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Seeing the Sausage Made: How Compromise Works in Large Groups and Representative Bodies

James E. Crawford Jr.
Virginia Commonwealth University

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Seeing the Sausage Made: How Compromise Works in Large Groups and Representative Bodies

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in English for Writing and Rhetoric at Virginia Commonwealth University.

by

James E. Crawford, Jr.
A.A.S, Germanna Community College, 2006
B.L.A, University of Richmond, 2008

Director: Dr. Elizabeth S. Hodges
Associate Professor, English

Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia
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Abstract

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By James E. Crawford, Jr., M.A.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in English for Writing and Rhetoric at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014.

Major Director: Dr. Elizabeth S. Hodges, Associate Professor, English

Inspired by the lack of Congressional compromise during the 2013 federal shutdown, I explore how compromise works in large groups and representative bodies. An on-line survey, personal interviews, and a discourse analysis of the Congressional Record yield a diverse collection of data, including personal and public stories of compromise. I examine the stories and other data through an eclectic mix of contemporary scholarship, borrowing literary theory from the Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin, socio-linguistic concepts from American linguist James Paul Gee, and moral philosophy from Israeli thinker Avishai Margalit. I also incorporate the work of political scientists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, as well as the political campaign coverage of writer and essayist Joan Didion.

My examination shows that differences in Discourse, Gee’s expansive model of the discourse community, underpin the uncompromising mindset that dominated the 2013 shutdown. I show that public and personal compromise have obvious differences in terms of scope and
complexity, but that all successful compromises, of any size, rest on a bedrock of trust. My research uncovered more effective ways of brokering legislative compromise in the future. I also learned that public opinion polls do not influence legislative decisions. Instead, regular, personal contact, whether by phone, fax, or e-mail, is the best way to engage and influence legislators. Finally, I consider the challenges and limitations of my research, including the difficulty of collecting a large, diverse survey sample, and scheduling personal interviews with public officials.
Introduction

To paraphrase 19th Century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, compromises are like sausages; it’s better not to see them being made. Though Bismarck spoke about laws, brokering compromise can be just as messy as making laws or sausages. This thesis chronicles my exploration of compromise, including the Discourses that enable and thwart it, in the sausage factory of the American Congress.

My journey began on October 1, 2013, the first day of the federal shutdown. Federal workers languished, public monuments closed, and essential functions ceased as Republicans and Democrats bickered over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the federal budget, and the national debt ceiling. Each side blamed the other, touting the moral superiority of their own positions. Negotiations to resolve the stand-off were frequently described as “deadlocked” (Ferraro and Bohan). Meanwhile, opinion polls showed that a majority of Americans — over 70 percent in one CBS News poll (Dutton, et al) — wanted their legislators to compromise to end the stalemate.

Despite this expression of the public will, the shutdown endured for sixteen days. It ended early on October 17, just hours before the nation would have defaulted for the first time in history. No one on Capitol Hill rejoiced. Republican Congressman Charlie Dent expressed the feelings of many legislators when he said, “This [bill which ends the shutdown] must be supported, but it should not be celebrated… it is not a win for anyone, particularly the institution of Congress or the Presidency” (H6621).
As a furloughed federal worker, I was relieved to return to work, but like Congress, I was in no mood to celebrate. While the shutdown had taxed my savings and my patience, it also kindled a sense of incredulity. I didn’t understand why the public call for compromise had gone unanswered for sixteen days. What accounted for this seeming disconnect between constituents and their elected representatives? What might explain Congress’s unwillingness, or inability, to compromise?

As a federal employee, I had no answers. But as a part-time graduate student studying writing and rhetoric, with a background in the humanities, I decided to investigate the lack of compromise in terms of rhetoric and sociolinguistics. Expanding on the methods and data I used in a preliminary investigation of compromise, I launched an exhaustive qualitative study on how compromise works, or fails to work, in large groups and representative bodies.
Past Research

Before outlining my expanded approach to compromise, let me first summarize the project that laid the groundwork for this study. I conducted the 2012 research as part of ENGL 652, *Applied Qualitative Research*, taught by Dr. Elizabeth Hodges. The resultant paper, “Explicitly Ambiguous: An Examination of Compromise in Daily Life,” explored how compromise works among individuals and small groups.¹

In 2011, the Congressional debt ceiling debacle — precursor to the 2013 shutdown — inspired me to investigate the workings and failings of compromise. At the time, I considered compromise an undisputed public virtue. Believing that our nation was founded upon, and sustained by, compromise, I was alarmed that this essential part of American democracy had seemingly transformed from virtue to vice among legislators.

In a December 2010 interview, just months before the nation faced default, incoming Speaker of the House, John Boehner, refused to use the word “compromise” when describing his philosophy of government. At one point in the conversation, interviewer Leslie Stahl prompted, “Governing means compromising.”

Boehner demurred. “It means finding common ground,” he said.

Stahl persisted. She finally asked Boehner why he wouldn’t say “compromise.”

Boehner’s reply: “I reject the word” (Nunberg).

¹ I presented this paper in March 2013 at the College of William and Mary’s Graduate Research Symposium in Williamsburg, VA.
Boehner’s obstinacy made me wonder about the role and history of compromise in America. Did the debt ceiling deadlock presage the end of compromise in America? How do Americans even define compromise? How does it work in their daily lives? I sought to answer these questions with an anonymous, on-line survey. Forty-two individuals responded, sharing stories of compromise in their personal and work lives. I analyzed the stories in the context of current literature on compromise.

I reviewed three books and one scholarly article to learn about the politics of compromise. Kimberly Shankman’s 1999 book, *Compromise and the Constitution: The Political Thought of Henry Clay*, gave a historical context, explaining how the 19th Century Kentucky Congressman brokered two of the most influential compromises in American history: the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and the Compromise of 1850. Together, these legislative deals delayed the Civil War, ultimately impacting its outcome (Shankman 1; Remini xiii).

For a contemporary view of compromise, I read Avishai Margalit’s 2010 book, *On Compromise and Rotten Compromises*. Though generally a proponent of political compromises, Margalit unilaterally rejects what he calls rotten compromises, which “establish or maintain a regime of cruelty and humiliation” (89).²

Robert C. Ellickson’s 1991 work, *Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes*, provides a different perspective of compromise through the relationships among cattle ranchers in remote Shasta County, California. Isolated from traditional law enforcement, the ranch community maintains order through a series of socialized norms (53). Interestingly, the word “compromise” doesn’t appear in the book, yet cooperation among the ranchers clearly relies upon the concessions made through compromise.

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² By Margalit’s reckoning, the U.S. Constitution was a rotten compromise (61). He admits that the creation of the Union “did more to undermine slavery than to help maintain it” (57), yet the philosopher still calls the Constitution rotten because it prolonged slavery for generations (61).
Finally, I incorporated a 2010 scholarly article, “The Mindsets of Political Compromise,” by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. The two scholars allude to the lack of Congressional compromise in their analysis of what they call the uncompromising mindset, built upon principled tenacity, which resists making concessions (1130), and mutual mistrust, which assumes that opponents are motivated solely to destroy their rival’s position (1132). Conversely, mutual respect, restraining suspicions while negotiating in good faith, and principled prudence, pragmatically recognizing the necessity of compromise, underpin the compromising mindset (1134, 1135). This article is a prologue to the authors’ 2012 book, *The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It*, which informed this thesis.

Buoyed by scholarly literature, my analysis revealed complex dynamics underlying even the simplest compromises. One example is deferred concessions. In theory, compromise demands immediate concessions from both sides. In practice, however, one side might make immediate concessions, and trust the other side to make future concessions. I noticed this phenomenon among the Shasta County ranchers in Ellickson’s book, who traded reciprocal favors with one another in times of need.

Respondents to my 2012 survey also employed deferred concessions. Respondent 02 described how, while working as a restaurant server, she compromised with two of her co-workers so that each could get time off on the weekends. Each server agreed to work by themselves, without complaining, on a busy Saturday evening, while the others took the night off. They agreed to rotate the Saturday shift each week. This agreement was obviously built upon the deferred concession made by each server when it was his/her turn to work on Saturday. Trust and camaraderie must have been high among the co-workers; according to the respondent, they maintained this compromise for seven years.
Semantic Context

As my 2012 study shows, compromise can be fraught with ambiguity and nuance. It’s important, therefore, to establish some basic meanings. The *Oxford Dictionary of English* lists five definitions for compromise. These two appeared most often in my research:

1. an agreement or settlement of a dispute that is reached by each side making concessions; and
2. to bring into disrepute or danger by indiscreet, foolish, or reckless behavior.

These definitions alone cannot capture the intricacies of compromise. In my 2012 survey, I found multiple meanings attached to the word. Some respondents defined compromise using the classic definition — two sides making mutual concessions to settle a dispute — yet their stories of compromise in action often departed completely from that definition.

Respondent 17, for example, called compromise “an agreement reached by both parties giving up something.” However, in his personal story, things work differently. The respondent wanted to cut off cable TV, saying it “was a waste of time and money.” His wife, however, was “dead set against it, so we ended up keeping it.” Respondent 17 says, “I feel fine about this compromise — I could have argued and tried to wear her down, but it’s not worth it. She wants it, so I’m willing to keep paying $60 a month if it makes her happy.”

What Respondent 17 describes is not compromise, but capitulation, which the *Oxford Dictionary of English* defines as “ceasing to resist an opponent or an unwelcome demand; yielding.” In the respondent’s story, I couldn’t find any evidence that his wife made any concessions, meaning theirs was not a compromise. In my view, Respondent 17 simply yielded,
though I suppose his action could be a compromise in the sense that he “brought into disrepute” his personal conviction that cable TV was a waste of time and money.

Also ambiguous is the boundary between compromise and cooperation. While compromise necessarily involves mutual concessions, to cooperate means, less specifically, “to work jointly towards the same end.” The two words seem to overlap in their definitions, and I found similar overlap in my research. One example is the Shasta county cattle ranchers described by Ellickson. The word “compromise” is never used, yet the ranchers routinely made concessions to one another in the name of cooperation. This example suggests, I think, that you can cooperate without compromising, but you cannot compromise without cooperating. Another example came from Capitol Hill during the 2013 shutdown. During one contentious debate, Kentucky Senator Rand Paul mixed definitions when he advised his colleagues, “Compromise means coming together and voting on some of the things on which you agree” (S7333).
Literature Review

Rand Paul’s co-mingled definitions might be best explained by this statement from 20th Century Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin. “Neutral dictionary meanings of the words…ensure their common features and guarantee that all speakers of a given language will understand one another, but the use of words,” he says, “… is always individual and contextual in nature” (Speech Genres 88).

Here, Bakhtin encapsulates two opposing forces of language. The first he calls unitary language, “a system of linguistic norms… guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding… [namely] the unity of the reigning conversational [everyday] and literary language” (Dialogic Imagination 270).

The second force he calls heteroglossia, the stratification of language into “a multiplicity of social voices” (Dialogic Imagination 263). The voices may emerge from different social classes, such as “the language of the nobleman, the farmer, the peasant” (311), or “between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools [of thought]… and so forth” (291).

According to Bakhtin, heteroglossia and unitary language influence every utterance, whether it be a few words spoken to a friend or a novel written fifty years ago. “The utterance not only answers the requirements of its own [unitary] language… but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity” (Dialogic Imagination 272). In other words, every utterance is impacted by utterances that have
come before it and by those that come after. Furthermore, every utterance contributes to the multiplicity of social voices that, in turn, influence other utterances.

Taking this effect to its logical conclusion, Bakhtin says that any utterance’s meaning, whether spoken or written (*Speech Genres* 89), is rooted in context. He writes:

… utterances are not indifferent to one another, and are not self-sufficient; they are aware of and mutually reflect one another. These mutual reflections determine their character… Each utterance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies on the others… (*Speech Genres* 91)

The notion that all utterances are in continual dialogue with one another, what Bakhtin called dialogism (*Dialogic Imagination* 280), never ends. Or, as he explains it:

There is neither a first word nor a last word and there are no limits to the dialogic context (it extends into the boundless past and the boundless future). Even past meanings can never be stable… they will always change… in the process of subsequent, future development of the dialogue.³ (*Speech Genres* 170)

Joan Didion’s 2001 work, *Political Fictions*, illustrates how the future can illuminate the past. Looking back upon her political reporting of the 1980s and 1990s, Didion suggests that class differences may contribute to our current political dysfunction. She recalls the flattery of being asked to cover the 1988 Dukakis/Bush campaign. “A presidential election was a ‘serious’ story,” she writes, “and no had before solicited my opinions on one” (3). However, shortly after starting the assignment, Didion observes, “events of the campaign as reported seemed to have taken place in a language I did not recognize” (4).

³ It seems to me that one consequence of Bakhtin’s dialogism is presentism, interpreting the past in modern terms. According to historian Lynn Hunt, “Presentism, at its worst, encourages a kind of moral complacency and self-congratulation. Interpreting the past in terms of present concerns usually leads us to find ourselves morally superior.”
What she does recognize is that “in 1988 the political process had already become perilously remote from the electorate it was meant to represent” (8). Driving this separation is an influential political class, “people inside the process… a new kind of managerial elite, [who] tend to speak of the world not necessarily as it is, but as they want people out there to believe it is” (Didion 20).4

To spread their beliefs, the elites recruit journalists to their cause. Didion describes ambitious reporters “willing, in exchange for ‘access,’ to transmit the images their sources wish transmitted. They are even willing… to present these images not as a story the campaign wants told but as fact (30-31). Promulgating these so-called facts often involved staged events that “were not merely meaningless but deliberately so: occasions in which film could be shot and no mistakes made” (Didion 27).

Michael Dukakis’s campaign yields an example. The Massachusetts governor was plagued with image problems throughout his presidential run. A communications professor noted the candidate’s affinity for lecterns, saying Dukakis “looked like he thought he was superior and giving a lecture” (Rothberg).5 Didion recalls another reporter saying, “Mike Dukakis is almost always indoors… behind a lectern” while “George Bush is almost always outdoors… sometimes with his sleeves rolled up” (Didion 33). Dukakis’s staff then arranged a photo op to establish new “facts” about their candidate.

In June 1988, shortly after landing in San Diego for an appearance, Dukakis descends from the plane and begins an impromptu game of catch with his press secretary. Didion describes

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4 Here, I am not suggesting that Didion was the first to identify a political class. The career politician dates back to ancient Rome. Between 123 and 122 BCE, the Roman tribune Gaius Gracchus introduced laws authorizing the oversight of magistrates and other politicians by citizens from non-political classes (Badian).

5 In the same article, media consultant David Garth compared Dukakis to a dentist, saying “You know you have to see him, but you don’t look forward to it” (Rothberg).
the scene: “some forty [reporters and cameramen] standing on a tarmac watching a diminutive figure in shirtsleeves and a red tie toss a ball” (34). One of the cameramen soon remarks, “Just a regular guy…” (Didion 34). Another offers, “I’d have a beer with him” (35). On cue, Kara Dukakis, the candidate’s then 19-year-old daughter, disembarks to join the game. After a few more tosses, a cameraman says, “We got the daughter. Nice. That’s enough” (Didion 35).

Weeks later, despite watching Dukakis in mild San Diego, reporters relocated his game to the 101-degree heat of the Phoenix airport, showcasing the candidate’s outdoorsy toughness (Didion 36). The implication was that if Dukakis could play catch in the heat of an Arizona summer, he could withstand the crucible of the White House. Didion concludes:

what we had on the tarmac [in San Diego]… was an understanding: a repeated moment witnessed by many people, all of whom believed it to be a setup and yet most of whom believed that only an outsider, only someone too ‘naïve’ to know the rules of the game, would so describe it. (37)

While Didion contemplates the rules of the political game, political scientist Alin Fumurescu’s offers a contemplative, though often puzzling, examination of compromise in his 2013 book, Compromise: A Political and Philosophical History. Modern compromise, says Fumurescu, evolved from compromissium, a Roman legal concept for settling disputes between individuals (64). When two parties could not resolve a disagreement, their last resort was to appoint a compromissarius, an informed, impartial third party (Fumurescu 4), to decide the matter — what we call arbitration today. Both parties agreed to accept the decision. They promised together — in Latin, com, meaning together, plus the infinitive promittere, meaning to promise (Fumerescu 64) — to consent to the arbiter’s ruling.
Three suppositions underlie the Roman model. The first is to trust in the arbiter to represent both parties equally. Second is the willingness of the parties to accept the risks of compromise, namely, that the arbiter will rule against one or the other. The third is the inherent equality of both parties (Fumurescu 67), the assumption being that a stronger party would simply force the weaker to capitulate, eliminating the need for *compromissium*. These three notions continue to influence compromise today.

From this foundation, Fumurescu builds a dense, confusing tale, which meanders between personal compromise, concerning individuals, and political compromise among groups. He identifies a new birth of personal individualism in the Middle Ages, yet quickly subsumes that individualism into the tide of political representation that carries through to the Enlightenment.

Fumurescu believes that modern compromise retains its “third party” Roman influence, the authority figure who arbitrates intractable conflicts. Ending his historiography in the 19th Century, he writes, “Without the creation… of a commonly accepted *compromissarius*, no modern politics would be possible” (265). Fumurescu then cites Gilbert Burnet, a Scottish contemporary of John Locke:

The true and Original Notion of Civil Society and Government, is, that is a Compromise made by such a Body of Men, by which they resign up [their rights for reparations, justice, war] against their Neighbors; to such a single Person, or to such a Body of Men as they think fit to trust with [these rights]. (265)

I reject Burnet’s prescription for civil society and Fumurescu’s insistence on a *compromissarius* for one simple reason: the lack of compromise in Congress cries out for impartial, authoritative arbitration, but there is none to be had. There is simply no third-party
dimension of compromise in American democracy. It is, instead, an on-going, messy, ambiguous process that must be negotiated among rivals, without the intervention of an authoritative arbiter. Moreover, if a third party were to intervene and enforce an agreement, that would not be a compromise. It would be coercion (Margalit 20).

Using Fumurescu’s material, let me explain how compromise lost its sense of third-party arbitration. The role of the arbiter in compromise declines, I suspect, with the dawn of individualism in the Middle Ages. The medieval period gave rise to new public communities, such as the church, market, guild, village, and kingdom (Fumurescu 97).

People began to identify themselves through their affiliations with particular communities, creating a two-dimensional concept of identity. The forum externum became the public face for identification and interaction with various communities (Fumurescu 10, 97). The forum internum was the private face, the seat of conscience and the source of personal autonomy and authenticity. Individuals were recognized and judged by their forum externum (Fumurescu 10). Conversely, the forum internum was sacrosanct, subject only to the individual and, in medieval times, to God (Fumurescu 10, 98).  

Even under the hegemony of churches and monarchs, individuals began to exercise self-representation. Powerful kings brought political stability to 13th Century Europe, leading to an expansion of commerce that gave people more choices in trade, while also freeing them to pursue different vocations (Perry 141-142). Medieval citizens were better able to exercise their


6 It’s worth noting that contemporary philosophers still recognize this dual identity. In 1959, Jürgen Habermas described the public and private spheres in his influential book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Goodman 2).

7 Consider, also, the role that the Protestant Reformation played in affirming self-representation and personal identity. Believers no longer had to petition God through the priesthood. Instead, they could communicate with Him directly through Bible-reading and personal prayer. Moreover, the Reformation, aided by the printing press, helped to kindle widespread desire for learning to read, a skill previously limited to nobles and the clergy (Fischer 225, 227-228).
forum externum, “the forum of the acting individual” (Fumurescu 112), to express the autonomy and proclivities of their forum internum. Peasants and store clerks, for instance, bartered prices directly, each making concessions in terms of cost, quantity, and quality (Perry 142). It is here that compromise began to transform from third-party arbitration to direct negotiation between peers.

Compromise became more prevalent as kingdoms gave way to nation-states with representative government. Although Fumurescu seems to think that representation repressed personal individualism (110, 232), history shows that societies grew more secular and pluralistic, with greater equality among individuals. Witness Alexis de Tocqueville’s proclamation from Democracy in America: “The more I advanced in the study of American society, the more I perceived that the equality of conditions is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to be derived” (3). Greater equality allowed more voices and viewpoints to emerge, while increasing the likelihood of conflict over ideas, values, and resources.

In the face of burgeoning conflict, compromise became expedient, forging dialectic between the forum externum and the forum internum (Fumurescu 91, 267). The forum externum, the public persona, could compromise. However, the forum internum, the seat of individual conscience and “the last bastion of authenticity,” (Fumurescu 119), could never compromise. To do so would threaten a person’s identity. Thus, in brokering a compromise, the two halves of identity weighed concessions on separate scales. The forum externum focused on maintaining community and achieving public goals, while the forum internum guarded against concessions that might compromise its essential nature. As Fumurescu said, “We may now understand why [the modern] ambiguity [of compromise] is not a mere accident… it occupies the fragile and unsettling space… between public and private… [and] between (political) representation and
self-representation” (266). He concludes by summarizing the current state of compromise: “to compromise means to make oneself equal to someone else… compromise means the recognition of the other as equally entitled to his or her own claims. It confers legitimacy” (283).

In his 2012 book, Social Linguistics and Literacies, James Paul Gee introduces Discourse, a concept that merges and expands Fumurescu’s two fora. Discourse is an overarching concept that combines theories of language and literacy with individual and social behaviors. In fact, Gee declares that “language has meaning only within Discourses” (179). A Discourse encompasses ways of speaking, listening, reading, and writing, combined with particular ways of acting, feeling, thinking, and even dressing (Gee 152). In short, Discourses “are ways of recognizing and getting recognized as certain sorts of whos doing certain sorts of whats” (Gee 153).

Bakthin said, “a meaning only reveals its depths when it comes in contact with another, foreign meaning” (Speech Genres 7). In the same mode, Discourses often define themselves in relation to other, ultimately opposing, Discourses (Gee 159). Discourses tend to be insular and resistant to internal criticism. As the seat of meaning, “the Discourse itself defines what counts as acceptable criticism” (Gee 159). Finally, Gee says that Discourses are “inherently ideological” (158), and “intimately related to the distribution of social power and hierarchical structure” (159). Combined, all of these factors reveal clear demarcations between who is inside and who is outside a particular Discourse.

I experienced, first-hand, being outside a Discourse when I became an English graduate student. In my first class at VCU, I was a 41 year-old humanities undergrad, commuting 180 miles between job, home, and college on a typical day. I found myself surrounded by 20-

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8 Here we see a manifestation of Bakhtin’s claim that context “extends into the boundless past and the boundless future.”
somethings who had majored in English, lived either on-campus or nearby, and juggled neither commute, nor full-time job, nor mortgage.\textsuperscript{9} When class discussions turned to writerly concepts such as “voice,” “audience,” or “tropes,” I was completely lost. I understood voice, for instance, as my speaking voice, but I had never encountered the rhetorical concept of voice, as in the way writers present themselves stylistically to readers. As Gee intimates, “voice” meant something entirely different in this new Discourse of English graduate school.

More important than my own feelings of “not belonging” was that my classmates did not recognize me as a member of the Discourse. My attempts at class discussion revealed discomfort and unfamiliarity with the terminology and social mores. In small group exercises, while my colleagues talked about “meta-levels of meaning” or the short story they were writing for a journal, or the class they were teaching, I could only sit in silence and hope to learn. Eventually, I was able to better articulate my writing challenges, and behave in ways that my peers could recognize and appreciate. Although I cannot say that I moved into the mainstream of this particular Discourse, I did eventually move from the margins.

In Gee’s parlance, what I describe as the Discourse of English graduate school is a secondary Discourse. People become “apprenticed” to secondary Discourses as part of their day-to-day socialization within various groups, such as church, school, office, bowling league, and so forth (Gee 165). Combined, these secondary Discourses lend meaning and significance to our public persona (Gee 165), our \textit{forum externum}. I might be recognized by others as a graduate student, office worker, commuter, woodworker, and many other identities because I talk, behave, think, and believe in ways that are recognized and accepted within these particular Discourses (Gee 165).

\textsuperscript{9} I once overheard a classmate confide, “I only went to grad school so I wouldn’t have to get a job.”
Underlying all my secondary Discourses is a primary Discourse. This is “a culturally distinctive way of being ‘an everyday person’” (Gee 153). As with a native language, people acquire a primary Discourse early in life. It forms the basis for our identity — the *forum internum* — and shapes our “initial taken-for-granted understandings of who we are and who people ‘like us’ are… and what sort of things… ‘people like us’ do, value, and believe” (Gee 166). In short, our primary Discourse influences whether, and how, we will accept, reject, or assimilate future Discourses that we encounter (Gee 166).

Looking back on my graduate school experience, I see how my primary Discourse impacted my adoption of the Discourse of English graduate students. I was raised in a politically and religiously conservative home. Education was valued, but we were not intellectuals; we did not discuss “voice” or “tropes.” I discovered, with some culture shock, that the secondary Discourse of graduate school was much more intellectual (“meta-levels”?) and also more liberal. At VCU, I had my first conversation with a gay person, a Discourse I had been taught was “an abomination” in the sight of God (*The New Scofield Study Bible* Lev. 18:22). Over time, I came to embrace certain values of graduate school Discourse and reject others. I learned to appreciate that gay people are, foremost, people, but I still reject the phrase “meta-levels of meaning” as pretentious.

As my experience shows, there are clear boundaries between Discourses which help members recognize one another; yet, individuals can also “float” among multiple secondary Discourses throughout their lives. Doing so can re-shape one’s primary Discourse and influence the assimilation of other secondary Discourses.

An example from legal scholarship demonstrates how a particular secondary Discourse, law school, might impact compromise in Congress. In a 1982 article entitled “The Possibilities of
Compromise,” political philosopher David Braybrooke describes the challenge of introducing compromise into law, “given the tendency of formal legal proceedings to favor ‘winner-take-all’ solutions” (140).

According to Braybrooke, compromise has no place in the Discourse of legal practice. Now, consider that 57 percent of Senators in Congress have law degrees, along with nearly 40 percent of the members of the House of Representatives (Manning 5). It is both sobering and enlightening to see that a majority of legislators belong to a secondary Discourse that values decisive “winner-take-all” victories, rather than the nuanced give-and-take of compromise.

Political scientists Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson examine the nuances of compromise in their 2012 book, *The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It*. An expansion of their 2010 article, the authors conflate the uncompromising mindset found in law school — principled tenacity and mutual mistrust — with campaigning (22). Governing, meanwhile, is linked to the compromising mindset (22), and characterized by principled prudence and mutual respect.

Campaigning and governing, and their associated mindsets, are essential to the democratic process. Gutmann and Thompson call campaigning “the best feasible practice for enabling free and equal citizens to choose their representatives” (158). However, choosing among alternatives implies competition, and in any competition, there can only be one winner. The winner is the candidate who focuses on an “uncompromising commitment to core principles” (150).

Principled tenacity and mutual mistrust, elements of the uncompromising mindset, are key to that focus. Clinging tenaciously to principle draws a clear contrast between candidates,
giving like-minded voters an easier choice.\textsuperscript{10} Similarly, mutual mistrust — the belief that opponents work solely to vanquish rivals — is essential for a successful campaign. Candidates become “adversaries who must be defeated rather than colleagues who should be worked with” (Gutmann and Thompson 150).

But after the rivals are vanquished and a victor declared, campaigning must give way to governing. As noted earlier, governing relies upon the principled prudence and mutual respect of the compromising mindset. Mutual respect, the counter to mutual mistrust, demands that legislators negotiate in good faith and curtail suspicions about the other side’s motives. “Assume your opponents… act not only for political gain but also out of a desire to do what they think is right,” Gutmann and Thompson advise (109). Principled prudence, unlike principled tenacity, views the concessions of compromise as a means of adjusting principles to improve a situation (Gutmann and Thompson 100). In other words, concessions are not an all-out assault on one’s morality or identity, but are a pragmatic means of reaching an agreement to improve the status quo.

To refuse to compromise is to privilege the status quo, say Gutmann and Thompson (2, 30, 101). Compromise, on the other hand, means making an agreement “in which all sides sacrifice something in order to improve on the status quo” (10). The complicating part, however, is that “the sacrifices are at least partly determined by the other sides’ will” (10). The influence of the other side suggests Fumurescu’s \textit{compromissarius}, and the fear of putting one’s principles and identity in another’s hands.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Principled tenacity, consistently applied, also guards against accusations of waffling. Citing John Kerry’s now-infamous claim, “I actually did vote… [to support the Iraq war] before I voted against it,” Gutmann and Thompson wryly observe, “The test of knowing where you stand seems to be just that you keep standing in the same place” (146-147).

\textsuperscript{11} This, in turn, recalls Bakhtin’s claim that meanings carry semantic baggage from the deep past. In this case, modern compromise remains burdened by meanings from ancient Rome.
“I will never compromise my principles” is the most common, and intransigent, rejection of compromise, say Gutmann and Thompson (69). One popular means of sparing principles while achieving compromise is to separate principles from interests during negotiations. This was a favored tactic of Henry Clay, who believed that “interests are capable of being compromised in ways that [principles] simply are not” (Shankman 13). Gutmann and Thompson are skeptical of that approach; they observe that “very few material interests in democratic politics… present themselves unattached to moral principles” (76). The cost of health care, for instance, connects to principles of human rights, personal responsibility, and justice. For instance, in a negotiation, one party might reasonably ask, “Is it fair to make one person subsidize the poor health choices of another?”

Borrowing from the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill, Gutmann and Thompson claim that a compromise of principle can be morally justified through a four-step process: first, if you cannot coerce your opponents into accepting your position; second, if you recognize moral value in your opponent’s views; third, the agreement does not worsen the status quo; and fourth, the compromise recognizes the moral principles at stake, even if it does not fully realize them (107).

Despite offering a justification for compromising moral principles, it’s important to note that Gutmann and Thompson do not elevate compromise to an undisputed virtue, as I once did. Uncompromising politics has a legitimate role in democratic politics, in areas such as social movements, political protests, and activist organizations. Refusing to compromise also forces proponents of a compromise to evaluate their positions more carefully. They must justify, for instance, why a particular compromise is an improvement over the status quo (Gutmann and Thompson 42).
The two scholars even raise a moral principle to justify an uncompromising stance, one I had not considered. Legislators have a duty to pursue their constituents’ values (Gutmann and Thompson 149); it is an implicit promise made during the election. Opening negotiations with an immediate offer to compromise jeopardizes the chance of achieving what legislators, and their constituents, stand for (Gutmann and Thompson 132).

Jeopardizing their constituents’ stance also jeopardizes legislators’ chances of being re-elected. The fear of losing an election — compounded by the 24-hour news cycle, ubiquitous social media coverage, and moneyed special-interest groups (Gutmann and Thompson 166) — has ushered in the era of the permanent campaign (Gutmann and Thompson 204). As mentioned earlier, a victorious candidate ideally transitions from campaigning with the uncompromising mindset to governing with the compromising mindset. In modern politics, this crucial transition often stalls; governing is held hostage by campaigning (Gutmann and Thompson 160).

Examples of the permanent campaign abound in recent history. In 2007, the last serious attempt at immigration reform was derailed, in part, by a feud between Senators John McCain and Rudolph Giuliani, who both vied for the 2008 GOP nomination for President (Gutmann and Thompson 97). Not coincidentally, the 2011 debt ceiling stalemate became a launch pad for Tea Party Republican Michelle Bachman’s 2012 presidential bid (Blumenthal). Finally, I will show that the 2013 government shutdown, particularly the opposition to the Affordable Care Act, was grounded in the uncompromising mindset of the permanent campaign.

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12 One consequence of money and technology is that campaigns now hire “trackers,” squadrons of volunteers who use digital cameras to film rival politicians at public events. The trackers’ goal is to catch opponents “saying something dumb, offensive, or off-message so it can then be used against them” (Terris). Republican Senator George Allen ended his political career when he insulted, on camera, the tracker hired by opponent Jim Webb.

13 Then-Senator Barack Obama also played a role in the demise of the 2007 immigration bill. Obama proposed changes that made the reform odious to Republicans, prompting GOP Senator Lindsey Graham, a key supporter, to charge Obama with “playing presidential politics.” Graham told Obama, “…when you’re out on the campaign trail, my friend, tell them about why we can’t come together [on immigration reform]… This is why” (qtd. in Gutmann and Thompson The Spirit of Compromise 96-97).
While legislators must always be mindful of the next election (Gutmann and Thompson 159), as well as their moral duty to their supporters, elected officials assume an even greater duty when governing. Improving the status quo for all citizens, not just supporters, must take precedence. As Gutmann and Thompson conclude, “For public officials, the refusal to improve a society when the status quo entails the perpetuation of harm, the denial of rightful benefits, or the violation of human rights is the moral equivalent of needlessly harming or denying people their… basic rights” (108).

How compromise impacts human rights weighs heavily on Avishai Margalit. In his 2010 book, On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, which I revisited for this study, he says compromises are generally good, especially for the sake of peace. Even “shabby, shady, and shoddy” compromises, while bad, are sometimes necessary (16). However, the rotten compromise — “an agreement to establish or maintain a regime of cruelty and humiliation” (89) — is never justified, not even when peace is at stake (Margalit 2).

Earlier, I mentioned Margalit’s distinction between compromise and coercion, namely, “an agreement based on coercion is not compromise” (20, 92). Instead, as Fumurescu also said, a compromise “involves painful recognition of the other side… making mutual concessions that express recognition of the other’s point of view” (Margalit 54).

In my 2012 reading, I overlooked Margalit’s claim that political compromise is shaped by two opposing views of politics. The first he calls “politics as economics,” meaning that anything in a particular situation may be compromised (24). Such compromises may not be palatable or prudent, but they remain within the realm of possibility. He explains, “Economic life is based on the idea of substitution: one good can be replaced by another, and this enables exchanges in the
market. Exchanges leave room for negotiation, and where there is room for negotiation, there is room for compromise” (24).

The second political view is “politics as religion” (24), in which some goods are deemed holy and cannot be compromised. One example is indivisibility, a word charged with religious connotations (Margalit 25).14 Indivisibility is one of the attributes of God; invoking it in the U.S. pledge of allegiance, “…one nation, under God, *indivisible*...,” ascribes this divine trait to the United States.15 Thus, a compromise between the U.S. and another agent could not include secession because “to compromise over the Union is to betray the Union in the same way that the idolater betrays the oneness of God” (Margalit 25).

The ways in which the religious and economic views may conflict are obvious. The religious perspective sees politics as a human activity meant to protect certain higher values, while the economic view focuses on the fulfillment of secular needs and wants, with little consideration for values (Margalit 25). Our ability to compromise is constantly affected by these irreconcilable perspectives. Margalit also warns that challenges to compromise are exacerbated when negotiators mistakenly think that only one view undergirds modern politics (26).

When negotiators focus exclusively on a religious view of politics, for instance, sectarianism can emerge. It’s important to note that a sectarian politician is not necessarily religious; he or she simply regards certain values as sacrosanct (Margalit 148). Demonstrating principled tenacity, sectarians will not compromise their principles, no matter what is at stake. Because they view their positions as sacred, even on secular issues such as taxes, any

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14 It occurs to me that words ripe with connotation are especially susceptible to Bakhtin’s dialogism.
15 The word “indivisible” was part of the original Pledge of Allegiance as it was written in 1892. The phrase “under God” was added in 1954 (“Pledge of Allegiance”).
compromise is a betrayal. Says Margalit, a sectarian “would rather split the party than split the difference” (148), a stance I found quite often in my research of the 2013 government shutdown.
Research Questions and Methodology

I focused my inquiry into the shutdown with these three research questions:

1. What might explain the disparity between the public’s desire for compromise and their elected leaders’ seeming refusal to compromise?

2. Is there a difference between the personal compromise that occurs between individuals and small groups, and the compromise that occurs (or does not occur) in larger, public bodies, such as Congress? If there are differences, what might they be?

3. If there are differences between personal and public compromise, do constituents need to tailor their expectations of the leaders’ ability to compromise? Or do constituents need to change their rhetorical methods when demanding that their leaders compromise more often?

I investigated along three fronts. I explored questions 1 and 2 by interviewing people whose vocations required them to broker compromise among large groups. To examine questions 2 and 3, I released a second SurveyMonkey survey, re-using questions from my original survey while adding new questions to unearth why people might refuse to compromise. Finally, I reviewed the Congressional Record, “the official record of the proceedings and debates of the U.S. Congress,” (“Search the Congressional Record”) for insight into all three research questions.

Before conducting any research, I completed VCU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) process. I created the study on February 20. On March 10, I finished the Humanities Responsible Conduct of Research on-line training. On March 19, I submitted the study for IRB review.
Between submission and final approval — a span of about one month — I responded to numerous edits from the reviewer. Changes included further development of my inclusion and exclusion criteria, an expanded evaluation of the risks associated with participating in the study, and a more comprehensive Informed Consent document for the interviews.\textsuperscript{16} Finally, on April 14, 2014, my project was exempted and I began my research.

On April 16, 2014, I launched a 12-question survey in SurveyMonkey. The questions are shown below.

1. How do you define the word “compromise”?
2. Please share a story about a time that you compromised in your personal life. What did you think about the outcome?
3. Please share a story about a time that you compromised at work. What did you think about the outcome?
4. Please share a story in which you refused to compromise. What did you think of the outcome?
5. In your story of refusing to compromise, what was at stake? What would’ve been the consequences of compromising?
6. In what areas are you most likely to compromise? Why? In what areas are you least likely to compromise? Why?
8. What is your education level? (choices: “did not graduate high school,” “high school graduate/GED,” “some college, but no degree,” “Associate’s degree,” “Bachelor’s degree,” “Master’s degree,” “Doctoral degree,” “Post-doctoral study.”)
9. How would you identify your gender?

\textsuperscript{16} Although I found the IRB process tedious, the requested changes forced me to think through several aspects of my approach, resulting in a better study.
10. How would you identify your race/ethnicity?

11. How would you identify your nationality?

12. How would you identify your marital/relationship status?

The first four questions are from my 2012 survey. I retained them because I felt that re-using the original questions might broaden my sample data and either confirm or refute my conclusions from the original study. Questions 5 and 6 are new; they are meant to reveal why people might not compromise. Questions 7 through 12 collect demographic data that might be used to identify trends in the responses.

Survey questions 1 through 6 are free-form “short essay” questions. Questions 7 and 8, regarding age and education level, are answered by choosing from a list of categories, shown in parentheses after the question. Questions 9 through 12, which ask about gender, race, nationality, and relationships, are one-line, short-answer questions. By using the short-answer format, I allowed respondents to self-identify, rather than forcing them to choose from pre-defined categories.

The target audience for the survey was a combination of Facebook friends, VCU classmates, and work colleagues. To expand the target audience, I had intended to crowdsource the survey, but I could not find a crowdsourcing site to fit my needs. I shared the survey on my Facebook wall, and distributed it by e-mail to non-Facebook friends at VCU and work. I also asked recipients to share the survey with their contacts. Finally, I arranged for the Coffee Party, a grassroots political organization, to publicize the survey on their Facebook page. Over the survey period, the target audience expanded to several hundred thousand people.

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17 Please see the Challenges and Limitations section for a full discussion.

18 As of July 27, 2014, the Coffee Party Facebook page had 478,307 followers.
My second research method involved personal interviews. For these, my target audience was elected and appointed individuals whose jobs require them to broker compromise among competing groups. I sent out 18 interview requests and conducted six interviews.19

My interview subjects were:

1. Philip Carter III, former U.S. Ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire in west Africa;
2. Lawrence Kennan, head football coach at the University of the Incarnate Word in San Antonio, TX;
3. Robert D. (Bobby) Orrock, Delegate representing the 54th district in the Virginia House of Delegates;
4. David Sam, President of Germanna Community College in Fredericksburg, VA;
5. Rev. D.J. Shelton,20 administrator of a large Christian venue; and

All six interview subjects allowed me to record our conversations, which I later transcribed. In accordance with VCU IRB policy, I collected signed Informed Consent documents from each of them.

For my third research method, I examined the sixteen editions of the Congressional Record from October 1 through October 16, 2013, the period of the 2013 government shutdown. I felt that this sample would showcase how the word “compromise” was used in Congressional rhetoric.

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19 Please see Appendix 1 for the full list of those contacted for interviews, along with the Informed Consent rubric for the interviews.
20 A pseudonym, chosen by the subject.
Shortly after starting my research, I decided to re-frame my inquiry into the Congressional Record. I had originally intended to analyze the Record using Marxist and structuralist perspectives. I felt that these approaches would best reveal how members of Congress view compromise, and how those views might impact legislative negotiations. Marxism, in particular, focuses on the ideologies underlying discourse, emphasizing conflicts among social classes (Bressler 176). It was these conflicts, I felt, that helped to answer my first research question: “What might explain the disparity between the public’s desire for compromise and their elected leaders’ seeming refusal to compromise?” However, after studying Gee’s concept of Discourse, with its ideological bent and focus on social goods and power, I thought it would be more insightful to examine the Congressional Record in discursive terms than from the Marxist literary perspective.
Data Description and Quality

As I said, my survey opened on April 16, and closed on July 31, 2014. By then, 44 people responded. To reiterate, the first six survey questions asked respondents to define compromise, share stories of compromise in their personal and work lives, and to tell stories and describe conditions when they refused to compromise. Responses were free-form, short-essay prose. The average length of a single response to any question was 54 words. Questions 3 and 4, stories about compromise at work and refusing to compromise, garnered the longest average response at 75 words each. Question 1, asking for definitions of compromise, had the shortest average response at 26 words. Questions 5 and 6, which asked for situations when respondents would not compromise, fell in the middle, with average responses of 48 and 52 words, respectively.

The demographic questions combined multiple choice and short answers. Forty-five percent of respondents said they were over age 55, while 60 percent had a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Of the thirty-nine who responded to the question on gender, 30 were female, and 9 were male. In terms of ethnicity, 30 identified as white, three as African-American, one Hispanic, one Asian, and one responding “your guess is as good as mine” (Crawford “2014 Survey” R19). Forty responded to Question 12, pertaining to relationship status. Of those, 26 were married, four were divorced, and seven identified as single. The remaining three identified as “independent,” “long term relationship,” and “single but with a wonderful man…” (R34; R35; R36).

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21 It is worth mentioning here that fifteen respondents skipped at least one survey question. I discuss that later in this section.
I found no identifiable connection between demographics and the operation of compromise in the respondents’ lives. The only real correlation, which I also observed in my 2012 survey, was that married respondents tended to share stories of compromise in their marriages.

Although I had a few more respondents to this survey than in 2012, I was disappointed to find that more respondents skipped questions in this survey than the earlier one. Fifteen people skipped at least one survey question. Questions 1 through 6, which encouraged short essays, were skipped most often. Question 4, asking respondents to share a story of refusing to compromise, was skipped by nine people. Ten respondents, the most for any single question, skipped Question 5, which asked about the stakes of refusing to compromise in the story told in Q4. Eight respondents skipped Question 3, a story of compromise at work, while seven skipped Q6, which asked for an explanation of areas in which respondents were most and least likely to compromise. No one skipped the first question, which asked for a definition of compromise.

The demographics questions, numbers 7 through 12, pertaining to age, education, gender, race/ethnicity, nationality, and relationship status, were skipped quite often, but in a surprising pattern. I thought that respondents would be more likely to complete the demographic questions and skip questions 1 through 6, which involved story-telling. Instead, I found several instances where respondents completed the essay questions, but skipped the demographics. Still, the demographics questions were not skipped as often as the story-telling questions. Only six skipped Q12 regarding marital/relationship status. Five people skipped Questions 9 and 10, which asked about gender and race/ethnicity.

22 Henceforth, for ease of reading and writing, I will alternatively refer to my survey questions as Q1, Q2, or Question 1, Question 2, etc.
I suspect, but cannot confirm, that the question-skipping was caused by the requirement to complete the survey in one sitting. One work colleague asked if she could save her progress and return to the survey later. I told her no, explaining that my subscription to SurveyMonkey did not allow respondents to save their progress and resume the survey later. I posted the questions with my survey invitation, so that people could think about their responses before starting the survey.

At least two respondents were put off by Q9, which asked people to identify their gender. Respondent 43 wrote, “I do not identify. I am male. ‘Identify’ seems to me a hedge, and I won’t do it.” Another respondent contacted me via e-mail to ask what I meant by “identify.” I explained the notion, perhaps unique to English graduate school Discourse, that gender was socially situated, and the phrasing of my question allowed people more flexibility than simply reporting male and female. The respondent seemed to accept this, and told me that she would finish the survey.

In light of the skipped questions — 34 percent of respondents skipped at least one of them — I considered whether or not to discard the incomplete responses. Ultimately, I decided to keep them. I reasoned that mine was a qualitative study, meant to examine “how human things work in particular situations” (Stake 14), and not a quantitative study depending on exact, reproducible measurements.

The personal interviews also illuminated how human things actually work. I interviewed six people with a range of backgrounds and experiences in brokering compromise. Five of the six

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23 I have since learned that my subscription to SurveyMonkey would have allowed respondents to save their surveys and return later. I overlooked this particular option when I created the survey, and was under the mistaken impression that the feature simply wasn’t available at my subscription level. It would have been useful to enable the save-and-resume option — doing so may have earned more survey responses — though I also learned that the feature only works if respondents use the same computer when completing the survey. A respondent could not begin the survey at work, and complete the survey at home, for instance.
allowed me to use their real names. In accordance with VCU’s IRB policy, one subject requested a pseudonym. I promised all of the interview subjects an opportunity to review a near-final draft, so that they could see how they were portrayed in the paper, and decide whether or not to allow their comments to be used. I sent the draft to all six interview subjects, even those whose interviews I did not use, on Friday, October 17. I asked them to reply with feedback by Saturday, November 1, explaining that I would have to submit the thesis to my review committee by Monday, November 3. None of interview subjects expressed any objection.  

As for the Congressional Record, I downloaded 16 issues, October 1 through 16, 2013, in PDF format from FDSys, the Federal Digital System database operated by the U.S. Government Printing Office. I had 1,247 pages of material, formatted in three columns per page, in 10-point Times Roman type. The October 4 issue, which included the proceedings of the House and Senate, was the longest at 123 pages. The shortest issue was from October 13 at 24 pages. It included only Senate proceedings; the House was not in session that day.

Thinking of Bakthin’s belief that meaning is rooted in context, and being mindful of the sheer amount of the material, I reduced my sample to those editions containing the most references to “compromise.” I counted all occurrences of “compromis” — which included “compromise,” as well as variants like “compromised” and “compromising” — in each edition. However, I did not want an arbitrary cut-off, so I devised a statistical method, based on variance, an indicator of how “spread out” the data is, to establish a cut-off value. I charted the occurrences of “compromis,” in chronological order, from all sixteen issues.

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24 In November, shortly before my defense, I shared my Informed Consent document with Patricia Garfinkel. I interviewed Ms. Garfinkel as an expert on the Congressional Record, not as an expert on compromise. Thus, at the time, I did not think I needed to provide Informed Consent. Later, I thought better of it; I came to feel that it would be unfair not to afford the same protections of Informed Consent to Ms. Garfinkel that I had given to the other interview subjects. On November 14, 2014, after reviewing the Informed Consent document, and a near-final draft of my thesis, Ms. Garfinkel signed an Informed Consent form.
As Figure 1 shows, there were, generally, more occurrences of “compromis” in the first days of the government shutdown than in later days, yielding a left-skewed distribution.\(^25\)

**Figure 1.** Occurrences of “compromis” in the *Congressional Record*, Oct. 1 – Oct. 16, 2013, showing left-skewed distribution.

In a typical bell-shaped distribution, standard deviation is used to calculate variance. But, because the distribution was skewed to the left, I could not use standard deviation. According to StatsDirect, a publisher of statistical analysis software, interquartile range — the difference between the 1st and 3rd quartiles — is the preferred method for calculating variance in a skewed distribution.

Using Microsoft Excel, I divided the occurrences of “compromis” into quartiles, and then calculated the interquartile range of 41.5. Next, I subtracted the interquartile range from my

\(^{25}\) I suspect the spike in “compromis” talk on October 8 was caused by two factors. First, it was on this day that several hundred thousand Department of Defense employees returned to work. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recalled the civilian workers under the authorization of the Pay Our Military Act, which provided funding for civilian employees whose jobs contributed to the “morale, well-being, capabilities, and readiness of service members” (Bitton). The second factor was the October 8 introduction of the Excepted Employees’ Pay Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014, which called for back-payment of excepted non-Defense federal workers, whose job responsibilities required them to work, without pay, during the shutdown (“H.J. Res. 89”). Admittedly, I could not find direct passages in the October 8 *Congressional Record* to support my view, but together, these two events, occurring on the same day, seem the most likely explanation for the surge in compromise rhetoric on October 8.
largest data value, 90 occurrences of “compromis” in the October 2 edition, to derive a sample cut-off at 48.5 occurrences of “compromis.” Rounding down to 48 occurrences limited my sample to seven issues of the Congressional Record, for a total of 711 pages.

Table 1 shows the occurrences of “compromis” for each addition, along with the quartiles and the calculations for the threshold value. The double-line in the middle of the table shows the cut-off threshold; the editions below the double-line, shaded in gray, were not included in my sample.

Table 1. Occurrences of “compromis” in the Congressional Record, including quartile analysis and sample threshold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edition Date</th>
<th>Occurrences of &quot;compromis&quot;</th>
<th>Proceedings Of</th>
<th># Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/2/2013</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/8/2013</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/2013</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/4/2013</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9/2013</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/5/2013</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/2013</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/2013</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/2013</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/11/2013</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/10/2013</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/12/2013</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/2013</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/15/2013</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>House and Senate</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/13/2013</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>621</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,247</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1st Quartile 17
2nd Quartile 43
3rd Quartile 58.5
4th Quartile 90

Difference Betw. 3rd and 1st Qrtl. 41.5
Largest Sample 90
Less Interquartile 41.5
Sample Threshold 48.5
In terms of data quality, the *Congressional Record* initially disappointed me. As the “official record of the proceedings and debates of the U.S. Congress” (“Search the Congressional Record”), I expected the publication to be rife with spirited, extemporaneous, parliamentary-style debate. What I found was mostly speechifying, or the delivery of prepared remarks.

The *Record* shows the orderly pattern of Congressional proceedings. All remarks are addressed to the presiding chair of the particular body, whether the president of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, or a designate.\(^{26}\) As Thomas Massie, Speaker Pro Tempore of the House, explained during one heated debate, “Directing remarks through the Chair helps to reduce personal confrontation between Members and fosters an atmosphere of mutual and institutional respect” (H6374). In the House, oration typically began with a Republican, followed by a Democrat, then a Republican, and so forth. The Democratically-controlled Senate followed the same alternation, though a Democrat usually spoke first. Spontaneity was so rare that members felt obliged to say when they spoke off the cuff. During the October 4 session, Representative David Scheweikert railed against the lack of civility in Congress, prefacing his comments with “I am unscripted” (H6233).

\(^{26}\) In the issues of the *Congressional Record* that I examined, the roles of House Speaker or Senate president were often delegated. In the Senate, for instance, vice-president Joe Biden is officially the President of the Senate. However, the President pro tempore, the most senior member of the majority party, presides (“President Pro Tempore”). During the October 2013 shutdown, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy was, and remains, the President pro tempore. In the House, the role of Speaker appears to be rotated among senior members of the majority party. Whether in the proceedings of the House or Senate, leadership substitutions are clearly noted in the *Record*, before any debate commences.
Data Analysis and Discussion

Although the Congressional Record was heavy on rhetoric, it yielded rich insight into the thinking behind the government shutdown. Ostensibly, the debates centered on the overall federal budget. However, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, better known as Obamacare, emerged as the key point of contention. Republicans insisted that new budget legislation include a curtailment of the health care act. They proposed everything from defunding the law, to delaying it for a year, to delaying the individual mandate that required people to buy health insurance (McClintock H6056).\(^\text{27}\) Democrats, however, insisted that Obamacare was the law of the land — passed by Congress four years earlier, signed by the President, and upheld by the Supreme Court (Schakowsky H6057; Harkin S7095; Andrews H6233). As such, the law should be off the table for budget negotiations.

Naturally, some Republicans disputed this. Senator John Cornyn of Texas asked, “Since when is it beyond the power of this Congress to change existing law by amending it or repealing it or defunding it?” (S7068). However, Senator Angus King, an independent from Maine, felt otherwise, saying “It is perfectly appropriate to negotiate budgets… but you negotiate about numbers, about details, about allocations. You don’t negotiate about entirely separate, substantive pieces of law” (S7223). Democratic Representative Marcy Kaptur also admonished Republicans on the breach of procedure. “If the majority party does not like the Affordable Care

\(^{27}\) Interestingly, the Republicans did not offer an alternative to Obamacare. Democratic Congressman Earl Blumenauer called the GOP on this omission, noting, “[Republicans] cannot say how they would produce a health care plan that would eliminate the stark specter of medical bankruptcy... They have no plan to protect families from being denied health insurance...” (H6055).
Act, use your real power in the regular committee structure… to change it. But closing down the entire government [to combat Obamacare] is a sledgehammer,” she said (H6420).

Much of the rhetoric also revolved around compromise. House Republicans proclaimed themselves agents of compromise, believing that each of their proposals, which impacted Obamacare a little less, represented deeper concessions to the Democratic position. The Democrats’ refusal to negotiate on Obamacare was portrayed as uncompromising.

The Democrats, meanwhile, insisted that Obamacare shouldn’t be a point of contention (Reid S7067). Democrats felt that the Republicans were both uncompromising and theatrical by continuing to attack the law. Democrats insisted that they already compromised by accepting drastic spending cuts in the budget. Steny Hoyer, the House minority whip, even described it as capitulation:

Mr. Speaker [John Boehner]… you said ‘Let us open government, and we will open it on the condition that we cap spending at $986 billion…. I don’t like your number, Mr. Speaker… [but] I want government open, so we have said ‘yes’ to your number. We didn’t negotiate. We said, “We will take what you propose.” (H6392)

Over the sixteen days of the shutdown, Republicans eventually agreed to a continuing resolution that did not impact Obamacare. On the evening of October 16, the House and Senate passed H.R. 2775, the Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014. President Obama signed it into law the next day, ending the government shutdown. Neither side of the aisle was satisfied. Texas Republican Ted Cruz continued to decry Obamacare, calling H.R. 2775 “a terrible deal” (S7530) because it left the health care law intact. Long-time Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer,

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28 Interestingly, the bill was introduced by Tennessee Republican Representative Diane Black on July 22, 2013, over two months before the shutdown (“Bill Summary and Status, 113th Congress (2013-2014), H.F. 2775”).
meanwhile, observed, “this is hardly a day of exultation… we have ended just where we started… But along the way, many people have been hurt” (S7530).

Schumer’s comment about hurting people calls to mind my first research question: “What might explain the disparity between the public’s desire for compromise and their elected leaders’ seeming refusal to compromise?” Earlier, I mentioned a CBS News poll, which showed that over 70 percent of Americans wanted a compromise to resolve the shutdown. Another poll, by the Gallup organization, found that Americans favored Congressional compromise over “sticking to [their] beliefs” by a two to one margin (Newport). Yet the uncompromising mindset prevailed.

When I began to consider why Congress seemed to ignore their constituents’ demands for compromise, it occurred to me that the answer was straightforward. The disconnect between Congress and constituents exists because they belong to different, conflicting Discourses. I got this idea, first, from Joan Didion, who identified the “perilously remote” (8) schism between the public and the political class in the 1988 election. Gee’s analysis of Discourse made my conclusion more apparent. Remember that Discourses are “socially accepted” ways of speaking, writing, thinking, and valuing that, together, signify membership into a particular role in society (Gee 158). Also recall that Discourses typically define themselves in relation to other, often opposing Discourses, and that criticizing a Discourse means that one is outside it (Gee 159).

The constituent Discourse heaped plenty of criticism on the Discourse of Congress during the shutdown.29 According to the opinion poll aggregator PollingReport.Com, Fox News, CNN, and Gallup polls consistently showed an 85 percent disapproval rating for Congress during

29 Late-night comedians, another Discourse, found the shutdown “irresistible fodder” (B. Carter). Responding to a GOP claim that Obamacare was “one of the most insidious laws ever created by man,” Comedy Central’s John Stewart wondered how Obamacare stacked up against slavery and Jim Crow.
October 2013 (“Congress: Job Ratings”). Some took to social media to express their contempt. On Twitter, @christophr wondered, “HAS ANYONE JUST TRIED TURNING THE GOVERNMENT OFF THEN BACK ON AGAIN?,” while YouTube user “LOL GOP” posted his own version of Miley Cyrus’s Wrecking Ball video, with John Boehner’s head merged onto Cyrus’ body (Waxman).

Despite the scorn, Congress maintained the budget stalemate for sixteen days. I was flummoxed. I had long believed that public opinion, as reflected in polls, exacted a strong influence in Congress. Members of Congress seemed to think so. A search of the Congressional Record found that members cited public opinion polls nearly 45 times to bolster particular arguments.

I came to learn, however, that opinion polls do not have the impact on Congress that I expected. A 2001 study found that “the policy decisions of presidents and members of Congress have… become less responsive” to public opinion since the 1970s (Shapiro and Jacobs 152). Instead, “presidents and legislators carefully track public opinion to identify the words, arguments, and symbols that are most likely to be effective in… ‘winning’ public support for their desired policies” (Shapiro and Jacobs 155). In other words, opinion polls matter to members of Congress, but only as resources that help them to frame arguments — specifically, the language used to express them — in a way that appeals to the public.

This need to reframe arguments for the public depicts how Congress operates in a different Discourse. First, recall Gee’s dictum that “language becomes meaningful only with Discourses” (179) — a variation of Bakhtin’s claim that language has meaning only in the context of dialogism. Gee also says that the most influential Discourses — the ones that tend to

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30 President Obama’s approval remained at around 50 percent during the same time (“President Obama: Job Ratings”), showing that more people blamed Congress than the President, while also implying that the office of the President is a separate Discourse from Congress.
acquire social goods such as power, money, and status — are those that have the least conflicts with other Discourses (159). One way to reduce conflicts is to “perform” as a member of another Discourse. Gee describes this as a “balancing act” between Discourses, as if an actor tried to play two or more roles simultaneously (191). A successful performance is “recognized’ as meaningful and impactful within that Discourse.  

Illustrating Gee’s theory in practice, Congress monitors opinion polls to judge how members of the public Discourse respond to certain words and phrases. They use the poll results to craft policies from their Congressional Discourse into a language that will be recognized, valued, and accepted within the public Discourse.  

When policies are accepted, conflict between Congress and constituents are mitigated. Members of Congress, secure in their Discourse, can proceed with their agenda.

Further evidence of a division in Discourse is shown by the different perspectives that constituents and members of Congress have about a legislator’s role on Capitol Hill. A 2012 report by the Congressional Research Service shows members of Congress rated preparing and sponsoring legislation as their top priority. “Representing the interest of their districts and constituents” was third on the list (Petersen 3). Members of the public, on the other hand, rated “represent the people and district according to the wishes of the majority” as a legislator’s top priority. “Solve problems in the district” and “keep in contact with people in the district” were second and third. Passing legislation was fifth on the public’s list (Petersen 3).

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31 Recall the cameramen at Michael Dukakis’s game of catch. After watching the Massachusetts governor toss the ball, one cameraman called Dukakis as “a regular guy,” while another felt he was someone to share a beer with (Didion 34, 35). In terms of Discourse, Dukakis’s game of catch was a successful performance, causing the candidate to be recognized as authentic by someone in a different Discourse.

32 In light of modern political partisanship, it may be more accurate to say that members of Congress attempt to perform in the specific partisan Discourses of their supporters. I discuss this in coming pages.
Based on these results, the report concluded that the public “[doesn’t recognize] a broader underlying institutional, procedural, and operational framework in which Members of Congress operate.” In other words, the public doesn’t recognize a separate Congressional Discourse. They don’t understand that, to secure local goods for their districts, legislators must appropriate the broader values, viewpoints, and behaviors of their colleagues in Congress. It seems to me that one of the most challenging tasks that legislators perform is somehow combining constituent Discourse (members of Congress were once constituents and remain members of the public, after all) with Congressional Discourse, while incorporating their own personal values and perspectives.

Virginia Congressman Rob Wittman explains how he integrates these competing mindsets. “When [a bill] gets to the House floor,” he says, “[you] have in your mind, ‘What are my principles? What are my constituents telling me they want to see? What’s in the best interest of the country?’ and then, ‘What’s in this bill?’… There is never a bill where you go, ‘Oh, this is perfect… everybody will be happy with this.’”

The 2014 budget, passed by Congress after the shutdown, shows the legislator’s dilemma in action. Wittman’s district includes the Marine Corps base at Quantico in Prince William County, the Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, and a host of military personnel, including about 100,000 veterans (Vaughn). He also chairs the Readiness Subcommittee for the influential House Armed Services Committee. There he works to ensure that active duty military get the equipment and training they need to “accomplish the mission and come home safe” (Wittman).33

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33 A 2012 newspaper article quoted Wittman’s perspective on military readiness: “I never want our people to be in a fair fight. I want us to have overwhelming superiority” (R. Carter).
The 2014 federal budget forced Wittman to make an unpopular choice between active
duty and veterans. In March 2013, sequestration — another consequence of failed compromise
on Capitol Hill — cut vital funding from the military readiness budget. The 2014 budget,
however, gave Wittman an opportunity to restore the funds.

In the midst of the negotiations, though, other legislators inserted a one percent reduction
in the cost of living increase for veterans’ pensions. Wittman disagreed with the reduction,
observing that no other federal beneficiaries faced cost-of-living cuts. “Just veterans were being
asked to sacrifice,” he says. He received pleas from constituents, asking him not to vote for the
budget. But, he says, “I voted in favor of it because I knew it was important to get money to our
active duty personnel.”

Immediately after the budget became law, Wittman sponsored a bill to remove the
reduction. The bill passed in about six weeks, he recalls, but he still faced criticism from
veterans. One complained, “Rob, I just don’t like the symbolism of it” (Wittman). The
Congressman convened his Veterans Advisory Council to explain his position. He took to
Facebook and Twitter, saying, essentially, “not a lot of good choices here, but a choice… had to
be made. I couldn’t go out there and vote ’maybe…’” (Wittman). He concludes:

[It] was one of those situations where you balance everything. You balance the
national interest. You balance the interest in your district. You balance the
thoughts and ideas you get from individual folks… on both sides of the issue. And
you cast your vote. And you know… once you cast your vote you’ve got your
work cut out for you because you’ve got to explain why you cast your vote that way.\textsuperscript{34}

Based on Wittman’s experiences, and Gee’s description of Discourse, it is plain that members of Congress and their constituents occupy different Discourses, which obfuscates communication between them.

What has become more apparent — and more obfuscating — is that Republicans and Democrats operate in separate Discourses. Again, Discourses each have their own ideology, based largely on the distribution of social goods and societal power (Gee 159). Discourses also marginalize the ideologies of others. Finally, they are resistant to self-scrutiny and criticism; as Gee says, “The Discourse itself defines what counts as acceptable criticism” (159). Based on these details, anyone following Congress, even superficially, can see the Discoursal divide between Republicans and Democrats.

Earlier this year, political science professors Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins drew the boundaries more clearly. Their article “The Ideological Right vs. The Group Benefits Left” reveals an asymmetric relationship in how the two parties operate. Republicans tend to be unified by a set of ideological goals, such as smaller government and reduced spending. Democrats, on the other hand, tend to be divided into “a coalition of self-conscious social groups”\textsuperscript{(2)} with each group demanding attention for particular issues. Democratic supporters tend to be social minorities, including blacks, Hispanics, Catholics, poor city dwellers, and gay people. These groups compensate for their fewer numbers by voting disproportionately for

\textsuperscript{34} Here, Wittman demonstrates reciprocity, or reason-giving, in which “citizens and their representatives are expected to justify to one another the laws they adopt and the lawmaking practices by which they adopt them” (Gutmann and Thompson \textit{The Spirit of Compromise} 158).
Democrats (8). Republican supporters are typically social majorities: whites, Protestants, suburbanites, married voters, and so forth (8). 35

Grossmann and Hopkins discovered additional complexities among supporters. Although both parties claim to represent the majority, the American electorate actually shares the views of both Republicans and Democrats. When responding to poll questions about specific issues, such as civil rights, healthcare, and crime, voters tended to be liberal (“Ideological Right” 4, 27), meaning they favored, for instance, more legislation to support healthcare reform. However, when asked more fundamental questions about the size and scope of government, respondents tended to be conservative, preferring a smaller, less-intrusive government (4, 27). These results seem to show that “conservatism, in the abstract, is more appealing to voters than… liberalism” (5). 36 Thus, Republicans candidates are more likely to be successful in an election if they can frame their campaigns in terms of broad, ideological concepts rather than specific policy issues (5).

As we know, campaigning must give way to governing, and, not surprisingly, Grossmann and Hopkins uncovered differences in the way that Republicans and Democrats govern. Their companion article, “Policymaking in Red and Blue,” found that Democrats, to appeal to the varying interest of their supporters, favor legislation as a means of achieving their goals (“Policymaking” 4). For these reasons, Democrats are more likely to compromise to gain at least

35 It is worth pointing out that, though Grossmann and Hopkins label the Republican Right as “ideological,” Democratic supporters have their own ideologies. All of the social minorities listed here represent different Discourses, which, by Gee’s definition, makes them intimately involved in the distribution of social goods and power, and, thus, “always and everywhere ideological” (159).

36 This dichotomy is illustrated by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Most voters brand the Act as an unwanted government intrusion into health care, but they approve of specific provisions within it (Grossmann and Hopkins “Policymaking” 7). For instance, only 40 percent of poll respondents approved of the Act, but 80 percent were in favor of health insurance exchanges (Grossmann and Hopkins “Ideological Right” 35).
part of their objective (‘Ideological Right’ 2, 14). Republicans, meanwhile, are less likely to compromise; they prefer the status quo because it prevents further government expansion.  

Republicans believe, and rightly so, that new legislation tends to expand government. Grossmann and Hopkins found that “any change that occurs [due to legislation] is much more likely to be liberal than conservative” (“Policymaking” 14). As Republicans often charge, new policies usually expand the scope of government. Moreover, it is very difficult to “shrink” government because new legislation tends to create beneficiaries who become constituencies for a particular policy (15). Taking Grossmann and Hopkins’ analysis one step further, I suspect that these new constituencies are likely to be social minorities who will vote Democrat, giving Republicans, mindful of the perpetual campaign, more incentive to resist new legislation.  

Having outlined these opposing perspectives on governing, it is interesting to see how they play out in the Congressional Record. The most dynamic debate of the material I examined occurred on Friday, October 4. It was here that Texas Senator Ted Cruz mounted four unanimous consent requests to re-open specific parts of the government.  

According to Senate rules, a unanimous consent request is used to set aside specific procedures and streamline the passage of bills (“unanimous consent”). However, as the term implies, there must be unanimous agreement in the Senate. If a single Senator objects, the request is denied and normal debate procedures continue. Democrats had already voiced staunch disapproval of re-opening the government piecemeal. To no one’s surprise, several Democratic Senators objected to Cruz’s requests.  

First, the Texas Republican proposed to continue paying veterans benefits. Patty Murray, a former chair of the Veterans Committee, objected. She approved of paying veterans their

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37 Grossman and Hopkins note that the 112th Congress, led by John Boehner, passed only 561 laws, the fewest in contemporary history. When asked about this seemingly low productivity, Boehner replied, “Most Americans think we have too many laws. What they want us to do is repeal more of those.” (“Policymaking” 1).
benefits, but invoked the military credo “Take care of our fellow man and leave no one behind” (S7182), noting the thousands of federal workers “held hostage” by “this tea party shutdown” (S7182). Cruz observed that the Senate passed a measure, defeated in the House, to pay active-duty military. He said that his bill merely attempted to treat veterans the same as active-duty. Then, he concluded, “I understand the Democrats in this Chamber are committed to Obamacare with all their hearts, minds, and souls, but the veterans of this Nation should not be held hostage” (S7182).

Next, Cruz proposed to pay Reserve members of the armed forces during the shutdown. Illinois Senator Dick Durbin objected, saying “the junior Senator from Texas launched this government shutdown... I understand the anxiety that Senator feels about the problems he has created, but trying to solve them one piece at a time is not the American way” (S7182). Cruz retorted:

We are in a shutdown because President Obama and the majority leader [of the Senate] want a shutdown… [and] every Democrat in this body has said, “No, we will not talk, we will not compromise, we will not have a middle ground, and 100 percent of [our priorities, such as Obamacare] must be funded…” (S7182)

Making a jibe at Durbin, Cruz then said, “I thank my friend from Illinois for making clear that the members of the Reserve… in his judgment, are not worthy of being paid during the shutdown” (S7182).

The third request involved reopening the National Park Service. This time, New York Senator Chuck Schumer leapt into the fray: “… the junior Senator from Texas is advocating shutting down the government and now he comes before us and says, ‘Well, why don’t we pass

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38 I suspect that this was not what Durbin meant, but it was what Cruz wanted to hear, and to emphasize, for those in his Discourse.
the parts of government I want to open?”’” (S7183). After some debate, the undaunted Cruz replied, “The Senator from New York has suggested that he is unwilling to open our national parks, to open our memorials… unless every other aspect of the government is opened immediately and Obamacare is forced upon the American people” (S7184).

Cruz’s fourth, and final, consent request asked for restored funding for the National Institutes of Health. This time, Senate majority leader Harry Reid objected. “We should open the government, all the government…. If people have a problem with Obamacare… let’s [address] it in a context that is reasonable and fair” (S7185). Cruz demurred, outlining the entire history of Republican compromise in the shutdown, from the initial attempt to defund the law, to attempts to delay it, with each offer rejected by the Democratically-led Senate. According to Cruz, the Democrats’ offer is “Give us everything we demand, 100 percent, no middle ground” (S7185). The Texas Senator held the floor for several more pages, before yielding for a Democratic rebuttal.

As these passages from the Congressional Record show, the Tea Party, led by Texas Senator Ted Cruz, appears to be the driving force behind the 16-day government shutdown. There are numerous political reasons for the Tea Party’s influence, particularly upon moderate Republicans in the House. Grossman and Hopkins argue that the ideological — or, as Margalit would say, the sectarian — unity of the Republican party has intensified, giving rise to “a unified, vociferous, and increasingly powerful conservative movement that constantly exerts pressure… to demonstrate ideological fealty” (“Ideological Right” 3). Republicans who deviate from pure ideology may find themselves out of office.
One noteworthy example is Indiana Senator Dick Lugar. A 35-year political veteran, he lost the 2012 Republican primary to Tea Party candidate Richard Mourdock.\(^3^9\) One of the nails in Lugar’s political coffin may have been his bipartisanship. The Senate’s expert on nuclear proliferation (Kane), in 2008, Lugar was touted by then-Senator Obama for his help in developing policy on post-Soviet nuclear weapons. Rather than rejecting the kudos from an ideological opponent, Lugar simply said, “I am pleased we had an opportunity to work together.” Four years later, Lugar was looking for work.

In addition to having a long memory for perceived betrayals, I suggest that the Tea Party was able to prolong the government shutdown because they operated as a separate, disruptive Discourse within the Republican Party. What Ted Cruz brought to the GOP was not just a different Discourse, but what Kenneth Bruffee, a pioneering scholar of collaborative learning, would call “abnormal discourse” \(^4^0\).

According to Bruffee, “abnormal discourse sniffs out stale, unproductive knowledge, and challenges its authority, that is, the authority of the community which that knowledge constitutes” \(^6^4^8\). There can be little argument that Ted Cruz does exactly that. He had only been a Senator for nine months before going toe-to-toe with senior Senators such as Harry Reid and Chuck Schumer during the shutdown. Moreover, Cruz’s insistence on keeping Obamacare at the forefront of budget negotiations challenged the collective knowledge and custom of the Congress, as evidenced by the protests from Senator Angus King and others.

\(^3^9\) Mourdock lost the Senate election against Democrat Joe Donnelley after Mourdock claimed that pregnancy from rape was God’s will (“Indiana Election Results 2012”).

\(^4^0\) Here I depart from Gee’s theory of Discourse. Gee says that Discourses can change as participants blend new values, languages, and behaviors from other Discourses, but admits that such intermingling is rarely recognized or accepted \(^1^6^6\). However, Bruffee’s notion of how knowledge is situated within communities is compatible with Discourse as the forum for certain whos being recognizing as certain whats.
Cruz’s four-step plan to reopen parts of the government can be seen as a challenge to authority and convention, but it is also a means of lobbying for votes in the permanent campaign. Almost all Americans understand supporting the military, enjoying our national parks, and appreciating the value of scientific research. Knowing the Democratic Senators would reject the consent requests, Cruz used his rebuttals to re-frame the Senators as indifferent to the military, contemptuous of our parks, and apathetic about scientific research. And he was able to accomplish this while retaining the favor of his sectarian base by remaining a staunch opponent of Obamacare.

While abnormal discourse challenges authority, it also leads to new knowledge. “Abnormal discourse is necessary for learning,” Bruffee writes (648). Although maintaining existing knowledge is essential to any knowledge community, Bruffee says that challenging and changing knowledge is also essential to maintain the vitality of the community (650).

If Ted Cruz and the Tea Party represent an abnormal discourse, one leading to new knowledge, there should be long-term indicators of their influence in the Republican party. Since the shutdown, Cruz has been conspicuously absent from the national scene. Six Tea Party-backed candidates lost handily to GOP incumbents in this year’s primaries, causing pundits, and relieved Republicans, to pronounce the Tea Party deceased (Cheney).

However, Ben Domenech, publisher of The Federalist, a right-leaning Web magazine, observes “The Tea Party’s success is not gauged by primaries alone. It’s gauged by how much the Tea Party’s priorities become the Republican Party’s priorities.” Said in Bruffee’s terms, the

41 One way the Congressional knowledge community maintains existing knowledge is through appeals to venerable traditions. For instance, in the seven issues of the Record that I examined, the Constitution was invoked 187 times. The Founding Fathers, or, simply, the Founders, were called upon 43 times. Among the Founding Fathers, Madison was invoked five times and Jefferson twice. Modern politicians Harry Truman and John Kennedy were cited three times each. Many members of Congress seem to be students of Abraham Lincoln; he was invoked eighteen times. These historic appeals can also be seen in terms of Gee’s Discourse, as a way for legislators to be seen as “Congressional whos” doing “Congressional whats.”
Tea Party’s impact as an abnormal discourse can be gauged by the new knowledge it has fomented in the Republican knowledge community.

Domenech identifies several “establishment” Republicans, including Orrin Hatch and Mitch McConnell, who, taking a lesson from Dick Lugar, moved right of center. Domenech also identifies a new generation of Republican leaders, among them Ted Cruz and Rand Paul, who are steeped in the Tea Party ideology and likely to carry it further into national politics. It seems apparent that the Tea Party has proven to be an abnormal discourse, sowing its influence years into the future of the Republican Party and American politics.

Differences between the Tea Party and the GOP give rise to my second research question — “Is there a difference between the personal compromise that occurs between individuals and small groups, and the compromise that occurs (or does not occur) in larger, public bodies, such as Congress? If there are differences, what might they be?” Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson provide one possible answer. Practically summarizing Rob Wittman’s dilemma as a member of Congress, the pair write:

[Legislative compromise] takes place in an ongoing institution in which the members have responsibilities to constituents and their political parties, maintain continuing relationships with one another, and deal concurrently with a wide range of issues that have multiple parts and long range effects. The dynamics of negotiation in these circumstances differ from the patterns found in the two-agent, one-time interactions that are more common in most discussions of compromise.

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Although Gutmann and Thompson have reason to distinguish between public and personal compromise, I am not comfortable drawing such a hard line between the two. There are aspects
of compromise, whether between two or two hundred people, which operate essentially the same. For instance, the compromising and uncompromising mindsets — principled prudence and mutual respect, principled tenacity and mutual mistrust, respectively — work in both public and personal compromise.

Let me illustrate these principles, writ small, in a story of interpersonal compromise. Recall the story of compromise between the three restaurant servers from my 2012 survey. They each agreed to work by themselves, without complaining, on a busy Saturday night, so that the others could take the evening off. They also agreed to rotate the Saturday shift among the three of them.

Now, it is possible that one or more of the servers may have held the moral principle, “It is not fair for me to work a busy Saturday shift by myself while my colleagues take the night off.” That is a reasonable assumption, it seems to me. However, in the name of principled prudence and mutual respect, they seem to have agreed to compromise this principle. The minimal condition for this, per Gutmann and Thompson, is to ask “Does the compromise improve the status quo?” The answer is “yes.”

As the respondent said, the servers agreed that it was better to have two or three weekends off per month than to share the work every Saturday (“2012 Survey on Compromise”). Mutual respect did the rest. The servers trusted one another to make deferred concessions, week after week, which kept the compromise in place until the respondent left that job.

Although personal compromise among restaurant servers is not a matter of national policy, I balk at Gutmann and Thompson’s implication that public compromise has higher stakes

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42 Based on the respondent’s story, the question of whether or not it was fair to restaurant patrons to only have a single server was not a factor. Presumably, the restaurant management was aware of, and sanctioned, the compromise. Thinking of the economic view of compromise, it would be in the management’s interest to get the same amount of work from a single server.
than personal compromise. Many times, the stakes are very high for the people involved. In my 2014 survey, Respondent 42 shares a painful story in which she compromised over the care of her disabled mother to keep her marriage together. Although the respondent didn’t provide details, she said that her mother suffered because of the compromise, and, ultimately, her husband filed for divorce anyway. Respondent 42 concludes, “I have never felt right about it and cannot have a clean conscience over it.” Obviously, this is not a low-stakes story. Some could argue that it is low-impact, affecting only a few people, compared to public compromise, which can affect millions. But for those few affected, the impact of this story was considerable.

While the stakes of compromise cannot differentiate between public and personal compromise, it is evident that public compromise can be more complex. That complexity arises primarily, I suggest, from the multiplicity of voices and views, or, more accurately, from the multiplicity of Discourses, involved. What is interesting, though, is that if all parties come to the table, no matter how large that table is, with a compromising mindset, compromise remains plausible. In fact, if more parties are willing to compromise than not, public compromise can be easier to obtain than personal compromise.

As the Congressional Record shows, it was a majority in both houses, on both sides of the aisle, who refused to compromise. If more members of the GOP-led House, for instance, had chosen to take Obamacare off the table, they could have easily trumped the disruptive influence of the Tea Party. Based on Ted Cruz’s claim that H.R. 2775 was “a terrible deal,” this must have been what happened.43

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43 Cruz may have seen the compromise leading to H.R. 2775 as coercion. He and his Tea Party colleagues were simply overridden by the Democratic majority in the Senate, while their counterparts in the House were likely silenced by more moderate Republicans. This illustrates, once again, the ambiguities of compromise, as well as Bakthin’s claim that meaning lies in context.
A majority cannot necessarily prevail in smaller, personal compromise. Remember Fumurescu’s claim that the parties in a compromise are inherently equal. A single person with an uncompromising stance could derail any chance for compromise. In the story of the three restaurant servers, imagine if a single one of them had refused to compromise. It would have been possible, I suppose, for the other two servers to strike the bargain, but it seems more likely that the compromise would have unraveled as feelings of resentment festered toward the uncompromising co-worker.

One way to mitigate the complexity of public compromise is to limit its scope. The Affordable Care Act, officially known as Public Law 111-148, provides an example of how NOT to do this. Obamacare is a monolithic piece of legislation — 906 pages in its final form. As House bill H.R. 3590, it was even larger, at 2,409 pages. The size and complexity of the bill, and the way it was handled in the House, eroded the already thin trust between Democrats and Republicans on the Hill.

On November 6, 2009, just hours before H.R. 3590 was to come to a vote, the Democratically-controlled House Rules Committee was still massaging the bill. Meanwhile, Republican representatives met on the House floor, discussing how to approach the looming vote. New Jersey’s Scott Garrett reminded his colleagues that then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi had promised to give legislators, and the public, a 72-hour window to read the final bill. However, Garrett observed, “we still don’t know what the final bill is… but there are 190 [Democrats] who have said they will be voting ‘yes’ at the first opportunity” (H12578). “I will close on this,” Garrett said, “…no one who is about to vote on this bill tomorrow will have read and understood [it], and that is a travesty to the American public” (H12574).44

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44 In light of this, it becomes easier to understand why Republicans may have resisted the Affordable Care Act so strongly during the 2013 budget negotiations.
Although even the simplest measure, when mishandled, can erode trust, Delegate Bobby Orrock, a veteran of the Virginia legislature, offers a method of public compromise that Democrats and Republicans might have found more effective for health care reform. In an interview, he observes:

Virginia has almost never moved except in a rather measured fashion in whatever policy change might be put forward… generally, the nature is that we resist change and especially radical change… I think that’s how government is supposed to work… you effect policy changes in a measured fashion so that people can accept it.

As an example, Orrock recounts “one of the most contentious bills I ever carried.” Several years ago, at the behest of animal welfare advocates, he sponsored a bill to restrict so-called puppy mills, largely unregulated dog breeding establishments that are infamous for their deplorable animal care.

Despite the well-known conditions at puppy mills, Orrock muses, “when you impose a framework on a previously existing commercial entity… there’s opposition.” Opponents included “an odd coalition” of commercial dog breeders, hunt clubs, and even Mennonites, who bred dogs on their farms. On Orrock’s side were animal control, law enforcement, local governments, and the state Department of Agriculture, who would be the regulators under the bill.

After negotiating with all the parties, Orrock orchestrated a compromise measure which, like any true compromise, displeased all sides (LeBeau). In fact, the original proponents we’re

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45 Orrock is in good company. When Henry Clay negotiated the Compromise of 1850, Southern states complained that they made all the concessions. Clay responded, “Why, at the North, they cry out ‘it is all concession to the South’ (Waugh 80).
so displeased, they considered asking the delegate to withdraw the bill because, he says, “they thought I had compromised too much.”

Finally, after the supporters had their say, Orrock put the matter into perspective. He admitted that the bill was not as strict as they would have liked, but he said that it would create a registration process for the breeding facilities. “And hasn’t that been the single biggest problem,” he asked, “…not so much that they’re not regulated, but that you don’t know where they are? So, don’t you gain the larger part of your victory?... [And] if that doesn’t address the concerns, we can build onto it…” Reluctantly, the supporters accepted the compromise. In 2008, the bill passed into law, and, Orrock says, “it ended up being a model for states across the country.”

The Democrats could have had an easier time with health care reform, and the 2013 budget debate four years later, if they had followed Orrock’s measured approach to change. They could have introduced one or two reforms at a time, rather than a single sweeping, monolithic, piece of legislation. Republicans might have supported eliminating the penalty on pre-existing conditions, or allowing children to remain on their parents’ insurance until age twenty-six.

This measured approach seems to fit with Gutmann and Thompson’s idea of public compromise occurring in “an ongoing institution” in which members tackle complicated issues with long range effects. Of course, in a nod to the permanent campaign, Democrats had to push through comprehensive reform to appeal to their base, the “coalition of self-conscious social groups” identified by Grossmann and Hopkins, as well as to cement President Obama’s legacy.\footnote{In a November 2013 interview with 20/20, President Obama called health care reform “a legacy I am extraordinarily proud of” (Easley).} It is still worth considering that this tactic probably helped to catalyze the 2013 government shutdown. The sweeping legislation and perceived obfuscation before the vote antagonized
Republicans and, apparently, voters, who gave the GOP a decisive House majority in the next election.

Philip Carter, former ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire in western Africa, takes Orrock’s measured approach a step farther. Like the Virginia delegate, Carter chooses to focus on a single goal, but he adds an extra dimension of flexibility. When brokering a compromise, the ambassador advises, “Look at… [the] destination… The path in front of you can wend into different directions. And there may be obstacles… it’s not a straight line.”

A recent project demonstrates his method. Carter was recently in negotiations with the Air Force to build a facility in a foreign country. Although many of the stakeholders agreed that the facility was necessary, Carter found that it was not a top priority at the Air Force. Making little progress negotiating from a distance, he flew to the site for face-to-face conversations.

In personal negotiations, Carter learned that the Air Force was concerned about the timeframe for building the facility. The discussion went something like this:

Air Force: “… we can’t do it in a year [but] we can do it in 18 months…”
Carter: “OK, 18 months. That’s fine.”

Air Force: “We can’t move this asset until we get this [thing]…”
Carter: “OK, but we’re still building this, right?”

“The goal for me,” the ambassador said, “was always achieving this facility. Building this thing.” As long as that destination remained in sight, the ambassador knew he could concede on minor points and still succeed.

Carter also maintains that you can’t reach a destination without help from colleagues. “You need to bring them on board,” he advises, “and you need to help them. And if that means… incorporating some of their ideas, and it doesn’t waver you off-course… Good! Perfect!”
Reaching the goal in this fashion means “you’ve compromised on their points, but have not given up your position” (Carter).

Although there are different ways to approach compromise, and different nuances of public versus personal compromise, trust is the bedrock for all compromise. Without trust, bolstered by on-going relationships, compromise is nearly impossible to achieve. The Congressional Record makes this case; the excerpts I presented reek of mistrust on both sides.

It was not always so. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson recall groundbreaking, bi-partisan legislation in our recent past. One example is the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The brainchild of Ronald Reagan, the Republican president enlisted the help of Democrat Dan Rostenkowski from the House. Later, Reagan recruited Republican Bob Packwood, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who reached out to Democratic colleague Bill Bradley. Together, these men crafted and passed the most comprehensive tax-reform legislation in modern American history” (Gutmann and Thompson The Spirit of Compromise 5).

What accounts for the partisan rancor that gridlocks modern government? One explanation might be what Gutmann and Thompson call the “Tuesday-Thursday Club” (The Spirit of Compromise 169). In 1995, then-Speaker Newt Gingrich ordered freshman Republicans to spend more time among their constituents to campaign for Republican values. New Representatives left their families in their home states and found lodgings among like-minded colleagues in Washington, from Tuesday to Thursday, during legislative sessions. Long-serving Congressman Jim Cooper recalls, “Members became strangers, the easier for them to fight” (qtd. in Gutmann and Thompson The Spirit of Compromise 169). 47

47 Gingrich’s order is now standard practice on Capitol Hill. A 2013 Washington Post article featured Democratic Representative George Miller’s townhouse, which he shares with Democratic Senators Dick Durbin and Chuck Schumer. The Congressional rooming house has become so pervasive that it inspired Doonesbury cartoonist and
Ambassador Carter, a veteran of Washington politics, also referenced the Tuesday-Thursday Club during our interview. When I explained my curiosity about the dearth of Congressional compromise, Carter said, “You know [why] that’s happened?... they don’t live in Washington.” He explained that members of Congress used to move, with their families, and live in DC for the duration of their terms. Congressional families socialized together. Their children attended the same schools. Now, he says, “They’re only in Washington from like Tuesday to Thursday… so they don’t have any of the personal connection… there is no bridge-building going on.” The ambassador wonders, “How do you compromise with people if you don’t know them… as individuals, as people, but [only] as opponents… You can never get anywhere with that.”

David Sam, president of Germanna Community College in Fredericksburg, Virginia, also relies on bridge-building to broker compromise. At the onset of negotiations, he tells all of the parties, “Can we all agree that everybody in this room is a person of good will and integrity and committed to student learning? He adds, “And I need everybody to say they believe that before we talk… Because when things get heated, then we go back there.”

Sam admits that this approach doesn’t mean that all parties get what they want. “Sometimes,” he says, “the answers are ‘we can only do one or the other… we can’t do them all.’” He even acknowledges that wrong choices can occur, but “you shouldn’t be able to say ‘you were wrong for the wrong reasons.’” By preserving mutual respect, and ensuring that all parties operate in good faith toward a common goal, even detractors confess “you were wrong for the right reasons, because you do care. You’re as committed as I am; we just took the wrong route.”

stauch Democrat Garry Trudeau to launch a Web-based television show dubbed Alpha House. Notably, in Trudeau’s show, the Congressional housemates are Republicans. (“The Real ‘Alpha House’”).

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While Dr. Sam and Ambassador Carter are experts in the field of compromise, even lay people instinctively understand the role that trust and relationships play in compromise. In my 2014 survey, Respondent 09 reflected Margalit’s economic view of compromise, saying “I will compromise in almost any area… if another person is willing to operate in good faith.” Respondent 01 said that she was most likely to compromise in her relationships. “Compromise is what makes relationships work,” she explains. Respondent 36 expressed a similar idea, saying she is also willing to compromise to maintain personal relationships. But, she adds, “I’m not compromising… with people I don’t know.”

The reasons people gave for refusing to compromise almost prompted me to create a fourth research question. Most survey respondents and interview subjects said they would not compromise their principles. Appeal to principle, you’ll recall, was also a common rationale in the Congressional Record. Democrats would not compromise on the principle that budget negotiations were an inappropriate forum to revisit the Affordable Care Act. Republicans, meanwhile, would not compromise on the principle that the Act was disastrous and needed immediate reform.

Some curious obstacles to compromise emerged in the 2014 survey. Several respondents said they would not compromise on legal issues, ethics, health, or safety. On the surface, these seem different than moral principles. There is a difference between ethics and morality, but for these respondents, I suspect that appeals to ethics, health, and safety reflect moral principles, such as “it is wrong to deliberately inflict harm on others.”

Respondent 34 gave an interesting answer, saying she would not compromise “in areas of nature, travel, artistic experience, or the feelings of others.” Respondent 05 cited ethics and
morality as barriers to compromise, but then added, “I find it very hard to compromise on my scholarly interests and research agenda.”

In his analysis of the political and philosophical history of compromise, Alin Fumurescu argues that a person’s refusal to compromise is rooted in perceived threats to the two fora, which constitute “one’s uniqueness, that is, identity, or the identity of the group one is supposed to represent” (22). The group identity is analogous to the secondary Discourse(s) in which the individual is operating in when refusing to compromise. Ted Cruz, for example, could not have compromised on modifying Obamacare, because to do so would have invalidated his performance among members of the Tea Party Discourse. To use Gee’s terminology, Cruz would no longer be recognized as a Tea Party who doing a Tea Party what, but as a member of an opposing Discourse, in this case, the moderate Republicans, or, worse, the Democrats.

Having shed some light on Cruz’s Discoursal dilemma, and the differences and similarities between public and personal compromise, I come to my final research question: “If there are differences between personal and public compromise, do constituents need to tailor their expectations of the leaders’ ability to compromise? Or do constituents need to change their rhetorical methods when demanding that their leaders compromise more often?”

First of all, constituents need to tailor their expectations of legislators, not only regarding their ability to compromise, but about their general role as legislators. Earlier I cited the 2012 Congressional Research Service report which showed that constituents and members of Congress have dramatically different perceptions of the legislator’s responsibilities. Members of Congress felt their primary role was to craft legislation while constituents thought the top priority should be representing the concerns of the district.
The same report says that it falls upon Congress to educate constituents. Forty-three percent of House members agreed, making “educate and inform constituents” third on their list of priorities (Petersen 3). Rob Wittman’s Veterans Advisory Council, which he consulted after voting for the one percent pension cut, is one means of informing constituents. Also recall that Wittman used Twitter and Facebook to explain his decision. At the state level, Virginia delegate Bobby Orrock has a Citizens Advisory Council which meets three times a year. I attended the spring council meeting, in which the delegate shared news from the Virginia General Assembly and fielded questions and comments.

It seems to me, however, that the public must take responsibility first, for recognizing their narrow view on what Congress actually does, and second, for educating themselves on both pending legislation and the general roles and procedures on Capitol Hill. The Congressional Record is a good portal through which to see the legislative process unfold, though Bismarck’s quip about laws and sausages comes to mind. While the Record can reveal some of the chaos of legislative debate, it’s important to recognize that it does not document everything that occurs in Congress. As I said earlier, I was originally put off by the obvious speechifying in the Congressional Record. Although touted as “…a verbatim account” (“About the Congressional Record”), I came to see the Record as an stylized, almost dramatized, version of events, much like the game of catch witnessed by Joan Didion.

In the Data Quality section, I mentioned being immediately struck by the polished rhetoric from members of Congress. I expected to encounter extemporaneous speech, perhaps scrubbed of “um” and “ah,” but extemporaneous, nonetheless. What I found were a series of obvious speeches. Witness, for instance, the parallel construction and rhetorical repetition in Representative Mark Meadows’s October 2 remarks:
Yesterday, in this very chamber, Mr. Speaker, we put forth three different bills, one that would pay our veterans… And what did the Democrats say? They said “no.”… One [bill] would open up our parks and monuments… And what did the Democrats say? They said “no.” Then, even in the District of Columbia… we looked… at… allowing them to use some of their funds to pay the teachers… We put forth a bill. Yet, what did the Democrats say? “No.”

Caught off-guard, I sought to learn just how polished, or how extemporaneous, the Congressional Record really is. An October 2011 report by the Law Librarians’ Society of Washington, DC says the Record contains “substantially verbatim transcripts of floor debate and remarks.” However, “non-substantive changes can be made by members…” (“An Overview of the Congressional Record”).

Wondering exactly what constitutes a “non-substantive change,” I consulted with Patricia Garfinkel, a former federal co-worker who was a speechwriter for the House Committee on Science for eighteen years. Ms. Garfinkel reckoned that ninety percent of the content in the Congressional Record is written by Congressional staff writers. She also noted, as did the 2011 Law Librarian’s report, that the Record originates from verbatim recordings on the House and Senate floors. But Garfinkel added, “that record goes through iterations where things get added to it, members want to take out some of the things they said… it’s manipulated.”

I asked her about the target audience for the Congressional Record. “It’s meant for the members,” she said. “If you’re not there on the day they debate a particular bill, you can read about it.” But she also said that the Record was ultimately meant to be a historical document. “It

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48 I am not the first person to question the Record’s faithful rendition of Congressional proceedings. In 1959, then-Senator Richard Neuberger wrote an opinion piece for The New York Times, in which he recalls, “After a major debate… I have seen many Senators… virtually rewriting the speeches and retorts just delivered on the floor… Some will totally expunge comments made in the heat of debate… others will be adding afterthoughts…” (qtd. in Mantel).
lays things out in detail,” she explained. “You get the mind of the members of Congress. Now that mind is often portrayed by a staff [writer], but a member will not take anything he [sic] doesn’t want to say.”

Despite my initial misgivings about the veracity of the Congressional Record, I had to agree with Garfinkel that it is probably the best insight into the mind of Congress. Though the proceedings I read were obviously edited and polished, they fit with the facts of the government shutdown, as I understood them from other sources. Moreover, I found equal (mis)treatment between both sides, and was alternately amused and chagrined by moments of candid snarking among members.

One of the most entertaining exchanges was between Rand Paul and Dick Durbin. After listening to Paul expound on the Democrats’ unwillingness to compromise, Durbin objected and asked to speak. The Senate’s presiding officer said, “The right [to speak] is at the sufferance of the Senator who has the floor.” Paul replied, “I will suffer longer.” Durbin quipped, “I thank the Senator from Kentucky, because I went through a period of suffering a few moments ago” when Paul was speaking (S7334).

It is worth repeating that neither the Congressional Record, nor any other source I could find, captures all of the interactions of the U.S. Congress. John Boehner admitted as much in a 2011 interview. After discussing the last-minute debt-ceiling deal (which “kicked the can” toward the 2013 shutdown), CBS’s Scott Pelley said to Boehner, “Folks at home have been

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49 Although the Congressional Record is obviously a historical document and a resource for members, as Garfinkel says, it’s worth noting that the Record is also aimed at the contemporary public. I encountered numerous appeals and “shout-outs” to constituents over the course of the shutdown debate. For instance, on October 4, Maryland Democratic Senator Barbara Mikulski, who represents many federal workers, announced, “I say to all Federal employees… at the end of the day, I think you’re important” (S7189). A few days earlier, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee wished her brother a happy birthday in the midst of debate on Obamacare (H6093).
watching the acrimony, name calling, finger pointing. And I wonder whether Congress has lost something, an ability to talk to each other, to settle down and make agreements.”

Boehner replied, “Well, there’s the public noise and then there’s the private discussion…. the American people don’t see the cooperation that exists, off camera that really are [sic] the glue that holds this place together.”

Pelley asked, “Are you saying it’s not as bad as it looks?”

“It’s not as bad as it looks,” Boehner said.

Based on Boehner’s assertion, I suspect we need more transparency in the legislative process. Boehner admits much of the news coverage is just “public noise.” My own research found that the Congressional Record, while not necessarily public noise, is still sanitized for our protection, lest we see the sausage as it’s made.

I was tempted to think that the C-Span television network, which broadcasts directly from the floors of the House and Senate, might give a faithful account of Congressional proceedings. However, if the Congressional Record is sanitized, C-Span may not be sanitized enough. The network’s vantage point from Capitol Hill yields “raw data without context” (Frantzich and Sullivan 300), which Bakhtin would say equates to raw data without meaning.

I also learned C-Span broadcasts are often staged, much like Dukakis’s game of catch, so that “viewers see the puppets, but not the puppeteers” (Frantzich and Sullivan 300). Ambassador Carter peeks behind the puppet stage, observing, “if you watch C-Span, every now and again, the camera will pan out. You’ll see… guys are talking to an empty room.”

Lacking reliable, transparent sources for Congressional proceedings, I repeat my claim that the public must take responsibility for educating itself. In the era of Google, this shouldn’t be difficult. However, Web sites shouldn’t be the sole source for constituent education. Thinking
back to Bakhtin’s notion of meaning in context, people should use a variety of different sources, in different media, to get the most complete, contextual picture of legislators and their positions. Campaign literature, newspapers, the Congressional Record, C-Span, televised debates, even those tiresome TV ads, are all viable, as long as they are consulted in context with other sources.  

But information collection is only part of the challenge in encouraging legislators to compromise. Constituents must make direct contact with members of Congress. One of my inspirations for this project was the seeming disconnect between public calls for compromise, via national opinion polls, and Congress’s refusal to compromise. As I learned, opinion polls are not effective in influencing Congress. The most effective way to persuade legislators, says political scientist Kristina Miller, is through direct contact to their offices, whether by phone, fax, or e-mail. As reported in The Monkey Cage, a political blog, Miller interviewed a random sample of eighty House members and staff. She learned that personal communication affects how legislators view their constituency, which, in turn, affects members’ behavior on the Hill (Sides).

Members of Congress represent many thousands of constituents, yet they perceive only a third of them as relevant to a particular issue, Miller says. She found that constituents who contact their legislators about a particular issue are more likely to be among that third, where they will be remembered by that legislator when it’s time to act. Borrowing an example from health care, Miller notes that if doctors call their representatives regularly to share their thoughts,

50 For the same reason — namely, context — the public should seek out a variety of general news sources. Neither Fox News nor the Huffington Post nor any other news outlet, by themselves, should be a sole source of news and information about anything.

51 The Monkey Cage was recently acquired by The Washington Post.

52 Miller showcases this research in her 2010 book Constituency Representation in Congress: The View from Capitol Hill.
but hospital administrators do not, legislators are three times more likely to consider the interests of the doctors than the administrators when handling health care policy. “Contact,” she concludes, “is the single most consistent predictor of which constituents legislators perceive in their district.”
Challenges and Limitations

If I had to identify a single limitation to this project, it is that I chose to ignore the moral quandary that often surrounds compromise. Dr. Chiara Lepora, a toxicologist with Médecines Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders in the U.S.), claims that “compromise necessarily involves… wrongdoing. Morally, something is lost, even if more is gained on balance” (2). I am not sure I agree with this. I tend to subscribe primarily to Avishai Margalit’s economic theory of compromise, which holds that everything is negotiable. This means that everything, including morality, has a subjective value that varies from person to person.

But I am reminded of Margalit’s caution against thinking that only one view of compromise, in this case, the economic view, is in play (26). The other, religious, view of compromise, you’ll recall, holds that some values are sacred and should not be compromised. This may be what Lepora has in mind when she says that compromise necessarily includes wrong-doing. However, by making wrong-doing a necessary consequence of compromise — one that apparently cannot be avoided — Lepora flouts Margalit’s warning by ignoring the economic view.

As Margalit intimates, there is no reconciliation for the conflict between the religious and economic views of compromise.\(^{53}\) The closest attempt seems to be the “painful recognition of the other side… making mutual concessions that express recognition of the other’s point of view” (Margalit 54), a tenet of compromise touted by Fumurescu as conferring legitimacy upon the

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\(^{53}\) The 18th Century Scottish philosopher David Hume famously addressed this conflict with his dictum “you cannot derive ought from is” (qtd. in Feiser). In other words, moral values and responsibilities cannot be deduced from empirical claims (Feiser), such as those made under the economic view of compromise.
other (283), and by Gutmann and Thompson as recognizing moral value in an opposing view (107). Granting this type of recognition implies some level of subjectivity in one’s “sacred” view, essentially undermining its sanctity. In the religious realm, to be sacred is an all-or-nothing proposition. Something is either sacred or it is secular; there are not degrees of sacredness (Margalit 24).

Contemporary Christian practice demonstrates the subjectivity of so-called sacred moral codes. Earlier I mentioned Leviticus 18:22, which brands homosexuality an abomination. This particular Scripture is often used by Christians to justify opposition to gay rights, from resisting gay marriage to excluding gay people from church membership (Farmer). But homosexuality isn’t the only abomination identified in Scripture. Proverbs 6:17-19 lists seven others, including “a proud look,” “a lying tongue,” and “a heart that devises wicked plans.” Yet, there are no calls to ban liars or schemers from church, despite these offenses being equated to homosexuality.54 This disparity shows that not all abominations are created equal; they are subjective.

Thinking back to Lepora’s claim that a compromise necessarily constitutes some form of moral loss, it seems to me that whether or not something is lost depends on each individual engaged in the compromise. Parties can make deep concessions to their position, and still retain their integrity. In fact, as Gutmann and Thompson aver, being willing to make concessions to improve the status quo has greater moral value than clinging tenaciously to principle and privileging the status quo (The Spirit of Compromise 108 ). Lepora acknowledges this, to some extent, saying “an action committed as a result of compromise is blameworthy if the result… is overall worse than the likely result of not compromising” (12).

54 In my experience, banning liars and schemers from church would yield many empty pews.
Her litmus test is not accurate, though. A compromise can only be judged in its aftermath, a case of 20/20 hindsight. In complex political compromises, the results, and the hindsight, may not appear for years. Gerald Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon in 1974 was seen as a great moral failure on Ford’s part, yet thirty years later, the former vice-president was celebrated for his courage (Weier). To me, judging Ford illustrates not only the myopia of 20/20 hindsight, but also that morality, the rightness or wrongness of an action, is also subject to Bakhtin’s dialogism. As the context changes over time, so does the meaning of what is moral or not.

Early in my research, I considered exploring the moral dimension of compromise. In addition to Lepora’s work, I consulted Martin Benjamin’s 1990 book, Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and Politics. Benjamin posits a means of preserving integrity during compromise. His method, predating Gutmann and Thompson by twenty years, involves “mutually respectful discussions” (34) in which both sides openly acknowledge mixed motivations and work together to develop alternative solutions to the particular conflict. In an ideal result, no compromise occurs. Instead, as Benjamin explains, “…an outcome is not a compromise when each of the parties comes to regard its initial position as mistaken, abandons it, and embraces the same third position, which both now believe to be superior” (35).

Although this method seems idealistic, and perhaps impossible in the era of the permanent campaign, it may be applicable in personal compromises. I went through Benjamin’s procedure in my conversations with gay people. Consequently, I adopted my moral principles to fit with what I came to see as the facts about gays. I do not understand being sexually attracted to a man, but I came to see that I do not need to understand that attraction to accept that gay people are people, not abominations. Of course, Christian members of my family may feel that I compromised my morals, my upbringing, and, according to Fumurescu, my identity. I disagree.
What I have learned is that identity should be dynamic and self-determining. Heritage can still be valued; it can still be part of one’s identity, but it should not be sacrosanct. By definition, heritage is locked in the past, but remains subject to the dialogism of the future.

The most compelling part of Benjamin’s book, and what ultimately convinced me to overlook the moral conflict of compromise, was a 1984 speech by New York governor Mario Cuomo. As a devout Catholic, Cuomo personally opposed abortion, yet he advocated for a woman’s right to choose. Here is how he explained this dichotomy:

the Catholic who holds political office in a pluralist democracy — who is elected to serve Jews and Moslems [sic], atheists and Protestants, as well as Catholics — bears special responsibility. He or she undertakes to create conditions under which all can live with a maximum degree of dignity and with a reasonable degree of freedom; where everyone who chooses may hold beliefs different from specially Catholic ones… Catholic politicians do this… not because they lack conviction… but rather because it is necessary to guarantee Catholics’ rights to be Catholic. (qtd. in Benjamin 146)

Cuomo’s explanation stood in stark contrast to the machinations of so many public officials, those whom Gutmann and Thompson admonish for “the refusal to improve a society [by] needlessly harming or denying people their… basic rights” (The Spirit of Compromise 108).

For me, Cuomo’s words undermined any moral claims that Lepora seeks to judge, as well as any principles that the Tea Party or other ideological groups hold. I’ve come to understand, perhaps cynically, that most so-called principles are appeals to supporters, rooted in the permanent campaign, and not the sacred moral values that politicians claim to defend.
Between Cuomo’s open-mindedness and the obvious subjectivity of moral prescriptions, I no longer found the moral dimension of compromise compelling or interesting. I was more curious to examine the partisan discourse surrounding the government shutdown, and the essential mechanics of compromise that might forestall future legislative gridlock.

I faced several challenges while investigating the mechanics of compromise. In the Research Methods section, I said that I had originally intended to crowdsource my survey to reach a broader target audience. I was encouraged by a 2011 study at George Washington University (GWU), which found that crowdsourced academic surveys yield sample data that is more diverse and reliable (Behrend, et al 810). GWU researchers used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk Web site to solicit responses for their survey. The site is designed to let businesses employ a pool of ad hoc workers, located all over the world, for specific tasks requiring human attention. Workers might review a company’s customer database and delete duplicate addresses, for instance. The business might pay each worker 5 cents for every record reviewed; workers accept this wage when they volunteer for the task.

The team at GWU paid 80 cents per survey response (803), estimating it would take a worker about 30 minutes to complete the survey (811). This yielded a wage of approximately $1.60 per hour. The research team received 270 responses, at a total cost of $216.\(^{55}\)

Lacking an extra $200, but intrigued by GWU’s results, I explored how I might crowdsource my compromise survey at no cost. I researched numerous crowdsourcing sites, including Kickstarter, IndieGogo, and GoFundMe. All of these sites focused on crowdfunding, raising money for particular projects, which did not fit my needs. I then searched for an

\(^{55}\) According to a 2012 article by California journalist Ellen Cushing, $1.50 is the median hourly wage of most “Turkers,” as Mechanical Turk workers are called. Although workers are free to choose their tasks and wages, critics condemn the crowdsourcing site as exploitative. Cushing branded it a “digital sweatshop,” while one of her interview subjects, a former “Turker” named Rob, noted that he completed over 2,000 tasks earning a paltry $157. “It’s not worth it all,” Rob said. “Return an aluminum can and you’ll make more money.”
academic-oriented crowdsourcing site, one that might facilitate donating time and effort, rather than money.

Finding nothing, I appealed, unsuccessfully, to the experts at Crowdsourcing.Org, the definitive Web portal for the crowdsourcing and crowdfunding industry. After getting no response on Crowdsourcing.Org, I concluded that Mechanical Turk was the only option for crowdsourcing the survey. I had hoped for 100 responses, and, as with the GWU team, I estimated it would take about 30 minutes to complete my survey. If I paid GWU’s wage of 80 cents per response — which I felt was unfairly low — the total cost for 100 responses, assuming I could collect that many, would’ve been at minimum $80. I simply could not spend this much on a crowdsourcing effort. I was already spending $24 a month to host the survey on SurveyMonkey, along with the cost of books, thesis credits, and other expenses that accrue during a research project.

In a final push, I contacted VCU’s Graduate School to see if any grant money was available to defray the cost of crowdsourcing. Hearing “no,” I abandoned my plan to use Mechanical Turk. Later, I contacted Coffee Party USA and explained my project. They agreed to publicize my survey on Facebook at no cost. I did not collect the 100 responses that I wanted, but I did not incur any additional cost, either.

I was also stymied in my quest for interviews. I sent out eighteen requests to federal, state, and local government officials, as well as to business leaders in the Fredericksburg and Richmond area. Yet, I was only able to conduct six interviews — a 33 percent success rate. I had expected my local representatives to grant interviews, particularly from my county Board of Supervisors and School Board. I was chagrined when they ignored multiple queries.
I have spent time considering why I had such a poor response to my interview requests. In the case of elected officials, it may have been that they were put off by my subject matter. As my research has shown, the very idea of compromise can be treacherous. It may also be that I identified as a graduate student, and members of that Discourse are likely seen as younger, more liberal, perhaps even radical, and thus, not especially sympathetic or even-handed to politicians and civic leaders. Their misgivings were compounded, I suspect, because most of the interview subjects did not know me personally. They had no reason to trust how I might use their responses, despite the assurances of my Informed Consent document.

It occurs to me that I obtained most of my interviews on the basis of personal interaction. For instance, Delegate Bobby Orrock’s office didn’t respond to my original interview requests. It was only after I met Mr. Orrock personally, visiting with him at a citizen’s advisory council meeting, that he agreed to an interview. Other interviews were facilitated by colleagues. A former classmate at the University of Richmond interceded with Ambassador Philip Carter and coach Larry Kennan. I only contacted them after they gave their assent to my classmate. Similarly, I suspect that the common bonds I shared with Congressman Rob Wittman, a VCU graduate, and Germanna President David Sam — I introduced myself as a Germanna undergraduate earning a graduate degree — led them to agree to interviews.
Future Research

Over the course of this project, one possibility for future research presented itself: investigating how compromise operates in different cultures. In his examination of the political history of compromise, Alin Fumurescu claims that the French and the British evolved drastically different views of the concept. For the French, compromise has negative connotations involving one’s honor, conscience, and reputation (Fumurescu 272). The British, on the other hand, extol compromise as a virtue (57).

Fumurescu believes that the divergent histories of the two nations underlie their contrasting views of compromise. Sixteenth century absolutism forced French citizens to comply with the whims of monarchy. Their forum externum became a mask of conformity, making the forum internum “the sole repository of authenticity and uniqueness” (Fumurescu 271), and thus, something to be fiercely protected from compromise. The English monarchy, on the other hand, steadily lost power after signing of the Magna Carta in the 13th Century (Fumurescu 158, 160). Effective representation though Parliament led British citizens to gradually merge their competing inner and outer fora into a cohesive whole, with no fear of compromise or being compromised (273).

I would be interested to investigate Fumurescu’s claims about the French and British views of compromise. I suspect other cultures also view compromise differently. The Japanese,

56 Citing the work of 20th Century political scientist Ernest Barker, Fumurescu says that Germans also take a dim view of compromise. Barker writes, “in British politics, compromise is a virtue,” but ‘in German politics compromise is the weakness of the moral flabby [sic]” (qtd. in Fumurescu 57). Fumerescu doesn’t elaborate on the German viewpoint, focusing instead on the British and French conceptions of compromise.

57 The French Revolution, particularly the Reign of Terror, demonstrated just how fiercely the French would protect their individuality (Fumurescu 150).
for instance, have a different concept of individual autonomy than that of Westerners. In Fumurescu’s parlance, the Japanese seem to value their *forum externum*, their public identity, more than their *forum internum*, or private self. Shigekatsu Yamauchi, president of the International Communications Institute, a Japanese/English translation and education firm, observes “the English-language mindset encourages people to promote their own will… with many people holding firmly to their own principles, is not confrontation likely,” he asks (2). The Japanese, on the other hand, consider others first, wondering, “Would my action affect others? If so, how?” Yamauchi avers, “These types of questions usually come to the Japanese mind before anything else. This ‘others-first consideration’ is often so strong that many will easily abandon actions that adversely affect others” (2).

I am unclear on the best approach for such a project. Fumurescu drew his conclusions about the British and French from an extensive review of their respective historical literature. I would prefer to use different methods, but am unclear of how to proceed. In-person interviews with British and French representatives is an obvious choice, but, as this project has taught me, securing interviews is difficult. Combined with logistical and budgetary challenges, this sort of research seems beyond me. I would have to be a full-time researcher, with the support of a research team and a substantial funding source, to tackle a project of this magnitude.

Inspired by the 2013 government shutdown, and buoyed by my earlier research in personal compromise, I launched an examination of how compromise works, or doesn’t, in large groups and representative bodies. Informed by a variety of scholarly and political literature, I used a survey, personal interviews, and an analysis of the *Congressional Record* to explain why public calls for compromise were unheeded by elected officials during the 2013 shutdown. I revealed barriers to Congressional compromise, most notably, the different Discourses of the two
political parties. My research also uncovered similarities and differences in personal and public compromise. I was able to suggest more effective ways for constituents, who occupy a separate Discourse from their legislators, to communicate with and influence their elected officials. Though I encountered some challenges with my research methods, I shed new light on how compromise, that messy but essential sausage, is made.
Works Cited


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Remini, Robert V. At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise that Saved


Shankman, Kimberly C. Compromise and the Constitution: The Political Thought of


Appendix 1: Personal Interview Requests and Informed Consent Document

Requests for Personal Interviews

(† indicates that the person was interviewed for this project)

Amanda Blalock, member, Spotsylvania County School Board, Lee’s Hill district

† Philip Carter III, former U.S. Ambassador to Cote d’Ivoire

Rob Corcoran, Director, Hope in the Cities, Richmond, VA

Tom Davis, former member, U.S. House of Representatives

Kimberly Gray, member, Richmond City School Board, Richmond, VA, 2nd district

Robert Holsworth, Managing Principal, DecideSmart, Richmond, VA

Tim Kaine, Senator (D-VA), U.S. Senate

† Lawrence Kennan, head football coach, Univ. of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, TX

Sandra Lovell, Realtor, Fredericksburg, VA

Terry Oggel, professor, Virginia Commonwealth University

† Robert “Bobby” Orrock, Delegate (R), Virginia House of Delegates, 54th district

† David Sam, President, Germanna Community College, Fredericksburg, VA

Charles R. Samuels, member, Richmond, VA City Council, 2nd district

† Rev. D.J. Shelton (pseudonym), administrator of large Christian venue

Gary Skinner, member, Spotsylvania Board of Supervisors, Lee’s Hill district

Mark Warner, Senator (D-VA), U.S. Senate

James Webb, former Senator, U.S. Senate

† Robert Wittman, Congressman (R-VA), U.S. House of Representatives, 1st Cong. district
Informed Consent Document for Personal Interviews

RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM FOR PERSONAL INTERVIEW

RESEARCHER: Jim Crawford; Virginia Commonwealth University; crawfordje2@vcu.edu

TITLE: How Compromise Works in Large Groups and Representative Bodies

VCU IRB NO.: HM20001179

If any information contained in this consent form is not clear, please ask the researcher to explain any information that you do not fully understand. You may take home an unsigned copy of this consent form to think about or discuss with family or friends before making your decision.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study is part of Jim Crawford’s Master’s thesis project, which explores how compromise works in large groups and representative bodies.

You are asked to participate because the nature of your position has given you expertise in negotiating compromise among individuals, groups, and/or representative bodies.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT

If you decide to grant an interview, you will be asked to sign this consent form after you have had all your questions answered and have affirmed your understanding about how the interview will proceed.

The interview will consist of a 30 minute conversation with Mr. Crawford. He will use the questions below to guide the conversation:

1. How do you define the word "compromise"?

2. Please share a story about a time that you compromised in your personal life. What did you think about the outcome?

3. Please share a story about a time that you compromised at work. What did you think about the outcome?

4. Please share a story in which you refused to compromise. What did you think of the outcome?
5. In your story of refusing to compromise, what was at stake? What would’ve been the consequences of compromising?

6. In what areas are you most likely to compromise? Why? In what areas are you least likely to compromise? Why?

Please be aware that this is intended to be a conversation, an interaction, between you and Mr. Crawford. As with any conversation, additional questions may emerge organically as the interview proceeds.

Mr. Crawford would like to record the interview for later transcription. Please indicate your permission to record by signing in the CONSENT section below. If you do not consent to be recorded, Mr. Crawford will take notes during your conversation.

Because this is a personal interview, your name will be included in the recording and/or notes. Unless you request anonymity, Mr. Crawford may quote you directly in the final paper. Please indicate your willingness to be quoted in the CONSENT section. You may also specify the name and title you prefer for quotation.

If you wish to remain anonymous, Mr. Crawford may change your name or identify you with an impersonal description (e.g. “a union shop steward said…”) to conceal your identity. If you prefer anonymity, please specify in the CONSENT section how you want to be identified if quoted in the final paper.

Mr. Crawford may contact you with follow-up questions after the interview. You are not obligated to participate in any follow-up.

Mr. Crawford will provide a near-final copy of the paper for your review and approval by the end of September 2014. After reviewing the paper, you may request revisions to your specific quotations, or you may withdraw your interview entirely.

RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS

The final paper is a Master’s thesis. It will be published electronically and made available on-line through the Virginia Commonwealth University library. As such, your family, friends, and colleagues may read portions of your interview. Although unlikely, it is possible that you may face teasing or other adverse reactions because of the views you expressed. To guard against this, you will have an opportunity to review and comment upon a near-final version of the paper, as described above.
BENEFITS TO YOU AND OTHERS

You will not receive any direct benefits from participating in the interview. However, your contributions may help to illuminate how compromise operates in complex, real-world conflicts, where the stakes are often high.

COSTS

There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend in the interview.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Potentially identifiable information about you will consist of your name and position. Data is being collected only for the purposes of this project.

Any audio recordings will be stored as digital MP3 files. The files will be stored at Mr. Crawford’s residence, on a home computer and on a single backup hard drive. Mr. Crawford will keep the recordings until after his graduation, which is projected for December 2014.

Any notes or transcripts will be saved at Mr. Crawford’s residence. Only he will have access to the material. At no point will he share your recordings or transcripts except in the context of the final paper.

As described in RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS, the final paper will be published electronically as a Master’s thesis. This signed consent form may also be read or copied for research or legal purposes by Virginia Commonwealth University.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL

You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any time. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked. You may choose not to respond to follow-up questions. After reviewing the final paper, you may choose to withdraw your interview entirely.
QUESTIONS

If you have any questions, complaints, or concerns about your participation in this research, please contact:

    Jim Crawford  
    Virginia Commonwealth University  
    crawfordje2@vcu.edu

    Elizabeth Hodges, Thesis Adviser & Principal Investigator  
    Associate Professor of English  
    Virginia Commonwealth University  
    ehodges@vcu.edu

If you have any general questions about your rights as a participant in this or any other research, you may contact:

    Office of Research  
    Virginia Commonwealth University  
    800 East Leigh Street, Suite 3000  
    P.O. Box 980568  
    Richmond, VA 23298  
    Telephone: (804) 827-2157

Contact this number for general questions, concerns or complaints about research. You may also call this number if you cannot reach the research team or if you wish to talk with someone else. General information about participation in research studies can also be found at http://www.research.vcu.edu/irb/volunteers.htm.
CONSENT

I have been given the chance to read this consent form. I understand the information about this study. Questions that I wanted to ask about the study have been answered. My signature says that I am willing to participate in this study. I will receive a copy of the consent form once I have agreed to participate.

________________________________________________________________________

Participant name printed  Participant signature  Date

I grant permission to record my interview. ________________________________

Participant signature

I grant permission to be quoted directly in the final paper, using the name and title listed below:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Participant signature

I wish to remain anonymous if I am quoted in the final paper. Please refer to me using the pseudonym and/or description listed below:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Participant signature

Name of Person Conducting Informed Consent Discussion / Witness (Printed)

________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Person Conducting Informed Consent Discussion / Witness  Date

Principal Investigator Signature (if different from above)  Date
James E. Crawford, Jr. was born on June 23, 1968 in Bethesda, Maryland, and is an American citizen. He graduated from Potomac Senior High School, in Dumfries, Virginia, in 1986. Mr. Crawford earned his Associate’s degree in Business Administration from Germanna Community College, Fredericksburg, Virginia, in 2006. In 2008, he earned a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts for Interdisciplinary Studies from the University of Richmond (Virginia). At the University of Richmond, Mr. Crawford was awarded the Investment Consultants and Management Company Book Award, in recognition of excellence in the liberal arts, as well as the Elizabeth Spindler Scott Book Collection Award, which encourages promising undergraduate students to develop a personal library.