EXPLORATIONS
IN
ETHNIC STUDIES

Ethnicity: Global Perspectives

The National Association for Ethnic Studies

The National Association for Ethnic Studies (NAES) was founded in 1971. NAES has as its basic purpose the promotion of activities and scholarship in the field of ethnic studies. The Association is open to any person or institution. The Association serves as a forum to its members for promoting: research, study, curriculum, design as well as producing publications of interest to the field. NAES also sponsors an annual conference on ethnic studies. *Explorations in Ethnic Studies* is an interdisciplinary journal devoted to the study of ethnicity, ethnic groups, intergroup relations, and the cultural life of ethnic peoples. The journal is refereed and provides a forum for socially responsible research. Contributors to the journal demonstrate the integration of theory and practice.

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EXPLORATIONS IN ETHNIC STUDIES

The Journal of the
National Association for Ethnic Studies

Special Issue: Global Perspectives

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Editor's Note

This special issue of the journal on the theme of "Ethnicity: Global Perspectives" results from papers presented at the National Association for Ethnic Studies' 22nd annual conference held in March 1994 at Kansas City, Missouri. For the first time the Association's national conference was held in conjunction with the annual conference of another organization, the Central States Anthropological Society. Under the able guidance of conference co-organizers, Harriet and Marty Ottenheimer, the meeting was an outstanding success both in attendance and active participation. Fortunately, Harriet graciously agreed to be the editor of this special issue.

In her introduction Harriet Ottenheimer establishes the importance of focusing on the far reaching impact of ethnicity in a global way. The papers in this special issue were selected because they reflect both global perspectives and emerging ethnic identities. The tendency to 'think globally but act locally' is readily apparent in the scholarship published in this special issue. No longer do the ethnic issues of one country exist in a social vacuum without having potential implications for ethnic groups all around the world. In this day of advanced computer technology, what happens in other parts of the world, almost instantaneously enters our homes through computers or televisions or other types of media. It seems as though those *incidents* on the other side of the world actually occurred right here in our own front yard. When one adds the massive influence of international immigration which is taking place in most countries, then it should be very clear to us that we are more an international community rather than isolated or even insulated ethnic enclaves.

The articles found in this issue focus on topics of ideology and identity, and explore situations in various places around the world (India, Indonesia, South America, and the United States), as well as addressing postcolonialism and ethnic group status development. Without too much of an imagination, the reader can draw comparisons to what ethnic experiences are occurring in multi-ethnic communities here and beyond our national borders and their international consequences.

This special issue makes an important contribution to the study of ethnicity and its global dimensions. Hopefully, this scholarship will serve as an essential starting point for continuing this significant research initiative.

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Introduction

Harriet Joseph Ottenheimer
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The papers in this volume represent some of the best current scholarship on questions of ethnicity. All of them were first presented at the 1994 annual meeting of the National Association for Ethnic Studies, held in Kansas City, Missouri. With the announced theme *of Ethnicity: Global Perspectives*, the conference attracted scholars from many disciplines and many countries. Presentations were selected to reflect both global perspectives on ethnicity, and examples of emerging ethnic identities around the globe. The interdependence of local and global issues emerged repeatedly and became a foundational theme in many of the sessions.

The papers selected here maintain that sense of interrelatedness between global and local issues. Some begin with local issues and bring insights to bear on global questions. Others begin with global questions and bring insights into local issues. All of them present important new scholarship in ethnic studies and its relation to global issues.

It has been a commonplace for quite some time that we inhabit a shrinking world. Recent developments on the internet have increased the speed at which we move towards a global village. It is now possible to communicate almost instantaneously with anyone who has a computer, a modem, and a telephone line, anywhere in the world. Moreover, with the impending availability of satellite connectivity, soon we will no longer need to wait for the telephone company to string lines to our houses.

In a world such as this, it is increasingly important to understand the power of ethnicity in our lives. Ethnicity brings us together and drives us apart. It creates groups where there might otherwise not have been any. It divides and destroys groups which might have existed for centuries. It forms the basis for political action, and the rationale for linguistic preservation. We label ourselves, and we are labled, in the name of

ethnic identity. Surely, if we are to survive as a species, we will need to have a clearer sense of the fundamental role that ethnicity plays in all of our lives, on a world-wide scale. This volume represents a beginning attempt at that task.

The papers in this volume overlap and intersect in remarkable ways. They focus on ideology (DasGupta, McClendon, Majak), conflict (Majak, Garr, Ratan), and identity (Ratan, Covin, Herzfeld, Alhadeff). They explore situations in India (DasGupta, Ratan), Indonesia (Garr), South America (Herzfeld and Covin), and the United States (Alhadeff and McClendon). They offer insights into postcolonialism (Majak, Ratan, DasGupta, McClendon) and into minority group status development (Garr, Covin, Herzfeld, Alhadeff). Above all, they offer intensive looks at specific situations, and they draw lessons from which all of us can learn.

Kasturi DasGupta's paper, *The Global Resurgence of Ethnicity: An Inquiry into the Sociology of Ideological Discontent*, is one of the more ideologically intensive essays in this volume. DasGupta argues that the current emergence of ethnic hostility is, in every instance, a reflection of discontent with--even disbelief in--a national ideology. As she explains, national ideologies function to reassure people, even in the worst of times, of the fundamental rightness of their goals. As confidence in a national ideology breaks down, the resulting ideological vacuum leads to a resurgence of ethnicity. Frustrations begin to be redirected towards scapegoat minorities, and ethnic suspicion, hatred, and hostility emerge. This process can be seen in the breakdown of both democratic secularism as well as socialism. Taking India as a case in point, DasGupta shows how that nation's forty year experiment with a national ideology of secularism has begun to break down in the face of a lack of perceived progress in social and economic well-being. The resulting emergence of ethnic divisions can be most clearly seen in the recent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the secularist India, and the recent trend towards Hinduization. Arguing that it is not the end of ideology but rather the loss of ideology that catapults nations into violent ethnic strife, DasGupta's discussion can be profitably compared with classic and recent discussions on the end of ideology and history, from Karl Marx to Francis Fukuyama. DasGupta clearly shows that resurgent ethnicity has filled the vacuum that has been created by the loss of ideology. This is an important insight for those who would seek to reduce ethnic strife nationally and globally.

John McClendon's paper explores the question of ethnic emergence and nationalist ideology from a somewhat different perspective. In *The Afrocentric Project: The Quest for Particularity and the Negation of Objectivity*, McClendon describes the intellectual and philosophical history of Afrocentricity, explains the contexts in which it developed, and shows how it has been used to affirm the integrity of an emerging Black metaphysics. Using the works of two key Afrocentrists, Molefi Asante

and Marimba Ani, McClendon shows that Afrocentrism is as subjective as any other centrism, even the Eurocentrism against which it defines itself. He then suggests that if one accepts the subjective--particularist--perspectives of Afrocentrism, then one is forced into a false kind of cultural relativism which, in the end, admits of neither centrism or universality. One result of this extreme position is the loss of objectivity as well. From this perspective, all centrisms are doomed to fall apart from within. This is a stunning commentary on the question of contested ideologies, and needs to be considered in all pluralistic nations if there are to be any fruitful discussions of national ideology at all.

A specific case of contested ideologies and ethnic emergence in a single nation is explored in Jonathan Majak's paper, *Pan-Arabism v. Pan-Africanism in the Sudan: The Crisis of Divergent Ethnic Ideologies*. Majak explores the nature and extent of political and cultural conflict between North and South in postcolonial Sudan. He explains the different ethnic heritages of North (Arabic and Islamic) and South (African and Christian) in the Sudan, and how, since independence from Britain, it is the North which has sought to provide the dominant ideology for the nation. He reviews the attempts of the North to impose Pan-Arabist policies--to Islamize and Arabize a largely Christian and African South--and discusses the reasons for the South's resistance. He explains that the current military regime, dominated by Muslim fundamentalists, is trying to turn the Sudan into an Islamic republic, and shows how this has brought about the current civil war in the Sudan. Finally, he discusses the extent to which Muslims in the North, who favor a secular government, have also been alienated by the actions and policies of the religiously fundamentalist military regime. Majak makes clear, in this paper, the extent to which ideological differences can be expressed in terms of ethnicity, and the dangers which portend in situations of contested ideology.

Sudha Ratan's paper, *From Tribal to Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of North-Eastern India*, provides a close-up look at the dynamics of the emergence of ethnic identity and the role and impact that a national ideology can have in the process. Ratan examines the contexts in which tribal groups in the North East Indian hills states of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh have been transformed and mobilized into highly politicized ethnic groups. The definitions of tribe and ethnic group are explored, as are the issues of tribal/ethnic group relations with the state. She shows how India's commitment to a secularist ideology provided support for the expression, and therefore the maintenance, of ethnic group identity. Language, in particular, became a rallying symbol around which ethnic groups were mobilized. The case in the hill states shows how the spillover of linguistic and cultural nationalism in India led to the emergence of ethnic identity among the tribal groups of the hill states. The imposition of a national ideology, the attempts to integrate the region into the

nation, led to increased resistance to assimilation on the part of the tribes. Linguistic and cultural preservationist initiatives in secularist India provided the model for the hill tribes to establish their own uniqueness in terms of linguistic and ethnic characteristics. Ratan also explores how ethnicity then provided the basis for political and economic demands on the part of the newly emerged ethnic groups.

What happens once an ethnic identity has emerged? In *Cemetery Squatting and Anti-Chinese Tensions: Insights from Central Java,* Daniel Garr takes a close look at the Chinese as an ethnic group in Java and the ways in which its members confront the ongoing hostilities that they encounter in their lives. Overseas Chinese were made to feel unwelcome and "different" in proto-nationalist Java. Seen by the Javanese as neither Dutch nor Indonesian, they developed an ethnic identity in Java which persists to this day. Garr uses the example of cemetery squatting to explore the intergroup hostilities between the Javanese and the ethnic Chinese in Java. Although the Chinese are not allowed to own land in Java, they have built cemeteries on land granted to them by the Javanese court. When some Javanese workers (street peddlers and government workers) began building homes in one of these cemeteries, the Chinese began building a wall to protect the remaining land from encroachment. Exploring this seemingly straightforward conflict in depth, Garr explains that the popular Javanese stereotypes of the Chinese (entrepreneurial, wealthy) appear to support the squatters' risk-taking behavior, as well as decision to build a wall, rather than "make a fuss". Garr suggests that the act of cemetery squatting is itself an expression of ethnic hostility, in which one group appears to be succeeding in depersonalizing and encroaching upon another and presents linguistic as well as structural evidence to support this conclusion. This article raises important questions regarding the importance of perceived hostility in the development and maintenance of ethnic group identity.

The salience of language as a dimension of ethnic identity is the focus of Anita Herzfeld's *Language and Identity: The Black Minority of Costa Rica*. Here language attitudes provide insight into the dynamics of nationalism, ethnicity, and group identity. Discussing the political and social complexities encountered in situations of linguistic diversity, Herzfeld shows how differential power relations among indigenous and immigrant populations affect linguistic attitudes, and therefore linguistic outcomes. In such situations, the survival or extinction of a language will depend in large part on the contexts in which that language is evaluated. Limonese Creole provides a case study. An English creole brought to Spanish-speaking Costa Rica by Jamaican immigrants, it was once seen by its speakers as a proud badge of identity. Linguistic diversity can represent a threat to the broader political order of a nation. In a search for perceived national unity, Costa Rica has embarked on a program of national literacy in Spanish. Limonese Creole, which is not for-

mally written, has, as a result, come to be seen as a marker of lack of education or social mobility. Now redefined as "bad English" it has come to represent a liability in the eyes of its speakers and is used less and less in daily life. Herzfeld raises the question of whether language death will result in the loss of ethnic group identity as well.

David Covin explores the maintenance of ethnic identity and group consciousness through the popular media in his article, *Political Consciousness as a Component of Black Consciousness in Brazil: Its Presence in the Popular Media*. Analyzing articles in six Brazilian mass circulation magazines through a nine-year time span, Covin seeks to discover the extent to which these media identify and represent African Americans in Brazil as a distinct ethnic group. Many of the articles appear to describe or refer to African Brazilians primarily in cultural, political, or racial terms. Covin finds that there has been a shift over time in the way that magazines in Brazil portray African Brazilians, from primarily focusing on cultural contributions, to concentrating attention on political awareness. This seems particularly significant, given that the magazines analyzed have primarily a European Brazilian reading audience. It suggests that political awareness--and activism--is growing among African Brazilians. It also suggest that such levels of political awareness among African Brazilians may be gaining a level of acceptability in the larger Brazilian public discourse. An important question raised by this article is the extent to which the media has a role in promoting and maintaining ethnic group identity, and the degree to which it can shape the large public acceptance of political activism by ethnic groups which formerly were seen primarily in cultural terms.

The concluding article in this volume, Cara Judea Alhadeff's *The Spectacle of the Invisible: Sephardic Jewish Identity in Multicultural Education*, takes on one of the most challenging questions of all--the construction of identity in a group which appears to be defined out of existence. In this study of Sephardic (Spanish) Jews in North America, Alhadeff explains how it is that they are simultaneously defined and excluded by whites, by people of color, and by American (primarily German and Eastern European) Jews. She also explains how it is that American Jews, who come from countries where they themselves were defined as "not white," are encouraged to assimilate into American society as "white," but all too often finds themselves unable to attain complete acceptance by other American "whites." This is an exceptionally rich analysis of the complexities of racism, anti-Semitism, whiteness, assimilation, multiculturalism, and ethnicity in America, with truly global implications. It is particularly appropriate as an end piece to this special issue on global perspectives on ethnicity. In its exploration of "hybrid identities" it takes on questions of power, hierarchy, imposed marginality, and institutional labeling. Pointing out that "ethnic ambiguity threatens the purity of the power-structure," Alhadeff raises some of the very issues that ethnic

studies scholars must address in the coming decades. It is essential that we clarify our understandings of the ways in which we define ourselves and others. It is essential that we explore the nature of inter-ethnic identity formation, and the opportunities that exist therein. As ethnic studies scholars, we have the responsibility to take the lead in explaining the dangers inherent in creating and imposing narrow definitions of race, ethnicity, and culture--from the local to the global.

The Global Resurgence of Ethnicity: An Inquiry Into the Sociology of Ideological Discontent

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This essay takes the position that global resurgence of ethnic hostilities can be seen as a manifestation of discontent with the proclaimed national ideologies. The breakdown in the conviction that adherence to an ideology and the application of a related social agenda would ameliorate the critically felt ills of a society, has resulted in the redirection of frustrations towards scapegoat minorities. Whether the ideology has been democratic secularism or socialism, the inability to "deliver the cargo" of economic and social well being, political stabliltiy has proven to be a direct indictment against the ideology itself. And, like opportunistic diseases, ethnic suspicion, hatred, and hostility have invaded the body politic of the national communities weakened by a crisis of ideological faith. In India, for example, the trend towards "Hinduization" indicates disillusionment with a forty-year experiment with secularism. This essay proposes that resurgent ethnicity has filled the vacuum created by the loss of ideology, and it takes a different trajectory to the "end of idealogy end of history" theme of K. Marx, D. Bell, H. Marcuse, and F. Fukuyama. Its objective is to enquire into the conditions needed for ideological realization and the consequences of its loss.

Introduction

As the Twentieth Century draws to an end, the world witnesses an intensification of ethnic, religious, and tribal confrontations. Ethnic hostilities and ethnic conflict have become a world-wide phenomenon. Yugoslavia, Rwanda, India, Algeria, Congo, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Egypt, the Republics of the former Soviet Union, and countless others have been repeatedly shaken by the paroxysm of ethnoviolence. Ethnicity and ethnic upsurge are defining political and social alliances in the struggle for power, and, in some cases, in the struggle for survival of individuals, groups, and nations.

The ubiquity of ethnic conflict runs counter to the more democratic and progressive aspirations of earlier decades. These ideals had predicted a steady decline of ethnic attachments which were seen as essentially transitional and recessive.[1] In Milton Gondon's "liberal expectancy" there was the expectation that in the modern and modernizing societies the "primordial" differences between groups would become less significant. In response to the democratizing influence of education and communication there would be increasing emphasis on achievement rather than ascription. The Marxist "radical" expectancy held that social class—an economic category—would do away with all other divisions. Class and the spirit of 'proletarian internationalism' would define social alliances—not language, religion, tribe, or national orgin.[2]

The movements for national liberation in colonial Asia and Africa, and the socialist 'class based' frameworks of Soviet Union, China, and other Eastern European nations which seemed to unify the otherwise diverse segments of the society, gave substance to these "expectancies." The general belief among progressives was that these broad coalitions based on economic and political characteristics would define future alliances and not narrow ethnic attributes.

The disturbing escalation of ethnic violence in recent years challenges all these asserutions. Ethnicity is alive and well. Its power to determine boundaries, alliances, and battlelines has never been stronger. As a consequence, there has been an eclipse of hope associated with these progressive ideologies.

Purposes

Since it was expected to diminish in significance, social scientists' interest and analysis of the subject matter—later coined as "ethnicity"—had not even coalesced until quite recently. In their 1973 study on the subject, Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan contended that "ethnicity seems to be a new term."[3] This shows that a systematic effort to conceptualize the phenomenon had not even started in earnest until the late 1970s. As Moynihan writes, "it is possible to have studied international relations through the whole of the twentieth century and hardly to have noticed...the turmoil of the ethnic conflict." "Clearly", he continues, "we had a subject here that had to struggle to make its way into the modern sensibility."[4] As Donald L. Horowitz has summed up: "Connections among Biafra, Bangladesh, and Burundi, Beirut, Brussels, and Belfast were at first hesitantly made—isn't one 'tribal', one 'linguistic', another 'religious'—but that is true no longer. Ethnicity has fought and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness."[5] As a consequence of delay in acknowledging the gravity of this matter, social scientists have, at best, only partial answers and explanations of this global "pandemonium." What is urgently needed is a general theory

of ethnospecific behavior and interaction which can draw out patterns in otherwise diverse events; a theory which can explain the revival of ethnic conflict, the vitality and potency of ethnic boundaries in Yugoslavia, Algeria, India, or any other country. Today, "ethnic conflict possesses elements of universality and uniformity that were not present at earlier times. The ubiquity of the phenomenon provides the basis for comparative analysis."[6] This paper proposes that the revival of ethnic hostilities can be seen as a manifestation of comprehensive disillusionment with proclaimed ideologies in one country after another. The breakdown in the conviction that adherence to an ideology and the application of a related social agenda would bear fruit in terms of amelioration of critically felt ills of the society has resulted in the redirection of animosities, frustrations, and discontentment towards scapegoat minorities—ethnic, religious, and tribal. Whether the professed ideology has been democratic secularism or socialism, the inablity to deliver the cargo of economic and social well-being, political stability, human rights, fairness in everyday dealings, and peace to the national community has proven to be a direct indictment against the ideology itself. And, like opportunistic diseases, ethnic suspicion, hatred, and hostility have invaded the body politic of the national communities weakened by a crisis of ideological faith. This paper proposes that resurgent ethnicity has filled the vacuum that has been created by the loss of ideology.

Ideology and Ethnicity

The dismantling of the Soviet Union and its satellites and the subsequent escalation of ethnic strife in the region have brought a new vigor to the discussion of ethnicity. Quite a bit of interesting dialogue has ensued in trying to account for the reemergence of ethnic conflict and the renewed emphasis on ethno-nationalism in the republics of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, after having been absent as an area of contention for almost seventy years in the Soviet Union and about four decades in Yugoslavia.

Since 1917, ideology, not ethnicity, had been salient in the political, economic, and diplomatic discourse of the Soviet Union. And for the last five and half decades, ideology—specifically a version of Marxism-Leninism—had been the determining factor in policies and alliances in domestic and foreign matters of this region in general. As a consequence, for much of this century the basic conflict has been over ideology. Post-1945 world politics is basically the politics of revolution and counter revolution, Marxism-Leninism and capitalism. This pattern broke down in 1989 with the unraveling of the Soviet Union and was immediately equated with the triumph of one, the "right" ideology over the other. The events have been viewed, since then, as a fitting obituary for socialism and a victory for capitalism, democracy, and freedom. The ethnic

resurgence is viewed, quite simply, as an effort to complete unfinished business and to play out impulses which had remained incomplete[8] under the ironhanded control of the socialist state. This point was clearly brought out in a recent *New York Times* article.

> Freed from the grip of a communist propaganda that had insisted that all peoples of the Soviet Union live in harmony and brotherhood, Russians and other nationalities are struggling to come to terms with a world in which they can say anything whether it be...an ugly racial slur against a neighbor or a blatant anti-Semitic remark.[9]

The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were very serious about upholding "their formulas for national federation and autonomy. As E.J. Hobsbawn puts it,

> these were the only form of constitutional arrangements which socialist states have taken seriously since 1917...while other constitutional texts...have for long periods been purely notional, national autonomy has never ceased to have a certain operational reality...Hence, as we can now see in melancholy retrospect, it was the great achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them. The Yugoslav revolution succeeded in preventing the nationalists within its states from massacring each other almost certainly for longer than ever before in their history, though this achievement has now unfortunately crumbled.[10]

Tito gave highest priority to the maintenance of a viable federal system within a socialist framework. One of his greatest accomplishments was his success in forcing quarrelling nationalities into a single unit. With the constitution of 1963, Yugoslavia became a federal republic comprising Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.[11]

The socialist governments maintained a state of stability and ethnic harmony, quite successfully and for a reasonable period, by following a policy which was intrinsic to their ideological agenda. Can the breakdown, then, be used as a legitimate ground to indict the ideology? Does the resurgence of ethnicity in these countries discredit Marxism and its claim that class, an economic category and not ethnicity, "would be the all determining crucible of identity?"[12]

Francis Fukuyama's first essay on the subject published in the Spring of 1989 argues quite simply that Marxism is dead as a guide to political construction. Marxism, to him, was a temporary threat to liberalism, and has been suitably discredited. What we have witnessed is "the passing of Marxism-Leninism...its death as a living ideology of world historical significance."[13] In the process, the ideals of liberal democracy have been vindicated. There has been "[the] triumph of the west, the western idea...an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism...[and] a total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to western liberalism." Mankind's ideological evolution has ended in this triumph and in the "realization of human freedom."[15] This is the end of ideology, and the end of history.

Fukuyama's "end of history—end of ideology" thesis can be used to explain ethnic hostility as a situation which remains unresolved under the authoritarian control of regimes misguided by "invalid, alternate" ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism. The demise of totalitarian regimes simply enables this cauldron of ethnic strife and violence to be emptied out however painfully. Once the ironhand loosens, a panoply of ethnic problems seething just below the surface in all the intervening years is unleashed. The first steps of a newly democratizing society is, therefore, directed tragically at fighting out primordial tribal issues. From this point of view, ethnic resurgence is regarded as concomitant to an end in ideology. Therefore, as Fukuyama contends, the end of history "does not by any means imply the end of international conflict...there would still be a high and perhaps rising level of ethnic and nationalist violence, since those are impulses incompletely played out."[16]

The recent events in Congo are a case in point. In 1990-91, a democracy movement, modeling itself on campaigns for change that were shaking governments in East Europe, began to take root in this country. It forced one of Africa's most determinedly Marxist-Leninist one-party states to hand over power. The democratic elections that followed opened up a Pandora's box of tribal hatreds. Ethnic and regional rivalries have undermined Congo's stability since then.[17] There again we see the exit of an authoritarian state being followed by an escalation of ethnic grievances and hostility.

Some very troubling questions, however, remain unanswered. At what point at the end of history does ethnonationalism play itself out completely? How long does a nation have to subscribe to the ideals of liberal democracy before the issues of ethnic conflict are resolved? What guarantees are there that the democratic ideals will liberalize the intensity of ethnic, religious, tribal hold—ever? Who is to say that progressive liberal expectancy will not wither away as ungloriously as radical expectancy? The experiences of democratic India over the last forty-five years fails to give credence to the notion that "end of history" will mean a true realization of human freedom—

– among other things, freedom from the insecurities, uncertainties, and limitations of ethnoviolence.

What this paper proposes, as an alternative explanation, is that it is not an end of ideology but a loss of ideology that is catapulting nation after nation into these situations of violent strife. How can a society lose an ideology? In two ways: First, when the ideology is distorted, its true essence is lost. The promise it might have held for resolving the core issues is lost. Second, when the most visible protagonists of the ideology, individuals who are most associated with the ideology—the leaders and politicians—are involved in actions and policies that are deemed questionable by the broad sectors of society, the ideology loses its validity, its authenticity. Because, in the judgement of most people, an ideology is only as good as its most ardent advocates—its most vocal, visible practicioners.

Erich Fromm wrote almost thirty-five years ago: "It is one of the peculiar ironies of history that there are no limits to the misunderstanding and distortion of theories, even in an age when there is unlimited access to the sources; there is no more drastic example of this phenomenon than what has happened to the theory of Karl Marx in the last few decades."[18] Fromm passionately believed that the Soviet Union was greatly responsible in propagating this distortion "...the Russian communists appropriated Marx's theory and tried to convince the world that their practices and theory follow his ideas. Although the opposite is true...the Russians' brutal contempt for human dignity and humanistic values is, indeed...the misinterpretation of Marx as the proponent of an economic-hedonistic materialism..."[19] and because "Soviet Union has been looked upon as the very incarnation of all evil; hence her ideas have assumed the quality of the devilish."[20]

In the minds of most observers, Stalin's system of unbridled terror, Ceausescu's blatant abuse of human rights, and the totalitarianism associated with these and other regimes has become synonymous with Marxism. Therefore, when these regimes lost their legitimacy in the last years of the 1980s, Marxism was also considered to have lost its legitimacy. To many, however, what has really been discredited by the developments of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is not Marxism as a theory of society and social change, but certain totalitarian regimes and their version of Marxism. As Robin Fox contends, the fall of Ceausescu does not mean the demise of Marxism:

> Marx certainly said that the temporary proletarian government should seize the means of production, distribution and exchange from the capitalists, he said nothing about, and would have been horrified by, despotism, secret police, totalitarianism, repression, gulags, purges, genocide and grandiose arms programs. Those

consequences of Leninism are what have brought about the downfall of the "socialist" regimes, along with the failure of the totalitarian system of production to raise living standards.

For Marx the only route to true communism was through the internal contradictions of capitalism. These had to be fully dveloped and fully played out before a proletariat endowed with true class consciousness could emerge and make the transition to the next stage. This progression for Marx was governed by the laws of history; there was no way of cutting corners. One could never reach communism via state despotism imposed by external forces, as in Eastern Europe, or dictatorships established by charismatic tyrants in noncapitalist countries.

In this view, then, the past seventy years or so can be seen as an interruption of the basic process of social change, and one which a Marxist, as opposed to an apologist for Soviet-style tyranny, would have predicted to be inherently unstable and doomed to failure. In the view of genuine Marxist theory, capitalism must run its course. There is no warrant for shortcuts.[21]

In the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Rumania, true class consciousness, the true essence of "proletarian internationlism, one which would be able to successfully withstand narrow parochialism", would be able to truly resolve the "alienation of man from other men,"[22] never developed. The ideals of the "socialist man" were defined by the nomenclatura and were imposed from above. For the broad masses of the people these ideals were like empty eggshells—fragile and devoid of any spiritual content.

The Soviet experience failed to resolve "the alienation (of Man) from his species life...(his) alienation from the essence of his humanity."[23] The recent upsurge of hateful tribalism is a consequence of this failure to restore the essence of humanity in the men and women of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. This failure stemmed from the inability or the unwillingness of the regimes to recognize that "...Marx's aim was that of the spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of economic determination, of restituting him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with nature."

Unfortunately, for the great majority of the people, the despotism of the so-called "communist" regimes, the constant indignities from economic and material deprivation, and the escalating costs of a mind-

less arms race, all added up to an indictment of the ideology of Marxism. In their minds, it was all rooted in the ideology. Consequently, the promise of the ideology to deliver a better life was lost. The ideology lost its spiritual persuasion. The communities, weakened by a crisis of ideological faith, have subsequently succumbed to primordial tendencies inherent in ethnic suspicion, hatred, and hostility. Frustrations have been redirected against the "other", designated on the basis of tribal, religious, regional, and other such ascriptive criteria.

In India there has been a similar eclipse of faith in the ideals of secularism. This is epitomized in the disturbing rise of religious fundamentalism, secessionist movements by the Sikhs in the Punjab, Muslims in Kashmir, and a myriad of other sectarian movements in various parts of India. Even though Hobsbawm has assured us that secession in post-colonial regimes is more of an exception than the rule, the separatist agitations in the South-Asian subcontinent, often bloody, take a heavy toll on the welfare and security of the area.

On 7 December 1992, as the Hindu fundamentalisms proceeded to destroy the Barbri Masjid, they also destroyed "the very premise of their nation, that secular right of law, not Hinduism, binds the country together."[25]

How did this come about in a nation which has epitomized civility, democracy, secularism, and nonalignment? A country which has been a beacon of hope for the post-colonial world—with Gandhis and Nehrus to show the way. The upsurge of fundamentalist and sectarian tendencies can, to a large extent, be attributed to the lack of any significant progress in the economic and social well-being of the general populace. A lacking which is directly tied to: (i) the Indian governments disastrous economic policies and planning over the last forty-five years; (ii) social structural problems stemming from gross inequalities in the distribution of land and the continued absence of aggressive land reform strategies; and (iii) the preoccupation of the leaders and politicians with electoral politics towards which all efforts are invested. It is this last point which is particularly important for our discussion on the state of ethnic India.

One explanation for the persistence of ethnic boundaries has been the convenience with which the group can become "a focus of mobilization for the pursuit of group or individual interests. Ethnic conflicts can become one form in which interest conflicts are pursued."[26] Thus ethnicity becomes a means of advancing interest, influencing government decision making, affecting electoral choices, and distributing favors. In several countries, votes are solicited by appealing to specific ethnic interests, the constituencies manipulated by promises of favorable "distribution of governmental largesse."[27] Such manipulative techniques can often have disastrous consequences.

In the 1980s, the Congress Party in India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, hoping to make electoral gains in the

state of Punjab, supported the extremist Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale by undermining the moderate leadership of Akali Dal. Even though Sant Bhindranwale and his secessionist party were involved in countless terrorist acts, the Central government refused to take action and was also unwilling to make concessions to the moderate Akalis. The tactic worked and the Congress Party was successful in the polls. However, by June 1985, the Central government felt compelled after a series of assassinations of innocent Hindus and moderate Sikhs in the Punjab to launch an assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar, where Sant Bhindranwale and his followers had taken refuge. That assault, along with the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two Sikh bodyguards in October, 1984, and the subsequent bloodbath in which thousands of Sikhs and Hindus, mostly poor, were massacred, is an unfortunate example of how governmental manipulation of specific ethnic groups and their interest lobbies can have catastrophic outcomes.

Though Punjab stands out as the most egregious instance of ethnic manipulation, it, nevertheless, is anything but unique. Other religious, tribal, and caste groups have been the victims of such partisan machinations. The Khasis, Bengalis, Assamese, Boro's, Mizo's in Assam and Meghalaya, Muslims, and Hindus in virtually every state have been victims. One group has been repeatedly pitted against the other for the sake of electoral gains. The ease with which ethnic groups facilitate group interests makes them particularly suitable as vehicles of manipulation, which often reinforces their claims at authenticity.

A total disregard for the laudable ideals of secularism can also be seen in government policies, agendas, and laws designed to appease certain ethnic and religions groups which are considered strategic for electoral victory. Even for thoughtul, well-meaning individuals, the special laws for Muslims on the issues of marriage, divorce, and family planning, the rigid quotas for the lower castes and untouchables, the "son of the soil" provisions for reserving employment opportunities and college admission, seem totally incongruent with the principles of secularism. The Hindu fundamentalist political parties have made the most of these policy debacles. As a consequence of their effective propaganda, in the minds of many Indians these policies are misconstrued as stemming from the ideals of secularism, further diminishing the latter's validity. The consternation they feel about the government and its policies is directed against those who are considered the beneficiaries of these policies and, thus, their adversaries. So many have been left out that all across the country there is growing political appeal to sectarian prejudice that continues to weaken India's long claim to secularism and democracy. Out of the crisis of faith in these progressive ideals has emerged political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which preaches that Indian-ness means "Hindutva"—total loyalty to Hindu chauvinism, and Hindu superiority—and whips up rampant anti-Muslim sen-

timent in a climate heavy with frustration, anger, and vengeance. In such an atmosphere, whatever remained of the ideals of secularism are further betrayed and the march towards a fair, democratic, and egalitarian society further derailed.

What we witness in India is what Ralf Dahrendorf refers to as the "refeudalization" of society, the return of the ascribed as opposed to achieved characteristics as determinants of social stratification.[28] That the new stratification is correlated with ethnicity makes the latter a more fundamental source of stratification. Therefore, a person's caste, language, religion, and ethnic status becomes vital in the determination of economic status—jobs, education, property ownership, access to bank credit, so on and so forth.

As ideologies, socialism, secularism, nationalism or democracy lose their validity, governments and groups are "decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology (and) increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to religion, language and other similar ascriptive identities,"[29] thus reinforcing them and giving them further validity. For the post-colonial Third world nations, the disillusionment with ideologies, which had infused them with hope for a stable, secure future, has been particularly hurtful and alienating, increasing their vulnerablility to the opportunistic diseases of xenophobia and bigotry.

Conclusion

This paper takes the position that the recent revival of ethnicity can be seen as a reaction to a loss of ideology in respective nations. When people lose an ideology which had served as the underpinning of their efforts at nation-building, the empty space is filled with the sentiments of a reviving ethnicity which then becomes paramount in the determination of alliances. In nation after nation, ideologies such as socialism, secularism, and democracy have taken the backseat as ethnicity has assumed prominence in national affairs. The eclipse of hope that by pursuing the ideals of an ideology a nation can lay the foundations of a secure life and future for its citizens has resulted in upsurge of xenophobic and nativist currents. The domination of ethnicity in a society's sociopolitical dialogue pushes ideology further into the background. Ethnicity, not ideology, becomes salient in the political, economic, and diplomatic discourse of the society.

It is the position of this paper that ethnicity can be delegated a secondary place—ethnic rivalries can become subdued or muted if strong ideologies become prominent and are validated. Ethnic preeminence in a society's affairs is not inevitable. It assumes that faith in a set of ideals can restore the essence of humanity in the nations around the world and strengthen the human community so it can withstand the divisive ten-

dencies of ethnic propaganda. People will continue to belong to diverse cultural communities, however, that will not be a basic, fundamental, or sole source of an individual's identity.

People need to believe in something bigger than themselves, something that will save them from themselves. Ethnicity and its current theme of divisiveness and exclusion can be delegated to a secondary place if people can believe in a set of higher ideals with a proven track record and be convinced that persual of those ideals will resolve the critically felt problems of their society. It is not the contention of this paper that subscribing to a progressive ideology will mean a total demise of ethnic divisions and ethnic strife. Nonetheless, it would diminish the persuasiveness of such divisions.

NOTES

[1] Daniel P. Moynihan, *Pandemonium* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 27.

[2] Moynihan, 28.

[3] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Ethnicity* (Cambirdge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 1.

[4] Moynihan, 11.

[5] Moynihan, 11.

[6] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 6.

[7] E.J. Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: University Press, 1990), 183.

[8] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest,* (Summer 1989): 18.

[9] Francis X. Clines, "In the Deep South of the Soviet Fold, Complaints Rise in Many Tongues", *New York Times,* 7 Janurary 1990.

[10] Hobsbawn, 183.

[11] Louis L. Snyder, *Global MiniNationalisms* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 120.

[12] Moynihan, 28.

[13] Fukuyama, 18.

[14] Fukuyama, 3.

[15] Alan Ryan, "After the End of History", *History Today,* 4 (October 1992): 8-10.

[16] Fukuyama, 40.

[17] Kenneth B. Noble, "Democracy Brings Turmoil in Congo" *New York Times*, 31 January 1995.

[18] Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (New York: Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), 6.

[19] Fromm, 1.

[20] Fromm, 7.

[21] Robin Fox, "Marxism's Obit is Premature", *The Nation*, 14 May 1990, 665-666.

[22] Fromm, 49.

[23] Fromm, 53.

[24] Fromm, 3.

[25] Marina Budhos, "Hard Passage to India", *The Nation*, 13 December 1993, 721.

[26] Glazer and Moynihan, 8.

[27] Glazer and Moynihan, 9.

[28] Glazer and Moynihan, 16.

[29] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, (Summer 1993): 29.

The Afrocentric Project: The Quest for Particularity and the Negation of Objectivity

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This article is a philosophical critique of a very controversial paradigm within Africana Studies. The methodology employed in this paper is a philosophical critique of the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of Afrocentricity. The quest for a distinctive (metaphysical) Africanist perspective has cast Afrocentricity as a subjectivist approach to affirming the integrity of an Africana existential condition. While in the course of African American intellectual history a number of scholars and thinkers have supported the notion of an unique Black metaphysics, Afrocentricity brings to the table a particular approach to the tradition of affirming an African metaphysical exclusivism. What I mean by the quest for particularity is the notion that there is a unique Africana presence in the world, such that it stands antithetical to the European/Western experience. I explore what I call "weak Afrocentricity," i.e., a cultural determinism demarcating the African and European experience. Afrocentricity, in positing a cultural relativism, renders that not only is Eurocentrism a false universality, but that universality per se is false. This denial of universality (at the ontological level) has as a corresponding category the negation of objectivity (at the epistemological plane). I examine the works of two leading Afrocentric proponents, Molefi Asante and Marimba Ani, arguably two of the most significant contributors to the philosophical foundations of Afrocentricity.

All discussion of ethnicity within the domain of a global perspective necessarily requires us to move to the plane, implicitly or explicitly, of a world view. The emergence of Afrocentricity as a philosophical world view, i.e., a theoretically substantiated world view consisting of the most general categories involving nature, society, human existence, and thought, is most saliently a global approach to the existential matter of an African grounding in the world.

All attempts, all quests to affirm the human existence of African Americans *vis-a-vis* the claims of racism and national chauvinism ultimately center on the question, what counts as belonging to the world? The nationalist response (of which Afrocentricity is a species) brings the question of belonging to the world to the forefront. American nationalism is discarded and in its place some form of African nationalism becomes preeminent. Malcolm X's statement, "We are not American but victims of Americanism" graphically gives expression to the nationalist rejection of Euro-American national chauvinism. His privileging of human over civil rights has a crucial cultural counterpart, the legitimatization of an African American cultural heritage as an autonomous tradition. For the Afrocentrists, what counts as belonging to the world is the existential affirmation of an Africanity which entails determinate ontological, epistemological, and axiological implications. This quest is one which has its grounding in a national rather than a liberal democratic paradigm. In terms of intellectual culture, the Afrocentric intellectual imperative moves beyond inclusion in America to what can be best described as a critique and corrective of the traditional academic canon. This critique and corrective are the first steps toward the affirmation of African particularity. For the so-called integrationist (read assimilationists), this central question remains in a mediated form. What counts as belonging to the world finds immediate expression in provincial terms, entailed in the more parochial question, what counts as belonging to America? Hence the struggle for civil rights and inclusion into the mainstream of American life, including the canon(s) of intellectual culture, are viewed as a necessary and sufficient condition for the quest of belonging in the world.

The integrationist is fueled by a firm belief and conviction that this country is in an essential way a good, if not the greatest, place for one to live. America's prime failure, its greatest blemish, for the integrationist, is its racism. The integrationist maxim is simply-eliminate racism and true democracy will surely flourish. The integrationist fully embraces the liberal democratic paradigm. Nevertheless, the problem faced by the integrationist is the failure of liberal democracy to embrace Black people as Americans. Langston Hughes' poem, "I Too Sing America," is a stirring expression of the integrationist protest against such rejection. In terms of intellectual culture, i.e., the Euro-American academy, the imperative is inclusionary, the push for more Black faces in the academy and in textbooks, e.g., affirmative action and multicultural education.

The Afrocentric critique and corrective call into question the academy's canon, i.e., the prescribed corpus of literature which functions as the academy's foundational elements. The Afrocentric project is engaged in a cultural war over the anchor of attendant assumptions and presuppositions undergirding the academy. Hence, the mere act of inclusion, of making provision for courses on the Africana experience, falls drastically short of the Afrocentrist's aim of reconstituting the very

basis of what has functioned as the higher learning. Ergo, Afrocentricity is not merely an academic addendum, better yet, it calls for a reconfiguration of the whole, traditional, academic enterprise. Afrocentricity boldly shifts the discourse on Africana Studies from the margins to the mainstream of academic and intellectual life.

This paper is a philosophical critique of Afrocentricity. What I mean by the quest for particularity comprises more than the explication of particularity via a descriptive presentation of the uniqueness of the Africana (here Africana is inclusive of the diasporian experience) locus in the world but, as well, entails a critical discourse on discursive practices relating to Black Studies, i.e., Africana, African, or African American Studies. What is pivotal to this discourse is the repudiation of all scholarship on the Black experience which relegates and restrains this experience to the level of an object of investigation. The Afrocentric project seeks to counter such objectification by proffering distinctive discursive practices which go beyond the pale of the traditional disciplines in the academy. The determination of such discursive practices, theories, and methodologies, the Afrocentrists posit, in the final analysis, (if not immediately) derives from the African experience. Hence Black Studies, Afrocentrists claim, is a disciplinary focus and is parasitic upon an Afrocentric paradigm.

Several central points are contained in my notion of a philosophical critique of the Afrocentric project. First, this critique is from a definitive philosophical perspective, *viz.*, dialectical materialism.

Second, the Afrocentric project contains a plurality of intellectual threads, which form a fabric of thought, which at best can be described as a mosaic, i.e., individual threads which maintain distinguishable qualities regarding analytical premises, emphasis, scope, and direction, yet all are woven together, and a common ontological, epistemological, and axiological fabric, i.e., a worldview or *weltanschauung*. My critique focuses on a composite sketch of the mosaic rather than a detailed examination of the various threads and strands, though I give particular attention to Molefi Asante's contributions due to his prominence as the intellectual systematizer of Afrocentricity, along with Marimba Ani's recent magnum opus, *Yurugu*. Arguably, their works constitute a formidable philosophical bedrock for the Afrocentric project.

Third, given the mosaic character of the Afrocentric project, I distinguish between a weak and a strong Afrocentricity. This line of demarcation emanates from what I view as a metaphysical exclusivism whose focus is the bifurcation of historical and cultural reality into a mutually exclusive relationship between the African and European cultural matrix. This juxtaposition, when expressed in strong Afrocentricity, finds its catalyst in either an environmental determinism, e.g., the thesis of sun versus ice people or a biogenetic causal theory where melanin (or better yet the lack of it) is said to have generated social, cultural, and psycho-

logical antithesis and antagonism, i.e., white supremacy looms hegemonic over Africans and their descendants. In contrast, weak Afrocentricity has a propensity to locate this metaphysical differentiation, *au fond*, in sociocultural structures and/or ideologies (world views). This latter thread is, what may be termed , cultural determinism. This contrast of strong and weak Afrocentricity should not be taken pejoratively. Here, the terms weak and strong are used merely as heuristic devices to formulate typology for, or as a mode of discriminating, the types of threads in the Afrocentric mosaic.

Fourth, my critique is focused on the Afrocentrist project as a quest for the affirmation of African particularity where such an affirmation entails a critique of Eurocentrism as false universality. The Afrocentrist critique of Eurocentrism as false universality is grounded on a cultural relativist stance, which in turn eschews the possibility of ascertaining universality per se . Universality, for the Afrocentric project, is a false proposition and, hence, is relegated to the level of a pseudo problem. This ontological dismissal of universality has an epistemological counterpart, *viz.*, the negation of any notion of objectivity beyond the confines of one's cultural matrix. The only epistemologically valid realm of inquiry for Afrocentrism, it is argued, is the African (and its attendant diasporian) experience. Additionally, a corollary claim is made for Eurocentrism; it can only have epistemological validity within the terrain of the European (Western) experience. My critical analysis is directed at how the Afrocentric project grounds and justifies its claim that universality, as such, is a false proposition and objectivity (objective truth) cannot be obtained outside of a given cultural matrix. The foundation for these claims rests in assuming a metaphysical exclusivism and an essentialist approach to both the African and European experience. What results is a historiography, established by means of a static or synchronic methodology, which strips both the African and European cultural heritages of their dialectical (dynamic and contradictory) development.

The Afrocentric Critique of Eurocentrism

Molefi Asante, in his *The Afrocentric Idea,* states that his work is "a radical critique of the Eurocentric ideology that masquerades as a universal view . . . "[1] So his critique is aimed at Eurocentrism as false universality. He further states, "I am not questioning the validity of the Eurocentric tradition within its context . . . "[2] His claim is that Eurocentrism has epistemological validity if, and only if, it is restricted to a European (Western) domain. The Afrocentric critique, *prima facie*, does not question the legitimacy of Eurocentrism *qua* Europe; however, if we go beneath this appearance, we will find Asante intimately engaged in giving commentary on European discourse. This engagement in European dis-

course is an intellectual imperative which derives from the effort to erect a philosophical foundation for the Afrocentric project. So despite his seemingly centrist perspective and commitment to cultural relativism, Asante enters the waters of European discourse and discursive practice. His entrance is ostensibly to describe, for us, the Eurocentric tradition. Asante's discussion and interpretation of the polemic between positivism and critical theory has import because he argues his Afrocentric critique and (European) critical theory "are engaged in a somewhat similar enterprise in reorienting thinking."[3] Yet he tenders this caveat: Despite critical theory assaults on the pitfalls of positivism, this polemic is an "Eurocentric family debate over the nature of ideology."[4] So the similarity between Afrocentrism and critical theory is only a surface appearance that when explicated (deconstructed) renders demarcated cultural ontologies undergoing quite different intellectual enterprises.

Granted, this debate originates within the European intellectual tradition (as does the Marxist/Freudian polemic which Asante also comments on); nevertheless I am compelled to bring into bold relief the glaring fact, that today these polemics are not constrained by its European origins. Indeed, the above polemics are presently waged on an international (global) plane outside of the European/Western cultural terrain. So the fact remains that the genesis of aforesaid polemics does not, in any way, confine their epistemological validity and veracity narrowly to European (Western) concerns. Asante charges critical theorists with arrogance due to their ignorance or lack of appreciation of the African conception of the unity of reality. Even if we assume the veracity of this claim, the question before us is how does a failure to appreciate **the** African conception of the unity of reality become equivalent to arrogance and thus Eurocentrism? The Afrocentric critique of Eurocentrism here involves a conflation of categories where, by virtue of their European origin, all such categories must be seen as Eurocentrist. Just as Asante argues elsewhere to be African is not necessarily to be Afrocentric, would not this hold true for Europeans and Eurocentrism?[5] What then is Eurocentrism? How may we discern the difference between what is simply European from Eurocentrism? Is one's engagement in the European intellectual tradition a sufficient condition for making the charge of Eurocentrism? In Molefi's analysis, there is no exemplar of a *differentia specifica* which we may employ to discriminate between the two. So the critical theory/positivist and the Marxist/Freudian debates are described within the Eurocentric tradition because of the simple identity (conflation) of the categories European and Eurocentrist. For Asante, the critique of Eurocentrism is not a process whereby what is European is differentiated from Eurocentrism. Asante tells us, "[t]he invalidity of an idea arises, not from its exponents, but from its own fundamental flaws."[6] I strongly agree with this assertion, however, and unfortunately, Asante fails to follow his own assertion and instead falls into the trap of the genetic

fallacy. A genetic fallacy is one whereby the genesis of an idea becomes the basis for its invalidity. In this case, the European origin of ideas is a sufficient condition to claim Eurocentrism. Here it is important to note this same line of reasoning continues with his rejection of Marxism. He argues, "[b]ut because it [Marxism] emerged from the western consciousness, Marxism is mechanical in its approach to social understanding and development. . ."[7] The assumption not only entails that Marxism is mechanical (despite Marxist dialectics), but it includes the ludicrous presupposition that Western consciousness *per se* is intrinsically mechanical. Asante's essentialist method in describing and analyzing both European and African thought is what is most mechanical here. He ignores the long history of intellectual exchange and specifically philosophical discourse in Europe where there were/are many proponents of a dynamic, dialectical approach to nature, society, and thought itself. Marxism was/is a prominent voice in the Western philosophical tradition of dialectical thinking starting from Heraclitus on up to Hegel and even encompassing a number of the critical theorists *a la* the Frankfurt School, a point which was well understood by a wide spectrum of Black philosophers including: William Ferris, George G. M. James, C. L. R. James, Martin Luther King Jr., Charles Leander Hill, Kwame Nkrumah, and Sekou Toure. Consequently, Asante's assertion regarding Western thought as endemically mechanistic manifests both an ignorance of European and Africana intellectual history. A poor commentary for a thinker who seeks to establish a philosophical grounding and a paradigmatic foundation for Africana Studies.

Asante's essentialism does an additional disservice to African realities. An essentialist view of Africa effectively arrests the dialectical constitution and composition of an African heritage and cultural traditions. Rather than his monolithic paradigm (i.e., **the** African conception of unity, reality, values etc.), we have the dialectical interconnection of unity and diversity (the unity of opposites), which brings into focus both the identity and difference which has characterized the African experience from the days of Kemet to the present.

I want to propose a different method for determining not only what is meant by Eurocentrism, but also suggest a way to disclose all forms of centrism. By doing so, it becomes possible to show how one may subject centrism to a critique of its fundamental flaws. My claim is that ethnocentrism is flawed because it centers reality around a given ethnic group. Such centering, by inference, devalues all other groups by virtue of their not being members of the central group. Eurocentrism is a species of ethnocentrism. Here the center becomes Europe (the West) and thus all groups outside of the European (Western) experience are inferentially devalued. My critique is aimed not at Europe, as the point of origin, but at the centrist perspective which relegates all others to a lesser status and place in the world. The danger in Eurocentrism is precisely its

centrist casting. Europe *per se* (as a category) is value neutral. By that I mean socio-cultural phenomena emanating out of Europe, by virtue of their genesis, are neither endemically nor intrinsically good or bad, progressive or reactionary, beautiful or ugly. Following this line of reasoning, Afrocentrism, via its commitment to a centrist paradigm, is a species of ethnocentrism and is subject to the same fundamental flaws of Eurocentrism, *viz.*, devaluing that which is not African. The emergence of false universality (what the Afrocentric project aims to critique and correct) logically follows from the centering of a given group. The privileging (centering) of a given group presupposes all other groups are at best satellites in a cultural orbit around the central group. However, if it is argued that each group by virtue of its own cultural matrix has epistemological validity, as long as it remains within its domain, what results is an ontological formulation whereby reality is seen as a monadology without a Leibnizian pre-established harmony.

This scheme of a universe of centers (centrisms) where autonomy (objectivity) is granted only within the limits of a given cultural matrix is a relativism which directs us into the swamp of subjectivism. The methodological implications for Afrocentrism, *tout court*, is a stringent subjectivism. Asante argues, "I do not castigate any other method, for all methods are valid within their context."[8] This context, for Asante, is a cultural one specifically situating Africa (and Europe) as a cultural whole and, thus, his proposal for centering within an African cultural matrix. The nagging problem for all relativists, and specifically Asante's Afrocentrism, is the paradox of incommensurability. In the case of Afrocentrism, the paradox of the incommensurability is exemplified in the relationship between the cultural heritage of Africa and Europe. If one claims what is true for Europe may be false for Africa and vice versa, then on what basis can we determine truth or falsity? We are confronted with this question since our culture-boundedness constricts us epistemologically, ontologically, and axiologically.

Part of the ambiguity in Asante's undertaking is that he offers opinions on such "Western" intellectual issues and philosophical problems as the mind/body problem and idealism/materialism debate, and proffers philosophical judgment on such figures as Protagoras, Aristotle, Sartre, Hegel, Marx, Kuhn, and Feyerbend, among others. Yet his notion of a cultural bound centrism and cultural relativism, in fact, nullifies any opinion, view, or perspective he may have concerning those persons and issues outside of the African world. In terms of his own cultural relativism, it is axiomatic that if one ventures out of his/her cultural center to participate in any other then that constitutes broaching false universality. It is to take what is an African ideal and apply it to an European reality. The right to speak (or rather rightly speaking) requires residence in a given cultural context. As such, this manifestation of the paradox of incommensurality or relativism simply means there is no way one can

assert the truth or falsity, the good or bad, the beauty or ugliness of any proposition or thing beyond one's cultural boundaries because there is no common domain or intersecting terrain. Cultural matrix conceived as autonomous centers, islands in themselves, or monads in self-containment, can offer no basis for objective truth or falsity beyond the bounds of a particular culture. Essentially, what is true or false is relative to particularity.

The irony of it all is that the very critique of false universality is undermined because if false universality is a value of Eurocentrism then it may not be false from the standpoint of Eurocentrism. Relative to Eurocentrism, it is a true universality. Correspondingly, it may be relative to Afrocentricity, viewed as a false universality. There is no objective grounds to claim false universality, only relative ground which makes it an either/or proposition. Either its true or false depending on one's cultural reference point.

Asante posits the "problem is not in the expounding of Western categories but in the absolute manner in which they are assumed to constitute the whole of human thought"(false universality).[9] He is at this point differentiating what is European (Western) from Eurocentrism, which is something he had fail to do throughout his earlier discussion. This reference to absolutism is none other than the claim that false universality is Eurocentrism. Now, it is not European categories which are the threat, but absolutism as false universality, hence the danger of centrism in Eurocentrism. The solution to this problem cannot have as its foundation an ontology which, in turn, gives affirmation to a plurality of particularities which have no objective support beyond their limited individual spheres. The critique of absolutism, or false universality, by Afrocentricity is undermined by the very act of its negating the category of objectivity. All particularities, enshrined in a centrist shell, will find their quest unfulfilled by negating the very basis which makes true particularity a reality. The truth of particularity resides in its dialectical relationship to universality. The universal as true universality, over and against false universality, must of logical necessity take into account what it is that makes for the commensurability of differing cultural or social formations. In effect, what does it mean to be human? What is the common denominator or connecting thread linking the world's diverse communities? The need for a category signifying commensurability among different cultural matrixes axiomaticly requires a notion of universality and objectivity.

Though Asante may be considered the leading theorist of the Afrocentrist project, the recent contribution of Marimba Ani to the corpus of Afrocentric theoretical formulations is arguably the most substantive work in the critique of Eurocentrism. Her *Yurugu* is both an intensive and extensive rendering of over six hundred pages. Time and space does not allow a detailed examination at this juncture; however, I will address her central thesis by way of summation.[10]

We found that Asante, despite his conflation of the categories European and Eurocentrism, concluded that a line of demarcation was necessary for the real danger consisted in the absolutizing of European categories as universals. Ani, on the other hand, argues that European cultural thought and behavior is intrinsically absolutist. European thought, for Ani, is Eurocentric.

> *Yurugu* as a moment in the movement is, no doubt, an apogee in the chorus of voices comprising Afrocentric discursive practices. And though her voice reaches the upper scale and contributes some unique improvisational polish to the Afrocentric ensemble, she is not a mere soloist without accompanying voices. Therefore, it is crucial, in my estimation, to contexualize *Yurugu* as an Afrocentric text. The locus of *Yurugu,* within the typology of strong and weak Afrocentricity, is as a weak Afrocentric text since the overriding principle employed, by Ani, for demarcating the African from the European paradigm is culturally determined. Ani, as an Afrocentric proponent, views the articulation of the African-centered perspective, as a dialectical process, whereby, the negation of European thought is the necessary ground for affirming African thought. She states, "[t]o be truly liberated, African people must come to know the nature of European thought and behavior in order to understand the effect that Europe has had on our ability to think victoriously. We must be able to separate our thought from European thought, so as to visualize a future that is not dominated by Europe."[11]

For Ani, this dialectical process is, on the one hand, "intellectual decolonization", and, on the other, "cultural regeneration." The first pole, "intellectual decolonization" is the explicit critique of Europe, while the second pole, "cultural regeneration", is implicitly contained in the first. Hence, the departure, the rupture from European epistemological presuppositions is a logical priority for the affirmative articulation of an African-centered worldview. With regard to positing a critique of the European cultural matrix, Ani shares a common intellectual space with Chinweizu, Iva Carruthers, George G. M. James, Diop, Olela, and Bernal among others. However, in important respects she takes a fundamentally different twist from James, Diop, Olela, and Bernal in how she situates Western (European) thought generally, and philosophy particularly. When we contextualize *Yurugu* within the terrain of Afrocentric critiques of European philosophy, Ani parts company in an essential way from this tradition. Her departure rests on the foundational assumption that

Greek philosophy, and specifically Platonic philosophy, is the seminal germ for European imperialism. Whereas Diop, Olela, James, and Bernal all claim that Greek philosophy, and specifically Platonism, is grounded in, if not a wholesale plagiarism of, African philosophical thought.[12]

My critique is in substance a philosophical one. The constraints of time will limit my discussion to the following points:

1.   What is the locus of Platonism in the history of world philosophy? Can it be reasonably demonstrated that Platonism is (or in some sense is) a prototype of Western philosophy?

2.   My second point addresses an epistemological problematic. Here my concern centers on the subject/object dialectic wherein Platonic thought demarcates these two categories and argues for the objectification of knowledge. For Plato, this objectification signals the emergence of philosophy as a science of knowledge ("episteme") which stands over and against mythology's merger and subsequent identity of subject and object. Ani upholds the identify of these categories and claims objectivity is mystification. The question before us is, can one reasonably claim that the realist elements in Plato's epistemology constitute a mystical casting of knowledge?

Albeit my critique, *prima facie*, may appear to be a modest under-taking since so much more can be said about a text which is over six hundred pages, I think I can demonstrate there is a sufficient warrant to my critique. My focus is on the philosophical anchors which ground her intellectual undertaking -- philosophical anchors at the level of history of philosophy and epistemology.

Platonism and the History of Western Philosophy

The question before us is, what is the locus of Platonism in the his-tory of philosophy. For Ani, Plato (though influenced by what she terms "pre-Socratic African philosophies") seems to have gone beyond this influence and was the catalyst for a distinctive philosophical stance. She argues,

> "[w]hat Plato seems to have done is to have laid a rigor-ously constructed foundation for the repudiation of the symbolic sense-the denial of cosmic, intuitive knowledge. It is this process that we need to trace, this develop-ment in formative European thought which was eventu-ally to have such a devastating effect on the nontechni-cal aspects of the culture. It led to the *materialization(J.H.Mc)* of the universe as conceived by the European

mind--a materialization that complemented and supported the intense psycho-cultural need for control of self and others.[13]

While Ani does not deny African influences on Plato (though she does not state precisely what these influences were), she strongly asserts that Plato was the initial and key European thinker to bring about a paradigmatic shift from an intuitionist to a materialist view of the universe. For Ani, this shift from intuitionism to materialism is not confined to Plato's persona as it becomes the essential feature of European thought. Ani's summation of Plato entails three crucial elements we need to investigate. First, Plato was influenced by African philosophical currents. While she gives no direct evidence in the text of such influences, she does provide references in her first endnote.

The first endnote contains a reference to the Platonic dialogue the *Timaeus.* There is no annotation as to why she makes this reference. One who is modestly educated in Platonic philosophy can infer the reference is made since this dialogue not only makes reference to Egypt, but follows the Egyptian doctrine of the uncreatability of matter. Both James and Obenga, who are also referenced in this endnote, make explicit mention to Egyptian doctrine in their works.[14] What is critical to our discussion is that both Obenga and James (even more vigorously than Obenga) assert an Egyptian influence on Plato.

Second, neither they nor Olela argue that there is an epistemological break dividing Egyptian and Platonic thought, instead they stringently assert a continuity with Egyptian thought. Both James and Olela argue this continuity is based on plagiarism. Now, of course, the failure to observe such an epistemological break in no way makes Ani's claim invalid. But even if we take as a given that they miss the boat and fail to recognize the Platonic epistemological repuncture, Ani's further claim that Platonism is materialist does not hold.

While Platonic epistemology is, in fact, a realist view, it is not materialism. Platonic realism is realist because it is an objective idealist stance parasitic upon a rationalist presupposition that mind is not restricted to individual instantiations. Mind for Plato, as with all objective idealists, is a general independent category and not circumscribed by an individual, existential, character.

What Plato calls for in his epistemology is a shift from perceptual to rational cognition. This fact does not imply intuition is absent from Platonic epistemology, for intuition plays a crucial role in his notion of anamnesis or recollection, as we witness in the *Meno*. Hence, Plato's rationalism includes intuition rather than excludes it. Reason has logical priority over intuition, but reason does not negate intuition's presence. In fact, Platonism needs intuition as a crucial component for recollection.

In the history of philosophy, the resort to anamnesis or recollection is predicated on the notion of innate ideas. Rationalists, since they de-value the role of experience, are intrinsically bound to resort to some notion of innate ideas, since ideas for rationalists are not derived from experiential encounters, as witness in Cartesian rationalism.

Third, Platonism, in the history of philosophy, is not a shift to materi-alism but idealism. It was precisely the pre-Socratic Ionian thinkers who began the march toward materialist philosophy. Thales, often referred to as the first Greek philosopher if not the first philosopher, studied in Egypt and came back a materialist. His materialism, as James and Olela show, is consistent with Egyptian philosophy. The argument that materialism is a European philosophy, and thus alien to Africa, is not supported by historical evidence. Plato was not a materialist nor is materialism uniquely a European philosophy.[15]

Plato's idealism is in part a response to Heraclitian materialism. The other part of the equation in this response is Parmenides' idealism. What Plato seeks at the epistemological and ontological plane is a critical syn-thesis of Heraclitus' dialectics and Parmenides' absolute idealism. The critical philosophical question, for Plato, is the reconciliation of the cat-egories of permanence (Parmenides) and change (Heraclitus).

Why has Ani missed the boat regarding Plato's place in the history of philosophy? I think her failure to grasp Platonism in the history of philosophy is due to her methodology. Her method is anthropological not philosophical. Anthropological or sociological reductionism cannot describe or explain philosophical discourse. Her attempts to break from Platonic epistemological restraints requires an epistemological, not an anthropological, analysis. While Plato's philosophical discourse takes place in a social, political, and culture context, and understanding that context is very important, it cannot, however, be a substitute for a con-crete philosophical analysis of concrete philosophical problems. To con-fuse idealism with materialism is an error due to her fundamental igno-rance of philosophy. One reason James, Olela, and Obenga do not make the same error is because they understand philosophy and recognize the *differentia specifica* which demarcates philosophy from anthropol-ogy. While anthropology and philosophy are not antithetical categories, and indeed work together philosophical anthropology they cannot be conflated. The context of a philosophical doctrine while dialectically re-lated to the content of philosophical discourse cannot be reduced to it.

Plato's idealism was a philosophical response to a concrete con-stellation of philosophical issues which were intrinsically connected with a host of socio-political problems prevailing in Athens. Plato's attempt at resolving the philosophical antithesis between Heraclitus' dialectical materialism and Parmenides' absolute idealism in its political ramifica-tion sought the restoration of an aristocratic landowning ruling class. Thus, any concrete analysis of the specificity of Greek philosophy, any

disclosure of Greek philosophy's *differentia specifica* demarcating it from any other cultural matrix, i.e., an African philosophy cannot be uncovered by Ani's essentialist anthropological methodology. One cannot explain the historical and glaring empirical fact the pre-Socratic **philosophy,** as opposed to **mythology**, was materialist.

Ani's thesis that Europe is a cultural entity accents its cohesiveness, integration (integral unity), and common features. But she does this by a reductionism which asserts, "[b]eneath its deceptive heterogeneity lies a monolithic essence; an essence that accounts for the success of European imperialism."[16]

The heterogeneity of Greek philosophy, for example, is not a deception; if is a historical and an empirical fact. The concrete explanation of this fact requires a method and theory which guides us toward an explanation of what is given and not a simplistic dismissal of the facts. A theory or philosophy of liberation cannot afford to say, "My mind is made up. Don't confuse me with facts." The heterogeneity of Greek philosophy is a fact. How do we, in seeking to understand this fact, explain it?

In part, Ani's confusion is the result conflating Plato's importance and influence in Western philosophy with trying to demonstrate that Platonism is a prototype of European philosophy. The affirmation of the former does not logically lead to the latter. Important and influential philosophical doctrines are not necessarily prototypes for subsequent doctrines, but instead can serve to create differing responses within philosophical traditions. Aldred North Whitehead's statement, "Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato," was not a claim that Platonism is a prototype in Western philosophy (he understood well how Aristotle, for example, sought to dismantle Platonic forms from arid abstractions to a concrete category). Better yet, Platonism was a significant view to which Western philosophers in its wake, in due course, had to respond. However, could not the same be said of Hegel for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? Are not Marxist dialectical materialism, Russel's logical atomism, and James' and Dewey's pragmatism, in some way, all responses (footnotes) to Hegel? Surely no one literate in philosophy would claim that Hegelianism is the Western prototype for the nineteenth and twentieth century? Platonism importance and influence cannot be reduced to a prototype.

I want to conclude this discussion on Platonism *locus* in the history of philosophy by returning to the issue of why Ani, in her critique of Plato (and Western philosophy), departs from her Afrocentric forerunners in the persona of James, Diop, Olela, and Bernal. What the latter group did was to point to the continuity of philosophical doctrines; a continuity of philosophical doctrines, in which differences regarding social, political, and cultural context could not override. Plato found in Egyptian philosophy and the State a model to carry out his reactionary aims. This continuity in philosophical doctrines refutes the basic assumption of Ani that

there is a fundamental metaphysical exclusivism between the European and African cultural matrix.

On the other hand, there were differences in the context in which Plato did philosophy and the African experience which influenced his thought. The latter group"s, James, Olela, and Diop, blunder was in not demarcating the concrete context. The salient continuity of philosophical doctrines obscured, for them, the *differentia specifica* of context in which philosophical discourse took place. Ani recognizes that there are differences, but she locates this difference in both context and philosophical doctrine by virtue of her metaphysical exclusion of Europe from Africa. What both Ani and her forerunners share in common is the failure to take into account the dialectical interplay of context and doctrine. Consequently, the *locus* of Platonism in the history of philosophy objectively remains undisclosed for them.

There is an additional point which entails an ontological problematic, *viz.*, the categorical relationship of particularity to universality. While it can be argued that the categories (universality and particularity) should not be conflated, conversely, they ought not be separated, for particularity and universality are correlative categories. By correlative categories I mean that each depends upon the other to exist. Particularity is not then a solitary category as assumed by the Afrocentrist.

The Epistemological Problematic:
Subject/Object Dialectic

Ani's claims that Plato, by virtue of differentiating between subject (knower) and object (the known) and arguing for the objectification of knowledge, formulates a "new epistemology" where objects replace symbols. She asserts, "[i]n the previous and disparate world-views, we see a knowing subject intimately involved in the surrounding universe. The acquisition of knowledge involving an immersion in this universe until, through sympathetic participation, meaning is revealed, expressed and understood via complex and multidimensional symbols."[17]

While it is true Plato's aim is the objectification of knowledge, it is not the case that this in and of itself constitutes a new epistemology. Ani, following Eric Havelock, establishes her notion of a new epistemology by contrasting Plato's philosophy to the Homeric poetic era. The contrast of Platonic philosophy to Homeric poetics is, in fact, a contrast between distinct kinds of intellectual discourse, i.e., between philosophy and mythology rather than disparate philosophical schools. The mythological use of symbols is consistent with the artistic form (poetry) of expression. Poetry seeks not the cognition of reality, but better yet, it is an avenue for the affective expression (an emotional response and release) of and to reality. Affective expression is laden with symbols, e.g., metaphor, simile, analogy, and synaesthesia; however, philosophy and par-

ticularly Platonism is not void of symbolism. Indeed, Ani makes reference herself to Plato's use of allegory, in the allegory of the cave.[18]

The grounds for charge of reification rest in the problem of the objectification of knowledge. Earlier I said the objectification of knowledge did not constitute a new epistemology by Plato. The break by philosophy from mythology, a break which precedes Plato required the objectification of knowledge. Rather than the mythological notion of the identity of subject and object which is an identity of immediacy, philosophy renders any identity of subject and object as a mediation. Western thought has numerous examples of the identity of subject and object, from Berkley to Hegel, yet for all objective idealists it is a process of mediation.

The mediation of subject and object is a logical necessity for any and all cognitive, as opposed to affective, undertaking. Even Ani follows this logical necessity when she argues that we must move from "deceptive heterogenity" to "monolithic essence." Here she is calling for a cognitive process whereby appearance (heterogeneity) and essence are not only not an immediate identity, but that our perceptions of the immediate appearance are different from the objective reality of monolithic essence. If the subject's immediate apprehension of essence can be false, then it follows essence stands apart, objectively separate, from the knower as subject.

The movement from appearance to essence is an implicit recognition that the identity of subject and object is not immediate, thus in some sense separate. If to perceive is not to grasp essence, the subject must be a different category than the object, i.e., we must assume the objectification of knowledge.

Both Plato and pre-Socratic philosophers are on a different epistemological plane than mythology. Ionian materialism, for example, is quite different than Platonic idealism. Thus, pre-Platonic thought cannot be reduced, as Ani does, to Homeric poetics. In the history of Western philosophy, the debate between rationalism and empiricism signals a deep epistemological divide about the role of the senses. The subordination of sensation to reason is not a singular feature of European thought as Ani claims. Hence, Plato's rationalism is not a singular European philosophical tradition.

Both James and Olela show that the objectification of knowledge and the privileging of reason over sensation is something Plato adopted as a result of his training in Egypt. Plato's view of philosophy as a science of knowledge ("episteme") is not original to him or the Greeks.[19] Hence Ani's assertion,

> "Plato's reason is the denial of spirit. Reason functions
> to control the more 'base appetites' and 'instincts.' The
> European view of the human begins to take shape
> here."[20]

is a distortion of the history of philosophy and the notion of rationality held by the Egyptians.

Eurocentrism is a false universality; however, it is a non-sequitur to claim, as Ani does, that universality (in and of itself) is false. The episte-mological and ontological points are corresponding philosophical issues. Ani's denial, on the epistemological plane, of objectivity (the objectifica-tion of knowledge) is correlative to the negation of the ontological cat-egory universality. And inversely, all claims that substantiate a realist epistemology, i.e., the objectification of knowledge, in turn give support to ontological claims of universality. Thus, the quest for particularity (by the Afrocentrist) not only entails the negation of universality, but also the negation of objectivity.

NOTES

[1] Molefi Kete Asante, *The Afrocentric Idea* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 3.

[2] Asante, 4.

[3] Asante, 4.

[4] Asante, 4.

[5] Molefi Kete Asante, *Kemet, Afrocentricity and Knowledge* (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 1990), 6-7.

[6] Asante, 1987, 8.

[7] Asante, 1987, 8.

[8] Asante, 1987, 180.

[9] Asante, 1987, 181.

[10] Marimba Ani, *Yurugu: An African Centered Critique of European Cul-tural Thought and Behavior* (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc. 1994).

[11] Ani, 2.

[12] Ani, 29-30. Cheikh Anta Diop, *Precolonial Black Africa* (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), 27-32. Henry Olela, *From Ancient Africa to Ancient Greece: An Introduction to the History of Philosophy* (Atlanta: The Select Publishing Corp., 1981), 191-219. George G. M. James, *Stolen Legacy* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954).

Martin Bernal, *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots to Classical Civilization Vol. 1* (New Brunswick: Tuges University Press, 1987).

[13] Ani, 30.

[14] Ani, *Yurugu*, 573. James, *Stolen*, 98, 101-02. Theophile Obenga, "African Philosophy of the Pharaonic Period," in Ivan Van Sertima, *Egypt Revisited* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), 292.

[15] James, 42. Olela, 115-23.

[16] Ani, 30.

[17] Ani, 39.

[18] Ani, 36-44.

[19] James, 83-111. Olela, 191-201.

[20] Ani, 32.

American Indian Culture and Research Journal

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Pan-Arabism v. Pan-Africanism in the Sudan: The Crisis of Divergent Ethnic Ideologies

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This article examines the nature and the extent of political and cultural conflict between Northern and Southern Sudanese. It describes and analyzes various attempts by Arab dominated regimes in the Sudan, since independence from Britain, to achieve national intergration through Pan-Arabist policies that seek to Islamize and Arabize the African and largely Christian South. The current military regime dominated by Muslim fundamentalists is trying to turn the Sudan into an Islamic republic. Not only has this brought about a civil war, but it has also alienated other Muslims in the North who favor a secular government.

The Sudan is the largest country in Africa and the ninth largest in the world. It is larger than Texas and Alaska combined. It shares borders with nine African countries and with Saudi Arabia just across the Red Sea. The Sudan is often referred to as a microcosm of Africa in that it comprimises the Arab Muslim elements of North Africa and the Black African elements of sub-Sahara Africa. The Sudan is also characterized by certain dualisms and interesting dichotomies.[1] It was, in theory, ruled by two colonial powers, Britain and Egypt, and was thus known as a condominium—the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Britain did the actual administration of the country. Two great rivers, the White Nile and the Blue Nile, dominate the Sudan. Khartoum, its capital, is dominated by two world religions, Islam and Christianity. Administratively, the Sudan was divided into two main regions, north and south. The northern Sudan was governed along Arab/Muslim lines and the south on African lines.

The Sudan is currently in the throes of a civil war brought about by attempts of various Arab dominated regimes to bring about national intergration through policies that seek to Islamize and Arabize the non-Arab Southern Sudan. The current military junta in Khartoum has declared the Sudan an Islamic state with *Sharia* law being the law of the

land, a policy that has aroused opposition even among Muslims in the Northern Sudan. This article describes and analyzes the policies adopted by the various regimes in the Sudan to bring about national intergration. More specifically, it will provide a brief historical overview and analysis of the dynamics of ethnic self-identification that are at the root of the conflict.

A Historical Overview

In 1898, the Sudan was reconquered by Anglo-Egyptian forces under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener. Although this reconquest was supposedly on behalf of Egypt, Britain, however, had its own reasons; its honor was tarnished somewhat by the death of General Charles "Chines" Gordon in 1885 at the hands of the Mahdists in Khartoum. The death of General Gordon had caused quite an outcry in Britain and there were demands made for an immediate reconquest of the Sudan. General Gordon was a popular national hero due to his military exploits during the Taiping Rebellion in China. Thus, when the news of the fall of Omdurman to Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian forces reached London, the British public was gratified.

General Gordon had been dispatched to the Sudan to evacuate Egyptian garrisons from Khartoum before the advancing Mahdist forces could reach that city. The Mahdists annihilated Egyptian forces under the command of Colonel Hicks, a retired British officer who had served in India. They sealed off Khartoum, trapping General Gordon, who was subsequently killed.

Sir Herbert Kitchener, later Lord Kitchener, became the first Governor-General of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Sudan was divided into provinces that were administered by British governors with the help of Egyptian and, later, Sudanese junior officers, especially in the Northern Sudan. The Southern Sudan was still resisting foreign rule well into the second decade of the twentieth century. This is often cited as the reason for the Southern lag behind the North in socio-political development. It was partly due to this "lag" that the "infamous" Southern Policy was established.

Early in 1930, the Civil Secretary sent a memorandum to Southern governors, outlining the Southern Policy:

> The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.[2]

As a result of this policy, Arab and Islamic influences were to be kept out of the Southern Sudan just like the Christian missionaries were not permitted to proselytize in the North except in the non-Arab districts. This latter point has not often been appreciated by Northern Sudanese critics of the Southern Policy.

Soon after the fall of Omdurman, Lord Cromer, then the chief British administrator based in Egypt, visited Muslim leaders in that city and assured them that he would uphold Islam. He was well aware of the almost fanatical zeal with which the Mahdists fought Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian forces. It was in that light that he wrote to a colleague in 1900 when the missionaries were seeking permission to proselytize in the North:

> I have no objection to giving the missionaries a fair field amongst the black pagan population in the equatorial regions [i.e. the South], but to let them loose at present amongst the fanatical Muslims of the Northern Sudan would, in my opinion, be little short of insane.[3]

Due to this restriction, the missionaries were only allowed to open schools and hospitals, but not to engage in proselytism. However, when the teaching of Islam was permitted at the newly founded Gordon College in Khartoum, some missionaries were outraged. "This is a Christian college," wrote a furious Reverend C.R. Watson, "founded in the name of Christian martyr, through the contributions of Christian government."[4] Perhaps it was not quite clear to the Reverend that the Sudan was a condominium ruled jointly by the Christian British and the mostly Muslim Egyptians. The colonial government was obliged to maintain a measure of balance between the missionary demands and those of the Northern Sudanese. The net result of this policy was the effective containment of Christianity in most parts of the North and the corresponding rehabilitation of Islamic learning.

In the South there was no attempt made, at least initially, to either protect or understand the indigenous religions. Instead, the Christian missionaries were given free reign to proselytize in the South. But a certain kind of balance was struck by the colonial government between the missionaries themselves. The entire Southern Sudan was divided into Catholic and Protestant missionary spheres of influence in order to minimize, as it were, "poaching for converts over interconfessional frontiers."[5] Thus the spread of Islam and Arab culture was to be curbed.

In the mid 1930s, it was becoming clear that the ideals of the age of Lugard with its emphasis on native administration were inadequate. There was no provision in the philosophy of indirect rule for the position of the burgeoning western-educated elite. Like their counter parts in other parts of the British empire, it was this group that challenged the

colonial government, in general, and the basis of the Southern Policy in particular. This elite was almost exclusively from the Northern Sudan. In 1939, just a year after its founding, the Graduates Congress sent a note to Governor General with the following recommendation on educational policy:

> In numerous aspects of our life we have much in common with the Arab countries of Islamic Orient which is due to our akin descent. We therefore consider that education in this country should take an Islamic Oriental character and not a pagan African one, or in other words that Arabic language and Religious Instruction should receive the greatest possible care in all stages of education.[6]

The educational enterprise in the South was in the hands of the Christian missionaries and it was along what the Graduates Congress considered "pagan and African" lines. A certain group of languages were used for instruction as recommended by the Rejaf Language Conference of 1928. This vernacular instruction was at the primary level; beyond that, the medium of instruction was to be English. It was hoped that the English language would become the *lingua franca* of the South. Although it has not achieved that goal, it has nevertheless become a bona fide element of Southern identity.[7] After World War II, the outburst of nationalistic activism in many parts of the British empire engulfed the Sudan. The nationalist agitation for self-determination by the newly founded political parties in the North necessitated the reformulation of a more defensible Southern Policy. Towards the end of 1946, the Civil Secretary declared in a memorandum to adminstrators in the South that it was the purpose of the policy

> ...to act upon the facts that the people of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be forseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for the future development to the middle-eastern and Arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.[8]

Within ten years, since the enactment of the new Southern Policy, the Sudan gained its independence from Britain with Egyptian blessing.

Egypt had hoped to unite with the Sudan, but in vain: the Sudanese leaders opted for full independence from both colonial powers.

The policies pursued by the Northern-dominated government of the independent Sudan brought into open the inherent conflict between the Northern and Southern aspirations. Education and the civil service soon become centers of dispute. The Northerners wanted, for example, to pursue an educational policy that was essentially pan-Arabist in philosophy whereas the Southerners wanted education that reflected their African heritage. Missionary schools were taken over (Sudanized) and a department of religious affairs was created and charged with the promotion of Islamic education in the South. The Minister of Interior at the time had these words of praise for this new department:

> It is my government's concern to support religious education and that is clearly shown by the progress scored by the Religious Affairs Department and the development of the Mahads (Islamic religious schools) under its aegis.[9]

The missionaries were criticized for allegedly devoting too much time and effort to proselytization than to "good education." The Mahads, however, proved to be dismal failures. They succeeded largely in producing a crop of Arabized individuals with no credible skills, some of whom became bitter critics of pan-Arabism. Even the government Arabic medium schools were not any better.

After the take-over of the missionary schools in 1957, an indirect assault was mounted against the English language in the South. The romanized alphabet of the Southern languages was somehow associated in the Northern minds with the missionaries; and Christianity, in turn, was associated with the English language. A new orthography more favorable to Arabic and Islam was to be developed. The Minister of education announced that

> The Ministry has entrusted to a committee of masters led by an expert in languages the task of writing booklets in the different Southern dialects [sic] but in the Arabic alphabet as first step towards the teaching of Arabic.[10]

The conversion to Arabic alphabet necessitated the invention of characters for sounds not found in the Arabic language. However, with the propensity of Arabic orthography for characters with dots, writing and reading soon became a torturous exercise. Besides, the Semitic consonantal spelling was fundamentally unsuitable for the phonological African languages of the South. This policy did not last very long be-

cause the military, under the command of General Ibrahim Abboud, took over power in a bloodless *coup d'etat* in November, 1958. But while it lasted, it virtually destroyed the then existing romanized literature.

The military regime did not waste time pursuing indirect methods of the civilian governments; it chose a more direct approach. Certain elementary schools were earmarked for yet another program of Arabization. Instruction in all subjects was to be in Arabic while English language was to be introduced as a subject at the intermediate school level. More Islamic institutes were built in the main urban centers in the South. Mosques were built near mission stations, especially in the Equatoria province where frequent quasi-revivalist, political rallies were held. At these rallies a few long term Christians would publicly confess to being "closet" Muslims. Some of them claimed that becoming Christians was the only way they could obtain a good education. Civil servants were promised promotions if they passed Arabic language examinations.

In 1960, the military regime launched an intense campaign against the conduct of Christian religion in the South. First, it declared Sunday a working day, triggering widespread strikes by students opposed to the policy, many of whom fled the country. The military regime used to claim that these students had been incited by the missionaries–a claim that grossly underestimated genuine Southern Nationalism. Then, in 1962, it passed the Missionary Societies Act, restricting Christian religious activity, and finally the missionaries themselves were expelled from the Sudan early in 1964. Only those in the South were expelled from the country. The military regime collapsed later in that year and was succeeded by a care-taker government headed by Sir El-Khatim El-Khalifa, a former Assistant Director of Education in the South who was well regarded in the region.

The care-taker government organized a Round Table Conference early in 1965 in an unsuccessful attempt to solve the Southern problem. Later that year, general elections which were boycotted in the South were held and a government headed by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub succeeded the care-taker government. Meanwhile, a growing number of Southerners were taking up arms in response to Mahgoub's government military approach to the problem. Many people fled the country, creating an influx of Southern Sudanese refugees in the neighboring African countries. The security situation in the South deteriorated to such an extent that the military took over power in a *coup d'etat* in 1969 under General Nimeiry. It was during Nimeiry's regime that the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed in 1972. This agreement granted the South a regional autonomy within the framework of a united Sudan.

The Agreement ushered in a decade of peace. General Nimeiry even adopted a more pan-Africanist foreign policy. Although this policy solidified his support in the South, it led to more opposition in the North, particularly among the pan-Arabists. In an attempt to regain pan-Arabist

support, General Nimeiry not only abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement, but also introduced *Sharia* law in 1983. Once again Southerners took to arms as General Nimeiry resorted to pre-agreement policy of using force. General Nimeiry was overthrown in a *coup d'etat* in 1985. The new military government promised to hand over power to the civilians after general elections. That civilian government headed by Sadiq al-Mahdi was subsequently overthrown by the current military government in 1989. This military junta, headed by General Bashir, has declared the Sudan an Islamic state. It has suppressed opposition in the North and is seeking a military solution in the South, fighting the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the largest resistance group in the South.

Pan-Arabism in the Sudan

Pan-Arabism is the energizing ideology of the Northern Sudanese nationalism. This means a commitment, on the one hand, to Arab affairs in the political realm and, on the other, to Arab culture, particularly in its linguistic and religious manifestations. The "racial" aspect of Arabism in the Sudan is a marginal one at best—especially because some of the self-identified Arabs are hardly distinguishable from Black Africans. As Ali Mazrui has observed, "the Arabs as a race...defy straight pigmentational classifications. They vary in color from white Arabs of Syria and Lebanon, brown Arabs of Hadramaut, to the black Arabs of the Sudan."[11]

The Arabic language, more than culture or religion, is the most important factor that has kept the Sudanese Arabs in the mainstream of Arabism and pan-Arabist politics. Elsewhere in Africa, for example, those Arab immigrants who did not keep their language have been significantly Africanized culturally. This is particularly so in East Africa, especially in the pre-revolutionary Zanzibar. However, the very core of Zanzibari oligarchy was still linguistically Arab although it was simultaneously acculturated into the wider Zanzibari Afro-Arab cultural synthesis. Elements of this core often referred to themselves as "Waarabu safi" (pure Arabs) and to non-Muslim and non-Christian Aficans as "Washenzi" (savages).

There is an Arab chauvinism in the Sudan, albeit one that is rather ambivalent on the question of racial purity. In 1965, at the Round Table Conference, the late Ismail el-Azhari said:

> I feel at this juncture obliged to declare that we are proud
> of our Arab orgin, of our Arabism and being Moslems.
> The Arabs came to this continent, as pioneers, to dis-
> seminate a genuine culture, and promote sound prin-
> ciples which have shed enlightenment and civilization
> throughout Africa at a time when Europe was plunged

into the abyss of darkness, ignorance and doctrinal and scholarly backwardness.[12]

This seemingly confident declaration may be indicative of the dilemma that the contemporary Arab society is facing. Westernization, particularly in its secular aspects, is precipitating a crisis among Arab leaders and intellectuals, some of whom have resorted to what Abdallah Laroui has characterized as "...the exaggerated medievalization obtained through quasi-magical identificaiton with the great period of classical Arab culture."[13]

In the Northern Sudan, there is a strong desire among the educated, urban classes to promote a higher form of Arabism. For instance, Sudanese popular songs, by contrast to Egyptian ones, are mostly in classical Arabic. Urbanization has thus become more of a conservative influence rather than a liberalizing one in many aspects of social development in the North.

With regard to religion, the Muslims are a majority in the Sudan, constituting over sixty percent of the population. However, this clearly religious majority, which includes Southern Sudanese Muslims, is often projected as an Arab majority. It is quite clear that being a Muslim is not synonymous with being an Arab. Furthermore, the mere fact that an Arab group is dominant politically does not mean that the entire nation is Arab.

Pan-Africanism in the Sudan

During the same Round Table conference, the late Aggrey Jaden responded to Azhari's declaration by asserting his own ethnicity saying:

> The people of the Southern Sudan on the other hand,
> belong to the African ethnic group of East Africa. They
> do not only differ from the hybrid Arab race in origin,
> arrangement and basic systems, but in all conceivable
> purposes—there is nothing in common between the
> various sections of the community; no body of shared
> belief, and above all the Sudan has failed to compose a
> single community.[14]

Pan-Africanism in the Southern Sudan really came of age as an ideology in the 1960s, particularly during the repressive regime of General Abboud. This was also the time many African countries gained their independence from European colonial powers. The major Southern Sudanese party in exile used the word "African" in its title, the first time any Sudanese political entity had done so. It was obviously inspired by the East African parties. Thus, SANU (Sudan African National Union)

was a Southern Sudanese version of Kenya African National Union (KANU) or the Tanzania National Union (Tanu).

Unlike Pan-Arabism, which is confined to the North, Pan-Africanism has adherents in the North, where it has often been condemned as a racist ideology. It was this kind of hostility that led to the demise of *Kutla-as-Souda* (Black Bloc) founded by Dr. Ahdam in 1938, the same year the Graduates Congress was founded. Due to the opposition and pressure from members of the Congress, the British colonial officials refused to license *Kutla-as-Souda* as a political party. According to Reverend Philip Abbas: "the beoc started as a social organization. It expanded very rapidly attracting people from the Nuba and the Fur, as well as West Africans and former slaves."[15]

Political Pan-Africanism has received somewhat perfunctory endorsement from Northern Sudanese leaders, especially as it relates to non-Sudanese affairs. Commenting on Sudanese African diplomatic efforts of the previous regimes, a former Foreign Minister in General Nimeiry's government said:

> We participated in general conferences without basic interest...we signed resolutions without faith in any single article among then [sic]; we issued revolutionary declarations...without implementing any one of them...the Sudan, despite its presence in all groupings and gatherings whether regional or continental, and despite its formal acceptance of all that took place in those gatherings and groupings was the last country to be committed to them.[16]

The Sudan, which is a member of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League, has never been in the forefront in either Arab or African affairs—a reflection of its marginality. But once in a while, exaggerated claims of Pan-Africanism are made by some Northerners. For example, Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim claims that "Arabism and Africanism have become so completely merged in the Northern provinces that it is impossible to distinguish the two, even from the most abstract view..."[.17] However, it does not require any special intellectual capacity to discern the presence of African ethnic groups in the North. In any case, Africanism is not a source of cultural pride in the North, particularly among the Afro-Arabs.

Prospects for the Future

The current regime came to power via a *coup d'etat*, so it could similarly be removed. In fact, it has already survived several attempts so

far; it is just a matter of time, so to speak.

With respect to the status of the Sudan as an Islamic state, that, too, could go away with the regime. This regime has no credibility with the significant traditionally friendly Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia; even Libya of the radical Gadhafi recoils from it. As a result, the regime went out of its way to ally itself with Iraq and Iran—an alliance that has earned it classification by the U.S. State Department as a state that sponsors terrorism.

The regime is supported mainly by the National Islamic Front (NIF), a fringe fundamentalist party that cannot gain power through legitimate democratic process. As a matter of fact its leader, Hassan al-Turabi, was soundly defeated when he ran for parliament in 1986 before advent of the current regime. The leading political parties in the North, the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), joined forces against al-Turabi. These parties are patronized by the principal Muslim sects in the Sudan. The Umma party has traditionally been backed by the Ansar (Mahdist) sect and the DUP by the Khatamiyya sect. These sects have no interest in the brand of Islamic fundamentalism being foisted on the nation by the regime and the NIF.

The real serious problem for the Sudan is the Southern problem and this problem is, at its core, a political one. The Southern Sudanese are not against Islam per se; indeed, Southern Sudanese Muslims are fighting against the regime with their kind of vision that had made the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement possible. When General Nimeiry talked openly about unity in diversity, he gained the support of Southerners and earned respect among African leaders. A Nigerian paper, for example, had these words of praise:

> The solution of the problem of Southern Sudan is one of the greatest things that have happened to the Sudan and Africa in recent months. It is notable that the conflict has now been solved under the leadership of a true believer in African unity—President Nimeiry.[20]

The historic, Afro-Arab tension which is always just below the surface is one that is rooted in slavery and slave trade. It could easily be revived by what is going on in the Sudan.

NOTES

[1] I do not agree with Ali Mazrui's assertion that the Sudan is characterized by multiple marginalities. See Mazrui, "The Multiple Marginalities of the Sudan," *Violence and Thought* (London: Longman's, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969).

[2] See Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 115-18; Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, *Imperialism in the Sudan* 1899-1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 244-49; and Dunstan M. Wai, ed., *The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 175-79.

[3] Cromer to Salisbury, 22 February 1900, P.R.O. FP/633/6. Quoted in Abd Al-Rahim, *Imperialism*, 72.

[4] Richard Hill, "Government and Christian Missionaries in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1914." *Middle Eastern Studies* 1(January 1965): 125.

[5] Hill, 114.

[6] Beshir, *Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 237.

[7] This fact was recognized in the Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter III, Section 6.

[8] J.W. Robertson, Memorandum on Southern Policy, 16 December 1946, CS/SCR/I.C.I., in *Background to Conflict*, 120-1.

[9] Joseph Oduho and William Deng, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 38.

[10] Helen Kitchen, ed., *The Educated African* (New York: Praeger, 1962), 69.

[11] Mazrui, 167.

[12] Francis M. Deng, *Dynamics of Identification: A Basis for National Intergration* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973), 74.

[13] Abdallah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual*, trans. Diarmid Cammell (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976), 156.

[14] Wai, p. 146.

[15] Philip Abbas, "Growth of Black Political Consciousness in North Sudan," *Africa Today* 20 (Summer 1973): 266.

[16] Richard P. Stevens, "The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan's Afro-Arab Policy," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (June 1976): 252.

[17] Abd Al-Rahim, "Arabism, Africanism and Self Identification in the Sudan," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 8 (July 1970): 249.

[18] In August 1994, after capturing and handing over to the French authorities the notorious terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, the Sudanese officials appealed to the U.S. to take Sudan off the blacklist. So far, the U.S. government has not obliged. See *Time*, 29 August 1994, 54.

[19] Raymond Bonner, "Letter from the Sudan," *The New Yorker*, 13 July 1992, 73.

[20] Stevens, 266.

From Tribal To Ethnic Identity:
The Transformation of North-Eastern India

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This paper examines the political mobilization of tribal identi-
ties in north-eastern India. Using examples from Assam,
Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, and
Arunachal Pradesh, the paper suggests that more attention
needs to be paid to domestic politics within the Indian state
which have contributed to the mobilization of tribal peoples
into highly politicized ethnic groups. The paper will explore the
impact of government policies in these hillstates and the role
of political elites in such mobilization.

The dynamic relationship between ethnicity and the state is
changing the political map of India as new groups are given political and
economic recognition by the Government of India. A number of these
groups are located in the northeastern part of the country. In this paper,
I examine recent developments in north eastern India, specifically, the
hill states of Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura,
and Aruncachal Pradesh (the "seven sisters"), which suggest that more
attention needs to be paid to the nexus between the activities of institu-
tions of the state and the mobilization of tribal people into highly politi-
cized ethnic groups.

In recent years violence has taken a heavy toll on human life as
well as property in the hill states in north east India. The conflict between
dominant tribal groups in these states and the resultant use of force by
government troops has put the official death toll in Nagaland and Manipur
alone at over four hundred lives in the past two years. Despite the sign-
ing of peace accords and agreements between the Government of India
and the various tribal groups, there is continued protest and unrest in
the north east as more and more groups stake out their claims to politi-
cal recognition and greater economic opportunities. This paper begins
with a brief overview of the use of ethnicity in political mobilization within
the Indian Union. The next section examines why and how tribal peoples
in these states began to mobilize politically around new constructions of

tribal/ethnic identities. The paper concludes with a brief look at future directions for government policy in the hill states of north-eastern India.

Ethnicity is defined here as the shared historical experiences, myths, and symbols like language, religion, and caste, which are used by the members of a group to set themselves apart from others.[1] Thus, members of an ethnic group often view themselves as part of a "nation." In contrast, tribes (like clans) tend to be more united and differentiated as they are almost feudal in character with every family having a status and a role within a specific community. Confederations of tribes can and sometimes do begin to function as ethnic groups by adopting unifying symbols, myths, and histories, and this paper examines the process of transformation among Indian tribal groups.[2] Tribal/ethnic group relations with the state are vital for understanding the process of transformation. The state is treated here as a relatively autonomous actor whose policies can be shaped by the dominance of certain groups within it as well as by its selective support to specific ethnic elites.[3] These policies in turn can have an impact on ethnic group consciousness as well as inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic relations.[4]

Ethnicity and the Indian Union

Religious, linguistic, and, caste groups have been a driving force in both the creation and the evolution of the Indian Union. The secular character of the Indian struggle for independence was largely the result of a pragmatic recognition of these forces by the leadership of the nationalist movement. Indian secularism, unlike its western counterpart, was concerned with equal government protection for all religions rather than a pure separation of church and state. It was this vision of secularism that guided the leaders of the independence movement.

The Indian National Congress, which was the driving force behind the movement for independence, conceded the importance of ethnic, and more specifically, language, caste, and regional identifications, long before independence. Gandhi, in his attempt to mobilize the Indian masses, encouraged the rise of ethnic elites who could help "build bridges" to India's villages for the Congress movement. As early as the 1920s, the Congress accepted the principle of linguistic states after independence in order to win the support of regional leaders for the struggle against British rule. By the time of independence in August 1947, religious and linguistic nationalisms had established their stake in the state-making process underway in the Indian sub-continent. Hindu and Muslim nationalism and language chauvinists from around the country sought to assert their rights. The strength of these forces became very visible with the Muslim League's successful campaign for an Islamic state of Pakistan.

The creation of Pakistan only served to strengthen the Congress commitment to secularism, and the Constitution drafted under its leadership provided extensive government support for ethnic minorities.[5] Thus, religious, linguistic groups, backward, and tribal groups as well as economically depressed groups were all given certain fundamental rights to propagate their beliefs and protect their culture, language, and, until the passage of the 16th amendment in 1963, the right to preach secession.[6] Ethnic identities therefore came to be openly acknowledged and were made the basis of political organization and bargaining. Ethnic group activity in the years immediately after independence also played a role in transforming the structure of government by wresting territorial concessions. The federal system bequeathed by the British to India had been retained in the Constitution and consisted of a central government and numerous states arbitrarily created (as in other British colonies) for administrative convenience. Nehru had promised that after independence linguistic states would be created to replace these British administrative units. However, the violence that followed the partition of the country had generated concerns about the need to provide the central government with effective powers to keep the country together, and on the recommendations of the Dar commission, it was decided that four administrative units would be created in lieu of a number of linguistic states. [7]

Language became a rallying symbol around which ethnic groups mobilized to challenge the central government. The first battle cry was sounded by the Telegu-speaking people of the south who demanded the creation of a separate state of Andhra. The popular support for this movement generated similar demands from other parts of India and led to the setting up of the State Reorganization Commission, which in 1955 recommended the redrawing of state borders along linguistic lines. The reorganization led to the creation of fourteen states and five centrally administered territories. The use of language to back territorial claims continued in the subsequent period. In the state of Bombay, the conflict between Gujarati and Marathi-speaking peoples ultimately led to the partition of that state in 1960. When the Sikhs were refused a state on religious grounds, they began a movement to secure a separate Punjabi-speaking state. In 1966, Punjab was divided into a Punjabi-speaking state and a Hindu-speaking state of Haryana. Popular support for this movement was fueled by the economic concerns of various groups. The demand for the creation of states on a linguistic basis reflected the concerns of middle and lower class groups who had traditionally used government employment to improve their economic and social status. Their interests were closely tied to the creation of state governments and bureaucracies operated in the local language. The forces at work in other parts of India also manifested themselves in the north-eastern parts of the country.[8]

Tribal to Ethnic Identity in North-Eastern India

The region that today comprises Assam, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, and Arunachal Pradesh was annexed from Burma by the British in 1826. In 1905, it was amalgamated with East Bengal (now Bangladesh) to form the Province of East Bengal and Assam. The only exceptions were Manipur and Tripura, which were independent states and were recognized as such by the British. The population was almost entirely tribal and was dominated by tribes like the Nagas, Mishmis, Adis, Miris, Apa Tanis, and Nishis. The entire region was administered by a skeletal staff compromised of commissioner/district commissioner assisted by a few clerks and a small force of soldiers.

Map of India's North-Eastern States

The rise of political awareness among the tribals in the hill states and their mobilization around ethnic symbols like language, history, and tradition needs to be examined in connection with three major factors; the change in official government policy towards the hillstates after independence, the spill-over effects of linguistics/cultural nationalism, and the influence of political elites.

Government Policy

In comparison with other parts of India, the tribals of these areas were well served by the British policy of non-interference and protection which allowed them to retain their lands and continue with their traditional lifestyles. Plainsmen were not allowed to acquire land in the hills, and the indigenous system of land tenure was also maintained. In the prolonged negotiations that preceded independence in 1946, there were discussions about the future of Assam, but the focus remained almost exclusively on the Hindu-Muslim question. At the time, a few of the larger tribal groups like the Nagas made their dissatisfaction felt while others stressed the need for constitutional safeguards to protect educational and employment opportunities. The vast majority of tribes stayed out of the negotiations of which they were only dimly aware.

Independence changed all that. Despite Prime Minister Nehru's advice that "People should develop along the lines of their own genius and the imposition of alien values should be avoided," the reality was that the Indian government adopted a much more aggressive and intrusive administration of these hill areas. To villagers who were used to managing their own affairs, the interference of lowly officials from the plains and from other parts of India who were often ignorant and uncaring of local customs was at the least offensive. As one Indian administrator who served in this part of the country for more than thirty years wrote,

> While inter-village rivalries and casual skirmishes have been endemic in the tribal areas since time immemorial, it has been only since Independence and the imposition of a much heavier administrative control that violence and armed insurgency have come to be accepted as the normal pattern of life.[10]

The problem of administration was complicated by the rush of Assamese plains-people who had hitherto been forbidden from acquiring or owning land in the hill areas. These plains-people were themselves tribals who had been converted to the Hindu religion and had developed a distinct language called Assamese with its own script, grammar, and literature. During the colonial period there had been occasional incidents in which the Assamese had complained against the colonial

policy of protection of the hill states since it was not applied to Christian missionaries. There was also some resentment that colonial administrators had actively encouraged the dissemination of English and the adoption of the Roman script among tribal groups whose lingua franca was a form of simple Assamese.[11]

Prevented during colonial rule from interacting with the people of the hillstates, the Assamese seized the opportunities presented by independence to begin the process of assimilation. The government's encouragement of the plains-people in attempt to generate economic prosperity for the hill people through cooperative ventures like paper and plywood industries only helped to deepen the animosity between the bigger tribes and the Assamese, who resented the privileged treatment given the tribes under British rule.

Government policy not only encouraged business interests from outside the region but also drew in a large number of non-tribals who possessed the necessary technical and other skills thought necessary for development. They in turn brought their kinsmen, and the lure provided by government development money brought in large numbers of contractors. The result was that the tribals found themselves becoming second class citizens in their own territories. In addition to this, as Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf has documented, government policies of land tenure and revenue collection also facilitated the transfer of tribal lands to outsiders.[12]

The Nagas were among the first to organize against this "invasion" from the plains. The constitutional recognition of tribal identity and the right to organize and preach secession was used by the Nagas in the years after independence when they formed the Naga National Council to spearhead the demand for a separate state to be carved out of Assam. After almost fifteen years of violent agitation, a moderate section of the Naga leadership settled for statehood within the Indian Union in 1963, although separatist groups continue to operate on the border with Burma. The Naga agitation against Assamese and Indian domination laid the basis for demands from other groups who were confronted with a much more intransigent Assamese state.

Spill-Over of Linguistic/Cultural Nationalism

In the 1960s other tribal groups began to mobilize around the issue of language and cultural preservation. They were responding to Assamese initiatives which were themselves a reaction to the influx of people from the East and West Bengal in the aftermath of partition. The presence of a large number of Bengali-speakers ("foreigners") in certain sectors of the economy led to fears of perceived Bengali domination of Assamese life and led to the passage in 1962 of the Assam Official Language Act of 1960 (making Assamese the official language in the

state).

The passage of this Act triggered unrest among the forty-four percent non-Assamese speaking groups in the state. Hill tribes like the Khasis, the Garos, and the Mizos, among others, launched separatist movements. While all of these groups had in the past used Assamese in various forms, they now began to distance themselves from Assam and claim separate linguistic/cultural status. In 1969, the Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo Hills were taken away from Assam to form an autonomous unit called Meghalaya. In the years that followed, Mizo protests intensified, leading ultimately to the reorganization of the north-east along tribal/ linguistic lines in 1971-72. The reorganization led to full-fledged state- hood for Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura, and union territory status for the Mizo hills (called Mizoram) and the North East Frontier Agency (called Arunachal Pradesh). In the late seventies and early eighties, both these areas were given full statehood within the Union.

Concerns about language and cultural preservation are often masks for economic issues, and the latter have been at the forefront of ethnic group mobilization in north-eastern India. The demand that the indigenes or "sons of the soil" be given their fair share of the benefits of government development led many groups to follow in the footsteps of the Assamese activists who had successfully linked their economic con- cerns about "foreigners" with questions of linguistic and cultural differ- ences. The Assamese agitation against Bengali domination was spear- headed by the All Assam Student's Union (AASU), and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), a spin-off from the AASU. Their demands included a call for central government intervention to protect the interests of the "sons of the soil" while keeping foreigners out of the state. The AASU and the AGP were able to mobilize Assamese society using non-violent demonstrations, rallies as well as bombings, burning of vehicles, and other tactics aimed at intimidating the government. They portrayed them- selves as victims of Central government indifference and "foreign" domi- nation. Similar strategies have found favor with groups in Meghalaya (All-Meghalaya Students Union), in Assam (All Bodo Student Union),and in Tripura (Tribal National Volunteers), among others. At the same time, there are groups in Nagaland and Mizoram which continue to seek sepa- ration from India. In Nagaland, the forces of Naga separatist leader Mr. A. Z. Phizo continue to destabilize the border with Burma, while another and more violent group (the Nationalist Council of Nagaland), led by Thuingaleng Muivah, is based in Burma. In Mizoram, despite govern- ment efforts to enter into talks in the 1980s with Mizo National Front (MNF) leader, Mr. Laldenga, problems continue.

The demands by these groups gathered force in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and following the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi, new initiatives were put forward by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi towards re- solving the situation. Accords were signed in Assam and Tripura, and an

agreement was reached with Mr. Laldenga. In elections held in the after-
math of the accords, regional parties were brought to power in many of
the north-eastern states. However, the situation did not improve. For ex-
ample, in the elections held in Assam in 1985, the Asom Gana Parishad
(AGP) won the state assembly elections and immediately put into effect
policies that have accelerated the pace of fragmentation in the region.
Among other decisions, the AGP authorized Assamese to be compul-
sory in non-Assamese language schools and also began a campaign to
evict "foreigners" and "encroachers" (most of whom turned out to be
indigenous people)from forest areas. The AGP, government which was
dominated by upper caste Hindu-Assamese, faced intense opposition
from other sectors of Assamese society who felt their interests were
being neglected. Some commentators have suggested that the ruling
Congress party in New Delhi encouraged the growth of opposition to the
AGP among tribal groups like the Bodos, Rabhas, and Misings. In any
event, the AGP government proved short-lived, and the current Con-
gress government faces destabilization from the United Liberation Front
of Assam (UNLFA), which claims to represent the "80% of the people of
Assam constituting the economically exploited sections."[13]

A more serious concern is that many of the insurgent groups
appear to be cooperating with one another in recent years. For example,
the NSCN-Muivah faction, the Bodo Security Force, the ULFA, and the
People's Liberation Army of Minipur are said to have formed a new orga-
nization aimed at coordinating policy and strategy.[14] There is also con-
cern that the activism has spread to other tribal groups in neighboring
states. The demand for a state of Uttarkhand has been put forward by
youth-dominated groups like the Uttarkhand Kranti Dal (UKD) and the
more extremist Uttarkhand Mukti Sena (UMS) on the grounds that these
hill districts in northern Uttar Pradwsh constitute a separate geographi-
cal and cultural region which should be given independent status within
the Union. However, their negotiations with the government indicate that
their major concern is with rectifying what they perceive to be the eco-
nomic injustices inflicted upon the peoples of the hill by the government
located in the plains. Unemployment, water-shortages, and lack of ac-
cess to government contracts thus emerge as the primary consider-
ations.[15]

Similar factors have contributed to the emergence of the de-
mand for Jharkhand comprising the tribal pockets of Bihar, West Ben-
gal, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh. In the case of the latter, the Union
government has under pressure conceded in principle to the creation of
Jharkhand if the four affected states agree. The Gorkha National Libera-
tion Front's (GNLF) demand for Gorkhaland similarly reflects the con-
cerns of its leader, Subhas Ghising, for the plight of six million Nepalis in
West Bengal whose underdeveloped status is credited to their lack of
access to higher education and administrative jobs, as well as the offi-

cial rejection of the Nepali language.[16] In all these cases the need for economic development is causing groups to seek out and reinforce cultural and language commonalities that then become the basis for political organization. Like the earlier movements centered on language, these groups also seek a separate territorial status in the hope that this will give them a measure of control over their political and economic futures.

The Influence of Political Elites

Paul Brass, writing about India, held that ethnicity and nationalism were the creation of elites who "draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the culture of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as themselves."[17] This becomes very apparent in examining the rise of ethnic identification in the Indian north-east. While government policies and the rise of Assamese cultural nationalism acted as catalysts in mobilizing the various tribal groups, such mobilization would have been impossible in the absence of leaders who seized the opportunities provided by these factors.

These individuals are part of a growing body of educated tribals who are now leading various insurgencies in the hill states or are part of mainstream political activity within these states. While the more radical elements like Phizo (Nagas), Laldenga, and Muivah (Mizos) have distanced themselves from India and are seeking separation, others like Bejoy Hrankhwal (Kuki from Tripura) have accommodated themselves to the idea of independent statehood within the Indian Union. These individuals, unlike many of their tribal compatriots, have received an education and have come to understand the history of the tribal people within the Union as one of exploitation and injustices. As the number of educated unemployed youth grows, the insurgents will have no trouble finding potential leaders and recruits among their number.

The power of the tribal elites lies in their ability to bring people together in defense of common symbols and to even create symbols where none may have existed. Thus, educated Khasi elites (with the help of missionaries) were responsible for the development of the Khasi language, script (Roman), and literature to the point where few Khasis (unlike other hill tribes) had any knowledge of Assamese. This made it easier for independence from Assam and, in recent years, to get Khasi recognized as one of the languages in which examinations can be taken at the University at Guahati.

Similarly, the movement for "Udayachal," or Bodoland as it is called, also focused on separating the Bodo language from Assamese. The Bodo Sahitya Sabha was founded in 1952 to make Bodo a language of instruction, a goal that was not achieved until 1963. There was little interest at the time in denying the importance of learning Assamese,

which was seen as an important route to economic and social mobility. Then in 1973-74, there was violent struggle over the choice of script for the Bodo language which had until then use Assamese. Bodo leaders launched a struggle in favor of the Roman script and, after the loss of twenty-one Bodo lives, the government agreed to a compromise candidate, the Devanagari script (in which Sanskrit is written).[18] The resulting alienation has led to the fact that most Bodo youth today have little knowledge of Assames, and Bodo elites use this as one more argument in favor of separation from Assam. The movement has made some headway in recent years, and a Bodoland Autonomous Council has been created. The success of the Bodos has in turn sparked demands by non-Bodo plains tribes in Assam like the Rabhas and the Misings, who are next in line for autonomous councils. Political elites have thus aided the process of identity formation in these hill states.

Conclusion

The increasing number of groups seeking some kind of separate identity is a clear signal that all is not well in the Indian Union. There is no indication that the process will cease. In fact, the Indian experience indicates that successful mobilization by one group can encourage other groups to do the same. There are those who would argue that the consequences on the state of continual mobilization of ethnic groups would appear to be fragmentation and ultimately disintegration. However, it must be made clear that while some members of the Nagas and Mizos have sought separation from the Indian Union, the rest of the groups have sought separation from Assam. As long as the central and state governments are able to identify and facilitate genuine demands for cultural/linguistic expression and economic development through greater autonomy/statehood, there is little cause for concern. The Indian Constitution has a clearly established pattern which every ethnic group in the country has had to follow to get constitutional requirement. The first step is the creation of a separate district, then an autonomous region or district council, later an autonomous state or union territory, and finally a full fledged statehood.

There are two major sources of problems in the north-eastern states. The first lies in the area of economic development. The constant complaints about the destruction or alienation of tribal lands in the name of industrialization provide ammunition in the hands of those who would seek separation. It is important that state governments take actions to restrain or prevent these activities. Secondly, the increasing use of the Army to put down violence in states like Manipur and Tripura brings back memories of the campaigns waged against the Nagas and the Mizos, and we know that Army-inflicted violence in these states leaves a long and bitter trail. It is absolutely imperative that the ruling Congress party

lend its support to regional initiatives instead of undermining (as it often has) non-Congress leaders and politicians who may hold the key to peace in these states. The ability of the Indian Union to weather the transformation underway is ultimately going to be determined by the policies adopted by the Government of the Union.

NOTES

[1]Ted Rober Gurr, *Minorities At Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 3.

[2]Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 240-41.

[3]Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), Preface.

[4]David Brown, "Ethnic Revival: Perspectives On State and Society," *Third World Quarterly* 11 (October 1989): 1-17.

[5]*The Constitution of India* (New Delhi: Rupa Publishers, 1965), The Preamble, Articles 14-17, 25, 29-30.

[6]The term minorities as used in the Indian constitution refers to any group that lays claim to equal or preferential treatment on the grounds of religion, language, or other cultural factors. K.K. Wadhwa, *Minority Safeguards In India* (New Delhi, 1965), 21.

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Cemetery Squatting and Anti-Chinese Tensions: Insights From Central Java

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Over the centuries, the Chinese minority in Indonesia has lived in an environment characterized by social tensions. This paper will explore Chinese-Javanese relations in the microcosm of a Javanese squatter settlement that has invaded a Chinese cemetery. Four issues will be considered which will illustrate the nature of long-standing tensions between these two ethnic groups: 1) the manner in which informal sector housing is developed; 2) economic attitudes of the Javanese with respect to the Chinese; 3) the relationship of the Chinese to law and authority and how conflict resolution is approached; and 4) the linguistic context of Chinese-Javanese relations. Although cemetery squatting has been an incremental process, it has been the result of a fundamental perception of the weak position of the Chinese in Javanese society. Similarly, the illegal occupation of land also results from perceptions that both the Chinese and public officials will ultimately acquiesce to the squatters' aspirations.

Over the centuries, the Chinese minority in Indonesia has lived in an environment characterized by social tensions. More recently, it has been observed that "almost every individual of Chinese descent in the country has to cope with the general predicament to some degree of his daily life, either as petty discrimination or as personal tragedy."[1] This paper will explore this inter-ethnic difficulty in microcosm as manifested in the development of a Javanese squatter settlement in a Chinese cemetery located in the community of Blimbing Sari in Central Java.[2] In doing so, four issues will be considered that will shed additional light on the relationship between the two groups and the manner in which this conflict proceeds towards its ultimate, though perhaps not consensual resolution: 1) the manner in which informal sector housing is developed, who the squatters are, and why they came; 2) economic attitudes of the

Javenese with respect to the Chinese; 3) the relationship of the Chinese to law, authority, and formal vs. informal routes to conflict resolution; and 4) the linguistic context of Chinese-Javanese relations.

Informal Sector Housing and Characteristics of the Squatters

As one might expect, the squatters are Javanese workers in the informal sector who require a central residential location in order to maintain proximity to their employment.[3] This is reflected by the fact that virtually all informal sector housing units can be considered a form of "infill" in Indonesian cities. That is, they were built as the result of a gradual or organized invasion of previously unoccupied land characterized by a continuing ambiguity in ownership status.[4]

This process of spontaneous settlement has focused on centrally-located but environmentally disadvantaged locations. Typically, they are situated off major thoroughfares on the sloping embankments to a river. However, when all such sites have been absorbed, Chinese cemeteries emerge as a second tier of advantageous habitat because they are located on high ground far removed from floods and the inevitable economic dislocations following a natural disaster. In addition, they are often proximate to existing urban communities and public services. However, Javanese cemeteries are off-limits in a country that is ninety percent Islamic, and Christian burial grounds are similarly excluded due to the strong societal and governmental recognition accorded that faith. In contrast, the historical and economic roles of the Overseas Chinese in Indonesia (and indeed, in all of Southeast Asia) have left them vulnerable to the larger society's ability to impose informal restraints, sanctions, and discrimination.[5]

The cemetery itself arose in the early twentieth century, and an examination of headstones reveals that the most recent burial occurred in 1992. The squatting commenced in late 1984 when eleven dwellings were constructed. A spurt of thirty more units followed between November 1984 and December 1985. The rate of growth then slowed to four houses in the next seven months. This pattern continued for the next four years, with only twenty-four houses constructed between August 1987 and August 1991. At this point the pace accelerated, with twelve units built over the ensuing sixteen months. By January 1993, a total of eighty-one dwellings had been built over a period of about nine years.

What determined the rate of growth of the squatter community during this time? It is apparent that the initial sites selected for squatting were in more remote (and therefore less desirable) locations where familial visitations to gravesites had been observed to cease. When these were absorbed, greater temerity and risk were necessary, and this may very well account for the decrease in houses built between January 1986 and August 1991. The pace of squatting then accelerated as the Chi-

nese community showed no inclination to attempt to halt these incursions. As one resident observed, "Investment is a function of bravery." A second noted the lack of action by the Chinese, attributing it to the fact "The community squats together."

Another perspective on this invasion is suggested by the squatters' prior residences, which suggest the monitoring of events from a near vantage point; more than half lived in the vicinity prior to squatting. Economics also plays a major role. An adjacent community characterized by legal land titles had incomes twenty-five percent higher than those in the squatter settlement.[6] This is consistent with other observations from Indonesia that a strong relationship exists between income and legal tenure.[7]

With this description of the squatters and their motives, issues can be examined that relate to the tensions between Chinese and Javanese, and other third parties whose attentions may be brought to bear on relations between the invaders and the invaded.

Javanese Economic Attitudes Towards the Chinese

In addition to the essential need for centrally-located land, the superior economic position of the Chinese provided a convenient rationalization for squatting in Blimbing Sari. Families visiting uninvaded gravesites had the appearance of affluence, invariably arriving in automobiles; in contrast, such ownership was limited to less than five percent of Blimbing Sari squatters.

Nevertheless, while various economic explanations have been offered to explain anti-Chinese sentiment, they do not appear to have much relevance in this particular situation. Blimbing Sari residents are largely employed as street vendors (forty percent), while a fifth are retired, another fifth are employed by the goverment, and no employment data was available for the remaining fifth. Clearly, the element of economic competiton with the Chinese is not a factor in this instance.[8]

On a larger scale, while economic development has been a primary objective of the Suharto government, its welcoming of foreign capital would benefit the urban upper and upper-middle classes.[9] Although the Chinese are well-represented in these strata, it is unlikely that those connected with Blimbing Sari would be included in these groups. If they were, one might expect such economic ties to generate stronger political influence. In this context, it would be more plausible to suggest that had Blimbing Sari enjoyed a more strategic location, e.g. close to major street, or had it been located in a key commercial or industrial center where a *cukong* could exert its power, then a cemetery invasion would not have occurred. This is underscored by the existence of another Chinese cemetery within a mile of Blimbing Sari whose frontage on a main artery is rumored to the the site of a shopping center. No squatting has

occurred and it is expected that generous compensation will be paid if the graves are removed.

If anything, it is the popular stereotype of the Chinese that is emphasized again and again in the media that appears to underscore the most frequently-heard rationalizaton for squatting in Blimbing Sari: "They can afford it." Additionally, it should be noted the recently-held national election in the Spring of 1992 might have reinforced resident attitudes. In his campaign, President Suharto emphasized that "conglomerates" should pass on their wealth to those less fortunate. Several analyists said that "Conglomerate was a code for Ethnic Chinese." At the same time, Suharto's half brother, Probosutedjo, accused the Chinese of clannish behavior and hoarding their wealth, thereby "suggesting they were working against the national interest."[10]

Perhaps it is fortunate that the Indonesian goverment does not compile, or has not made available ethnic compilations of wholesale or retail trade data, which would probably suggest a strong Chinese preponderance.[11] As a provincial official observed concerning the economic success attributed to the Chinese, "Most of them have talent in business."[12] In Blimbing Sari, the opportunity to construct a house at the expense of the Chinese represents a grass-roots activation of Suharto's exhortation.

The Chinese, Authority, and Conflict Resolution

Social harmony and the resolution of conflict, *rukun,* is the ideal which every Javanese community strives to achieve and maintain.[13] As Jay has obseved, "*Rukun* is a term both for a state of being and for a mode of action."[14] It is this equanimity and its relationship to the Chinese in Blimbing Sari that will be examined in this situation.

By most standards, *rukun* might appear to be ill-suited as a descriptive term for the uneasy equilibrium in Blimbing Sari. But, indeed, efforts made by all parties were designed to promote at least a temporary state of harmony. If the squatters are accomodated by building sites and the Chinese are mollified by the preservation of the remainder of the cemetery, the equilibrium is maintained. In order to better understand this phenomenon, we can examine the hierarchy of institutions in Indonesian local government, each of which has a specific role to play, either as a neutral party, a mediator, or an advocate. In doing so, the administrative system of local goverment in Indonesia will be considered, as well as non-governmental entities. Further complicating matters is the fact that the cemetery is divided by the boundary of two mutually-exclusive jurisdictions, one a *kabupaten* (country) and the other *kotamadya* (city) (see Figure 1).

County	Kabupaten	Kotamadya	City
Sub-district	Camat	Camat	Sub-district
Rural Village	Lurah	Lurah	Urban village
Neighborhood	Tukun Warga	Rukun Warga	Neighborhood
Community	Ruken Tetangga	Rukun Tetangga	Community

CEMETERY

PUK (Chinese	Area 3	Area 2	Area 1	Royal Court
organization)		Juru2 Kunci (caretakers)		(landowner)

Regional ABRI
(Military Office)

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Figure 1

Non-Governmental Entities

The Royal Court: In existence since the eighteenth century, this institution is not a monolithic organization. In fact, its activities involve the administration of assets owned by the Sultan, those of his family, as well as those belonging to the *kraton* (palace). Because the Chinese are not allowed to own land in this area, they are dependent on the desires and decision of the Sultan, and it is not clear how long the cemetery will be permitted to exist. At the same time, it has been widely discussed among some of the squatters with longer histories in the area that it is possible that the *kraton* will provide them with some type of land tenure—either as individuals or as a collective—in order to formally recognize their status. In any case, their view of the *kraton* is a benevolent one: "We follow the Sultan." As for the Chinese, their relationship with the *kraton* appears to be one of deference, recognizing their claim on the land "depends on the Sultan's will and decisions."[15]

Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian (PUK): This is a Chinese association, whose idiomatic title loosely translates to "burial society;" it not only serves Chinese bereaved families, but serves a social purpose as well as provides aid to families of travelers who may have lost their lives in the general region. Its existence is reminiscent of the institution of Captaincies prior to World War II. During the period, *peranakan* Chinese communities preferred to have as little contact with the government as possible. Instead, they relied on officers who represented their interests to Dutch colonial authorities. Although these formal positions were abolished in the 1930s, the tradition of mediating interests has persisted.[16]

The PUK remains an active advocate for Chinese cemetery interests. In the case of the cemetery on a major thoroughfare noted above, it has worked with the landowner (coincidentally, the *kraton*) to forestall squatting and, as noted, negotiations are in progress to provide compensation for moving the graves to an alternative site well removed from any urbanization.[17] However, in Blimbing Sari, the PUK has facilitated some decisive action in concert with local government. In October 1992, a four and a half foot high cinderblock wall was constructed on the boundary between Areas 2 and 3 of the cemetery (see Figure 2), a line which also coincides with the division between two major administrative divisions, the *kabupaten* (county) and *kotamadya* (city). Further, a perpendicular extension was also constructed simultaneously, and there are plans to finish the enclosure if and when funds become available from the Chinese community. These monies are collected by the PUK and the project is managed by the Rukan Warga (RW), Pak Mischbah, of the appropriate *kabupaten* neighborhood. The PUK does not have any formal responsibilities for safeguarding the cemetery; that is the role of the caretakers (*juru2 kunci*), whose role will be discussed below. Ultimately, however, it is each individual family's responsibility for the maintenance of and vigilance over each gravesite.

The PUK's motives for the construction of the wall was to stop expansion of squatter housing into Area 3 and to make everything clear as to where future houses could be built. However, should this fail and the situation continue to deteriorate from the Chinese point of view, the PUK can "broker" this interest and report the situation to the *kraton*, with which it already does business, to the *bupati* (regent), i.e. the chief official of the kabupaten (country), and/or to the military (ABRI––Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia). Since a relationship already exists with the *kraton*, it is unlikely that contacts with the *bupati* or ABRI will be undertaken, if for no other reason than informal procedures would be more effective than pursuing formal avenues of redress. The reasons for this are twofold: first, the Chinese are politically weak in this region and there is little expectation that higher authorities will assist them if the *kraton* chooses not to do so; second, it is doubtful that formal procedures will work efficiently for anyone. The system grinds very slowly even when a clear-cut, legitimate claim is at issue.

The Caretakers: Over the years, Javanese caretakers have been loosely employed to maintain the cemetery. Because this position does not require regular compensation, their responsibilities are not well-defined and any type of "police" function is out of the question. The PUK offered the opinion that if gravesites are to be preserved, it is the responsibility of the families of the deceased. It would be further observed that gravesites that received regular familial visitations would not be disturbed.[18] Neither the PUK nor the caretakers could control the degree of familial attention in this regard. Referring to Figure 2, Area 1 of the squatter settlement has been looked after by Pak Dono since the 1940s; in early 1993 he reported his age to be ninety-four. Area 2, the first to be developed, was the domain of Pak Harjo until his death in 1982 or 1983. It could not be learned why a replacement was not obtained upon his demise. Pak Karto and his wife are the present caretakers of Area 3 and until late 1992 have been able to repulse any new squatters. But since that time, a young friend of his built a bamboo house to the northwest of Area 3 and by January 1993 three other temporary dwellings were under construction. However, this series of events should not be interpreted as a sign of ineffectuality on the part of Pak or Ibu Karto. Rather, it appears that they were working in conjunction with Pak Mischbah, the *Rukun Warga* (RW) responsible for Area 3 in local government administration. Though in their seventies, the Karto's are still vigorous and could be regularly observed fulfilling their caretaker tasks such as weeding and cleaning gravesites in response to requests by the families of the deceased. Additionally, Pak Karto operates a *warung* (foodstall) on the northern edge of the cemetery: this appears to have the sanction of the Chinese. The most likely explanation for the December 1992/January 1993 squatter invasion was the pursuit of *rukun* (harmony) through the efforts of Pak Mischbah. This will be discussed in the context of the efforts of governmental entities in Blimbing Sari.

Governmental Entities

***Kabupaten (county), Camat (sub-district) and Lurah (village)
Administration:*** These levels of Indonesian local government are not
involved in matters pertaining to the cemetery unless called upon to
take notice. For example, the PUK could report matters to the *Bupati*
(regent, something that has not been done either on the *Kabupaten*
(county) or *Kotamadya* (city) side of the jurisdiction boundary. At that
point, the *Camat* (subdistrict) office and the *Lurah* (village administrator)
would be called in to make inquiries. But since the Chinese have not
sought to activate these levels of oversight, the more central role of neigh-
borhood administration, the RW, will be considered.

Rukun Warga (RW) (Neighborhood Head): Unlike officials on
higher levels, Pak RW (pronounced "air-way") is a non-salaried post and
the person holding this position is an individual of civic spirit and higher
occupational status, e.g. a present or retired governmental employee
with both administrative and interpersonal skills. As Guinness has ob-
served, RW's "are elected to these offices because they have been able
to translate their social rank into social esteem."[19] According to Pak
Mischbah, the general responsibilities of the RW whose authority en-
compasses Area 3 of the cemetery, include: a) issuing *kartu penduduk*
(the resident identity card, a requirement for all Indonesian citizens); b)
writing letters of introduction for individuals seeking to relocate out of his
jurisdiction; c) mediating conflicts among neighbors; d) coordinating
gotong royong (community mutual cooperation), assisting in community
development projects and increasing resident participation in this sphere;
and f) maintaining order and harmony (*rukun*) in the community.[20] As
the conversation proceeded, Pak Mischbah discussed his specific role
in the Chinese cemetery. His primary link was with the *juru kunci* (care-
taker), Pak Karto, whose responsibility was Area 3. As a result, Pak
Mischbah was well informed about the new houses that had sprouted
rather quickly in December 1992 and January 1993. In contrast, the RW
of Areas 1 and 2, Pak Pudiono, has had little or no contact with the
caretakers. That is understandable in the case of Pak Harjo, who died in
1982 or 1983. But Pak Dono, the nonagenarian caretaker of Cemetery
Area 1, appears to be outside his area of immediate concern. This fur-
ther underscores the informal nature of *Rukun Warga* oversight, which
appears to depend more on individuals and their perceptions rather than
on any procedural guidelines. It then becomes more understandable why
Pak Mischbah would play a central role in Blimbing Sari affairs than
would his counterpart on the *kotamadya* (city) side of the boundary. First,
at the request of the PUK, the Chinese organization, he managed the
construction of the wall. He was well aware of their concerns. Second,
he maintained contact with the caretaker of Area 3 and was cognizant of
the circumstances behind the "invasion" of new squatters. Third, he es-

tablished informal guidelines to control and monitor the homes built in late 1992 and early 1993. Fourth, he remained available to coordinate the construction of the proposed wall as funds become available. Fifth, he had given consideration to the problem posed by the new squatter houses should the wall project be brought to completion. And sixth, he was in regular contact with the appropriate *lurah* (village) and *camat* (sub-district) officials about events in the cemetery as with the *bupati* (chief county official).[21] It was surprising to learn that in the long run, Pak Mischbah envisioned that the graves in Area 3 would be moved out of the urbanized area after compensation was paid, that some building sites would be reserved for households from the immediate vicinity (he called them "house-seekers") whose shelter needs were severe, and that the largest remaining territory be developed as a school. One could conclude that a "Master Plan" had already been worked out for Area 3, and that the Chinese (specifically, the PUK) were not aware of this at the time these interviews were conducted. In fact, Pak Mischbah intimated that the idea for the school had already been approved in principle by the Governor of the province.[22] Secure in both his long and short-term concepts for his jurisdiction in Blimbing Sari, Pak Mischbah established the criteria for the new squatter invasion. First, only families known to him would be permitted to build; further, they would have to be truly in need of housing. Second, should the Chinese mobilize funds to continue their wall project, the houses built would have to be moved. And third, they could only be built on sites that would not interfere with the normal functions of the cemetery or with those who came to visit deceased relatives. No such guidelines were established in the *kotamadya* (city) cemetery, Areas 1 and 2. In fact, Pak Mischbah indicated that any house built close to the *kabupaten* (county) side of the jurisdictional boundary might have to be removed. However, on both sides of the wall, perceptions are more incremental. Everyone agrees that the desire of the Chinese to make everything clear has been realized. In Areas 1 and 2, the pace of house consolidation has quickened as more permanent building materials are used to retrofit bamboo houses. Houses built after the wall was constructed have been made entirely of brick. Pak Pudiono, the RW of Areas 1 and 2, has been issuing *kartu2 penduduk* (identity cards), establishing official recognition of residences. Water and electrical services has been expanding, echoing the "more is better" attitude of utility companies in developed countries. Nevertheless, no one is absolutely certain what will ultimately occur, though optimism grows on a daily basis for the permanence of this settlement. The sanction of the landowner, *the kraton*, has yet to be obtained.

The Linguistic Context of Chinese-Javanese Relations

Thus far, it has been observed that cemetery squatting possesses inherent circumstantial qualities which suggest tensions and hostility directed at the Chinese by Javanese squatter/invaders. As shown above, these feelings have been demonstrated in the economic context where the depersonalization of the Chinese has been noted. Further, in the political realm, the Chinese have pursued their objectives along more informal lines rather than pursuing formal channels with their potential for direct confrontation. Even though this approach may not work expeditiously for Javanese either, the Chinese recognize that they would be placed at a disadvantage should they pursue their interests in an adversarial manner.

Nevertheless, there is still more direct evidence of anti-Chinese feeling, this time manifested in the use of pejoratives by the Javanese in everyday speech. Specifically, two words, *Cina* (formerly *Tjina*), its derivative, *Cino*, and *bong* are sufficient to clearly express Javanese hostility against the Chinese in Blimbing Sari.

Although *Cina* had been in use since the seventeenth century, by 1900 it was considered to be derogatory by the *peranakan* community.[23] These feelings continued unabated so that in Semarang in the 1930s the Chinese were able to effect a street name change from "Jalan Kebun Cina" to "Jalan Kebun Tiongkok."[24] This, therefore, reflects the long-standing preference of the Chinese for "Tiongkok," meaning "China" in the South Fujian dialect, and for "Tionghoa" as its correlate for "Chinese."[25] These terms also gained in cachet among the Chinese during the first decades of the century as the result of Indonesian proto-nationalism excluding the Chinese from the very beginning. As a result, the Chinese were forced to confront the reality that they were essentially different from both the Dutch and the Indonesians. Therefore, a consciousness began to grow that they were part of a Chinese nation, "Bangsa Tionghoa."[26]

By the 1960s, these terms became infused with even more complex connotations, all of them vehicles for hostility against the Chinese. Some elements of the Indonesian press argued that "Tiongkok" and "Tionghoa" were terms used by the Dutch as a "superior name for the Chinese."[27] In contrast, "Cina" was a historical Malay usage and therefore, for political reasons, "Cina" must be re-established in order to maintain Indonesian national dignity.[28] Other rationalizations also exist—not the least of which was hostility to the Beijing government itself—but as Coppel notes, "Cina" had been "displaced in polite usage...Its use in 1966 was felt to be insulting by the Chinese, and this fact was known to the Indonesians who used it."[29]

Today, many of the vestiges of the difficult 1960s have faded and the term "Cina" has changed according to the attitude of the par-

ticular speaker. Nevertheless, as Santoyo has observed, "*Cina* still remains at least a word used by indigenous Indonesians to express their dislike of Chinese in Indonesia."[30]

How does *Cina* apply in Blimbing Sari? It is used extensively, while "Tiongkok" and "Tionghoa" have never been encountered. Indeed, *Cino* is used as much, if not more than *Cina*. And it is rather obvious that this term, *cino*, is a powerful and strongly-felt epithet, reminiscent of the ugliest North American racial terminology.

Similarly, rather than use the Indonesian word for grave, "kubur," residents prefer the epithet, *Bong*. In a 1991 survey, residents were asked, among other things, where did they dispose of trash? In three-quarters of the responses, the unanticipated answer of *bong* was registered. While the author cannot claim to have mastered all the nuances of Indonesian language, it is nevertheless very clear that *bong*, *cina*, *cino*, and *bong cino* "speak" for themselves as very strong conveyors of hostility directed at the Chinese. Whether or not these terms have been shorn of their historical context in the minds of Blimbing Sari residents, their contemporary application is not encouraging for better relations between Javanese and Chinese, especially when many call their community *Bong Sari*.

Conclusions

Cemetery squatting in Blimbing Sari is an incremental process that can be viewed from a variety of perspectives. It represents a logical destination for house-seekers who require a central location at a time when vacant river embankment sites have been exhausted. However, it also bears witness to a rational calculation of the risks inherent in the enterprise. The pioneering squatters in this cemetery began their efforts with a degree of confidence that no sanctions could be levied against them by the Chinese. It was therefore a fundamental perception of the weak position of the Chinese in Javanese society. As the number of dwellings increased, it became apparent that the only immediate authority in the area was vested in irregularly paid caretakers with no desire to exercise a "police" power. The death of one caretaker prior to the first wave of squatting was evidently a primary event in the process. A secondary event was the lack of vigilance on the part of relatives of the deceased which further widened the vacuum caused by a caretaker's demise.

Although the need for housing underscores all motivations in the squatting process, a psychological underpinning is provided by the depersonalization of the Chinese by the squatters. It is easier to usurp a gravesite when it does not come at the expense of an individual. Instead, the collective rationalization, "They can afford it," deflects the impact of the action to an extraneous group. When families arrive at an

invaded gravesite, their tearful reaction is reduced to an anecdote about "the Chinese who cried."[31]

By the time the Chinese began to mobilize resources to preserve their remaining graves, the squatters were further emboldened and began to noticeably accelerate investments in their houses with permanent building materials. When the October 1992 cinderblock wall was erected by the PUK, houses began to be built entirely of brick. This surely was seen by all concerned as a capitulation by the Chinese, conceding that the ambiguity of the squatting process was yielding to a clear scenario of unthreatened development. It also sent a signal that the Chinese lacked the political standing to defend their interests. Since the cemetery land is controlled by the royal court, it was the squatters' consensus of opinion that the Sultan would eventually recognize their efforts.

Another indicator of the vulnerable position of the Chinese was the cooperation of the *Rukan Warga* (Neighborhood Head) with a small number of new squatters attempting an invasion from the north on the site of a proposed but as yet unfunded wall extension. Not only that, this RW had also suggested that plans were discussed by the Provincial Governor for a school in the part of the cemetery that the Chinese were trying to preserve, a fact of which they were unaware.

But the most direct communication of hostility against the Chinese was the terminology utilized by the squatters. *Cina* and its derivative, *cino,* are powerful racial epithets. Similarly, the use of *bong* instead of *kubur,* the proper word for grave, and the use of graves as trash disposal sites, even as props within a dwelling, speak eloquently for the immense gulf between Javanese squatters and the Chinese.

In a few more years, the residue of the Chinese cemetery in Blimbing Sari will be visible here and there as one strolls amid crumbling headstones and shards of statuary. Two decades ago, a prominent scholar observed, "In the end, nothing which the ethnic Chinese can do can fully account for the feelings against them; nothing they can do can fully counteract that sentiment."[32] In the 1990s, the situation in Blimbing Sari continues to lend strength to that view.

NOTES

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[2] Research for this paper was conducted between the Summer of 1991 and the Winter of 1992-93. A survey instrument was prepared in August 1991 and administered by graduate students from a nearby university during October and November 1991. Photodocumentations were conducted and open-ended discussions took place with residents as circumstances allowed.

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[15] Interview with Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian, 7 January 1993.

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[17] Interview with Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian.

[18] Interview with Perkumpulan Usaha Kematian.

[19] Guinness, 159.

[20] Interview with Pak Mischbah, Rukan Warga, 8 January 1993.

[21] Interview with Pak Mischbah, Rukan Warga, 8 January 1993.

[22] Interview with Pak Mischbah, Rukan Warga, 8 January 1993.

[23] Leo Suryadinata, "Pre-War Indonesian Nationalism and the Peranakan Chinese," *Indonesia*, 11 (1977): 83.

[24] Juis Santoya (pseud.), "*Tionkok* or *Cina*? A Survey and Analysis," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 21:2 (Summer 1987): 40.

[25] The translation in both cases is "Chinese Garden Street." Santoyo, 34.

[26] Suryadinata, 83-4.

[27] Santoyo, 37.

[28] Santoyo, 37; Coppel, 89.

[29] Coppel, 72.

[30] Santoyo, 42.

[31] Garr and Setiawan.

[32] Mary F. Somers Heidhues, *Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities* (Melbourne: Longman, 1974), 111.

Language and Identity: Limonese Creole and the Black Minority of Costa Rica

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Given the general connection between the development of nationalism and linguistic uniformity, the existence of multi-lingualism and ethnic diversity in a country is a complex problem. Limonese Creole is the language spoken by a Black minority of approximately 30,000 people who have lived in predominantly white and Spanish-speaking Costa Rica for over 400 years. The Limón Province, where this group resides, is markedly distinguishable from the rest in terms of its geography, history, population, economy, language, and culture. This paper seeks to present the development of ethnic relations and language in that area. History shows that either harmonious bilingualism or fiercely suppressing colonialism usually prevails in a "languages-in-contact situation." In this case study, the historical relationship between ethnicity and language accounts for differences between societies, with such divergent consequences of contact as racial nationalism, cultural assimilation and fusion, and possibly even language extinction.

Introduction

In this paper the English-based Creole spoken by the Limonese Black minority of Costa Rica will be used as a case study to explore the salience of language as a dimension of ethnic identity in the history of that Caribbean population. While many scholars[1] consider that the possession of a given language is of particular relevance—almost essential—to the maintenance of group identity, others[2] claim that it is important not to lose sight of its non-unique status as a marker.[3] I will argue that while social identity and ethnicity are in large part established and maintained through language, it is because of the sociohistorical character of the process through which a group's language is evaluated

that a subordinate people's language will either survive or become extinct as a symbol of identity.[4]

Members of a linguistic community may derive feelings of pride or shame from their perception of the degree of standardization their language has undergone; thus the prestige value attached to their language's history may facilitate or inhibit the vitality of a given ethnolinguistic group.[5] It is my contention that currently, given the climate of socioeconomic distress that the region is undergoing,[6] Limonese Creole speakers feel more self-conscious than ever about their "broken English." While at other times in history, their creole could well have acted as a symbol of linguistic rebellion conducive to feelings of group solidarity, at present it is clearly considered a liability.

Dimensions of Language and Ethnicity

Attempts to analyze the relationship between language and identity have focused foremost on the relationship between language and ethnicity. Language is a highly structured and sophisticated system which, with subtlety and flexibility, is crucially related to a human being's most significant capacities, thought and cognition, including the ability to categorize, classify, and symbolize. Ethnicity, on the other hand, comprises a number of concepts because of the many interrelated factors that it subsumes. At a simple level, ethnicity can be thought of as a "sense of group identity deriving from real or perceived common bonds such as language, race or religion."[7]

In those general terms, ethnicity is based on a collectivity's self-recognition. It differs from other kinds of group recognition signals in that it operates basically in terms of what Fishman calls "paternity"[8] rather than in terms of "patrimony."[9] Through ethnicity individuals not only attain social integration, but they are also linked to social norms and values, to a certain *Weltanschauung*, to inherited and acquired both stable and changing notions of society and the world. It is easy to see why language, one of the essential characteristics of human behavior, is associated with ethnic paternity. Moreover, because one can exert more control over one's linguistic behavior (more than over other dimensions of ethnic identity), language is seen (and heard) by others as "a truer reflection of one's ethnic allegiance."[10] However, since the course of language is dynamic, it is also very susceptible to change as an element of identity, inextricably linked as it is to the social determinants of human life.

Indeed, in the history of humankind, nationalism records its strong link with language and identity from the moment of its modern inception. Largely a product of German romanticism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, both Herder and Fichte, and a little later Wilhelm von Humboldt, felt that nothing was more important for national culture and continuity than possession of the ancestral tongue.[11]

On many occasions language became a tool for achieving nationalistic goals. The idea of linguistic nationalism was a dangerous one, however, when it equated language and race. Although the power of language is undoubtedly a factor in nationalism, Smith[12] has made the useful point that emphasis upon language **follows** the growth of nationalist fervor; it does not create it.

Languages in Contact

Multilingual societies are found in all parts of the world; they existed in the past and they occur today; they are found in older nations as well as in the newly-created states. Currently, for instance, there is more than one viable language in each Latin American country. The political and social situation created by this linguistic diversity ranges from the quasi-perfect harmony of Spanish and Guaraní in Paraguay to Guatemala or Perú,[13] where the entire political fabric is torn into factions which often coincide with linguistic boundaries. Even in those societies, where equality between linguistic groups would seem to have been achieved in official political terms, it is rare to accomplish it either in the social or economic sphere. To complicate matters further, linguistic differences often become associated with racial or ethnic differences, thus making the language contact situation a hopelessly entangled one.[14] Generally speaking, speakers of diverse languages do not come into contact under neutral emotional conditions; more often than not the contact situation involves some kind of dominance of one group over the other, thus always producing significant attitudinal reactions.

In studying the relationship of language and identity within a bilingual/multilingual nation, it is important to examine the history and nature of the contact situation between the peoples who speak diverse codes, whether dialects or languages. One fundamental step is to distinguish groups which are politically and economically **superordinate** from those that are **subordinate** in these institutional domains,[15] and how such a differential power relationship was created. Likewise, one should also distinguish between migrant and indigenous populations at the time of their contact, "indigenous" referring to groups with established social institutions—not necessarily the earliest groups known to have inhabited a given area.[16] From these distinctions, one can develop a rudimentary theory which suggests that the course of language and identity will be different in settings where the indigenous group is subordinate as opposed to those where the migrant populations are subordinate.[17]

Migrant subordinate groups seem to show a relatively rapid rate of linguistic and identity shift.[18] This is the case of the Limonese Creole speakers of Costa Rica, the subject of the remainder of the paper. As we shall see, Jamaican Creole speakers, migrating from their own established

social order to a setting of subordination in Costa Rica, brought about their need to assimilate or adapt to the new order. In a non-symmetrical culture contact situation such as this one, varying degrees of socio-structural and socio-psychological acculturation took place under the considerable pressure exercised by the superordinate group. Language played an important role as the vehicle for acquiring the new culture; it was, in fact, the most important element acquired in the quest for new identity. As a result of the geographic displacement of the speakers and the broken ties with their sociocultural identity and their original language, their sociolinguistic history, and not just the structure of their language, is an important determinant of the linguistic outcome in this type of language contact situation.

Limonese Creole

Even though our social identity is established by the parameters and boundaries of our ethnicity, gender, and class, once we study language as the interactional discourse of that social identity, we find that these parameters are not constants that can be taken for granted, but are communicatively produced.[19] Therefore, to understand issues of identity and how they affect and are affected by social, political, and ethnic divisions, we need to gain insight into the communicative processes by which they arise. However, communication cannot be studied in isolation; it must be analyzed in terms of its effect on people's lives. Thus in what follows, I will take up the ethnohistory of its speakers, analyzing situated talk in the perspective of sociolinguistics.

Peoples of African origin have constituted a segment of Costa Rican society for over four hundred years. Those who arrived in colonial times (probably not many at any time) assimilated to Costa Rican society and culture. Those who migrated to the country during the nineteenth century and their descendants constitute the Afro-Costarican minority of mostly Jamaican origin who speak Limonese Creole (hereafter LC), known by its speakers as /mekaytelyuwl/.[20] They number approximately 30,000. They have lived mostly in the Province of Limón, on the Atlantic lowlands of Costa Rica (See Figure 1), while Costa Rican society—white, Catholic, and Spanish-speaking—tends to be considered as existing only in the highlands of the Central Valley (formerly called *Meseta Central*, Central Plateau). This dichotomy between the Limonese Black and the Highlanders has been very significant throughout the Republican history of the country, as can be seen in Melendez's outline of the basic structures of both cultures (see Table 1).

Figure 1

Spread of English Creoles in Central America

Figure 1. English and Creole Speakers in Central America, 1978

Legend:
- Creole Speaking Area (270,000)
- English as Second Language (72,000)
- Spanish (12,500,000)
- Other (3,500,000)

After: Holm, John ed . *Central American English* 1983 8

Map labels: MEXICO, Cayman Islands, GUATEMALA, Belmopan, BELIZE, Bay Islands, HONDURAS, Tegucigalpa, EL SALVADOR, San Salvador, Providencia, NICARAGUA, San Andrés, Managua, Corn Islands, COSTA RICA, San José, Limón, Bocas del Toro, PANAMA, Panama City

Table 1

Comparative Cultural Structures

Institutionalized Activity	Structure valid for the Black Antillean group	Structure valid for the Costa Rican group of the Central Valley
Language	English	Spanish
Family and Kinship	Matrilineal,common law marriage	Patrilineal Formal marriage
Local economy	Subsistence agriculture	Commercial agriculture
Employment	Laborer	Proprietor
Diet	Tubers, breadfruit, coconut	Rice, beans tortillas
Religion	Protestantism Magic	Catholicism Non-orthodox beliefs
Socialization and Education	Elaborated Church Schools	Simple public School
Recreation	Baseball Dominoes	Soccer
Associations	United Negro Improvement Assn. Lodges	Sport clubs Church
Community	Musical events	Fairs (*turnos*) Carnivals

Source: Meléndez, Carlos. "Introducción a la Cultura Negra," 1974:48 (my translation).

The ethnohistory of Limonese Blacks can only be understood vis-a-vis the history of Costa Rican society itself. For that purpose, Michael D. Olien, in his study "The Negro in Costa Rica: an [sic] Historical Perspective," pointed out three major structural changes in Costa Rican society which resulted in important alterations in the position of the Blacks:

> 1.) the polarization of power which took place during and after the colonial period (1570-1870); 2.) the *de facto* control of the lowlands exercised by the United Fruit Company (1879-1948); and 3.) the legal and social reforms brought about by the 1948 Revolution (1948 to the present).[21]

Correspondingly, Olien distinguished the existence of three "types" of Blacks, each type to be assigned to one of the above-mentioned time periods, respectively: 1) the African Black, 2) the West Indian Black, and 3) the Costa Rican Black. His thesis being that these "types" represent different adaptation patterns to Costa Rican society at different points of time, he concluded that there is no evolutionary sequence or continuity from the first to the second period—miscegenation (as was mentioned above) was important during the colonial period, and separatism during the United Fruit Company period. The opposite is true about Blacks living at the end of the second period into the third, acculturation and assimilation have become important to them. Linguistically, a West Indian heritage can still be traced back for Blacks of the third period (Figure 2).

Early in the nineteenth century, Costa Rica gained independence. There was no longer a Spanish government that considered trading with the British illegal, and the highlands produced coffee, a bulky product that needed to travel to England. However, the good road for exporting it went in the opposite direction—west, to Puntarenas. Freight rates were twice as high for shipping coffee to England from Puntarenas as they would have been had it been exported from an Atlantic port. Costa Rican coffee growers decided to invest in a railroad to the Atlantic.

Minor C. Keith, an enterprising North American, was commissioned in 1872 to build a railway from San José, the capital, to the Atlantic coast, so as to permit coffee shipments to Europe. The construction of the railroad attracted intermittent waves of workers, especially from Jamaica. The rural Jamaican subculture, which the original migrants carried with them to Costa Rica, constituted a part of the end result of a complex process of integration of the African and British cultures into a new creole culture.

Figure 2

English-Speaking Settlement in Western Caribbean

English-Speaking Settlement in Western Caribbean

Most sources that deal with this topic attribute to Minor C. Keith a further feat: in order to struggle against some of the discouraging financial factors, he decided to introduce the commercial planting of bananas. The presence of Jamaicans—a banana eating people who had previous experience in the cultivation of the fruit—certainly contributed to the success of the enterprise that was soon to replace the railroad in importance. Keith formed the United Fruit Company in 1899. Many Jamaicans who had originally emigrated to work temporarily on the construction of the railroad decided to stay on and work for the Company on the plantation or at the port, which was Company-owned as well. The plantation system was to permeate all aspects of their lives. All needs of the workers were from then on fulfilled by *Mamita Yunai*.[22] It was a self-contained system, with the train as the backbone of communication in the region. Since the *de facto* government of the lowland was exercised by the Company, peoples' lives depended on it; consequently, their process of acculturation and assimilation to Costa Rican culture and society was slowed.

The workers as well as the managers introduced their languages— Jamaican Creole and American English, respectively—as the everyday languages of their community. The Blacks, who had been acculturated to British West Indian culture and were "English"-speaking Protestants, found it very easy to comply with their managers' pressure to maintain both their language and their religion. Obviously, they were encouraged to do so.

At the end of this period, when the United Fruit Company folded on the Atlantic coast in 1942, the pervading picture of unity among the West Indian Blacks in Limón started to break down to give way to a rise of native Costa Rican prestige and power groups. Once outside the plantation system, Blacks began to adopt Costa Rican customs, and gradually the West Indian Black was transformed into a new cultural type: the Afro-Costarican of the third period.

Although racially distinct, Limonese Blacks became citizens of the country, started sending their children to public schools, learned how to speak Spanish, and some even became Catholics. The Revolution of 1948 was seen by people in Limón as the lever that would help Blacks rise in social status, due to sweeping constitutional reforms. Such was supposedly the law that granted Blacks rights equal to those of all other Costa Rican citizens, so that they could consider Limón their real home.

It is true that some socioeconomic changes ensued as Blacks went through the strongest immersion in "Costaricanization" ever; a redistribution of wealth allowed many to become landowners, some were appointed to important public and private positions, and their voice and vote assured them some steady continuity of federal representation in the National Assembly.[23]

However, at present four main socio-economic events have altered the composition and racial profile of Puerto Limón: 1) the construction in 1975 of the first highway to join the port with San José and a second highway built in 1988; 2) the great influx in the 1980s of white (and some Blacks from Bluefields as well) refugees from the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador; 3) the Costa Rican government's newly-adopted economic policy of neoliberalism in compliance with directions issued by the International Monetary Fund for Latin America; and, consequently, 4) due to rising unemployment, the increasing search for labor opportunities on the Atlantic coast. (See Figure 3).

Additionally, the 1991 earthquake not only demolished part of the city and the entire coastal settlement of the Valle de la Estrella, but it also brought about a defeatist attitude. Puerto Limón's shabby houses, propped-up cracked cement buildings, and piles of unremoved rubble stand witness to the subhuman living conditions and the ongoing frustration and hopelessness within which the Limonese people survive, as well as to the rapid deterioration that their social fabric has suffered. How has this briefly sketched economic picture affected the Blacks? Originally farmers, railroad workers, and plantation laborers, the members of the Black minority have not been able to enter the competitive market effectively as a people, save for a few successful professionals. Consequently, emigration has been one solution to the lack of challenging opportunities and lack of permanent employment.[24] More jobs are now taken by the Whites from the highlands and the refugees in the banana plantations; the Black families are completely torn apart, and therefore they are experiencing a serious weakening of links with their roots.[25]

Language and Identity: Maintenance or Shift?

Linguistic diversity constitutes a threat to the broader political order of a nation. Usually, a commonly shared tongue is seen as a vehicle for the maintenance of the perceived unity of purposes and needs shared by the country's inhabitants. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in order to develop and keep the political loyalties in place, the state will run programs for the national language to be used by the entire population.

In Costa Rica, if the degree of success of the national literacy campaigns is to be measured by the increasing number of people who can speak, read, and write Spanish in the Province of Limón, then the efforts of the Ministry of Education have proved effective.[26] If linguistic differences form a major obstacle to assimilation—even though ethnic and racial groups can perpetuate themselves without distinctive language— by reducing linguistic differences the nation fosters ethnic merger. Although no official figures are available, it appears that there have been great increases in the proportion of ethnically- and linguistically-mixed marriages between ingroup and outgroup. This gives the high

Figure 3

**Costa Rica's Internal Migration to the Atlantic Region
1968-1973**

Costa Rica's Internal Migration to the Atlantic Region
1968-1973

North Region

North Pacific

Atlantic Region

Central Region

Central Pacific

South Pacific

1 mm of width = 1000 migrants

After: Carvajal and Driori 1987:45.

status linguistic variety (Spanish) a better chance of being used as the language of the home, and hence of caretaker-child interactions. More-over, a group that does not maintain its identity will be more likely to give up its language as well.

As people acquire a language, they also acquire attitudes and beliefs toward that language and toward other people's languages. These are shared by the members of the linguistic community and form an integral part of the culture. As with most creoles, LC speakers have fallen prey to the widespread belief that /*mekaytelyuw*/ is "broken or flat English," a "patois," a "dialect" not "a real language." Proof of this, they claim, is that it is not a written language and that "it has no grammar."

With a writing tradition, languages acquire standardization, norms are set by recognized authorities and they are printed in books and taught in schools. Thus, languages which are transmitted exclu-sively through the speech of individuals, without the formal frame which education gives to language variants, make their speakers focus on the reality of variation. In the Limonese situation, certain feelings of it being a second-class language (and consequently, of their being second-class citizens) are attributed to LC by its speakers, and their very deeply-seated prejudices against it are apparent. It is associated with what they believe is their own negative self-portrayal: lack of education, primitive ways, superstitious beliefs, poverty, slavery, and a general inadequacy for acquiring a high social status.

Contrary to their deprecatory self-image, the Limonese have a highly verbal culture. And although Jamaican-educated grandparents abhor the creole spoken by their "grands"--and blame their children for not having insisted on their grandchildren attending English schools to acquire "proper" English and to learn to respect it as had their parents and ancestors—it is obvious that fluent LC speakers enjoy /*mekaytelyuw*/.Through decades of white colonization and domi-nation, they have come to keep to themselves the love they feel for their language and their culture.

As to the actual use of LC, the chart in Table 2 next exemplifies the most common linguistic exchanges which call for either LC, Spanish, or Standard (Limonese),[27] but bearing in mind that there are a number of factors which intervene in language choices (such as ethnic compo-sition of the group, topic, age, and gender of the interlocutors).

Table 2

Intragroup LC - S - SE Usage

MEDIA DOMAINS SUMMARY	ROLE RELATIONS	
	Prior	After 1948

<u>Speaking</u>   Code: **LC:Limonese Creole**
                                    S: Spanish
                                    SE:Standard English

Family

	Prior	After 1948
Husband-wife	LC	LC/S
Parent-child	LC	LC/S
Grandparent-grandchild	LC	LC/S
Other (= generation)	LC	LC/S

Neighbors

	Prior	After 1948
Friends	LC	LC/S
Acquaintances	LC	LC/S

Work

	Prior	After 1948
Employer-employer	SE	S
Employer-employee	SE	S
Employee-employer	LC	S

Religion

	Prior	After 1948
Priest/Minister-congregation	LC	SE/LC/S
Congregation-Minister	LC	LC/S

<u>Reading</u>

Home

	Prior	After 1948
Father	SE	S
Mother	SE	S
Grandparents	SE	S
Child	SE	S

School

	Prior	After 1948
Father	SE	S
Mother	SE	S
Grandparents	SE	SE/S
Child		S

<u>Writing</u>

School

	Prior	After 1948
Father	SE	S
Mother	SE	S
Grandparents	SE	S
Child		S

Conclusions

As mentioned above, it appears that even the most fervent desire on the part of grandparents to retain LC-SLE may eventually be overcome by the promise of social and economic advancement, in both the public and private sectors, offered by the mastery of Spanish. Moreover, the number of social contacts in which speakers use LC seems to be steadily declining. The evidence gathered so far shows that domains specific to the minority language variety have often been encroached upon by Spanish, the prestige language; actually, only if those domains were identified as stable would a condition of bilingualism possibly prevail. Without continued representation of the language and group members in a variety of institutional settings such as educational systems, media, religion, and work, the ethnolinguistic vitality of the group is at great risk, since the influence of the home is not sufficient to preserve LC (particularly considering that the time children and their family spend at home has greatly diminished).[28]

Stages in the process of language shift fall into a continuum ranging from language conservation (language life) to language loss (language death). However, I would argue that the life-death metaphor does not serve the study of language usage well. The more meaningful question is one of ethnicity, i.e., How important is it for a member of this minority to be a Black Limonese? And does LC express that ethnicity?

The point has already been made that few other elements involve the emotional attachment that oral communication has in members of an ethnic group; however, the death of a language does not inevitably mean the total disappearance of a group's identity. One of the common circumstances for language death is that of the gradual disappearance of its speakers; in that case, however, the group's identity could be kept intact until its last speaker dies. That is not what concerns us here at this time. The LC scenario is, rather, a case of language contact and conflict (one superordinate language actively threatening to supplant the other) in a racially and culturally distinct speech community which is now somewhat spread out geo-graphically and which may succumb to "the intrinsic hostility of the technology-based infrastructure of modern civilization."[29]

The sociolinguistic process outlined above would seem not to bode well for the survival of LC. However, as Fishman has suggested, the question to be asked is "Do they love it in their [the speakers'] hearts?"[30] I would venture to say that if, in light of its sociohistorical background, the group values its identity—particularly in the face of present socioeconomic pressures towards the universalization of cul-ture—it is likely that LC will prevail against all odds, particularly if they continue "loving it in their hearts."

NOTES

I am indebted to Professor María Eugenia Bózzoli de Wille for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper and to Professor Mervyn C. Alleyne for bibliographical information.

[1] Fishman, Joshua A., "Language, Ethnicity, and Racism," *in Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics*, ed. Muriel Saville-Troike (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1977); Gumperz, J.J., ed., *Language and Social Identity* (Clevedon, PA: Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1988); Giles, Howard, ed., *Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations* (London: Academic Press, Inc., 1977).

[2] Edwards, J., *Language, Society and Identity* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

[3] Of all the powerful elements of group identity (ethnicity, nationalism, and the relationship between them), Edwards (1985, 22) claims that "the most important ingredients are the subjective sense of groupness and the continuation of group boundaries." He considers that these two are indeed related, but since certain aspects of group culture are always subject to change, the continuing identity must depend upon elements which transcend any purely objective markers. "This is not to say," he continues, "that visible markers are dispensable, but rather that the presence of any particular marker is not essential."

[4] In this paper, it is impossible to consider the full range of complex relations which exist between the status of a language and such factors as literacy, urbanization, industrialization, political and economic power, religion, geography and demography, among many others which definitely intervene in a two-way causal relation between language and identity.

[5] Giles, 312.

[6] Carvajal, Guillermo, and Israel Driori, "La diversidad étnico - cultural en la región atlántica y los problemas de integración socio-espacial al contexto regional costarricense," *Revista Geográfica* 107 (1987): 19, my translation, explaining the depressed state of the local economy, claim that:

> At present the Limonese region developmental model could be summarized by saying that the benefits of the local economic activities either flee the region via multinational corporations or else favor directly the public treasury via taxes.

7 Edwards, J., "Ethnic Identity and Bilingual Education," in *Language and Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations,* ed.H.Giles (London: Academic Press, 1977), 254. Edwards' more complex definition (1985, 10) suggests that:

> Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group - large or small, socially dominant or subordinate - with which one has ancestral links. There is no necessity for a continuation, over generations, of the same socialization or cultural patterns, but some sense of a group boundary must persist. This can be sustained by shared objective characteristics (language, religion, etc.), or by more subjective contributions to a sense of groupness, or by some combination of both. Symbolic or subjective attachments must relate at however distant a remove, to an observably real past.

Definitions of "ethnicity," of course, abound as do the criteria considered adequate for defining a collectivity as an "ethnic group," and as distinctive from a "racial group." In this paper, I will adopt the view (based on Turner, 1978) that an ethnic unit is formed by those individuals who say they belong to ethnic group A rather than B, and are willing to be treated and allow their behavior to be interpreted and judged as A's and not B's.

8 Fishman, 1977, 16. Fishman states that "paternity" is a central experience around which all others can be clustered, and that:

> it deals with the recognition of putative biological origins and, therefore with the hereditary or descent-related "blood", "bones", "essence", "mentality", "genius", "sensitivity", "proclivity" derived from the original putative ancestors of a collectivity and passed on from generation to generation in a biokinship sense.

In other words, heritage determines one's ethnicity. From the point of view of a person's experience, this "paternity" is probably seen as the key (referred to as "primordial" by Geertz, 1963) to that individual's ethnicity, no matter whether it is played down, or even denied to escape it.

9 Fishman (1977, 20) claims that although distinct from each other, "paternity" and "patrimony" may reinforce each other since they are constantly interacting in ethnicity, as poles along a continuum. The difference is that while ethnic patrimony is learned, paternity is inherited from ancestry. In other words,

> The paternity dimension of ethnicity is related to questions of how ethnicity collectivities come into being and to how individuals get to be members of these collectivities. The patrimony dimension of ethnicity is related to questions of how ethnic collectivities behave and to

> what their members do in order to express their mem-
> bership. The former maintains that one must either be
> or not be of a given ethnicity [...]. The latter recognizes
> that one either may or may not fulfill the obligations of
> ethnicity.

Interestingly enough, it seems that these acquired characteristics of one's identity (Fishman's "patrimony") are the key by which outsiders perceive a group's identity (Giles, 1977, 326).

[10] Giles, 326.

[11] Johann Gottried Herder (1744-1803), the author of *Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache*, argued in favor of the human innately-endowed capacity of reason and speech, which ultimately links an individual through his/her mother tongue, to the expression of the nationality's soul and spirit.

[12] Smith, A., *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1971), 149-150.

[13] Harrison, Regina, *Signs, Songs and Memory in the Andes* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), 15, tells the story of Gregorio Condori Mamani, a monolingual Quechua speaker when he served in the Peruvian army some years ago:

> Up until that time [entering the army] I didn't speak any
> Spanish and I scarcely left there speaking Spanish; I
> almost spoke some Spanish at the end. The lieuten-
> ants and the captains didn't want us to speak in Quechua
> (*runa simi*).
> "Indians, dammit! Spanish!" they used to say.
> With that, they make you speak Spanish in classes.

[14] Lieberson, S., *Language Diversity and Language Contact*, essays selected and introduced by A.S. Dil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), 1.

[15] Lieberson, 2.

[16] This terminology is borrowed from Lieberson (1981, 84):

> By indigenous is meant not necessarily the aborigines,
> but rather a population sufficiently established in an area
> so as to possess the institutions and demographic
> capacity for maintaining some minimal form of social
> order through generations.

[17] When two linguistic groups come into contact, we may find a situation in which 1) the indigenous group is superordinate, 2) the migrant group

is superordinate, 3) the indigenous group is subordinate, 4) the migrant group is subordinate, and 5) neither group is superordinate in all domains.

[18] By 'rapid,' I mean a substantial change in the course of only a few generations.

[19] Gumperz, 1.

[20] Limonese Creole is called /mekaytelyuw/ or /mekatelyuw/ by its speakers. It comes from Jamaican Creole in which "Make I tell you [something]" is equivalent to Standard English "Let me tell you [something]." The broad transcription used here is a phonemic system accessible to a non-initiated reader.

[21] Olien, Michael O., "The Negro in Costa Rica: An Historical Perspective," n.d. (1965). Mimeographed copy.

[22] *Mamita Yunai* is the title of a book by the Costa Rican novelist Carlos Luis Fallas (San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Soley y Valverde, 1941, 246). He explains that this is the name by which the Spanish speaking workers referred to the United Fruit Co. *Mamita*, of course, is a diminutive of *mamá* ('mother') and *Yunai* stands for the way the Costa Rican pronunciation of 'United' sounded.

[23] Since 1948 (when Alex Curling was elected the first Black Federal representative of Limón), the National Liberation Party (*Partido Liberación Nacional*, i.e. the "social-democratic" party) has had continuity in carrying a Black on its Limonese federal representative ticket to the National Assembly. It has obviously paid off, since the party won all but the last elections in Limón—which they lost by 16,000 votes or 73%. For the first time since then, the present presidential candidate (ironically enough, Figueres' son) decided not to have a Black representative in the Limón ticket, while the other major party, Christian Social Unity Party (*Partido Unidad Social Cristiano*, i.e. the "Christian-democratic" party) does. It will be interesting to watch the forthcoming elections, in February of 1994, to see whether the Black minority has given up its loyalty to "its" party.

[24] Many Blacks now work in San José, and many others have taken up jobs on board ships, if they are men, and as nannies or domestic servants in the U.S., if they are women. There is practically no family in Limón that does not have some relative in the U.S. at this point.

25 This situation has currently affected Limon's youth in a twofold manner: 1) those high school graduates who stay in Limón are working as stevedores, as messengers for the shipping companies, or in the box factories or local refinery; and 2) the few who continue their studies at the local university branches (of dubious quality) or in the capital, later opt for white collar jobs, but once they have succeeded in securing a degree these young people do not wish to return to Puerto Limón because of the lack of challenging opportunities. On the other hand, the number of single mothers has increased dramatically, and crack cocaine is available for the asking. A particular Limonese neighborhood popularly called "*Cieneguita*" (and officially *Barrio Cristobal Colón*) is now jokingly know as "*Piedrópolis*" (from *piedra* which means crack cocaine).

26 The degree of illiteracy is relatively low in the Province of Limón as compared to the rest of the country. It was 7.5% in the Central Province and 10.9% in the Province of Limón according to the census taken by the Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos, Censo de Población de Costa Rica (San José, Costa Rica: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, 1984, 165).

27 Herzfeld, Anita, "Bilingual Instability as a Result of Government Induced Policies," in *ITL: Review of Applied Linguistics* 48 (1980): 11, here revised for 1995.

28 During a recent interview conducted in Limón (October 2, 1993) a young Black professional shared with me that when he gets home from the office, often quite late at night, he is so tired and stressed out that he finds it hard to switch to LC after he has been talking Spanish all day long at the office—even though he has a Black Limonese wife.

29 Edwards, 1985, 49.

30 Quoted by Huffiness, Marion L., "Pennsylvania German: 'Do they love it in their hearts?'" in *Language and Ethnicity: Focusschrift in honor of Joshua Fishman*, ed. James R. Dow (1991), 9.

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Political Consciousness as a Component of Black Consciousness in Brazil:
Its Presence in the Popular Media

David Covin
California State University, Sacramento

This research presents a study of articles in six Brazilian mass circulation magazines between 1983 and 1992. It combines the study with an earlier analysis conducted by the author. The research depicts the extent to which political consciousness is represented as a component of Black consciousness in the publications. The research finds that one-third of the articles in the popular press on Black consciousness include an element of political consciousness. This is a significant percentage of the total. The article concludes that, though to a minor extent, Black political consciousness has entered the public discourse in Brazil's popular press.

The purpose of this paper is to describe the extent to which political consciousness may be found as a component of Black consciousness within a sampling of the Brazilian popular press, and to suggest some significance of that description for the political lives af Afro-Brazilians. In the first section the paper identifies the popular press reviewed and examines the relationship between the popular press and the Afro-Brazilian population. Next, the relationship between Black consciousness and Black political consciousness is discussed, including the significance of that relationship for this paper. It examines the role of the cultural question in some detail. Thirdly, the paper sets forth its working definitions, including those of Black consciousness and Black political consciousness, among others. The paper illustrates how each of those definitions plays out in the general findings and reaches some conclusions on their significance.

The Sources

This study utilizes work published during the Spring of 1992 in the *Western Journal of Black Studies*.[1] That work focused on Black consciousness as it appeared in the Brazilian mass circulation magazine, *Veja,* between 1978 and 1982. I concluded that article by noting that my research confirmed my two initial hypothesises: (1) that *Veja* promoted the notion of racial democracy and minimized the presence of Black consciousness, and (2) *Veja's* reportage reflected the veiled character of Brazilian racism.[2]

This study revisits those data and expands the data base. There was a minimal presence of Black consciousness in *Veja's* pages. In the 1992 study I found only seventeen articles which I identified as representing some form of Black consciousness. Additional sources examined for this study include *Veja* throughout 1983, 1991, and some of 1992 editions; *Afinal* in 1989, *Isto E* in 1991, *Visao* in 1989, *Manchete* in 1988, *Placar* in the late 1980's and early 1990's, and a special literacy supplement of *Minas Gerais* in 1988 entitled, "100 Years of Abolition: The Black Man Today."

While, except for the special supplement, I again found pickings slim—I found no articles meeting my tepid definition of Black consciousness in *Placar* (a soccer magazine)—there were enough articles overall to enable me to determine the extent to which a political element was present in the coverage. I found forty-one articles in the categories I identified in the mass circulation magazines. There were also twenty-three articles in the special literary supplement. I am reporting on a total of eighty-one articles.

The Popular Press and the Afro-Brazilian

It is important to point out that the Afro-Brazilian population is largely illiterate or semi-literate.[3] As a result, Afro-Brazilians are not, primarily, consumers of the popular press, but to the extent that they are present in it, are primarily objects of its scrutiny. Hence there is little need and little intent for that press to address them. With regard to the subject matter of this research, what we see in the press is for the most part a reflection of how white Brazilians see Black consciousness. The first statement we must make about that vision is that it is decidedly limited. Black consciousness is peripheral to white Brazilians' view of the universe and to their view of Brazil. They are much more attuned to Black consciousness within the United States,[4] but it is a phenomenon which, to them, is alien to Brazil.[5]

Black Consciousness and Political Consciousness in Brazil:
The Prevailing Tendencies

Throughout the literature on Brazil, both on Brazil at large and on Afro-Brazilians in particular, there is no small recognition of a continual and widely recognized tradition and presence of Black consciousness.[6] It is specifically **not** political, and that has been one of the major complaints of Black activists.[7]

Much of the obvious character of Black consciousness has been the practice of Yoruba-Nago religions as manifested in Candomble', Macumba, and to lesser extents Umbanda; in the widespread teaching of the martial art, *capoeira*; in the use of African foods and musical instruments; in widespread recognition of the African contribution to Brazilian culture; in historical sites specifically related to the African and slave experiences; in the literature; and in cultural organizations such as Samba schools, Blocos Afros, and Afoxes'.

However, this widespread and long lasting Black consciousness has had scant political expression.[8]

Thus it is possible, in fact, it has been the norm, to have extensive cultural expression of Black consciousness in Brazil with an accompanying void of political expression. If, on the other hand, contemporary expressions of Black consciousness, even in mainstream media, include a significant political component, then the potential for political activity rooted in Black consciousness must be recognized. As Karl Mannheim reminded us long ago, it is the mind that prepares the way for action.[9]

A Note About Culture

During the Black Power Movement in the United States of the late 1960s and early 1970's, the Black Panther Party asserted a distinction between what it called its own members (Revolutionary Nationalists) and what it labeled some of its adversaries (Cultural Nationalists, or perjoratively, "pork chop nationalists").[10] This emphasis was in part, at least, an expression of the Maoist line **politics takes command.**[11] This accent highlighted the importance of politics in social change. For that reason, if no other, the Panthers' emphasis on the political line was significant.

However, many argue, and argued then, that the Panthers' distinction was a false one. Culture cannot be extricated from politics, such thinkers asserted, and any political line has a cultural base, whether its adherents are aware of it or not.[12] Specifically with regard to the purpose of this paper, such thinkers would argue that one cannot usefully separate political from cultural factors, and that to do so is not only an exercise in the absurd, it is analytically counter-productive. Hence, what this paper contemplates is misguided.

Indeed, many Afro-Brazilian activist adamantly assert this position. I was lectured on this very point by members of the Unified Black Movement (MNU) in Salvador during the summer of 1992. Our stance, they maintain, is at its roots cultural. Our cultural view and our cultural activities cannot be separated from our political views. They are one and the same. However, much political power may grow out of the barrel of a gun—a **political** stance represents the leaves and flowers of a tree whose roots and trunk are cultural.

The analysis in this paper accepts that line of reasoning. It does not, however, accept as a corollary that a cultural stance which is specifically Afro-Brazilian in and of itself assumes a political direction which is Afro-Brazilian. I argue that an Afro-Brazilian cultural stance can be the base for a reactionary, a conservative, a moderate, a liberal, or a radical political perspective. Indeed, I maintain that a clear, Afro-Brazilian cultural stance can even be the basis for an entirely confused and befuddled political stance. Therefore, a Black cultural consciousness, while it may be a prerequisite for a Black political consciousness, does not guarantee it. Afro-Brazilians who created Candomble' and Macumba, who practiced Capoeira, who chanted Yoruba, played African drums, celebrated Carnaval, wore African masks, and maintained tribal identities, were and are entirely capable of accepting the Brazilian myth of racial democracy and of whitening as an acceptable form of social uplift. Their Afro-Brazilian cultural base allow them to take a political stance which is not at all Black, or African-centered. It is not a stance which could be associated with Black **political** consciousness.[13]

Therefore, in this research I look, specifically, for political expressions which are African-centered, which are rooted in a concern for the political well-being of Afro-Brazilians. Because Afro-Brazilian culture alone has not proven itself a sufficient base for a political consciousness attuned to the specific imperatives and visions of Afro-Brazilian people, it is important to identify a component of Afro-Brazilian consciousness which has. In this study I look explicitly for expressions of Afro-Brazilian political consciousness. I look for them in the mass media, in part, because to the extent that they have filtered into media, they have entered the public dialogue as a legitimate viewpoint.

Definitions of Black Consciousness

To ground the paper I must establish what I mean by Black consciousness and, specifically, Black political consciousness. As the base definition of Black consciousness I use the one I had applied in my earlier study of *Veja*. Most simply stated it is this: I will consider as representing Black consciousness an article in which a distinction is made between Afro-Brazilians and other Brazilians.[14] I have, additionally, added six other dimensions to Black consciousness. I classify an article as: (1)

limited to the presence of Black consciousness, (2) containing Black consciousness which is cultural, (3) containing Black consciousness which is political, (4) containing Black consciousness which is both cultural and political, (5) containing Black consciousness which identifies racial prejudice, and (6) articles which deny the existence of racism in Brazil.

I use the following working definitions for each of the six categories. To be placed in a category an article needs to have only one of the major identifiers for the category, e.g., cultural consciousness might include only lifestyle elements, or only artifacts. It need not include both.

Black consciousness: A specific awareness of a particular identity for persons of African descent, a distinction between Black people and others.

Cultural: A recognition of common elements of lifestyle, formal and informal expression (including art forms), production and consumption of artifacts which derive from a common African ancestry.

Political: A recognition of the importance of mobilizing the Black population to participate in and influence political power as Black people, and the recognition of political and social factors which have a pronounced effect specifically on the lives of Afro-Brazilians.

Political/Cultural: A combination of any of the elements of Cultural above with any of the elements of Political below.

Racial prejudice: An expression of racial prejudice related to Afro-Brazilians.

Denial of racial prejudice: Explicit denial of racial prejudice in Brazil, particularly with regard to Afro-Brazilians.

Illustrations of the Categories of Black Consciousness

The following examples are intended to serve as illustrations of how I operationalized identifications of each category of Black consciousness.

Black consciousness:

An article on crime in the 28 August 1991 edition of *Isto E* mentioned, "...a mulatto youth, 17 years old..."[16] An article in the 17 September 1988 edition of *Manchete* providing background about an opera singer said, "Black and poor, she was born and raised in Niopolis, in the center of Baixada Fluminenese, a suburb of Rio."[17]

Cultural:

An article in the 19 December 1989 edition of *Afinal* was entitled, "Black Culture." It was about a documentary film which, the article

said, was, "...91 minutes on black culture that had crossed over from Africa to the Americas."[18] An article in the 29 March 1989 edition of *Visao* covered a Candomble' priestess in Salvador, Mae Aninha, who was the Mae de Santo do Opo Afonja', a *terreiro* in Salvador. [19] An article in *Veja* of February 1991 was on the Bloco Afro, Oludum, the musical group which performed on an album with Paul Simon. It identified them as an Afro-Brazilian musical and cultural group.[20]

Political:

A 14 May 1988 edition of *Manchete* carried an article about an exposition on the history of Black people in Brazil which was entitled, "Slavery in Brazil, the extinction of the Traffic, the Campaign for Abolition and the Search for Citizenship."[21] On 16 November 1983, *Veja* carried an article about race and poverty. It showed how greater poverty is associated with Afro-Brazilians than with white Brazilians.[22] On 8 May 1991, *Isto E* had an article stating that the death penalty applies most directly to poor people and Black people.[23]

Cultural/Political:

On 18 May 1983, *Veja* printed an article entitled, "Rhythm in Black." It was about the growth of the Black movement in Salvador, and it mentioned Blocos Afros and Afoxes, both of which it called traditional carnaval groups in Bahia. It described such groups coming together in a neighborhood to dance and to discuss the Black problem.[24]

Racial Prejudice:

On 24 January 1979, *Veja* had an article about the racist town of Itapocu where Blacks and Whites had separate and exclusive parties, ballrooms, and Catholic churches.[25]

Distribution of Articles by Categories of Black Consciousness

In the initial study, four of the articles were political, two were cultural, three were both political and cultural, five were simple expressions of Black consciousness, two identified the existence of racial prejudice, and one denied it. In later issues of *Veja* I identified four political articles, seven cultural, two both political and cultural, six expressing Black consciousness, and three denying the existence of racial prejudice. My review of other publications found *Afinal* with two cultural articles and *Isto E* with three political articles, two Black consciousness articles, and four articles denying existence of prejudice. *Manchete* produced two political articles, one cultural article, one both political and

cultural, and one indicating Black consciousness. *Visao* showed three cultural articles. Combined, these later magazines printed five Black consciousnsess articles, thirteen cultural, ten political, three with cultural and political combined, four which cited racial prejudice, and six which denied the existence of racial prejudice. The special literary supplement produced one Black consciousness article, two cultural, seventeen political, two combined cultural and political, and one denying the existence of racial prejudice.

In the press at large, a total of twenty articles had some explicit political content. That number was exceed only by articles with some cultural content. For all the magazines reviewed, 34.5% of the articles had some political content, as compared to 64.5% which did not. The literary supplement was altogether different. Eighteen of the twenty-three articles had some political content, or 73.9% of the total.

There can be no question that with over one-third of the articles in the popular press in which Black consciousness appears having some political consciousness content, Black consciousness which appears in Brazilian mass circulation magazines has a significant political element. If one looks at treatments which focus specifically on Afro-Brazilian concerns, one finds an even higher incidence of political elements–73.9% in the *Minas Gerais* supplement. Despite the overall paucity of articles in which Black consciousness appears, that such a proportion of the total is explicitly political is a matter of no small import.

Conclusions

Keep in mind that I reviewed literally thousands of articles to come up with eighty-one expressing some political consciousness: over 13,000 in my earlier study and a like number in the more recent magazines. In short, the articles reported on here constituted approximately 0.313 of one percent of the popular press articles I surveyed. This hardly speaks to a significant presence of articles on black consciousness in the popular media. As I suggested earlier, however, there is at least one very good reason for this. The overwhelming numbers of people buying and reading these magazines are not Afro-Brazilians. White Brazilians do not pay much attention to Black consciousness. Yet interestingly enough, when they do, at least one-third of the time they recognize that it has political dimensions.

In 1988, when a number of publications drew special attention to the plight of Afro-Brazilians, it was the 100th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. In those publications, as represented by the *Minas Gerais* literary supplement, much more concentrated attention was given to the recognition of political elements in Afro-Brazilian self-consciousness.[27]

This trend reverses the long-standing tendency for the Afro-Brazilian voice to be specifically a cultural voice, devoid of a political dimen-

sion. With at least forty-four percent of the Brazilian population having African ancestry, and possibly more than fifty percent,[28] should such an emphasis make more than marginal headway among the Afro-Brazilian population, the potential impact on national political life is immense. Imagine the Civil Rights movement in the United States magnified by a factor of five. The prospect is almost incomprehensible.

I make no claim that anything remotely like that is now underway. I simply point out that even in the almost exclusively white Brazilian mass circulation magazines, there is some, even if minute, recognition that Black consciousness in Brazil sometimes contains a political component. Black political consciousness has attained at least a modicum of acceptability in public discourse. This condition has great potential for the future of Brazilian political life.

Afterthought

We do not know from these data how widespread attitudes incorporating some Black political consciousness are among the Afro-Brazilian population. But we do have some evidence of the significance of Black consciousness for communication with the Afro-Brazilian masses, and the degree to which Afro-Brazilian activists who possess Black consciousness are attuned to that significance. I will provide three examples by way of illustration.

In Brazil there is an extensive public education campaign to combat AIDS. One element of it, published by the Institute of Religious Studies in Rio, consists of a comic book which illustrates the dangers of AIDS through the cosmology of Candomble'.[29] The opening words of the comic book are a Candomble' greeting, "Odo Ya'!" The next words are addressed to devotees, "To Babalorixas, Yalorixas, omon orixas and everybody that attends the terreiro communities." The comic book proceeds then with three separate picture-stories illustrating basic Candomble' myths, and following each with a specific lesson that the particular story can teach about AIDS: (1) If you follow certain rules, you can avoid it; (2) Avoid exchanging blood or touching instruments contaminated with human blood; (3) Seek help and provide support for those who are sick with the disease. This use of Black consciousness is entirely cultural, but it is used in a public health approach. It is a deep use of Black culture. It is esoteric, accessible only to those familiar with it, it is quite detailed, and it is used for specific purpose. Religious and health activists realized that Black culture has tremendous potential for reaching, and possibly transforming, the lives of the Afro-Brazilian masses.

The second has to do with the Bloco Afro, Ile' Aiye', in Salvador. This is an extremely popular carnaval group, ostensibly a cultural group. Yet they tell us otherwise. In a May 1992 information bulletin, *O Mondo*, announcing the theme for the 1993 Carnaval, Ile' Aiye' says, "In 1974

we of Ile' Aiye' began our work of raising the consciousness of the Black Baiano and Brazilian, we had as one of our basic references, the struggle of North American Black people for equal rights and citizenship in the United States."[30] In other words, since 1974, they have been self-consciously using a cultural group and cultural activities to raise political consciousness. They say, "Ile' Aiye' is one of the most significant examples of this resistance of Black people in the Americas."[31] They not only recognize the role of Black consciousness in reaching the Afro-Brazilian masses politically, they are steadfastly using it.

The third, by far the most powerful, is the campaign of Benedita da Silva for the mayoralty of Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Her campaign explicitly expressed a Black political consciousness. Benedita said, "For years, a Brazilian politician has always been rich, white, and male. Now we have a new profile: a black woman from a poor background."[33] Yet hers was not a campaign which was marginalized. Though at the beginning of the primaries she had only four percent voter support, she ended the primary with the highest number of votes, guaranteeing a place for herself as one of the two candidates in the general election. Though she lost the general election—she garnered forty-eight percent of the vote while explicitly and adamantly articulating a vision informed by Black **political** consciousness—Benedita de Silva is a member of the Unified Black Movement.

With occurrences such as these and with the incredible popularity of a group such as Oludum, there may be in the scant references to Black political consciousness in the overwhelming white popular magazines of Brazil...more than meets the eye. The ground is ripe for further study.

NOTES

[1]David Covin, "Black Consciousness in the White Media: The Case of Brazil," *The Western Journal of Black Studies*, 15(1992): 95-101.

[2]Covin, 95-101.

[3] In November of 1979, a *Veja* article showed 52.4% of Blacks and 44.3% of part-Blacks with less than one year of education, pp. 121-122. On 16 November, *Veja*, p. 91, shows thirty-nine percent of Blacks and part Blacks with less than one year of education and sixty-seven percent with three years of school or less.

[4]For example, on 4 April 1991, *Veja,* in a review of this United States movie, *Glory*, p. 86, the reviewer writes about Colin Powell, as a Black General who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest

position in the United States military. The reviewer labels the United States situation strikingly different from the case in Brazil, where Afro-Brazilians did not fight in a war for their freedom, rather, they were used as slave soldiers in Brazilian wars. And in *Veja* of 23 January 1991, Powell is labeled, "a Black Eisenhower," for which, of course, there is no counterpart in Brazil.

[5]Typical of this position is an article in the *Minas Gerais* literary supplements entitled, "The votes of this Black man don't have a color," *100 Anos do Abolicao-o Negro Hoje*, 7 May 1988, Ano XXII, No. 1098, 8.

[6]See, for example, *A Mao Afro-Brasileira*, Emanuel Araujo (ed.), (Sao Paulo: Tenenge, 1988).

[7]Paulo Bonfim, "Crioulo Fala," *Nego*, 4 April 1988, No. 14, p. 6. Bonfim says in a country replete with Afro-Brazilian cultural organizations, the presence of an Afro-Brazilian organization with a political line is unusual and critical.

[8]Most scholars note only two major Black consciousness movements prior to 1978 in the twentieth century. They were the Brazilian Black Front (FNB), 1931-1938; and the Experimental Black Theatre (TEN), 1945- 1948. Both were limited geographically and temporally. With 1978 and the birth of the United Black Movement (MNU), a new wave of Black consciousness began which persists to this day.

[9]Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia,* (New York: Harvest, 1936).

[10]Huey P. Newton, "To the Black Movement: May 15, 1968," *To Die For the People* (Vintage Books, 1972 92), "Cultural nationalism, or pork-chop nationalism as I sometimes call it, is basically a problem of having the wrong political perspective."

[11]Huey P. Newton, "The Correct Handling of a Revolution: July 20, 1967," *To Die For the People*, 14. "The primary job of the party is to provide leadership for the people." Also, 17, "...if the Chinese Revolution is investigated it will be seen that the Communist Party operated quite openly in order to muster support from the masses."

[12]Maulana Ron Karenga, "Ideology and Struggle: Some Preliminary Notes," *The Black Scholar,* Volume 6.5, (January-February, 1975) 25, "Blacks are more than their music and color...The whole shapes the parts and gives them function, but the parts also give meaning to the whole and make it a functioning system or alter it."

[13]Tania Regina Pinto, "Centuria Armagura," *Afinal*, 19 April 1988, No. 190, 38. She cites a poll in which 89.5% of Brazilians (including Afro-Brazilians) declare that the President of Brazil must be white. Also on the same page, she quotes Flavio Jorge, saying, "A Black person does not vote for a Black person..."

[14] In "Black Consciousness and the White Media," the wording, exactly, was, "...any article which spoke specifically to the racial condition of Afro-Brazilians."

[15]Covin, 94-101

[16]*Isto E'*, 28 August 1991, 42.

[17]*Manchete*, 24 December 1988, 102.

[18]*Afinal*, 19 December 1989, 50.

[19]*Visao*, 29 March 1989, 58.

[20]*Veja* 27 February 1991, 77.

[21]*Manchete*, 14 May 1988, 76.

[22]*Veja*, 16 November 1983, 91.

[23]*Isto E'*, 8 May 1991, 45.

[24]*Veja*, 18 May 1983, 77.

[25]*Veja*, 24 January 1979, 38.

[26]*Veja*, 26 October 1983, 10.

[27]In addition to the *Minas* supplement, see, for example, *Manchete*, 17 September 1988; 14 May 1988, 76, especially; 21 May 1988. Also see *Afinal*, 19 April 1988; *Isto E'*, 20 April 1988; special collections of articles from 1988 published by the Ministry of Culture.

[28] While the forty-four percent figure came from the 1980 census, *Veja*, 20 January 1982, 20-22, the latter figure comes from Benedita de Silva, elected member of the National Constition Assembly (the National Congress), and elected to the National Senate in the last Senotorial elections and also in the MNU, according to an interview with Luiza Bairros, National Coordinator of the MNU, July 1992, Salvador, Bahia.

[29]*Odo Ya'!* Published by the Institute of Religious Studies (Rio: 1991).

[30]*O Mondo*, Bulletin of Information, No. 2, Salvador, May 1992.

[31]*O Mondo*, 1992

[32]*New York Times,* 4 November 1992, 3.

[33]*New York Times*, 16 November 1992.

The Spectacle of the Invisible:
Sephardic Jewish Identity
in Multicultural Education

Cara Judea Alhadeff
Pennsylvania State University

This study assesses from a North American Sephardic (Span-
ish-Jewish) perspective, the ambiguous relationships among
Jews, "people of color," and definitions of "whiteness" in order
to re-evaluate multicultural education in the United States. My
intent is not to polarize multiple cultural identities but to illumi-
nate and clarify differences in Jewish histories, identities, and
cultures. The assumption that all Jews are and can pass as
white, and therefore "have privilege," denies the complexities
of racism, anti-Semitism, whiteness, assimilation, and
multiculturalism. In a world where hierarchical divisions nar-
rowly define our perceptions, our relations to power, and our
multiple identities, Sephardic non-white Jews are often simul-
taneously defined and excluded by "whites," "people of color,"
and by those who are themselves stereotyped as the "mono-
lithic Jew" (i.e., the German or Eastern European Jew). By
examining historical and social constructions of "whiteness," I
hope to compel Jews to politicize the construction of our iden-
tities within the context of the diaspora and cultural workers to
strengthen the vitality, complexity, and legitimacy of a
multicultural curriculum.

As a Sephardic female who is conscious of having been socially
and culturally conditioned by American institutions, I experience daily an
ambiguous "identity of exile," which I define as the spectacle of the invis-
ible. This study assesses, from a North American Sephardic (Spanish-
Jewish) perspective, the complex relationships among Jews, "people of
color," and definitions of "whiteness" in order to examine the intersec-
tions of multicultural education and the politics of representation in the

United States. Such re-evaluation is particularly significant in light of growing anti-Semitism resulting from white supremacy at the extreme right, and various resistance movements at the radical left, such as the unexamined Christianity of Liberation Theology.[1]

With this paper, I intend to use the term "spectacle of the invisible" as a lens through which I examine power relationships among Sephardic peoples, the United States as one of their many white "host" countries, and the repressive homogenization which such "hosting" breeds. Just as there is no monolithic Native American, or singular Asian, Arab, or African, Jews come from India, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, and Montana. My intent is not to polarize multiple cultural identities, but to illuminate and clarify differences in Jewish histories, identities, and cultures in order to strengthen the vitality, complexity, and legitimacy of a multicultural curriculum.[2]

Dominant forms of cultural and political representation in the United States call for all Jews to assimilate into white institutions. "White" is a socio-political construction, not a biological one, which is manifested within our society's power-structure. I use the terms "white" and "power-structure" to refer to a systematic universalizing and dehistoricizing of Jewish peoples now living in the United States: "Our school system teaches us that we must forget ourselves. We must...learn a language which universalizes, so that not only [are] our voices[s] silenced, but our very existence[s are] eliminated."[3] In the United States, the multiple layers of Jewish identities are lumped together into the anonymous, homogeneous Jew and then lumped again into the category of "White." It is this ironic trap that perpetuates anti-Semitism and signifies the spectacle of the invisible.

The assumption that all Jews are and can pass as white (and therefore have privilege) denies the complexities of racism, anti-Semitism, whiteness, multiculturalism, and multiplicity of Jewish identities. I question, what color is this white?

According to James Baldwin:

> No one was white before he/she came to America. It took generations, and a vast amount of coercion, before this became a white country...The Jewish community-or more accurately, perhaps, its remnants—in America has paid the highest and most extraordinary price for becoming White. For Jews came here from countries where they were not white, and they came here, in part, because they were not white.[4]

Given the recurrence of pogroms, inquisitions, quotas, and variations on the Dreyfus affair, clearly, Jews cannot and do not integrate into our "host" societies; we either become invisible or stand out as a stereo-

type. This contradictory condition results in assimilation and complicity in our own silencing. Assimilation is too often manifested as internalized oppression. Internalized oppression is "the result of psychological and ideological domination...the primary means by which we have been forced to perpetuate and agree to our own oppression."[5] Similarly, Trinh T. Minh-ha states:

> When those who are different, or 'other', are admitted to the discussion, they are only admitted on the terms of those in power, using 'their' language and 'their' standards for discourse. But, this just ends up 'allowing' those who are different to contribute to their own silencing, and at the same time, legitimizes the discussion.[6]

Assimilationists (i.e., Jews who readily identify themselves as white) are often whiter than white. (This is only the case, of course, until our "certificates of pure blood," "limpieza de sangre," are verified by authorities.) According to Audre Lorde, they take on the "language and manners of the oppressor" to give themselves an "illusion of protection."[7] Cherrie Moraga tells us that those who are able to "pass" become acclimated to the sound of white language..." I had disowned the language I know best-ignored the words and rhythms that were closest to me. I had but off the hands in my poems. But not in conversation: still the hands could not be kept down. Still they insisted on moving".[8]

Hierarchical degrees of socially constructed whiteness determine power relationships; we are socialized to act as though "passing" as white grants us immunity and power. What is the nature of this passing? "To pass...is to get by in public life...but only at the mercy of detailed and conscious concealment and invention."[9] Passing cannot presume acceptance and community: "For some Jews, 'passing' seems a choice; for others, passing means total denial and pain; for still others, passing is something they do without even thinking, and for still others, passing as white/American/normal is impossible."[10] Whiteness, just as the mainstreaming, or what I identify as Yiddishizin, of what it means to be identified as a Jew, has functioned as a convenient tool for both exposing and denying my identities as a Sephardic woman.

In her essay, "La Guera," ("fair-skinned,") Moraga confronts her identity as marginal Chicana. She describes "a world that is both alien and common to me: the capacity to enter into the lives of others."[11] Moraga stresses that those who have the "ability" to pass, are only "peripherally advantageous." According to the specific circumstance, I am able to pass as white or as non-white, while simultaneously, I am defined as neither. Nava Mizrahhi's poem of contradictions explores her experience of hybrid identities.

"To Be an Arab Jew":

To be an Arab Jew.
What is the title?
What does it mean?
Are you Arab? Are you Jewish?
Where you standing?
How can it even be?
You are either Arab,
Or you are Jewish-
Because there is the Arab-Jewish conflict.
But I am an Arab Jew,
Because Farha Abdallah
Came from Iraq
Which is Arab country.
Of course when she came to Jerusalem,
She become Farha Mizrahhi.
She is Jewish.
She been to the synagogue
Every Friday night and Saturday morning.
She keeps kosher.
Her language is Arabic.
The music she listens to is in Arabic.
And her connection to the big world
Is through the Arabic department
Of the Israeli television.
Since she live in Jerusalem,
She could also enjoy some more
Program from the TV station in Amman.
I didn't grow up speaking Arabic.
And through my childhood, I wasn't able to communi-
cate with my grandmother.
My parents wanted me to speak Hebrew.
Then I went to school and learned English and French.
Arabic never been a priority for them.
In the housing project we lived in,
People from Persia Kurdistan Morocco
Iraq Egypt Bukhara Yemen
Lived one next to other.
And instead of a multi-culture
We heard the national radio play
European and "Israeli" music.
And then was the Arabic department.
But you don't really listen to it
Because in the projects everyone could hear

What you listen to-and you are
Ashamed to be caught
Being an Arab Jew.[12]

Not only does such ambiguous marginality threaten the homogenizing definitions of "what is a Jew?," but it clearly reflects social relationships Sephardic Jews have had within their/our host countries. "As Sephardim, it is our multicultural histories and hybrid sensibilities that enable many of us to identify with the crypto-Jews of the southwest, with the Ethiopian Jews, with the Palestinians, and the Moslems of Yugoslavia."[13] This reciprocal responsibility reminds me of Rabbi Hillel's provocation, "If I am not for myself, who will be? If I am only for myself, what am I?" Rabbi Hillel's assertion resonates with the potential to cross borders set by historical and social constructions of power and their implicit and explicit ways in which assumptions about and representations of Jews inform cultural norms. According to David Rabeeya, "Sephardic Jews must recognize the international dimensions of their situation which is comparable to many other groups who have been subject to forces of bigotry and prejudice."[14]

In a world where hierarchical divisions and definitions narrowly define our perceptions, our relations to power, and our multiple identities, as a Sephardic non-white Jew, I am simultaneously defined and excluded by "whites," "people of color," and by those who are themselves stereotyped as the "monolithic Jew" (i.e., the German or Eastern European Jew). Once again, I am the spectacle of my own invisibility. This spectacle exploits the reductionism of Jews' ambiguous identities and denies, exoticizes, or ignores a Spanish presence while it objectifies the anonymous Jew who supposedly has the option and desire to assimilate and who can conveniently, albeit temporarily, fit into the mainstream.

Thus, I perceive myself as a kind of hidden or invisible Jew in Christian North America.[15] Sephardim are often mistaken as Moslem or Catholic and "pass" into situations where anti-Semitism would have silenced a Yiddish speaking person. Three years ago, for example, when I was living in Tunisia, for reasons of daily survival I had to conceal that I am a Jew. In spite of the guilt I felt, I was grateful to be mistaken as an Arab from the city. On the other hand, "Ashkenazi Jews here in the U.S. often label Sephardim as 'exotic,' and often do not see us as really being Jewish, given that our physical characteristics, or languages (including our Hebrew), as well as our literature, folklore, music, foods, and rituals are a hybrid of Spanish, Arabic, and Turkish."[16]

Another layer of this contradiction of an identity of exile is that for the very reason the Sephardim had been exiled from their own particular countries for being Jews, when they arrived in the United States they had to prove to other Jews that very "Jewishness":

> The American Jewish population here had no idea that these immigrants [Sephardic or Levantine] were Jews. The Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) sent people to the boats to help the Jewish arrivals, but they failed to identify the Sephardim as Jews. Rabbi Marc Angel goes on to say that the Sephardim weren't recognized as Jews by the Ashkenazim because they didn't know Yiddish; their pronunciation of Hebrew was different; and their names were Alhadeff, [Cardoza], and Angel, which to Ashkenazim didn't sound 'Jewish'.[17]

The Sephardic "invisible" identify of the "minority within a minority"[18] is reinforced by what the mainstream perceives as mainstream Jews. For example, the stereotypical "known" Jew speaks Yiddish. Ladino, the language of the Sephardim, is not acknowledged as a Jewish language; thus, it is not a target of derision, as is Yiddish. Michele Wallace makes a similar case against theoretical discourses, in which "race" is marginalized, trivialized, and excluded. "[Such convenient omissions] provide the component parts for the structure of racism in the dominant discourse. It has meant and continues to mean that as you turn to the cultural left you are greeted by the emphatic symbolic representation of your own invisibility. At least 'race' is real to the reactionary right."[19]

Clearly, homogenizing definitions of all peoples tend to perpetuate racism and divisiveness. It is essential, therefore, not to ignore basic cultural differences among Jews living in the United States. My personal experiences resonate with Barbara Christian's statement: "Many of us are particularly sensitive to monolithism because one major element of ideologies of dominance, such as sexism and racism, is to dehumanize people by stereotyping them, by denying them their variousness and complexity."[20]

Because in the United States we are taught that ambiguity is not only threatening, but "absolutely" invalid, the reductionism of identities has become institutionalized. Ethnic ambiguity threatens the purity of the power-structure. In institutional arenas (universities, public schools, governmental, and cultural sites), and in organized hate groups, Jews are consistently defined by others: the economic essentializing view of the corporate Jew, alluding to both wealth and conspiracy; the Israeli perceived as only the Zionist,[21] erasing the existence of Arab-Jews and Palestinian-Israelis; the religious Jew, delegitimizinng the secular Jew (discussed below); and the Eastern European or German Jew, ignoring the presence of Spanish Jews and all other non-white "non-Ashkenazim." "Jewishness" is amplified as a race by the extreme right and reduced to a religion and/or Israeli politics by the Left—both liberal and radical. In contrast, Amalia Mesa-Baine stresses that, "power [functions] as the

ability to create self-definitions upon which one can act."[22]

Assimilation to expected norms (in contrast to active Jewish secularism) leaves Jews powerless to personally define and publicly voice our identities beyond institutionally stereotyped categories which are perceived "natural." As a Sephardic woman, if I am to challenge the erasures of assimilationism, to demystify and communicate beyond constructed boundaries, I must examine my experiences of cultural isolation from the "American Jewish community" *within* its social context in the United States.

Multicultural advocates, as historical agents and cultural workers, have the responsibility to recognize the dangerous dichotomy of defining racism as all white people oppressing all people of color. This schism denies complexities of both "white" (quotation marks emphasized) people's "color" and people of color's "color" and how they may overlap.[23] Without such a recognition, multicultural educators too often perpetuate the unaccountability of whiteness and its historical and social power-structures.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty stresses:

> The challenge of race resides in a fundamental reconceptualization of our categories of analysis so that differences can be historically specified and understood as part of larger political processes and systems. The central issue, then, is not one of merely acknowledging difference; rather, the more difficult question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and engaged. Difference seen as benign variation (diversity), for instance, rather that as conflict, struggle, or the threat of disruption, bypasses power as well as history to suggest a harmonious, empty pluralism.[24]

I am defining multiculturalism not through a self-referential lens (i.e., having a voice simply for the sake of hearing oneself speak), but through a lens which reflects multiculturalism's relationship to white supremacy and institutionalized racism. This perspective renders articulate not only those voices who have been historically eliminated, but those voices who get heard precisely because of such an elimination. I do not intend to promote pluralism, as referred to above as the "notion that all positions in culture and politics are now open and equal,"[25] or inclusiveness, which is defined by Michele Wallace as a "color-blind cultural homgeneity which originates in liberal humanist ideology."[26] Instead, I am advocating an empassioned resistance based on the specificity of difference; one which interrogates and holds the "white power-structure" accountable.

Baldwin states that anti-Semitism among Blacks often stems from displaced hatred toward the good white Christian-American institu-

tions.[27] Similarly, Earl Raab defines political anti-Semitism as perceiving the Jew as the corporate structure. The concept and propaganda of a Jewish conspiracy, which once again presumes a universal identity of Jewish peoples, detracts public attention away from the taken for granted hegemonic power structure.

The irony of American Jews being identified with the all pervasive, all intrusive power structure lies in the economic and political position of Jews as "middlemen":

> Black rage at white power was transformed into anti-Semitism by the myth of the omnipotent Jew...The omnipotent Jew and rapacious black male are twin spectres in the Western psyche, always available to be played as an instrument of public policy. It is Bush and the elite he epitomizes that are ultimately empowered by Crown Heights. Now, blacks may be held up to Jews as the real anti-Semites, even as Jews are held up to blacks as the real racists.[28]

The assumption that economic status is the key to control within the power structure is based on the absences and ignorance of Jewish histories in the United States. This assumption equates money with the privilege of defining one's own identity and relationships within society. Because this reductionist perception breeds an insidious anti-Semitism, the need for education of Jewish histories, both present and past, becomes even more vital:

> The socio-economic success of some American Jews in no way mitigates the importance of invigorating university curricula with relevant and previously neglected Jewish cultural contribution. Elevated class status has not immunized economically successful American Jews against discrimination or cultural exclusion. Only an environment which fosters an appreciation of Jewish contributions to American culture among Jews and non-Jews alike can alleviate an anti-Semitism which thrives on stereotypes of Jewish wealth.[29]

Oppression of Jews in the form of institutional assimilation and cultural exclusion persists in large part because numerical representation does not reflect or constitute cultural representation. By inserting token fragments of Jewish histories into curriculum (such as the Holocaust taken out of historical context), professors neutralize and depoliticize our histories and identities, thus erasing memory.

Rather than defining ourselves, we have internalized the constructed desire to learn "their" language, "their" HIStory, and "their" culture:

> in school, nothing encouraged us to look to our homes and backgrounds for cultural resources worthy of preservation. The message was just the opposite: we were to erase all traces of who we were and where we came from. Higher education continues the process of making us "become" something new.[30]

Within this institutionalized space of "becoming" the pre-defined invisible other, we are taught to speak white Christianizing English--"Standard English"--the language of those in power. "Standardized means the rule, the norm...Although we all come from different experiences and our silencing each takes on different forms, Standard English silences us all in some way."[31]

In the following citation, June Jordan discusses a form of institutional racism many African-American children experience. She could very well be describing various Jewish children's experience in the United States:

> What those children brought into the classroom: their language, their style, their sense of humor, their ideas of smart, their music, their need for a valid history and a valid literature history and literature that included their faces and their voices... Nobody wanted to know what they felt or to teach them to think for themselves. Nobody wanted to learn anything from them.[32]

This pedagogical omission continues to be played out in university classrooms. Too often, when Jews come out of the closet by specifically raising "Jewish concerns", we are confronted by a hostile Left. When I voice my direct empathy with "oppressed Others," I am told my voice diverts the issue at hand—acknowledging those who experience "real" oppression—"real" racism. This myth of scarcity, in which there exists an unspoken monopoly on oppression, where anti-Semitism is pitted against racism, reifies the very power-structure which constructs oppressive conditions.[33]

One example of politically correct anti-Semitism, in this case internalized anti-Semitism, is that of a well known Chicana activist-"borderland intellectual" whose (textual) politics of location emphasize multiple, often conflicting and always leaking identities, but as a professor in the classroom, she chose to selectively omit any discussion of her one-fourth (sephardic) Jewish ancestry. I cannot help wondering if her peda-

gogically abridged version of her personal politics of location was the conscious result of needing to satisfy her students' unquestioned assumption of the myth of scarcity, in which the discussion of everyday Jewish oppression is deemed distracting and illegitimate.

When white supremacists have the power to make their world a White world, Jews have historically been one of the primary groups to be eliminated:

> It's obvious for people in Europe that anti-Semitism is a form of racism. People don't have any questions about it, partly because they've experienced it close at hand and because they're re-experiencing it now. Europeans have often seen Jews as a very different people. In the U.S. the distinctions are blurred. Jews are seen as white people who go to Jewish church. So Jews need to explore an analysis that connects anti-Semitism to racism and makes plain to Jews what the dangers of racism are to us, and makes plain to progressives and people of color what the dangers of anti-Semitism are to them.[34]

Discussions on anti-Semitism which are either subsumed under or overshadowed by discussions on racism simply perpetuate monolithic definitions, and bypass the interconnecting relationships among power, authority, and privilege. (Multi)Cultural workers must clarify specifically about, for, and/or with whom we are speaking.[35] Ironically, many students, faculty, and those specifically involved in the "diversity industry" who spend so much of their time and energy on educating and fighting against racism simultaneously sponsor and publish (both subtle and blatant) anti-Semitic (and racist) speakers and articles.

To counter-act "ethnic amnesia" cultural workers must develop a solid knowledge of Jewish histories which would give Jews the tools to analyze the multiple manifestations of their/our oppression. (Of course, this is against the interests of those who dominate the modes of representation.) This struggle, which uses cultural memory as a resource, resists the blurring and erasure of identity and culture which assimilation breeds.

Radical leftists continue to use the term "Judeo-Christian" when criticizing ethnocurricula. The naturalized institutionalization of "Judeo-Christan" perpetuates the myth that Jewish histories are voiced through Eurocentric histories. Such a notion once again equates Jewish identity with the white power-structure. Using the term "Judeo-Christian"

> successfully deceives Jews into believing that the two civilizations are really alike...to minimize again our distinctiveness and the uniqueness of our tradition[s] and

culture[s], and to anesthetize us against recognizing and remembering the Christians oppressed us for many centuries in the name of their 'civilization.'[36]

Jews defining ourselves in the Diaspora becomes "a commitment...in which politics and Jewish identit[ies] are intimately connected...How we define ourselves as Jews determines our politics and how we express them." Irena Klepfisz goes on to discuss "the radical concept of Jewish secularism...the possibility of being a committed unassimilated Jew without being observant." To be secular is to experience the "desire to affirm Jewish identity and unequivocally to disassociate oneself from assimilationists."[37] Judaism embodies multiple ethnic and political identies: it is not, as the Left—both radical and liberal—claim, simply a religion and/or Israeli politics.

A visible Jewish autonomy can be based on the Hebrew word, *tzedakah*, meaning justice. The Torah and high holidays (examples of popularly perceived religious signifiers) are integral elements of Jewish philosophies and cultures: "Hanukkah, Purim, and Pesakh are not dependent on synagogue observance, but linked to historical and political Jewish events."[38] They are stories of resistance and survival which can and are directly applied to contemporary political contexts around the world. This vital recognition of geographical and cultural differences acknowledges the presence of not only the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim, but also, Oriental Jews from Turkey, the Balkan countries, Syria, and Northern Africa (particularly Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt); Jewish communities in Ethiopia, India, China, Iraq, Lebanon, and "edot Hamizrah" (the Oriental communities in Israel of Asian-African origin), to name but a few elements of the Jewish Diaspora.

As a child of a Sephardic Holocaust survivor of a European based World War, I am propelled to activate histories through a recognition of multiple identities and empathetic experiences. Like many Jews who have resisted internalized anti-Semitism, Diego Rivera attributed his partial Jewish ancestry to his passionate drive to fight against social injustices.[39] I too have learned that being a Jew means actively resisting everyday violence.[40] By reducing Judaism to religion, as an isolated category, all Jews who define ourselves as secular-political Jews must confront an imposed and internalized erasure of identities.[41]

The majority of the students of color who spoke out at Sarah Lawrence College's 1991 *Forum on Racism*, insisted that Judaism is not a race but a religion. The result is that the difference between secular and assimilated Jews is not even considered by most Jewish (and, evidently, non-Jewish) college students today. This limiting perspective too often confuses secularism with assimilation. Klepfisz's definition of a strong Jewish secular consciousness can be defined through "intergrated art and politics, introspection and activism, a concern for Jewish survival and the survival of other peoples."[42]

Part of the unstable common ground that many Jews share with people of color is:

> the sense of uprootedness-expulsion, moving to strange lands, searching for safety, for a home; the power of history of anti-Semitism with its hatred and genocide; ...sharing and the fear of losing that connecting thread; assimilation...self-denial, and self-mutilation, the betrayal of our own in order to be 'one of them';...recognition of worth a coming into language of Yiddish or Ladino, one that is connected with music and dance and food and humor, the humor that says so much about how people live with loss, pain, dislocation, that says so much about survival and joy, sharing and love.[43]

Because, as Stuart Hall claims, "all identity is constructed across difference," we must recognize and act on the profoundly hybrid character of "race," "ethnicity," and "nationality." Rabbi Marc Angel's statement: "Sephardim are able to balance contradictions without feeling hypocritical about it"[44] reinforces an acceptance of the potential to activate the permeability of identities. Adrienne Rich emphasizes the transformative potential of such intersubjectivities: "The relationship to more than one culture, nonassimilating in spirit and therefore living contradiction, is a constant act of self-creation."[45]

Perhaps we, as cross-cultural activists who exist within and between multiple worlds, can learn from the Crypto-Jews of the southwest United States, who, as spectacles of the invisible, for the past five-hundred years have been living as Catholics in name only, while passing on to their descendants both their hidden Jewish traditions and their fear of exposure. The complexity of these communities' hybrid identities embodies the possibilities for cross-cultural alliances.

In *The Buried Mirror*, Carlos Fuentes makes a radical claim for reciprocal responsibility:

> We are men and women of La Mancha. In Spanish, la mancha means "the stain." [It is crucial that] we understand that none of us is pure, that we are all both real and ideal, heroic and absurd, made of desire and imagination as much as of blood and bone, and that each of us is part Christian, part Jew, part Moor, part Caucasian, part black, part Indian, without having to sacrifice any of our components.[46]

NOTES

[1]Judith Laikin-Elkin, "Colonial Legacy of Anti-Semitism," *Report on the Americas* 25 n. 4, (February, 1992).

[2]"Since most Sephardic perspectives have historically been publicized by non-Sephardic Jews, it is essential now that Sephardic Jews themselves offer their own perceptions on historic events." David Rabeeya, "Sephardic Perspectives: Past, Present and Future—Contemporary Arab-Israeli-Ashkenazic-Sephardic Issues", *Jewish Education News*, CAJE-33 (1992): 2-3.

[3]Laura Wernick, "Why I Can't Write My Thesis" (Social Science Senior Thesis, University of California Berkeley, 1991), 26.

[4]James Baldwin, "On Being 'White'... and Other Lies", *Essence*, (April 1984).

[5]Lipsky, in *Notes on Anti-Semitism and Anti-Oppression Work*, ed. Naomi Nim (1991), 2.

[6]Trinh T. Min-ha, *Women Native Other* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989).

[7]Audre Lorde, "Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference" in *Out of the Other Side: Contemporary Lesbian Writing*, eds. Christina McEwen and Sue O'Sullivan (London: Virago, 1988).

[8]Cherrie Moraga, "La Guera", *Loving In the War Years* (Boston: South End Press, 1983), 55.

[9]Lisa Henderson, "Justify Our Love: Madonna and the Politics of Queer Sex," in *The Madonna Connection: Representation, Politics, Subcultural Identities, and Cultural Theory,* ed. Cathy Schichtenberg (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 121.

[10]Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz, "Towards a Radical Jew in the Late Twentieth Century", in *The Tribe of Dina: A Jewish Women's Anthology*, eds. Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz and Irena Klepfisz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 308.

[11]Moraga, 44.

[12]Nava Mizahhi, "To Be an Arab Jew", *The Tribe of Dina*, 231.

[13]Micaela Amato, personal conversation, 1992.

[14]Rabeeya, 3.

[15]"We are Christian in everything. We live in a Christian state, attend Christian schools, read Christian books, in short, our whole 'culture' rests entirely on Christian foundations". Franz Rosenszweig in *Response, A Contemporary Jewish Review: "Special Issue: Multiculturalism, Jews and the Canon"* (New York: Response, 1991).

[16]Amato, personal conversation, 1992.

[17]Marc Angel, "Our Different Heritages: Sephardim and Askenazim", *Jewish Congress Monthly,* January 1992.

[18]Rita Arditti, "To Be Hanu" [Ladino word meaning good-looking woman], *The Tribe of Dina*, 16.

[19]Michele Wallace, "Multiculturalism and Oppositionality", in *Between Borders: Pedagogy and the Politics of Cultural Studies,* eds. Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren (New York: Routledge, 1994), 186.

[20]Barbara Christian cited in Wernick.

[21]"While Some leaders of the Sephardic Jewish community in Arab lands actually took part in the growth of Arab nationalism, they were unaware of the growth of a similar nationalism called the Zionist movement. These leaders were conceptually unprepared to transfer their experience in the Arab world to an unfamiliar European-Ashkenazic movement called Zionism." Rabeeya, 3.

[22]Amalia Mesa-Bains, "The Real Multiculturalism: A Struggle for Power and Authority," in *Different Voices: A Social, Cultural, and Historical Framework for Change in the American Art Museum,* ed. Marcia Tucher (Chicago: Library of Congress, 1992), 88.

[23]According to Audre Lorde, "It is not our differences which separate [us], but our reluctance to recognize those differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have resulted from the ignoring and misnaming of those differences. [we must] identify and develop new definitions of power and new patterns of relation across difference." Lorde, 275. Without connections, recognitions of differences and similarities in our histories, we are insulated in our own oppressions. Through reading about and listening to experiences of women of color, I began to clarify

both my role in their oppression as well as my own relationship to anti-Semitism. These experiences reveal that although the racism I experience is different from other women, I am not alone: "Its through acknowledging and understanding our own oppressions that we come to really gain an understanding of others' oppressions." Wernick, 49.

[24]Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "On Race and Voice: Challenges for Liberal Education in the 1990's, in *Between Borders,* 146.

[25]Hal Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays in Post-Modern Culture* (Seattle: Bay Printing, 1983).

[26]Wallace, 182.

[27]Nat Hentoff, *Black Anti-Semitism and Jewish Racism* (New Your: Richard W. Baron, 1969).

[28]Richard Goldstein, "The New Anti-Semitism: A Geshrei," *The Village Voice*, 1 October, 1991.

[29]*Response.*

[30]Irena Klepfisz, *Dreams of an Insomniac: Jewish Feminist Essays, Speeches, and Diatribes* (Portland: The Eighth Mountain Press, 1990), 38.

[31]Wernick.

[32]June Jordan, *On Call Political Essays* (Boston: South End Press, 1985), 29.

[33]The "dis-ease" of coming out and openly discussing ant-Semitism is rampant among Jewish social activists who do not acknowledge the multiple layers of their/our own Jewish identities. This institutional production of silence feeds on its self-legitimizing curricular omissions. Audre Lorde tells us, "For we have been socialized to respect fear more than our own need for language and definition, and while we wait in silence for that final luxury of fearlessness, the weight of that silence will choke us." Lorde, 44.

[34]Kaye/Kantrowitz, "Raising Consciousness and Making Change: Workshop on Anti-Semitism and Jewish Identity", in *The Issue is Power* (Aunt Lute Books, 1992), 8.

[35]Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Woman Native Other*, (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-

sity Press, 1989).

[36]Rosenberg, 43.

[37]Klepfisz.

[38]Klepfisz, 195.

[39]*El Lapid: Journal for the Society for Crypto-Judaic Studies.*

[40]I am told that I am white, yet, growing up in a small towns in Colorado and Texas, I have never identified with "normalized" white experiences. Where I grew up, people thought that my mother and I were gypsies. Our clothes were strange, our food was strange, we smelled strange, and we had strange accents. I encountered individuals who were convinced that underneath our curly hair, we were hiding our horns.

[41]"In sharp contrast to the Sephardic Jews who in their heyday were among the leading statesmen, diplomats, philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, astronomers, navigators, physicians, etc., of Spain, North Africa and Egypt, the Polish Jews, with very few exceptions, considered interest in any realm of non-Jewish intellectual endeavor as un-Jewish and therefore prohibited". Raphael Patai, *The Vanishing Worlds of Jewry* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1980), 21.

[42]Klepfisz, 210.

[43]Bernice Mennis cited in Wernick, 38.

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Newsletter Article   [3]James H. Williams, "Ethnicity and Human Rights: Raising the National Consciousness," *NAIES Newsletter* 5 (October 1980): 19.

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