government accountable for its failure in securing and protecting its population against the terrorism. Thus, to Indridason (2008), depending upon their performance, it is reasonable expect that the electorate reward or punish the political parties at the ballot box. By the same
token, on the other hand, it is also possible that fear of terrorism may work both in favor of the insurgent. If the local population feels that the government is not capable of protecting the population and preventing terrorism, it may vote for the insurgent’s political party, just to avoid from being a target of the insurgent terrorism, especially in the post election period.

Although pre-election violence is more likely to bring a hard-line government, sometimes it may not always work that way. In few cases, it may defeat a hard-line governing party, or lead the government to implement warm policies that the insurgent may favor. For instance, Madrid bombings, which occurred just three days before the Spanish General Election of 2004, replaced a hard-line government (PP) with a soft one, (PSOE). Or in others, pre-election violence may the lead the new government to accommodate the insurgent’s demands in return for a relative decline in political violence. For instance, in Colombia, when Liberal party candidate Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994) won the elections and became president, he pushed the legislatures to replace the constitution of 1886, appointed a former guerrilla leader to his cabinet, pushed large scale budget increases in social expenditures and moves that could be viewed as accommodating insurgent demands (Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004).

As seen in the literature, only one dimension—position of the governing party on terrorism— does not explain the election outcome, therefore, there
should be some additional dimensions in anticipating the consequences of pre-election violence and election outcomes.

### Fault factor

If people reach a conclusion that government’s policies or programs attracted the terrorists to launch their terrorist campaign or carry out a terrorist attack, then they are more likely to hold responsible the government for the terrorist attack(s), and as a consequence, will punish the government at the ballot box by replacing it with another one, even with a soft one. Spanish general election of 2004 is a good example of this.

On March, 11th of 2004, just three days before the general elections ten bombs were exploded in three different trains in Madrid and killed 191 deaths and injured over 1500. Although polls indicated that the incumbent party, People’s Party was supported by a majority of population in February 2004, the incumbent lost the 14 March election with 37.6% of the vote while the Socialist Party (PSOE) received 42.6% of the vote and won the election (Indridason, 2008). The winning party PSOE gained three million new votes compared to the previous elections and as a consequence, won a total of 164 of the 350 seats, while the incumbent a hard line PP party lost almost 7% of its votes from the previous election and 35 of the 183 seats gained in 2000 (Chari, 2004). Whether the Madrid bombings affected the unexpected election outcomes received a great attention from scholars (Chari, 2004; Van Biezen, 2005; Montalvo, 2007;
Bali, 2007; Rose & Murphy, 2007; Tures, 2009). Almost all scholars agreed that the Madrid bombings affected electoral outcomes in various ways.

Many international analysts and news media argued that if the ETA had been responsible for the Madrid bombings the election outcomes would have been very different than the current results; because an ETA attack would benefit the incumbent party because of its clear accomplishment in combating terrorism. However, an attack by Al-Qaida would put the responsibility for the deaths on the governing party because of its support of the U.S in the war in Iraq, which most of the Spaniards clearly opposed (Michavila, 2005, p.4).

Bali (2007) examined the influence of Madrid bombings through individual level survey data and found that the Madrid train bombings of 2004 influenced the electorate’s voting behavior not because of the population’s weakness against terrorism, but because the terrorist attack increased the turnout rate in favor of other parties and issues regarding the incumbent government’s policy on the Iraq war and mismanagement of the bombing investigation.

Chari (2004) views the Madrid bombings as a catalyst for change and as a reaction to governing party’s foreign policy. He concluded that the terrorist attack coupled with the misinformation by the government and served as a catalyst to encourage the abstainers to vote against the governing party.

In addition to the government’s support the war in Iraq, Rigo (2005) concluded that poor management of the terrorist investigation was perceived by
the population as an attempt to manipulate the tragedy influenced the election (p.613).

Michavila (2005) analyzed published pre-and post-election polls and micro-data from the post-election poll by the CIS, based on 5,377 door to door interviews. He categorized the most proposed reasons for the election outcomes under the following four hypotheses and tested their influence: 1) a latent desire for a change of government; 2) the shock caused by the attacks; 3) a desire to punish the government for its position on the war in Iraq; and 4) a dual manipulation of information – by the government and against the government. His study findings suggest that the Madrid bombings had a decisive impact on the election results that is relatively small but a determining factor that changed the final result. Finally, he concludes that those four hypotheses are not exclusive, but rather complementary. The first three were necessary preconditions for the electoral turnaround and the last one reinforced the process. In other words, he argues that, without a latent desire for change, without the Spanish government’s support for war in Iraq, and without the shock by the terrorist attack, the change would not have occurred (p.32).

**Proximity**

Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and
electoral accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that occurred two years before the elections and found that they do not influence the election outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short sighted with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the terrorist act occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance of the electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had occurred three months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have been different today. In other words, due to the political competition and media coverage, if a terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s performance becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing government at the elections by the electorate.

The other two factors that can affect the election outcomes are the 4) severity and 5) targets of the terrorist campaign. The more severe and bloodier terrorist attacks may generate the greater electoral impact on the elections; and indiscriminate terrorism usually generates greater concerns about the personal safety among the population.

To sum up, from the electorate’s perspective, pre-election violence raises the concerns about the personal safety and these concerns dominates the voting behavior. In case of pre-election violence that is close to the election, if the governing party is a soft one, it is most likely that it will be punished at the ballot box because of being incapable of protecting its citizens against the terrorists,
thus will be replaced with a hard-line political party in the upcoming elections. However, if the incumbent government is already a hard-line political party, then people would decide whether the government’s policies or programs might have attracted the terrorists to carry out the attack. If the terrorist attack was carried out by a domestic terrorist group, then it is most likely that the incumbent government would benefit from the attack because of its already known position against the terrorist group and harsh policies. However, if the attack(s) were conducted by an international terrorist organization, then the population would look at its policies or programs that might lead the terrorist organization to choose that country to attack. If the governing population is held responsible for the terrorist attacks due to its poor or faulty policies, then it would be replaced with another one, probably with a hard line party. This mostly depends on the perception of the population. The media, political rivals and other actors may be able to undermine incumbent government’s credibility and increase its concerns about the incumbent government thus replace the government with the upcoming elections; or depending upon the conditions; capabilities and skills of the government, its allied media and other factors, if the blame can be attributed to other factors and public can be convinced, the government may even benefit the terrorist attacks and increase its vote shares.

Conclusion

In conclusion, pre-election has at least five dimensions. Therefore we argue that if the insurgent is really rational, as many scholars acknowledge, then it
should consider these dimensions, and carefully plan its terrorism campaign prior to the election. Otherwise, since the election is a zero-sum game, the insurgent would not only lose its popular support and fail at the ballot box thus deprive it from political and population’s resources but also bring a hard-line government that would make everything harder. Thus it is important to ask if pre-election violence is likely to bring a hard-line government, why would the insurgent use violence prior to elections; who actually benefits from pre-election violence, the government or insurgent? What are the rationales behind of it? In order to get desired outcomes, under what conditions would the insurgent resort to pre-election violence?

Under the light of existent literature, if the primary goal of the insurgent is to increase support and votes for its political party, it would not attack against its native population, especially in its constituencies. Rather, the terrorism campaign would focus on combatants and governmental targets in its constituencies. However, if insurgent’s primary aim is to damage the government and electoral process rather than winning elections, then terrorism campaign would focus on government’s civilian population in non-insurgent constituencies. By this way, the insurgent might increase the government’s population’s concerns about their personal safety and to lead the government’s population to hold responsible the government for the attacks. Thus, as a consequence, in order to decrease personal security concerns among its citizens and secure a victory in the upcoming elections, incumbent government would sit at the negotiating table and
give concessions in favor of the insurgent. Because, in some cases, as Rose and Murphy (2007) points out, terrorist attacks on civilians may potentially lead to policy concessions if the government and citizens believe that the insurgent’s is motivated by limited policy objectives; so the government may prefer to make some policy changes in favor of the insurgent. Or, even if the elections usually brings a hard-line government, due to its possible harsh indiscriminate counter terrorism policies against the insurgent’s native population, the insurgent’s population may alienate itself from the government; thus, the insurgent still would be able to increase its popular support in the long run and secure the next elections. As an example of such strategy, in November 2001 the Maoist insurgents, the CPN-M, intentionally escalated the conflict to force the government to drop their “democratic mask” and reveal their “true fascist role” in front of the Nepalese people and international people (Gobyn, 2009).

Violence in the Post-Election Period

Various factors can influence violence in the post-election violence. They include fraud in elections (Sisk, 2008; Fischer, 2004), which often occurs when disputes over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes in a fair, timely and transparent manner; electoral system—occurs especially when elections are seen as “zero-sum” events and “losers” are left out of participation in governance (Fischer, 2004) or in winner-take-all systems may cause violence in fragile states because of not letting ethnic minorities to represent in the government due to a threshold that must be met across the
country (Sisk, 2008); and election outcomes (Amerasinghe, 1989; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008).

Most of the studies focusing on the post-election violence (Amerasinghe, 1989; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001, Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008) focus on election outcomes and explain it through a relative deprivation approach that is generated by dissatisfied election outcomes.

Electoral Outcomes

Most scholars have considered election outcomes as the main source of the post-election violence therefore conceived post election violent events as quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a short period of time, such as a couple of weeks. According to Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) usually, post election violence occurs after the results are announced, as it did in Sri Lanka Elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). The election violence started as soon as results of 1988 Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 announced (Amerasinghe, 1989). As the Sunday Times (January 1, 1989) reported, 94 bodies were found just on the day. Furthermore, at least 260 people were killed within the five days and 417 were killed within 13 days in the post-election violence (as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989, p.346).

Poor election outcomes have various negative meanings for the insurgent such as failure at mobilizing the mass (Weinberg & Eubank, 1992), deprive of political power and its benefits (Sisk, 2008; Finn, 2009), loss of legitimacy.
Without a correct interpretation of election outcomes, post-election violence cannot be anticipated or analyzed accurately.

Weinberg and Eubank (1992) suggest that terrorist violence is the outcome of a small elite group of individuals who are frustrated by their inability to mobilize the masses; therefore terrorism should be related to a frustrating decline in power, not an increasing parliamentary presence, because they may think their electoral appeals go “unheeded” (p.136). In other words, when the insurgent confronts the indifference of the population that it hopes to get its support and mobilize against the government, and its appeals for support are rejected by the electorate, it resorts to violence (Weinberg, 1991). Likewise, the Hewitt (2000) study on violence perpetrated by the White racists during the South during the civil rights period and by the Black militants in the late 1960s and early 1970s, found that timing of each outbreak of terrorism coincided with the decline of popular mobilization, rather than its high points. To Hewitt, unexpectedly poor electoral support at the ballot box may lead the insurgent to conclude that the entire electoral politics is a fraud and the population has been blinded to the insurgent’s real interests (p.433). Furthermore he concludes that groups lose in the elections, particularly if they lose “consistently”, are likely view violence as tempting option (p.343).

Similarly Sisk (2008) and Finn (2009) views undesired election results as the main source of the election violence because of the insurgent’s aims to retain political power or unwillingness to cede power. When the insurgent’s political
party lost the elections, it may frustrate its supporters thus lead to political violence (Finn, 2009, p.53). As Boyle (2009) pointed out dissatisfied groups have powerful incentives to use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009); thus, when the insurgent does not satisfy with the defeat at the ballot box, the insurgent may use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009), or try to overthrow or alter the election outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.416). Depending upon the insurgent’s interpretation of election results, the perpetrator can punish the electorates for not voting for its political party, or target government and its citizens. For instance when the results of 1999 referendum indicated that an overwhelming 78.5% of people voted for the independence of East Timor from the Indonesia, military-backed militias launched a violence campaign against the East Timorese population, foreign journalists, the UN staff and Catholic clergy (Schulze, 2001,p.77-78); as a consequence of this campaign 70-80% of the business district in Dili was destroyed, almost 50% of houses in the capital city were burnt, and over 271,545 East Timorese were forced to leave to the West Timor (Crouch,p.155 as cited in Boyle, 2009, p.225).

Scholars (Guelke & Smyth, 1992; Neumann, 2005; Berrebi & Klor, 2008) have reached different conclusions in their research on the influence on election outcomes on post-election violence. For instance Berrebi and Klor (2008) examined the influence of Israeli popular support for Israel’s right block parties on Palestinian terrorism during the post election period and found no evidence indicating a relationship. Perhaps it would have generated greater insight for the
proposed study if Berrebi and Klor had examined the Palestinian population’s votes.

Guelke and Smyth (1992) examined this relationship between violence and relative decline in popular support for the IRA by using electoral data and concluded that relative decline in popular votes led the IRA to commit terrorist acts to increase its popular votes. They suggested that when its political party, the Sinn Fein, suffered a setback in the second direct election to the European Parliament and polled 10,000 fewer votes than the party had received in the Westminster election a year earlier, this failure led to dissatisfaction within the IRA regarding the priority given to the electoral contest. Consequently, violence increased and most important was the attempt to assassinate the British prime minister at the Conservative Party Conference held in 1984 (Guelke & Smyth, 1992). They suggested that the IRA carried out this attack in order to increase its popularity among the Irish population. However, effectiveness of resorting violence to increase popular votes is open to discussion. Neumann (2005) found that the IRA violence did not manage to increase its popular support in the long run. He found that in the long run, as its popular support declined the IRA violence declined too in the following ten years and never has reached its death tolls.

Weinberg (1991), McAllister (2004) and Neumann (2005) suggested that depending upon the conditions the insurgent may shift its strategy from violence to electoral politics, or use both simultaneously. Neumann’s (2005) study
indicates that relative declines in vote share of the Sinn Fein started at 1984 European elections and lasted till 1989 local elections of Northern Ireland. In the following years after the 1989 elections, the number of IRA killings gradually declined. When the IRA declared a ceasefire in 1993, its political party Sin Fein received its highest vote share at 1993 local elections in Northern Ireland and European elections. Neumann attributes this electoral success to the IRA’s ability to correctly read the changing dynamics of the movement and understand its electorates’ opposition to violence. Likewise McAllister (2004) suggested that Sinn Fein benefited from the ceasefire of 1994 and built itself a stronger personal base of support. In other words, Sin Fein’s political constituents delegitimized the violence and this opposition put a pressure on the IRA and limited its violence. Therefore, in order to keep popular support with its own side, the insurgent did not increase its violence to meet its electorate’s demands thus succeeded in regaining popular support. Similarly, Weinberg (1991) points out the mutability of political conditions and suggests that given the appropriate circumstances the insurgent can replace the electoral campaign with terrorism campaign, the opposite, or both simultaneously. If the insurgent desires to acquire respectability in domestic and international politics and its violent activities have been to be ineffective, then it may pursue its political goals through participating in democratic electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).

The degree of attached importance to efficiency of violence to reach insurgent’s political objectives varies with the time and may affect the insurgent’s
violence as well. Similarly, Funes’s study findings indicate that in 1989, 80% of the Basque country people agreed that violence is unnecessary to obtain political goal. This percentage reached to 88% in 1991 and in 1997. The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the U.S and March 11 2004 in Madrid have further reinforced strong opposition to any terrorist activity in Spain (Pallarés, Muñoz, & Retortillo, 2006), as consequence in order to not to alienate the population from itself and keep its popular support, the ETA decreased the number of its killings.

Discussion on Post-Election Violence

Much of the past literature on election violence primarily has focused on the pre-election violence and its effects on electoral process and/or election outcomes. However, post-election violence has different dynamics and stems from different reasons than the pre-election or election day(s) violence. As Amerasinghe (1989) points out pre-election violence aims to “obstruct” electorates whereas post-election violence aims to “punish” them (p.347).

Much of the past studied has explained violence in the post-election period with dissatisfaction with the election outcomes, in other words, through a relative deprivation approach. Basically, these studies suggest that when a political party lost elections, they deprive from political power and resources, thereby these political parties or their supporters resort to violence because they do not want to loss political power and resources. Although this approach provides some insights about post-election period in cases where the insurgent’s political party has lost elections or gained a poor success at the ballot box, it provides little
information on post-election violence when the insurgent’s political party has won the elections or increased its vote shares compared to previous election.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

This study uses a quantitative research methodology and secondary data analysis approach, and constructs a longitudinal design. This chapter first provides information about the research design, research approach; then it discusses validity and limitations of the study. It introduces the variables and how they are coded in the study. Finally, it presents proposed hypotheses.

Research Design

Longitudinal designs are quasi-experimental designs, in which the same subjects are examined two or more time intervals to allow researchers to examine the changes in the dependent variable, and to determine the direction of the causation (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Furthermore, due to the fact being extended over time, longitudinal designs are considered as superior to cross-sectional designs (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).

In this study we examine terrorism trends over the elections and relationship between insurgent’s electoral support and its terrorist attacks. Timing of data collection should be consistent with the nature of change processes under investigation (Mitchell & James, 2001, as cited in Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002). Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its
impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and electoral accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that occurred two years before the elections and found that they do not influence the election outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short sighted with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the terrorist act occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance of the electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had occurred three months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have been different today. In other words, due to the political competition and media coverage, if a terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s performance becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing government at the elections by the electorate. Consistent with previous research, we assumed that a monthly time period is appropriate for data collection over a year period both before and one year after the elections.

Research Approach

The study uses a secondary data analysis approach to examine the relationship between electoral support for the political party affiliated with the PKK and terrorist incidents over the election periods. Nachmias-Frankfurt and Nachmias (2000) list four main advantages of using a secondary data analysis
approach: 1) provides opportunity for replication; 2) enables researcher to employ longitudinal research design; 3) may improve the validity of measurement by expanding time the scope of the independent variables used when operationalizing major concepts; and 4) enables the researcher to increase sample size, its representatives, and number of observations; 5) it can be used for triangulation; and finally reduces the costs.

Secondary data analysis has three main limitations: 1) differences in data collection methods, variables, sample sizes and others; 2) difficulties in accessing the data; and 3) problems may arise if insufficient information is provided on how the data were collected and other procedures (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).

Data of the Study

In this study, unit of analysis is the provinces of Turkey. Currently, there are 81 provinces in Turkey. Although the PKK does not carry out any terrorist attacks in some provinces, due to presence of a 10% threshold and not to harm generalization of the study across Turkey, we included all provinces in to the study. The secondary data of the study were collected on two main areas: 1) Elections and 2) terrorist attacks

Terrorism data for the dependent variable was acquired from a database generated by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, TX. This database includes terrorist incidents that occurred in Turkey between 1980 and 2008. The researcher
assigned terrorist attacks only carried out by the PKK listed in the database to the province wherein the attack was carried out.

Electoral data for both the parliamentary and municipalities were obtained from Turkey’s High Election Board (YSK). For the parliamentary elections, data includes the total number of eligible voters, voter turnout, and popular votes for each political party. These observations correspond to the results of the parliamentary elections of 1995, 1999, 2002, and 2007, and municipal elections of 1999, and 2004, in provinces of Turkey.

Measurement of Variables

In this study terrorism is measured through the “number of terrorist incidents” carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. Vote share of the political party affiliated with the PKK is assumed to represent the degree of popular support from the province; therefore popular support was measured through “vote share of the political party affiliated with the PKK”. Its vote share is assumed to represent the degree of popular support from the province.

Dependent variable

Number of terrorist incidents: This variable represents the number of terrorist attacks that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey. The study measures terrorism through number of terrorist incidents rather than casualties, because from a RMT approach, it is assumed that each terrorist attacks requires some level intelligence, logistics, materials and human
resources to have; therefore, from this perspective, number of terrorist attacks also indicates the terrorism capacity and intention of the insurgent. While a terrorist attack could kill tens of people several terrorist attacks might not result in any casualties. Therefore, by counting only casualties, not only might we miss some terrorist incidents but also might overestimate the capacity or think that the insurgent avoided carrying out terrorist attacks. For instance in reality, the insurgent might attempt carry out a number of terrorist attacks, but due to effective counter-terrorism efforts, they could have been prevented or failed to kill or wound anyone. Or resorting indiscriminate terrorism in a crowded place could kill tens of people. For these reasons, the researcher counted terrorist attacks within corresponding time period for each province.

Independent variables

Singer and Willet (2003) describes how to construct a model to analyze changes upon an expected event. They name it as “discontinuous individual change model” and illustrate how to code the variables into the dataset to examine changes pre- and post-event period. Their analogy and discontinuous individual change model were use in few studies such as Lang and Bliese (2009). Similar to others, this study uses the Singer and Willet (2003) study’s design for the sake of this study.

Due to both statistical and theoretical reasons, an election was divided into three election periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term post-period; and 3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). If the
elections have any impact on terrorist attacks, then they will affect terrorism trajectories of provinces by the following ways:

**An immediate shift in elevation, but no shift in slope:** In this case provinces’ terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election, but their subsequent rate of change will be unaffected. This means that the elevations of their trajectory jump, but their slope in the pre-election and post-election epochs remain the same. The following figure illustrates such an immediate shift at the election but no shift in the post-election slope.

**An immediate shift in slope, but no shift in elevation:** In this case provinces’ terrorist attacks will remain stable upon election, but their subsequent rate of change will be affected—increase or decline in the post-election period. This means that elevation of terrorism trend is no higher at the election, but its slope in the pre-and post-election epochs differ.

**An immediate shifts in both the election and slope:** In this case provinces’ terrorist attacks change in two ways as a result of election: They abruptly change (increase or decline) and their subsequent rate of change increases/decreases. This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.

The model of the study was structured to represent these possible changes upon election by including the following independent variables.

**Time:** The time period for the time variable begins 12 months (coded as 0) before the election and ends twelve months after the election (coded as
23-month) for each individual province; because of following two time variables, the \textit{time} variable in this study represents the pre-election slope for terrorism attacks over the pre-election period.

\textit{Election}: A dummy coded \textit{election} variable has been added in the dataset, and 0 has been coded for terrorist incidents that occurred before the election and 1 for after the election. This dummy variable examines the possible elevation upon election. Furthermore, the inclusion of the dummy-coded time variable allows for discontinuity in the change model (Lang & Bliese, 2009). In the Bliese’s study this represents the transition stage to the post-election period. Thus, in words of Singer and Willet (2003)’s study this dummy variable indicates whether there is an immediate shift in elevation.

\textit{Post-election}: The \textit{post-election} variable is used to determine if the post-election slope differ from the pre-election slope. Stated differently, this variable examines whether the slopes of terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.

\textit{Vote share of the political party associated with the PKK}: This variable represents the electoral support (or popular support) of the PKK. For each province, it is calculated by dividing valid votes for its party into total valid votes. Before the new election (\textit{election}=0, or \textit{time}=0…11), previous vote share of the PKK’s party has been used and its latter vote share has been used for after the new election. Thus, parameter of this variable indicates whether vote share of the PKK’s party is significantly associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. A positive
parameter indicates a positive relationship with the attacks, thus representing the RMT approach, whereas a negative parameter indicates a negative relationship, thus representing the RD approach. The Table 1 lists all of the variables in the study.

**Table 1:** List of the Variables in this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of terrorist incidents (continuous)</td>
<td>time (continuous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>election (dummy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-election (continuous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vote share of the party affiliated with the PKK (continuous)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This design was employed for each election separately. Although data were collected from 1995 and 2002 election results to calculate electoral support, the study does not include a separate analysis for 1999 local elections and 2002 general elections. With regards to local elections of 1999, the PKK’s political party did not participate in 1995 local elections, so no electoral data available for its political party that is needed for the analysis of 1999 local elections. As explained previously, consecutive election results are needed to analyze one election. Therefore the researcher did not include local elections of 1999. Regarding the general election of 2002, after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire that covers 2002 general elections –the ceasefire ended in 2004. During the period of 2002 general
elections, only few terrorist attacks occurred, so, inclusion 2002 general elections into the study would not yield reliable results. Therefore for the sake of this study, the researcher has not included 1999 local and 2002 general elections in to this study. As a result, three separate dataset (1999 general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections), were constructed by using above mentioned independent and dependent variables. The Table 2 below indicates the data structure for Istanbul province in 1999 general elections.

**Table 2: Data Structure of the study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>provincename</th>
<th>voteshare</th>
<th>time</th>
<th>election</th>
<th>postelection</th>
<th>ntotalincidents</th>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Hypotheses of the Study

The main research question of the study is “are the elections and popular support affect insurgent’s terrorist attacks?” Two main hypotheses are proposed to answer it: The first one;

\( H_0 \): “Terrorist attacks are not associated with its popular support”.

\( H_1 \): “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.

With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses: First, deriving the RMT approach, we hypothesize that:

\( H_{1a} \): “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.

From a RMT approach we expect that an increase in its vote share increases its terrorist attacks. If vote share of the insurgent is positively associated with terrorist attacks, then provinces with higher electoral support are expected to experience higher terrorist attacks, because more electoral support is assumed to indicate more popular support from the local population. Thus, the PKK would be able move freely with little concern about being informed to the security forces and get more logistic, intelligence and other resources to conduct terrorist activities.

In contrast to the RMT approach, taking a RD approach, we hypothesize that:

\( H_{1b} \): “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.
If vote share of insurgent is negatively associated with terrorist attacks, the researcher expects that a relative decline in the PKK’s electoral support lead to an increase its terrorist attacks because of the relative deprivation caused by undesired election results.

The second main hypothesis of the study is that:

\( H_{I2} \): “Terrorist attacks are not associated with elections”.

\( H_2 \): “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.

The main reason of proposing two related but separate hypotheses is that vote share of the insurgent might be related to terrorist attacks but terrorist attacks may not change as a function of time over the election periods. Or it is also possible that terrorist attacks may change as a function of time over the election periods, but vote share may not associate with them.

As explained previously, the study divides an election into three election periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term post-period; and 3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). We propose hypotheses for each of these periods.

\( H_{02a} \) (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change during the pre-election period”.

\( H_{2a} \): “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.

The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes, and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population. Thus, as a possible consequence of its pre-election terrorism the incumbent might be
replaced with a rival, probably a conservative party—who is known for, or promised to take though counterterrorism measures against the PKK.

As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe, 1989). Consistent with previous research finding we expect an increase soon after the election and a decline in a short period of time; so we propose the following hypotheses:

\[ H_{0b} \] (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change abruptly upon the election”.

\[ H_{2b} \]: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.

\[ H_{0c} \] (Null): Subsequent terrorism attacks will not differ in the post-election period.

\[ H_{2c} \]: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.

Analytical Techniques used in the Study

Longitudinal Data as Hierarchical: Time Nested Within Individuals

In this study, we examine the changes in terrorist incidents over election periods and how relative changes in vote share of the PKK’s political party are related to terrorist attacks. Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski (1982) provided the following useful guidelines for analyzing changes: First, assessments of change must be based on a model for change. Second, a model for individual change is useful for the measurement of change. Third, the regression function represents the key initial summary of the data. Fourth, measures of individual change can be
“improved” by incorporating information from all $n$ persons into the measure of change. Finally, answers to questions regarding change are most often obtained from longitudinal panel data. This study meets Rogosa et al.’s suggestions because of its longitudinal design and application of multilevel modeling to model terrorism trajectory of provinces over time.

Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) can be applied to multiple observations nested within a single individual. Due to this feature, HLM can be applied to longitudinal data where the primary interest is to model the structure and predictors of change over time (Luke, 2004). These models, in which the HLM applied to longitudinal data, are also known as “growth models” or “growth curve models”.

Within a longitudinal design, HLM is an intuitive and efficient way to estimate individual growth or change curves (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). Multilevel models are also known as Random coefficient models (RCM), Multi Level Modeling (MLM) or Linear Mixed Models (LMM). Furthermore, multilevel modeling is capable of separating changes over time within individuals and differences in between individuals at the initial status. It allows random effects into the model, and each individual is treated as a random effect. In multilevel model, data should be in long format in order that individual slopes and intercepts can be calculated. Having estimated individual slopes and intercepts, the model predicts individual variability with more precision by using other variables to predict the individual variability. Thus, the researcher can examine how an
individual changes over time, what the rate of change is, and how the rate of change varies by predictors across the individuals.

One of the essential features of multilevel modeling is that it substantially reduces the number of parameters to be estimated while still allowing the coefficient to differ from unit to unit or from time to time (Hsiao & Pesaran, 2004). This is done by estimating two models: The Level 1 model specifies the intra-individual model (also referred to as micro model, within-subject, or intra-individual model), and then the Level 2 model produces parameters for the inter-individual model (also known as macro, between-subject, inter-individuals model) using the parameters of the level 1 model. In other words, level 2 models the macro model based on the parameters of level 1 and attempts to explain the change and variability by adding predictors of interest in the level 2 model.

In addition, unlike other repeated measures analysis methods, HLM allows the fit of data with unequal numbers of repeated observations for each subject, variable timing of observations, and missing data features (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). Many traditional longitudinal approaches, such as repeated-measures MANOVA, are unable to easily handle unbalanced longitudinal data (Luke, 2004). The HLM can also provide significance tests for individual parameters (Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002).

Growth and Discontinuous Growth Models with Hierarchical Linear Modeling

“Growth modeling” is widely applied to the analyses of longitudinal data and tests for individual differences in the outcome and variability in the rate of change
over time. The growth model can explain differences in overall outcomes and differences in slopes as a function of level 2 characteristics. Growth curve modeling requires that the outcome data collected at each time point be measured on a common metric in order that changes across time reflect growth and not changes in the measurement scale (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987). Typical growth models work in cases when there is an underlying trend to the data, or there is no explicit transition point between measurement intervals where change takes on a distinct non-linear pattern. However, in many situations, events representing distinct transition points occur during longitudinal data collection. When this occurs, the growth model masks sub-trends in the overall change pattern. Even longitudinal data without any apparent change may reveal important information when transition points are examined. If the topic of interest is a certain point(s), a “discontinuous growth model” is a good way to reveal such information (Bliese, 2006; Lang & Bliese, 2009). In this study, election is the ‘transition point’ that we will examine.

Discontinuous growth models are a specific form of multilevel mixed-effects models with multiple time variables to model transition processes over time and individual differences in transition processes (Lang & Bliese, 2009). Furthermore a discontinuous growth model can capture possible changes and variability among provinces. Therefore, in order to thoroughly analyze the differences in the terrorism outcome and variability in the rate of change over time, a discontinuous growth change was established to analyze whether the terrorism pattern has
really changed after an election within-individual, inter-individual levels. Furthermore, individual provinces may differ in each term of the discontinuous growth model, because it is possible that individual differences can exist for the pre-election, election, and post-transition slopes among provinces. For instance, some provinces may experience different terrorism patterns in the post-election period while others might stay the same. Such individual differences can be predicted using level-2 variables.

The standard HLM does not appropriately analyze the data if the data is count. In these cases, the possible values of Y are non-negative integers, typically indicating a positively skewness. If data has few zeros, a transformation may solve the problem and allow us to use a linear model; however, if there are many zeros, the normality assumption cannot be approximated by a transformation (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). In such cases, predicted values based on a linear model might be negative, indicating coefficients are not interpretable. Generalized Hierarchical linear models (Luke, 2004) also known as generalized linear models with random effects (Schall, 1991), or Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), offer a coherent modeling framework for multilevel data with nonlinear structural models and non-normally distributed errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). GHLMs can handle a wide variety of different types of non-continuous or non-normal dependent variables including binary, proportion, count, and ordinal variables
through a necessary transformation and appropriate error distribution for the dependent variable (Luke, 2004).

Initial analysis of the data of this study revealed the need for a Poisson distribution in the study because of the presence of nonlinearity of the association between predictors and outcome, production of negative predicted values, and highly skewness of terrorist attacks is highly skewed. These problems can be addressed more productively in employing a nonlinear model. Therefore, a generalized hierarchical linear model (GHLM) is more appropriate for the sake of this study.

**Generalized Hierarchical Linear Models (GHLM)**

Hierarchical linear models are considered as a special case of GHLM with a normal sampling model and identity link function at level 1 (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The level-1 model in HGLM has three parts: a sampling model, a link function, and a structural model. A standard generalized linear model for the count data uses “Poisson” sampling model and a log link function. These extend directly to hierarchical models. In other words, the transformational link connects the untransformed dependent variable to a new transformed variable (Luke, 2004).

The standard link function when the level-1 sampling is Poisson is log link, that is,

\[ Y_{ti} = \log(\lambda_{ti}) \]
In words, $Y_{ti}$, is the log of event rate. Thus, if the event rate, $\lambda_{ti}$, is 1, the log is 0. When the event rate is less than 1, the log is negative; when the event rate is greater than 1, the log is positive. Thus, while $\lambda_{ti}$ is constrained to be nonnegative, $\log(\lambda_{ti})$ can take on any real value.

The transformed predicted value of $Y_{ti}$ is now related to the predictors of the model through the linear structural model.

$$Y_{ti} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t_{ij} + \beta_2 j_2 + \ldots + \beta_p j_p$$

Then such, transformed predicted log event rate can be converted to an event rate, $\lambda_{ti}$ by computing $\lambda_{ti} = \exp(Y_{ti})$. Whatever the value of predicted $n_{ti}$, $\lambda_{ti}$, will be nonnegative. As seen, combining the level-1 sampling model, the level-1 link function and the level-1 structural model reproduces the usual level-1 model of HLM.

$$Y_{ti} | \lambda_{ti} \sim P (m_{ti}, \lambda_{ti})$$

According to the Poisson distribution, the expected value and variance of $Y_{ti}$, given the event rate,$\lambda_{ti}$, are then

$$E(T_{ti} | \lambda_{ti}) = m_{ti} \lambda_{ti}, \ Var(T_{ti} | \lambda_{ti}) = m_{ti} \lambda_{ti}$$
In words, the expected number of terrorist attacks in time \( t \) for province \( i \) is its event rate, \( \lambda t_i \), times its exposure \( m t_i \).

**Specification of the Model of the Study**

**Level-1**

\[
Y_{t,i} = \beta_{0,i} + \beta_{1,i} (\text{voteshare}_{t,i}) + \beta_{2,i} (\text{time}_{t,i}) + \beta_{3,i} (\text{election}_{t,i}) + \beta_{4,i} (\text{postelection}_{t,i}) + e_{t,i}
\]

Where \( Y \) is the ‘log’-number of terrorism incidents in province \( i \) at the time \( t \); \( t \) denotes the measurement occasion (\( t=1 \) to \( T_i \) where \( T_i \) is the number of observations for province \( i \)), and \( \text{time}_{t,i} \) is the month that begins for all provinces from 12 months (time starts from 0) before election and ends 12 months after the election.

For the current scaling of \( \text{time} \), the intercept \( \beta_{0,i} \) represents the log-number of terrorist incidents in the province \( i \) 12 months before the election (time=0); The \( \beta_{1,i} \) coefficient reflects the log-rate of terrorism change when vote share of insurgent increase one 1% for the province \( i \); the \( \beta_{2,i} \) coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of change of terrorism indicator for the province \( i \) over pre-election period; the \( \beta_{3,i} \) coefficient reflects log-linear rate of change of terrorism indicator for the province \( i \) in the transition stage; the \( \beta_{4,i} \) coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of change of terrorism indicator for the province \( i \) over post-election period. The \( e_{t,i} \) term is the log-within-subject residual at the \( t^{th} \) month (i.e., the deviation of \( Y \) regarding the
true systematic change curve for province \textit{i} for the t\textsuperscript{th} measure). In count terrorist attacks are converted by calculating its exponential value.

If this level 1 analysis suggests that people differ on within-individual change, then the level 2 (between-provinces) can examine the association between explanatory variables of interest and patterns of change. Stated differently, like HLMs, in GHLM models, variables are added to level 2 models to analyze level-1 coefficients, either intercepts or slopes (Nezlek, 2001). Due to the fact that primary interest of this study is level-1 model (within-province change), no level-2 predictor other than the mean score of the corresponding coefficient has been included in to the level-2 model.

**Level-2 Model**

\[
\beta_0i = \pi_{00} + r_{0i}
\]

VoteShare Slope (change rate by 1\% increase in vote share): \[
\beta_{1i} = \pi_{10} + r_{1i}
\]

time (change rate in pre-election period): \[
\beta_{2i} = \pi_{20} + r_{2i}
\]

election Slope (change rate in transition stage): \[
\beta_{3i} = \pi_{30} + r_{3i}
\]

postelection Slope (change rate in post-election period): \[
\beta_{4i} = \pi_{40} + r_{4i}
\]

**Analysis Steps for each election**

The HLM.6.08 software package, which was developed by Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon (2004) was used in analyses and only \textit{the population-average} estimates were reported. \textit{The population-average estimates} give the expected difference in the in outcome associated with a unit increase in the predictors,
holding constant the other predictors, but averaging over the distribution of level-2 random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Furthermore Raudenbush, Bryk and Congdon suggest using population-average estimates if the researcher is interested in how a change in a predictor can be expected to affect the overall population mean.

Researchers of the HLM usually points out the importance of three main steps in conducting level-1 model analysis (Bliese et al, 2007), Singer and Willet, 2003, Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002): 1) Estimating null model (also referred as unconditional means model) and calculate intra class correlation coefficient (ICC). 2) Estimate unconditional growth model without random slopes and 3) estimate growth model with random slopes.

Step 1: Estimating Null model and calculating the ICC score

Step 1 of the procedure involves estimating the intra class correlation coefficient (ICC) for the criterion measure. In our context, the ICC indicates how much variability in terrorism scores among observations can be attributed to between-province differences across time periods.

Null model

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<th>Level-1 Model</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>$E(N_{totalincidents} \mid \beta_{ti}) = \lambda_{ti}$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\log[\lambda_{ti}] = \eta_{ti}$</td>
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</tr>
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<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{0i} = \pi_{00} + \tau_0$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The null model does not describe change in the outcome over time; it stipulates that the true individual change trajectory for individual $i$ is completely flat, sitting at elevation $\pi_{00}$ at level-1. Instead, the null model simply describes and partitions the outcome at every level. The level-2 stipulates that while these flat trajectories may differ in elevation, their average elevation is $\pi_{00}$, and any interindividual variation in elevation is not linked to predictors. Thus testing the null model allows researchers to establish whether there is systematic variation in our outcome that is worth exploring (Singer & Willet, 2003, p.92). The null model needs to be fitted first, because its partitions the total variation in the outcome meaningfully. The primary reason for fitting the null model is to estimate variance components, which assess the amount of outcome variation that exists at each level (Singer & Willet, 2003; p93). Where $\beta_{0i}$ is true log-mean of $Y$ for province $i$; $\pi_{00}$ is true log-mean of $Y$ across provinces in population; and the level-1 residual is a “within-individual” deviation that assesses the “distance” between $Y_{ij}$ and $\beta_{0i}$. Variation in the log-outcome is just the sum of the within and between-individual variance components, so the population intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is calculated as the following:

$$\text{ICC} = \frac{\text{Intercept variance (between-province variance, also referred as level-2 variance)}}{\text{Intercept variance + Residual (also referred as level-1 variance)}}$$

**Step-2: Unconditional Growth Curve Model**

Step 2 involves estimating the nature and shape of the time-terrorism score relationship. The null model and unconditional growth model assess
whether there is potentially predictable outcome variation, and if so where it resides (Singer & Willet, 2003; p.102). In order to examine the fixed relationship between level-1 variables and number of terrorist incidents, number of terrorist incidents were regressed on four time-variant predictors which represent the pre-election, transition stage, post-election slope and vote share slopes. Vote share of party affiliated with the PKK has been included as a covariate into to model as a level-1 variable rather than level-2 predictor, because of being a time-varying covariate, which means it is not constant for a given province, rather it covariates with the time, because it changes after the Election Day (time=11). Time-varying covariates are included into the level-1 model as level-1 predictors, not into the level-2 model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p.179) so that the variation in the vote share can be captured by the model.

Adding additional time-varying predictors to the level-1 can reduce the level-1 variance and can affect variance components in both levels, because they vary both within- and between provinces; but time-invariant (level-2) predictors cannot explain much within-person variation (level-1). The reason is that since time-invariant predictors are constant across all individuals they have no within-province variation to allow for a level-2 residual. However, adding time-invariant predictors will reduce the level-2 components if they “explain” some of the between-province variation in initial status or rates of change, respectively. (Singer & Willet, 2003; p.103, p.170). Adding a time- varying predictor changes the meaning of the individual growth parameters because of the two reasons: (1)
the intercept parameter $\beta_{0i}$ now refers to the value of the outcome when all predictors, not only time variables, but also the time-varying predictor, are zero.

(2) The slope parameters are now a conditional rate of change, controlling for the effects of the time-varying predictor.

The level-1 and level-2 models for the unconditional growth curve model are presented in Equation 2.

**The level-1 and level-2 models for unconditional growth curve model.**

**Level-1 Model**

$E(N_{\text{totalincidents}} | \pi_{t_{i}}) = \lambda_{t_{i}}$

$\log [\lambda_{t_{i}}] = \eta_{t_{i}}$

$\eta_{t_{i}} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i}(\text{voteshare}_{t_{i}}) + \beta_{2i}(\text{time}_{t_{i}}) + \beta_{3i}(\text{election}_{t_{i}}) + \beta_{4i}(\text{postelection}_{t_{i}}) + \epsilon_{t_{i}}$

**Level-2 Model**

$\beta_{0} = \pi_{00} + r_{0}$

$\beta_{1} = \pi_{10}$

$\beta_{2} = \pi_{20}$

$\beta_{3} = \pi_{30}$

$\beta_{4} = \pi_{40}$

**Step-3: Unconditional Growth Curve Model with Random Coefficients**

Step 3 involves testing for significant variability across provinces in the slopes of time-terrorism relationships. One of the drawbacks of unconditional growth models in step 2, which allow only intercepts ($r_{0}$) to vary among provinces, is that it assumes these parameters are constant for each province. However, some provinces may have different terrorism patterns over the time than other provinces. In order to determine whether provinces have different terrorism patterns, alternative models with random slopes that allow slopes vary are tested in the Step 3. P values of the parameters have been used to examine
parameter variability. A p-value that is smaller than 0.05 indicates a statistically significant variability in the corresponding parameter among provinces.

Limitations of the Study

External validity of the study is a limitation of the study. Whether the study findings can be generalized to larger populations and applied to different settings is referred as “external validity” (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Since the study focuses only one specific insurgent terrorist organization in Turkey over time, it could have a low external validity. Although findings could provide some insights into election related terrorism in other countries—especially for those who struggle with ethnic insurgent terrorist organizations with political party, since terrorist organizations have different background, characteristics and operates countries with different characteristics, its findings cannot generalized to other countries. Namely, terrorist attacks might follow a totally different trend over the election periods or there might be no trend at all.

The other limitation of the study is related to the data of the study. The data were collected by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of Sam Houston State University in Huntsville through open sources, so the data might cover important terrorist attacks that attracted media attention. There might be some small scale terrorist attacks that did not attract media attention thus not present in our data.
CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The results of the study are presented in three sections. The first section provides descriptive statistics on the overall number of and type of attacks, then charts the attacks longitudinally. The second section test hypotheses and presents results of the study.

Briefly, our study found that electoral support for the PKK was positively related to its terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks changed in two ways as a result of election: They first abruptly increased upon election and their subsequent rate of change declined over the post-election period, meaning that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.

Descriptive Statistics of the study

Number of provinces affected by PKK terrorism and number of terrorist attacks differ from election to election. Terrorist attacks increased and expanded to more provinces in the 2007 elections. In 1999 general election a total of 27 provinces (34%) out of 80 experienced terrorist attacks, however this number declined to 20 provinces (25%) out of 81 in the 2004 local elections, indicating the PKK focused on certain provinces, especially those are located in the dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR)—which the PKK claims to fight for
its independence—rather than conducting a large-scale terrorism campaign. On the other hand, for the 2007 elections, terrorist attacks occurred in 30 (37%) out of 81 provinces. 18 (60%) of those 30 provinces are located in the DKPR; furthermore while provinces located in the non-DKPR region experienced 44 terrorist incidents other provinces experienced 380 terrorist attacks over 24-month period in 2007 general elections. The tables 5-6-7 provide detailed information about number of and types of terrorist attacks as well as casualties for elections.

Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections

In 24-month period of 1999 elections, a total of 147 terrorist attacks were carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey (See Table 3, Figure 7 and Figure 8). In terms of attack type, 58% of attacks were armed attacks and 29% of the attacks were bombing attack. 47% of the attacks targeted individuals/vehicles or facilities with combatant status, which include soldiers, gendarmerie forces, police and village guards. However, 63% of the targets were affiliated with the government. Stated differently, although the PKK targeted mostly non-combatant targets (53%), most of the targets (63%) were either government’s officials or facilities used by the government. We argue that by targeting officials, vehicles or facilities of the government, the PKK tried to avoid losing support of the local population, because it is normally easier to justify carrying out terrorist attacks against governmental targets than merely civilians without any tie to the government.
Among combatant targets, the PKK much more preferred to target military targets (36%) rather than the police (11%). Since the PKK mostly targeted combatants, almost half of the deaths (55%) and wounded (51%) were combatants. Attacking mostly military targets is not surprising, because of three main reasons: First, the PKK considers itself as a kind of army of the Kurdish people and to have a responsibility to expel occupying (Turkish) forces from the DKPR region. Second, the police work only in urban areas, whereas the PKK militants mainly operate in the rural areas. In order to target the police, the PKK has to gather intelligence against police, acquire some logistics and other materials; however, operating in the urban areas decreases their chances to succeed in their attacks because of relatively less resources and supporters in the urban areas.

**Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist attacks</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Arm.Att.</th>
<th>Bomb.</th>
<th>Kidn.</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Comb vs. non-Comb.</th>
<th>Gov vs. non-Gov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>147</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>69 - 78</td>
<td>93 - 54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Total Attack</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Security Forces</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7: Targets of Terrorist Attacks in 1999 GE

Figure 8: Casualties in 1999 GE

The Figure 9 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 1999 general elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election periods below and their characteristics are explored.

Figure 9: Terrorist Attacks over the Time in 1999 Elections
Pre-election period of 1999 GE

The Table 4 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the governmental vs. non-governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of 1999 elections, the PKK mostly hit the non-combatant targets (50, or 63%), especially in the final lap of the election. Despite a higher number of attacks against non-combatants, they were not merely civilians. Rather, 55% of the targets were affiliated with the government. However, when looked the time period of the attacks, it is seen that especially in the final lap of the election the PKK dramatically increased its violence against both the governmental and non-governmental targets, however, most of them were non-combatant targets (see Figure 10 and Figure 11).

Table 4: Target Types over Pre-election period of 1999 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-governmental</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-combatant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Table 5 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the pre-election period of 1999 elections by dividing them into their regions and combatant status. As seen in the table 5, almost 90% percent (or 26 out of 30) of the combatants were attacked in the DKPR region, indicating that during the pre-election period, the army, police and village guards experienced much more terrorist attacks compared to their counterparts deployed out of the DKPR region. Interestingly, the PKK carried out more terrorist attacks against the non-combatant (50) than the combatant targets (30) over the pre-election period.

However, as closing the Election Day, while terrorist attacks against the combatant targets were declined in the DKPR region, they increased in the non-DKPR regions (see Figure 12 and 13). Furthermore, in the final lap of the elections, attacks against the non-combatant targets sharply increased in both
the DKPR and non-DKPR regions. 42% of the attacks against non-combatants within two months prior to the Election Day.

**Table 5:** Terrorist Attacks over the Pre-Election Period of 1999 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999 GE</th>
<th>month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR Combatants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR Combatants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Combatants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999 GE</th>
<th>month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR Non-Combatants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR Non-Combatants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Combatants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12:** Attacks against combatants over the pre-election period of 1999 elections according to their region.

**Figure 13:** Attacks against non-combatants over the pre-election period of 1999 elections according to their region.

**Post-election period of 1999 GE**

Table 6 provides number of terrorist attacks against non-combatants over the post-election period of 1999 elections according to their regions. Like the pre-
election period, most of the combatants (31, or 79%) were hit in the DKPR region. However, unlike pre-election period, the PKK avoided from targeting non-combatants (5) out of the DKPR region but continued in DKPR region. 82% of non-combatants (23 out of 28) were hit in the non-DKPR region over the post-election period. Terrorist attacks against combatant and non-combatant targets abruptly increased upon the election in both the DKPR and non-DKPR regions (see Figure 14 and Figure 15). 82% of the attacks (or 23 attacks) against those non-combatant targets and 74% of attacks (or 29 attacks) against combatant targets were carried out within three months after the Election Day.

\textbf{Table 6: Terrorist Attacks over the Post-Election Period of 1999 Elections}

| 1999 GE | month | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | Total |
|---------|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| DKPR    | Combatants | 5  | 8  | 9  | 7  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 31   |
| non-DKPR| Combatants  | 3  | 1  | 3  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 8    |
| Total   | Combatants  | 8  | 9  | 12 | 7  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 39   |

| 1999 GE   | month | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | Total |
|-----------|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| DKPR      | Non-Combatants | 4  | 2  | 12 | 4  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 23   |
| non-DKPR  | Non-Combatants  | 1  | 1  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 5    |
| Total     | Non-Combatants  | 5  | 3  | 15 | 4  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 28   |
To sum up, in 1999 general elections, most of the PKK terrorist attacks were armed assaults and attacks focused on governmental targets without combatant status. In the final lap of the election, PKK increased its violence in the DKPR region. However, starting from the election, the PKK concentrated its attacks on the DKPR region and targeted both combatants and noncombatant targets (see Figure 16).
Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections

In 24-month period of 2004 local elections, a total of 84 terrorist attacks were carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. While armed assault (58%) was the primary attack type and non-combatant targets (53%) were the primary targets in the 1999 elections, the attack type shifted from armed assault (46%) to bomb involving attacks (48%) and target type shifted from non-combatants (39%) to combatants (61%) in 2004 local elections (See Table 7). 75% of the targets were affiliated with the government. As a consequence of its attacks, half (51%) of the overall deaths and wounded were combatants (see Figure 17 and Figure 18). This indicates that PKK strategically chose certain targets which are affiliated with the government but was not good enough to control the consequences of its attacks, especially number of wounded. Finally, like the
1999 elections, in terms of combatant targets, the PKK directed its violence against military targets (40%) rather than the police (19%).

**Table 7: Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Arm.Att.</th>
<th>Bomb.</th>
<th>Kidn.</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Comb vs. non-Comb.</th>
<th>Gov vs. non-Gov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51-33</td>
<td>63-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Total Attack</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Security Forces</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17: Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections**

**Figure 18: Casualties in 2004 Local Elections**

The Figure 19 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2004 Local elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre- and post-election periods below and their characteristics are explored.
Pre-election period of 2004 LE

The Table 8 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the governmental vs. non-governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants over the pre-election period of 2004 elections. In contrast to the pre-period of 1999 elections, the PKK concentrated its attacks against the combatant targets (10, or 59%). 70% (or 12) of targets were affiliated with the government. Unlike the previous elections, the PKK minimized its violence especially within the last months of the local elections (see Figure 20 and Figure 21). Specifically, only one attack was carried out against a civilian target.
Table 8: Target Types over Pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental targets</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental targets</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 20: Attacks against combatants and Non-combatants over the pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections

Figure 21: Attacks against governmental and non-governmental over the pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections

The Table 9 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the pre-election period of 2004 elections according to their regions and combatant status. 70% (or 12 out of 17) of overall terrorist activities during the pre-election occurred in the DKPR region. 75% of the targets were combatant targets, which occurred in the DKPR region (See Figure 22). Of those combatants, 90% percent (or 9 out of 10) were attacked in the DKPR. Terrorist attacks against combatant targets stopped within the last months of the election regardless of the region, although
few individual attacks were carried out non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region, only one non-combatant target was attacked in the DKPR region within the last six months of the election (See Figure 23). Unlike the previous elections, it seems that this time PKK wanted a peaceful electoral process before the local elections, therefore minimized its terrorist attacks.

**Table 9:** Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2004 Local elections according to their regions and combatant status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004 LE</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
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<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Combatant</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>2004 LE</th>
<th>Month</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>Non-Combatants</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Non-Combatants</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 22:** Terrorist attacks against combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions over the pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections.

**Figure 23:** Terrorist attacks against non-combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR Regions over the pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections.
Post-election period of 2004 LE

Table 10 provides number of terrorist attacks according to combatant status over the post-election period of 2004 local elections. 80% (67 out of 84) of overall terrorist attacks were carried out during the post-election period. 25% of the post-election attacks occurred within three months and 74% of them occurred within the six months after the election. Almost 90% of the attacks within the first three months after the local election were carried out against combatant targets.

Table 10: Terrorist attacks according to combatant status over the post-election period of 2004 local elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
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<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>non-combatant</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Post-election terrorist attacks focused on the DKPR region (see Table 11, Figure 24 and Figure 25 below). 75% of overall post-election attacks occurred in the DKPR region. First choice of target was combatant targets in the DKP region. Over 70% of the targets in the DKPR region were combatant targets; and 90% (37 out of 41) of the combatant targets of the post-election period were attacked in the DKPR region. This indicates that during the post-election period, the PKK carefully chose its targets especially in the DKPR region and used a discriminate terrorism strategy to increase its popular support and avoid from losing it. However, in contrast to the DKPR region, the PKK directs its violence against
non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces. In post-election period, 75% of overall targets were non-combatant targets.

Within the first three months following the election, the PKK exclusively targeted combatants in the DKPR region. Only 1 attack out of 15 was carried out against a noncombatant target.

**Table 11:** Terrorist Attacks over the post-election period of 2004 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004 LE</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
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<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
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<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Combatant</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2004 LE</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
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<th>20</th>
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<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
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<td>Non-Combatants</td>
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<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>Non-Combatants</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 24:** Terrorist attacks against combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions over the post-election period of 2004 Local Elections.

**Figure 25:** Terrorist attacks against non-combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR Regions over the post-election period of 2004 Local Elections.
When considered the overall terrorism trajectory, it is seen that in the long run up to the 2004 local elections, the PKK increased its attacks against the combatant targets in the DKPR region, where it’s most constituencies live in, but during the election’s final lap it stopped its terrorist activities in this DKPR region (See Figure 26). In the post-election period, it concentrated on the DKPR region and launched a massive terrorism campaign against combatant targets in this region. Furthermore, starting from four months after the election, the PKK also directed its violence against non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region.

**Figure 26: Attacks against combatants and non-combatants in 2004 Local Elections**

In conclusion, the 2004 local elections have the lowest rate of terrorist attacks among others. The PKK made some changes in its terrorism strategy. In general, the attack type shifted from armed assault to bomb involving attacks and target type shifted from non-combatants to combatants in 2004 local elections.
While the attacks focused on combatant targets in the DKPR region, they focused on non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region. In contrast to the other elections, provinces experienced more terrorist attacks during the post-election than the pre-election period; finally, there is no increasing trend in the final lap of the election, instead, terrorist attacks declined to minimum points as closing to the Election Day.

Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections

Compared to other elections, the 2007 general elections have the greatest number of terrorist attacks. In 24-month period of 2007 general elections, a total of 424 terrorist attacks were carried out provinces of Turkey (See Table 12, Figure 27 and 28). Armed attacks (63%) became a prevalent attack type again in the 2007 general elections. Like the previous elections in 2004, terrorist attacks were concentrated on officials and property of the government (88%), especially on combatant targets (84%). Not surprisingly, the military was the first choice of the PKK; 77% (or 328 out of 424) of attacks were directed against the military. Civilian targets were the second choice, which came even before the police targets. Although a greater proportion (67%) of the deaths was combatant targets, proportion of the wounded civilians (51%) exceeded the combatant targets (48%). As a consequence of the terrorist attacks, 485 civilians and 460 combatants were injured. This indicates that either the PKK was not good enough to control civilian victims or intentionally did not avoid from using indiscriminative terrorism, which increases number of civilian casualties.
Table 12: Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Arm.Att.</th>
<th>Bomb.</th>
<th>Kidn.</th>
<th>Arson</th>
<th>Comb vs. non-Comb.</th>
<th>Gov vs. non-Gov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>135</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>355-69</td>
<td>375-49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Civilian</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27: Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections

Figure 28: Casualties in 2007 General Elections

The figure 29 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2007 general elections. Then these terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election periods below and their characteristics are explored.
Pre-election period of 2007GE

The Table 13 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the governmental vs. non-governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of 2007 elections, 88% of the targets were governmental targets; specifically 84% of the targets were combatant targets. As closing the Election Day, the PKK increased its violence against governmental targets, especially against combatant targets (see Figures 30 and Figure 31 below). Choosing combatant targets indicates the PKK’s intention to use discriminate or selective terrorism strategy, thus avoiding from being criticized by its own population. As mentioned previously, use of violence against combatant targets is a means of acquiring popular support for the insurgent. Increasing terrorism especially within the final lap of the election indicates the intention of the PKK to effect elections. The
reason could be discouraging adversary parties’ voters and increasing its own electoral support especially.

**Table 13**: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2007 General Elections

<table>
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<tr>
<th>pre-election 2007</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Governmental targets</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental targets</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>206</td>
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<th>3</th>
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<th>5</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatants</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 30**: Attacks against Combatants and non-combatants over the Pre-election Period of 2007 General Elections.

**Figure 31**: Attacks against Governmental and Non-governmental over the Pre-election period of 2007 General Elections.

The DKPR region and combatant status of the targets are important factors for the PKK. Almost 90% (183 out of 206) of the terrorist attacks during
the pre-election period were carried out within the DKPR region; and 90% (161 out of 183) of those attacks within the DKPR region targeted combatants (Table 14 and Figure 32 and Figure 33 below). Furthermore, especially in the final lap of the election the PKK dramatically increased its violence against combatants in the final lap of the election. 60% (106 out of 173) of the attacks targeting combatants were carried out within the last three months of the election, and only one of them was carried out of the DKPR region.

**Table 14:** Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period against combatants/noncombatants according to the region in 2007 General Elections.

<table>
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<th>2007 GE-pre</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR</td>
<td>combatant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>combatant</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2007 GE-pre | Time | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | total |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 32:** Attacks against combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions over the Pre-election period of 2007 General Elections

**Figure 33:** Attacks against non-combatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions over the Pre-election period of 2007 General Elections.
Post-election of 2007 GE

Post-election violence started after the election and quickly declined three months after the election. 84% (183 out of 218) of the post-election period attacks were carried out within the first months after the election (See Table 15, Figure 34 and Figure 35 below). Like the pre-election period, main targets of the PKK during the post-election period were governmental (89%) and combatant targets (83%). 88% of the combatants that were targeted during the overall post-election period were attacked within the first three months after the election. Attacks followed a similar trend for both the combatant and noncombatant, or governmental and nongovernmental targets.

Table 15: Terrorist Attacks According to Governmental and Combatant Status over the Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-election 2007</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental targets</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental targets</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-election 2007</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-combatants</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When considered the DKPR region, it is clearly seen that the attacks focused on the DKPR region. Specifically, 90% of (197 out of 218) the post-election attacks occurred within the DKPR region (See Table 16, Figure 36 and Figure 37). 86% of those attacks were carried out against the combatant targets; which 75% (149 out of 197) of them occurred within the first three months after the election.

**Table 16:** Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status and Region over the Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 GE</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR</td>
<td>combatant</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>combatant</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2007 GE</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DKPR</td>
<td>non-combatant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-DKPR</td>
<td>non-combatant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The PKK focused on the DKPR region and launched a massive terrorism campaign against specifically combatant targets over the final lap of the 2007 general elections. In the post-election period, campaign against the combatants abruptly increased in the short run after the election but then declined approximately over the post-election. Furthermore it seems that the PKK considers the DKPR region factor and combatant status when directing its violence (See Figure 38).
In terms of geographical location, Kurdish region factor seems to be an important for the PKK. The PKK’s main area of terrorism is the DKPR, which it has a considerable amount of popular support and each passing election the PKK has more concentrated its terrorist attacks on Kurdish region. While 72% of terrorist attacks occurred within the Kurdish region in 1999 general elections, this percentage increased to 75% in 2004 local elections, and peaked at about 90% in 2007 general elections (see Table 17). In addition to DKPR region, the PKK specifically targets combatants, which include soldiers, police and village guards that were deployed in the DKPR region. For instance, the percentage of terrorist attacks against the combatant targets in the DKPR region increased from 54% to 73% in 2004 local elections and peaked at 87% in 2007 general elections (See Table 18). On the other hand, in contrast to such a selective terrorism strategy in the Kurdish region, the PKK tends to target mostly noncombatant targets (70-
75%) in non-Kurdish region provinces. Although such an indiscriminate terrorism strategy was a prevalent strategy in non-Kurdish provinces till 2004 local elections, this strategy seems to shift from non-combatants (45%) to combatants (55%) in 2007 elections. In 2007 elections, only 13% of targets were noncombatant targets in the Kurdish region and 45% were noncombatants in the non-Kurdish region. Stated differently, the PKK systematically decreased its attacks against noncombatant targets region but increased them against combatants in the DKPR region.

Despite this shift, a considerable amount of threat against non-combatant targets still exist in the non-Kurdish region provinces.

**Table 17:** Terrorist Attacks according to Combatant Status of Terror Targets across Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DKPR</th>
<th>Non-DKPR</th>
<th></th>
<th>DKPR</th>
<th>Non-DKPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comb.</td>
<td>Non-comb.</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Comb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 GE</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>72.11%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 LE</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 GE</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>89.62%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 18:** Percentages of Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status of Terror Targets across Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DKPR</th>
<th>Non-DKPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999 GE</td>
<td>53.77%</td>
<td>46.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 LE</td>
<td>73.02%</td>
<td>26.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 GE</td>
<td>87.11%</td>
<td>12.89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Visual inspection of terrorist attacks over time indicates that terrorist attacks show an increasing trend and reaches their peaks two months before the general elections. However; in contrast to general elections, terrorist attacks started to decline as closing to the local elections and reached its minimum levels in the final lap of local elections (See Table 19 and Figure 40 below). In general elections, terrorist attacks first reach their peak points within three month after the election day, then dramatically declines in the post-election periods. However, local elections has a different terrorism trajectory during the pre-election period only. Terrorist attacks were kept at the minimum level during the pre-election period of the local election of 2004, then, like the general elections terrorist attacks increased in the post-election period, declined in the long run.
Table 19: Total Terrorist incidents in Turkey during pre-and post-election periods for each election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-election period 1999</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-election period 1999</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-election period 2004</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-election period 2004</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-election period 2007</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-election period 2007</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 40: Overall terrorism trajectories per election

Conclusions from descriptive statistics

To sum up, the data indicates that terrorism starts to increase three months before the general elections and drops three months after the election. Local election has a different terrorism trajectory in pre-election period. Although terrorism shows a declining in the long-run over the post-election period of the
local election, it did not drop below the level in the pre-election terrorism. Furthermore, in terms of geographic locations, most of terrorist attacks occur within the Kurdish populated region. In terms of target type, the PKK specifically chooses combatants within the Kurdish region. Although the PKK concentrated its violence on non-combatants in the non-Kurdish region provinces in the past two elections, it has shifted this strategy to combatant targets in the last elections.

Analysis Results of the Study

This section presents the results of our analysis. Each election is analyzed and interpreted separately first, then compared to each other. In each election, variables (vote share, pre-election, election and post-election) in the model represent our hypotheses; therefore their corresponding parameters have been used to test to our hypotheses. Having analyzed each election separately and compared to each other, we present our hypothesis tests.

Overview of the Results

Briefly, our analysis indicates a significant immediate shift in both the elevation and slope for each election. Namely, terrorist attacks changed in two ways as a result of election: They first abruptly increased and their subsequent rate of change declined. Statistically, this means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election. With regards to the relationship between popular support and terrorism, our study
found a positive relationship between them, indicating that electoral support for the PKK is positively related to its terrorist attacks.

To start with the terrorism trajectories, with the exception pre-election terrorism in 2004 local elections, our analysis indicated that all independent variables are statistically significant. In terms of terrorism trajectory our findings indicate that that terrorism increases upon the election in the short-term after the election but subsequent terrorism declined in the long-term over the post-election periods. Specifically, our analysis indicates a statistically significant increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election periods in the 1999 and 2007 general elections \( (t=2.01, \ p=0.045; \ t=3.69, \ p=0.000, \text{ respectively}) \), but not in the 2004 local elections \( (t=0.330, \ p=0.74) \). Furthermore, terrorism dramatically and significantly increases upon the election \( (t=6.2, \ p=0.000; \ t=5.5, \ p=0.000; \ t=6.2, \ p=0.000, \text{ respectively}) \), then subsequent terrorism declines over the post-election period \( (t=-12.6, \ p=0.000; \ t=-2.9, \ p=0.005; \ t=-11.133, \ p=0.000, \text{ respectively}) \). The Figure 41 illustrates the expected terrorism trajectories over the 24-month period for each election based on our findings.
Our analysis indicates that PKK’s electoral support is significantly and positively associated with terrorism in all three elections (t=3.213, p=0.002; t=6.279, p=0.000, respectively). These findings provide evidence for resource mobilization theory, suggesting that popular support increases terrorist attacks and lack of electoral support decreases them.

Finally, our analysis indicates that there are variances among provinces in terms of their terrorist attacks, indicating that terrorism declined in some provinces whereas increased in others.

Variances among provinces in Elections

The Table 20 below presents the estimates of the null models for 1999 general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Results for the step 1(estimating
the null model) presents that provincial characteristics had a statistically significant effect on terrorist attacks across all the three elections (t=-10.7 for the 1999 GE, t=-12.4 for the 2004 LE, and t=-6.3 for the 2007 GE). This finding indicates that there are statistically significant differences among provinces in terms of their terrorism scores. Provinces could experience terrorist attacks differently either because of their provincial characteristics (time in variant factors such as being located in the dominantly Kurdish populated region) or because of some time-variant factors that they experienced over the time (such as elections, changes in electoral support for the political party associated with the PKK). Since the primary interest was not on the differences of the provinces (Level-2 model) we did not attempt to explain these differences by including provincial characters.

**Table 20:** Unconditional Model estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effect</th>
<th>coefficient</th>
<th>s.e</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>d.f</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>exp(coeff)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For intercept, β0 (when time=0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 GE: INTRCPT2, B00</td>
<td>-2.480</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>-10.71</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 LE: INTRCPT2, B00</td>
<td>-3.021</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-12.45</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 GE: INTRCPT2, B00</td>
<td>-1.493</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>-6.298</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At step 2, we looked at the variance components and calculated the ICC scores in order to see where these differences reside. Our analyses indicate that provinces varied in terms of their terrorist attacks, and provincial characteristics of provinces are the main source of such variance among provinces. Furthermore in all elections there was much more between-province differences
than within-individual differences in terms of their log-terrorist attacks (results are not shown here). For instance, 90% of the variance in log-terrorist attacks over 24-month time period can be attributed to provincial characteristics in 1999 elections; 92.5% in the 2004 local elections and 84% in the 2007 general elections.

At Step-3 whether there were any differences in terrorism during any of the periods among provinces were examined. A series of analyses suggested that there are differences among provinces in their transitions stage (short term after the election) in each election. For instance while provinces followed a similar terrorism trajectory in their pre-election periods in 1999 and 2004 elections, there were sufficiently large differences in 2007 elections to conclude that certain provinces experienced different terrorism trajectories in their pre-election, transition stage and post-election periods (results are not shown here). Since the primary focus of this study was on the intra-province, or within-province changes over the time, we have not included any level-2—provincial characters—predictors to explain such differences in terrorism trends over the periods among provinces.

Terrorism in 1999 General Elections

Briefly, our analysis suggest that vote share of the PKK’s party is positively associated with its terrorist attacks in 1999 elections accounting for other variables. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the pre-election
period, then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then declined over the post-election period. The table 21 presents the results of our analysis for 1999 general elections, and Figure 42 and 43 illustrates the logs and counts of expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 1999 elections, respectively.

**Table 21: Analysis Results in 1999 Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>D.F</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp{Coeff}</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.256077</td>
<td>0.254955</td>
<td>-12.771</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share</td>
<td>0.041697</td>
<td>0.012979</td>
<td>3.213</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.002*</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election</td>
<td>0.035774</td>
<td>0.017832</td>
<td>2.006</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>0.955136</td>
<td>0.153641</td>
<td>6.217</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>2.599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election</td>
<td>-0.443562</td>
<td>0.035141</td>
<td>-12.622</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 42: Log-Terrorist incidents over time in 1999 Elections**

**Figure 43: Count Terrorist Incidents over time in 1999 Elections**

Our analysis suggests that vote share of the political party affiliated with the PKK is significantly and positively related to terrorist attacks (t=3.2, p=0.002). A 1% increase in the vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042; or
stated differently, a 1% electoral support is the expected to make a 0.042 difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces. Holding others constant, a positive relationship between electoral support and terrorist attacks implies the followings: First, provinces with higher popular support experiences higher level of terrorism; or provinces with less popular support experience lower level terrorism. Second, an increase in electoral support for the PKK leads it to increase its terrorist attacks in the post-election period. From the same token, a decline in its electoral support decreases its terrorist attacks in the post-election period.

The Figure 44 and Figure 45 below illustrate this relationship on three provinces with different electoral support for the PKK. As seen in the Figure 28, a province with a higher level electoral support for the PKK’s party is expected to experience higher level of terrorism over the time. In other words, more ballots breed more bullets.

**Figure 44:** Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 1999 Elections

![Figure 44: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 1999 Elections](image)
Figure 45: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 1999 Elections

Parameters for pre-election slope suggest that terrorist attacks systematically increased over the pre-election period, thus indicates presence of a significant increasing terrorism trend ($t=2.0; \ p=0.045$). Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks significantly increase by 0.036 per month. This increase is a very small change relative to the dummy election and post-election variables. It is 26 times smaller than the dummy election and 12 times smaller than the post-election variable. In other words, there is slower rate of terrorism change during the pre-election period compared to the dummy election and post-election period.

The Figures 46 and Figure 47 below plot the log terrorist attacks and count terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.
As explained previously, we have included a dummy election variable in the election month, because we anticipated that elections would affect the PKK’s terrorist attacks, thus the PKK will employ a different terrorism strategy after the election. The parameter for dummy *Election* indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 0.96 upon the election ($t=6.2, p=0.000$). Election caused an immediate shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the terrorist attacks among others. If the parameters for the dummy election variable had not been significant, it would have indicated that terrorism trend remained stable upon the election. The Figures 48 and Figure 49 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 1999 elections in the log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.
Finally, election had a significant influence on the subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-election period. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks declined by -0.44 per month over the post-election period. A significant p value for the post-election slope indicates that election also shifted in the slope. When compared to pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks over the post-election period changed 12 times faster than the pre-election. The Figures 50 and Figure 51 plot post-election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of terrorism change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-election period of 1999 elections.
Since the parameters for dummy election has a significant $p$ value, our analysis indicates that rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-election period. This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.

Terrorism in 2004 Local Elections

Like the general elections of 1999, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively associated with its terrorist attacks in 2004 local elections accounting for other variables. However, in contrast to the previous election, there is no reliable terrorism increasing trend over the pre-election trend. Like the previous elections, terrorist attacks first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then declined over the post-election period.
Table 22 presents the results of our analysis for 2004 local elections and Figure 52 and Figure 53 plots the expected logs and count terrorist attacks over the pre-election period in 2004 elections, respectively. As seen in the Table 22, vote share of the PKK’s political party is significantly and positively related to terrorist attacks (t=5.9, p=0.000). A 1% increase in the vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.077, indicating that a 1% electoral support is the expected to make a 0.077 difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces.

**Table 22: Analysis Results in 2004 Local Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>D.F</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp(Coeff)</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-4.920254</td>
<td>0.339737</td>
<td>-14.483</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share</td>
<td>0.077152</td>
<td>0.013004</td>
<td>5.933</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election</td>
<td>0.011992</td>
<td>0.036289</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>1.571605</td>
<td>0.284813</td>
<td>5.518</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>4.814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election</td>
<td>-0.113615</td>
<td>0.039612</td>
<td>-2.868</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>0.005*</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 52: Log-Terrorist incidents over time in 2004 Local Elections**

**Figure 53: Count Terrorist incidents over time in 2004 Local Elections**
The Figure 54 and Figure 55 below illustrate this relationship on three provinces with different electoral support for the PKK. Although two provinces with the same degree electoral support for the PKK are expected to experience the same terrorism trajectory over the pre-election period, the province where the PKK gained an additional 10% vote share is expected to experience a higher level terrorism trend than the other one whose electoral support remained same in the latter election (See Figure 54 and Figure 55). This finding implies that provinces with higher level electoral support are expected to experience a higher level of terrorist attacks over the time. Similarly, provinces where the PKK’s political party gained more electoral support in the new election are expected to have higher rate of terrorism over the post-election period (see Figure 53 and 54 below).

**Figure 54: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local Elections**
**Figure 55:** Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local Elections

Parameters for pre-election slope indicate that there is no statistically significant terrorism trend over the pre-election period ($t=0.33; p=0.741$). As seen in the figures 53 and 54, count terrorist attacks remained stable over the pre-election period.

Similar to the previous elections in 1999, the parameter for dummy *Election* indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 1.57 upon the election ($t=5.5, p=0.000$), indicating election caused an immediate shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the terrorist attacks among others. It coefficient is 131 times greater than the coefficient of pre-election and 14 times greater than the post-election’s. The Figures 56 and Figure 57 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2004 local elections in the log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.
Finally, subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-election period was also significantly affected by the local election ($t=-2.87; p=0.005$), indicating that local elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks declined by $-0.11$ per month over the post-election period (See Table 22). Despite this decreasing trend over the post-election period, due to high rate of terrorism change in the short run and relatively small rate of change over the post-election slope, terrorist attacks did not decline below the pre-election period’s level (see Figure 58 and Figure 59).

The Figures 58 and Figure 59 plot post-election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of terrorism change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-election period of 2004 local elections.
Figure 58: Log-Terrorist incidents over the post-election period in 2004 Local Elections.

Figure 59: Count Terrorist incidents over the post-election period in 2004 Local Elections.

In conclusion, because of the fact that dummy election and post-election parameters have significant p values, we conclude that rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-election period. Like the previous election, this means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.

Terrorism in 2007 General Elections

Like the other two elections, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively associated with its terrorist attacks in 2007 general elections accounting for other variables. The terrorism trajectory over the 2007 general elections resembles the 1999 elections. Namely, terrorist attacks increased over the pre-election period, then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then declined.
over the post-election period. Table 23 presents the results of our analysis for 2007 general elections; and Figure 60 and Figure 61 plot the logs and counts of expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 2007 general elections, respectively.

**Table 23:** Analysis Results in 2007 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>D.F</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp{Coeff}</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.443496</td>
<td>0.251876</td>
<td>-13.671</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share</td>
<td>0.060502</td>
<td>0.009636</td>
<td>6.279</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election</td>
<td>0.08153</td>
<td>0.022098</td>
<td>3.689</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election</td>
<td>1.173584</td>
<td>0.188138</td>
<td>6.238</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>3.234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election</td>
<td>-0.486888</td>
<td>0.043735</td>
<td>-11.133</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 60:** Log-Terrorist incidents over time in 2007 General Elections.

**Figure 61:** Count Terrorist incidents over time in 2007 General Elections

Like the previous elections, our analysis of 2007 general elections found a significant positive relationship between the vote share of the PKK’s political party and its terrorist attacks ($t=6.3; p=0.0000$. Specifically, a 1% increase in the vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.06. In other words, a 1% electoral support is the expected to make a 0.06 difference in the log-terrorist
attacks of provinces. This finding implies that provinces with higher level electoral support for the PKK’s party are expected to experience higher level of terrorism over the time. The Figure 62 and Figure 63 below illustrate this relationship on three provinces with different level of and changes in electoral support for the PKK (see Figure 62 and Figure 63).

**Figure 62:** Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2007 General Elections

![Graph showing impact of electoral support on log-terrorist incidents](image)

**Figure 63:** Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2007 General Elections

![Graph showing impact of electoral support on count terrorist incidents](image)
Our findings indicates presence of a significant increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election period of 2007 general elections ($t=3.7; p=0.000$). Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks significantly increase by 0.08 per month (See Table 23 above). This increase is a relatively small change compared to the dummy election and post-election variables. It is 14 times smaller than the rate of change upon the election and 6 times smaller than the rate of change over the post-election period. In other words, terrorist attacks shows a slowly increasing trend over the pre-election period, but a faster increasing trend in the short run upon the election and a faster declining trend in the long run over the post-election period. The Figure 64 and Figure 65 below plot the log terrorist attacks and count terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.

**Figure 64:** Log-Terrorist incidents over the pre-election period in 2007 General Elections.

**Figure 65:** Count Terrorist incidents over the pre-election period in 2007 General Elections
Similar to the previous elections in 1999 and 2004, the parameter for dummy Election indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 1.17 upon the election ($t=6.2$, $p=0.000$), indicating election caused an immediate shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the log-terrorist attacks among others (See Table 23, Figure 66 and Figure 67). The Figures 66 and Figure 67 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2007 general elections in the log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.

**Figure 66**: Change in Log-Terrorist Incidents upon the 2007 General Elections

**Figure 67**: Change in Count Terrorist Incidents upon the 2007 General Elections

With regards to post-election terrorism, our analysis suggests that similar to 1999 and 2004 elections subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-election period was significantly affected by the 2007 general elections ($t=-11.13$; $p=0.000$), indicating that elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks declined by -0.49 per month over the post-election period (See Table 23). The rate of change per month in the post-election period is 6 times
than the rate of change per month over the pre-election and only 2.4 slower than the rate of change in the short run after the election, therefore in few months after the election terrorist attacks dropped below the terrorism level during pre-election period (see Figures 68 and 69 below). The Figures 68 and Figure 99 plot post-election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of terrorism change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-election period of 2007 general elections.

**Figure 68:** Log-Terrorist incidents over the post-election period in 2007 General Elections

**Figure 69:** Count Terrorist incidents over the post-election period in 2007 General Elections

In conclusion, rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-election period. Therefore we conclude that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.
Tests of Hypotheses

In this section we focus on the same independent variables across elections, compare their rate of change in terrorist attacks and test our hypotheses.

Hypothesis Test for Electoral support for the Insurgent’s Political Party

The primary focus of the study is on the popular support and its relationship with the terrorist attacks.

H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.

Due to the RMT and RD approaches’ different assumption, we had developed two different sub-hypotheses:

H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.

H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.

To remind, we have measured popular support for the PKK through vote share of the PKK’s political party in this study and have tested its relationship with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. The Table 24 provides our results across elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>D.F</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp{Coeff}</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vote share (1999 GE)</td>
<td>0.041697</td>
<td>0.012979</td>
<td>3.213</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share (2004 LE)</td>
<td>0.077152</td>
<td>0.013004</td>
<td>5.933</td>
<td>1219</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote share (2007 GE)</td>
<td>0.060502</td>
<td>0.009636</td>
<td>6.279</td>
<td>1399</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>1.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To summarize, our analysis found a statistically significant relationship between popular support and number of terrorist attacks in provinces \((\beta_1=0.041697, p=0.002\text{ in 1999 GE, } \beta_1=0.077152, p=0.000\text{ in 2004 LE, } \beta_1=0.060502, p=0.000)\). Since this relationship was statistically significant in 1999, 2004 and 2007 elections, we accepted our first main hypothesis (H1) which states “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.

A statistically significant ‘positive’ relationship between PKK’s electoral support and terrorism supports the RMT and provides no evidence for the relative deprivation approach. If the findings had found a ‘negative’ relationship between electoral support and terrorist attacks, this would have supported a relative deprivation approach, meaning poor electoral support would lead to more terrorist attacks; or relative decline would lead to terrorist attacks. Therefore we accepted our sub-hypothesis H1a which states “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks” and rejected the rival one, the H1b which states “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.

When compared the effect of vote share on terrorist attacks across elections, vote share had the greatest impact on local elections. While a 1% increase in electoral support for the PKK increased the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042 in 1999 and 0.06 in the 2007 general elections, it increased the log-terrorist attacks by 0.077 in 2004 local elections. It had a quadratic impact on terrorist attacks over the 2004 local elections. The Figure 70 and Figure 71 below illustrate how electoral support is expected effect terrorist attacks in each election. As seen in
the those figures, as electoral support increases, terrorist attacks are expected to increase; and similarly as electoral support decreases, terrorist attacks are expected to decrease. However, magnitude of this impact varies in elections (See Figure 70 and Figure 71).

**Figure 70**: Impact of an Increase in Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents per Election

**Figure 71**: Impact of a Decrease in Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents per Election

Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in the Pre-election Periods

The second interest of this study is on the relationship between elections and terrorist attacks. To remind, our main hypothesis was;

\[ H2: \text{“Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”}. \]

With regards to terrorism over the pre-election period, our sub-hypothesis was;

\[ H2a: \text{“Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”}. \]
We have tested our hypothesis in our models through our independent time variable that represents the pre-election period. With the exception of local elections, we have found evidence for our hypothesis. The table 25 presents our findings for terrorism over pre-election period across elections, which were explained under each election separately.

Table 25: Pre-election Terrorism across Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp(Coeff) Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election (1999 GE)</td>
<td>0.035774</td>
<td>2.006</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>1.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election (2004 LE)</td>
<td>0.011992</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.741</td>
<td>1.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-election (2007 GE)</td>
<td>0.08153</td>
<td>3.689</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
<td>1.085</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To remind, terrorism significantly increased towards the general elections ($\beta_2=0.035774, p=0.045$ in 1999 GE; and $\beta_2=0.08153, p=0.000$ in 2007 GE). Therefore for the 1999GE and 2007GE, we rejected the null hypothesis $H_0\,2$ and accepted the $H_2$, which states that “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”; however we failed to reject the null hypothesis $H_0\,2$ for the 2004 local elections. In terms of direction, all parameters are positive, indicating a positive relationship between popular support and terrorist attacks.

Furthermore, the rate of change differed from election to election. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks increased by 0.036 in the 1999 general election and by 0.08 in the 2007 general election per month over the pre-election period. In other words, during the pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks in 2007 general elections increased over twice times faster per month than the 1999 general elections. In contrast to the general elections, log-terrorist attacks did not
significantly increase during the pre-election period of 2004 local elections. Terrorism trends in the pre-election periods for each election are illustrated in the figure 72 and 73.

**Figure 72**: Log-terrorist attacks in pre-election periods across Elections

**Figure 73**: Count terrorist attacks in pre-election periods across Elections

In conclusion, we conclude that there is statistically significant increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election period in general elections but not in local elections of 2004.

**Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in short-term period after the election**

Deriving from existing literature, which was pointed out post election violent events are quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the first part the argument we proposed that;

\[ H2b: \text{“Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”}. \]

The dummy variable “Election” in our model represents the H2b sub-hypotheses and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the short term after the
election. Parameters for the dummy election variable across elections are presented in the table below and have been used to test our hypotheses.

**Table 26: Terrorism upon the Election in the Short-Term Periods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp(Coeff)</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Election (1999 GE)</td>
<td>0.955136</td>
<td>6.217</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>2.599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (2004 LE)</td>
<td>1.571605</td>
<td>5.518</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>4.814</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election (2007 GE)</td>
<td>1.173584</td>
<td>6.238</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>3.234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings of study revealed terrorism significantly increases abruptly upon the election ($\beta_3=0.955136$, $p=0.000$ in 1999 GE; $\beta_3=1.571605$; $p=0.000$ in 2004 LE; and $\beta_3=1.173584$, $p=0.000$ in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the null hypothesis $H_0$2b and accepted our hypothesis $H_2b$, which states “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.

Log-terrorist attacks significantly increased by 0.96 upon election in the 1999 general elections, by 1.57 in the 2004 local elections, and by 1.17 in the 2007 general elections (See Table 26). When compared the elections, holding others constant it is the 2004 local elections which had the greatest effect in terrorism elevation (See Figure 74 and Figure 75).
In conclusion, we conclude that terrorist attacks increases upon the election in the short run after the elections, but their rate of change differ from the election.

Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in post-election periods

Deriving from the same argument arguing post election violent events are quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the second part the argument we proposed that;

H2c: “Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”.

The post-election variable in our model represents the H2c sub-hypotheses and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the long term after the election. Parameters for the post-election slope across elections are presented in the Table 27 below and have been used to test our hypotheses.
Table 27: Post-election Terrorism across Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed effects</th>
<th>Coeff.</th>
<th>t-ratio</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>Exp(Coeff)</th>
<th>Rate Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post-election (1999 GE)</td>
<td>-0.44356</td>
<td>-12.62</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election (2004 LE)</td>
<td>-0.11362</td>
<td>-2.868</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-election (2007 GE)</td>
<td>-0.48689</td>
<td>-11.13</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our findings revealed that subsequent terrorist attacks significantly declines over the post-election periods ($\beta_4=-0.44356$, $p=0.000$ in 1999 GE; $\beta_4=-0.11362$, $p=0.005$ in 2004 LE; and $\beta_4=-0.48689$, $p=0.000$ in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the null hypothesis $H_0c$ and accepted our hypothesis $H_2c$, which states “Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”.

Figure 76: Log-terrorist attacks in the Post-election period across elections

Figure 77: Count terrorist attacks in the Post-election period across

Rate of subsequent change in log-terrorist attacks differ from election to election. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks significantly declined by -0.44 per
month over the pre-election period of 1999 elections, by -0.11 in 2004 local election and by -.049 in 2007 general elections. Among three, the 2007 general elections have the fastest rate of decline in log-terrorist attacks over the post-election period. However, holding constant other factors, 1999 general election’s declining trend is very close to trend in 2007 elections (see Figure 76 and 77). Terrorism declined to its lowest points in several months after the general elections but despite its declining trend, it did not end or drop below its level during the pre-election period.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

Introduction

In this study we have sought answers to two main questions: First, whether popular for the PKK was associated with the terrorist attacks; second, whether elections had any impact on the PKK’s terrorist attacks. Terrorism trends were explored both prior and after the elections. In this section, we discuss our findings, compare them to the existing literature, and discuss possible policy implications.

Discussion of Findings

Popular Support for the Insurgent and Terrorism

Hypotheses:

1: Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support.

Hypothesis 1 tested whether popular support for the insurgent was related to its terrorist attacks and the direction of this relationship. Our analysis found a statistically significant positive relationship between them. This finding indicates
that popular support for the insurgent increases its terrorist attacks and lack of popular support decreases its terrorist attacks.

The primary interest of this study was on the insurgent’s electoral support. In the social movement and insurgency literature there are two leading approach to this issue. Taking a relative deprivation approach some scholars argue that an expected result and achieved result would create a relative deprivation and this relative deprivation lead to political violence. On the other hand, RMT scholars suggest that resources of the social movement (or insurgent) are crucial for the social movement organizations; thus without sufficient resources, organizations fail to achieve their objectives. In this study, electoral support for the PKK is assumed to indicate popular support level for the PKK. As explained previously popular support is identified as a key factor in the insurgency literature because of the fact that popular support from the local population is closely associated with logistics, intelligence, and recruitment for the insurgent. Thus, without sufficient popular support the insurgent would not survive. The study findings shed some lights on this dispute between resource mobilization and relative deprivation scholars. The analysis results found a significant positive relationship between popular support and terrorist attacks, providing support for the RMT approach; however this study found no evidence supporting the RD approach. If the findings had found a negative relationship between electoral support and terrorist attacks, this would have supported a relative deprivation approach, meaning poor electoral support would lead to more terrorist attacks; or relative
decline would lead to terrorist attacks. On the other hand, we acknowledge the possibility of that poor election results in some provinces might still frustrate the insurgent and could lead it to carry out few terrorist attacks in some of those areas.

Our findings on the positive relationship between popular support and terrorist attacks are consistent with arguments of leading counterinsurgency practitioners and a few scholars. As the flow of resources increases, the insurgent will be able to recruit more members, and increase its intelligence, logistics, financial support other necessary material (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), in return, increasing the level of resources invested in terror would increase the success of the insurgent (Mesquita, 2005). From the same analogy as the insurgent group loses support, its capabilities and resources to generate violence will diminish, because the insurgent are subject to resource constraints that limit the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or resources (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Even if the insurgent loses a relative amount of its support, the insurgent will be confined to its popular base areas, therefore, it will fight for its popular bases for the sake of intelligence and logistical reasons (Thompson, 1966; Galula, 2006). Concentrating the terrorist activities in popular activities is logical and beneficial for the PKK, because the PKK has limited number of militants and limited ammunition and other material that are used to carry out terrorist attacks. By carrying out terrorist attacks in less or non-supportive areas it would not only waste their resources but also decrease its
chance to succeed in carrying out those attacks. Each terrorist attacks requires some materials, safe houses, intelligence and individuals to participate in. Carrying out terrorist attacks in hostile or less supportive areas is easy as it might seem to be. Residents of less supportive areas have no sympathy for the PKK, thus are more likely to cooperate with the government and inform any suspicious activity. In addition to low chance, high risk and waste of resources, in terms of popular support, the effect of the terrorist attack would be less compared to more supportive areas.

In conclusion, we conclude that the PKK is more likely to increase its terrorist attacks when there is more popular support and to decrease them when lacked popular support.

Election and Terrorism

*H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.*

This study reveals that elections affect the insurgent’s terrorist attacks, so terrorism trend differs pre-election and post-election periods, indicating that PKK is not oblivious to elections.

Terrorism before the Elections

*H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.*

With regards to pre-election terrorism, our study found a significant increasing trend in terrorist attacks over the pre-election period of general elections only. There may be various reasons or a combination of these reasons for increasing
terrorism towards general elections. These reasons could include discouraging potential voters of adversary political party; increasing popular support among the Kurdish population, thus increasing its vote share in the upcoming election; generating fear among the population, discrediting the incumbent government and replacing it with another party. We do not think the PKK is increasing its terrorism to disrupt the electoral process; rather it tries to increase its vote share, thus win the elections, because winning general elections provide the PKK extra power and status. Once the PKK won the general elections and gained seats in the parliament, it will be able to gain also respect and legitimacy both in the domestic and international arena. Its parliamentary members will be able to oversee policies and government official’s actions. An analysis on the proposals submitted by parliamentary members indicate that the parliamentary members of the political party affiliated with the PKK were very active; they have submitted approximately 30 proposals either to change or make new laws. These proposals include changes in anti-terrorism law, and certain laws related to the police and army. For instance, on December 13th and May the 15th of 2008, its parliamentary members proposed bills to abolish mandatory military service and to change tasks of the Turkish army. On December 2nd of 2008, they submitted a bill to limit discretion of police in using force. On February 12th of 2009 and June 24th of 2009, they have submitted bills to make changes in the Anti-Terrorism law. In these two bills, they aimed abolish some of the articles regulating trial of young people between 15 and 18, propaganda of a terrorist organization and
punishment of directors of media organizations. With their proposals, the parliamentary members of the PKK’s political party attempted change laws on the benefit of the PKK. In addition to these efforts, these parliamentary members submitted numbers of proposal regarding the activities of the government’s officials. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, they have submitted 602 proposals requesting either oral or written explanation by the minister of related governmental institution regarding an official's operation. One third (172 out of 202) of these proposals were related to the law enforcement issues. 5% of them were related to prisons or jails. By submitting proposals, these parliamentary members were not only putting pressure on government’s officials who fight with the PKK terrorism but also proposing as if they were defending the Kurd’s rights in the parliament. In addition, as a parliamentary member, they often pointed Abdullah Ocalan as the only solution of the Kurdish issue and asked the government to negotiate with him. Because of these and many other benefits, the elections offer extra power to the PKK, thereby the PKK strive to win the elections; as explained its rationales, political violence is a common means of acquiring popular support and often used over the pre-election period. Like the other insurgents, the PKK resorted violence to win the elections.

Our findings on pre-election terrorism are consistent with previous studies, suggesting that terrorism increases before elections (Dhanagare, 1968; Amerasinghe, 1989; “Ever bloodier.2005”; “Can the voters build on success? 2005”; Gobyn, 2009; Sisk, 2008; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008).
Most of them focused on the pre-election terrorism were descriptive studies and pointed out low turnout rates as a consequence of terrorist attacks prior to the elections. For instance, as mentioned previously, the Sinhalese nationalist extremist organization) and Patriotic People's Front launched a terrorism campaign three months before the elections; as a consequence, due to fear of terrorism, only 55.32% of the electorates went to the polling stations in the Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). Similarly, Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) carried out violent nationwide protests and as consequence only 20 percent of the electorates voted in Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). Likewise, the Chechen insurgents killed 40 and wounded 150 people just two days before the Election Day and as a consequence only 55.75% of the electorates voted in the 2003 Duma elections in Russia. Similarly, insurgent groups in Iraq launched a terrorism campaign just three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, (Ever bloodier.2005); as a consequence of these attacks, hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and did not cast their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005).

Specific reasons of the PKK are not statistically examined in this study; however descriptive statistics on target types indicates that the PKK prefers to specifically attack against combatant targets, which include soldiers, police and village guards in the dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR). We argue that by targeting specifically combatant targets in its constituencies—which are the DKPR provinces— the PKK aimed to increase its popular support and turn it to
electoral support for its political party. As explained in the descriptive statistic section of this study, the PKK focused combatants in the DKPR region, over the pre-election period, especially in the final lap of the elections, whereas targeting more non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces compared to the DKPR region provinces. This findings are partially consistent with the Sisk(2008) and the Höglund (2009) studies, which argued during the election campaign’s final lap main common aim of the election violence is to intimidate or influence voters through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential supporters, thus the pattern of violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging candidates from political parties to potentially adversary electorates and candidates. Their study did not make any difference in provinces or regions. In our study, although the violence intensified as the Election Day approached, violence shifted to noncombatants (in which covers potentially adversary electorates and candidates in those studies) only in non-DKPR region provinces, however violence was directed against the combatant targets in the DKPR region provinces. For instance, in the DKPR region the percentage of terrorist attacks against the combatant targets increased from 54% to 73% in 2004 local elections and reached to 87% in 2007 general elections. On the other hand, in contrast to such a selective or discriminate terrorism strategy in the DKPR region, the PKK still targets noncombatant targets in the non-Kurdish region, where it has poor popular support.
Another factor related to pre-election terrorism is proximity, which was mentioned previously. Literature suggested that terrorist attacks start within a short time period prior to the elections. Some studies explicitly pointed out the “proximity” of the terrorist attacks. (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Sisk, 2008; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). Briefly, they have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). Our finding is also consistent with these studies’ argument. Similar to these studies, our descriptive statistics reveal that the PKK increases its terrorist attacks especially within the last three months of the general elections. This study shows that the PKK intentionally carries out its terrorist attacks as closing to the general elections.

To sum up, this study indicates that the PKK systematically increased its violence over the pre-election period of general elections because of the four main reasons:

First; electorates are short-sighted, terrorist attacks closer to the elections have more impact on the electorate’s preferences. It mobilizes the sympathizer Kurdish constituents and increase electoral support for the PKK’s political party in the upcoming elections; it discredits the incumbent government in the eyes of citizens for not being able to protect them from the PKK’s atrocities; thus decreases its chances to win in the elections.
Second, if the terrorist attacks are successful enough the replace the incumbent with another one, most probably a tougher one. If the new government would implement harsh counter terrorism measures, especially indiscriminate policies against neutral Kurdish population, it could radicalize the Kurdish population, alienate the Kurdish population from the government. As a consequence of these harsh counter-terrorism policies, the local population would sympathize the PKK, thus the government would be doomed to failure.

Third, by increasing terrorist attacks, the insurgent intends to persuade the government that it has capacity to impose serious costs to the government and the citizens if the government continues a particular policy (Kydd & Walter, 2006). So, by resorting violence prior to the general elections, PKK wanted show the government it has strong enough to create costs to the government.

Fourth, targeting especially combatant targets in its own region, not only would the PKK increase its popularity among the Kurdish population but also propose a considerable threat against non-supportive sections of the Kurdish population. By using terrorism tool, as Kydd and Walter (2006) pointed out, the insurgent intends to convince the local population it has still power to punish the disobedience and the government is not capable of protecting them from the insurgent; similarly Galula (2006) argues that support from the population is conditional; so as long as the local population is convinced that the government has will and power to win, people will not be able to openly support the government (Galula, 2006). So, by carrying out terrorist attacks prior to the
general elections, the PKK has reminded the constituents that it is strong enough to impose cost to the population, so wanted to secure votes for its political party. As Weinberg (Höglund, 2009) argues that presence of military wing makes it easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election outcomes.

Terrorism after the Elections

*H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.*

*H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.*

Although existing literature does a relatively better job in explaining pre-election terrorism, it does not provide sufficient insights into the post-election terrorism other than arguing poor electoral results. Most scholars have considered election outcomes as the main source of the post-election violence; some scholars conceived post election violent events as quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a short period of time, such as a couple of weeks (Kydd & Walter, 2002; Mesquita, 2005). Our study results suggest that terrorist attacks first abruptly increase upon the elections, and then decline in the long run over the post-election period. Although our study indicates that argument that post-election terrorism is quick short-lived events, we don’t attribute it to poor election results. If we had found a negative relationship between terrorism and vote share of the PKK, then our findings would have attributed their arguments regarding poor electoral supports.
Since there is no evidence for the RD approach in our study, why would the PKK increase its violence in the short-run after the election, and then decline in the long run over the post-election period?

There might be many factors relevant to the post-election terrorism, some of them could be publicized, whereas some others not. In general terrorism trends after elections may stem from the followings: First, indication of political willingness to combat terrorism by the incumbent government; second, discrediting the government for its election pledges; second showing its power to impose cost to the government and discrediting the government in the eyes of its constituents.

**Indication of government’s political willingness:**

Since the terrorism increased prior to the general elections, political parties that contesting the elections might have touched upon the terrorism issue in Turkey and given election pledges stopping terrorism if they get elected. Due to their election pledges to stop terrorism and to meet the expectation of the constituents, the incumbent governments might have increased the counter terrorism efforts and operations in the short run after the elections. In return, the PKK might have responded to these efforts by dramatically increasing its terrorism thus imposing more costs to the government to stop government’s those efforts. This might be a reason for such a dramatically increase right after the election.
Increasing the Bargaining Capacity and Sitting at the Negotiating Table: As some scholars note that if the insurgent wish to affect the government and population, they must use costly signs (Kydd, 2005; Riley, 2001). Besides, the insurgent has to persuade its adversary (government and target population) that it is strong enough to impose serious costs, so the adversary accepts the insurgent’s demands (Overgaard, 1994). From this perspective, the greater costs the insurgent is able to impose, the more credible its threat to impose future costs and more likely to obtain concession from the adversary; and furthermore, the insurgent may use resort terrorism directly against the population when the government has consistently refused to implement a policy at the insurgent’s favor or when its efforts to change the government’s policy appear useless (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Similarly, after the election, by increasing terrorism level, the PKK may have wanted to indicate how it was able to and still has power to instantly increase the costs for the incumbent, thus tried to force the incumbent to sit at the negotiating table and make some policy changes favoring the PKK. For instance, the PKK may have attempted to force the government to stop military operations, or to make some changes in certain laws or some concessions. In other words, the PKK may have attempting to push its demands into the political agenda by resorting terrorism after the election.

Discrediting the government in the eyes of the constituents and showing its weakness in protecting them from the PKK: By increasing costs to the local population through terrorist attacks the PKK would be able to kill two birds with
one stone. By this way, the PKK not only would be able to gain obedience and support of the local Kurdish population but also discredit the government in the eyes of the local population through showing the incumbent government's weaknesses in protecting them from the PKK. In other words, the PKK might have been attempting to give a signal to the population that it is the *de facto* and only power in the DKPR region. Having launched a massive terrorism campaign right after the election, the population would come to conclusion that the incumbent government was a bluffer and does not have capability to stop atrocities of the PKK, so they would prefer to hide their true feelings and avoid from cooperating with the PKK rather the government.

With regards to a decline in terrorist attacks in the long run over the post-election, we think that since the PKK has given its messages to the government and population during the pre-election period as well as the short term period after the election, so the PKK did not see any additional benefit to keep carrying out terrorist attacks in the long-run over the post-election period, thus wasting its resources.

Finally, seasonal factors may have influenced the terrorism trends. Two of the elections (April 18th of 1999, and March 28th of 2004) were held in the spring and one of them (July 22nd of 2007) was held in the summer seasons. In order to rule out impact of the elections, we have included 12 months periods for both the pre- and post-election periods, so we were able to see a whole year period before and after an election. If we had considered only three or six months periods for
pre- and post-election periods, then it would have been impossible to rule out this alternative explanation. However, it is still possible that the PKK may have increasing its terrorist activities in spring and summer seasons. This constitutes one of the limitations of this study; however, even if seasons have any impact on terrorism trends, it would not affect our conclusions for impact of popular support. When considered the time period of the elections in explaining the terrorism trends, the PKK might have increased its terrorist attacks after the elections because the elections were held in the seasons when the PKK was most active, and declined over the time because of the upcoming fall and winter semester when the PKK’s militants operating in the rural areas station in shelters or sanctuaries and do not move frequently. On the other hand, this argument is built on an assumption that terrorist attacks are carried out by only guerrillas who operate in rural areas. However, this does not represent the actual situation, because the PKK has also cells operating in the urban areas and capable of carrying out detonating bombs and conducting armed assaults, kidnapping and arsons, which our data include all of them.

Policy Implications

The findings of the study have some policy implications. Briefly, the most significant policy implication would be derived from this study is implementation of winning hearts and mind policies that target the local population and help the government acquire popular support of the local population and win the population to government’s side. Since the popular support was positively related
to the PKK’s terrorist activities, the best policy to diminish PKK terrorism is to isolate it from the local population through well designed good counter terrorism policies. These policies are non-military and politician oriented policies; the military and law enforcement oriented policies must be subjugated to politician oriented policies and play a complementary role. The military should not lead the politicians; instead, the politicians must play a central role and coordinate overall counter terrorism policies. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that terrorism problem neither can be solved without effective military and law enforcement approach. Without neutralizing the armed wing of the population and political organization operating at the grassroots of the local population winning hearts and mind policies cannot achieve its goals. Without securing the population, the government cannot win the population to its own side.

Secondary important policy implications are related to terrorism trends over the pre-and post-election periods. Unlike long-term, politician oriented winning hearts & minds policies, these policies are relatively more tactical measures and designed to harden the government affiliated targets, to protect civilian population from the terrorist attacks, to predict and prevent terrorist attacks before they occur.

Policy implications for popular Support

Since the popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare, the population is the key component, which the government and insurgent must
strive win it to its own side. As explained in previous sections, depending upon the sympathy level, the population is usually divided into several sections by the counterinsurgency practitioners and scholars. The findings of the study have some policy implications for each section of the population as well as the other insurgent and government. Deriving from findings of this study, we recommend long-term winning hearts and minds policies for the general Kurdish population, especially for those living the DKPR region. For the sympathizers of the PKK, the government should develop a combination of nonmilitary repressive and law enforcement based policies. Finally, for the PKK’s armed militants the government should implement effective military based policies and conduct effective intelligence operations on the active supporters who actively help the armed militants (see Figure 78 below)

**Figure 78: 3-Tiered Counter-Terrorism Policies**
1. Tier: Winning hearts and mind policies on neutral population

When the insurgent becomes unable to recruit new members and some segments of the population express its hostility against the insurgent, the insurgent may end its struggle and violent activities (Weinberg, 1991). Therefore, primary aim of the overall counter-terrorism policies is to isolate the PKK from the local population.

According to our study findings insurgent violence varies depending on the degree of popular votes for its political party, thereby the government should resort on “winning hearts and minds” policies in an effort to win the population over to its side and erode popular support for the PKK, because eroding popular support for the PKK through good policies will bring an end of backing for the PKK, thereby leading the organization to suffer from the absence of resources, thus leading to a decline in terrorist incidents.

As our study pointed out the PKK concentrated its terrorist activities in more supportive areas because of the availability of resources. Therefore, while implementing good countermeasures especially on insurgent friendly areas, at the same time, the government should also position its counterinsurgent forces in the provinces where PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular votes due to its potential capabilities of carrying out terrorist attacks. Adopting this strategy has three main advantages: first, the government will be able to; 1) use its forces more effectively; 2) predict where the most vulnerable provinces to terrorist attacks; and 3) discourage current and potential supporters.
Winning the local Kurds in the DKPR region is core of counter-terrorism policies. As Horowitz and Sharma (2008) pointed out ethnic insurgents fight for their core national territories, which they claim; therefore they are likely to be pursued with high levels of political will. Causes of insurgency lie in the political conflict (Martin, 2010), thereby military conflict is subordinated to political conflict (Shaw, 2001). Since the PKK is as an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization, Turkey’s counterterrorism policies must destroy the PKK’s political will and causes of this political conflict. Political will cannot be destroyed without eroding local population’s popular support for the PKK. As Parker (2007) pointed out good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent where poor ones contribute to popular support. Thus, by implementing good counterterrorism policies not only the government will be able to erode popular support for the insurgent but also solve the problems, or grievances that the PKK has exploited for years. As our study results have indicated, the insurgent PKK’s terrorist attacks are dependent on strength of its popular support from the local population; therefore eroding popular support through good counterterrorism policies is the main policy implication derived from this study. However, achieving this objective is not an easy task and requires long term, politician oriented policies that aim to gain the Kurds to the government’s side.

Such long term policies include social reforms, education, health and other civilian policies to win the local population to government’s side. Social reform is an attempt to address the grievances of the terrorists and their championed
group. Its primary purpose is to resolve and undercut the underlying problems that the terrorist organization exploits to acquire popular support and causes of the conflict (Martin, 2010). Social reforms can include the improvement of economic conditions and public recognition of the validity of grievances (Gus, 2010). For instance, when Peru’s insurgency group Shining Path’s leader, Abimail Guzman, was captured in 1992, the Peruvian government launched a social reform campaign that includes land reforms, political rights, and rural improvements. As a consequence, these policies have successfully eroded popular support from the peasants for the insurgent Shining Path. Similarly, the Turkish government should channel its resources to decrease the gap between the DKPR region and other regions. Currently, the DKP region provinces are less developed and have worse conditions in almost all areas compared to especially the western and south western region provinces. The PKK has exploited these grievances over 30 years. Although the Kurds are citizens and possess all political rights, still the living conditions in the DKPR region provinces need improvement. The government should increase job opportunities by promoting economic investments and agriculture, so that employed individuals would find little reason to join the PKK.

Similarly, education should be promoted in the DKPR region. The government should increase the number of public schools and promote entrepreneurs to invest on private schools through various monetary and tax incentives. Thousands of students live in villages and hamlets, which makes it harder for
them to get good quality education. In order to promote the education, the government should offer them free boarding schools and provide vouchers for private schools if they meet the conditions. By this way, the government will not only be able to increase the level of education in the region but also protect them from exposure of the PKK. The more young people attend schools, the fewer individuals the PKK could find to recruit. In addition to increasing the level of education on the DKPR region, schools and especially universities will also contribute and vitalize social and economic life of the provinces.

University education is very competitive in Turkey, so majority of the students will not be able to get a university education. Therefore, the government should open new public universities and promote private universities as well. Especially medical and law schools are very popular; prospective students of these schools are usually willing to go anywhere to graduate from these schools. Launching medical and law school programs in the DKPR region provinces would be a good start in order to vitalize the social and economic life in the DKPR region.

Despite an anticipated increase in the undergraduate level education, still thousands of students will not be able attend universities. Therefore, the government should also make long term plans to meet middle-person needs in the industrial and other areas. In order to meet these needs, the government should promote vocational schools and design courses (electric & electronic technician, nurse aids, child care, auto mechanics etc) for those who will have little chance get a university level education, so having graduated from these
schools or courses, individuals would be able to find jobs or start a business. By this way, the government will be able decrease their possible deprivation and diminish the risk for joining the PKK.

Health care is another important issue in the DKPR region. Compared to western region provinces, there are fewer hospitals, health care personnel and medical equipment in the DKPR region provinces. One reason for the shortage of health care personnel is that there is no mandatory service and rotation in health care officials. Therefore, not many people are willing to serve in the health care facilities of the DKPR region. As a consequence, people of the DKPR region wait longer in the lines to see a doctor and less time are allocated due to lack of human resources. Besides, due to less sufficient medical equipment in the hospitals, people receive a lower quality treatment compared to the Western region provinces.

The areas needs development can be expanded; the DKPR region also needs better inter-province and inter village roads. There are still non-motorway inter-province roads in this region. This may be affecting the trade in the region as well. Some villages and hamlets even do not have roads connecting each other.

In conclusion, by promoting the economic, social, education and other conditions in the DKPR region, the government will be able to win the hearts and minds of the population and erode the support for the PKK. Eroding popular support will diminish resources of the PKK; thereby force it to decrease its
terrorism. The PKK has exploited these less favorable conditions in the DKPR region over 30 years and claimed that the Kurds are being discriminated in this country. Actually, the DKPR region was not the only region with less favorable conditions. For instance, the northern region (Black sea region) has less favorable conditions compared to the Western regions but the people living in this region have never challenged with the government or claimed that they have been discriminated. In short, the government should make this DKPR region a better place to live.

However, as Martin (2010) noted long term, politician oriented policies should be used in conjunction with other counterterrorism policies.

2. Tier: Repressive policies against supporters or friendly population

Martin (2010) argues that the successful use of nonmilitary and nonparamilitary assets to suppress terrorism requires the effective deployment of technological and organizational resources. The primary objective is to disrupt and deter terrorist organizations and their support apparatuses. Counterinsurgency practitioners Galula (2006) and Trinquier (2006) point out the active supporters of the insurgent living with the population. They argue that when the population is watched by the active supporters of the insurgent, they face with a threat of denunciation to the insurgent and prompt punishment by its armed militants; thereby without neutralizing these active supporters, the local population will not be able support to the government and have to act with the insurgent to avoid from such punishment.
Martin (2010) divides nonmilitary options four categories: 1) *covert operations* (nonviolent)—which are secretive operations that include a number of possible measures such as infiltration, disinformation and others; 2) *intelligence*—which refers to data collection to create an informational database about terrorist movements and to predict their behavior; 3) *enhanced security*—which refers to the hardening of targets to deter or prevent terrorist attacks such as security barriers, checkpoints, surveillance and others; 4) *economic sanctions*—which are used to punish or disrupt state sponsors of terrorism.

Deriving from their arguments, we argue that the government’s intelligence and law enforcement organizations must have closely work together for the purpose of revealing these active supporters of the insurgent. Intelligence should be collected on possible active supporters and their activities in the area. Having collected and analyzed the information they have collected to reveal the network of active PKK supporters, the intelligence organization work together with the law enforcement to prosecute them. Through these repressive policies against the active supporters at the grassroots of the population, the government will be able to defeat the threat imposed to the neutral population, in return, the local population will not have to support or act with the insurgent. As a consequence, the PKK will have less resources, intelligence and logistics to invest terrorist activities.
3. Tier: Offensive policies against militants:

These policies include military operations, covert operations and aim to disrupt armed band of the PKK. As a military solution, Robert Thompson (1966) suggests employing full-time paramilitary forces to protect hamlets and villages from the insurgent and tasking the army with conducting clear-hold operations and controlling the local population in insurgent’s popular base areas. In order to achieve this goal, the military and intelligence organizations must work in a great harmony to succeed in neutralizing the armed militants. Without doing so, fear of terrorism among the local population will not disappear and government’s long-term policies will be doomed to failure.

Policy implications for Terrorism Trends in Elections

In addition to policies targeting certain sections of the population and insurgents, the government should also implement some defensive policies to protect its forces, officials, facilities and the population. Defensive policies include: increase of terrorism and security awareness in the security forces, officials and population; target hardening; strengthening possible security weaknesses. Our study findings have some implications to diminish casualties, predict possible terrorist attacks depending upon the election period.

Revealing an increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election period of general elections has significant policy implications for the incumbent government and population: The government should increase terrorism awareness among its security forces and population towards the election and
short term after the election, especially the last three months of the election and three months after the election are very important. Within these approximately six months period, provinces experience more terrorist attacks. During this period, the intelligence agencies should increase their technical and surveillance operations against the suspected individuals who could provide places, logistics, intelligence and other necessary materials for the members of the insurgent’s armed wing. In addition, the police, army, and private security companies should be briefed about possible terrorist attacks against possible targets such as security forces, political party buildings/workers and candidates and others toward the election; protective countermeasures should be revised and their efforts to protect possible targets should be increased.

Furthermore, our data indicates that the PKK strategically direct its violence against the combatant targets deployed in the DKPR region. This finding leads us to conclude that the PKK focuses and targets combatants in the DKPR region, thus we recommend developing countermeasures that designed to diminish attacks against government’s forces deployed in the DKPR region and protect them from terrorist attacks. Such countermeasure include using jammer devices to disrupt radio or cellular phones signals, thus disable possible remote controlled bomb devices on the roads during transportation of military personnel and materials; preferring air transportation as much as possible; developing intelligence networks to reveal possible terrorist plots planning to attack combatant targets and their collaborators.
Finally, according to our study findings, the PKK decreases its terrorist attacks in the long-run. Knowing this information would help the government to re-allocate its resources and give rise to non-military initiatives.
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