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Edited by Cathy A. Brooks

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BULLETIN NUMBER 3 continues the lively exchange of ideas, information, and views about the relationship among art, social and cultural values, and education. The assembled authors provide us with thought-provoking articles on modern art, educational ideology, and curriculum; with vigorous arguments from differing sides of the "elitism versus populism" debate; with socially-oriented reviews of major art education texts; and with an annotated bibliography of relevant study resources.

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If there were no budget constraints, art education would be nice. Most people agree it's fun to do, and students do enjoy it. But most people also think it's a frill and unnecessary.

As thinking art educators, we must address these issues and the concerns of our policy makers. We must definitively respond to the questions of why we spend all that time, effort, and money teaching art.

**Historical Overview**

John Adams said,

I must study politics and war so that my sons have liberty—liberty to study mathematics and philosophy, geography, natural history, naval architecture, navigation, commerce and agriculture; in order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture...

(1841, p. 68)

In the late nineteenth century, the need for skilled draftsmen and designers prompted a group of industrialists to pressure the Massachusetts state legislature to make drawing a required subject in the schools. They brought Walter Smith to this country to teach and to create a series of drawing books which were based upon stereotypical images.

Around the turn of the century, the virtues of hard work, piety, and loyalty were introduced into the schools through art appreciation of "famous" paintings depicting those themes. It was a form of culture and effort to properly refine the socially elite.

In the 1920's, John Dewey's philosophy of learning through experience gave birth to the concept of creative self-expression. This concept was strongly emphasized by Viktor Lowenfeld in his landmark text, Creative and Mental Growth, first published in 1947. For the past 35 years, this philosophy based on the "new" field of psychology has pervaded the art education field.

Art education is really made up of three distinct but often confused categories: self-expression, observation, and appreciation. (Read, p. 208)
The art education field has been heavily influenced by the concepts of Arthur W. Dow, whose book Composition (1899) placed great emphasis on observation of visual phenomena and the application of this observation to the construction of a design. Although design constructs have played an important role in the final product of art education, the primary thrust has been on the making aspect or process of art.

It is now time to reevaluate that basic question, Why are we teaching art? Is it for skill development, cultural elitism, creative self-expression, developmental growth, or communication and understanding?

Contemporary Issues

Chapman, Feldman, Grigsby, Lanier, and McFee agree that we tend to look upon the arts with the eye of an elitist group. Neither the History of Art (1962) by H. W. Janson nor Educating Artistic Vision (1972) by Elliot Eisner refer to a female artist, although art is still somehow considered a "feminine" thing to do. Nor does Eisner include a single work by a folk or craft artist, filmmaker, graphic or industrial designer.

Engel (1981) state that art is considered "Something Special" and therefore not for everyone. He does not suggest that the schools should create artists, for that is an impossibility and ridiculous, but that the schools should be charged to create competent visual perceivers. These visual perceivers should be able to respond to our total visual environment: the traditional "fine arts", the creations of mass media, and the utilization of urban spaces. Only then will we be confident that we will view art as necessary for communication both within and between groups. Only then will we create a future of choice, not chance.

The problem has many challenges. We must reach a larger portion of the school population while simultaneously convincing the policy maker of the value of understanding multicultural, visual forms. These forms are not only the means to establishing individual identity, but also the way in which we understand much of what we know about our own culture and others'. America is not a melting pot, but a tossed salad with a variety of cultures existing side by side. The political ramifications are powerful.

In his article "New Directions for Urban Research," Anthony Downs (1976) identifies education and aesthetics in the top ten priorities for social research. His ideas act as a bridge between those concerned with urban problems and those concerned with multicultural art curriculum development. Downs identifies education and aesthetics especially in terms of the effect that mass media has on social change. He recommends policy-oriented, multidisciplinary research with large scale data collection and analysis to illuminate this interaction.

Also concerned with the impact of mass media, Sherman (1980) observes that a reassessment of our conceptualization of art and emotions is essential. The pervasive influence of images from the mass media
demands a thorough analysis.

Hans Gifforn questions the criteria upon which the revision of curriculum ought to be based. He notes that, "we must not forget that school instruction has also been influenced by social groups primarily interested in increasing their personal power or economic advantage." (1978, p. 51) Gifforn concludes that art education is political education as well, strengthening or weakening an individual's inclination and ability to control or change social structures.

The most popular approach to inquiry in art education is through the theoretical framework of psychology. As Johnson notes (1980), this approach does not consider the social context. According to her, what is significant is how people describe life in the world. She recommends three alternative approaches:

1. Symbolic interactionism--the "self" changes through life based on social interactions.

2. Phenomenological Sociology--an inquiry into the life of consciousness to illuminate the things that are taken for granted. This approach depends upon the context of lived experience.

3. Ethnomethodology (also called "Garfinkeling" for its author)--focuses on the methods by which people accomplish the affairs of everyday life based on practical reasoning in life situations.

Johnson states that any of the above approaches are more appropriate than the traditional psychological framework.

Compounding the complexity of inquiry are the concerns of Chalmers (1981), who states that visual symbols express and convey ideas, emotions, qualities and feelings, but that members of different cultures do not react in the same way to the same stimuli. He states that all art should be considered as cultural artifact, related to the social order in a causal-functional manner.

In his book, Ways of Seeing, Berger states that "seeing comes before words." It is seeing which establishes our place in the world, although we explain our world with words. The relationship has not been settled, but clearly the social context impinges on our way of seeing.

Members of preindustrial cultures appreciate art because of their direct and regular participation. Many of the important day-to-day things these people do are not only functionally useful, but also useful aesthetically. Their conception of value is different from ours.

Perhaps there is much that we can learn from this attitude. If, in fact, a culture is determined by its values, beliefs and attitudes, then every culture must surely benefit from an understanding and an
appreciation of every other culture. McFee (1978) asks some very serious questions about our current values. Is it not time for Americans to begin to benefit from the richness of diversity within our country? Have we nearly lost the specificity of culture by stratifying our society along economic lines? Or has this divisionism brought about new "cultures" based on personal life experiences? Only exploration, research, time and an openness to new experience will lead the way to a society of meaningfulness and fulfillment for each of its citizens.

The challenge then must be to create an art education curriculum which is personally rewarding, relevant to experience, and sound intellectually. In our culture, the dominant features of which are the quest for wealth and upward social mobility, there have been precious few opportunities to express constructively how life feels, what life's special meanings are, and why life is different for me than for you. We need an art education curriculum that will help children to understand art in varied life styles, and thus to wisely shape their own.

According to Chapman (1978), a child's attitudes are well developed by early adolescence and, therefore, each of these purposes must be met in a substantial way during the elementary and junior high school years. We must recognize that our environment is created by human effort. Toward that end, we must emphasize how all of us are in some respects like every other person, like some other people, and like no other person. We must attend to those dimensions of our selfhood that can be shared with others, in order to understand our own uniqueness. We must recognize that the art which we create is influenced by cultural/social forces, and that our perception and response to visual forms is influenced by our cultural values.

In Values Clarification (Simon, et al., 1972), the authors explain their title as a process for selecting the best and rejecting the worst elements contained in various value systems. These choices come about through peer pressure, submission to authority, and propaganda that we encounter through traditional learning approaches, such as moralizing, modelling, or "laissez-faire". The authors identify this sequence of categories in the clarification process:

1. Prizing and cherishing
2. Affirming
3. Choosing from alternatives
4. Choosing in view of consequences
5. Choosing freely
6. Acting
7. Acting with a pattern, consistent and repetitious

They acknowledge an indirect indebtedness to Dewey's philosophy, affirming the substance and richness of his ideas.

Perhaps we should acknowledge that values clarification is a way to identify cultural differences and to assist us in determining what we truly value aesthetically and artistically in our multicultural society.
The Need for Alternative Approaches

A story is told about Picasso and a conversation he had with a German visitor to his studio. The visitor rhetorically—or perhaps aggressively—asked, "You are the painter who made the picture, Guernica?" Picasso responded, "No! It was you who created it!" This story reminds us of the connections between the individual and society, artistic act and cultural impetus, experience and symbolic transformation. (Kaufman, 1966, p. 51)

In "Why Art Education Lacks Social Relevance: A Contextual Analysis," Bersson (1981) observes that democracy represents the desired goal. "In its declared tolerance of and respect for cultural differences, in its promise of equality of opportunity and popular governance 'of, by and for (all) the people,' the principles of democracy stand as the essential potential force for the democratization of society and culture." (p. 6)

We must begin at home with the programming in our local schools. The visual arts are not a separate entity from other art forms and must, therefore, become interdisciplinary. We must address the issue of teacher resources and staff development, particularly in the study of cultures and subcultures previously ignored in the teacher's professional preparation.

We must build upon some of the efforts of particular school systems and specific individuals. The Richmond, Virginia school system has a Teacher Resource Center (Arts Library) especially equipped with motivational materials for black students. The art supervisor there has a personal slide collection of works by Afro-American artists which he uses for staff development. (Note 1) The chairman of the Art Department at Norfolk State University has noted the need to generate a list of black artists in the community who would come to the schools to demonstrate. (Note 2)

Hobbs (1981) stated that university art departments seem to be remiss regarding art and social concerns in their professional teacher preparation programs. They have placed little emphasis on the responding process, emphasizing self-expression through studio production. Clearly, teacher preparation programs are a pertinent concern in a holistic approach to multicultural art education.

Learning from some existing programs which are socially responsive is a direction worth pursuing. One such program is RITA, Reading Instruction Through Art, an innovative curriculum for improving visual perception skills. This Title III, ESEA program in New York City has reported remarkable gains in basic skills competencies, particularly in the areas of human communication, reading, writing, and speaking. A second program worth pursuing, and perhaps incorporating into the school curriculum, began in California in 1967. It has involved young people in urban mural design that reflects their cultural background. It has grown nationally, and is a powerful force in community arts programming and volunteer commitment. Another exemplary program is the Urban Arts Project in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It brings students to a place where they can work
directly with artists from many disciplines.

There is no one curriculum which could possibly meet all multicultural concerns. Socially relevant objectives are so wide-ranging, and an expanded definition of art so diverse, it would be simplistic to presume that one curriculum could possibly be a panacea. However, in the American tradition of being challenged to remedy an undesirable situation, I present the following curriculum outline, with the goal of increasing the social relevance of art instruction:

I. Objectives of Multicultural Art Education
   1. To understand the visual symbols which maintain the concepts of reality for different cultures.
   2. To understand the organization and roles of a given society through its visual forms.
   3. To understand how visual forms contribute to our current values, especially through the mass media.
   4. To create visual communication forms which respect cultural differences.
   5. To increase the aesthetic knowledge of the arts audience of the future.

II. Procedure to Implement Multicultural Art Education Objectives
   1. Combine art, music, theatre, and dance into an Arts Department for mutual cooperation and benefit.
   2. Develop programs to utilize community resources, both individuals and arts organizations.
   3. Provide opportunities for students and adults to interact in the arts, inside as well as outside the schools.
   4. Require arts education for all students throughout their years of schooling, as basic to understanding effective communication in our multicultural society.
   5. Develop curricula which will meet the intellectual and technical demands of each discipline. In the visual arts, we should give equal emphasis to observation, production, and response.

Conclusion

When we consider what is really basic in a society, we must pause and reflect upon the ancient peoples who drew on their walls in the caves of Altamira and Lascaux. What were they telling us of the world in which they lived? What were they telling one another?
John Ruskin said that we learn of a society through three sources: the Book of their Words, the Book of their Deeds, and the Book of their Art. Though one does not exist without the other, the Book of their Art is the most reliable. (Janson, p. 2)

How and what do we want our descendants to know of our society?

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MODERN FINE ART:
A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING WESTERN MODERNITY

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While art curricula are not without reference to twentieth century
fine art, the social significance of modern fine art has been a neg­
lected area of study. The purpose of this paper is to survey and
review the modal characteristics of modern society and modern fine art.
Striking similarities are revealed in such a review which strongly
suggest that a study of modern fine art in art education could serve
to problematize both the social origins of modern fine art and the
values of Western modernity.

Art Education Literature Review

A review of art education literature indicates that modern fine
art is often neither an integral part of proposed art programs nor a
specific area of study considered to be of value in understanding
modern society. This may be due to a general reluctance to deal
with the social functions of art. However, more specifically, neg­
lecting the social significance of modern fine art may be due to an
inability to consider modern fine art—which is often abstract and
separate from overt social functions—as having meaning beyond its
presentational aspects. In many of those instances in which modern
fine art is specifically included in curricular planning, its social
significance is essentially ignored or is limited to examples in
which social content is derived from fairly obvious socio-political
subject matter expressed in a representational style. The work of
Beckmann, Grosz, the Mexican muralists and, of course, Picasso’s
Guernica are invariably cited as instances of social consciousness
in modern fine art (Feinstein, 1982; Feldman, 1971; Myers, 1957).
The operative assumption appears to be that social meaning in art
is limited to subject matter, rather than also being embedded within
artistic assumptions, working procedures, audience attitudes, and
the overall institutional configuration of art production and response
in a given society.

A formalist approach is often accorded the study of modern fine
art, wherein abstract perceptual qualities are assumed to constitute
its meaning. The influential Guidelines (1970), compiled under
the auspices of CEMREL, serves to indicate how the endorsement of a
strictly formalistic interpretation of modern art can sever abstract
form from any type of meaning beyond the perceptual experience of
design element relationships. For example, a painting by Albers is
discussed as a work
in which the sensuous surface has been exploited in order to produce certain tensions and vague feelings in the viewer. Since this is a non-objective painting, the experience should come to a close, there being no other kinds of meaning or significance to be found. To seek further would be fallacious. (p. 52)

Modern fine art study appears to be primarily art historical and art critical, with an emphasis on aesthetic qualities.

Among those art educators who are concerned that students understand art in its social and environmental context, the idea that modern fine art might warrant specific study receives uncertain responses. For example, while Schellin (1973) implies that modern fine art may be indicative of social ills, he prefers that a broader spectrum of art be studied. In a similar vein, Chalmers (1978) observes that historically, art educators, by studying primarily fine art, have promulgated a restricted definition of art that needs to be broadened to include the popular, environmental, folk, and commercial arts. Modern fine art is often considered to have little social import beyond the heady world of the artist and his/her moneyed clientele. Gowans (1971), for example, dismisses modern fine art on the basis that it is elitist and self-referent, i.e., art for art's sake, art about itself, art about the material means of art, etc. (Also see Collins, 1977.)

The Characteristics of Modernity

Paradoxically, it is the asocial, self-referent character of much modern fine art that makes it very much part of a society which gives legitimation to decontextualized experiences. From sociology of knowledge literature, values of Western modernity have been identified that, as will be shown, often have their parallel in modern fine art. Bell (1978), Berger, Berger and Kellner (1974), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Bowers (1980), and Gouldner (1979) have cited the following as dominant values of modernity: a temporal orientation toward the future (rather than past or present), the activity modality of doing (rather than being or becoming), human relationships that are individualistic (rather than communal or linear), and the human subjugation of nature (rather than coexistence or subservience). (Also see Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961.)

Bell specifically identifies change as the most pervasive value of modernity, wherein change is often equated with progress, and human purpose and action are the means by which perfection will be ultimately attained. At the extreme, it is believed that there are no restraints upon what can be humanly accomplished -- anything that can be formulated can be done, and should be done. The individual, by dint of possessing purposive rationality, gives legitimation to human action by creating the reality in which those actions are judged. As Foucault (1970) has noted, prior to the nineteenth century, the individual, per se, did not exist; the shift from the external world
as a frame of reference to that of internal mental constructs places 
the individual stage center in a society of change, improvement, and 
decontextualized experiences.

Foucault traces the inception of modernity to the turn of the 
eighteenth century when systems of knowledge became self-referent, 
with each discipline folded over upon itself, seeking the source of 
its own episteme. In structure, operating procedures, and terminology, 
disciplines became increasingly self-contained, self-conscious, and 
self-reflective. This opened the way for artificial language systems 
of formalized codes, wherein signs are what they are, without connec-
tions or meanings beyond their self-evident existence. Foucault 
dates the all-important break with Classicism to when signs ceased to 
represent, to when they lost their metaphorical as if dimensions. In 
the twentieth century world of metaknowledge and metacriticism, 
language codes have become their own object. Consistent with this 
development, the possession of abstract, theoretical knowledge is 
given the highest plaudits in modern society, resulting in what 
Gouldner has termed the "culture of critical discourse." In modern 
society, there is a so-called knowledge industry which establishes 
and maintains disciplinary and intellectual integrity through 
theoretical justifications, specialization, and self-referenced 
terminology which define parameters and exclude all but the trained 
expert.

Modern Aesthetic Theory and Artistic Self-Reference

Significantly, the historical inception of modernity -- that is, 
of individualism, futurism, the separation of work from leisure, 
disciplinary self-reference, theoretical legitimations, and bureaucratic 
specialization -- coincides with the development of aesthetic theories 
emphasizing the noninstrumental, intrinsic value of art. From Kant's 
Critique of Judgment in 1790, through Schopenhauer in the nineteenth 
century, to Bullough, Stolnitz and Kaelin in the twentieth century, 
many aestheticians have proposed that art be valued for its own sake 
and that the value of art eschew all interests extraneous to the 
aesthetic response, per se (see Dickie, 1971; Osborne, 1970). This 
bracketing of the object is accomplished by what has been variously 
described as imaginative reduction, aesthetic disinterest, aesthetic 
interest, the aesthetic attitude, the aesthetic point of view, and 
psychic distancing. According to Bosanquet (1915), "In the aesthetic 
attitude, the object which embodies the feeling is valued solely for 
what it is in itself" (p. 9). One instigates the aesthetic by "putting 
the phenomenon ... out of gear with our practical, actual self... 
by looking at it 'objectively'" (Bullough, 1913/1935, p. 317). Without 
risk of hyperbole, one may state that the intrinsic value of art 
constitutes the very cornerstone of modern aesthetic theory. The 
idea that "art is responded to on the basis of its intrinsic qualities, 
isolated from societal life experiences, has become thoroughly embedded 
and taken for granted in the operational tenets of most art theory 
and in much art creation and instruction" (Hamblen & Jones, 1982, p.51).
The analogy of a painting to a window with a view of a garden is often used to explain how the viewer is to be concerned only with what is intrinsic to art. Prior to the twentieth century, the viewer of art might look into the window/painting, to the garden beyond, recognizing the types of vegetation there, the configuration of the landscape, perhaps identifying people in the garden and noting their attire and activities. In other words, the painting offered a view to representations with functions and associations related to one's life experience and memories. In the twentieth century, however, often aided by nonrepresentationalism, the aesthetcian urges the viewer to look only at the flat surface of the window pane/canvas itself on which the lines, colors, textures, and shapes of the garden form abstract relationships (Redfield, 1971). The artist and, by implication, the viewer of art in his/her noninstrumental responses to art, is dealing with the synthetic language of the material means of art, which has its own internal logic and meaning. That is, art is self-referenced; it is about itself.

Maurice Denis, a nineteenth century artist, was one of the first to be aware of the implications of disciplinary integrity for artistic creation.

One should remember that a painting—before being a warhorse, a nude woman or some anecdote—is essentially a flat surface covered with colors arranged in a certain order. (Quoted by Jaffé, 1965, p. 139)

To continue within the idiom of the garden/painting analogy, Denis "established the credo of the new spirit, saying, 'We must close the shutters.' A painting was not to be an illusion" (Bell, p. 111). Langer (1971) echoes the beliefs of many aestheticians when she denies to the art experience metaphoric as if dimensions, thereby decontextualizing art from the everyday flux of experiential associations and resemblances. "A work of art differs from a genuine symbol—that is, a symbol in the full and usual sense—in that it does not point beyond itself to something else" (p. 91). Within the formalistic aesthetic, the artist creates what Nakov (1979, p. 30) calls a self-contained "pictorial culture," in which a metaformal dialogue is acted out upon the flat surface of the canvas. In many cases, modern fine art is a visual treatise on its own epistemology.

The Historical-Institutional Character of Modern Fine Art

The history of why modern fine art has come to be separated from everyday life and why artistic creation has come to be considered as occurring outside societal norms can only be suggested here. The creation of art which exhibits varying degrees of abstraction, art ensconced in the museum setting, and the changing role of the artist from anonymous craftsman to that of individualistic creator have contributed significantly to art being defined and evaluated on the basis of how greatly it differs from common experience. As other contributing factors to artistic decontextualization one might also cite developments such as the Renaissance separation of crafts from the so-called higher
arts, the artists' loss of religious patronage and the replacement of handicrafts by industrially produced goods.

**Individualism and Change**

Commensurate with disciplinary self-reference and the societal cult of individualism, in the nineteenth century there arose a belief in the artist as the interpreter, creator, and prophet of reality. To the artist was imputed the ability to reveal subconscious truths, to be ever-critical of "what is," to be at the very cutting edge of social change. As the creative individual par excellence, the artist has ostensibly not only the right but the duty to give expression to all manner of artistic creation. "Aesthetic imagination was regarded as the sacred fount of a spirit which would transfigure the world" (Alder, 1976b, p. 420). Mondrian, for example, envisioned a world based on pure design, without recourse to the natural environment or the clutter of everyday sentiments. In her book aptly titled *Progress in Art*, Gablik (1977) proposes that nonobjective art epitomizes the pinnacle of cognitive operations; in such art, human purpose and ingenuity have created a world untainted by material exigencies and utilitarianism. That is, nonobjective art is a humanly created synthetic language, sufficient unto itself.

A veritable kaleidoscope of change and human invention characterizes twentieth century life, i.e., rapidly changing technologies of exponential complexity; the proliferation of information that quickly becomes outdated; and a plethoric, ever-increasing production of goods that are designed to be discarded. Needless to say, there has been a commensurate loss of cultural traditions and stabilizing belief systems. As part of the modernity mandate for progress and change, art in this century has also been marked by a bewildering number of artistic styles, movements and isms. By mid-century, the carte blanche afforded human purpose and creativity often took on a farcical, if not pathological, cast. Existential angst in the larger society found expression in the institution of fine art which readily embraced anti-art movements, anti-anti-art movements, self-disintegrating art, body mutilation art, and art which remained a thought process. While much twentieth century art is often referred to as being "revolutionary", essentially modern artists have been concerned with the radical manipulation of the material means of art, rather than direct social involvement, let alone a confrontation with established social institutions. In actuality, avant-gardism has been socially programmatic, inasmuch as change, novelty, and invention are part of, rather than counter to, modernity (see Bell; Rosenberg, 1966).

**The Reliance on Expert Knowledge**

While modern fine art developed, in part, out of a reaction to excessive literary meanings in Victorian art, the modern artist, ironically, has created art forms highly dependent upon the literature of art criticism and theory for understanding and appreciation. Rapid stylistic changes, abstraction, and artistic self-reference have resulted in art that often requires extensive art study and expert interpretation (see Battecock, 1973).
He who depends, as his grandfather might have done, on the normal processes of his social environment to introduce him to the paintings and sculptures that form part of his culture will end with neither art nor knowledge. (Rosenberg, p. 198)

As a synthetic, self-referenced language system, modern fine art is part of the larger information society. Much as the understanding and use of computer languages is not a birthright or acquired through informal learning, the understanding of modern fine art requires expert knowledge. One might suggest that modern fine art reveals class distinctions based on knowledge acquisition, or, more correctly, based on whether or not the individual is part of, or has access to, the official value system created by modernity. In essence, art knowledge is a commodity; its possession is an indication of having shares in the "cultural knowledge bank," enabling one to participate in, to paraphrase Gouldner, the culture of aesthetic discourse (Schwartz, p. 31). In modern fine art, the values of modernity are writ large. If modern fine art is alienating and confusing to much of the public, it is perhaps the modernity values of society which are actually being rejected or which are inaccessible (Hamblen, 1982).

Summary and Recommendations

The study of modern fine art can provide valuable insights into the defining character and underlying assumptions of Western modernity. In fact, modern art should be studied for some of the very reasons it is dismissed as being of limited social consequence. Disciplinary specialization, the isolation of experience from context, the credence given to discipline-specific language codes, an emphasis on innovation and individual freedom, etc., are all part of the legitimating structure of modern society. These and other values of modernity constitute the underlying, taken-for-granted assumptions of modern life upon which many institutional attitudes, ideas and actions are based. Not surprisingly, as one of the institutions of modern society, modern fine art also exhibits characteristics of modernity specialization and self-reference. It is modern art's autonomy, its lack of contact with everyday life, its continual change, and the artist's search for novelty and claim of freedom from social restraint which make modern fine art very much about modern society. Modern fine art is an integral part of modern society specifically because it exhibits characteristics unique to itself.
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MARGINAL IMAGES: ART AND IDEOLOGY IN THE SCHOOL

Dan Nadaner

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Art has come to connote something that is eclectic and unpredictable. Art may be concerned with the aesthetic organization of visual elements, or it may defy conventional aesthetics; it may seek to interpret visual experience, or it may interpret psychological phenomenon that have no visual manifestation; it may have significant social content, or it may not. Art defies generalizations about its form, but welcomes more readily a characterization of its spirit. Art is inquiring, open-ended, illuminating, often startling. Art is very close to the central concerns and experiential reality of the artist. While it is increasingly difficult to say what art is, it is not difficult to have a clear intuitive awareness of what art feels like in relation to other basic human activities. In the context of social mechanization and pervasive pressure to ideological conformity, the importance of this intuition about the artistic spirit may surpass the importance of particular works of art.

When we think of art as it is taught in the elementary and secondary schools, however, our intuitions about the nature of art are assaulted by uninspiring certainties. Now art can be defined by clear and familiar criteria. Art in the schools is concerned with making art objects. These art objects resemble well-known prototypes -- nineteenth century landscape painting and sculpture, expressionist painting, commercial crafts, advertising design. Art in the schools rarely is concerned with significant social content. Art in the schools is heralded as the student's opportunity for "creative self-expression", yet is presented as an infrequent diversion, occurring on the distant periphery of the student's experience during the school years. The artistic process, rather than being inquiring and open-ended, is recipe-directed; and rather than resulting in shocks and illuminations, it produces only satisfaction or disappointment in the attainment of a conventional aesthetic norm. While there exist, happily, exceptions to this characterization of art in the schools, I believe that in most cases the characterization is accurate.

Why does this gap exist between the conception of art in life and art in school? While it may seem to an artist that school teachers simply do not know enough about art to teach art, I do not believe that this is the primary reason for the gap. Teachers are not the least informed sector of society with regard to the arts, and they have long had special access to artistic discourse through art education organizations. Nor is it the case that the arts have been singled out for unfair treatment in the schools. Rather, I believe that the arts in the schools are shaped (or mis-shaped) by the same social values that shape the teaching of all subjects in the schools. These values are 1) materialism, 2) scientific reductionism, and 3) conventionalism. While the arts are not alone in being subject to these pressures, it is certainly possible to argue that they are most severely affected by them.
Materialism, scientific reductionism, and conventionalism, are of course not unique to schools. They are larger social forces. And it is this that makes them so influential in the school. Sociologists of education have long noted that one of the underlying functions of the school is to reproduce the social order (Karabel and Halsey, 1977). Public schooling in North America has performed this function from its inception, from the time it taught the scriptures to a society for whom religion was law. In the 1830's, Horace Mann expanded the curriculum to include the subjects with which we are familiar in schools today, but the dominant intent remained moralistic, to ensure the moral habits of an expanding working and middle class (Karabel, 1967). Further major developments in education have been guided by similar motivations, aimed at ensuring a preferred social order. The high school of the 1910's would provide vocational training; the new science curriculum of the 1960's would answer Sputnik with a North American technocratic elite. Rarely have major innovations in education been motivated solely by deep humanistic concern or by a commitment to intellectual integrity. The schools were founded to convey preferred social values, and it would be a great oversight to ignore this function in schools today. Hidden, perhaps, among the "objective" teachings of reading, math, science, social studies, and the arts, the larger social values are nevertheless instrumental in shaping how these subjects are taught.

Thus, if it can be said that art adheres more to a spirit than to a form, then the same can be said of schooling. Except that the spirit is different. When art occurs in schools, the conflict between these spirits is implicit and will remain highly problematic until it is explicated and thoughtfully resolved. I will examine here the nature of the implicit conflict between artistic and school ideologies along the three dimensions of materialism, scientific reductionism, and conventionalism. Materialism of course needs no explanation here as a dominant theme in North American culture. Children are taught to value the acquisition, maintenance, and protection of material goods over human needs in everything they see about them: extensive devotion to house and garden; peer pressure on clothing, records, television, sports equipment; the high professional status of real estate, insurance, and anything technological. In its effect on school art programs, materialism has acted as a steady erosive force, and the course of that erosion is not difficult to chart. Contemporary art education in North America was founded on anything but materialist values. Art was the most romantic element of the romantic child-centered movement in education of the 1920's and 30's. During this time, new emphasis was placed on the child's innate capacities. With the intellectual stimulus of Freud and Jung, psychologists and educators began to see an inner world in children that was deep in meaning, and conducive to emotional development if it were made manifest. One educator wrote in 1932:

The newer education is learning the uses of the mysterious forces of the spirit through which one may liberally educate oneself for all the important needs of living. It is like the heart beat; no one has found the source of its power but no one doubts that the source is within us. The creative spirit is another heart; it will keep us alive if we give it a chance to beat for us (Hartman and Shumaker, 1932).
Art was seized upon as the way to make this inner world manifest. Painters like Klee, Kandinsky, and the German Expressionists validated this link between psychology and art. They, like the psychoanalysts, saw a profound inner world in child art (Hafmann, 1967), and then elaborated in their work the expression of this inner world, a world filled with fantasy, fears, sweeping emotions, and simple whimsy. European art teachers like Franz Cizek and Viktor Lowenfeld absorbed these charged artistic developments, and channeled them back to education (Efland, 1979). In the literature that soon emerged on creative self-expression in child art, the artistic process was seen as emerging from the child, being filled with deep fantasy, expressing emotions, depending entirely on motivation and not at all on visual deliberation. The social upheavals of the second world war brought many European art educators to the United States, where their ideals found company with a desire to develop the emotional aspect in children's education. The creative self-expression approach to art education established itself in the educator's and the public's mind, and has remained firmly embedded there.

It might seem from this brief historical review that art has been a romantic, inner-directed, anti-materialistic force in schools. And certainly it was this in its genesis, as well as the second wave of "process not product" rhetoric in the 1960's. But it was precisely because the founding rhetoric was anti-materialistic that it is so easy to see the shaping of school art by the materialist ethic. When the discourse of school art is dominated by terms like "creativity" and "self-expression," but the practice of the school arts is directed toward making conventional art objects for exhibition, then something is amiss. Either too little thought is being put into what "creativity" and "self-expression" mean, or these terms have passed into the realm of pure slogans that are not connected to practice at all. Most likely the latter is true. Through a remarkably effective process of cultural transmission, every parent, teacher, and child seems to know that creativity and self-expression (as well as the exercise of "talent" to produce "beauty") are the purposes of art. They also expect that the fulfillment of these ideals will consist of step-by-step instructions in silk-screen printing, tie-dying, batik, watercolor, macrame, enameling, metalwork, ceramics, weaving, acrylic painting, crayon resist, collage, mobiles, puppets, papier-mache, and numerous additional "media" which are commonly described in art education literature in spite of playing little role in contemporary culture.

What seems to have happened is that the originally subtle relationship between "inner worlds" and their physical manifestation in art has degenerated into a linking of slogans to recognizable art products -- any art products. While humanistic goals still have a plane in school arts rhetoric, they are valued much less in practice than are technology, recipes, and acceptable products. Teachers seek skills in as many media as possible, with skills defined as basic technique plus a demonstration of a conventionally acceptable product. I often remind my students that many artists spend their entire lives working in one medium -- for example, oils -- and spend little time concentrating on technique even within that medium. But then, of course, these painters do not work in schools where the social ethic calls for a new and different kind of product to be created every other Friday. Teachers and students function within a set of social pressures that can never be dismissed, and that only a clear analysis and strong will can counteract.
By submitting to the materialist ethic, art is both integrated into the school curriculum and guaranteed to fail within that curriculum. Fitted to a technological mold, art can not do what it does best. Its Friday afternoon miracles -- the pattern that emerges when the rubber bands are removed from the tie-dyed cloth, the straight line under the masking tape on the acrylic painting -- can not compete with the computer war game. The pot and painting, as products, are "enhancing" and "enriching" to the model home, and so they remain only enhancing and enriching, and thus peripheral, in the school curriculum. Without the spirit, there isn't much point to art; I think that any artist would affirm this simple point.

The pressure toward scientific reductionism in schools does not do much to preserve the artistic spirit either. By scientific reductionism I mean the tendency, widespread in twentieth century thought, to believe that all physical and psychological phenomena can be broken down to a set of discrete component parts. Thus human action is understood as a set of behaviors in response to stimuli and reinforcements. In art education, the reductionist tendency may be observed in the exaggerated dogmatic emphasis on visual elements and styles. Countless textbooks review the elements of line, shape, color, form and texture. In some, such as Johannes Itten's Bauhaus course Design and Form, the explanation is genuinely illuminating, giving depth and clarity to a formalist conception of art (Itten, 1963). But in others, contemporary derivatives of the Bauhaus approach, the reductionist tendency takes over. Now the visual elements are taken literally to be a language, and exercises with these elements become equated with art as a whole. Examples of good and bad approaches are given not only for shape and color, but also for less tangible concepts such as unity, balance, and rhythm. The desire to teach art as if it possessed a definite grammar surpasses by good measure the understanding of whether art in fact has a grammar at all (a questionable proposition, perhaps best treated by Christian Metz's statement that film is not a language; nevertheless film is like a language (Metz, 1974).

Styles too become stereotyped, as if they were preexisting categories that artists followed, rather than critical generalizations developed after the fact to describe what artists have done. Students are often asked to work in impressionist, cubist, and expressionist styles, with the chronologically later styles being understood to be the more advanced styles. The isms of the sixties and seventies are reserved for advanced work.

The social pressure of the reductionist ethic, like the materialist ethic, is unavoidable. The structure of twentieth century thought, and the structure of thinking experiences in school, demands a precise breakdown of a phenomenon even though that phenomenon may cease to exist once disassembled. I do not mean by this to revive the myth that art is such an intangible and mystical experience that it cannot be systematically analyzed. Rather, I mean to make the distinction that the useful and productive analysis is more likely to occur through critical and phenomenological methods than through reductionist ones. Scientific reductionism does not destroy interest in art as much as it makes it out to be a duller, less vital occupation that it can be. Scientific reductionism ultimately creates an art in its own mold, an art of patterns and forms that are equally at home in the engineering laboratory or the computer screen as
they are in the artist's studio. This art fulfills reductionist predictions by being built upon identifiable elements; but this art represents only a limited genre of formalist art, and does little to help us understand the dominant aesthetic and social forces of contemporary art. The "visual vocabulary" art serves only to support the ethic of scientific reductionism that is so central to North American economic and social systems, and does little to support the plurality of aesthetic systems that art has the potential to bring to society.

Reductionism encourages one type of conventional product in school art, but not the most conventional type. Schools constantly look back to those styles which have been labeled and celebrated. The single criterion for emulating these styles is that they are widely known as a style. The style may be as popular as naturalistic still-life painting, but it may also be as unpopular as Rauschenberg's assemblage or as poorly understood as Cubism. But it is crucial that it is historically identifiable. Through its identifiability, the style becomes liable to simpler and simpler labeling, until the history of art becomes a succession of pointed brushstrokes, geometric shapes, and dripping paint, in that order. "Styles" are conveniently matched with techniques, such as the dripping paint style with the straw technique to blow patterns in nursery school. Or the assemblage style and the junk technique. "Don't throw away your junk," is an admonition I have heard several times among the more progressive teachers, "Bring it to the art class."

The overarching conflict between the ideologies of art and schooling, a conflict which has been implicit in the discussion of materialism and reductionism, emerges clearly in this preference for conventions. The conflict is simply this: art asks for new ways of seeing, schooling (historically) has encouraged fixed ways of seeing. Conventional patriotic figures are identified as heroes in school, when they have little heroic effect on contemporary life. North American and European military battles are singled out for intensive study, while South American, African and Asian social history receives passing notice at most. These aspects of the curriculum are evidence of a conventional view of reality, a view that fixes social reality within a particular cultural perspective and reflects specific social interests. And with this conventional, fixed view, it is very difficult to deal with a subject that represents an antithetical position. This is the conflict that emerges when schooling and art meet. Art demands an open and critical attitude toward the exploratory and inventive; schooling, seeking to evaluate the student's grasp of identifiable subject matter along a right and wrong scale, can not cope with this openness and uncertainty.

One might argue at this point that I have sketched my case too broadly, that the ideology of schooling can not be so sharply delineated. And clearly (indeed happily) there are many art teachers whose teaching practices do complete justice to the spirit of art, whose students learn to see more fully and develop a critical attitude toward contemporary culture. Yet no matter how many of these teachers and students are enthusiastically acting as artists in schools, the question must be raised as to why their enthusiasm has not spread more rapidly to the wider community of teachers and students. And why, conversely, has the culture of school art described here developed very rapidly, and without the sanction of the larger intellectual and artistic community? The answer to these
questions can only be framed in the context of a larger pattern of social values that operate in schools and that work to shape the teaching of art whenever it is introduced in the school.

The alternative to this sketch of school ideology is not likely to be found in an opposing historical interpretation of schools. Rather, an alternative view is found in the realm of educational ideals, in the writings of educational philosophers such as John Dewey and Paolo Freire. For these writers, education and art have much in common. Education, like art, seeks to develop new ways of seeing and new intellectual resources for responding critically to problematic situations (Dewey, 1939; Freire, 1970). Education, like art, begins with the experience of the individual set in a social context, and seeks to develop that experience in a socially constructive manner. And education, like art, encourages the communication of different perspectives from individual to individual, and from community to community. In Dewey's and Freire's view, and in the view of many educators, this is the type of education that invites art to do what it does best, because it is art that builds upon individual and social experience to develop new ways of seeing social reality.

Thus it is ironic that this essay has had to note the opposition of schooling and art, when in theory the purposes and procedural principles of education and art are indistinguishable. In a school that fulfilled Dewey's and Freire's vision of education, the nature of school art could not be as I have described it here. School art would be changed, first, simply by being accepted. Educators would share in the intuition of what art feels like, and look for that intuition in school art activities. Materialism would give way to mentalism, an interest in the mental experience represented by artistic form, rather than in the sheer physical form itself. The history of art would become not a chronology of technological styles but an array of interpretations of social reality. As Panofsky notes in Meaning in the Visual Arts, the world view made manifest by the work of art is nothing less than the content of the work itself (Panofsky, 1955). By examining perceptual evidence and restating it as clearly as possible, the artist does his basic work. He makes known to himself and to others the mental images that compose his experience of the world. Through the course of his work he reveals how those images combine into readings of social life and social issues -- as Vertov's films show a different Soviet Union than Eisenstein's, and as De Kooning represents a different sexual and emotional world than Bacon, or Hockney, or O'Keeffe. The artist's work makes contributions to intellectual and emotional life that far surpass the materialistic evaluation of the art object. The artist represents and structures his or her own knowledge of the world through the artwork, and invents symbolic means for communicating that knowledge to others.

The representational and communicative functions are basic to art, and are equally basic to education. In his literacy programs in Brazil, Freire called for educators to encourage learners to reconstruct their views of social situations that directly affected their lives (Freire, 1973). It is precisely this goal that the artistic process is designed, by its nature, to serve. Rather than dwell on the properties of the "art media," art becomes concerned with the mental structures that give artifacts their life. And once liberated from its material mold, the artistic image becomes the educationally relevant image as well.
With a changed ideology in schools, scientific reductionism would give way to its long overdue successor, phenomenological criticism. The reductionist movement, through its negligent attitude toward such basic phenomena as consciousness, perception, and the social organization of knowledge, has left behind it an immense vacuum in formal knowledge. What is needed now, not only in the arts but in the social sciences as well, is an introduction to critical methods that provide a multi-focal approach to social reality. And here again, recent experience in the contemporary arts provides the exemplar. Film critics regularly compare semiotic, structuralist, psychoanalytic, formalist, and phenomenological critiques of the same films. The film is illuminated, its meaning enlarged and clarified, through this process of interchange and comparison. In schools, children desperately need to gain at least the feeling of what the critical process is about. They need to know, for example, that there are many ways of seeing the experience of minority groups, not the one way represented by the wire services and the television networks. They need to know that news reports are interpretations rather than incontrovertible facts; and that not only can a pen leave behind relevant features of a social event, but a camera can as well. The phenomenological attitude seems to me the most inspiring of the contemporary critical methodologies, and not a difficult one to translate into the educational practice. In biology, social studies, or English, the phenomenological attitude as modeled by art critics would simply ask children to look more carefully for relevant features, to relate interpretations more closely to the evidence, and to value the interpretations of others.

Conventionalism would face a struggle in the new school as well. The constructive and critical attitude of the artistic activity would work against the inertia and stereotyping of convention. Conventions, of course, are no less a part of the art world than the school world. But the underlying spirit of art works systematically against convention. It works for a reexamination of established reality constructions, which means a continual replacing of stereotyped images with images that more adequately represent both the data and feel of contemporary experience. The artist seeks to be non-conventional, not in the cliched Bohemian sense, but in ways that matter in contemporary society. Artists now are increasingly questioning, for example, the convention of individual self-expression as a characterization of the artistic process; they are reestablishing a social role for the artist that has not been visible under the massive rhetoric of court art, patronage art, and celebrated art. If the artist’s self-critique of his individualistic past were brought into the school, it would provide the ideal model of the self-critical, socially cooperative education that Dewey and Freire delineate. Artists could help students develop their roles as social investigators and community spokespersons, roles that have become stereotyped and thus neglected in their traditional "civics" context in the curriculum.

Could schools take this kind of open questioning both of social phenomena and of the learner’s response to those phenomena? From the historical evidence, one does not know if they could sustain the will for this kind of enterprise; but from a philosophical analysis, one can not doubt that they are obliged to try.
Art would benefit from a valid association with schools as much as schools would benefit from art. While this essay has taken a critical attitude toward the history of schools and a favourable attitude towards the ideals of art, the distribution of problems and merits in each field is of course not entirely one-sided. The ideals of art also outstrip its contemporary performance, especially its most visible (museum-exhibited, book-published) contemporary manifestations. The artist's ideal of representing authentic perspectives toward social reality requires a broader base of committed artists if it is to be fully realized. Reality constructions in art must represent diverse cultural and class experience, if art is not to function only as an esoteric affirmation of dominant cultural values. The public school, obviously, is the meeting ground where the public and art could come in contact to redefine each other. From increased contact with the public school, art might lose its marginal status not only in the school, but in society as well.

References


FOR CULTURAL DEMOCRACY:
A CRITIQUE OF ELITISM IN ART EDUCATION

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In the spirit of the poet and art critic, Charles Baudelaire, the essay which follows is "partial, passionate, and political." As such, it stands in direct contrast to the kind of critical writing the poet decried, "cold [and] mathematical which, on the pretext of explaining everything has neither love nor hate, and voluntarily strips itself of every shred of temperament." (1846)

To its credit, Ralph A. Smith's (1981) passionate argument for elitism in art education, "Elitism Versus Populism: A Question of Quality," elicited from me an equally partial and passionate response. This response focuses on Dr. Smith's essay and the Reagan administration's arts policy position because, taken together, they are the clearest and most unequivocal defenses of elitist art education policy that this writer knows.

It should be noted that the introductory section of this essay appeared as a "Commentary" in the November, 1981 issue of Art Education.

Introduction

After reading a good deal about the Reagan administration's proposed arts policy, I was a bit shaken to discover a strikingly Reagan-like art education policy espoused in the front pages of the July, 1981 issue of Art Education. Was it possible that the nationwide rise of political and cultural conservatism was finding its way into the ranks of our own profession? Over the years, I had come to know art educators as persons of generally liberal persuasion, but here was philosophy and rhetoric to match the best of the Reagan arts advisors. The article causing my surprise was "Elitism Versus Populism: A Question of Quality." The writer was Ralph A. Smith, Executive Secretary of the Council for Policy Studies in Art Education, a group which seeks to promulgate and assess policy for the profession.

In the past I had seen Smith take what I would call liberal positions on certain issues. For example, his opposition to competency-based education as a dehumanizing, technocratic form of training, not education. What I had not realized at the time was the conservative, elitist nature of Smith's basic philosophy of art education, especially his view as to what constitutes correct content for our discipline (Smith, 1981). The shock of full recognition did not strike home until
I had read over and over again the remarkably similar positions held by Smith and the Reagan arts advisors, and then put both to the litmus test of asking, "What does all this mean in terms of the real world?" The answer was clear in both cases: the startling elimination of popular, folk, ethnic, applied, social, and political art as cultural forms worthy of federal support and art teaching, respectively. Based on the intellectual justifications provided by the Reagan arts advisors and Smith, the place of the popular or "people's arts" in the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and in the schools, museums, and community arts centers of this country would be severely reduced, or eliminated. Fine or "high" art would reign supreme. In fact, it would be the primary--or possibly the only--form of art which would be federally funded and, following Smith's philosophy, taught in art education settings nationwide. What such philosophy and practice represents is a conservative, elitist, and historically reactionary response to the "expansion arts" developed under the Carter administration (Kramer, 1980), and the significant cultural advances made in art education over the past decade. The Women's Caucus, Committee on Minority Concerns, United States Society for Education through Art, the Social Theory Caucus, and Environmental Design and Rural Art Educators special interest groups--all products of the last decade--should take serious note. Hard-earned socio-cultural gains of recent years are now under heavy philosophical and political attack from both inside and outside the profession.

The Elitist Conception of Culture

Getting to the crux of the matter, let us see how Smith and the Reagan advisors define "fine art" and how they justify it as the primary or only category of art worthy of being funded and being taught. According to Smith, fine art is "elite art," "the kind of art appreciated by genuinely open elites, that is elites composed of persons with a higher degree of education than that found in the general population." (1981) The Heritage Foundation Report (Martin, 1981), which serves as justification for the Reagan arts policy, echoes the Smith definition:

The arts that the NEA funds must support belong primarily to the area of high culture. Such culture is more than mere entertainment, and is concerned with permanent values beyond current tastes and wide appeal.

As Smith notes, fine art is "the best" art, the "more difficult, aesthetically more rewarding" art, the art whose "artistic merit has been certified."

Rebuttal to Elitist Cultural Philosophy

The Big Question suddenly lights up the sky: Certified by whom? Who certifies that certain forms of art (e.g., popular, ethnic, folk) are "mere entertainment" whereas another form (i.e., fine art) is of "permanent value?" Who decides that one form of art is political and another above and beyond politics? Who defines the terms, decides upon evaluative criteria, and determines the rules of the game? Why, the experts, of course: persons like Smith and the Reagan arts advisors--
partial, passionate, and political proponents of high culture. It is on this most-important-of-all question, and the circular reasoning that justifies it, that the arguments of Smith and the Reagan advisors begin to fall apart.

Easiest to rebut is Smith's contention that fine art is the type of art preferred by open elites—those persons, groups, or classes with "a higher degree of educational attainment than that found in the general population." It is only too apparent that there are many persons of higher educational attainment in our society and, more specifically, in our own field—e.g. the members of the professional special interest groups named above, and others—who value popular, ethnic, folk, applied, social, and political art as much as, or possibly even more than, works of traditional fine art. Must we dismiss all of these persons and groups as not being of a sufficiently "high degree of educational attainment," or rather, as being simply misguided or mistaken in their cultural preferences? Perhaps only those persons and groups—and only highly educated ones at that—who agree with the Smith/Reaganite definition of fine art (and its preferred formalist aesthetic criteria of judgment) should qualify as "open elites" capable of defining and determining arts policy?

A second contention which is not difficult to rebut concerns the assertion that fine art is characterized by "high standards," "the pursuit of perfection," and "excellence," (Smith, 1981) whereas ethnic, folk, popular, social, and political artforms are not. All of us could, I think, agree that artists working in every conceivable form—popular, folk, ethnic, propaganda, film, video documentary, commercial photography, graphic design, etc.—can and do achieve "fine art" standards, and do create art of "permanent value." The fact that some of this art, like some fine art, has proven to have lasting value and "the integrity of great art" (Martin, 1981)—and that it is represented in the most respected art museums, books, and journals—only confirms that the finest art is a matter of, not category, but of rich, complex quality.

The Reagan art advisors, the new champions of formalist aesthetics, contend that art which is primarily concerned with social or political content should not be federally funded because it is prone to be of lesser "artistic merit" (Kramer, 1980). This contention is summarily refuted by an examination of art history. The creation of art which is supposedly separate from life (art for art's sake) and its accompanying philosophy of aesthetic formalism are recent phenomena, being no more than two hundred years old (Hauser, 1951, 5-25). Almost all high art prior to the Romantic period, as well as much fine and popular art of the last two centuries, has been deeply concerned with socio-cultural and/or political content. This in no way has reduced its artistic merit; witness the Parthenon, Gothic cathedrals, the Sistine Chapel ceiling, the consciously political paintings of David, Goya, Delacroix, Courbet, Picasso's Guernica, and all of the great often-anonymous folk and popular art—concerned with the everyday lives, struggles, and triumphs of common people—that have come down to us over the generations.

The related contention that the extra-aesthetic(i.e., practical,
psychological, socio-cultural, political) dimensions of art are less worthy of study and experience than the purely aesthetic dimension finds itself opposed by many art educators both past and present (Logan, 1955). Many contemporary art educators of "higher educational attainment" have come, for example, to view the socially humanizing values of art experience and study as being at least as important as the benefits derived from formalist aesthetic experiences. For socially concerned art educators, the following goals have become of the utmost importance: multicultural understanding through art; critical understanding of the dominant visual culture, especially its more manipulative and dehumanizing aspects; critical understanding of the way in which the larger social context shapes art and art education; actual improvement of our individual and collective lives through art study, experience, and practice. For art educators of formalist persuasion to discredit or ignore the social dimension of the study, experience and practice of art seems exceedingly narrow, as well as irresponsible. Supporters of a socially relevant art education therefore are gratified that the NAEA has issued an "Art in the Mainstream" (Feldman, 1982) policy statement wherein the social significance of art as work, language, and values is emphasized.

Those who favor aesthetic formalism and essentialism by maintaining that art education ought to concern itself only with art-centered goals and thus avoid any analysis of socio-cultural and political values, represents a severely reductionist, as well as unrealistic, point of view. Fine art, even the most "art for art's sake" art, is socially and politically involved. The most abstract art bears a social message about the world and the place of the artist and viewer in that world. The most consciously asocial and apolitical works of art—as well as aesthetic experience which many assume to be transcendentally detached from life and culture—function in tangible socio-cultural and political ways in our society. In actual effect, they qualify as political art and aesthetic experience; that is, they serve to either strengthen (i.e., conserve) or change—in reactionary or progressive ways—the socio-cultural, politico-economic order that governs and shapes our daily lives (Hauser, 1951, pp 5-25).

Elitist Art Education and the Dominant Social Order

Where, one might then ask, do the various philosophies of art education fit into the overall scheme of contemporary American culture and politics? More specifically, and relative to our discussion, where does elitist art education fit into the overall scheme of American society? Giffhorn (1978) and Feldman (1978) have offered insightful answers to these questions. The Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education was specifically brought into existence to study the connections between art, education and its social context (Bersson, 1980).

The connection between elitist art education and the cultural policy of our society's power elite is most clearly seen in the strikingly similar philosophies advocated by Ralph Smith and the Reagan arts advisors. Both represent the cultural philosophy of oligarchy, as opposed to the cultural philosophy of democracy; that is, culture created of and
by the few, as opposed to culture created of, by, and for the many. Elitist cultural policy is largely certified, shaped, financed, and produced by the wealthy, powerful and academically educated. It is transmitted to the larger public by primarily middle-class art specialists and educators who are of upper-class cultural persuasion. That upper-class collectors, museum trustees, gallery owners, art book and magazine publishers shape, as well as prefer, high culture is no secret. In this respect, high culture is clearly class-based culture (Bersson, 1981a). Feldman (1978), in his excellent article, "A Socialist Critique of Art History in the U.S.A.," has incisively explicated this process by which middle-class art historians, critics, and the "fine art" educators have become the often unconscious guardians, champions, and educational eminaries of the upper-class power elite. Ardent proponents of expertism, essentialism, and aesthetic formalism in art education must become aware of how they have become cultural allies of, and educators for, the arts policy of the Reagan administration and upper-class America. If we, as art educators, are concerned with the real world implications of art and education, we must look beyond the walls of our universities, museums, and public school classrooms in order to realize the larger socio-cultural and political effects of our philosophies and actions.

For Cultural Democracy in Art/Education

What I believe art educators should be arguing for is "cultural democracy," which is succinctly defined as "culture created of, by, and for all the people." Cultural democracy equates with equality of opportunity for all persons, classes, and groups to create, study, and enjoy the arts. It is culture as a human right and not as an upper-class privilege. Cultural democracy does not mean "forced equality of results" (Smith, 1981). Cultural democracy, or "egalitarianism" -- a term Smith distorts in his article--does not equate with "a flat philosophy of the equality of everything." In point of fact, it means the opposite. It means pluralism, diversity, variety, difference. It means financial and educational support for the full range of visual culture. Employing an analogy from the world of music, we support our composers and performers of classical music, but we also support our jazz and folk musicians, labor balladeers, ethnic and neighborhood artists.

Elitist Fear of Cultural Democracy

The Reagan advisors and Smith seem to be afraid of putting cultural power in the hands of the "untutored" masses. Scenes of women textile workers making documentary films about their past struggles and black youth finding out about their roots through artist-in-residence blues singers in the schools apparently send shudders up the spines of the Reagan arts advisors (Adler, Hager, and Shabad, 1981). More cultural democracy does mean more participation and power for the "untutored" common folk. Putting political, economic, and cultural power (i.e., democracy) in the hands of middle- and lower-class persons and groups has always caused fear among elites, and with good reason. Such sharing or democratization of power threatens upper-class political, economic, and cultural hegemony. In this well founded upper-class fear, and the surrounding air of superi-
ality that hides it, is a deep-seated apprehension about, and resistance to, change. Thus the frequent connection between upper-class elitism and conservatism. Somehow the unschooled masses might come to share power with the upper classes, just as these classes have appropriated power from the aristocratic and clerical ruling classes that came before them. This fear by the elite—often paranoiac—surfaces at times in their language, images, and references. We have Smith, for example, through the words of Barbara Tuchman, comparing the cultural sentiments of the "new egalitarians" or "populists" to those of the "Jacobins denouncing aristocrats to the guillotine." A more vivid example of elitist fear of the democratization of culture could probably not be found.

Conclusion

As art educators, we cannot be—and most of us are not—afraid of "the people." What makes us art educators is our concern for the education of the larger public. We are committed, not to art education for the privileged few, but to art study, practice, and experience for all people. An elitist art education, one based in fear of and insufficient respect for all the citizens of our multicultural, multiclass society, cannot be our way. Our road can only be toward cultural democracy, and the tolerance, respect, and equality of opportunity that it brings.

Cultural democracy, with its values of generosity and tolerance, is the only cultural and educational policy capable of embracing both elitism and populism. Reagan's arts policy which amounts to "elite art for the elite" is certainly not desirable; nor is Smith's well-intentioned but restrictive art education policy which would mean "elite art for the masses." What we do want is art and art experience of, by, and for all the people. As United States Congressman Sidney Yates has asserted, "What we want is elitism plus populism. We want quality in the arts, and we want the arts represented throughout the country" (Martin, 1981)—in every neighborhood, and among every group and class.
Reference Notes

1. The Expansion Arts Program is described in the National Council on the Arts' **Advancing the Arts in America** (July 1981) as "a point of entry for developing groups that are established and reflect the culture of minority, blue collar, rural, and low-income communities."

2. In addition to the development of the National Art Education Association affiliate and special interest groups subsequently cited, major art education texts with a socio-cultural focus we were published during this decade, among them: Edmund Feldman's *Becoming Human Through Art* (1970); June King McFee and Rogene M. Degge's *Art, Culture, and Environment: A Catalyst for Teaching* (1977); Eugene Grigsby's *Art and Ethnicities* (1977); Laura Chapman's *Approaches to Art in Education* (1978); and Vincent Lanier's *The Arts We See* (1982).


References


"Elitism vs. populism" identifies dichotomous stances that are increasingly causing acrimony among those concerned with defining cultural and educational relations. Not surprisingly, the controversy is one of the sundry things touched on by the Rockefeller Commission Report The Humanities in American Life. The report characterizes the opposing positions as follows:

Some people think it elitist to point out that our culture arose in what is generally described as the Western tradition; populist to affirm that Native and Latin American, African, and Asian cultures also form our heritage. Elitism is associated with high culture, which often refers to a finite list of works, authors, and standards; populism with popular culture, which has an inexhaustible list. The rich are thought elitist because they can afford educational and cultural activities the poor cannot. Those who emphasize our common culture are sometimes called elitist, whereas those who accentuate cultural pluralism are called populist. Maintaining traditional forms of cultural expression is often viewed as elitist, whereas admiring novelty and spontaneity is apparently a populist trait. It is allegedly elitist to advocate the preservation of cultural resources, populist to urge broad access to them.

At one level, the report appears to express weariness with the entire issue, claiming that the dispute prevents us from coming to terms with genuine problems in our culture and that some of the divisions are more artificial than real---e.g., does not our heritage contain non-Western as well as Western elements, examples from popular as well as from high culture? In almost the same breath, however, the report warns that populist and elitist orientations "express tension between cultural views that are sometimes irreconcilable [emphasis added] and often must compete for limited resources...." But having acknowledged tensions and declared viewpoints

irreconcilable, the report cannot have it both ways simply by formulating a new set of principles. These remarks will therefore follow another strategy, one that leaves open the possibility of narrowing the gulf separating the contending parties. To be sure, the chances for achieving this goal are slim so long as debate degenerates into ideological haggling and name-calling. Since, moreover, during such exchanges, elitism suffers by being used as a term of derogation while populism retains an aura of democratic virtue, an effort to rehabilitate elitism is in order before a reconciliation is attempted.

For present purposes, a useful outlook on elitism is provided by Stuart Hampshire, who writes that elitists accept four propositions. An elitist, that is, believes

first, that there is a tradition of great, and of very good and interesting work, in each of the liberal arts, and that there is good reason to expect ...that these traditions are being prolonged into the future. Second, that at any time a minority of otherwise intelligent persons, including artists, are deeply interested in one, or more, of the arts, and have devoted a considerable part of their lives to their involvement with them, and to thinking about them. The judgments of artistic merit by such persons, who are not difficult to recognize, are the best guides to artistic merit that we have....Third, that enjoyment of one or more of the arts is one of the most intense and most consoling enjoyments open to men, and also the principal source of continued history and of pride and of sense of unity for any city, nation, or empire. Fourth, very often, though not always, a good artist does not create his own public within his lifetime and needs support, if he is to work as well as he might....

It follows from these beliefs that elitists set some store by the ideas of tradition, continuity, judgment, and competence. Nothing in Hampshire's four propositions, however, implies that elitists are necessarily cultural snobs, insensitive to minority or ethnic interests, antidemocratic, or contemptuous of popular culture. Neither do these propositions demand that access to the heritage be restricted, nor intimate that the masses are incapable of acquiring a taste for high culture. In short, much of what elitism is often criticized for is not part of Hampshire's description of it. Still, it is difficult to imagine that Hampshire's position would change the minds of avowed populists who bridle at the suggestion that judgments of artistic merit are necessary and, what is more, that they are to be made by a minority (artists, critics) specially qualified for the task; this, they would charge, constitutes an unwarranted imposition of elite tastes.

Whether one finds judgments by an aesthetic elite objectionable or
not, they are the manner in which artistic merit has usually been determined, a point to which Lord Kenneth Clark bears witness when he writes, "would deduce from history this first law...of the relationship of art and society: that visual art, whether it takes the form of image or ornament, is made by a minority [i.e., an elite] for a minority but accepted by the majority unquestionably, eagerly, and with a sense of participation."5 One might suppose populists unpersuaded, however, for they would interpret the historical record only as confirming their conviction that the masses have long been deluded and that it was high time they were undeceived and ready to defend their own preferences in art.

And the right of the masses to their own culture is, of course, a central tenet of what is called the new egalitarianism (a term here taken to be nearly synonymous with "populism"). Herbert Gans, for example, would disagree with Hampshire's claim that only experts are "the best guides to artistic merit that we have." Since the United States is a democracy, culture should reflect the people's tastes. Knowing what they like, the people ought to be given the art they want. In other words, since there can be no disputing the value of people's preferences, considerations of quality and merit are to be abandoned in favor of a de gustibus principle. What are the likely consequences?

Some are described by Barbara Tuchman7 in an indignant article. "The new egalitarians," she writes, "would like to make the whole question of quality vanish by adopting a flat philosophy of the equality of everything. No fact or event is of greater or less value than any other; no person or thing is superior or inferior to any other. Any reference to quality is instantly castigated as elitism, which seems to inspire in users of the word the sentiments of Jacobins denouncing aristos to the guillotine." Tuchman's objections are in part aesthetic: a "flat philosophy of the equality of everything" presents an uninspiring prospect; nothing stands out to attract attention or admiration.

But the new egalitarianism can also be faulted on pragmatic grounds. Hampshire, it will be recalled, said that even good artists may need support. In modern times, this has increasingly been understood to mean government support, which in turn has resulted in government policies for financial aid to art and artists. Yet how are such policies possible under the populist proscription of judgments of artistic merit? In the absence of standards of promoting the best, all that can be done is to distribute cultural resources equitably and to satisfy as many interests as possible. Once it is discovered, however, how wide-ranging cultural interests are and how new ones can be thought up overnight (especially when it is believed there is money available to satisfy them), a de gustibus principle becomes untenable because unmanageable.

The preceding remarks were intended to disencumber the term "elitism" of some of its undeserved negative connotations. But it should also be asked whether the new egalitarianism deserves its reputation for serving the best interests of the people. Sir Roy Shaw3 has broached just this issue as part of his examination of the popular (and populist) view that because Western culture—the culture of Titian, Shakespeare, and Bach—is middle-class or bourgeois in its origins, it can have no relevance for
today's working classes and that those who insist it can are perpetrating one of the major deceits of the twentieth century. This position, Shaw contends, is rife with hypocrisy:

Some of those who invoke the title of democrats seem to believe that the most are incapable of appreciating the best and so you must give them something less than the best specially prepared for their weaker constitutions. However, they grossly misuse the word "elitist" by using it to smear anyone who champions traditional arts or high standards in them. These so-called democrats are elitists in the proper sense of the term. They agree with cultural snobs that the high arts should be preserved for the elite, a privileged few and the rest of the population should have something else.

He concludes that attacks on elitism are often "politically inspired philistinism at best, and advocacy of a form of cultural apartheid at worst...."

The great hypocrisy of the new egalitarianism, then, consists in this: cultural apartheid—i.e., giving the masses less than the best—violates a sacred democratic principle, the individual's right to self-improvement. Many who came from backgrounds that did not include an appreciation of the fine arts but who were fortunate to have been encouraged to educate themselves to "one of the most intense and most consoling enjoyments open to men" (Hampshire) should have no difficulty in understanding the severity of Shaw's charge against populism.

If this particular indictment is seen to even the score somewhat in favor of elitism, it still has done nothing to effect a rapprochement between elitism and populism. Yet conciliation is not out of the question. One needs only to remember that the present discussion has equated populism with the "new" egalitarianism, which suggests that "egalitarianism" also has a traditional meaning. In an illuminating essay, the late Charles Frankel wrote of the old egalitarianism that its virtues consisted of "chivalry, loyalty, generosity, at least a rough courtesy, self-reliance and self-discipline, an eagerness to improve oneself but also a sense of amusement at oneself, respect for an honest day's work and getting one's hands dirty, a capacity to tell the genuine article from the fake, and a certain earthiness and imperiousness to gentility." Such virtues, says Frankel, "were drawn from the traditions and experiences of all classes; and while it [traditional egalitarianism] espoused equality, it did so in recognition of the value of other things which create differences, partisan feelings, and stratification in society," not least of which was "the need in every society to give public recognition to things noble and excellent lest everything in the society's culture be regarded as disposable." Such considerations, he says, do not subvert the principle of equality, they merely set limits on it and keep it sane. Judgment, excellence, limitation, sanity—these attributes certainly make the old egalitarianism compatible with the kind of elitism described by Hampshire and defended by Shaw, an elitist egalitarianism or egalitarian elitism that aims at the best for
the most and pays the majority of the people the compliment of believing them capable of appreciating the best. Here, then, is a reconciliation between elitism and populism that could appeal to the best sentiments of educators.

Realistically speaking, however, what hopes are there for resolving the "elitism vs. populism" dilemma in art and aesthetic education in the direction of the old egalitarianism? One might expect that periods of consolidation such as the one we are said to be passing through at the moment would be more receptive to ideas of the kind just expressed--ideas that would have been laughed out of most forums in the 1960's. But optimism would be premature, for the opposition remains formidable. Energetically promoted by influential sponsors, the panaceas of the populist/pluralist recent past continue to be urged upon the public. And new voices are beginning to be heard which, should their chorus swell, would drown out the concerns discussed here. These voices belong to the new social critics (or critical theorists) whose writings emphasize the links between art and its social, economic, and political conditions and who tend to believe that the function of art and aesthetic education is to promote radical social change, meaning that the study and appreciation of art for its unique qualities and satisfactions get subordinated to ideological interests. This is not to say that all critical theorists and their followers are hardened ideologues; some serious work is obviously being done. But there is also some adolescent dabbling and thrill-seeking, as evidenced by unexpected references to Marx and condemnations of capitalism from previously timid and conservative writers.

The path of sane compromise is thus strewn with sizable obstacles, and those bold enough to set foot on it may wish to draw inspiration from the famous words of Matthew Arnold: "The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to another, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light."
Footnotes

1. Versions of these remarks have appeared in Cultural and Educational Affairs 2 (January 1981), the newsletter of the Council for Policy Studies and Art Education, and Art Education (July 1981).


3. Several critics—among them Hilton Kramer, Samuel Lipman, and Ronald Berman—have pointed out the report's characteristic squeamishness about taking a firm stand, a failure of nerve also evident in its reluctance to define the humanities with any decisiveness.


10. I am thinking primarily of The Arts, Education, Americans Panel, David Rockefeller, JR., Chairman, Coming to Our Senses (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), which, though distinctly out of joint with the times, is still systematically promoted by the interests that brought it into being.

A CRITIQUE OF ELLIOT EISNER'S EDUCATING ARTISTIC VISION

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I would like to begin with an image of a wolf pack. In a wolf pack the younger and less threatening members are allowed to take playful nips and bites at their leaders, whereas those wolves ranked just below the top do not have this privilege. Challenge for leadership is only taken seriously by a wolf of equal status. This same game is played in academic circles. It preserves the illusion that we live in an egalitarian liberal climate—all voices are given an equal primordial howl; sometimes, if one is lucky, it even results in cosmetic change—the fur is left threadbare.

Educating Artistic Vision is an "old" book written a decade ago. As such there are many aspects in it, I'm sure, Eisner would not accept today. Therefore, the critique is made by keeping his later works, particularly The Educational Imagination (1979), in mind.

To begin, Eisner claims that there are two major justifications for the teaching of art, both of which he presents in an either/or fashion. First a contextualist justification is made by claiming that art satisfies social needs. From this perspective, the practice of art must be pragmatic: art as leisure, art as creative thinking, art as self-esteem would be manifestations of this view. Shaped by this instrumentalist viewpoint, the art teacher undertakes a "needs assessment" in order to determine what the particular function of art should be (p. 3). Eisner, quite correctly, points out that the assessment of this need ultimately rests upon a particular value base which the art educator strongly believes in. Conflicts are thus possible. However,

Somebody or some group MUST apply a set of values to those populations to determine what goals and content of the field OUGHT TO BE. (p. 5) [Capitals are my emphasis]

So, irrespective of the possible conflicts of values, realistically a program MUST be implemented.

The other position, which Eisner calls essentialist, gives art an exclusive and unique justification. Art can provide aesthetic experience—it vivifies life. Following Langer, art is a language of the affect. The artwork articulates our "most cherished values," he says (p. 11). These unique functions of art include a sense of vision, a means of activating one's own sensibility, to vivify the particular, to express the social character of society and possibly to bind people through ritual acts.
Having introduced these two positions, Eisner commits himself to an essentialist position claiming that art education should be "...for the aesthetic contemplation of visual form" (p. 9), and it should redress the "historical and cultural aspects of the art curriculum which have been neglected in our programs" (p. 26). To vindicate this thesis was the task of his book. It is my opinion that he fails to meet the promise of that commitment and inadvertently presents its antithesis.

Eisner attributes the low status of the arts in our schools primarily to the belief that American parents perceive the school to be an institution for social and economic mobility. Art, not being a very useful endeavor for employment, is perceived as a frill. Recently Bowles and Gintis in Schooling in Capitalist America (1976), Michael Apple in Ideology and the Curriculum (1976) and others like Giroux, Penna and Pinar in Curriculum and Instruction (1981) have argued quite a different thesis. They claim that the quality of education a child receives is dependent upon the social class to which he/she belongs. In short, students are streamed by a hidden curriculum to fill the slots that industry needs. Today's industry requires a glut of blue collar and white collar workers. Few middle and upper management positions are needed. Both our higher education and public schools ensure that the "needs" of capital are met. Extrapolating from Anyon's (1981) work, the discipline of art plays a different function in the education of each class. In working class schools, where the parental population consists of blue collar workers whose average incomes are $12,000, children are trained through a rigid, rule-governed and mechanized curriculum; the possibility for self-expression is non-existent. Via the ditto machine, art is reduced to the worst sort of pre-determined product. However, for schools which cater to a middle class, art takes on a popular role. In such schools, "work tasks do not usually request creativity. Serious attention is rarely given in school work on how the children develop or express their own feelings and ideas, either linguistically or in graphic form" (Anyon, p. 329). The consumption of the popular and mass arts is encouraged. This form of artistic knowledge corresponds to the tastes of white collar workers, whose children are familiarized into a slightly more active consumptive role, through the purchase of popular books and the faithful indiscriminant viewing of seasonal Hollywood features. In school, art comes across as a frill, an escape and a leisure activity. In affluent professional class schools, where the parent population is composed of upper middle class jobs (i.e., cardiologists, corporate lawyers, executives in advertising or television), art is perceived as an expressive activity. Greater autonomy and freedom is a prerequisite for those whose future successes lie in the ability to handle responsibility, show creativity, understand the nature of paradox in human existence, and yet present effective choices and programs for the resolution of such conflicts. Such a character formation is necessary for middle management positions wherein a continual crisis of identity and stress prevails. The presentment of unjust solutions to keep the system afloat (having to do the "dirty work" as the expression goes), often leads to self-doubt as to which class of people this strata wishes to identify with. Lastly, in executive elite schools, whose parents are among the top executives in major multinational corporations, the status of art is the antithesis of working class values. Art is a refinement of taste and a potential investment. Stress is placed not so much on the doing as on
acquiring reasoning and organizational skills. Such an education is well suited for tomorrow's owners of capitalist production, future directors of museum boards, members of art gallery advisory boards, or cultural offices for the government. Inadvertently and unconsciously, Eisner's book supports such a stratified society. The kind of art program he offers, I will show, maintains such inequalities. It is an ecological (biological) rather than an economical (cultural) model. It recognizes change, but not transcendence. What do I mean by this?

It is no accident that public elementary schooling was institutionalized during the mid-nineteenth century. Machines were becoming more complex and a need arose for a trained worker to handle them. Public education made this possible through the sequenced instruction of elementary school. Children of poor families were released from laboring at the age of six or seven in order to attend school. The institutionalization of public education preserved the illusion that the capitalists were indeed progressive, magnanimous and caring individuals. As capitalism changed its form from its laissez-faire beginnings to monopoly status, new skills were wanting. Again it is no accident that adolescence became a cultural phenomenon at the turn of the century (Friedenberg, 1959). Children now needed to stay longer in school because industry required more technical training. The promise of the machine age eventually generated the Bauhaus and the Vkhutemas schools along with a new crop of philanthropic robber barons. In England, Mr. Tate, a sugar magnate, immortalized his fame through the donation of the Tate Gallery, while the exploits of American culture barons such as the Rockefellers, Mellons, Guggenheims, Fords and Harrimans are well documented (Levine, 1976). Today in our own post-industrial society, we are witnessing the birth of new prolongation of childhood, that of a post-adolescence. It requires much money and many years of non-productive labor devoted to training at a technical institute or university in order to function in a bureaucratic government, cartel, or multi-national corporation.

What can be gleaned from this historical and sociological perspective is, first, that our own maturation rate is contingent upon our status in the economic production process—maturation is not a natural stage dependent on a naturally evolving organism. The amount of decision-making ability and actual effect of such decisions on lives has a tremendous bearing on our attitudes towards the constraints of our position in society. Second, our schools have always been in the service of capital despite the rhetoric of progressive, liberalist education (Feinberg, 1975). The importance of art in our school curricula is contingent upon the social stratifications of a post-industrial society. Third, along with this vertical assessment of stratification we can add a horizontal one. The relative status of art education in our schools can also be seen in the light of the needs of industry and the state. Walter Smith's mechanical drawing programs were consistent with the needs of America's industrialization, made possible by the assembly line. Gradually, the craftsperson lost control over his/her artform as industry offered shop steward status to anyone who was willing to part with the secrets of his/her craft (Braverman, 1974). Likewise, the recognition of Lowenfeld's belief that art should be expressive of a child's psychological growth as the foundational
ideology for art education in the 1950's was consistent with America's Cold War policy. Eva Cockroft (1974) has admirably demonstrated how and why Abstract Expressionism became such a successful movement during the same period. Her suppositions and analysis apply equally well to Lowenfeld's ahistorical creative approach. Art was, after all, primarily expression.

A work of art is not a product of nature: it is a product of human spirit, thinking and emotions, and can only be understood when the driving force which leads to its creation is understood. The driving force represents the need to incorporate all experience deriving from expression into a single work of art to make it a symbol of expression. (Lowenfeld, p. 156)

Sound familiar? This statement could easily characterize Abstract Expressionism. The success of Abstract Expressionism, through the attendant legitimizing by Nelson Rockefeller as the dominating force behind the Museum of Modern Art during the 1940's and 1950's, ensured the promotion of an artistic style best suited for America's Cold War rhetoric and propaganda. Such a style demonstrated the virtues of "freedom of expression" in an "open and free society" (Cockroft, p. 17). It was antithetical to both Russian Social Realism and the previous W.P.A. (Works Progress Administration) projects of the 1930's and 1940's, wherein form and content were integral components for social change. "Abstract Expressionism produced a separation of form and content in which form became dominant and predicated by the individual feelings of the artist without reference to any previous tradition." (Purdue, p. 220) Likewise, Lowenfeld's program supported a similar ideal, for he wrote in the introduction to Creative and Mental Growth, 

We have clearly to differentiate between content or subject matter and mode of expression. As long as the child has the freedom to use his own mode of expression, his creativeness remains free. (p. 3)

The support of this Cold War ideology was further enhanced through the illusion that a scientific, empirical approach to art education research was neutral and value-free. "Lowenfeld was one of the first art educators to be consistently published in scientific and psychological journals." (Purdue, p. 220) The stress on creative self-expression was also consistent with a biologism that professed natural growth, unhampered by adult intervention, and Eisner's thesis is a logical extension of this development.

Eisner began his book by claiming sympathy for an essentialist position, a position which claims the justification of art on the grounds of aesthetic experience, but he brilliantly(?), or mistakenly(?), changed his mind. From Chapter 4 on, Eisner accepts a contextualist view, drawing upon the ecological biologism of Dewey, and preserving the status quo wherein education is the hand maiden for capitalist needs. After a review of the history of art education, he writes,
Although it is easy to say that, in general, the goals of art education should be based upon what it is that is unique and valuable about art, goals always function for people, and people live in contexts. Without consideration for who and where the what can only be couched in the most general and abstract terms. (p. 54)

From this remark Eisner then develops an art program squarely placed in an upper middle class view. He begins by drawing on Deweyian and Piagetian theories, both of which are a form of reduction (see Buck-Morss, 1975). Both are appealing because they support a democratic-liberalist view. So bad is Eisner's appropriation of their theory that he mixes up chronological age with mental age. For instance, he claims that

the appropriateness for emphasizing the making of useful art forms for five- or six-year-olds will be different than for twelve-year-olds. Each stage of development, so to speak, affects what we desire or aim to achieve. (p. 61)

No one has raised the critical question that possibly the hidden curriculum sequences our young to think like five-year-olds or twelve-year-olds. No one has raised the questions, To what form of knowledge is learning being sequenced? For what ends and in whose interests? In light of my remarks concerning maturity, why was there no childhood for the aristocracy? Could it be that art education curriculum unintentionally conditions the character of artistic sensibility in each grade level to meet predetermined mental ends necessary to reproduce the necessary worker spectrum?

What is most frightening about Eisner's work is the way he rationalizes how a child's social-cultural background affects his or her particular education environment. The question of gender, for instance, is not even whispered despite the growing liberalism in the late 1960's and early 1970's, particularly in California (Loeffler, 1980). Eisner presents the worst kind of determinism and predetermined slotting of classes. It is, for all intents and purposes, the twentieth century "great chain of being" of education. He claims that an art education program must accommodate (a Piagetian biological term) the "cultural baggage" a child brings with him or her to the school. This cultural overlay is to be cross-referenced with a child's maturity which is still defined in chronological terms. Consequently, a readiness profile is possible which can be mapped on his Cartesian grid, which in itself is a sixteenth century concept. This grid, which has an X-axis for maturing and a Y-axis for a continuum that runs from low socio-economic level to high socio-economic level, becomes the pigeon holes for all classes.

The six year old child living in an urban ghetto fits in the upper left hand quadrant. So goals, contents, methods are selected which match that need.... a method quite
different from a child of the same age but living in a well-to-do suburb.
(p. 61)

Huxley would have been proud. We have here a nicely ordered, packaged world that places everyone in his or her place. Each strata is given a different program. The system stays the same but accommodates everybody "equally".

Eisner, drawing from both Piaget and Dewey, recognizes the "live" creature but his creature is seen in biological not human, anthropological terms. Dewey and Piaget recognize assimilation and accommodation through the concept of negentropy—the self is transformed gradually and slowly. When Eisner applies this model of human development, art activities become prepackaged consumables which bracket the student in the proper developmental niche. There is no explanation as to how students may transcend, rather than merely transform themselves, through quantum leaps rather than qualitative jumps.

This ecological view is essentially a pragmatism. It hides its real task which is how to keep the little "monsters" happy and believing that they are doing their own thing—expressing themselves. Since behavioral objectives work well for rats and most elementary children, they are still nicely accommodated in the grand scheme of things through what Eisner calls "sedate times". This is when the children learn about technique through a rigid sequence of events. However, children are not rats. There is a great deal of resistance to predetermined plans through the children's own forms of Brinkmanship. Schools are no longer providing the upward mobility once promised. The sharing in the growth of capitalist expansion has stopped. In a recession, the current crisis of capitalism requires a continued and refined ideology if the system is to maintain itself. One result has been the wedding of expressive objectives and behavioral ones.

Expressive objectives now satisfy the illusion that upper and working class children have been given laissez-faire status. They are able to "discover themselves" through art. The "New Deal" is to have the teacher still remain as the authoritarian figure, but with a difference. The authority is hidden from direct sight; the teacher is merely a "facilitator," like Adam Smith's "invisible hand." However, should any student get out of line, the "invisible hand" becomes visible, and the system is once more stabilized. A similar illusion is found in the market place, where small business capitalists are seen as the American ideal, but in actuality are unable to compete with conglomerates. There is only the illusion of free enterprise.

In Eisner's terms this practice is called "pace." It is the same process I have just described in economic terms. He wants the teacher to apply behavioral objectives, then give students some "rope", by allowing them to express themselves. The illusion that the school is an egalitarian and free place is preserved, while all along the enterprise is being properly managed.
The illusion of the "liberalism" wanes as the absurdity of the biological view is pushed to the limit, with the introduction of the notion of the connoisseur. The pretense to elitism is exposed. The upper middle class is, after all, a group of entrepreneurs wishing to mimic those in control. They want their schools to reflect this. This is yet another contradiction in what is supposed to be an egalitarian art program. At the beginning of his book he claimed that knowledge is value-based and now the startling claim is made that it is precisely expert knowledge on which we need to rely.

The connoisseur fallacy lies in Eisner's inability to distinguish aesthetics as a purely sensuous, bodily awareness and art which falls into the realm of meaning. The two do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. A florist can identify a well tended orchid through its color, size and crispness, but an orchid has no social meaning--no history. If it does, it may function only as a sign of affection but not art. To get at symbolic meaning, Eisner would have to, at the very least, couch his arguments in hermeneutics. Reference to social history rather than the application of a formalist ahistorical description would help overcome the discrepancy between symbol and sign. (see Gadamer's (1975) criticism of Kant in this regard.)

I should sum up by saying that Eisner's organicism supports the status quo. Maturation is seen organically, not economically; the cultural overlay--the baggage we bring to any situation--is perceived in passive terms. Eisner eventually adopts a Deweyian problem-solving approach. Pragmatism is vindicated, and a feedback-loop model justifies artistic knowledge as a qualitative endeavor. Such an art program justifies art as expression aimed for an upper middle class population. Such a program preserves the ideology that art of this class must emulate the elite of society through connoisseurship. It is ironic that this upper middle class should not begin to develop an art that they can at least call their own. Finally, Eisner's program says nothing to the lower classes, nor to the elites.

If one wishes to go beyond Eisner, I would claim that a more critical, emancipatory approach is needed--one which allows the student to protect himself or herself against unconscious structuring of one's own thought. To make the unconscious conscious would be a start for a change of intent.
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What is socially relevant practice? From my perspective, socially relevant practice has to do with making knowledge available to students that enables them to know about social institutions and contexts associated with the visual arts. In other words, the students are provided with experiences that lead them to an understanding of the phenomenon of art in culture and society so that they can assess and decide what their own relationship will be to concepts and objects comprising the visual arts.

Review

In Art, Culture, and Environment, June King McFee and Rogenous Degge (1977) present a means for beginning to accomplish this kind of understanding. Sensitive to the power of culture and society upon the environment, their approach involves learning to "read" the meaning of objects created as forms of art. My focus is on the part of their book that deals with the cultural meaning of art. This part "analyze(s) the diverse meanings of art and explore(s) the ways these meanings function in the lives of people from different cultural groups" (p. 272).

McFee and Degge hold that the arts transmit and maintain the values of a culture. Art is thus a means of communication. The conceptual framework they use for theorizing about art is drawn from information theory and systems theory. From this perspective, the visual arts are perceived to carry messages. An example of this kind of conceptualizing can be found in McFee and Degge's analysis of clothing and dress. Clothes and body ornaments provide information about a person's role, status, and identity through symbolic meaning. To illustrate, long hair or short hair, T-shirts or suits, and earrings or watches can show others what sort of person one might be as well as what are one's interests. Wearing apparel for marriage, mourning, a football game, or other ceremonial events gives information about the importance of these events to a person and to our society. McFee and Degge also note that as cultural change occurs, the symbols and meanings associated with dress likewise change over time.

In Art, Culture, and Environment, activities are suggested for use in art classes that are designed to help children understand the nature of art in society. They involve the following concepts and sub-concepts:

1. Discovering the cultural meaning of objects  
   a. comparing the meaning of objects. Example: Pots from other countries.  
   b. reading the messages in objects. Example: Clocks.  
      What does the design, material, or style say about the object? What is the message?

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c. studying the meaning of placement and arrangement.  
Example: Playgrounds. What does the design tell?  
Where are the open and closed areas; spaces for adults,  
etc.?  
d. designing meaning through organization and placement.  
Example: Drawing and planning spaces for others to use

2. The art of costume and cultural roles  
a. dressing up and playing roles  
b. comparing apparel cross-culturally  
c. studying values and roles in costume design  
d. studying taste, images, and values in dress

3. Understanding cultural influences on art  
a. comparing art from different cultures. Example: Masks.  
Look at the design. How do you feel about it?  
b. studying the values and beliefs of artists. Example:  
Look at the phenomena in the art world such as galleries,  
professional artists, Sunday painters, or quilt-makers.

Another aspect of understanding art in society is the difference in  
cultural backgrounds of the students. One of McFee and Degge's goals  
is to relate art to these differences and encourage the students to under-  
stand the visual forms of other cultures.

Critique

McFee and Degge are to be commended for presenting art in society  
as an important part of art education. Their perspective is in contrast  
to the psychologically-based individualistic view of art that is so often  
encountered in the literature of art education. There are, however,  
several problems with their approach.

One of these is the lack of discussion about how objects come to  
have meanings that are socially understood. This absence may in part be  
due to the inadequacies of information theory and systems theory. Neither  
theory addresses the importance of human action and interaction in the  
creation of social knowledge and culture. Had the authors perhaps drawn  
upon symbolic interactionism as a theory (Blumer, 1969), the perspective  
of Victor Turner in symbolic anthropology (1967, 1974), or the sociology  
of knowledge developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966), their  
presentation might have been more complete. In a sense, one could say  
that McFee and Degge's theoretical perspective is not entirely socially  
relevant because it does not fully consider human agency in the formation  
of meanings and concepts in the visual arts. An appropriate question  
for the authors to address in some way is: How do cultural values come  
about through visual arts?

A second problem is that McFee and Degge do not provide teachers  
and children with sufficient conceptual tools for changing the visual  
environment. It is certainly useful to be able to design spaces and  
create art objects, but there is also a need to know that one can engage in  
forming the visual environment through one's own action or a group's action  
upon the thinking and planning of others. One can write letters to editors
and officials, form and join groups to speak for or against visual issues and policies, and create images such as films, posters, or art shows for the purpose of engaging in culture change. Students should know that there are ways to participate in changing and creating the visual environment and that they can indeed engage in social action if they wish to do so. Meanings about art are human products to be fashioned and refashioned as we see fit. The arts do not exist as entities, either physically or conceptually, beyond our individual and collective creation. Learning to manipulate meanings through design is an important skill, but to understand the social processes by which cultural values come to be reflected in the arts, and how they act upon the self, is a far more significant act in education.

References


SOCIAL RELEVANCE IN LOWENFELD'S
CREATIVE AND MENTAL GROWTH

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For the sake of this panel presentation, I am defining "social relevance" to mean that aspect of an art education textbook which fosters a growth relationship between the student and his or her social and physical environment. Ten minutes is not much time to deal with this, either in depth or detail. This entire panel could be spent discussing the varieties of social growth in Lowenfeld's, Creative and Mental Growth. I'm sure each of the panelists could say the same about the books they are covering.

With Creative and Mental Growth, a special problem exists; that is, which edition do you use? The Old Testament or The New Testament? The first three editions by Viktor Lowenfeld, or the four posthumous editions -- the gospel according to Sts. Brittain and Macmillan. I have chosen the third edition, (hereafter cited as C&MG-3), because it was the last edition completely written by Viktor Lowenfeld, and represents a culmination of his thinking as of 1957. I shall also make a few brief comparisons with the recently published seventh edition (cited as C&MG-7).

I find three basic varieties of social relevance in Creative and Mental Growth. They are interrelated, especially as they operate on the individual child, because synthesis and integration take place in the mind of the child rather than in the subject matter itself. Lowenfeld's three varieties of social relevance are:

1. the role of art in society - which for Lowenfeld was one of creative aesthetic sensitivity to art and design in the cultural or built environment.

2. art for social growth - that is, using the art activity as a means of learning to work, cooperate and share with others.

3. art for social consciousness (or social awareness) -- that is using the art activity for children to express their feelings and attitudes about events and phenomena in society and the environment.

The first type (the role of art in society) is expressed in his opening statements about the integration of art and society.

If we want to understand a period and its characteristics, we should look at its cultural, social, and scientific achievements and its art expression. If we want to understand fully a work of art we should look at the time in which it was created, the
circumstances which determine its style and art expression as well as the individual forces which led the artist to his form of expression. This interchanging effect between period and culture, social, political and religious environment and art expression has always been of greatest significance for the understanding of both the period in which a culture was created as well as the culture itself. The total integration of all these aspects determines a culture.

If later generations would look at the interchanging effect between our contemporary culture and its bearers, they would get a most diverse impression. Gothic cathedrals are built between skyscrapers and most advanced fields in science are taught in buildings of styles or pseudo-styles long outmoded. It is quite obvious that in this way a discrepancy is created between teaching and action. This is true especially if educators are not conscious of this fact. "Learning by doing" also applies to teaching, for we cannot expect confidence from our youth if we accept different measures for our actions. By so doing teachers deprive themselves of the proper functioning of a most effective educational means -- environment. In a well-integrated culture such discrepancies do not exist. (C&MG-3, p.38)

The second variety of social relevance (art for social growth) is described in Lowenfeld's observations about social growth, of which a different aspect takes place at each stage of the child's artistic development. For instance, social growth is revealed in the pre-schematic stage (age 4-7 years) by the child's ability to identify with drawing himself or herself in the picture, and including others and some features of the physical environment, although their placement may be egocentric or subjective. (C&MG-3, pp. 126-127). During the schematic stage (7-9 years), social growth continues as the child establishes a mass consciousness, and an awareness of her or his social environment, revealed in their art by using a baseline and including specific features and objects in the physical environment, such as windows, doors, furniture, trees, plants, etc. in a sociocentric or objective placement. (C&MG-3, p. 174) During the stage of drawing realism or the gang age (9-11 years), social growth is the outstanding factor. The child discovers his or her social independence, that she or he has more power in a group than as an individual. The child's drawings may show an interaction between human figures that was missing in earlier art work, express an emotional feeling about the environment, such as happy or dreary, and include social differences in clothes. They show more cooperation when working together on a mural or other group project. (C&MG-3, pp. 209-210) During the pseudorealistic stage or stage of reasoning (11-14 years), children develop a consciousness about their social environment, and characterize their feelings and attitudes about it through art. They show a close and cooperative relationship between the human figures and specific features of the physical environment and its conditions, juxtaposing buildings, streets, signs, symbols and natural objects. (C&MG-3, pp.249-250) Lowenfeld identified those items and details in examples of children's art which indicated social growth with instructions on how to score them on evaluation charts he provided. For each stage of growth he also discussed methods
for identifying and evaluating features in child art which indicated intellectual, emotional, perceptual, physical, aesthetic, and creative growth; their related discussions have subsequently been eliminated to form the posthumous editions.

Lowenfeld described art lessons, activities and the types of motivation or stimulation that elicit social growth (and growth in other areas) in the child's art work. They were such activities as having the child draw, paint or model in plasticine himself or herself with a pet, parent or in an event with another person. Art activities during the stages that include the baseline and a socio-centric orientation to the environment were planned to encourage additional ways of depicting spatial relationships, such as through X-ray drawings, foldovers, and overlapping. He also recommended murals as a method for developing student interaction and cooperation through group art activities. The student learned not only to cooperate and share ideas, but to give up space and territory, to move his or her contribution from a prominent to a less prominent position for the overall success of the mural, and to use overlapping and size to show importance and relationships.

The third variety of social relevance (art for social consciousness) is an extension of social growth appearing to some degree in the stage of dawning realism (gang age), but more fully during the pseudo-realistic stage, stage of reasoning and adolescence. Since this latter stage is also the one when the student's visual and haptic orientations tend to settle somewhere on that continuum, Lowenfeld recommended socially-conscious topics and stimulation which developed both orientations in its production.

Brittain also raises issues of responsibility which relates social consciousness with social conscience, as in the following passage:

Somebody has to worry about the future of our country. With poorly designed "builder" houses, glaring neon signs, big billboards proclaiming the virtues of particular kinds of beer, and local streams being used as garbage dumps, the prospects for the future beauty of the earth look very dim... Examining our surroundings in detail, seeing beauty not only in the spectacular but also in the smallest growing things, is not limited to any one field. But art experiences can bring new realizations to this environment, evaluations based on reasons other than economic. The conservation of our resources depends in part on the sympathetic preservation of that which is beautiful, that which has intrinsic value, and that which is reusable in other forms. (C&MC-7)

Where Lowenfeld uses the imagery of cathedrals among skyscrapers to illustrate his point, Brittain uses "builder" houses, billboards, and garbage dumps. Although each reflects a different personal point of view, they also reflect the difference of twenty-five years and social change.
In addition to these three varieties of social relevance, Lowenfeld held a very specific aesthetic philosophy about murals in the social and physical environment. He felt that murals reflected the nature or character of the society and culture in which they were painted. The purpose of murals, for Lowenfeld, is to enhance the architecture of the building, to remain sensitive to the building's architectural features and the texture of its wall surfaces without losing the building's integrity. Murals, such as those in Byzantium or the early Renaissance, reflected morally sound cultures. In contrast, murals of the late Renaissance and Baroque -- with painted-in architectural features that did not exist, beginning with Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel Ceiling, and reaching a climax in the skies, clouds, ascending angels, and people leaning over balcony railings in Rococo ceiling frescoes -- reflected a decadent and immoral society or culture.

I sometimes think of this when I see murals on the outside of big city buildings. Some are flat and decorative, depicting the history of an ethnic group or some aspect of their lives. Others deny the existence of the building by depicting streets of little shops, landscapes and beach scenes, the extension of parking lots or the street itself into a vanishing point, or the architectural features of another era. Murals we now call "street art"; they are reflections of a society trying to open-up the environment of the city through illusion.

Without making a detailed comparison between the third edition of Creative and Mental Growth, and the recently published seventh edition, one observation should be made. With the fourth edition the sections on growth areas (social, physical, intellectual, emotional, perceptual, aesthetic and creative) were dropped from the discussions on each stage of development, and collapsed into a single chapter on "The Meaning of Art in the Classroom." In the seventh edition, the sections on social growth, which Lowenfeld treated separately at each stage of development, are collapsed into four paragraphs in a chapter on "Understanding Growth and Development." In the chapters dealing with special stages of development, Brittain refers to aspects of social growth related to each stage, but in broad terms. They reflect Lowenfeld's ideas but the text has been changed.

The revision of a textbook might be compared to the remaking of a movie. Each remake takes on the styles, emphasis, design, and social milieu of the time in which it occurs. The revision, or updating, of a textbook often incorporates new research, reflects recent trends, and responds to social and cultural change. One problem arising from this is how to make the necessary revisions without losing the unique features, qualities and other aspects which gave the original its significance, importance and popularity. Consequently, Brittain may deal with similar issues but in more contemporary terms and references. For instance, the following passage under the heading, "The Meaning of Art for Society" in the seventh edition has relatively the same location and purpose as the introductory passage by Lowenfeld, quoted above from the third edition:

Art is often considered the highest form of human expression. It is certainly true that art is something that is cherished, sometimes valuable for the collector, and can even be stolen for ransom. Art is also a reflection of the society that
creates it. The art of ancient Greece or Egypt tells us a great deal about the society in which it was produced. It is a little difficult to evaluate the present forms of art within our own society; although art critics enjoy tackling this task, the artists themselves seem to be less interested in the meaning of the art they produce...It could be interesting to look at our society from the point of view of an archeologist a few thousand years from now and guess at the kind of society he might piece together from the variety of art forms found in the drug store, automobile showroom, or airport novelty shop...

Art can play a meaningful role in the development of children. Focus of teaching is the developing, changing, dynamic child who becomes increasingly aware of himself and his environment. Art education can provide the opportunity for increasing the capacity for action, experience, redefinition, and stability needed in a society filled with changes, tensions, and uncertainties. (C&MG-7, pp. 22-23)

To summarize, there is a strong element of social relevance pervading Lowenfeld's Creative and Mental Growth in both the original editions and the revisions by W. Lambert Brittain. As noted, there are three varieties of social relevance in Creative and Mental Growth: the role of art in society, art for social growth, and art for social consciousness. Lowenfeld demonstrated how to stimulate students to include aspects of social growth in their art and how to evaluate student drawings in order to identify manifestations of social growth in the relationships between human figures, the child's social and physical environment, and spatial representations. The Brittain revisions treat these aspects more generally.

References


AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
FROM MEMBERS OF THE CAUCUS ON SOCIAL THEORY

Susan L. Dorsey
Park School District, Boulder, Colorado

I wish to thank all of those members who helped in the compiling of this bibliography. The idea for this project originated with the thought of exchanging some of our interests with one another through an exchange of our favorite, or most inspiring, books that influenced us in one way or another.

A few books are listed by more than one individual; all comments have been included here for the simple reason that another person's view of the same book varies, and can make for enlightening reading.

Since many of us come together only once a year at the NAEA Convention, this might be a way of learning more about each other, individually and as a group. I hope this bibliography can become a useful resource for you in teaching, as well as in your own interests.

From MYRNA T. Amdursky:

Juster, Norton, The dot and the line.
"Freedom is not a license for chaos!"

"Deals with how people--especially women--are exploited visually through advertising."

From ROBERT BERSSON:

"Describes in detail for the classroom teacher (preschool through junior high school) and college methods students a demanding but practical art program and philosophy. Nonsexist, nonelitist, and in harmony with the yet-to-be-accomplished ideals of our democratic society. Chapman's approach achieves a rare balance between individual fulfillment and social relevance in the art program. For all reading levels, undergraduate through professional."

"A lively introduction to the ways in which the dominant social classes in any given society define and shape art and visual culture to their own cultural, political, and socio-economic ends. Focuses in particular on the ways in which capitalism and its ruling classes have shaped Western art and culture. Provocative reading for advanced high school art classes, college art appreciation and art history courses, and professional art educators. Challenging text made clear and comprehensible by many visual aids and reproductions."


"Wicked fun and insightful satire. The whole art world hated it, but the book sold like hotcakes. Wolfe explores, in pop journalistic fashion, the influence of "theory-loving" art critics and wealthy, culturally pop patrons on the development and history of modern art. Laugh and learn in two hours time. Reading for all levels, high school through professional."


"Excellent critique of the education of art educators by art departments. Art world values are taught and absorbed which prevent art education from being socially relevant. Very readable. For college level art education students through professionals."


"Seeks to explain how our democratic, capitalist, technocratic society has influenced art and art education in a direction which is so individual- or discipline-centered as to be socially irrelevant. An overview. For college level art education students through professionals."


"Giffhorn, an important West German art educator, examines the likely socio-political implications and effects of different philosophies (i.e., ideologies) of art education, in particular, those which focus on the child, the discipline, and aesthetic education. A critique of logic and insight which makes for challenging reading. For art education professionals."


"Highly readable primer on and argument for nonsexist, multicultural, socially relevant art education practice. Like his other fine article, "Art and Cultural Understanding: The Role of Film in Art Education," (Art Education, July, 1981), it makes a strong case for the inclusion of popular art forms in
the art curriculum. For college art education students through professionals."

Also recommended are both Bulletins of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education, (Atlanta Papers and Number 2).

From LANDON E. BAYER:


"While this book may be difficult reading for undergraduates, Williams comprehensively integrates culture, literature, and ideology. The author does a particularly nice job of arguing against the usual interpretation of Marxian analysis which reduces "superstructural" activities to economic conditions. An important book for all those concerned with the sociology of culture."


"A very readable, insightful analysis of how visual perception has changed historically, given changes in the larger social structure (e.g., the ability to reproduce paintings and the affect of that ability on their meanings). The book is filled with numerous examples which Berger uses to illustrate his points. One of the few attempts I know of to make concrete the connections between the visual arts and the rise of capitalism."


"This chapter analyzes the Aesthetic Education Program produced by CEMREL, Inc., and its philosophical underpinnings. Beyer argues that the curricular form and aesthetic content of this program reinforce each other in the construction of ideologically embedded tendencies."

From GRAEME CHALMERS:


From LAURA CHAPMAN:

"For teachers involved in curriculum planning. Outlines what a curriculum can and cannot do, shows how to plan for integration of studio work with history-criticism and/or with work to enhance awareness of the social-cultural dimensions of art."

"Calls for 'quality control' in museum education at a level comparable to that which is exercised in other aspects of museum work, with particular attention to the public responsibilities of the museum to its audience, the traditions of scholarship and practice which are insensitive to cultural diversity."

"Examines the anti-intellectualism in art education and how it has affected research in our field, especially the preoccupation with child art that seems to be 'untutored and the neglect of research into the social dimensions of expression and response'."

"A criticism of the well-publicized report, Coming to Our Senses which was assembled under the leadership of David Rockefeller, Jr., and argues (in effect) that arts education should be de-schooled."

"For school administrators, parents, advocacy groups, teachers at all levels. Tells the 'other side' of the art education story; it's neglect in schools, why it's treated as a frill, what to do about it."

"For elementary and junior high teachers, a number of practical suggestions for activities that will heighten awareness of the role of art in contemporary life, keyed to theory and to specific art forms—painting, sculpture, architecture, graphic and product design, etc. Deals with problem of judging 'kitch' art."

From ELSBETH COURT:

Griaule, M. Conversations with the Ogotemmeli. OUP reprint, 1980.
"A poetic introduction to Dogon beliefs—how a whole society is organized around art. Shows the highly interrelated quality of traditional life; anthropological approach."

"An introduction to non-Western Aesthetics, a little heavy, but logical and clear."

"A classic collection of articles which includes philosophical statements and methodological approaches."

Series of Working Papers in the Traditional Arts from the Institute for the Study of Human Issues, P.O. Box 2367, Philadelphia, PA 19103.
"Ongoing series which includes "theoretical and methodological discussion, research reports, bibliographies, and special issues. University level studies of cross-cultural work in art (anthropology of art)."

From MARTHA DAUGHERTY:

"I find them nearly always socially relevant, and appealing to teachers and prospective teachers."

From SUSAN L. DORSEY:

"I especially recommend the chapters 2, 4, and 5. The book discusses the need of reevaluation of many of the ideologies that are taught and passed on as 'taken for granted knowledge' today. Although not an art-based book, I think the book deals in such a way as to expand one's view of teaching as a whole and gives rise to some interesting questions and possibilities."

"Although I find that I do not always agree with his point of view, I have always found him to be interesting and controversial in his writings. If I could pinpoint one person who I felt had
the greatest impact on my work as an art educator, it would be Vincent. I highly recommend his writings, including his April, 1980, speech in Atlanta (NAEA), "Six Items on the Agenda for the Eighties." I find his writings to be for undergraduate level as well as for the professional.

"The book covers such ideas as drawing concepts, aesthetic philosophies, and student responsibilities. The emphasis is on the interrelationship of fundamentals, creative aspects, the materials and techniques of drawing for students at various levels. High school and college levels."

Bell, Daniel. The cultural contradictions of capitalism.
"His analysis of the relation between modernization and what he sees as the adversary culture of the artist is provocative. I think it is an important book. Graduate level reading."

"His work on critical consciousness via a dialogical situation wherein he discusses the decoding process is most enlightening. I found his writing to be very enriching toward the conception of education for critical consciousness. I highly recommend all his books, especially Education for Critical Consciousness (New York: Seabury Press, 1973)."

From ELIOT EISNER:

"A book that has nothing directly to do with art but which deals with the impact of technology in society that I believe would be relevant to members of the Caucus. The book describes the ways in which technological devices such as the telephone, the automobile, affect social relationships, which in turn affect the qualities of experience that people undergo. It is extremely relevant to anyone attempting to understand the factors affecting contemporary society, even if one does not accept the solutions that Illich proposes."

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Efland, A. D. Conceptions of teaching in art education. Art Education,
April 1979.


"These sources are most appropriate for graduate students in art
education and especially for those with an anthropological and/or
sociological interest."

From JACK HOBBS:

Hauser, Arnold. The social history of art (4 volumes). New York:
Vintage Books.
"The basic text on the whole subject has to be... Difficult
reading."
"A Marxist perspective. Difficult reading."

"A Marxist perspective. Difficult reading."

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"A Marxist perspective." Difficult reading."

"Easy reading."

"Easy reading."

"A good book on aesthetics that proposes an institutional theory of art, (really a social theory). Difficult reading."

Loeb, Judy. (Ed.) Feminist collage. Teachers College Press.  
"An anthology of very current interest. Difficult reading."

"For provocative ideas about art education. Difficult reading."

"Especially chapters 1, 5-8, and pages 4-51-103."

"Especially chapter 2 and his many other writings."

"I also recommend Vincent Lanier's writings."

From NANCY JOHNSON:

"An excellent theoretical treatment of the development of social knowledge. The authors do not focus specifically on art; however, there are many implications for art education. Appropriate for graduate level reading."

"This book illuminates some of the social beliefs and life in Renaissance Italy and relates them to the style of paintings made at that time. A short and concise social history. Appropriate
for undergraduates and graduates."

"A cultural history of modern radicalism as reflected in theories of art, works of art, and the social activities and beliefs of their creators. Appropriate for college-level reading."

From ELLEDA KATAN:

"Very expensive. That's its only fault. Beautiful, lushly illustrated with industrial, domestic folk, popular, youth (and fine) culture images from Western and non-Western societies. The text is succinct and clear. The introduction provides a rock-solid redefinition of art, away from the Capital-A Art of the NAEA and towards what I believe must be foundational to the redesign of our profession towards relevance. And then--the part that blew my mind--Baynes treats the social role of art with respect to four fundamental human functions: Work, War, Worship, and Sex. Worship and Sex are presented as stabilizing forces; Work as adversary; War, symbolic and restrictive, within the modern era. Suggests to me a whole new way of organizing both historical and studio content."

"I have no idea whether these two represent the best of Mumford. He's prolific and I've read only a small part. These are simply the two I live with. In the intro. to *Condition* (pp 3-15), he defines man, society, art, work, knowledge in ways essential to reintegration of art into everyday life. It is the cultural paradigm for which all of his work is an illustration. *Condition* deals principally with systems of thought, *City* with networks of power and communication across the breadth of Western history. However true to his model of culture, ideas and symbols are understood only in their dialectical negotiation with econopolitical forces. Not only richly informed and complexly interwoven, his style is lusty and vigorous. Very entertaining. Accessibility belies depth of implication. (If in college we could have studied Mumford instead of Art History, we'd have had the necessary foundation for the history needed in public school art. The end result of reading Mumford is not simply increased understanding of who and how we are today but an inspired vision of who we could be."

"In this book, Barzun moves into Mumford's league in choice of illustrative incidents, color and energy of language, breadth
of cultural and social reference... and the repeated insistence upon the social function of art.

His concerns are the modern movements within the fine arts. He traces the Romantic rejection of the elevation of reason; the impact of sciences' high status upon art; and the destructive impact of anti- and non-art.

His basic thesis is that art is power and power can be wielded for good or bad. To mysticize art into uninflicted goodness is to mark both what it is doing to us at the moment and what it can do in the future.

Lastly, he speculates that the form of art-to-come might well be collective and anonymous."

From DIANA KORZENIK:


"Munro looks at how society, culture controls our use of art, especially with adolescents. He shows how taboos about nudity alienate kids from art at the very age they'd be most drawn to it."


"Excellent book for teachers to offer examples to students of different roles society has offered artists. This book could be a basis for teaching art history and studio—particularly useful for adolescents since it is organized around identity—social roles, etc."

Korzenik, Diana. Back to basics and the preparation of art teachers. In Art education and back to basics. NAEA Publications, 1979. "Describes the varieties of social purposes art education has served as a function of the need of a particular historical moment. Art education is many, many types of education and teachers are compelled (by dint of their limited time with kids, etc.) to CHOOSE. Here's where the teachers beliefs, biases are critical."

From MARTHA T. LALKA:


From VINCENT LANIER:

"Education as understanding of the forces of oppression and how to combat them. College and above."

Lanier, V. The teaching of art as social revolution. Phi Delta Kappan, 1969, 50(6), pp 314-139.
"Just what the title suggests. College and above."

Shahn, Ben. The shape of content.
"How social forces are reflected in the visual arts. College and above."


From HELEN MUTH:

"This book is written from an existential perspective on teaching, curriculum and school policy. It was my first encounter with a philosophy of education, which addressed some of my own basic notions of the power of the learner. It is the individual's choices that expand or restrict his or her own consciousness. I believe that education is the process by which learners take possession of the direction and intent of their knowledge and
teaching is the medium by which the learner is asked to evaluate his or her own view of reality as it is formed from life experiences. Learning becomes an ongoing process."


"The house as a symbol of the self. Cooper wrote this paper as a think piece, based on her own interest in people's responses, to the beginning architecture students who showed an unselfconscious use of design elements from their own homes in their studio projects. The idea that one's house is invested with meaning symbolic of how one relates to the rest of society and that this meaning is fundamental to the image one holds of the world is relevant to social content in art education."


"Content in art education is often so narrowly limited to traditional concepts of what is art that many children have no experience from which to build meaning into school art activities. According to this study the children involved had developed affective attachments to familiar forms of housing by the age of eight and nine years. The result was consistent even though there were differences in socio-economic levels represented.

To make art classes more socially relevant to children's lives, I believe art teachers should be aware of the impressive amount of learning children have acquired although much of it remains at a preconscious level. I believe that art teachers should be aware that children's cognitive, perceptual, and aesthetic development are closely interrelated in the formative years and that children's early predispositions are inextricably bound to values not yet articulated. I believe that art teachers need to be aware that these early values are not easily superseded and may not be alterable in any significant manner.

I believe that art teachers should construct conceptual bridges between meaning in everyday life and meaning in art. Aesthetic meaning is different only in degree not kind."

From ROBERT SAUNDERS:


"Both books merge for me, but they opened up a whole new dimension in communication, and in his concept of monochronic-polychronic personalities. Although not directed towards education and schooling, they revolutionized my techniques in classroom communication, use of furniture and classroom dynamics."
Halprin, Lawrence. The R.S.V.P. cycles: creative procedures in the human environment. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1969. "Halprin's theory on energizing (open-ended) and controlled (close-ended) scoring, and his Resources, Score, Valuation, and Performance cycling of human behavior, movement (as in dance with his wife Ann Halprin), and community planning, so blew my mind back in 1969 that I read it in one sitting. It has exciting and viable applications to curriculum design and scoring classroom interaction, although there is nothing about curriculum in the book. It deals with the architectural-visual environment. It also gave me the techniques to make student performance objectives creative."

Lowenfeld, Viktor. Creative and mental growth. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949, 1952, 1959 (Eds. 1, 2, and 3). "These three original Lowenfeld editions still have the sections on evaluating aesthetic, physical, emotional, social and intellectual growth in child art, and his theories on art history in a visual-haptic context. The social orientation Lowenfeld has given to creative growth are prominent through his text, and still remain in essence in the subsequent posthumous editions by W. Lambert Brittain."

Saunders, Robert. Relating art and humanities in the classroom. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Publishing Co., 1977. "The chapters on human needs and social needs, on core monuments using humanistic themes related to social values has a particular significance for developing moral, ethical, and aesthetic values through the arts. The section on the Structure of Aesthetic Education provides a context for the relation of each sensory mode to aesthetic perception, and interaction with other disciplines."

Thomson, William Irwin. At the edge of history: speculations on the transfer of culture. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971. "Thomson's tracing of tribal, agricultural, industrial cultural orientations, and our current direction into a scientific-planetary culture provided a new working basis for my own philosophy on the history of art education. It also opened me up to a context in which the future and the past became one reality. Out of it came a recognition of the need for art education to take an active role in bringing about a New Age in which the arts, aesthetics, and things of the spirit are central to human existance."


Lessing, Doris. Canopus in Argos.
From MURIEL SILBERSTEIN-STORFER:

Storfer, M. S. Doing art together. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Museum Special Services Office, P.O. Box 700, Middle Village, N.Y. 11379.
"A book for parents who want to develop and share the creative instincts of their children. This is a book about creating art. Based on the past eighteen years of research by the author in the areas of parent-child art workshops that have been enormously successful both at the Metropolitan and the Museum of Modern Art. An imaginative and practical introduction to the world of art for beginners of all ages."

From WALTER ST. DENIS:

"I can't think of a specific article or book which has influenced my belief that thus teaching art involves social theory. You are aware of the impact you are making in each student's social awareness and behavior in daily contact with each student."

From CHARLES G. WIEDER:

"Writing from a classical liberal (Libertarian) point of view, the author argues for the importance of art and individuality in education, especially as these affect life in free, open societies."

"This softbound volume contains two essays on social science research methodology. The author, an Austrian economist, is incisively critical of the trends toward quantitative(empirical, statistical) research models where human action and motivation are involved. Recommended is an approach termed methodological individualism which is outlined in terms of basic principles and underlying assumptions."

"This work combines humanism with ideas on self development. A forerunner of the humanistic psychology movement and all of the spinoff self-help and marriage counseling guides that have taken Maslow's lead."
From ANONYMOUS, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND:


