those works. He comments, as well, on multiculturalism in ways that should interest ethnic studies scholars. He states, for example, “All cultures are the result of a mishmash, borrowings, mixtures that have occurred, though at different rates, ever since the beginning of time. Because of the way it is formed, each society is multicultural and over the centuries has arrived at its own original synthesis. Each will hold more or less rigidly to this mixture that forms its culture at a given moment” (152-53). And he notes that “There is no country more the product of mixture than the United States, and nonetheless there exists an “American way of life” that all inhabitants of the country are attached to, no matter what their ethnic origin” (153).

“Succinct” is probably the most descriptive word for this book. It is a slim volume and at times Levi-Strauss seems like a reluctant interviewee, resisting Eribon’s praise, claiming little, if any credit for his successes. Eribon, on the other hand, does a fine job of drawing out a broad range of interesting tales and of providing an intriguing portrait of Levi-Strauss, of anthropology, and of European and American cultures.

Harriet Ottenheimer
Kansas State University


Scholars of the history of race and race relations social science should be deeply indebted to Jeffrey C. Stewart for uncovering and meticulously reconstructing these extant lectures by the philosopher better known for his later contributions to the Harlem Renaissance than his social scientific theorizing: Alain LeRoy Locke. The book is an invaluable source on the thought of an African American intellectual on the subject of the nature of race relations during the Progressive Era and on its relationship to ethnic and class relations as well. So fecund are these lectures with insights and hypotheses which deserve further investigation and analysis that it would require a work of equal length to do justice to this collection of lectures. As a consequence, this review focuses only on Locke’s treatment of race, race prejudice, and race relations.

One of the numerous strengths of this African American’s lectures is their assault on the conception of biological race. For
Locke, the concept of biological race—albeit still subject to clarification—was a “scientific fiction.” Drawing on the work of the father of modern American anthropology, Franz Urri Boas, Locke argued that biological race differences were negligible: “Because of differences [in] anthropological [factors], points of comparison have now been reduced to such a narrow margin in each instance that the variation between individuals of the same race, and even the same nation, more than outspan the maximum variability between what are regarded as cognate races of mankind” (5). As a result Locke thought it necessary to draw a distinction between racial differences and racial inequalities. Racial inequalities, according to him, were to be explained “in terms of historical, economic, and social factors”; while racial differences were to be explained “in terms of anthropological and ethnomethodological factors and predating another cause and effect [basis] for the relation between the two” (9). Since race, as most contemporary scholars agree, is a social or cultural phenomenon, Locke concluded that “any true history of race must be a sociological theory of race” (11).

More problematical for most recent scholars, and an indicator that he was indeed a prisoner of his times, is Locke’s analysis of racial prejudice. Believing that since ancient times racial prejudice had been “automatic and instinctive,” it is not surprising that Locke held what the Swedish political economist Gunnar Myrdal called a “laissé-faire, do-nothing” approach in reference to the potency of the law in changing race relations in establishing a modus vivendi between conflicting racial groups. “It would seem,” Locke remarked, “that in the majority of instances, almost as there is any recognition or sense of a difference, the law springs up to help confirm it and perpetuate [the difference]” (49). Written in the period when the Supreme Court’s decision in *Plessy v. Ferguson* had legitimized Jim Crow, Locke concluded on a fatalistic note that: “One of the saddest phenomena with which the study of society can concern us is the way in which every legal, every customary, prescription accentuates and perpetuates differences [and] handicaps which would perhaps pass off as temporary accidents if they did not have the sanction and the perpetuation of the legal or the customary forms. [This is the] stereotype function of the law” (49).

In reference to the relationship of race relations, Locke argued: “Race issues are only very virulent forms of class issues, because as they can be broken up into class issues they become possible of solution in society” (70). Furthermore, he perceived a similarity between race relations and ethnic relations. For Locke, the relations that existed between dominant and minority groups in Europe, which were separated not by skin color but rather by speech
dialects, customs, and religious faith, were the basis for group domination and exploitation.

Those of us with historical hindsight might disagree with Locke's pronouncements, but there is no doubt that his views which were brought forth in 1916 are worthy of serious discourse. This book is highly recommended for those persons interested in a theoretical discussion of deeply disturbing and perplexing problems of race in the early twentieth century.

Vernon J. Williams, Jr.
Purdue University


On December 29, 1890, at the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, there occurred one of the most bloody and tragic events in American history—the massacre of hundreds of American Indians by the US Seventh Cavalry at Wounded Knee Creek. A principal factor precipitating this atrocity was the American government's misperception of the so-called Ghost Dance which had spread from the Great Basin and Plateau into the Great Plains. Just a week before the massacre, James Mooney (then a young employee of the Smithsonian Institution's Bureau of Ethnology) had headed west to study the Ghost Dance phenomenon. Field work over the next four years convinced Mooney that the Ghost Dance was not a militaristic enterprise aimed at armed rebellion against the United States. It was rather a religious movement based on indigenous values which the whites had failed to understand.

Mooney's tome was originally published in 1896 as part two of the Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology. His study has long been considered a classic crosscultural study—perhaps one of the finest pieces of American ethnology undertaken in the nineteenth century. It includes not only good descriptive data, but also the participant-observer approach, cross-cultural comparisons, and a theoretical framework which are among the essentials of modern anthropology and perhaps of ethnic studies as well. Although an abridged paperback version was edited by Anthony F.C. Wallace and published by the University of Chicago Press in 1965, Mooney's complete opus has not been easily accessible for research and teaching. The reviewer is especially aware of this problem since Mooney's original report, a required source in more than one course, disappeared from the Iowa State University Library some years ago!