Art, Education, Work, and Leisure: Tangles in the Lifelong Learning Network

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Abstract

Although the field of art education has, in recent years, acknowledged the prevalence of non-formal educational sites, our literature is divided on whether this trend poses an opportunity for cooperation and strength or a threat to the status of art as a school subject. This paper consults the literature of critical theory within the domains of art, education, and leisure studies in order to examine the relationship between formal and non-formal art education. First, it considers ways in which traditional conceptualizations of art, education, leisure, and work foster an acceptance of art as experience and knowledge to be gained outside of school. Second, it explores the notions of lifelong learning and education, which are frequently offered as umbrellas under which school and community-based art education can peacefully co-exist. The paper suggests that neither an uncritical call for cooperation nor a more entrenched territoriality between formal and non-formal institutions is likely to serve the future interests of art education. Rather, a complex problem is revealed which requires a reconceptualization of education, a consideration of values surrounding democratic access to knowledge, and a challenge to work toward more egalitarian institutional and social structures.

Introduction

Until recently, the literature of our field has focused on art education within the formal institutions of schooling. Art is distinguished from most other school subjects, however, by its prevalent availability in non-formal settings, and by its social construction as a form of leisure. In light of an increasing tendency by non-school agencies to view art education within their mandates (Soren, 1993; Barret, 1993), and a growing interest in adult learning in visual art, our field is slowly expanding to include practice which takes place within a diverse set of school and non-school contexts.

For some, this shift is a refreshing acknowledgement of forms of art programming that should have “counted” as art education all along. Often under the banner of lifelong learning, this change in parameters may be viewed as an opportunity to form new alliances, fill in missing components, and augment existing programs, eventually strengthening the field as a whole.

The fact that many social agencies—those geared to education, high art, leisure, and training for the labour market—include art education within their missions, however, reflects the complex ways in which art has been conceptualized, and the social, political, and economic influences which have shaped the institutionalization of art education in Western society (Efland, 1990; Freedman, 1987). If viewed from this perspective, an increase in non-school art education may seem to exacerbate a sense of institutional territoriality by threatening the already marginal position of art as a school subject, and stoking fears that art education will ultimately be de-schooled.

I can position myself in my writing by stating that much of my own practical experience has been community-based. Because I considered the work I was doing to warrant the label “art education”, I was often frustrated by the fact that the literature of our field seemed to focus almost exclusively on that which occurred in school. As a result, I welcome the increased representation of non-formal art programming in our field. Nevertheless, I argue that all members of the art education
community need to take responsibility for examining the issues raised here.

Posing non-school art education practice as either a simple opportunity for cooperation or as a threat to school-based art education, for example, provides little useful guidance as to how or whether formal and non-formal realms should interact. Instead, I suggest that we need to acknowledge certain frictions among the institutions offering education in art, and to think critically about what may underlie them, before any new associations or policies are defined. Similarly, we need to examine the tenets of lifelong learning/education before we embrace them as frameworks.

This paper contributes to an understanding of relationships between formal and non-formal art education practice by, first, considering how notions of art, education, work, and leisure have been conceptualized in ways that perpetuate both the low status of art in school and its welcome acceptance in the domain of leisure. Second, it explores lifelong learning and lifelong education in terms of the framework and values they imply. These discussions converge to suggest that neither an uncritical call for cooperation nor a territorial stance is likely to serve the best interests of art education in the future. Nor is the status of art in our society likely to improve through a renewed program of advocacy alone. Instead, democracy in education and in the social structure emerge as key issues which frame the problem.

Before proceeding it may be useful to clarify certain terms that I employ here. I use Jarvis' (1987) definitions of "formal", "in-formal" and "non-formal" education. He uses "formal" education to refer to officially sanctioned schooling; "informal" education to refer to that which occurs spontaneously or incidentally, as through ordinary social interaction or the media; and "non-formal" education to mean organized, non-credit courses for adults or children. It is "non-formal" education that is my primary concern here.

I deliberately use "non-formal education" even when referring to organized programs that may be labelled as "leisure" or "recreation" although some may contest this use. I argue that while education may not be the single goal of such programs, it is always at least a partial goal. Further, while such programs may be differently structured than school programs, they are rarely unorganized or haphazard in nature.

I also use "non-formal" in order to draw attention to the fact that what we count as formal education and what we categorize as leisure are often the result of relatively arbitrary distinctions. The two may in fact be essentially very similar. Media such as television, for instance, is pervasively and deliberately influential and stimulates a great deal of learning, while usually claiming not to be doing "education." Because it does not claim to be educating, it has not needed to endure the same kind of scrutiny, nor is it held accountable or responsible, in the same ways that the formal school system is. Alternatively, the formal school system, because it does claim to be conducting education, is often "blamed" for outcomes that are quite beyond its control. The point is that learning and education occur in many contexts; while some forms are officially sanctioned and others are not, we cannot equate sanctioning with influence or value.

In art, non-formal education may be provided by such disparate sponsors as art galleries, museums, senior citizen centres, hospitals, recreation centres, community art centres, continuing education programs, children's clubs, preschools, artist's organizations, arts councils, and art colleges, to provide a partial list. When I use the term non-formal education, I also mean it to encompass programming developed for both children and for adults.

Mapping Tensions in the Literature

Within art education literature, those interested in adult learners have been particularly instrumental in initiating dialogue about non-formal education and lifelong learning. This work has provoked a re-examination of what constitutes art
education, raising questions about who it might be for and where it can take place, as well as challenging assumptions about artistic growth, learner's needs and characteristics, and good teaching practice. (See, for example, Barret, 1993; Blandy, 1993; Jones, 1993; Kauppinen, 1990; Kauppinen & McKee, 1988; & Sidelnick, 1993). Barret's (1993) review of earlier publications in this field cited work that urged art educators to think beyond a K—12 approach, and to become both more aware of and involved with non-formal art education practice.

Although this literature has been predominantly supportive of the need to attend to non-formal art education, it has nevertheless hinted at tensions between educators and community facilitators. Some art educators have charged that programs have often been taught by leisure specialists or care givers who were not trained in the arts, and that content was frequently of a "craft-kit" calibre, which the authors charged was intellectually and creatively undemanding. These critics have proffered the need for specialized training and perhaps certification for non-formal practitioners as a means of assuring an upgraded quality of instruction. Without disputing the circumstances which inspired these recommendations, it should be noted that such statements do stimulate questions about who should have authority over non-formal art education, and who is the "expert" in this arena. At the same time they skirt problems of differences in artistic and educational values that occur when moving into varied instructional settings. An inclination to equate lifelong learning with adult education may have the added effect of masking conflicts which can arise when non-formal practitioners direct their programming to school-aged children. It may further imply that notions such as lifelong learning offer simply an untroublesome extension of—an adding on to—educational systems already in place. As I will discuss later, this is not the case.

A transition in literature dealing with non-formal art education practice is offered by studies directed at factors which sometimes divide members of the broader art education network. Mullen (1989) interviewed "housewives" who were art hobbyists and identified differences in artistic values between these women and their fine art-educated instructors. Degge (1987) conducted a survey of community-based artist/teachers in order to learn more about their backgrounds and teaching philosophies, and was surprised to learn that, contrary to what she expected, most of these community instructors were highly educated in the arts. Day's (1986) study suggested that "non-conformity", a value embraced by artist's communities and evident in university fine art departments, has sometimes made non-art majors taking these art courses feel alien or excluded. He argued that this creates a contradiction for the artist/teacher as a model for art education. And Eisner and Dobbs (1986) noted that educators working in art museums perceived themselves and were perceived by museum directors to have low status within the museum hierarchy, with the curator often seen as the "real" educator whose ideas were simply implemented by the education coordinator. These studies indicate the tensions between the worlds of popular/amateur art and fine art, and between fine art and education. They also provide clues as to why a simple call for cooperation among art education institutions may be a simplistic recommendation.

Among those researchers who have directly considered organizational relationships in our field, a number have questioned outright the motives of non-formal art education agencies. Smith (1980) claimed that a combination of philanthropic and government cultural agencies in the U.S. more interested in grant money than pedagogy, were succeeding in deschooling art education. He argued that talk of collaboration and partnership between schools and non-schools simply obscured the fact that such an approach would ultimately fragment funding and weaken art education as a whole. Chapman (1982) concurred that these groups would have the effect of draining art out of the schools. Chapman went on to chastise elite, wealthy groups for supporting non-school programs rather than school-based art education efforts. Kimpton (1984) worried that the perception of art as a frill could result in the take-over of art education by a cottage industry lying in wait. He argued that such a development would interfere with sequential learning and the integration of art with other school subjects. But perhaps the paramount concern of those who have argued against the increase of non-school involvement in art education has been that democratic access to art knowledge would be obstructed,
restricting opportunities to become literate and critically aware about the arts to those with the will and financial means to take part. This would be an art education caught up with the whims of a free market and the interests of dominant social groups.

On the side defending non-formal practice, Fowler (1984) berated Chapman for taking a territorial stance and denied that non-school agencies have any intention or desire of taking over the formal art education curriculum. He assured all those concerned that they want only to enhance, enrich, and broaden the formal art education curriculum. He assured non-school agencies have any intention or desire of taking over.

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Numerous assumptions within all of these arguments, however—schools as unequivocally the best sites for democratic access to art knowledge, and non-school art institutions as either threatening or benign—need to be more closely examined. As noted in the introduction, I have chosen two arenas to explore in sorting out these seemingly contradictory stances. The first of these concerns the conceptual links of artistic practice to notions of leisure, and how that affects the institutional positioning of art education. The second is the idea of lifelong learning and the radical departure from current systems of formal schooling that it may imply. I turn now to the former question of art as leisure.

Art, Education, Work, and Leisure: Apparent Dichotomies

Of all the topics addressed in art education literature, explanation for the marginal position of art in school and argument against this state of affairs is among the most prevalent. The familiar complaint that art is perceived as a “frill” is supported by identification of beliefs, for example, that artistic growth does not require instruction (Chapman, 1982) and the perception that artistic processes are non-cognitive (Hamblen, 1983). These ideas are linked to assumptions that artistic abilities spring from innate talent, as well as the Western tendency to separate notions of mind and body, thought and feeling, and to categorize artistic practice as involving physical and emotional rather than mental processes (Dissanayake, 1993). What emerges is that the positioning of art as a school subject is a problem for the sociology of knowledge, resulting from rather confused, often unfounded assumptions and the relatively arbitrary selection of content domains in school.

In terms of examining the relationships between education, art, and leisure, however, the most interesting charge that has been used to de-value art education is that it is considered “play” and “not work”. Efland (1976) referred to the use of school art as play when he suggested that art is used as a respite from the “real” work of schooling; and Feldman’s (1982) well-known essay dealing with work, language, and values struggled to reverse this pervasive claim by arguing that art must be considered a valuable school subject precisely because it is work of a very special kind. Constructing the problem as one of communication, Feldman scolded art educators for not providing the larger education community with a strong enough argument about the value of art in the curriculum. He claimed that art involves physical, emotional, and intellectual effort, is “personally satisfying and socially important” (p.7), and that the value of such work needs to be instilled in every child as part of the general purpose of education.

The assumption that underlies Feldman’s argument, of course, is that art must be considered work in order to gain
respect in school, and in fact, few art educators would disagree that meaningful artistic engagement does involve effort and work. The sociological literatures of art, education, and leisure, however, have suggested that it is the construction of art as personally satisfying work, and work that reflects “free choice” that is at the crux of the problem of the status of art in school.

The set of assumptions that need to be considered in relation to this discussion interweave as follows:

1) Education and schooling are directly linked to work and particularly to the needs of business and industry.

2) Work is that which we are obligated to do, and is an activity over which someone else has control.

3) Leisure is the opposite of work, posed as occurring during free time and the result of free choice.

4) Art is conceived as non-work, and idealized as a uniquely free and spontaneous process.

5) As art is non-work, it is also non-education, and is therefore more suited to leisure than to school activity.

The next sections briefly expand on and examine these ideas.

**Education and Work**

One dominant assumption about the role of mandatory public education in Western society is that schooling “elevens the playing field” by providing equal education and opportunity for all to succeed. Further, we have tended to assume that high achievement in school corresponds to exceptional ability and that social rewards gained through school achievement are therefore justified. Numerous theorists and researchers in the sociology of education, however, have questioned these assertions, arguing instead that achievement in school is linked to social position and influenced by factors such as ethnicity, class, and gender; rather than measuring actual ability, it is argued, schooling instead serves to stratify students in the service of economic and political ends.

Writers in critical theory have suggested, for example, that schooling accommodates the needs of business and industry through a hidden agenda which replicates workplace hierarchical relationships; that schooling discourages the questioning of authority or the critical analysis of the stratification of school knowledge, including the privileging of technological forms of knowledge; and that schooling fosters an acceptance of a consumer society (Illich, 1971; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Bourdieu, 1990; Apple, 1990). Bourdieu, of course, argued that art is not taught in school because it is not perceived as directly useful to the industrialized workplace, and in order to maintain it as rare and mystified knowledge so that it can be used as cultural capital by a privileged class. (Apple (1993) qualifies these points of criticism somewhat, however, suggesting that this process does allow room for agency and resistance by members of non-dominant groups.)

**Work and Leisure**

The above assertions in a sense agree with Feldman that in order for school content to be construed as valuable, it must in some form correspond to notions of work. But the kind of work they say is valued by industry and business is not Feldman’s “personally satisfying and socially important” artistic type. Rather, Wolff (1981) suggested that work has been traditionally understood in the context of industrialized labour, as alienating, non-creative, and involving a division of tasks as opposed to offering the possibility of overseeing or engagement in an entire process. In addition, work has been viewed as that which one is obligated to do for someone else, and not for personal satisfaction.

Alternatively, notions of leisure have been commonly posed as the opposite of work, as self-directed and characterized by
free choice and a lack of obligation. From the perspective of leisure studies, Rojek (1985) wrote:

"Work is experienced as a burden or a drag on the self rather than as a means of personal creative development. This gives leisure an extraordinary significance in popular Western culture. For it is in leisure rather than work that individuals see themselves as free to act and develop as they please." (p.109)

But Rojek also pointed out that these conceptualizations of work as drudgery and leisure as freedom are both misleading. He noted, for example, that the Latin word for "leisure" actually implies something which is "allowed" and is therefore subject to constraint. Feminists have made this point repeatedly, arguing that women's experiences of leisure have historically been different from men's, and clearly occur within the constraints of social obligations and expectations. Women's time away from paid labour, for example, has traditionally been filled with domestic labour or in the service of other people's leisure. Women who do not earn pay outside the home, or who receive less remuneration for their work, may not be perceived as "earning" leisure time in the same way as men. As well, women's "free time" may be experienced as subject to interruption, or as having a sense of being "on-call". Also, of course, constraints on women's freedom of movement and use of public leisure spaces have been well documented. (see also Green et al., 1990).

In addition, leisure as "freedom" or as self-directed activity can best be understood in terms of the constraints of socioeconomic class and cultural convention. We are free to do as we wish only to the extent that we perceive actions to be possible, socially appropriate, and have the resources to carry out our goals. We can see further flaws in dualistic notions of work and leisure when we consider that much leisure involves arduous labour as in, for example, mountain climbing, and that work often involves at least moments of leisure. (While dichotomous ideas of work and leisure are changing as contemporary workplaces evolve, they nevertheless illuminate this discussion.)

Wolff (1981) argued, however, that because work and leisure have been defined in these confused ways, artistic work has been construed as non-work. She posed that, due to the fact that artists have in general been marginalized in contemporary society by a lack of patronage, and because artist's work has not been organized by industrial systems (nor viewed as "industry"), artistic production has been romanticized and mystified as a unique process—"representative of non-forced labour and truly expressive activity" (p.18), separate from social life, and self-controlled by a single artist, considered to be endowed with unusual gifts. Wolff reminds us that it is the conceptualization of work here that is troublesome, as many forms of work other than artistic production are also potentially "creative" and fulfilling.

Becker (1982) concurred that artistic work is in many respects not very different from other forms of work, and painstakingly showed how art production is thoroughly connected to community life and to our social worlds, through the availability and production of tools and materials, through the many individuals who complete tasks which support artistic production, and through the conventions within which a piece is produced and later judged. The need for such careful analysis highlights how deeply entrenched this misconception of artistic work has been.

When we look at these arguments, it is easy to see the link between the depiction of leisure as freedom from obligation and art as free expression, as well as the connections between traditional notions of work and education. This seems to be the source of a natural dualism, positing art and leisure on one side and work and education on the other. When coupled with an emphasis on leisure as the key site of personal and creative development, the assumption that artistic work and art education fall outside the domains of work and school seems plausible.
Art educators recognize these common notions of art, work, and leisure as confused. Few would deny that work and artistic production can be simultaneously fulfilling and challenging. And yet the position of art in Western society continues to be tenuous as long as it is affected by such dichotomous understandings. In this vein both school and non-school organizations battle the conceptualizations of art as leisure and non-work, and neither can afford to conceive of their programs in terms of traditional notions of leisure time—i.e., neither freedom from constraints or obligations, nor as solely self-directed experience. This is a particular problem for non-formal practice, where programs are frequently viewed as opportunities which can be freely chosen rather than as accessible only to those who have the resources to participate, or where assumptions that adult learners are self-directed may actually assume a position of privilege.

What should also be clear, however, is that the tactic of providing an ever more convincing argument about the value of art in education and schooling has by itself been ineffective. The implication seems to be that the status of art as a school subject, or in our society generally, will not change no matter how rational our explanations, until our conceptualizations of work and leisure change. Arguably, a narrow notion of work is the antithesis of Feldman's personally and socially fulfilling art work. And if we recognize, as illustrated here, the dynamic relationship between our conceptualizations and our social and institutional structures, then changing our conceptions depends on changing our social worlds. In other words, rather than simply arguing that we should think of art as a form of productive work, we need to take action such that work becomes more like art, both personally and socially satisfying. We must fuse our conceptualizations of work and leisure in order to fuse conceptualizations of art and education.

Keeping in mind the conceptual and structural interconnections between art, work, education, and leisure, I will now turn to a discussion of lifelong learning. As it turns out, lifelong learning requires a fundamental reconceptualization of these very notions and relationships. My focus is again on tensions and contradictions in interpreting this educational framework, and on the differing political and economic agendas that each reading may imply.

**Lifelong Learning—Lifelong Education: Whose Interpretations, Whose Interests?**

Even those who have submerged themselves in discussions of lifelong learning and lifelong education still struggle over key definitions. Apps (1985) notes that misconceptions result from the tendency to use these terms interchangeably, and to equate them with adult education. The notion of lifelong learning, of course, may be more properly viewed as an internal process, and even a basic (personal) human need (Long, 1985), namely the recognition of the potential to continue to learn throughout one's life. Apps points out, however, that lifelong learning as a "need" can also stem from the perception that adults may become "obsolete" in terms of their knowledge; thus the "need" may be construed as a requirement for occupational and economic survival. Lifelong learning may also be used to make the distinction between learning—which can occur in virtually all life contexts—and schooling. Alternatively, lifelong education refers more to a planned effort to encourage learning, and may therefore be thought of as an educational framework or policy. Although the terms are distinct they are also, of course, deeply interconnected; if we assume that we have the ability or need for lifelong learning—for personal or economic reasons—then lifelong education seems necessary.

There is, however, a substantial level of consensus about what a lifelong educational framework would entail. Lifelong education is a system which encompasses all stages of life from birth to death as well as all subject matters, in a sense "expanding" the conceptualization of education to embrace all forms of facilitated learning. It proffers the need for cohesion among formal systems of education as well as recognition of and interrelationships with non-formal systems, blurring or even erasing the lines between formal and non-formal institutions. It emphasizes greater availability to students through provision of many entry points, sites, and systems of delivery, and may de-emphasize certification of teachers and credentialing roles of
schools, calling for greater use of volunteers and non-credentialed instructors. Pursuing a goal of self-directed and independent learning, it tends to place greater responsibility on the individual to control her or his own learning processes, and to “learn how to learn.” It may call for greater student and public roles in educational decision-making; increased cooperation between schools, business, industry, and government with respect to technical training and educational content; a re-allocation of funding for out-of-school educational opportunities; and greater emphasis placed on the need for young people to be flexible in adapting to a range of occupations throughout life—among other ideas (Apps, 1985; Unesco, 1973).

The framework within which lifelong learning and education are situated is obviously not restricted to adult education, nor would it be likely to co-exist peacefully with present formal systems. Rather, this is an orientation which profoundly challenges current conceptualizations and systems of education. In addition, its emphasis on weakening the credentialing authority of schools clearly raises the issue of de-schooling, to be taken up next.

**Lifelong Learning and De-schooling**

What is interesting about the notions of lifelong learning, lifelong education, and de-schooling is that they can be viewed as growing from either progressive or conservative agendas. On one hand, they can be read as signs of a general disenchantment with rigid and undemocratic practices which, through the respective privileging and exclusion of dominant and non-dominant groups, reproduce the social status quo. Apps reminds us of the influences in this paradigm of notions of emancipatory learning and social action, and argues that the age of technology must be more about searching for meaning than the accumulation of information. Alternatively lifelong education, and the pressure to assume the need for it, can be interpreted as driven by conservative economic forces bent on shifting control of education away from systems of schooling and into the hands of business and industry, perhaps in response to incessantly changing technology, global competition, and the need for a perpetually flexible and unstable worker.

The “threat” of de-schooling which tenets of lifelong learning pose can also be read as revealing progressive or conservative values. Wexler et. al (1981) explain this puzzle by suggesting that although support for de-schooling initially grew out of charges that schooling served the interests of a free market economy—as in Illich’s (1977) radical critique of schooling—the kinds of skills that are now required by the North American workplace are changing. Now the requirement is for a worker who is not only technically skilled, but flexible and knowledgeable about the full process of industrial production. The authors argue that at this level of critical awareness and analytic skill there can be no guarantee that workers will also be docile, and may even seek increased control over the production process. In this scenario, business and industry may argue for de-schooling so that greater control over the training process and the worker can be achieved. In addition, the authors suggest that, in times of economic restraint, the society in general—including schools and teachers—bears more critical, and ideological assumptions begin to break down. If schools become sites of greater critical awareness, they also represent a risk for industry and may not serve as efficiently in accommodating the needs of the workplace and of the economy for amenable workers and consumers.

All of this means only that the education agenda will continue to be, as it always has been, a focus for struggle and negotiation. In this sense we are naive if we assume that moving into lifelong learning modes can be done neutrally. It is perhaps more useful, however, to think of education not as a pawn caught between dualistic interests, but as an active player on a field of shifting ground. Further, as education changes and evolves, so do the arenas surrounding it. Apps (1985) cites Ireland (1978) on this issue, arguing that lifelong learning is about taking on
a new approach to a whole concept of education [and to consider] the relationship between education and work, education and leisure, and that between the individual and the collective needs of man [sic]. (Apps, p.7)

Art Education and Lifelong Learning: A Summary

If we think of the lifelong learning framework as implying a reconceptualization and shifting of relationships between education, work, and leisure, then finding how art education fits into the scheme means considering its link to each of these realms. What emerges from this discussion is not the need simply to convince others that art is "work," but to consider what kind of work we want art to be. In addition, I have suggested that if we want to promote a conceptualization of art in Feldman's sense of personally and socially satisfying work, a conceptualization which would reposition art as valued knowledge, then we need to change the nature and structure of work in our society. (The discussion concerning dichotomous notions of art/leisure and education/work also implies a danger in blindly embracing technological forms of art education because they are more readily perceived as traditional forms of "work," as well as the danger in the emphasis our literature places on art as a special kind of "play," because of the misconceptions it tends to perpetuate.)

My understanding of working realms that approach art work—in the sense that they merge conceptions of work and leisure, personal satisfaction and social obligation is one in which workplaces offer increased voice, empowerment, and cooperation and less obedience to hierarchy. The use of knowledge—in this case art knowledge—as power, and a more equitable distribution of power—are interconnected. May (1994) argues eloquently that we can begin by examining our own working worlds, the worlds of schooling and education. And I will extend her challenge to those who work outside of schools, conducting art education in recreation centres and art institutions. Do we have the courage to make all our working worlds personally and socially satisfying by empowering our students and communities, creating more equitable access and cooperative structures, and breaking down hierarchical relationships in our organizations and our society?

Because this, in the most positive and progressive sense, is also what a call to embrace lifelong learning can mean. It means breaking down structures that have disempowered—in both work and education—and creating new structures which are more egalitarian and which provide opportunities for a balance of personal satisfaction and community commitment.

In this view, neither a territorial stance nor a simple call for cooperation between art education agencies is very useful in considering issues of non-formal art education. A call for cooperation among existing agencies ignores the troublesome conceptualizations and competitive strands out of which different institutions grew in the first place. It may further naively encourage non-formal agencies to solidify and perpetuate commonsense notions of art as non-work and non-school, and to become complicit within a traditional conservative economic agenda. Especially where an increase in non-formal art programming takes place simultaneously with a decrease in art within school curricula, such programming clearly threatens the fundamental value of democratic access to knowledge. If non-formal art institutions do choose to take on more art education, they cannot ethically abdicate the responsibility that goes with it, to provide truly equal access to all. This is a huge challenge, for the market-driven programming of most non-formal agencies is dependent on patrons that are able to pay. Further, these organizations must be prepared to endure the kind of scrutiny and evaluation that claims to doing "education" justify. (Trend [1992] and Giroux [199]) offer some assistance in suggesting that those doing social and educational work in all realms think of themselves as "cultural workers" working toward a more equitable society through critical pedagogy.)

Alternatively, an argument that art education should move entirely under the wing of formal education, as in the call for certification of non-formal practitioners, may miss valuable
critiques of schooling by writers on lifelong education. A call for certification of non-school teachers, for example, may be seen as a contradiction of certain understandings of lifelong learning goals, which emphasize the non-credentialled resources of the community and shifting roles of learners and teachers through recognizing the expertise of learners and the capacity of teachers as learners. This implies a recognition of amateur knowledge and an empathy with non-expert values which art educators need to consider in moving into varied art and education contexts.

In terms of considering a future agenda for education and art education, it may be simplistic to say that the notion of lifelong learning is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. It is a concept which must be infused with social and educational values by the people who embrace it, and it is these values that must be agreed upon if formal and non-formal organizations are to form a collective net for art education. In light of this discussion, those values must centre around a concern for democratic access to education. The only certainty is that both school and non-school organizations will become targets of change as conceptualizations and institutions in our postmodern world shift. Art educators need to be reflective, however, about forces which may underlie our choices and be careful not to pursue many of the commonsense understandings of art, work, education, and leisure in building new relationships in the art education network.

REFERENCES


