THE BULLETIN OF THE CAUCUS ON SOCIAL THEORY AND ART EDUCATION NUMBER 4
In this issue of The Bulletin our colleagues in the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education continue a tradition of comment and expression which seeks to explain theoretical or pragmatic relationships of art education and social circumstance.

The works presented here examine critical practice in art education, recognize the relevance of political understanding for art educators, present the significant contributions of Herbert Read from a humanist frame of reference, continue the dialogue on the A.I.M. statement, and examine the use of metaphor from a social perspective.

The majority of the articles in this issue are derived from presentations made at the 23rd annual N.A.E.A. convention.

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Lanny Milbrandt
# CONTENTS

## ARTICLES

**THE ARTS, SCHOOL PRACTICE, AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION**

Landon E. Beyer

**WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "ART MEANS WORK"? (A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO THE A.I.M. STATEMENT)**

Cathy A. Brooks

**THE CULTURES OF AESTHETIC DISCOURSE (CAD): ORIGINS, CONTRADICTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS**

Karen A. Hamblen

**A.I.M. REVISITED**

Jack A. Hobbs

**ART EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL USE OF METAPHOR**

Nancy R. Johnson

**EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND SOCIAL TRANSFIGURATION**

Lanny Milbrandt

**SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE IN ART TEACHER EDUCATION**

Dan Nadianer

**THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM**

Ann L. Sherman

**THE HUMANISM OF HERBERT READ**

Charles G. Wieder
Attempts at articulating and instituting socially responsive programs in art education are heartening and long overdue. The work of the Caucus on Social Theory and Art Education, and the Bulletin as a reflection of the issues dealt with by the caucus, are laudatory and provocative. I seek to further these efforts in this essay by: 1) elaborating the social context within which schools function, and detailing how the political, economic, and ideological interests our educational system serves affect school policy, organizational structures within education, and school practice generally; and 2) suggest how the arts may be an effective force in countering the socially useful practices which schools embody. By situating the study of the arts within the literature on schools as agents of social reproduction we may see more clearly both the problems and possibilities for education in the arts that is socially responsive, politically sensitive, and ethically just.

Schools have historically been understood as central institutions in helping further the major tenets of the liberal tradition upon which our society was founded. From the inception of the common school system almost 150 years ago, and continuing through various reform efforts, schools have been thought of as central to the stability of our social system. Within the liberal tradition, our educational system has been conceived as essentially meritocratic and politically neutral, while schools have been thought to maximize human potential, provide necessary and fitting socialization experiences, create the conditions necessary for equality of opportunity,
promote social mobility, and generally serve as an important cornerstone for enlightened participation in democratic institutions. The value and place of the public school system in promoting and maintaining these liberal values has not gone unnoticed.

Yet increasingly this role of schools has been subject to critical analysis and interpretation. The major assumptions which inform our understanding of schools are continuing to be challenged from several quarters. Historians such as Katz (1968, 1971), Greer (1972), Karier (1975), and Tyack (1974), have questioned the view that public, universal schooling was instituted to further the interests of the lower classes and poor, on the one hand, or the "good of all," on the other; these scholars suggest instead that the creation of schools, their organizational patterns and structure, centralization, etc., progressed in such a way as to benefit disproportionately those in positions of power in the wider society. For instance, the patterns of acculturation which the schools fostered has the effect of denying the validity of values, norms, and ideas expressed by minority cultural groups and of furthering the beliefs of, particularly, white, male, middle class Americans. Again, there is considerable evidence that schools were founded to protect the wealth and privileges of the advantaged at least as much as they were designed to provide avenues for social and economic improvement. In addition to such historical inquiry, philosophers of education like Feinberg (1975) argue that an overt or tacit commitment to science, technology, and the demands of industrial capitalism skewed the theories and programs of educators working within the liberal tradition (e.g., Dewey) and affected their ideas concerning progress, human nature, and equality. Taking the demands of a growing, increasingly industrialized, and divided labor force as facts of social life to which schools must respond, educational theories become shaped by the values of the productive forces of society. By remaining sensitive to the social context within which educational policy and practice necessarily functions, the critically oriented research efforts of such people as Feinberg reminded us of the continued need to treat historical and philosophical analyses as more than mere doctrines. When placed within a larger framework, such philosophical investigations become insightful and illuminating (see, for example, Feinberg, 1983). I shall return to this point later in this essay.

Political economists like Bowles and Gintis (1976) have presented further evidence that schools are not in fact the meritocratic institutions we have assumed. In particular, these authors have argued that the personality and dispositional traits which schools sanction correspond to the "needs" of a stratified, hierarchical, unequal society such as ours. The pervasiveness of a hidden curriculum (Jackson, 1968) within our educational institutions, thus, is not to be seen as natural, inevitable, or even necessarily justifiable, but rather as being compatible with the requirements of a capitalist labor force. In addition to the hidden curriculum, still other writers have argued that the knowledge which schools convey—both the form and content of the overt curriculum— is related to the larger distribution of wealth and social power (Apple, 1979; Young, 1971; Whitty and Young, 1976; Bernstein, 1975). Here it is argued that the question of whose knowledge finds its way into classrooms (and whose does not), how it is organized and distributed (by class, race, and gender), what sorts of evaluative activities are correlated with it (Apple and Beyer, 1983), and so on, cannot be answered apart from the larger patterns of distribution extant in society generally. Thinking about specific knowledge forms, and their distribution in schools, as essentially isolated, politically neutral phenomena, is
All of these investigations point to one central fact. Educational policy and practice at a variety of levels—the organizational patterns in accord with which schools are governed, the hidden and overt curricula they promote, the form in which knowledge is transmitted, the ways in which these things are evaluated, and even the very historical and contemporary purposes they were designed to serve—need to be situated within the complex nexus of processes, institutions, and ideologies which comprise our social system. It is no longer sufficient to analyze education as an autonomous, abstracted, apolitical domain. Nor is it justifiable to design policy, programs, and curricula which are indifferent to the social context within which schools exist. Analyses such as those outlined above have gone some way in eroding the view that schools are meritocratic, amoral, culturally fair institutions dedicated to upholding traditions of freedom, democratic participation, and equality. Indeed the arguments and studies generated by this growing body of critically oriented research on schools indicate that educational institutions operate so as to further patterns or dominance, exploitation, and stratification. We may collectively refer to this body of scholarship as concerned with the socially reproductive role of schools. Two aspects of this research literature are of special interest when considering the possibility of a socially responsive art education.

First, the literature on the role of schools as agents of social reproduction has raised significant questions about the role of culture generally in ideological domination. While some initial studies (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 1976) focused on the economic parameters of social reproduction, and hence tended to generate analyses that were overly mechanical and economistic, more recent investigations have highlighted the cultural components of reproduction (Apple, 1982; Willis, 1978; Everhart, 1983; Apple and Wais, 1983; Beyer, 1983). Within this expanded version of social reproduction, the role of ideology is not to be located exclusively in economic patterns having to do with the division of labor, social mobility, and the like; instead cultural processes and objects, forms of consciousness, and concrete, day to day lived experiences are to be seen as key elements in understanding the role of schools in promoting social reproduction. In this way the arts may become an important subject for such critically oriented investigations (Beyer, 1979, 1981; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978; Williams, 1961, 1977; Eagleton, 1976).

Let us examine this important conceptual point in some detail. Critical theorists have focused in part on the means by which the central demands of the economy are furthered by school policy and practice. For example, there is ample evidence that as students are hierarchically ordered, different students are taught different norms, skills, and values—often on the basis of race, social class, and gender. Further, these norms and skills tend to embody the values required by these students' projected rungs on the labor market. In this way schools help meet the needs of an economy for a stratified and partially socialized body of employees. Again, the educational apparatus as a whole helps to further the proliferation of various technical and administrative forms of knowledge that bolster the expansion of markets, help create new (and usually artificial) consumer needs, help maintain the division of labor, and promote technical innovation to increase one's share of a market or to increase profit margins. In sum, schools further the economic patterns of our system by promoting patterns which are aimed at 1) creating the conditions necessary for capital accumu-
lation and 2) increasing the viability of production.

More culturally oriented theories, while recognizing the validity of such economic consequences of schooling, have gone beyond this structural or impositional model of social reproduction. They highlight the ways in which schools, in addition to promoting, say, capital accumulation and production, also create forms of consciousness, cultural activities, and specific ways of seeing and feeling within day to day experiences for students. Such culturally sensitive theories insist that we analyze the ideological role of schools in more detail and specificity, and remain cognizant of the potentially transformative power of human agency (Wexler, 1982). In understanding the role of schools as agents of social reproduction, then, such theorists reject a simple correspondence between economic needs and school practices, and argue for a more sustained and closer look at how ideology may become a part of the actual lived culture of schools.

The insistence on detailing the actual unfolding of school practice as a carrier of ideological meaning and on analyzing cultural forms in general as important aspects of social reproduction has had another important consequence for our understanding of educational policy and school practice. We have developed an increased awareness of the particular ways in which people and social groups either perpetuate, or resist and mediate, the ideological messages transmitted to them. An increasingly fine grained analysis of the ideological aspects of lived culture has resulted in a fuller realization of how the socially reproductive role of schools is often contested and transformed. Willis (1978) and Everhart (1983), as well as others, present research studies which show how students do not always passively accept, but often attempt to resist and transform, the ideological, reproductive practices of classrooms.

This has special salience for programs in art education in a way which I believe highlights the possibilities for a socially progressive treatment of the arts. For what these studies indicate is that cultural forms, and perhaps the art especially, are not necessarily determined in any strict sense by the ideologically useful patterns which dominate in schools. The domain of culture, that is to say, may itself be an effective counter to the socially reproductive role which our educational institutions play.

What this means for art and aesthetic education is of no small moment. In the remainder of this essay I will suggest how a critically oriented understanding of the social role of schools and a renewed interest in the resistant role of culture might affect policies and programs in art education.

There are several fronts on which we might move, given the preceding analysis and the consequences which flow from it. All of them have to do with the value or potential of the arts, and of programs dealing with the artistic/aesthetic domain, as these are situated within the reproductive role which schools serve. First, we need to recognize and value the ways in which aesthetic knowledge may be an important counter to the overly technicized, linear based, efficiency oriented activities which tend to dominate the formal curriculum (Huebner, 1973; Eisner, 1979). The dominant model for curriculum making—and this model is intimately related to those ideological functions of the overt curriculum mentioned already—is based on the view that the goals for the curriculum are to be located in the demands of the larger society, its activities, occupations, and tasks (see, for example, Bobbitt, 1918; Charters, 1927; and Snadden, 1921). Further, these goals must be prespecified, behaviorally oriented, and systematic. Indeed this way of doing curriculum work is most descriptively referred to as the "factory model" (Kliebard, 1975). Artistic production and aesthetic appreciation,
on the other hand, seem incompatible with the sort of prespecification, linear thinking, and technological emphases this model relies on. In countering such tendencies through the arts (in their construction, appreciation, and evaluation) we not only foster alternative forms of pedagogy and curriculum, but we challenge a dominant cultural tendency which is related to the socially reproductive role of schools. The arts, in altering our casual acceptance of such technological influences as natural or inevitable, may be useful in providing alternative forms of consciousness and patterns of interaction that undermine such tendencies. We may refer to this dimension of artistic programs as helping promote a socially responsive aesthetic through its embodiment of a different formal emphasis.

Second, we need also to rethink the content of our efforts in art education and the use of aesthetic objects in this process. This needs to be done in at least a couple of ways. We need to reexamine, to begin with, the philosophical and conceptual foundations upon which our understanding of the arts, aesthetic experience, and aesthetic value rests. We have become much too infatuated with a Presentational aesthetic which emphasizes sensory, formal, surface features of works of art, to the detriment of their other aspects and meanings (see, for example, Broudy, 1972). We have divorced art from other human interests, social concerns, and moral dilemmas in a way which ensures their continued impotence. We must articulate, and help others interpret and understand, an aesthetic theory that puts the arts in the center of social conduct and ethical deliberation (Beyer, 1982). Moving from such abstract, conceptual issues to the more immediate concerns of curriculum making in the arts, a part of which necessitates giving legitimacy to those cultural symbols which seem most actively resistant to ideological domination. We need, in other words, to help our students appreciate the moral force of aesthetic objects, so they may become meaningful and useful in opposing the dominant, reproductive messages which schools communicate. There are many ways to further this: appreciating and evaluating contemporary and historical works of art that are of social import and consequence; creating works of art that respond to a variety of the most pressing contemporary issues and problems (social injustice in all its guises, the oppression of women and minority populations in particular, the prospects for world peace, the dangers of nuclear holocaust, and so on); being increasingly sensitive to the possibilities for working class, minority, and women’s cultural forms, as examples of alternative, resistant aesthetic experiences; and analyzing more critically than we often do the “high arts” as these may embody social and ideological sentiments we might rather avoid.

What I am urging is a politicization of culture in a way which may further the emancipatory potential of aesthetic experience and artistic activity (Beyer, 1977). This does not entail reducing art to an instrumentally useful tool, as for example in the more vulgar forms of Socialist Realism. I do mean to suggest, though, that unless we see the arts as of potentially liberating benefit to real people in actual lived situations, and art education as related in one way or another to the larger social and ideological purposes the school serves, we are apt to miss something important about the arts and their value for education. By remaining cognizant of the political, ideological, and social elements of educational policy and school practice, we may reorganize our efforts at promoting progressive programs in the arts. It is in seeing the political value of the arts in schools—their ability to transform lived experience and the very facts of our social
consciousness and existence—that we may begin to remake both educational practice and social life. Can we expect anything less of the arts, or of ourselves?

REFERENCE NOTES

1. Though I believe there is a basic incompatibility here between the dominant model of curriculum making and aesthetic knowledge, this does not mean that, in practice, the two have not been combined. The fact that aesthetic education programs, for instance, have utilized the factory model of curriculum making speaks to the dominance of that system (see Beyer, 1981 for an extended discussion of this).

REFERENCES


What is work? And how is it that art is called the best example of good work? To seek the meaning of work in other than dictionary definitions or within social life, in its contextual relationship to other meanings and values in everyday existence.

Feldman's statement of values and commitment, "Art in the Mainstream" (1982a), reacquaints us with a crucial ideological concept, work. Art means work. Over and above creativity, self-expression and communication, art is a type of work. This is what art has been from the beginning. This is what art is from childhood to old age.

Through art, our students learn the meaning and joy of work—work done to the best of one’s ability, for its own sake, for the satisfaction of a job well done. There is a desperate need in our society for a revival of the idea of good work. Work for personal fulfillment; work for social recognition; work for economic development.

Work is one of the noblest expressions of the human spirit, and art is the visible evidence of work carried to the highest possible level. Today we hear much about productivity and workmanship. Both of these concepts have their roots in art. We are dedicated to the idea that art is the best way for every young person to learn the value of work.

What is work? And how is it that art is called the best example of good work? To seek the meaning of work in other than dictionary definitions or the artistic process (Day, 1982), we need to look at work as it exists within social life, in its contextual relationship to other meanings and values in everyday existence.
hibits the individual from achieving that unified intelligence and control which typifies work as craft.

Educational practice has historically, derived its models of organization from industrial management practices (Nasaw, 1979); so it is not surprising that the concept of work as labor is evident in schooling practices (editor's note; refer to Boyer in this issue). The implicit fragmentation of individual intelligence into bits of mind and body skills can be seen in the logic behind behavioral and performance objectives. Art educators have been as likely as other educators to rely on this model, even while their discourse and theory talk in terms of work as craft. It is that contradiction between practice and rhetoric that I want to draw attention to here. I think that the notion of "good work" presented in the A.I.M. Statement perpetuates that contradiction.

The A.I.M. Statement draws upon the middle-class American belief in the Work Ethic — person's moral and social commitment to gainful and productive contribution within the world of economic exchange. The character of work is defined by this ethical commitment as well as in the style of living exemplified in the activity called art. Although art is associated with a model of work as craft, in the practice of many public schools, art is probably closer to the model of work as labor.

The model of work as labor dominates in common sense understanding in most people's everyday life, and in most educational practice. I do not refute that art exemplifies work as craft. But I do refute the simplistic notion that work as craft serves as "antidote" to work as labor, which the A.I.M. Statement seem to imply. To simply posit works as craft as the answer to the inadequacies of work as labor is to underestimate the ideologica dominance of work as labor, and its connections to the common sense understanding of the Work Ethic.

**ART AS WORK AND ART AS PLAY**

The A.I.M. Statement's focus on art as work reflects the desire to improve the current status of art in the school curriculum. Its devalued position has resulted from defining art as opposite to work (work as labor). For those whose everyday reality is a job structured by work as labor, even the experience of work as craft (art) takes place outside of job time, within the space of leisure time pursuits including hobbies and entertainments. Art is not work (as labor); it must be—even in its sense of work as craft-play. The roots of our economic, social and ethical reality intrinsically designate a secondary place to culture (art) in the "natural" order of things. Work signifies the primacy of meeting life's economic necessities. Play signifies what one does for its own sake and for pleasure and is separate from the necessity of survival. Our common sense understanding of the secondary value of culture is based on the idea of the surplus of production; culture is produced when the necessities of life have been met and there are still resources, time and human energy left for something more. We are taught this ideology from earliest childhood: "First do your work, then you can play."

The social implications of this organization of human activity are immense. The hierarchical relationships of work and play, or economic value and cultural value, translate into patterns of social organization and cultural dominance. Groups who are able to achieve mastery over economic necessity are those who are more likely to engage in cultural activity. The more one's life is free from economic necessity, the more one is free to engage in those activities which are playful. In turn, the education
of different classes reflects the extent to which their lifestyle is seen to be devoted to work activity (meeting economic necessity) or play (cultural activity).

Certain aesthetic theories, e.g. Schiller's, define art and aesthetic experience as play, as distinguished from work (Hein, 1968). Such theories typically view aesthetic experience as activity for its own sake, pleasurable in and of itself. The problem with such a theory is its inadequacy to account for the social and economic privileges that enable a lifestyle focused upon aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience seen as play tends to exclude aesthetic experience related to a lifestyle concerned with meeting economic necessity. As the basis for art education, aesthetic play theories have demonstrated their problematic nature: in schools where social and economic conditions are adequate, art as play is permitted. But it is not surprising that art as play is considered useless and even impertinent to those groups whose lives are more closely tied to a laboring existence. Art as play may be a fine model for those groups who are able to achieve the required distance from economic necessity, but it can also be a theory that effectively disenfranchises those groups who are unable to achieve that distance.

The work-play division is also manifest in the hierarchy of the individual arts. Crafts are placed at the bottom and the fine arts at the top: those arts more closely related to practical needs are considered less aesthetically valuable than those objects whose function is more closely related to contemplation, purely aesthetic pleasure, and other activities that require a situation far removed from survival concerns. As times have become less prosperous, it is no wonder that art education based on a play-

theory seems expendable. Economic necessity comes first and culture comes second in that "natural" order of common sense understanding. And in times such as these, the decisions between those groups who can afford art as play and those who cannot, become more rigidly drawn.

PERPETUATING OLD CONTRADICTIONS

In A.I.M.'s praises of "workmanship and productivity" and "good work that serves both the individual and the economy" are imbedded the ideological dilemma of craft and labor that has been discussed above. Here is the same contradiction that has existed in art instruction since it was first introduced into the public school curriculum more than a century ago. The A.I.M. statement sees work as "done to the best of one's ability, for its own sake, for the satisfaction of a job well done ... for personal fulfillment." But it also seeks work as "for social recognition" and for "economic development", and for "serving the goals of productivity and workmanship that are lamentedly lacking in current industrial circumstances." As the society and political economy are now organized, I find it impossible to imagine how we can expect all individuals to have equal access to work that offers personal development. That ideal has been invoked before in art education, in the persuasive rhetoric that brought art - as manual training - into the public schools of the late nineteenth century. Educational leaders - cum-businessmen of that time saw art as a way of disciplining and training a skilled workforce of industrial laborers. Their romantic rhetoric emphasized the fostering of a generation of ethical, disciplined, self-reliant artisans. In practice their approach to education resulted in the first generations of increasingly specialized, dependent wage earners-cum-consumers. It is disappointing and alarming to see Feldman's nostalgic invo-
cation of those past goals as a model for today's art education. Feldman had admitted elsewhere that his ideas derive from those of such early industrial-age romantics as John Ruskin (1982). But I would remind Feldman that the historical, social, and class circumstances of Ruskin's prescriptions may not pertain to those of this post-industrial age. We must consider Ruskin's ideas within the social and class context that afforded him a lifestyle of relative comfort and freedom from economic necessity. That qualification extends to the ideas and projects of Ruskin's followers, such as William Morris, and in America, Gustav Stickley. Their experiments in trying to combine the ideals of work as craft with commercial success in an economy based on work as labor ended in failure. The fine materials and workmanship and the stylistic characteristics of their aesthetic, were attractive to and affordable for only a small group of upper-class clientele.

Our society is at a different social and historical moment. To simply reiterate a simplistic myth of the early industrial age - even with heart-felt commitment - is not going to provide us with a realistic understanding of the social and economic context of art education today. We cannot afford to follow a romanticized model of an idyllic world that imagines everyone can achieve the ideal of work as craft. The challenge before us is to find, and then develop practices from, a meaning of good work that realistically considers the social and economic structure - and the ideological dynamic - in which art education functions today.

The A.I.M. Statement's endorsement of good work is significant; not as a guide that shows us a clear direction to follow, but for its manifestation of the social and economic contradictions that must be critically addressed if we are to forge a path toward realistic and effective art education for this society. It is that these contradictions have been exposed and my critical reflection prodded that I am most appreciative.

REFERENCES


THE CULTURE OF AESTHETIC DISCOURSE (CAD): ORIGINS, CONTRADICTIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

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Art has long been accepted as comprising a visual language that communicates cultural values and qualitative meanings through its subject matter, functions, and stylistic characteristics. However, not until this century has visual art also been considered as a language system of signs and symbols amenable to systematic verbal analysis and evaluation. Consistent with this development, in recent years art educators have increasingly proposed that art instruction include various art criticism activities (Johansen, 1982). This author personally considers an interest in art criticism to be a positive development for the field of art education inasmuch as it offers a much-needed counterbalance to the now-predominant emphasis on studio production. Moreover, if art education is to be in the educational mainstream and to have an equal share of the budgetary pie, art instruction will need to have a strong verbal component that will render it fairly compatible with the goals and instructional methodologies of general education. Art criticism meets this requirement in that it depends on a specialized language code requiring formal instruction.

However, behind this author's optimism is the realization that this new focus on art criticism may prove to be a mixed educational blessing. Stepping into the mainstream of education cannot be done without incurring certain dangers and possible trade-offs. Assuming the role of art critic is not a value-neutral activity. Formal talk about art among experts is structured according to prescribed rules; it is based on a particular type of art historical knowledge and on specific assumptions as to what constitutes artistic creation and response.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the value system art educators may be inculcating through the introduction of art criticism. The thesis will be developed that art criticism originated in response to the characteristics of modern fine art. Modern fine art, in turn, is embedded within the value system of Western modernity in which there is a reliance on expert knowledge and a positive value is given to the acquisition of abstract language skills. It will be proposed that art critical knowledge and analytical skills are, in Western societies, a form of cultural capital. By participating in art criticism, one becomes part of the Culture of Aesthetic Discourse (CAD) wherein class status is measured by analytical, verbal abilities, and art is considered inaccessible to those without such skills. In other words, in this paper, art criticism is not discussed as an activity, but rather as a social institution with positive value orientations toward self-referent, abstract knowledge; with a class structure based on the possession of analytical, verbal skills; and with cultural capital that consists of specialized knowledge applied to critical discourse.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ART CRITICISM

The source and even the need for art criticism can be traced to the inception of modern fine art during the early part of this century. Modern fine art, often nonobjective or displaying varying degrees of abstraction, was created, in part, as a reaction against the excesses of Victorian art. The official art of the Academies often depicted obscure classical myths or historical events that required lengthy titles and
verbos explanations in exhibition brochures (Rookmaaker, 1970, pp. 38-39). It appeared to some artists that an art style without an overt subject matter requiring special background knowledge could appeal to and be understood by all segments of the population. A so-called strictly visual art would allow for a free play of cognitive powers and be amenable to the universal structuring principles of the mind—or so the reasoning went (Jaffe, 1965, pp. 137-139; Kandinsky, 1912/1947; Segy, 1967, pp. 421-428). Ironically, the democratic ideal of an art which would not require or call forth associations contained the seeds of its own circumvention. As art became more separated from specific contexts and associations, it became more an object of study rather than an object of experience—and the more it required verbal explanations to be understood.

The twentieth century dependence on art criticism for artistic understanding is perhaps too easily attributed to abstraction alone. Modern fine art lost not only the mimetic image but also, more fundamentally, it lost symbolic associations. Art ostensibly no longer pointed within the art's sake in order to explore its material qualities, and it was often bewildered, if not hostile, public (Hamblen, 1983).

Over the decades since the inception of modern abstract art, the bewildement has, if anything, increased for much of the population, and the need for explanations and evaluations has escalated even among those within the art world. In an essay titled "The Painted Word," Wolfe (1975), not altogether facetiously, prophesied that soon paintings would be the size of postage stamps and would require an accompanying display explanation the size of a normal painting. By the mid-twentieth century, artistic styles consisted of a series of visual philosophical treatises on the nature of art, wherein a meta-dialogue among the formal qualities of art was carried out on the surface of the canvas. Visual ambiguities, elaborate puns, and optical games were developed through a plethora of rapidly changing styles which served to problematize the philosophical parameters of visual meaning. "This is another way of saying that art has become part of 'language': it is a writing of sorts; and there is a growing difficulty in attaching the work from meanings of a literary and theoretical order" (Rosenberg, 1966, p. 198). Ironically, academic literary qualities in nineteenth century art and theoretical self-reference in twentieth century art have met full circle in their dependence on "the word."

There is also another irony which most succinctly told the general public that art had become the province of the art specialist: the art critical explanations themselves were often not easily understood. The obfuscation of meaning in modern fine art, both in its visual presentation and in subsequent written analyses, needs to be understood as symptomatic of Western value orientations (Hamblen, 1983). In the official institutions of modern society and of modern fine art one find positive value orientations toward self-reference, theorization, artificial language codes, reflexive discourse, and abstract knowledge modalities. which, in total, are supportive of a reliance on expert knowledge. The institution of modern fine art and art criticism represents essentially a closed shop comprised of museum curators, academics, artists, buyers, historians, and
abilities are a form of capital in that they allow one to gain access to power and to the control that power gives rather than incomes, Gouldner, this author, however, suggests that art critical skills provide access to power and to the control that power gives rather than incomes. Incomes may accrue or the rewards may be increased social status and personal satisfaction.

Entry into the CAD, however, does not come easily. The appreciation of art has become heavily dependent on learned perceptual conventions and specialized knowledge about art. Moreover, in many instances, it would appear that these dependencies have actually been cultivated. Bell (1974) suggests that incomprehensibility has become "a prime social asset in a work of art" (p. 42). A class structure has been created in the art world, with entry and participation dependent on aesthetic capital. "Capital then is inherently an advantage; those having it are secured gratifications denied to those lacking it" (Gouldner, p. 25).

Much art criticism has been formalistic, dealing with such matters as whether paint is on the canvas or a separate entity from the surface, or whether the edge of a painting is the existential limits of a defined process and so on. Such concerns are, to say the least, esoteric and specific to art itself. Although the abstract elements of design are the very building blocks of the physical world and are continuously perceived, manipulated, and experienced in nonart contexts, art criticism tends to delegitimate such life experience associations. Art criticism as a speech community forms its own self-referent legitimation in a grammar that takes its structural cues from symbolic logic, linguistics, philosophy, and physics (Reichardt, 1974, p. 43). In the following excerpt, one might note how artistic choices and meanings are limited to the art world. In
In this example, the social role of art and its functional meanings—those very aspects which are readily accessible to broad-based understanding—are not discussed.

Stella's subsequent rejection of the literalist interpretation of his early painting is consistent with his shaped color compositions after 1964. These developed into the brilliant logos of the protractor series starting in 1967, and have since become more and more bounded by a rectilinear format. What is radical about Newstead Abbey is that its three-dimensionality reinforces the illusionism of its objecthood. Irreducibly the painting represents contradictions inherent in all painting—this is the gap between idea and the physicality which toposm bridges. Newstead Abbey as an aesthetic position is a cul de sac, so it is not surprising that Stella began to incorporate color and internal composition later on. (Burnham, p. 115)

This is knowledge about art which is created, controlled, and administered; it is discipline-specific and must be formally learned.

**EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS**

Formal talk about art can be found throughout written history in both Western and Eastern cultures (Osborne, 1970). However, in the past, the general population, for the most part, responded to and used art in the ongoing ordinary course of daily events with little conscious thought of this or that object being art—much less engaging in lengthy discussions on the merits of certain aesthetic qualities. A generally taken-for-granted fitness of form, the pleasures of usage, and a culturally understood significance of meaning comprised a culture's knowledge of art.

The distinction needs to be made between the pre-twentieth century knowledge of art, i.e., the experience of art, and the twentieth century knowledge about art, i.e., talk about art. The New Class differs from other social classes in that it is specifically a speech community that embodies "an ideology about discourse" (Gouldner, p. 28). It is not enough to experience, enjoy, and appreciate art; art must be verbally prodded, probed, and problematized. Members of the New Class believe they have "the obligation to examine what had hitherto been taken for granted, to transform 'givens' into 'problems,' resources into topics: to examine the life we lead, rather than just enjoy or suffer it" (Gouldner, pp. 59-60). Art cannot just be allowed to exist as a part of human experience. Designed objects become Art with a capital A when aesthetic experience becomes a focus of study and art critical literacy becomes a prerequisite for artistic understanding. To paraphrase T. S. Eliot, not until this century have people needed to come and go, talking about Michelangelo. However, dealing with art as a visual statement to be verbally analyzed and critiqued is not without its inconsistencies, paradoxes, and untoward consequences.

Educating all students to discuss, analyze, and evaluate art is a democratic ideal, which concomitantly introduces students to an elitist, exclusive language community and mode of aesthetic experience alien to their everyday experiences in art. In moving art instruction into the mainstream of public education via art criticism, art education becomes enmeshed in the democratic paradox. Namely, knowledge must be made avail-
able to all citizens, yet accessibility must be limited or knowledge will lose its power.

The New Class ... thinks its own culture of critical discourse best, which is to say that it lives a contradiction. On the one side, its CCD presses to undermine all societal distinctions and, on the other, believing its own culture best it wishes to advantage those who must fulfill and embody it. Its own culture, then, contains the New Class's "seeds of its own destruction." (Gouldner, p. 86)

The belief that art criticism will actually provide aesthetic understanding, sensitivity, and enlightenment is itself an elitist claim that imposes a class structure, limits participation, and ignores subcultural aesthetic preferences and experiences.

The culture of critical discourse of the New Class seeks to control everything, its topic and itself, believing that such domination is the only road to truth. The New Class begins by monopolizing truth and by making itself its guardian .... Even as it subverts old inequities, the New Class silently inaugurates a new hierarchy of the knowing, the knowledgeable, the reflexive and insightful. Those who talk well, it is held, excel over those who talk poorly or not at all. (Gouldner, p. 85)

Most public school education fosters various forms of linguistic conversions in which students are weaned away from the language of their everyday lives toward the CCD. Again, however, the democratic ideal is foiled, inasmuch as it is the ordinary language and the ongoing experience which specifically has relevance for the student. This raises the question of whether it is necessary or even advisable to educate everyone to deal with art as a form of discourse.

Art critical discourse gives the student both an elaborated language code as well as a limited perspective on art. The speech of the New Class is calculatingly impersonal, theoretical, and autonomous. In having students discuss art as formal elements of design, in having them postpone value judgments, and in having them deal with art in terms of other art that has been produced, one is assuring that students are rising above the exigencies of personal taste and the particularities of time and space. By the same token, students are also being asked to abrogate their ongoing, nonverbal experiences of art to a self-conscious artificial speech code of analysis and evaluation.

The formalized culture of aesthetic discourse "distances persons from local cultures, so that they feel an alienation from all particularistic, history-bound places and from ordinary, everyday life" (Gouldner, p. 59). Aesthetic knowledge is verbally democratized at the expense of a loss of warmth, imagination, and spontaneity of subcultural art experiences. Discursive reflectivity ultimately destroys the free play of expression, replacing one's knowledge of art with an analytical knowledge about art.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The inclusion of art criticism in the curriculum needs to be qualified by certain cautions and a realistic view of what art critical dialogue can and cannot accomplish. The CAD gives access to a particular type of art knowledge which, of necessity, is a limited view of art.
However, art criticism instruction can be monitored so that the implicit elitism of learning an elaborated language code and the separation of art criticism from life experiences can be minimized. Toward those ends, two provisions for art criticism instruction are proposed. (1) All types of art forms need to be the subject of art criticism dialogues--fine, popular, folk, commercial, environmental, etc. This does not mean that one only starts, for example, with popular art forms for the purpose of initiating interest and then subtly moves toward an appreciation of fine art. Rather, in the spirit of Gans (1974), who has proposed that all aesthetic taste cultures have validity, the art teacher needs to consider the study of non-fine art forms as both a valid means and a valid goal of art criticism. (2) The self-referential and formalistic character of much art criticism needs to be tempered by the inclusion of socio-cultural and environmental considerations. The evaluative component of art criticism should be based, not solely on aesthetic criteria, but also on the functional uses and social consequences that are part of the ongoing experience of art.

The historical sources of the CAD and its value system are to be found in Western modernity. As such, the characteristics, inconsistencies, and paradoxes discussed in this paper appear to be endemic to the Culture of Aesthetic Discourse. Art educators, however, as members of the New Class, can problematize the very value system of which they are a part. This is the power of reflexive, critical discourse; it may also be the ultimate value of including art criticism in the curriculum.

REFERENCES

AIM REVISITED

Jack A. Hobbs

In case you may have forgotten: AIM is the acronym for Art in the Mainstream, a statement of "value and commitmen"t, authored by Edmund Burke Feldman. AIM first appeared in the March '82 issue of Art Education and then again in the September issue where it was the subject of a "mini issue."

According to AIM, art means three things: work, language, and values. Americans need to relearn the value of work, and art is the best way to do this. Visual imagery is a type of language, and, like any language, it needs to be learned. Finally, art and values are virtually identical; art education, therefore, is the same as values education.

In case you may also have forgotten: Feldman used to be president of the NAEA. Therefore AIM had the status of being a semi-official position of the whole organization. This is probably why it received so much attention. First, it was reviewed editorially and analyzed by several authors in the mini issue, the most interesting pieces being by Ralph Smith (Feldman's "loyal opposition") and Feldman himself (responding to Smith). Second, it was the subject of at least two panels, including one that I served on, in the Detroit conference last March.

Mainly, in this article I want to reflect on AIM, especially its implications. But before that I am going to talk around the subject.

Our field, more than any that I know of, is afflicted by rhetorical overload. One reason perhaps is because it is an educational field and, like all of education, art education is perennially on the defensive. Defending oneself often required heroic feats of rhetoric. Another reason is that our field is connected with art, a special world well known for metaphysical explanations. Still another reason is the history of our


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field. Going back to the Lowenfeld era, or perhaps even to the Progressive Education period, Art Education has had a missionary frame of mind. The first chapter of *Creative and Mental Growth* by Lowenfeld reminds me of an esquire by St. Paul. Both are fervent, ideological, and charismatic. Like Paul, Lowenfeld used bold language, reprimanded sinners (i.e. teachers or parents who interfered with the child's natural development), exhorted the faithful (i.e. art teachers), and, most importantly, won converts. Paul and the evangelists envisioned the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, Lowenfeld and his followers envisioned a utopia of creativity and self-expression.

Today, though there is still a lot of it around, creativity/self-expression utopianism no longer dominates the field. Lowenfeld's following has been extended, modified or repudiated by a number of new ideologies (and ideologists). The listing below is certainly not exhaustive (its range being limited by the author's own limited knowledge) but it will give some idea of the diversity of thinking that exists in art education today:

1) **phenomenologists**: steeped in the philosophical writings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, these people are usually just as utopian as Lowenfeld but ten times harder to read. Also, not being as committed to creativity as Lowenfeld, phenomenologists are apt to have children explore the subjective and objective aspects of experience by looking at rather than making art.

2) **brain-hemisphere theorists**: these advocates struggle heroically to find a physiological justification for art. Like Lowenfeld, brain theorists seek to demonstrate that art in school is necessary for the whole child, but their theories are based in medical science rather than psychology.

3) **aesthetic educators**: unlike the rest, these people are generally more interested in cognition than in personality growth or mental health. To them art is a subject to be mastered rather than a developmental process but they divide over just what that subject is.

4) **Marxists**: steeped in Marxist art criticism these people are just as intellectual (and hard to understand) as the phenomenologists. Potentially, they could become the left-wing activists—the new missionaries—of the field. All they need is a program.

As can be seen even in this incomplete list, the intellectual side of art education today is pluralistic. Moreover, after close study, it becomes apparent that the pluralism has to do with goals and fundamental premises, not just approaches or methods. In other words, art education lacks a philosophical center. Conflicting positions of this nature tend to cancel each other out one another making all positions—good or bad—incoherent.

If in the 50s there was the problem of rhetorical overload it was at least confined to one channel—a belief in the value of creativity/self expression. Now the overload flows through many channels. The result, of course, is rhetorical chaos, a state of entropy in which workable solutions are indistinguishable from nonsense.

Getting back to AIM: I recognize that the statement, as it appears in the Journal, is far too simplified to be a complete philosophical position, let alone a program. But, allowing for its journalistic brevity, I personally approve of AIM as a position (for reasons that I shall explain later). I would like to see it adopted de facto by the field as well as de jure. However, I'm only one art educator and my opinion probably represents the minority. If I were a phenomenologist I would reject AIM because, as an art program, it does not sufficiently provide for the exper-
tential realities of the child; it stresses the cognitive at the expense of the child's affective life. If I were a brain theorist I would agree in part with the phenomenologist but would express my position in medical language claiming that the AIM program favors the left hemisphere and slight[s] the right. If I were a Marxist I would probably condemn AIM as a toll of a conservative educational establishment which in turn is a tool of an essentially corrupt, capitalistic society. I would use the language of political-economist rather than that of the existentialist or neurosurgeon. If I were an aesthetic educator I would be more prone to accept AIM, but, like Ralph Smith (who is an aesthetic educator), question its emphasis on work and language and the lack of mention of the aesthetic experience as a major, if not the sole, justification for art in the schools. Furthermore, aesthetic educators are divided over just what kinds of art examples should be used in the classroom, i.e., fine art or popular art? AIM is not clear about this issue. Finally, if I were a neo-Lovzenfeldian I would condemn AIM as a heresy, a throwback to the picture-study era, if not worse.

Meanwhile, many art educators do not belong in any of the above, or any other philosophical camp. I'm thinking of those in elementary or secondary education who, generally, lack the inclination or time to be very interested in philosophy. What is their reaction to AIM? I don't know. I don't believe anyone has taken a poll. But my guess is that of those who have read AIM most probably agree with it. Why? Because they tend to agree with any rhetoric that sounds good. Feldman's writing is good, it's also captivating, almost seductive. Moreover, because of the rhetorical overload, substance no longer matters. Thus AIM elicits agreement because of its putative sincerity, its tone of advocacy, its charm, but not necessarily because of what it really means, especially for the practice of art education.

What does AIM mean? Negatively: it means putting aside utopian rhetoric, past or present, about how art in the schools will make born-again, creative, right hemispheric children of light. It means abandoning mental health, emotional growth, and personality development as being primary foci and goals of art education. In terms of practice it means much less studio activity in the classroom, in particular, no more studio activity designed to produce instantaneous, satisfying, ego-gratifying results. Positively, it means adopting visual literacy as a main goal of art education. In terms of practice this means much more discourse about art. Let me be clear: discussion and oral reporting in class and written assignments out of class. All in all AIM means much greater emphasis on the serious aspects of art and much less on fun as an end in itself.

AIM, if we take it seriously, is calling for a radical overhaul of the field—from elementary to higher education. How many art teachers today can talk intelligently about art? How many have had a thorough grounding in art history or art criticism? You know the answers. Such things have not been stressed in art-teacher education for at least a half century.

Therefore, the main flaw of AIM, as a semi-official document, is its failure to account for the chasm between what it calls for and what actually exists in the field. Indeed throughout the piece Feldman uses the present tense and the indicative verb mood as if the things the statement calls for actually exist. "In art class," he says, "we study visual images... art education stimulates language—spoken and written—about visual images... As art teachers we work continuously on the development of critical skills...."
we study the art of many lands and people..." (my italics). Needless to say, these sentences are inaccurate and misleading. Better that Feldman had used the subjunctive mood and "should" verbs, e.g., "In art class we should study images," etc.

In the final analysis, my feelings about AIM are mixed. I support it wholeheartedly as a manifesto for a new direction in art education. But I question its status as an official pronouncement uttered by a national president of what the field is presently standing for. I think it expects too much in this regard. I fear that, as a position, it is more isolated than it sounds or than its reviewers in the September '82 Journal acknowledge. Worse, I fear that its message is not fully comprehended by those who should react and respond to it.

ART EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL USE OF METAPHOR

Nancy R. Johnson
Marshall University

Human beings are greatly dependent upon social knowledge as a basis for directing their actions in the world and interpreting the actions of others. The dominant quality of social knowledge, or culture, is that it is symbolic. Consider the concept of culture offered by anthropologist Clifford Geertz:

(Culture) denotes a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life. (1973, p. 89)

In his discussion of the epistemological underpinnings of sociological theory, Richard Brown (1977) proposes that all knowledge is perspectival in that it is construed from some point of view. What we know is configured in symbolic forms. Brown argues that knowledge is basically metaphorical. "(M)etaphors are our principal instruments for integrating diverse phenomena and viewpoints without destroying their differences" (Brown, 1977, p. 79)

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) also support the cognitive status of metaphor. They maintain that the conceptual system human beings use for thinking and acting "is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (p. 3). Lakoff and Johnson show that concepts that are referentially based in natural encounters are used in what Victor Turner (1967) calls a condensed or multivocal form. In this way, it becomes possible to create new and more
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symbolically complex meanings for human experience. Within this context, Susan Ervin-Tripp (1976) notes that a feature of languages is polysemy or multiple meanings. Such diversity allows for "leakages" in meaning and opens the way for metaphorical extension. Ervin-Tripp offers the example of the same person who can be correctly addressed by the following: Mommy, Aunt Louise, Sis, Lou, Dr. Leland, Grandma, and Mrs. Jamison. Lakoff and Johnson use the example of ideas are food. They offer:

All this paper has in it are raw facts, half-baked ideas, and warmed-over theories...That argument smells fishy...

that's food for thought...This is the menty part of the paper. (1980, pp. 46-47)

Consequently, social knowledge or culture can be seen to be replete with metaphor. The cognitive status of metaphor is significant in the configuration of concepts in a society. This can be seen on a broader scale in the work of two symbolic anthropologists, Victor Turner (1967) and Christopher Crocker (1977).

Turner illustrates quite well how knowledge and thought are shaped with conceptual metaphors. The colors white, red, and black are dominant symbols in the life of the Membu in Africa. The meanings given to this color triad are multivocal. There are twenty-three known meanings for white. It can stand for goodness, making strong or healthy, purity, life, chieftanship or authority, generosity, to laugh, or to eat. Red things are of blood or red clay. There are seven known categories of blood of which some are: the blood of animals which stands for huntsmanship or meat, the blood of all women as a sign of life or fertility, and red things having power, that is, life blood. Blackness has eight known meanings which include: evil, suffering, death, or night.

Crocker reports that the Bororo men in Central Brazil say, "We are red macaws." This assertion is a condensation of many complex meanings about human beings and the nature of the world. In Bororo society, macaws are highly domesticated, and owned and taken care of mostly by women. The macaws serve as sources of feathers for ritual objects and are one of the few items of personal property that are given to heirs. Macaws are perceived as beautiful and are thought to be a manifestation of aroe or spirit. One of the many meanings of aroe refers to the immortal spirit of all creatures. Spirits enjoy a diet of vegetable products like nuts, fruits, or corn as do macaws. The activities of spirits are ascribed to the phenomenon of variegated color which describes the appearance of a macaw. Upon death, the soul as spirit undergoes several metamorphoses of which one is to take the form of a macaw. The shared attributes of spirits and macaws are the basis for generating songs, myths, and stories.

Crocker states that these views on macaws reflect the place of men in Bororo society. A man traces his lineage through women and lives in his wife's house. Yet, it is in the company of males only, that spirits congregate. It is men, and not women, who have direct contact with spirits. Both men and macaws have transactions with spirits and represent them. In actuality, the relationships I have described are much more complex. However, even in the simple form presented here, it is possible to see that conceptual metaphors are socially significant.

THE SOCIAL USE OF METAPHOR IN ART EDUCATION

Metaphors are pervasive in the conduct of human affairs. They configure our theories, carry our ideologies, and structure our interpretations of each other. Supply-side economics, Reaganomics, and the drama
of the Queen of EFA, Anne Burford, which ends with loyalty to her man, are powerful and sobering figures of speech for us all.

Nonetheless powerful are the ways in which we configure and express our professional conceptions of art education. We speak of child art, aesthetic literacy, art therapy, or artistic development. We develop commitments to these cognitive symbols and orient our behavior to them. We also quite often forget that the symbols are human creations and turn them into things bearing all the attributes of natural phenomena. These commitments can be very strong, for it is possible to lose one's reputation in art education because one might not have been supportive of aesthetic education, creative self-expression, or correlated art.

Clements (1982) notes that writings about art education have utilized such conceptual categories as love, play, law, or religion for referents to be used metaphorically to describe our experiences in art. Carlisle (1982) has pointed out seven root metaphors frequently encountered in arts disciplines. These are: (1) the mind as a problem-solving machine, (2) creativity as a divine flame, (3) mind as a blank slate, (4) artist as genetic accident, (5) arts as molecular structures, (6) the emotions as volatile matter, and (7) ignorance as disease, education as treatment. She notes that all of these conceptions have implications that bear investigation before adopting any one of them.

My purposes, here, are to examine some of the symbolic and social aspects of three approaches to art education. Two of these have been the mainstream of art education thought: the creative and mental growth orientation of Viktor Lowenfeld (1957) and aesthetic education from the perspective of Stanley Hadeja and Sheila Ouska (1977) of the CEMREL program developed for national dissemination. The third approach is emergent in the AIM statement of Edmund Feldman (1982). All three of these perspectives have endeavored to place art in a central position in the school curriculum. Lowenfeld recommended the creative process as the base for all learning. The CEMREL program offered aesthetics as an umbrella concept for study of all of the arts. Such an idea is comparable to the definition of other subjects as language arts or social studies. Feldman suggests that we give form to our conception of art through the medium of basic goals in education. Each of these approaches or professional images in art education allows us an opportunity to view the practice of art education from a different socially relevant symbolic perspective. Each view is built upon key metaphors containing several cultural assumptions about art and education.

**CREATIVE AND MENTAL GROWTH**

Lowenfeld's key metaphor is the child as creator. This concept is multivocal and brings together several meanings for interpreting our professional activities. Lowenfeld said:

Art on all levels is an expression of the human spirit. It expresses the relation of the artist to himself and his environment; thus it expresses the experience of the creator with the thing and never the thing itself. Therefore it can only be understood and appreciated if we identify ourselves with the creator. (1957, pp. 32-33)

Lowenfeld develops this basic premise in a number of ways shown in the following summary. The art educator is to make people more sensi-
tive to themselves and their environment. Art is a means to an end and not an end in itself. The independent creation of one's own concepts about one's self and the surrounding world is of greatest value. The individual and his or her creative potential is to be placed above subject matter. The "deeply rooted creative impulse" of human beings leads to the growth of confidence if it is not thwarted by interferences from civilization. For example, Eskimo children and persons who live in remote areas exhibit the beauty and clarity of natural expression and thus confidence. Of particular concern is the influence of repetitive stereotyped images found in the child's environment which when used in art lead the child away from personal expression to imitation. In this way, one can become dependent upon the thinking of others and court insincerity. Interferences and imitation are also visible in complex and more highly developed forms of art. The inner spirit of the creator becomes hidden under a facade of style. The truth of art education is freedom of expression and self-identification. This is accomplished through a great variety of direct experiences in sensing and perceiving. In art education we should not emphasize handling the material or medium, "but the human spirit which transcends the material into expression" (Lowenfeld, 1957, p. 32).

For Lowenfeld, the child is creator, spirit, and an individual. The child is natural, sincere, and self-confident. Art is a means; it is creation, expression, and activity. His conception of art education is replete with patterns of social thought popularized during the Romantic Movement in Germany (Hauser, 1951). In view of Lowenfeld's emphasis on forming one's own thought and not borrowing that of others, it is somewhat ironic that his thinking utilizes socially available ways of conceptua-

alizing art experience. If we adopt Lowenfeld's viewpoint, what are some of the cultural assumptions we would be obliged to accept?

We would be supporting an extremely subjective view of the artist in which one's own feelings are followed and the rules established by tradition are repudiated. We would hold that all systems are obstructions to truth. We would value openness and change, and disparage the clear-cut and definite. We would deny the status of knowledge to anything that was not experienced directly. As such, we would probably not spend much time showing children the work of artists, past or present, nor would we tell them anything about styles or techniques and conventions in representation. Traditional techniques and forms of art expression would be rejected in favor of letting each person create the accumulated wisdom of the human race from his or her own personal resources. The net effect would be to extinguish the social origin and context of what has come to be called art. Certainly, there would be no art criticism because there would be no way to develop any criteria to share with anyone beyond one's own personal reactions to art work.

THE CEMREL AESTHETIC EDUCATION PROGRAM

There is no key metaphor in the CEMREL point of view unless one wishes to use the term aesthetic education itself. Instead, there are several conceptions about the arts that are juxtaposed to one another. One of these is that learning and knowledge are acquired through the senses. Sensory experience is the base from which concepts are developed. Other conceptions are: aesthetic experience refers to those moments when beauty is recognized in our natural environment, and aesthetic refers to order, form, and beauty. Further, in aesthetic education, one perceives, judges,
and values the form and content of the artist's experience. To create or
encounter an art work, one utilizes the language of art, that is, the ele-
ments of design and engages in creative problem-solving to achieve a per-
sonal point of view which is valued intrinsically. Whereas Lowenfeld's
conceptualization of art education was consistent for the most part, the
CEMREL conception of aesthetic education is thematically somewhat
irregular. Indeed, there is some cognitive discomfort in relating the idea
of creative problem-solving with the idea of moments when beauty is recog-
nized. In aesthetic education, many disparate perspectives on the pheno-
menon of art are brought together under one conceptual umbrella. The CEMREL
view, however, is perhaps more representative of current art education
thinking (Born, 1977).

The Aesthetic Education Program Curriculum is likewise eclectic. It
focuses on aesthetics in relationship to the physical world, the arts ele-
ments, the creative process, the artist, the culture, and the environment.
Aesthetic education also includes all of the arts: music, visual arts,
dance, and theater. As stated by Madeja and Onuska, aesthetic education
designated that area of the curriculum where children have "the chance to
learn how to experience, judge, and value the aesthetic in their lives"
(1977, p. 5).

The CEMREL view is indebted, in part, of the nineteenth century
aesthetic movement which valued sensual experience, a contemplative atti-
tude, pure form, and art as the justification for life (Hauser, 1951).
There is also an intellectual debt to the work of Pestalozzi (Gacek, 1968).
Pestalozzi advocated direct experience and sense impression as the basic
means by which clear ideas or concepts come to be formed in the mind. He
believed in the unity of thinking and doing. Thought which involved no ac-
tion was mere idleness. Hence, the CEMREL emphasis on games, curriculum
packages and kits, and other participatory learning experiences.

There are several assumptions embedded in CEMREL's approach to aesthe-
tic education. Learning in the arts begins at a sensual level, not the con-
ceptual. Much value is placed on an individual's personal experience as the
basis for gaining trustworthy knowledge. Little interest is shown in the
collective social knowledge developed by other persons. Yet, the idea of
aesthetic experience as something of intrinsic worth is itself socially
originated and transmitted. The purpose of aesthetic education is pur-
portedly to teach or enhance aesthetic response. As such, it is a social
activity more than it is a personal one. Further, the scepticism shown
towards concepts and abstractions committed to written form in books con-
tradicts the development of curriculum units by which knowledge about the
arts is shared with children. Would anyone know about the elements of de-
sign or what a choreographer does through personal, direct experience only?
If we accept the CEMREL Aesthetic Education Program as a needed part of the
school curriculum, it appears that we would also accept some ideas that are
not in order or harmony, but ones that contradict one another. One might
say that the conceptualization of aesthetic education is somewhat dissonant
and does not integrate the various borrowed knowledge about the arts and
aesthetics very well. This is a case of the mixed-up metaphor, perhaps.

THE AIM STATEMENT

Feldman's approach to art education is a metaphor that is multivocal.
Art means work, language, and values. He says that art requires effort
that is physical, emotional, and intellectual. Artistic images are linguistic devices. Animal tracks and work-marks are visual images to be read. Visual imagery underlies verbal language. In this sense, Feldman confirms that language is a metaphorical system representing our perceptions. Values are vehicles of thought and feeling. They focus on fundamental human experiences and concerns. A key idea in his approach is that art is part of life and living, and grounded in our daily lived experience. Art is a social phenomenon more than it is a private sensory experience.

Feldman's approach reflects an intellectual perspective on art that is reminiscent of the Renaissance and aspects of the nineteenth century Arts and Crafts Movement. Art is a rational activity; it is a discipline. It has theory and structure. We are asked to believe that there is content to teach in art. There is an acceptance of the traditions of the past as useful information. Every individual does not have to reinvent the whole of human experience without help from those who have lived before. We are invited to look at the spectrum of works of art, not for imitative purposes, but for deriving and sharing the meaning of life which all human beings have searched for and continue to do so. In Feldman's approach, there is a commitment to improve human beings, and thus society, through art.

If we adopt Feldman's AIM Statement, we likewise adopt some cultural assumptions about art and education. One of these is the idea that art is work. An advocate of this idea was John Ruskin (18, 1957). Ruskin believed in the honesty of images created by workmen in the building of Gothic cathedrals. These images were to be preferred over other styles of imagery because the Gothic or Medieval workman was not servile to a master or to a rigid style. Images, or art, were created through freedom of expression and work. To work is to commit one's time, to be involved, to take pleasure in the results of one's efforts. This idea about art has become hidden behind the concept of work as an activity that is self-antagonizing. With the advent of the machine and mass production, many of us have only experienced work in this way on weekends when we can choose and define our own labors. For some persons, the visual arts are still thought of as honest labor while for others, the visual arts are a form of play to be juxtaposed to work that is alienating to the self. The idea of art as play, however, cannot command the respect that art as work can among decision-makers in schools in a time of limited resources. Furthermore, as Feldman is aware, the claim that art is work has a longer history in the art world than our current conception of it as some sort of play activity.

Art as a visual language is a more modern idea derived from formalism. This idea, rooted in art history, provides the perspective that works of art require interpretation and understanding in order to achieve meaning; they must be read. In past societies, where literacy was not so universal, perhaps being able to interpret the visual phenomena in painting, sculpture, and architecture was a more honored skill than it is today. There is also the modern idea that the artist makes visual statements as opposed to rendering nature. These ideas are replete with metaphor.

A time honored cultural assumption is that art reflects the values and aspirations of a society. The greatest societies have the greatest art. Noble values are embedded in noble visions. While there may be some truth to such a view, it must be treated with caution. One needs to remember that the pyramids were created with the labor of slaves, the Greeks were rather bellicose, and the Renaissance was also a time of persecution and stake-
burning. Events of this sort were not necessarily recorded by visual means for public consumption. How many slaves, prisoners, and dissenters are known to us through art? Yet, these, too, are values and aspirations.

**SUMMARY**

In sum, our conceptualizations about art education are dependent upon historical and socially-based patterns of meaning configured by metaphor.
Many art teachers in the public schools are in a seemingly constant struggle to legitimize their programs in the eyes of school administrators, the public, and their students. These art teachers, our colleagues, often find themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to react to educational policy that may negatively impact upon the art programs of their school district or state.

In such a scenario we cannot assume that educational policy is constructed with sophistication and input from all quarters that might be affected by those decisions; on the contrary, policy may be made with little heed given to the potentials of art education to enhance our society. Perhaps 10-15% of our students in high school are enrolled in art classes, a situation that produces an adult society whose acquaintance with the visual arts occurred in the form of a mandatory dose of art at the seventh or eighth grade level; a society best described as naive rather than sophisticated in its ability to secure or express meaning in the visual arts. These then are characteristics of import when one considers who forms educational policy and with what understanding it is formed.

It is not the purpose of this paper to treat at great length the value of art education for our youth; I would remark however that human potential for learning seems to be governed by two significant factors: what our natural endowments equip us with and what our culture provides in the way of opportunities to actualize those endowments. Our schools are a very great part of the cultural opportunities provided our citizens as they mature.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND SOCIAL TRANSFIGURATION

Lanny Nilbrandt

The schools are ostensibly the seat of learning, the agency charged with encouraging human potentials to become functional for the benefit of our society.

The schools and their curricular offerings, patterns of course selection, patterns of student characteristics for those enrolled in art and other subjects all seem to suggest that art is held in low esteem by the general public as well as by sub-populations of parents, administrators, and students. We also understand that human beings are multi-dimensional in their abilities. We have the ability to read, to write, to compute, to know art and biology and many other forms of knowledge. A restrictive understanding of human potential would disallow the broad possibilities for human development; a restrictive curriculum says, in effect; we will nourish and enable learning in some content areas and ignore others. Those content areas, components of mind if you will, that are not afforded opportunities for growth will wither, not become actualized and result in a debasement of human potential—a waste of human resources resulting in continuing generations of citizens naive where sophistication could have occurred. This then is the legacy of ill-formed educational policy. Are there opportunities to initiate strategies for change that would enable policy cognizant of the potentials of art education? Although a litany of strategies to affect policy could be listed here, I will identify one that seems to hold some promise.1

Perhaps the greatest long term effects for managing educational decision making will come as art teachers begin to acknowledge the problem and look for opportunities to enable responsive policy. Surely one area of investigation should be the preparation of art teachers. New accreditation standards
for art education in our colleges and universities must include a demonstrated involvement with policy management as an area of inquiry. Our teachers must be familiar with purposes and strategies that will encourage educational policy responsive to art education. The preparation of art teachers must first of all be undertaken by those with credentials in art education and who themselves are prepared to deal with policy issues. There appears to be the need of a marriage between art education, and the administrative or managerial expert.  

A cadre of socially committed, politically savvy art educators who are not reluctant to inform and educate those in our society charged with making educational decisions could be a powerful step toward insuring a society whose people have the opportunity to realize a greater range of their potentials. Educational policies and decisions that recognize the contributions art education can make may indeed effect a social transfiguration.

**FOOTNOTES**


2. For an example of new accreditation standards responsive to issues voiced here, see *Regulations For Certifying School Personnel And Accrediting Institutions And Approving Programs Offering Teacher Education Kansas State Department of Education, Topeka, Kansas, May 1983.*

**SPECIAL TREATMENT AND SOCIAL PRACTICE IN ART TEACHER EDUCATION**

Dan Nadaner
Simon Fraser University

**THEORY AND PRACTICE**

The connection between theoretical and practical activities is not always direct. A sculptor friend of mine believes that elementary art education should be practical in the most concret, sensory way: children should simply have the opportunity to touch things, explore things, and fully sense their physical presence. It would be a mistake, in his view, to transfer a discourse on symbol systems from the university art education seminar to a third grade classroom. And I agree, for both philosophical and developmental reasons. There is no harm, no loss of holistic integrity, for a teacher to separate discussions of symbol systems from exercises with clay, just as reading and running can each be profitably experienced without being blended together. But while there is not always an obvious application of theoretical discussion to artistic practice, there is a very important sense in which the larger concepts of art education give meaning to even the most manual and visceral practices. Theoretical models are useful for teachers because they illuminate the relationships between art and the wider sphere of human values. Feldman's (1970) thesis on the value of art criticism for social understanding, or Coffin's (1978) critique of the lack of social value in North American art education, are examples of this kind of theoretical discourse. They are useful because they specify both the goals of the art program (e.g., social understanding rather than a conventional production of art objects) and the types of activities that are likely to achieve those
for art education in our colleges and universities must include a demonstrated involvement with policy management as an area of inquiry. Our teachers must be familiar with purposes and strategies that will encourage educational policy responsive to art education. The preparation of art teachers must first of all be undertaken by those with credentials in art education and who themselves are prepared to deal with policy issues. There appears to be the need of a marriage between art education, and the administrative or managerial expert.

A cadre of socially committed, politically savvy art educators who are not reluctant to inform and educate those in our society charged with making educational decisions could be a powerful step toward insuring a society whose people have the opportunity to realize a greater range of their potentials. Educational policies and decisions that recognize the contributions art education can make may indeed effect a social transfiguration.

FOOTNOTES
1. Two works that have appeared recently which provide information about educational policy and strategies to enable enlightened decision making are: Chapman, Laura H. Instant Art Instant Culture: The Unspoken Policy For American Schools. N.Y.: Teachers College Press, 1982, and Hatfield, Thomas A. An Art Teacher In Every School? A Political Leadership Resource For Art Educators. Columbia S.C.: Whitehall Publishers, 1983.

2. For an example of new accreditation standards responsive to issues voiced here see Regulations For Certifying School Personnel And Accrediting Institutions And Approving Programs Offering Teacher Education Kansas State Department of Education, Topeka, Kansas, May 1983.

SPECIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE
IN ART TEACHER EDUCATION
Dan Nadaney
Simon Fraser University

THEORY AND PRACTICE

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Gisner, intrinsic differences do not find any real explanation. Any attempt to understand a critical account of classroom practice, that teacher and teacher, where the clear view to the world and

society, educational context, and educational programs are needed. I believe that the main course of educational action is something like this:

- Teacher and school will be better way to understand
- Teachers should make an action to understand common practices and common programs, as
- Where the clear view to the world and

ensuring that this is an unconstitutional position to be in the student's teacher...
our concern with the problems in school practice, and our interest in improving those practices through critical inquiry.

A second precondition of Freire's educational programs is that the learner have her own knowledge of the concrete context. This would suggest that sufficient time be allowed for student practice; that students be given an opportunity to build up their own store of experiences; and that, as an additional emphasis in teacher education, more attention be directed to the further education of practicing teachers.

Freire's ideas imply, thirdly, that there is no harm in the students seeking out their professors' "maximally-systematized" knowing. The sensitive, dialogical teacher educator can be a great help in facilitating surveys of ideas and readings, and overcoming the tyranny of conventional ideology. To do this in a dialogical manner is far different from simply imposing a set of authoritative texts. The learner moves from the concrete situation to the theoretical explanation, and then back to the concrete level for practical experimentation, or (in Freire's terms) praxis.

Freire's ideas add texture and depth to our model of theory-practice relations in teacher education. Freire's work addresses the problem of authenticity squarely, by indicating that it is essential that learners have some first-hand knowledge of schools. Similarly, he indicates that the teacher will play a role in insuring the adequacy of the student's theoretical investigations. But this role should not be confused with the transferring of concepts in a non-dialogical education. In the dialogical model, the teacher's efforts are responsive to the student's experience; and thus the teacher's role, far from being obviated, becomes more flexible and attentive.

TWO CASE STUDIES

Two brief case studies illustrate a few of the ways in which student teachers can relate social theory to personal experience, and emerge with a more meaningful praxis in their art teaching.

Marie A. is a general classroom teacher seeking to deepen her background in art teaching. A Native Canadian, she developed an interest in using the concept of mental imagery to look at the traditional story-telling of the Lillooet people of British Columbia.

In our art education course, we discussed the concept of imagery with reference both to mental imagery and media imagery. Marie expressed her concern that children in her town were uncritically absorbed in the adventures of Spiderman, E.T., and Bugs Bunny, and had too little opportunity to develop an involvement with the equally fascinating myths of their own culture.

Marie became interested in Richard DeMille's imagery exercises, (Put Your Mother On the Ceiling, 1976) which are now quite popular as a method of teaching drawing (McKim, 1972; Wilson and Wilson, 1982). Following a seminar on DeMille's work, Marie wrote in a paper:

Telling stories is just like "putting your mother on the ceiling." Telling stories in a comfortable atmosphere is important... Open the windows for fresh air and turn off the fluorescent lights. I told stories to kindergarten students during their rest period. I told them about "gwenis" in Anderson Lake. Fifteen minutes of seeing blue lake, green mountains, Indian children, wet rocky shore, white fluffy clouds, the big slimy, dark gwenis, the people, the village, and the old man. All those subjects fall into place like a movie...

By using concepts of imagery, Marie productively inquired into her own practical experience, and then used that experience to elaborate further her
I am interested in using photographs, video, film and tape recorders, using technology not to create what Giffhorn calls an "aesthetic ghetto" but as a means of deconstructing the theology of art, "l'art pour l'art" (W. Benjamin). This position entails moving away from the production of unique objects toward direct involvement with living communication ... I think teaching should more often focus on questions such as "what is framed?" and "what significance or meaning does it imply?" and not on the making and production of aesthetic objects ... Before looking at photographs by Dorothea Lange, Ben Shahn and Walker Evans, I would invite students to look at their own mental pictures of "poverty" or "love" and to write these on a blackboard ... Problem: Given your mental pictures of "love", does Diane Arbus's photograph of a New Jersey housewife with her baby macaque monkey named Sam constitute a photograph of "love"? Why or why not? ... This exercise could also be supplemented by a search for photographs that express the student's experiences, their understanding of "love," "pleasure", "poverty", "dream", "religion", etc.

Not all students will have the background in art that Judy has, or the background in cultural studies that Marie has, but each is likely to have some specific kind of experience that can be fruitfully manifested in the praxis of teaching. With the guidance of theoretical inquiry, the mediating actions of the art educator, and the commitment of students to a critical search, it seems reasonable to expect that the social values articulated by critical theory can be used to design activities for the art curriculum, and that the practice of art teaching can thereby be improved significantly.
SUMMARY

It seems clear that art educators must think clearly about the design of teacher education programs if social theory is to become social practice. The obstacles to successful integration of theory and practice are many, ranging from the logistics of engaging artist-teachers in theoretical studies, to the intrinsically different natures of theoretical and practical activities. And it is difficult to guarantee that such amorphous qualities as flexible dialogue, love, hope, and mutual trust can be made part of a teacher education program, even when a deliberate effort is made to do so.

But while the model of teacher education discussed here is problematic to achieve, the reasons for working in this direction are compelling and inescapable. We do not want the gap between practice and theory to widen further; and we can not ethically close that gap except through the authentic participation of student teachers. The pedagogical conditions which can make this participation real are beginning to be identified; now is the time to make our practices live up to these pedagogical insights.

REFERENCES


THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM
Ann L. Sherman

Nielsen (1981) challenges philosophers to examine the nature of philosophy. He criticizes them for adhering to 'philosophy for philosophy's' sake and points out the non-neutrality of philosophy. Nielsen and other radical philosophers ask: In what sense are the concepts and distinctions which philosophers address 'ordinary'? What are the societal influences on the formation of their discourse? What are the societal consequences of their discourse? Can philosophy be conceived in such a way as to perform a critical service to society? and In what ways does or should philosophy interface with other disciplines?

Taylor (1978) raises similar questions and argues that the concept of 'art' is detrimental to the furtherance of an equitable society:

What I am suggesting is that limited areas of the conceptual system work adversely against people's interest. It is my contention that the concept of art and attendant concepts work in this way (p.17).

In this paper I will: a) outline the arguments which radical philosophers bring against mainstream philosophy; b) delineate their views on the nature of philosophical criticism; and c) discuss Taylor's application of this view to the concept of art. I will attempt to be descriptive in my statement of their views. However, to the extent that I employ logic or conceptual analysis, it should be understood that I am not, thereby, advocating that these methodological approaches are or should form the nature of philosophical criticism.

The group of philosophers, who in 1972 formed the Radical Philosophy Group and began publishing the journal of Radical Philosophy, are not uniform in their beliefs and/or approaches. Yet, there are some common threads which bind them together. These are the rejection of mainstream philosophers' tendency to: a) assume that philosophy itself needs no justification; b) view philosophy as neutral with respect to moral and practical issues; c) obscure the ideological role of philosophy; d) uncritically subscribe to scientism; e) uphold exclusive 'professionalism' and f) work in a socio-historical vacuum. On the positive side, they are held together by a view of philosophical criticism which encompasses: a) a commitment to philosophy's function as "a weapon of criticism in an attempt to raise consciousness—a consciousness which will see the need for and the possibility of a socialist future" (Nielsen, 1981, p. 88); b) addressing actual problems of people and not solely problems of philosophers; c) a belief in the importance of teaching philosophy to the non-specialist; d) attempting to gain a systematic view of human reality rather than a piecemeal one; e) unwavering commitment to examining the ideological role of philosophy; and f) avoiding the separation of political convictions and philosophical work. A central point of the radical philosophers is that philosophy necessarily serves some socio-political ends and that choosing such ends, rather than having them dictated by others, is a central responsibility of philosophers. Their arguments on this issue involve a distinction between 'objectivity' and 'neutrality'. As Nielsen states:

It is objectivity and a respect for truth that is important not neutrality. We should take to heart in this context C. Wright Mill's remarks about his own study of the Marxists: "I have tried to be objective, I do not claim to be detached" (1981, p. 86).
Rather than proceeding with a description of what radical philosopher’s say about the nature of philosophical criticism, I will proceed to examine the instances of this view in the work of Taylor (1978). This approach is, itself, a crucial part of the radical philosopher’s view of philosophical criticism. Not only is effort spent discussing the nature of philosophical criticism suspect, the uncovering of the ideological function of an approach and its growth and change are more likely to ensue from observing the ways in which it structures particular issues.

Taylor is aware that the utility of adding yet another volume to the writings on art must be examined. Given his claim that “art and philosophy are enemies of the people” (1978, p. 2), one might indeed challenge his grounds for writing a book which focuses on these subjects. Taylor’s justification is that he wishes to “arm the masses” against art and philosophy:

As things stand, the masses, somewhat shamefacedly, ignore art and philosophy; I wish to stir up an arrogant awareness of and resistance to these activities (1978, p. 2).

Taylor goes on to ask the reader, whom he hopes is the masses, to make allowances for the style and vocabulary which have necessarily been ingrained by his academic background. He stresses that he will try not to be condescending or affected in his writing. However, as I will argue later, Taylor’s superficial treatment of the concept of art proves to be both.

It is the second chapter of Taylor’s book which focuses upon examining the concept of art. Chapter three is intended specifically for those interested in how his view fits with Marxist views of art and chapter four is limited to examining art and jazz. Taylor begins chapter two, “Correcting Mistaken Ideas About Art and Culture”, by stressing that our tastes in and definitions of art are influenced by non-art related factors. He makes an analogy with the factors that have influenced our taste in and view of bread:

This analogy echoes Dickie’s (1968) institutional view of art and, similarly, leaves the issue of how the concept of art originally came into existence unanswered. Yet, before proceeding to examining the history of the concept of art, Taylor stops to make another point. He invokes a hypothetical which is aimed at showing the futility of trying to counter an elitist concept of art with a concept of revolutionary or mass art. His claim is that the concept art, itself, is the culprit.

Taylor asks the reader to imagine a future group attempting to discover why the twentieth century upper class seemed unable to grasp the concept of art. This group might propose that, because of certain class experiences, the upper class was prevented from understanding the true definition of art. (The reverse argument is, of course, often used to ‘explain’ difficulties which the lower class have in understanding art). At this point, Taylor...
Taylor remarks that, although this hypothetical does bring out the social influences on the concept of art, it also promotes the mistaken view that all cultures will arrive at some definition of art. The underlying assumption is that art picks out some aspect of human activity which all cultures would delineate. Taylor rejects this view and argues that art is a historical concept which has certain socio-economic functions but which does not refer to some essential human activity. He criticizes Marx and his followers for not recognizing this point and for treating art differently than they treat concepts such as religion, the State and Law:

To understand the State, for Marx, one has to follow the story of its development. When we turn to Marx's treatment of art the historical method, he uses elsewhere, disappears. Art is, for Marx, some fundamental human dimension. This commitment to art, as something basic and universal, leads Marx to positions at odds with the facts (1978, p.35).

Taylor's account of the 'facts' which counter the universality of art are, by his own admission, sparse.

Taylor begins his historical analysis by citing Kristeller (1951; 1952) in support of the view that "it is only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the modern system of the arts emerges" (Taylor, 1978, p.39).

Taylor recognizes that making this claim solely on the basis of Kristeller's history of ideas is problematic in that what people say about a particular time period may be a variance with what actually happened. He cites as cross-checks archeological support for the absence of art galleries and educational institutions which separated the arts and sciences as we know them. Unfortunately, this is the extent of his cross-checking and he does not cite sources for those cross-checks which he does include.

From this brief analysis, Taylor claims that, with respect to the concept of art, there is a historical divide around the seventeenth century. He suggests that this divide can be explained in terms of the growing dominance of the bourgeoisie and the concomitant rise of science. Taylor's thesis is that art was a form of life circumscribed by the aristocracy in order to maintain their separation from and superiority over the emerging bourgeoisie who had transformed those activities now labeled 'scientific'. Through the use of the concept of art, the aristocracy elevated certain activities of the old form of life which had not yet been transformed by the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, these activities were put forth as communicative of truth by which was meant the reinforcing of the old cosmological and social order. The bourgeoisie reacted to this by developing a view of art as evoking pleasure and as a matter of taste. However, as they rose to power, this vague and rather democratic view of art gave way to theories of art which would maintain their own class position. Taylor views all subsequent aesthetic theories as attempts to rationalize the bourgeoisie's changing needs for the category of art.

Although Taylor's interpretation of the development of the concept of art may be useful for sensitizing us to the function of aesthetic theories, the basis for his interpretations are not adequately supported. He makes his interpretations on the basis of a few references to Hauser (1962) with no other supporting information. His two 'anthropological' examples do not alter this situation. They do suggest that other cultures may not subscribe to the view of art as museum contemplation, however, cultural activity which conforms to other definitions of art are unaccounted for. Taylor's failure to give an indepth historical account of the variety of views of art which have been advanced leaves the reader without the needed 'weapons' to counter
masses credit as rational human beings. Given
that Taylor could adequately prove that the concept of art is a category
with does not access any human need but is solely used for perpetuating class
distinctions and forms of life, we are still left with the possibility that
activities which have mistakenly been grouped under this concept may designate certain human essentials. For example, we might admit that the produc-
tion of visual symbols which communicated feelings should not be classified as 'art' and, yet, argue that this activity is an essential part of human
culture.

At this point, Taylor might reply that, although this may be true, he
is solely concerned with pointing out the function of the concept of art.
Yet, by ignoring the particulars of the experiences detrimentally labeled as
'art', we run the danger of throwing the baby out with the bath water. Furthermore, a failure to cover this material reflects a condescending attitude
towards the masses. Not only is Taylor condescending in his assumption
that the scanty historical information which he provides will suffice to con-
vince the masses of his interpretation, he is also condescending in his assump-
tion that the masses have accepted the concept of art solely because they are intimidat-ed by it. I suspect that the process is much more complicated
than this and revolves, in part, around the fact that aspects of aesthetic theo-
ries do address essential human needs. At any rate, by not addressing such
issues, Taylor provides them with no information for arming them for or
against those who will point out the intricacies of the concepts that are
involved in discussions about so-called art activities. To assume that the
masses will be satisfied with an "arrogant awareness" is to fail to give
them credit as rational human beings.

How, then, does Taylor's work measure up to the criteria outlined by
Nielsen and other radical philosopher's? Clearly Taylor seems committed to
examining actual problems of people and to raising consciousness. However,
his understanding of these actual problems appears to need revision. More
importantly, Taylor has wandered from a number of the commitments which the
radical philosopher's stress. For example, he does not provide a systematic
view which places the history of the concept of art within a system of other
conceptual development nor does he adequately rely upon information from
history, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and so forth. In addition, he
does not address or acknowledge the kind of society which he is committed to
brining about. Perhaps this concentration on critique rather than develop-
ment is at the root of his failure to address potential issues of human
need which may have arisen out of the, admittedly detrimental, focus on 'art'.

In sum, Taylor's work does not live up to the standards proposed by the
radical philosopher's. Yet, it is a step in that direction—a direction
which art educators have yet to explore.

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As readers of the Social Theory Caucus Bulletin, you are probably, by and large, more familiar with Herbert Read's views on art education than others in our field. One would expect that you are also generally more sympathetic with his theoretical orientation as well as more aware of the relevance of his work to current educational concerns. This essay will focus on the historical basis of Read's moral ideas, and their implications for the work that lies ahead for this group of socially concerned art educators.

To all those who have followed the establishment of the Social Theory Caucus, it is safe to say that the group is founded upon humanist values. As the title of this essay implies, Read's work is thought to represent a distinct form of humanism. It is this alternative conception of humanism that I will endeavor to establish in the hope of indicating its pertinence to current social issues bearing upon art education. In so doing I hope to support the contention that the commonly held view of what it is to be a liberal humanist is tragically flawed.

Far more radical than Lowenfeld, his contemporary, Read was an uncompromising individualist and romantic. Yet, for all his romanticism, he was nonetheless rational; and for all his individualism he was no less compassionate. Since so much of this composite of traits may seem paradoxical, explanation is in order. In referring to Read as a romantic I do not mean merely that he subscribed to philosophical idealism, but more essentially that he held the deepest confidence in the human potential for competent, meaningful, and ethical existence, as well as a firm belief in human volition and self-determination. And by the term individualist, reference is to Read's appreciation of personal and cultural diversity coupled with a commitment to self-ownership and self-expression.

What of this view of humanism being attributed to Read? Is it one that is commonly held, even among self-proclaimed humanists? I dare say that most of those associating themselves with the Social Theory Caucus would not describe their ideological affiliations in quite this way. Probably, most would prefer to describe themselves as more or less liberal-minded politically and philosophically. Hence, some readers may now rightfully be asking if individualism is at the core of true humanism. Could it be that Sir Herbert was mistaken? Am I?

This very question of the relationship of humanism and individualism was recently raised quite succinctly by the British humanist philosopher Anthony Flew in a review of Henri Lapage's Tomorrow, Capitalism. (Free Inquiry, Sp., 1983) "Most American humanists," Flew writes "(are) liberal, just as most British humanists are...socialist(s)." The idea of an individualist-humanist, also committed to capitalism, was to him unheard of at the very least. As a result of his reading of Lapage, though, Flew's humanism had come to be refined, and by his own admission he was let to reconsider what it is that humanism stands for. Likewise, I will be urging you to challenge conventional orthodoxy and ask if today's brand of socialist-liberalism is the best or the only form that humanism should take.

Despite the appearance of Humanist Manifesto I in 1933, Humanist Manifesto II in 1973, and A Secular Humanist Declaration in 1980 (Kurtz), answers to the questions posed above are far from decided. In fact, the
Kurtz statement, though endorsed by fifty-eight "leaders of (humanist) thought," has come under more heavy fire from proponents than detractors. At the last count, there were those individuals brazen enough to admit to being secular humanists, as well as those calling themselves rational humanists, in addition to ethical humanists, social democrats, and free-thinkers, among other brands proclaiming their allegiances to more or less the same cause (LaMont, 1977, pp. 19-29). Even within the ranks of these various and often diverse factions there appears to be more than occasional dissonance. Yet, odd as it may sound to the uninitiated, there is surprising acceptance of this divisive state of affairs, an understanding that comes from the recognition of the value that humanism places on independence of thought, critical judgment, open discussion, and diversity of opinion. Still, even with this agreement to disagree and to work toward mutual goals amidst the disarray, let me hasten to add that there appears to be far more than necessary amounts of counterproductive consternation within the ranks. One's broadmindedness—as well as one's commitment—is indeed tested by keeping company with both B. F. Skinner and Abraham Maslow: the id and the ego seem more compatible bedfellows than the notions of behaviorism and self-actualization.

To keep from suffering utter despair, a historical perspective is advised. Studying the course of civilization one finds that humanism, as an idea of a way of life, offered not only a novel conception of mankind but also one which is still very much in the process of defining itself.

To further complicate matters, schools of thought commonly associated with the humanist social-political frame of mind, such as liberalism, have come to represent such diverse outlooks that these terms have lost much of their power to define let alone to call to action.

In all of this—the novelty of the idea of humanism combined with the inner uncertainty of its meaning—it is not at all difficult to lose sight of the shared concerns and insights that gave rise to humanist philosophy and are its lifeblood. As a consequence, it has been difficult to keep in sharp focus the tradition of humanism embraced by Read. Tragically, this conception is fading from sight not because it has grown obsolete, but rather due more to the truly radical departure of this view of mankind from mainstream ideology. Having barely surfaced in a handful of preindustrial civilizations, this revolutionary, if formative, conception of human morality tilts headlong against established belief and institutional authority. Though there have been historical forerunners of humanism, the theory has never been systematically and comprehensively formulated. And, for reasons that have been indicated, the fact that this far from simple notion has has little historical precedence explains its lack of popular appeal.

Hence, it becomes all the more important that the time to carefully and patiently explain what it is that we are about. If not ushering forth a philosophical renaissance, this effort is necessary to stem the tides of tradition which tend to dull the edges of ideas that do not blend well into the uniformly familiar landscape of certified slogans and unoffensive nonsense.

Just what were the intellectual forebears of the brand of classical liberalism that Read stood for? Historically—and this is recent history—classical liberalism was grounded on the following currents of post-renaissance enlightenment thought: a) freethought—the ideal of human independence, independent judgment, and free-will (which view had come to be associated
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In all of this—the novelty of the idea of humanism combined with the inner uncertainty of its meaning—it is not all difficult to lose sight of the shared concerns and insights that gave rise to humanist philosophy and are its lifeblood. As a consequence, it has been difficult to keep in sharp focus the tradition of humanism embraced by Read. Tragically, this conception is fading from sight not because it has grown obsolete, but rather due more to the truly radical departure of this view of mankind from mainstream ideology. Having barely surfaced in a handful of preindustrial civilizations, this revolutionary, if formative, conception of human morality tilts headlong against established belief and institutional authority. Though there have been historical forerunners of humanism, the theory has never been systematically and comprehensively formulated. And, for reasons that have been indicated, the fact that this far from simple notion has had little historical precedence explains its lack of popular appeal. Hence, it becomes all the more important that, as we make our stands, those of us of humanist persuasion take the time to carefully and patiently explain what it is that we are about. If not ushering forth a philosophical renaissance, this effort is necessary to stem the tides of tradition which tend to dull the edges of ideas that do not blend well into the uniformly familiar landscape of certificed slogans and unoffensive nonsense.

Just what were the intellectual forebears of the brand of classical liberalism that Read stood for? Historically—and this is recent history—classical liberalism was grounded on the following currents of post-renaissance enlightenment thought: a) freethought—the ideal of human independence, independent judgment, and free-will (which view had come to be associated with romanticism and later with irrational emotivism); b) philosophic and scientific rationalism—belief in the efficacy of reason and the corresponding opposition to religious supernaturalism; c) individualism—the view that individuals are the makers of their own characters, that, barring coercion, nobody owns other persons or rightfully forms their beliefs without their compliance (not the state, nor gods, nor even dissertation committees); and d) the idea of a free, open society respecting voluntary associations between individuals, a spontaneous social order spawned from natural law (which was the original meaning of anarchism).

Standing firmly against this bold, new, defiant, affirmative conception of human nature were—and are—intolerance, entrenched dogmatism, and political tyranny. And yet, far more lethal for the emergence of classical liberalism were its self-inflicted, internal wounds: a) rationality, subverted by narrow-minded scientism, took the form of positivism, and later still narrower forms of linguistic philosophy, which shied away from all but the most esoteric matters; b) scientific problems and methods accordingly became more narrowly confined and reductionistic (e.g., behaviorism) and their application less and less relevant to human conditions; c) romanticism's association with quixotic impracticality undermined its appeal as a virtue; and d) the association of individualism with lack of compassion for one's brethren likewise tended to discredit its moral worth.

The consequence of this internal sabotage was a shift in the meaning of humanism toward today's liberal-collectivism, as noted earlier in the Flaw quotation. To revive the humanist sense of purpose that so moved Herbert Read I recommend to you a careful rereading of Read and those thinkers upon whose shoulders he so proudly stood.
FOOTNOTES

1. This essay is based on a presentation to the Social Theory Caucus at the 1983 Detroit conference of the National Art Education Association, which was an extension of an earlier research presentation entitled "Herbert Read on Education, Art, and Individual Liberty" (scheduled for publication in The Journal of Aesthetic Education).

For an exposition of Herbert Read's ideas on art and education, in addition to consulting his Education Through Art (N.Y.:Pantheon, 1958), the October 1969 issue of The Journal of Aesthetic Education (R. Smith, ed.) features three articles on Read by J. Keel, M. Parsons, and R. Wasson.


REFERENCES


