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THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN PUBLIC: POLICING, POLITICS, AND PARADES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HAMBURG, 1806-1830

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The Napoleonic Empire and the Making of a Modern Public: Policing, Politics, and Parades in Nineteenth Century Hamburg, 1806-1830

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University

by

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Abstract

THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AND THE MAKING OF A MODERN PUBLIC: POLICING, POLITICS, AND PARADES IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY HAMBURG, 1806-1830

By Brendan William Haidinger, Master of Arts

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts at Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.

Director: Dr. George Munro
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Despite the attention historians have given to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras in Central Europe, few works have sought to understand these events' reverberations throughout the nineteenth century in a local or regional context. Taking the northern German city of Hamburg as its focal point, this study investigates the change in the urban political culture affected by eight years of Napoleonic occupation. In the process of replacing Hamburg's sprawling and archaic government with one characterized by Gallic centralization and rigor, the French introduced a new style of politics that relied on consistent, public, and martial presentations of its authority. This public presence was heightened not only by the implementation of modern policing techniques, but also by a series of choreographed, ideologically-charged public spectacles whose effectiveness relied on a clever manipulation and politicization of urban space.
INTRODUCTION

For several generations of historians, the Napoleonic Wars marked the origins of German nationalism while also sparking the process of political and economic modernization throughout Central Europe. During the nineteenth century, the period was integrated into a heroic-nationalist and Prusso-centric master narrative, as both historians and contemporaries regarded the wars of 1806 to 1815 as the direct precursors to the wars of 1864 to 1871 and the emergence of the German Kaiserreich. Scholarship of the post-World War II generation often marginalized or ignored experiences of other German states, incorporating them into a Prussian historical framework. No historian has framed the argument quite as provocatively as Thomas Nipperday, who introduced his study of nineteenth-century Germany with the infamous maxim: “In the beginning was Napoleon.”¹ Yet it would not be until the 1990s that historians shifted their focus to the regional level, complicating our view of German Central Europe prior to unification.² While this study of the north German city-state of Hamburg is fundamentally indebted to such research, it takes a somewhat different tack as it is not necessarily concerned with the emergence

¹ Thomas Nipperday, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck, 1800-1866, trans. by Daniel Nolan (Princeton, 1966), 1. As Stephan Berger has argued, nineteenth-century historians, appointing themselves as nation-builders, created a “backwards-oriented teleological myth of the nation,” The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany Since 1800 (Providence, RI., 1997), 1-25.

of German nationalism or state building. Rather than documenting the complex process of fashioning national unity from former independent polities, the focus here is on the formation of a distinct political culture that directed Hamburg’s development throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.

The decades under consideration are part of what has been identified as a “Sattelzeit,” the period between 1750 and the late 1840s that bridged the early modern and modern periods in Central Europe. Over the course of the last twenty years, historians have argued that this era evidences important social, economic, political, and gender transformations that helped shape the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in Germany in ways historians had yet to fully understand. More specifically, this study explores the influence the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and eight years of Imperial occupation had on the social and political life of the Hanseatic city-state of Hamburg. This work joins similar studies on the Rhineland, Württemberg, and Prussia that seek to uncover how contemporaries experienced an era of unprecedented upheaval and uncertainty. Occupation and war are front and center here as I argue that the period between 1792 and 1815 was transformative for both the practice of

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3 According to scholars associated with the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte), the Sattelzeit is a watershed where in which traditional authority “unevenly crumbled” under the weight of new practices, mentalities, and ideas. See Reinhart Koselleck, *Future Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. by Keith Tribe (Cambridge, MA., 1985).

Fig. 1. Map of Hamburg, 1813-1814. Including a view of Hamburg-Harburg Bridge.
politics and the way in which contemporary Hamburgers related to their community. This study also takes as its guiding premise that eight years of Imperial occupation fundamentally reordered the ways in which authority in Hamburg was understood, legitimized, and practiced. The methods by which post-Napoleonic regimes (such as Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate) asserted, articulated, and defended themselves and the socio-economic and legal order they represented, are crucial concepts for understanding the dynamics of modern politics.

Underlying much of this study are questions regarding the nature and applicability of the term “modernization.” The historiography concerning the process in German history is understandably massive and far too overwhelming for any single scholar to master. In general, the majority of the work on modernization has focused almost exclusively on the twin projects of state building and the transition to democracy. Less attention has been paid to other trends considered fundamental to the emergence of modern political institutions and which have roots in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This exploration of how the French Imperial administration in Hamburg organized and practiced its authority, and how Hamburg’s post-occupation Senate reestablished its legitimacy after 1814, exposes both the state’s monopolization and use of coercive measures and the process by which urban space became fully politicized. Each regime relied heavily on a professionalized policing agency, increasingly responsive to state demand, to replace traditional and communal practices of law enforcement and social control. Likewise, both the French administration and the post-war Senate in Hamburg staged highly-choreographed and ideologically-charged public displays that relied on

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5 Katherine Aaslestad, *Place and Politics: Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany during the Revolutionary Era* (Boston, 2005), 1-32.

the clever manipulation of urban space. These phenomena are directly related to the slow and often indirect processes of increased state centralization, the emergence of a “public sphere,” and new ideas emanating out of the French Revolution, and have histories that would unfold throughout the revolutionary nineteenth century, and became central features of modern political cultures of the West.

The first of such themes under investigation is the state’s monopolization of coercive force in both occupied (chapter one) and post-occupied Hamburg (chapter two). The concept itself was not new to the nineteenth century as it had its intellectual roots in the late-seventeenth century. Fleeing the English Civil Wars only to end up in France during the wars known collectively as the *Fronde*, Thomas Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* to offer resolution for both conflicts.7 Hobbes’ reply to civil war and the confusion it engendered was, of course, the coercive power of a sovereign; conceived in either an individual or an assembly, the sovereign was to be considered indivisible, relatively autonomous, and necessary for the conversion of a mass of individuals into a well-structured society.8 Contrasting with Machiavelli, Hobbes argued that the sovereign’s legitimacy was earned from subjects by the quelling of civil strife and the assuring of stability. Ending the “war of all against all” induces “awe” in the people, Hobbes asserted, and as the sovereign’s rules continue to make life more predictable, the people, who stand to gain their individual rights, concede to the social contract.9

In reality, however, early modern practice of “repression” (as that which preserves the social order) relied on cooperation amongst social groups (such as urban elites, rural nobles, and

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the local population) as well as a more democratized access to the means of coercion. The term “policing” in Hamburg had, up until the city’s first year of occupation, maintained a connotation of moral improvement and social caretaking. As historian Howard Brown has argued for the case of Napoleonic France, the shift from traditional notions of communal justice and democratized access to coercion towards the state’s monopolization of coercive means was completed between 1797 and 1802, when state-appointed magistrates and military commissions intervened throughout France to restore order during a period of intense lawlessness. Brown’s theoretical considerations, as well as my own, rely heavily on the work of prolific social historian Charles Tilly. Tilly documented the long and bloody struggle by state-builders to wrest coercive measures from other individuals and groups within their territories. Before the eighteenth century, he argues, states did not monopolize force even within their own territories. Urban militias, private armies, armies of regional lords and rival claimants to royal power, police forces, and state armies all made some claim to the right to utilize coercive means. In this sense, authority and control over internal coercion was “dispersed, overlapping, and democratized.”

The process by which control over such means was monopolized and “made hierarchical” entailed the state’s ability to impose itself as the “defender” of a distinct legal order. As historian Janice Thompson argues, social groups “vigorously resisted” state-builders’ push to monopolize both “political authority and the coercion on which it ultimately rested.” This process entailed bargains being struck between state rulers and social groups in which the latter traded “war-making resources” in an exchange for property and political rights. These bargains, Tilly argues,
are the “sub-plots” in an ongoing “drama” in which states centralized authority and the use of coercion.\textsuperscript{13} While this historical trend did not necessarily require any protracted struggle between competing interests in Hamburg per se, the process of state monopolization of force was a product of a costly occupation.

A discussion regarding the state’s monopolization of force requires some conceptual clarification, especially regarding the use of terms such as “force” and “violence.” Hobbes’ \textit{Leviathan} has a certain affinity with Max Weber’s formulation of the state as “that agency in society which has a monopoly of legitimate force.” Yet Weber never attempted to answer questions regarding what makes force legitimate and violence illegitimate. In addition, Weber neither investigated the practice of repression nor attempted to explain how a show of force could enhance state authority and, in effect, increase the state’s legitimacy.\textsuperscript{14} Where most scholars break with Hobbes is not with the idea that force is necessary to preserve the social order, but that a sovereign should have unrestricted use of force. If methods of repression the state employs appear excessive, then it becomes discredited as coercion, or what historian Howard G. Brown has called, “domestic state violence.” The difference between legitimate use of force and domestic state violence, he argues, is one easily missed. Violence and the legitimate use of force are not interchangeable concepts; they are, in fact, “intrinsically opposites” even though they may appear “extrinsically indistinguishable.”\textsuperscript{15} Despite appearances then, the difference between force and violence is not like beauty, in the eye of the beholder, nor is it a matter of semantics. Thus Hannah Arendt’s claim that “violence can be justifiable, but it never

\textsuperscript{13} Tilly, \textit{Coercion}, 72.

\textsuperscript{14} Howard G. Brown, \textit{Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to Napoleon} (Charlottesville, VA., 2006).

will be legitimate,” is crucial here as it captures a most salient aspect of violence: it is a quasi-moral concept linked to ascertaining means in terms of ends. In that respect, to describe force as violence is to question an act’s legitimacy in terms of harmony and order. Because difference of opinion regarding the “justness” of a particular social order compared to potential alternatives becomes the basis for assessing the use of coercion, it is necessary for historians to distinguish between legitimate force and violence. This distinction should not be made on the “morally subjective” terrain of assessing ends and means.

Italian legal philosopher Sergio Cotta, who wrote in response to the Red Brigade of the 1970s, developed a theory that distinguishes between “force,” on the one hand, and “violence” on the other, based solely on their “structural characteristics.” Both, he argues, have a physical dimension and “disturb existing relationships,” but violence is distinguished from other forms of coercion by being “sudden, unpredictable, discontinuous, and disproportionate.” Here, nature offers a perfect example: a lengthy drought will damage crops more than a single storm, but only the storm is perceived of as being violent. In “human affairs,” an act of force does not slip into the realm of violence as long as it displays “measure” along three “axes”: internal, external, and purposive. Internal measure means applying force with regularity and precision to increase effectiveness and “decrease collateral damage.” External measure means using force in “accordance with broadly accepted social, moral, and legal norms.” Purposive measure means using force to “defend or establish” a distinct “form of polity.” Cotta argues that an act of force may adhere to one or even two of these measures and yet still be violent: only the presence of all

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three measures prevents force from slipping into violence and, in effect, losing its legitimacy.\textsuperscript{19} Importantly, these three “measures” are titled according to their relationship to the act, not to the government that orders it. And equally as important, the “purposive measure” is not related to an abstract end such as “liberty,” “equality,” or “social justice,” but to the polity deemed capable of achieving a certain end.

Historians may see a problem here: if the use of coercive force is well managed, sanctioned by law, and designed to uphold an exploitative socio-economic regime, then force would appear to lack legitimacy. If an act lacks legitimacy, then it would be necessary to label it violence. This view tends to blur the line between means and ends as well as the distinction between contemporary moral judgment and those of the historian. As far as the historian is concerned then, it is necessary to recognize that if force is used to defend a certain political order and done so within Cotta’s three “measures,” calling it violence is not analytically helpful but, instead, is a way to pass moral judgment on the order. Historians who deem such a judgment appropriate should critique the injustices of that regime itself, not the use of force to preserve it.\textsuperscript{20} This should provide plenty of room to analyze the methods by which force is enacted, whether a political order is deemed oppressive and to include judgments, preferably those of contemporaries.\textsuperscript{21} Such a distinction between the moral judgments of the historian and those of contemporaries will became clear as the discussion moves towards the end of the first French occupation. By 1813, Imperial force, once understood by urban elites as a necessity in the defense of private property, slid into arbitrary acts of violence, thereby discrediting the French regime and leading to a city-wide rejection of their presence.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 82-91.

\textsuperscript{20} Carl Schmitt, \textit{The Concept of the Political}, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago, 2007).

However, in the years between 1806 and 1814, French reform and policing tactics succeeded in rupturing the traditional relationship between community, justice, and social stability in Hamburg. Professionalized police forces emerged in the post-war environment as a viable means through which to ensure order and defend state interest. This transformation encompassed a similar break with the city’s traditional civic republican ethos that had defined society and politics in early modern Hamburg. As with other republican polities, Hamburg’s constitution and rule of law maintained a commitment to the support of the common good, bolstered by civic virtues that stressed moral public service. It is important to note that republicanism in Hamburg shared little in common with modern democracy as it did not entail political equality or equal representation. As historians of Hamburg have documented at length, the city’s republicanism functioned to preserve self-government within certain legal limits while acting to shelter the population from arbitrary acts of the state.\(^{22}\) The early modern understanding of republicanism was often described ambiguously by contemporaries and has defied any unifying explanations by later scholars. Whereas some studies have uncovered the intellectual underpinnings of republicanism, in order to locate the “moment” of the republic’s emergence as a political form,\(^{23}\) others have stressed the complexity of the eighteenth century’s understanding and practice of republicanism.\(^{24}\) And while it lacked any coherent ideology,


German Central Europe nonetheless evidenced a republican tradition and a civic politics driven by service to the “common good” (*Gemeinwohl*).  

Because the city of Hamburg held no allegiance to a monarch or confession, republicanism was at the center of the city’s early modern political culture. Hamburg’s constitution as well as its traditional political practices combined rights and civic duties and stressed the importance of communal participation in protecting the common weal. As Mary Lindemann has clearly shown, city residents recognized their obligations as decidedly republican and viewed Hamburg as a community based on social and moral commitments. Civic and political culture in early modern Hamburg was built upon the perceived connection between moral considerations and politics in public life. An understanding of ethics and civic morality was at the center of social and political discourse in Hamburg and regularly informed decision making by the city’s Senate. The civic and ethical ethos of Hamburg’s citizens was expressed in the celebration of the republican virtues such as patriotism, industry, frugality, and service to the wider community. These virtues were viewed by contemporaries as fundamental elements for a successful republic polity and were considered as one’s duty (regardless of economic or political position) as a good republican.

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26 Lindemann brilliantly connects concerns of public morality with political and economic considerations by demonstrating the importance of Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief. *Patriots and Paupers*, 1-12, 48-73; Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 32-77.


28 In fact, as Mary Lindemann has shown, a successful career in the world of Hamburg politics almost always began in the ranks of the city’s Poor Relief.
Yet following eight years of French occupation and the destruction of the city’s economy, the republican ethos in Hamburg began to wither. The Imperial authorities’ reliance on a hierarchical system of policing and law enforcement in the early years of the occupation, followed by the implementation of the Napoleonic Code in 1811, eroded communal responsibilities by promoting an atmosphere of social and political laissez-faire. The experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, an uncertain economy, increasing numbers of refugees, and eight years of punishing occupation eventually suffocated Hamburg’s early modern commitments to communal well-being. The necessity of survival coupled with the effects of eight years of occupation nurtured a drive towards individual self-interest and forced a redefinition of the common good. Rather than focusing on communal welfare and addressing the social ills of a growing city, the post-1814 Senate fostered policies that stressed security, order, and individual economic prosperity. As the city increasingly relied on a hierarchical and professionalized police force to identify and control new classes of deviants, the sense of communal responsibility waned. This new understanding of social responsibility in Hamburg was informed by a nascent liberalism that, as Dieter Langewiesche has argued, forced the “collective to take second place to the individual.”

By the mid-nineteenth century, this social laissez-faire individualism would fundamentally inform an emerging middle-class ideology.

The third chapter largely breaks with the narrative established throughout the first two, and deals specifically with questions regarding Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate use of city space as an arena for the representation of its authority and ideological contours. This chapter argues that a defining feature of the nineteenth century and of the practice of modern politics is a

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politicization of public space. While Hamburg’s lower classes (its journeymen and unskilled workers) had taken to the streets to defend hard-won, traditional economic rights, their grievances clearly lacked any real political significance and focused on assaulting (and insulting) symbolic targets.\(^{31}\) This was the case throughout virtually all of early modern Europe.\(^{32}\) Yet during the revolutionary era, when concepts such as right-bearing individualism and popular sovereignty emerged, public space was transformed into a dense “marketplace” of competing representations of the body politic. Imperial administrators, “awakened” religious commentators, German citizen-patriots, and, finally, Hamburg’s conservative elite, all vied for control over public opinion as well as the symbols of post-Napoleonic citizenship and sovereignty. It is this chapter’s central contention that the politicization of public space marks a fundamental divide between the political and social worlds of early modern Europe and the nineteenth century.

In breaking with the narrative style of the previous chapters, chapter three is better able to investigate such instances of state ceremony. It also functions as a critical assessment of Jürgen Habermas’s well-known formulation of the rise of the public sphere. More specifically, the chapter deals to a large extent with Habermas’s concept of “representative publicness” (or, the way in which medieval and early modern authority is re-presented, publically before the people), and argues that such a concept is applicable to the study of the German nineteenth century. Contrary to Habermas’s contention that critical-rational debate and the subsequent division

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between the private and public spheres made such public representations of authority politically hollow, this chapter argues that Hamburg’s returning Senate, in fact, routinely used public space as a setting for the display of authority and legitimacy. City-wide military parades, award and religious ceremonies, and dramatic reenactments of important events, were all ways that Hamburg’s Senate publically (and dramatically) presented itself before the city’s inhabitants. These bits of spectacle also allowed the Senate, and the socio-economic order it represented, symbolically to enact the ideological underpinnings of its rule. These events tied the sacred and secular realms together as the Senate positioned itself as the defenders of order, security, and traditional authority.

In a speech he delivered to the Convention on 7 May 1794, Robespierre declared that “Man is nature’s greatest phenomenon, and the most magnificent of all spectacles is that of a large popular festival.” Republican holidays, celebrated from the very beginning of the Revolution, consisted of mass processions that wound their way through Paris to sites charged with political meaning. The accompanying neoclassical pomp of such spectacles came through the addition of triumphal arches and secular alters designed by Jacques-Louis David. Yet, after the fall of Robespierre and the Jacobin regime, such collective celebrations abruptly ended as the effects of State control began to counter participatory zeal. Under Napoleon, parades had become pure displays of state power and authority, and citizens had become mere spectators. A chance for a truly organic and participatory style of politics was lost as order, security, and the defense of private property became the state’s fundamental concern.

This would prove to be a legacy of French occupation in the city of Hamburg as well as much of Europe, seeing its ultimate expression in the revolutionary regimes of the Soviet Union

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33 As quoted in Spiro Kostof, The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form Through History (Boston, 1992), 196.
and Nazi Germany. After 1814, Hamburg’s Senate moved quickly to secure a monopolization of the means of coercion, routinely associated itself with its military through parades and award ceremonies, and relied on highly-choreographed spectacle as a means through which to represent its claims to legitimacy and authority. In the post-Napoleonic world, authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty could no longer be justified or guaranteed by right or tradition; modern politics necessitates the ability of the state to defend its claim to authority through the use, or threatened use, of force. And while we today are no longer subject to overwhelming displays of state might, as we tend to prefer reasoned and practical debate to being put in awe, these themes are undoubtedly present in the modern political cultures of the West, as staged political performances still resonate with citizen-spectators, though other popular media platforms have come to replace the market square.
Chapter 1
The French Empire in Hamburg and the Introduction of Modern Police Reform, 1806-1813

While Hamburg flourished financially amid the upheavals of the 1790s, by the turn of the century the city had become an unwilling actor in an altered international arena. Continental warfare had come to threaten the independent republic's livelihood, forcing Hamburg to join with the Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Lübeck in order to maintain their neutral, free-trade status. According to Katherine Aaslestad, this redefinition of the republic's status entailed a broadening of Hamburg's local character into a regional, Hanseatic identity. Contrary to what historians had argued well into the 1990s, a bourgeoning sense of German nationalism had little resonance in the regions that suffered under Napoleonic occupation. Rather, entire regions, such as Bavaria, Baden, and Württemberg, rallied around identities provided by religion, traditional authority, and ancient freedoms. In the cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, a Hanseatic Legion was assembled in order to fight the French, not due to early stirrings of German-ness, but in defense of the cities’ claim to independent status and common concerns regarding the continuation of free trade. Emerging from the Wars of Napoleon in ruins, the Hanseatic cities

34 Katherine Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 203.

35 For classic examples of the “relationship” between the Napoleonic Wars and the rise of German nationalism see Nipperday, Germany from Napoleon to Bismarck; Hagan Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867 (Cambridge, 1994); Felix Markham, Napoleon and the Awakening of Europe (New York, 1965).

maintain and reinforced this new “regionalist” or territorial identity, one that was often at odds with nineteenth-century nationalist movements.\footnote{37 Regarding the concept of “region” in Central European history, see the pioneering work of Applegate, \textit{A Nation of Provincials}; Confino, \textit{The Nation as Local Metaphor}; Green, \textit{Fatherlands}.}

Nonetheless, in the years between 1806 and 1813, the French occupation of Hamburg replaced the city’s archaic and decentralized administrative structure with one characterized by Gallic centralization and rigor. One part of this process was a redefinition of “policing,” one which ultimately swept away Hamburg's multiple police agencies and created a single, professionalized, and armed police force, charged solely with the execution of government policy. In the process of installing a professionalized policing agency, the French also inadvertently showcased to Hamburg's authorities the political uses of centralized armed force. This new institution, a product of French occupation, would come to symbolize political authority in new, highly public, and militarized ways. The government’s turn to increased use of coercive means also entailed a redefinition of their notions of “order” and “legitimacy” in post-occupied Hamburg. Throughout the eighteenth century, the policing of Hamburg’s public still connoted correction, the educating of poor children, and the moral improvement of adults. French occupation, however, stripped policing of its function as social caretaker, and focused it instead on the creation, control, and punishment of urban deviants.

Although historians have investigated the role which a decade of economic warfare played in the consolidation of this regionalist, post-war identity, they have not thoroughly investigated the effect of French occupation on the political culture of post-war urban governments. By the end of 1814, French reform had altered the way in which Hamburg's functionaries articulated and defended their authority, as well as the way in which they would relate to the city's inhabitants throughout the nineteenth century. The French occupation, then,
was crucial not solely in terms of its economically exploitative nature, but also because French reform “modernized” conceptions of political authority by making power contingent on the state’s monopolization of coercive means.  

**Napoleon and Central Europe**

In 1801, the treaty of Lunéville forced the Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II, to recognize France’s conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, confirming France’s increasing influence in Central Europe and initiating Austria’s retreat from Imperial politics. The signing of Lunéville codified the terminal conditions of the Empire and secured the radical territorial realignment of Central Europe that had begun in 1797 with the signing of Campo Formio. Beginning with the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* in April 1803, Napoleon, with the nominal support of the *Reichstag*, began the political and geographic reorganization of German Central Europe, collapsing some 300 polities into fewer than forty. Furthermore, after Napoleon’s military victory over a combined Russo-Austrian army on 2 December 1805 at Austerlitz, the east lay open to further French expansion. The territorial realignments undertaken in 1803 were furthered by Napoleon’s proposal to create a new confederation of German states in 1806.

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Designed to consolidate his military, diplomatic, and financial domination over Central Europe, Napoleon’s proposed confederation served as a counterweight to Austrian influence and as a buffer-zone between France and the eastern powers. On 16 July 1806, sixteen Central European states formed the Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund) under French control. In the process of redrawing the map of Central Europe, Napoleon promoted the expansion of larger states at the expense of small- and middling-sized territories and separated these member states from the Reich, rendering the imperial crown virtually meaningless. On 6 August 1806, Francis II, the fifty-fourth Holy Roman Emperor since Charlemagne, abdicated his imperial title, bringing the 1006-year-old empire to its end.

While the Hanseatic cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck had maintained their political and economic independence, it became increasingly clear by the middle of 1806 that the threat of French hegemony in northern Europe was becoming serious. Many Hamburgers looked towards Prussia to guarantee Hamburg’s independence, and some even suggested joining the Prussian-led Confederation of the North. Most, however, continued to support the city’s neutral stance as France offered assurances throughout the summer of 1806 that Hamburg’s sovereignty and independence would be respected. That fall, despite longstanding clashes of interest and intermittent competition, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck announced the first Hanseatic Conference, from which was formed an official Hanseatic Federation. Motivated


41 Hamburg had been briefly occupied by Danish troops in 1801 when the city became a pawn in a conflict between Russia and Great Britain following the breakup of the Second Coalition. Soldiers never occupied the city directly and only held the city gates for two months. See Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 219-20.

largely by self-preservation and based on a common commercial past, the Federation, styled as a revival of a centuries-old political and economic arrangement, reaffirmed the cities’ neutral status as well as their central role in world trade. The Conference adopted a common seal, created guidelines for a yearly Hanseatic Bundestag, and outlined future legal and economic reform. Even so, the new Federation was at a significant strategic and economic disadvantage, lacking the force necessary to defend their neutrality. Despite their legacy of autonomy and “enlightened cosmopolitan rationalism,” the Hanseatic Federation’s insistence that the cities independence was good for Europe as a whole ultimately proved insufficient to halt French expansion northward.

Prussia, facing French encirclement, declared war on the Napoleonic Empire in early autumn 1806. The French double victory at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt decided the fate of the Hanseatic cities. On 6-7 November 1806 a combined French army of approximately 53,000 troops stormed the gates of Lübeck. The 21,000 Prussians left to defend the city were crushed after three hours of savage hand-to-hand and house-by-house fighting. The brutality of the Napoleonic Wars had finally reached the neutral Hanseatic cities. Both Hamburg and Bremen surrendered peacefully to the French two weeks later. On 19 November French forces, under the command of Marshal Édouard Adolphe Casimir Jospeh Mortier, marched into the city of Hamburg, where they would maintain a presence until 1814.

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44 Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 184. These plans also included policies regarding citizenship, bankruptcy regulation, and allowed for the creation of a common exchange rate. In addition it established a Hanseatic institution dedicated to the development of science and the arts, see Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 227-8.

45 Ibid., 207.
The tone of French occupation had, however, been set by Mortier on the previous day. Encamped just south-east of Hamburg in the town of Bergedorf, he announced to Hamburg’s Senate that while strict discipline would be maintained and property would be respected, the housing and feeding of his forces and the “pains of living expense” would be passed on to the city's inhabitants.\(^{46}\) Mortier required the quartering of 2,600 Dutch and Spanish Imperial soldiers, their French officers, and over 700 horses.\(^{47}\) Quarters were made available just outside the city walls in the districts of Steintors and St. Georg, and as regiments of Spanish and, in early December, Italian soldiers poured into Hamburg, stalls, cellars and attics were requisitioned throughout the city.\(^{48}\) In addition to the quartering, residents were responsible for providing soldiers and officers with three meals a day. Daily rations of French wine, beer, and brandy were added to their demands for meat, vegetables, soup and bread.\(^{49}\) Monetary allowances for officers (especially on weekends), as well as special housing in the expensive hotels in Hamburg’s wealthiest districts, drove the initial cost of occupation higher still. The French also forced the city's inhabitants to procure coats, boots and medical supplies for occupying soldiers.\(^{50}\) As one local commented, the influx of Imperial soldiers and the growing importance of military affairs

\(^{46}\) “Publicandum,” Altonaischer Mercurius Nr. 184, 20 November 1806.

\(^{47}\) For a contemporary account see, Marianne Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit in Hamburg von 1806 bis 1814, 3rd ed. (Hamburg, 1898), 14-5.

\(^{48}\) Altonischer Mercurius, Nr. 190, 29 November 1806.

\(^{49}\) Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 18-22.

within the city walls had transformed the once prosperous commercial entrepôt into a military encampment.  

According to Napoleon, the occupation of Hamburg was of great political and military importance, but his true motive was made clear on 21 November with the announcement of the Berlin Decrees. This set of decrees ultimately laid the foundation for Napoleon’s Continental System, which sought to combat Britain's lucrative trade with the continent. The capture of Hamburg, Britain's main commercial port in Europe, was central to Napoleon's plans for economic warfare. Trade with Britain had risen nearly tenfold between the years 1789 and 1800, and while commercial ties had seen a few years of stagnation, most notably 1799 and 1803, Hamburg remained a “thorn in Napoleon's side.” Even though the city's trade included products from French and Spanish colonies that were valuable to both France and its allies, Napoleon increasingly regarded Hanseatic trade as a vital British interest which must be strangled. As such, on 21 November, Colonel Jean-Baptist Lecat de Bazancourt announced that within twenty-four hours the Berlin Decrees would go into effect. One week later, French authorities stated that all unsold British property would be immediately confiscated and that no communication between Hamburg and British industry would be tolerated. In addition, all correspondence with Britain was forbidden, and no British man, woman, or child was allowed into or through

51Friedrich Gottlieb Zimmerman, Neue Chronik von Hamburg, von Entstehender Stadt bis zum Jahre 1819 (Hamburg, 1820), 651.

52La possession de Hambourg est de la plus haute importance politique et d'une grande importance militaire,” as quoted in Carl Henke, Davout und die Festung Hamburg-Harburg, 1813-1814 (Berlin, 1911), 1. See also Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 228.

53Ibid., 228.

54Eli Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation (Oxford, 1922) 96-8; Mary Lindemann, Patriots and Pauper, 177-80.

55“Publicandum,” Altonischer Mercurius, Nr. 185, 21 November 1806.
Hamburg. Following on the heels of the Berlin Decrees, Napoleon's Milan Decrees extended trade limitations to neutral shipping and opened up economic warfare on the Atlantic. As Paul Schroeder has persuasively argued, the real target of the Continental System was Europe itself, as Napoleon sought to further stamp French hegemony onto the continent.  

**French Military Occupation, 1806-1810**

Hamburg’s Senate offered little resistance to the demands made by the Imperial occupation. Eager to continue trade and to mitigate the city's financial burden, the Senate implored its residents to maintain peace and order and to comply with the French military, the first regular, armed, and “modern” policing force in the city's history. All orders from occupying soldiers were to be taken “quietly and obediently,” including prohibitions against large public gatherings. Male heads of households were charged by Hamburg’s Senate with keeping good order not only within the home, but also by monitoring the public comings and goings of their dependents. Any verbal or physical engagement with occupying forces, unless one's business demanded it, was severely restricted. Those who defied these pronouncements would immediately be subject to French military justice, as the Senate refused to jeopardize the city's

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56 *Altonaischer Mercurius*, Nr. 189, 27 November 1806. The French confiscated almost seven million francs worth of goods from Great Britain, which they then sold to Hamburg for seventeen million francs; a “deal” which was paid for by a tax increase on both large and small Bürger. See Detlef Zunker, *Hamburg in der Franzosenzeit 1806-1814: Volkskultur und Volksprotest in einer besetzten Stadt* (Hamburg, 1983), 35-7.


59 *Altonaischer Mercurius*, Nr. 185, 21 November, 1806.
welfare in order to protect rebellious citizens. Resistance to the growing number of Imperial authorities and occupation forces soon seemed impossible, if not entirely unwelcome. In an examination of popular songs from the first years of occupation, Katherine Aaslestad found that many focused entirely on the welfare of the city and showed no expectations that Napoleon's Grand Army would soon depart. The public’s appeal to the welfare of the community indicates that the city’s inhabitants were well aware of their precarious position. The Senate’s decision to place the city’s well-being above the interest of specific individuals shows both a keen understanding of the situation and a desire to maintain some form of authority during a military occupation.

Yet the Senate’s reaction also hints at future developments in the course of Imperial occupation in Hamburg. While major restructuring of Hamburg's administrative and policing structure were years away, policing in Hamburg almost immediately took on a more modern face. Up until 1806, policing in Hamburg operated according to the older models that stressed the values of guidance, correction, and instruction common throughout most of early modern Europe. Policing not only denoted domestic policy (as compared to foreign or military affairs), but, as Marc Raeff argues, it sought to “elevate society to a higher level . . . by promoting the

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60 “Publicandum,” Wöchentliche gemeinnützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg, 10 December 1806, 22 April 1806.

61 Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 14-5.

62 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 240; see also her article “Old Visions and New Vices: Republicanism and Civic Virtue in Hamburg’s Print Culture, 1790-1810,” in Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and National Culture: Public Culture in Hamburg, 1700-1933, ed. Peter Uwe Hohendahl (New York, 2003), 143-65.

common good." The highest authority in early-modern cities, in Hamburg, the Rat, was the institution ultimately responsible for the outlining of police policy and law. In Hamburg, police duties were generally outlined by three basic statutes, yet it was ultimately the daily decisions (numbering in the thousands) made by the Rat that came to shape policy. The “agents of policing” were mandated to carry out police laws, but also to shape policy into precedent for future action. In Hamburg, the organization most responsible for policing and the administering of social policy was the Wedde, composed of four senators, and the two praetors, or city magistrates. However, virtually all departments of Hamburg’s government as well as many “private” charitable organizations maintained some policing powers. Authority was often wielded summarily as the absence of formal legal processes left punishment to the discretion of individuals and private institutions.

Within the first few years of occupation, “to police” lost its connotation of policy-making and was limited to the more narrowly-defined realm of policy execution: control and punishment remained as guidance and improvement increasingly lost their resonance. The French military, under the control of commander-in-chief Marshal Brune, French Consul Lachevardiére, and Minister Louis-Antoine Fauvelet de Bourriene, was tasked with the policing of the population on a day-to-day basis. Soldiers soon began drilling in public squares and patrolling city streets and city gates during the day and after nightfall. The French cavalry made its first official

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64 Raeff, _The Well-Ordered Police State_, 5; Lindemann, _Patriots and Paupers_, 49.

65 Hamburg’s three codes were the _Redaction_ of 1497, the _Gerichtsordnung_ of 1570, and the _Stadtrecht_ of 1605. See the collection of “Conclusa et Commissoria perpetua, welche das Officum der Herren Praetorum betreffend, so viel sich deren auffinden lass, in chronologischer Ordnung, 1699-1800,” Staatsarchiv Hamburg (from here on referenced as StAH), Präturen, I, vol. 1; Lindemann, 236, n. 10.

66 For an account of the web of private “policing” agents see a letter from Amandus Augustus Abendroth to Caspar Voght, 26 June 1832. StAH, Familienarchiv Voght, V. 2.

67 Lindemann, 49-50.
appearance in December, as 500 officers and their horses marched slowly throughout the city, requiring the military to shut down not only several major thoroughfares, but also to police the parade route. 68 Furthermore, French military courts, swift and extralegal even by standards of the time, 69 were in effect no later than December of that year. While no records survive of the courts’ early activity, judging by the Senate's promise to turn malcontents over to the military, the threat of French justice was real. 70 Within the first month of the occupation, then, a new relationship between Hamburg's inhabitants and armed authority was slowly beginning to take shape, a process that would only accelerate throughout the next few years. And while the French administration allowed private charitable organizations, such Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief, to continue their work, these local institutions had their powers of policing drastically curtailed and limited to the execution of French policy. 71

In the early years of occupation, the French military undermined its own efforts through its willingness to accept the bribes of local merchants. By the end of 1806, Minister Bourrienne received over 558,000 francs in bribes and, by early 1810, had amassed a sizable fortune. These activities led Napoleon to recall him to Paris later that year. Within the first months of 1807, Hamburg merchants had already paid military authorities 1.5 million francs for them to turn a blind eye toward trade on the Elbe. 72 Trade with Britain was still a thriving enterprise, so much

68 Altonaischer Mercurius, No. 191, 1 December 1806.

69 The foremost authority on military repression, policing, and increased administrative capacity within Napoleonic France is Howard G. Brown. See his article “Special Tribunals and the Napoleonic Security State,” in Napoleon and his Empire, 79-95.

70 “Publicandum,” 5 December, 1806 (Anderson, Sammlung, vol.8), 120-3.

71 Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 199-200.

72 See Zunker, Hamburg in der Franzosenzeit, 41; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 230; Silvia Marzagalli, “Port Cities in the French Wars: The Response of Merchants in Bordeaux, Hamburg and Livorno to Napoleon's Continental Blockade, 1806-1813,” The Northern Mariner/Le Marin du nord 6, no. 4 (October, 1996): 65-73, here 68.
Fig. 2. Christoph Suhr, A painting of *douaniers* in Hamburg, watercolor, 1809.
so, that an 1807 police report suggested that “trade with English goods in the city continues as prior to the decree.”

Smuggling English goods between Hamburg and its Danish neighbor, Altona, was also becoming a very lucrative business. As the system of smuggling became increasingly sophisticated, French officials likewise sharpened their methods for combating this black market trade, leading to what historian Jean Mistler has described as a guerrilla war between Hamburgers and custom agents. In Hamburg, French military patrols increased and a swarm of green-jacketed *dounaiers* (custom agents), who became the despised icons of Imperial oppression, descended upon the city. By the end of 1807, over 300 *dounaiers* had arrived in Hamburg, establishing a visible presence on the docks and at the city’s gates. Unable to slow the flood of illicit goods that poured into the city via Altona, French authorities announced a program to register all legal citizens and inhabitants of the city and its suburbs, in order to limit the number of outsiders who entered the city. Given no more than eight days to register, citizens of Hamburg had to show proof of residency, while all those born outside the city (but who legally resided there) were required to state where they were born, where they were staying, and what their current profession was. Later that year, Hamburg’s Senate was “advised” by the French that the local authorities would be required to maintain a presence at city gates to spot smugglers.

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75Authorities estimated that some 6,000-10,000 individuals smuggled goods between Altona and Hamburg each day, with as little as 3 to 5 percent of them ever being caught. See Schmidt, *Hamburg im Zeitalter*, 307-8; Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 232; Woolf, *Napoleon’s Integration of Europe*, 152-4.


As Hamburg’s wealth now served the French war effort, so too did its press. Throughout most of Central Europe at the time, Napoleon and his administrators sought to control the press in order to publicize French orders and announcements. In the first years of the occupation, a number of Hamburg’s newspapers and journals were forced to close shop, either because they were unable to afford the steep French press tax or because they withered under strict censorship. Those that had not closed were known by locals to be under strict police supervision. In numerous warnings from the Senate, Hamburg's public was explicitly instructed not to complain in print (or otherwise) about a French-controlled press. As one Hamburg resident claimed, by 1808 “all liberty of the press is lost and none dares to speak politiks [sic], which to tell the truth are at present nothing but reports and false news.” Imperial administrators used Hamburg's press in the hopes of persuading locals to the benefits of the Napoleonic Code, which, by late 1807, was slowly being introduced to the city. As Katherine Aaslestad has noted, a number of newspapers pushed a “subtext” that sought to give voice to a sense of German cultural nationalism by glorifying common cultural themes. Yet none of this, she continues, could be said to have offered a “call to national resistance” against French

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78 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 238 n. 143.
80 Carl Mönkeberg, Hamburg unter dem Druck der Franzosen, 1806-1814 (Hamburg, 1864), 33. According to Mönkeberg, Hamburg’s theaters were known to be closely watched by Imperial authorities as well.
81 “Publicandum” Wöchentliche gemeinnützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg, 10 December, 1806; 22 April, 1807; 10 October, 1807.
82 As quoted in Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 239.
Napoleon's determination to control the press throughout his growing Empire was a move not only to dictate and mold public opinion, but also to take opinion out of the hands of the public in order for it to better serve the interests of France. Publicity and manufactured consent, then, were key aspects of the French occupation in Hamburg that would eventually come to serve post-war regimes throughout Europe. In a century that would come to rely on the printed word for its understanding of the world, control over public discourse was a fundamental aspect of state control. Surveillance of Hamburg’s press and the suppression of subversive material (pamphlets, newspaper, and woodcuts) would be among the top priorities for French police agents throughout the entire occupation.

But authorities in Hamburg did not rely on the press alone to publicize their regime. In a series of choreographed celebrations of Imperial power, the French reinforced their authority through a selective use of city space and public spectacle. While Imperial soldiers drilling in city markets under the inspection of Military Governor Marshall Brune impressed local notables for their professionalism as well as for their “handsome” uniforms, these parades lacked the pomp that later processionals would soon begin to incorporate. On 15 August 1807, Marshal Jean Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, along with the Marquis de la Romana, led a military procession through the streets of Hamburg in celebration of Napoleon's birthday. To the sound of drums and trumpets, Imperial soldiers, dressed in full uniforms, marched from Hamburg's

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86 StAH 111-1 Senat Cl. I Lit. Pb Vol. 8D, Fasc. 22A: “Letters from Hamburg Syndic von Sienen to Patrick Colquhoun, 7 April, 1807.”

87 The Marquis was in command of the 12,000 Spanish soldiers quartered in Hamburg. He was remembered rather fondly by Carl Mönkeberg for his taste in literature and his knowledge of international politics, see Mönkeberg, *Hamburg unter dem Druck*, 9, 16.
Heiligengeistfeld, the parade field located just outside the city walls, to the Alster via Hamburg's main promenades. The Imperial eagle was hung from lamp-posts and building facades along the route of the parade, adding further symbolic weight to the day’s events. The entire event was brought to a close with the ringing of Hamburg’s church bells and a spectacular fireworks display over the Alster.  

As Burghart Schmidt has argued, this event reinforced to Hamburg’s inhabitants that the city had become a military depot, but attention should be drawn to such events for several other reasons as well. On the one hand, Imperial spectacle in Hamburg necessitated that law and order to be maintained not by decree alone but, visibly, by the police. In preparation for Napoleon's birthday in August of 1809, the French began cordoning off sections of the city, reserving Hamburg's most busy thoroughfares for use by French officers alone. Travel throughout the city was restricted, carriages were not allowed on the main streets, and only those on foot were allowed access to the festivities. Special police posts were erected on all major intersections where the festivities would be held and security at city gates was increased so as to manage the expected flow of traffic. On the day of the celebration, a procession of over 3,000 soldiers wound its way through the city, eventually ending on Hamburg's illustrious Jungfernstieg (Fig. 11) where the Emperor was honored with a fire-works display over the Alster. Not only was this costly spectacle paid for by the city, it was also mandatory that all inhabitants attend. The French military was in full force, there to ensure both the smooth running of the celebration and that everyone was able to witness the “Illumination.” The city's inhabitants, then, had to be

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88 Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 334.
89a Polizen-Reglement,” (Anderson, vol. 9, 1809), 32.
90a Mönkeberg, Hamburg unter dem Druck, 19. These events cost the city over 15,000 francs. See “Polizen-Reglement,” (Anderson, vol. 9, 1809), 33.
ushered through designated viewing areas, as no one was allowed to stand still and watch, regardless of her or his status.

Police presence at these events not only gave the appearance of law and order but, more importantly, helped shape the way in which Hamburg's inhabitants experienced the spectacle. As historians of urban spectacle have argued, individuals may, in fact, “read” such events through their own idiosyncratic lens, and as such, “official discourse” may not be totalizing or complete. But it is necessary to note the length to which French authorities, by publicizing and regulating of these events and by directing the public's collective gaze, went in their attempt to stamp the spectacle with a sense of legitimacy and to imbue them with a distinct meaning. Also, it is important to recognize the centrality of such “ceremonies of power” in the reproduction of authority and the “creation and perpetuation of political legitimacy.”

Whereas the form employed by the French Empire had its roots in age-old performances of power, the parade’s content relied on distinct emotional and cognitive aspects to impart a particular political meaning. The symbolic content Imperial spectacle utilized was designed to legitimize both French authority in occupied territories and to interpolate or produce a distinct political subject. Hamburgers were repeatedly addressed as “citizens” of the French Empire not only through a distinct legal and political rhetoric but through scripted ceremonies. Making attendance

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mandatory with no special allowances based on one’s social status highlights the continuation of the Revolutionary ideals regarding the suppression of hierarchies, so closely associated with festivals of the French Revolution that celebrated the political nation.\textsuperscript{94} While unitary citizenship had not yet been made \textit{de jour}, as it would by the instituting of the Napoleonic Code in 1811, all Hamburg’s residents were, through their identical participation in the spectacle, being contextualized as citizens of the polis, regardless of their past status.

\textbf{The Continental System and the Increase of the French Military Presence}

Despite the increased Imperial presence in Northern Germany, the Continental System would never stop trade on the seas, nor would it ever be able to contend with the sheer amount of illicit trade on land.\textsuperscript{95} Instead, the “guerrilla war” continued, the number of customs agents and military patrols increased, and smugglers relied on even riskier schemes. Arrests skyrocketed, so much so that by 1810 more than thirty individuals a day were arrested for smuggling, prompting Napoleon to strengthen his military presence in Hamburg. The Billeting Deputation, initially created in late 1808 and consisting of senators and citizens, now had to cope with over 200,000 Imperial administrators, officers and soldiers, lodged in domestic quarters.\textsuperscript{96} The military’s heightened presence was marked by increased patrols and new policing ordinances that sought to re-order city space in a more “rational,” streamlined manner. For example, in March 1810,

\textsuperscript{94} Ozouf, \textit{Festivals and the French Revolution}, 9-10.

\textsuperscript{95} Schroeder, \textit{The Transformation of European Politics}, 404-5.

Fig. 3. “Take a pick, take a pick; six douaniers for a penny.” Dutch cartoon from 1808.
Imperial authorities, in an attempt to regulate the traffic both within the city and at the city gates, issued orders for the military to begin regulating the flow of those on carriage as well as those on foot. In what amounts to modern traffic laws, incoming and outgoing traffic was differentiated and relegated to its own side of the street. Those on foot were expected to keep out of the streets and, whenever entering or leaving the city, were directed to separate pedestrian entrances. This rationalizing of city space not only allowed for the increased surveillance of the urban population, it also led to an increase in the effectiveness of the *douaniers*. Customs agents were now instructed to check *all* those who moved through the city gates, demanding that each individual remove hats, stockings, footwear and even false limbs; some were forced to disrobe entirely.

French administrators did not limit their spatial reconstructing to just the city gates. The entire city was re-imagined along the lines of Napoleon’s model for France. Hamburg officials had, since 1614, divided the city into districts according to parish in order to fill the ranks of the *Burgerwächte*. In the late 1780s, as an attempt to erase much of Hamburg’s “geographical Babel,” and to better investigate and combat poverty with the city, the Rat ordered the naming of streets and began assigning numbers to houses. But in the early months of 1810, the French reorganized the city into separate cantons, each run by its own police commissioner.

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99 Each district, however, was further subdivided up into eleven districts that blurred any lines of “jurisdiction” in the city. See Franz Heinrich Neddermeyer, *Zur Statistik und Topographie der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg und deren Gebietes* (Hamburg, 1832), 1-20; Redeker, *Die Reorganization der hamburgischen Polizei*, 21.

100 Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers*, 140.

101 There were 6 districts within the city walls. After Hamburg was incorporated within the French Empire, that number would increase to include the towns of Wihelmsburg, Hamm, and Bergedorf. Mönkeberg, *Hamburg
senator, or the “General Director of Police” as he would be known after 1811, sat at the head of the entire city's police force. All local authority was in the hands of the French with a few positions offered to pre-occupation local authorities, a structure that was comparable throughout the Empire at large. \(^{102}\) The Imperial authorities liquidated Hamburg's *Bürgerwache*, as well as the city's praetorship, an ancient position that had combined administration with the distribution of justice. \(^{103}\) This effectively eliminated Hamburg’s redundant crime-controlling agencies while simultaneously limiting the number of individuals and institutions responsible for meting out justice. The remapping of the city and the unifying of the police forced a separation between those who formulated policy and those who executed it, a fundamental divide mirrored throughout the French Empire. This professionalized and bureaucratized police force was now able to maintain a consistent, armed, and public presence that not only represented Imperial authority throughout the city but also lent a sense of legitimacy to the regime as the source of law and order. This practice continued under Hamburg’s post-occupation government.

In September 1810, French authorities announced all official proclamations were to be printed in both German and French, a practice that would continue until the very end of Imperial occupation. \(^{104}\) By November 1810, the French authorities were issuing no fewer than two and as many as five new proclamations a week, all intended to rationalize Hamburg's law codes and to stamp French authority on the city. Regulations against large public gatherings were

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\(^{103}\) StAH, Bürgerwache, 341-1, B6 and B7. The city spent over 2300 Marks in 1810, 1600 in 1811, and 260 in 1812-1813. Regarding the fate of Hamburg's praetorship see, Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers*, 204.

\(^{104}\) “Publicandum,” 6 September 1810 (Anderson, vol. 10), 100.
strengthened, the harboring of foreign soldiers was elevated to a serious crime, and the confiscation of private stores of gunpowder began in earnest.\textsuperscript{105} In December, Napoleon announced that Hamburg had become a \textit{Kaiserlicher Gerichtshof (Cour Impériale)}, a major legal hub for the northern region that included the cities of Bremen, Lübeck, Lüneburg, Osnabrück, and Minden. In the coming months, Hamburg's juridical institutions would undergo a significant overhaul, providing the city with a standardized legal procedure that was organized around Napoleon’s model for “administrative uniformity” throughout the Empire.\textsuperscript{106}

Napoleon's 1810 Decrees of Trianon and Fontainebleau increased police pressure on illegal trade with Britain and sought to discourage smuggling by raising Imperial tariffs in order to benefit French manufacture. In order to make smuggling work for the French treasury, licenses were now issued for the import and export of crucial raw materials.\textsuperscript{107} A customs court, and the establishment of the death penalty for the transportation of illegal goods, was instituted as part of the ongoing struggle against smuggling in Hamburg.\textsuperscript{108} Imperial authorities soon began a widespread campaign to capture and burn British goods. On 16 November 1810, Imperial authorities confiscated over 800,000 francs worth of contraband and, in what would be the first of many such events, burned every item in a large bonfire in the town of Grassbrook,

\textsuperscript{105}“Publicandum” 2 November 1810; 4 November 1810; 8 November 1810; 15 November 1810; 16 November 1810; 18 November 1810; 23 November 1810; 26 November 1810 (Anderson, vol. 10), see pages 134-146.

\textsuperscript{106}“Bulletin des Arrêtés de la Commission de Gouverment Établie par le Décret Impériale,” StAH 212-1, Französische Gerichtsbehorden (Gerichte unter Französischer Verfassung). See also Geoffry Ellis, \textit{The Napoleonic Empire} (Basingstoke, 1991), 44-6.

\textsuperscript{107}Altonaischer Mercurius, Nr. 185, 19 November 1810; “Publicandum,” 4 November 1810; 15 November 1810 (Anderson, vol. 10), 135-40.

Fig. 4. Christoph Suhr, Burning of English goods by French soldiers on 16 November, 1810.
just outside Hamburg's walls. The bonfires themselves were highly publicized events and, while not compulsory, were usually well-attended. By the end of the year, British goods had been burned in Ritzebüttel and Harburg, both suburbs of Hamburg, as well as in Bremen. Shipping came to a virtual standstill as 300 ships sat idle in the harbor, bringing ruin to a city whose livelihood depended on trade.

The destruction of Hamburg's economy, and with it, much of northern Germany's, certainly underscores the exploitative nature of French hegemony. But it also points towards the emergence of a highly visible organizational structure that was increasingly able to provide the security and centralization that the Imperial regime now required. The implementation of the Continental System, as well as control over passports, the press, and the theaters, became the exclusive domain of the General Director of Police, M. Brun d'Aubignosc, who sat atop a linear chain of command and controlled a web of informants. As the administration settled into prominent locations throughout the city, the Imperial regime's consistent, public presence reinforced for the city's inhabitants both the source and force of French authority. Beginning in late 1810 then, and completed no later than July 1811, all local authority had passed into the hands of a new, centralized French administration. Stripping policing of its centuries-old instructional tendencies, the French used its police force not only to maintain order but, more importantly, to represent Imperial authority throughout the city. This transition, as Frank Hatje has argued, represents a fundamental aspect of the nineteenth-century's centralized and

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109 Altonaischer Mercurius Nr. 185, 19 November 1810.

110 For a contemporary account, see Prell, Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 33.

111 In 1799, Hamburg's General Poor Relief supported 600 individuals. By 1809 it assisted over 17,000 individuals or 17 percent of the population. By 1810, 180 commercial houses had failed entirely or relocated to places such as London, Göteborg, or St. Petersburg. For an overview, see Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 286-300, esp. 290-1; Aaslestad, “Paying for War,” 646-53.
militarized power-states (*Machtstaat*).\textsuperscript{112} And while Hamburg itself could never compete with the Great- or Middle-states within post-war Germany, it too was beginning the transition into a substantially more modern and sovereign city-state whose monopolization of coercive means would secure the Senate’s legitimacy. For Hatje, Hamburg’s nineteenth-century dual processes of centralization and bureaucratization, or *Etatismus*, required the unification of policing powers under the sole authority of the Senate. This monopolization of armed force, a process accelerated by French reform, served as the foundation of Hamburg’s sovereignty and autonomy in a period of crisis in May and June 1814, as well as during its restoration as a sovereign city-state within the German Confederation immediately following the Congress of Vienna in 1815.\textsuperscript{113}

**“Bonne Ville de L'Empire Française” 1811-1813**

In preparation for his war against Russia and part of the ongoing struggle with Britain, Napoleon decided, on 13 December 1810, to annex the whole of the northern-German coast into the French Empire.\textsuperscript{114} Incorporated in January 1811, the northern coast became part of Napoleon’s Thirty-Second Military District, eventually to be composed of three departments: the *Ems Supérieur*, *Bouches de Wéser*, and *Bouches de l’Elbe*. The Imperial eagle immediately replaced Hamburg’s ancient ensign of a white, tri-towered castle on a red field on all newspapers, public buildings, and proclamations, visibly announcing Hamburg’s lost independence. The city became a “*bonne ville de l'Empire française*” and underwent a series of

\textsuperscript{112}Frank Hatje, *Repräsentationen der Staatsgewalt: Herrschaftsstrukturen und Selbsdarstellung in Hamburg, 1700-1900* (Basil, 1997), 283-4. The idea of a “machtvolle Zentralisierung der Staatsgewalt” or the centralizing of state power is one borrowed from Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgechichte, 1700-1814*, vol. 1 (Munich, 1987), 531.

\textsuperscript{113}Hatje, *Repräsentationen der Staatsgewalt*, 284.

\textsuperscript{114}“Publicandum,” 18 December 1810 (Anderson, vol.9), 153-4.
changes that saw the wholesale replacement of its sprawling administrative structures with centralized French institutions. In addition, the annexation also entailed a literal restructuring of the urban environment that would not only change the face of the city but would also change the way Hamburg's inhabitants experienced their surroundings and related to their government. As Imperial administrators settled into prominent locations throughout Hamburg, institutions, such as the police bureau, recruitment offices, or tax collection agencies, and the buildings in which they were housed, took on new meanings that would resonate throughout the nineteenth century. While some French reform was discarded after 1814 and 1815, the years between 1811 and 1813 drastically altered the relationship between Hamburg's inhabitants, their environment, and their local government.

The details regarding Hamburg's new role as an Imperial administrative city were laid out by French officials in a series of proclamations throughout late December 1810 and early January 1811. The city was to become the capital of a military district that extended to the Dutch, Danish, and Mecklenburg borders, and included the cities of Bremen, Lübeck, Minden, Osnabrück, and, after 1812, Wissenburg.115 Hamburg would not only house the entire general staff of Napoleon’s thirty-second military division, but the city was now a legal and administrative center, with offices for the navy, post, customs, and tariffs. And while this new position as an Imperial capital increased Hamburg’s regional influence, it crushed any hope that the former republic would maintain its status as an independent city.116 Arriving in Hamburg in February 1811, Marshall Louis Nicolas Davout, Duke of Auerstädt and Prince of Eckmühl, immediately assumed the position of General Governor and Chief Commander of the new


116 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 246-7.
Fig. 5. Johann Marcus David, “Prospect of the Imperial French City of Hamburg,” watercolor, 1811
One of Napoleon’s most loyal marshals, Davout was charged with the wholesale replacement of Hamburg’s constitution and local institutions with a new Imperial administration. Within the first month of his tenure, Davout abolished Hamburg’s Senate and Citizen’s Council and named a new conseil municipal headed by a French prefect. By July, “an army of French administrators,” under the direction of Privy Councillors François Louis René Mouchard de Chaban and Faure, had settled into the city and put into motion the organizational and legal bodies that would govern Hamburg until the very end of occupation.

By the end of July 1811, virtually all local authority had been transferred to a new French administration with the positions of Prefect, General Director of Police, and General Intendant of the Interior and Finance held by Barnon de Coninck-Outrive, M. Brun d’Aubingnosce, and Count Chaban, respectively. This transfer of power from Hamburg’s sprawling government to a “rationalized and centralized” Imperial administration re-shaped the ways in which local citizens experienced the city’s physical and political landscape. The General Director of Police of the Hanseatic department, d’Aubignonose, now in charge of enforcing the Continental System and control over passports, the local press, and public opinion, located his new office in Hamburg’s former Freemason’s lodge. The mayor and the municipal administration moved their headquarters to Goertz Palace, a building once used to serve the representatives of the Holy Roman Empire, and re-named it the Hôtel de Mairie. Ironically, as Frank Hatje has noted, the

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117 The announcement of Davout’s arrival was made on 27 December, 1810 along with an outline of his titles and function as General Governor. See Altonaischer Mercurius, Nr. 207, 27 December, 1810.

118 After destroying a Prussian army at Jena in 1806, Napoleon named Davout “Duke of Auerstädt,” a title that included a German estate, a princely salary, a chateau in the Loire Valley, and a town house in Paris. The title of “Prince of Eckmühl” was bestowed upon him in 1809. See John G. Gallaher, Iron Marshal: A Biography of Louis N. Davout (Carbondale, IL., 1976).

119 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 246; Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 421-99; Wolf-Rüdiger Osburg, Die Verwaltung Hamburgs in der Franzosenzeit, 1811-1814 (Frankfurt am Main, 1988). Chaban died in March 1814 after purposefully exposing himself to a “hospital fever” on account of his “grief” and “disappointments.”

120 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 248.
Imperial regime’s appropriation of this building to represent a modern, centralized state, effectively returned Hamburg to the status of an Imperial city.\textsuperscript{121} It was here, at the \textit{Hôtel}, that Hamburg’s residents would eventually experience the French-style administration, as it would house taxation and finance, military recruitment and quartering offices, city police offices, and birth and death records once held by local churches.\textsuperscript{122} The re-location of these new government institutions to prominent locations not only invested these buildings with symbolic, secular weight, the move also lent French authorities legitimacy and sense of continuity with the past.

A central feature of the new regime was the separation of the executive branch from the judicial, which entailed the creation of a new hierarchy of local and imperial courts as well as standardized statutes and legal procedure. As a major legal center of the French Empire, Hamburg was named the capital of the newly created \textit{Département de l’Ems Oriental} on 20 August 1811.\textsuperscript{123} Located in the chief city of every \textit{arrondissement}, of which Hamburg was one, were the Courts of First Instance, charged with the application of correctional and civil justice. The members of the Courts of First Instance worked in association with deputies, appointed by the Imperial government, to initiate court cases in departmental \textit{Tribunals}.\textsuperscript{124} Each \textit{Tribunal} consisted of twelve appointed judges, a president and vice president, and two \textit{Zivilkammer}, or courts of appeal. These courts were located in every department throughout the empire and tried local criminal cases with fines rarely exceeding 200 francs.\textsuperscript{125} In every canton, of which

\textsuperscript{121} Hatje, \textit{Repräsentationed der Staatsgewalt}, 264.

\textsuperscript{122} Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 248-9.

\textsuperscript{123} StAH, 212-1 B-24, “Französische Gerichtsbehorden: Gerichte unter Französischer Verfassung”; “Publicandum,” 18 December, 1810 (Anderson, vol.10), 2, 7; see also Schmidt, \textit{Hamburg im Zeitalter}, 500.

\textsuperscript{124} Ellis, \textit{The Napoleonic Empire}, 44-5.
Hamburg had six, was the *Friedengericht*, consisting of one judge and two deputies (members of the municipal police department) who were given the authority to fine and incarcerate individuals. In September 1811, an assize court (*Schwurgericht*) was instituted in Hamburg with five judges and one president, and was charged with the enforcement of all Imperial decrees, including the implementation of the Napoleonic Code, which would increasingly come to bear on the lives of the city’s inhabitants.\(^{126}\) Headed by *Monsieur de premier President de la Cour* P.F.H DeSerre, the centralized Imperial judicial system required the work of hundreds of lawyers, civil servants, and law enforcement officials, many of who were recruited from Hamburg’s pre-existing government, but all of whom were now reliant on the Imperial regime’s success for their livelihood.\(^{127}\) And while a number of Hamburgers joined in the hopes of softening the impact of French reform on the city, most collaborated with the Imperial regime to further their own careers or feed their families during a time of severe economic crisis.\(^{128}\)

With the full introduction of the Napoleonic Code by the beginning of 1812, all remnants of Hamburg’s feudal past were erased from legal practice. In an Imperial decree, signed on 26 August 1811, to go into effect no later than November of that year, the French abolished all

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\(^{125}\) The Tribunal’s first judgment was just over 100 francs. Although, by the time of their final judgment in 1813, it appears that penalties had become far more severe with cases reaching just under 1000 francs. See the introduction to StAH, 212-1, “Französische Gerichtsbehorden: Gerichte unter Französischer Verfassung.”


\(^{127}\) Considered to be both a practical solution to the Imperial regime’s growing needs and to be part of a “public relations” campaign, French officials welcomed members from all social classes, including individuals from the recently enfranchised Catholic and Jewish populations. See Schmidt, *Hamburg im Zeitalter*, 477-86; Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 247-8; Tilman Stieve, *Der Kampf um die Reform in Hamburg, 1780-1842* (Hamburg, 1993), 109-15.

remaining conditions of feudalism through the northern-German departments. The legal distinction between those who lived within Hamburg’s walls (Stadtwohnern) and those who resided in the countryside (Landwohnern) was replaced with unitary citizenship for all Hamburgers; this included a political enfranchisement for all male citizens in electing the local judiciary. In addition, all honorific titles (or “titles of superiority”) were officially banned along with the landowner’s right of dispensing exemplary justice in the countryside. A new Imperial commission was created to both ensure adequate police presence and standard legal procedure outside the city’s walls, and to punish those who continued to use force either against fellow Germans or the institutions of Imperial authority. And finally, the regime ended the feudal lord’s (Lehnsherr) “right” of succession by forcibly breaking-up all land, traditionally held as fiefdoms, into several allodial plots that were now free to be alienated by their new owners.

While a number of reform-minded Hamburgers welcomed these “progressive” elements of French rule, Napoleon recognized the continued resonance of traditional government throughout occupied Europe. Yet, as Katherine Aaslestad argues, in the hopes of encouraging allegiance to the Empire, the French sought to administer their territories through “efficient, enlightened, and rational government.”

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130 Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 505-7

131 Letter from the Le’Maître des Requêtes dest Bouches de L’Elbe to P.F.H. DeCerre, StAH 212-1, B35. The letter also contained a dire warning to the French administration in Hamburg regarding the fragile nature of the rural economy and asked that a commission be created to regulate it in the hopes a major food shortage could be avoided.

132 Kaiserliches Decret, welches das Feudalwesen in den Departments der Elb-Mündungen, der Weser-Mündungen und der Ober-Ems auhebt, 26 August 1811, 3.

133 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 249; Broers, Europe Under Napoleon, 99-101, 180-205, esp. 202-05.
the strengthening and centralizing of Imperial control, a fundamental aspect of which was breaking the power of the Lutheran Church in Hamburg. As early as 1522, reformed teaching had begun to sink roots into Hamburg’s parishes and by 1527, a permanent collegial body, the Forty-Eight, gained the right to advise the Rat on all matters concerning the welfare of the city. By the late eighteenth century, the Rat had come to rely on the city’s collegial bodies as “collaborators and co-rulers over the vast majority of Hamburg’s inhabitants,” with certain individuals simultaneously holding parish and government positions.134 The Imperial administration, by eliminating the legal distinction between social classes, enfranchising minority Calvinist, Catholic, and Jewish populations, and by secularizing fundamental aspects of individuals’ public and private lives (birth, death, marriage, justice, and law enforcement), defined a strict separation between church and state and drastically limited the role that unelected officials could play in the world of city politics.

Repression, Violence, and the First Liberation of Hamburg

Yet, these progressive, secularizing reforms had little effect on the mentality of the majority of Hamburg’s residents who were scornful of the Empire’s desire to “Frenchify” the city.135 Imperial spectacle celebrating Napoleon’s birthday, the anniversaries of French victories, and the birth of Napoleon’s son in March 1811, likewise did not generate popular support for the regime, despite the fact that they were highly publicized, widely attended, and offered free entertainment for the city’s lower classes.136 On 9 June 1811 the city celebrated the birth and

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134 Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 16-7, 221 n.11.

135 Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Französenzeit, 38; Mönkeberg, Hamburg unter dem Drucke, 35; Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 506-7.

136 Ibid., 495-7; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 251.
crowning of Napoleon’s son as the King of Rome. The event began with a special service for civil and military authorities at St. Michael’s Church; all other churches in Hamburg were required to open their doors and offer an identical service so that all residents might share in the solemnity of the event. Throughout the city, a crown was added to the head of the Imperial eagle, signifying the initiation of a Bonapartist dynasty and a new era of Imperial design throughout Europe. That evening, a military procession moved slowly through Hamburg’s streets, illuminated especially for the ceremony, to the Alster, where a giant blue flame was lit. 

Throughout the summer of 1811 and again in the years 1812 and 1813, the French repeatedly turned Hamburg’s streets and public squares into stages for political theater. Not only were dinners and masquerades held for Hamburg’s wealthy, but a series of fireworks displays, lotteries, and free theatrical performances were held in the hopes of gaining support from all strata of Hamburg’s population. Statues and busts of the Emperor, proposed in May 1811 and unveiled in August of 1812, stamped French authority permanently throughout Hamburg’s urban fabric while announcing the city’s inclusion within the Empire. But with a shattered economy and new conscription obligations, an increase in the heavy-handedness of the French police and custom agents turned a generally quiescent population hostile and, in some cases, even violent.

137 The blue flame echoes Napoleon’s Imperial crest, a golden eagle on a blue field that, in itself, harkens back to the colors and designs of the kings of the Isle de France. Blue may also have revolutionary connotations tied to citizenship. Either way, the choice of blue clearly represented French authority by contrasting with Hamburg’s own ancient heraldry, which was red and white. Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 38-9; Rist, Johann Georg Rise in Hamburg, 183-5.

138 StAH 112-3 Mairie Hamburg Nr. 1, Sitzungen des Munizipalrates vom 23 April 1811 und 3 August 1811. “Programm,” 7 August 1813 (Anderson, vol.11), 40;

139 StAH 112-3 Mairie Hamburg, Nr. 1, Sitzung des Munizipalrates vom 11.May 1811. These statues were paid for by the city at a cost of 10,000 francs. See Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 496-7.

While the occupation had always relied on an intrusive, public police presence, French authorities’ use of force had remained within accepted, regularized, and legitimate limits. Yet in an environment of extreme economic dislocation, French force appeared to most Hamburgers as disproportionate and arbitrary French violence.

Police surveillance of the press, which began in the earliest days of the occupation, increased significantly after Hamburg’s incorporation into the Empire. All official correspondence and public announcements were mandated by the Imperial regime to be printed in both German and French no later than 1 July 1811.\textsuperscript{141} To ensure complete control of public opinion, many of Hamburg’s most widely-read newspapers and journals were also forced to add a French title and to publish articles with no overt political content. A review of four years’ worth of publications by three of Hamburg’s internationally recognized journals, the \textit{Hamburgischer Correspondent} (renamed the \textit{Journal de Département des Bouches de L’Elbe}); the \textit{Orient, oder Hamburgisches Morgenblatt}; and the \textit{Gemeinützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg} (renamed \textit{Affiches, Annonces et Avis divers de Hambourg}) offers little more than bland local news, the availability of common goods, and international stories given pro-Imperial interpretations.\textsuperscript{142} By late 1811, General Director of the Police, d’Aubignosc, had focused his personal attention on the former \textit{Hamburgischer Correspondent}, giving the paper a modicum of independence in the hopes of preserving the paper’s continental credibility. It soon became clear to Hamburg’s reading population, however, that the once-reputable \textit{Correspondent}, along with the rest of Hamburg’s “reformed press,” had ceased to be a medium for genuine news, earning it

\textsuperscript{141} “Publicandum,” 18 December 1810 (Anderson, vol.10), 2.

\textsuperscript{142} One such (prophetic) article, from late 1811, attempted to vilify “aggressive” British policy which, according to the French, was “clearly” leading to a war with the Americans. \textit{Hamburgischer Correspondent}, Nr. 205, 24 December 1811. See also Obst, “Die Presse in der Franzosenzeit”; Schmidt, \textit{Hamburg im Zeitalter}, 450-2; Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 252.
the popular moniker, the “paper of the beets” implying that Hamburger were being fed news fit for livestock (beets were raised to feed farm animals). Eventually, d’Aubignosc would make all editorial decisions for the Correspondent himself, even dictating many articles personally. For the French police, the seeking out of illegal publications, woodcuts, and pamphlets, and the monitoring of content published in journals still active within Hamburg, remained a central priority until the final month of the occupation.

The regulation of the press, arbitrary searches of private property, and the continuation of the Continental System, increasingly brought the French police to bear on individuals’ daily lives. Relentless in their pursuit of contraband, the douaniers and the police, often arrogant and cruel, intruded upon Hamburger’s private lives to such an extent that, as one observer put it, “Harsh regulations were enforced with heartless brutality. Ground down by the exactions of greedy officials of every rank, and harassed by arbitrary persecution, the inhabitants of Hamburg had not even the consolation of feeling themselves free from annoyance in their own homes.”

It was also common knowledge throughout the city that d’Aubignosc relied on a web of paid informants and had planted a number of spies in coffee houses, clubs, the Stock Exchange, and, disguised as church figures, even among Hamburg’s most wealthy merchant families.

Conscription and billeting obligations also increased throughout the end of 1811 and early 1812 as Napoleon prepared for his campaign against Russia. By 1812, the French had drafted 3,500 men into 127th Infantry Regiment, promising an immediate and harsh response to those who

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143 Ibid., 252-3.


145 Frederick Perthes as quoted by Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 258.

146 Ibid.; Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 529.
failed to report as well as sanctions against the families of soldiers who deserted.\textsuperscript{147} Service in the Imperial armed forces fell most heavily on Hamburg’s poor as wealthy families could afford to “purchase” substitutes. These policies further enraged a section of society whose numbers had increased throughout the occupation. Likewise, billeting obligations cut along class lines as Hamburg’s poor were forced to bear the cost of feeding and housing the 13,000 soldiers, 40 officers, and 3,000 military horses stationed inside the city walls, with thousands more in Hamburg’s suburbs.\textsuperscript{148} The combined effect of increased police surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and the inequality in billeting and conscription obligations, eventually drove Hamburg’s underclass to challenge the regime both vocally and physically by early 1813, as news of Grand Army’s debacle in Russia slowly began to trickle in.

While the French police had arrested a number of individuals publicly protesting conscription and noted a general dissatisfaction with Imperial rule throughout Hamburg, the mood of the city remained rather tranquil. Those examples of anti-Imperial agitation that existed remained localized and small-scale allowing French police to maintain order without relying on French soldiers.\textsuperscript{149} By late 1812, word of Napoleon’s evacuation of Moscow had reached Hamburg and, in January 1813, the ragged remains of Napoleon’s army had reached Hamburg’s gates with news of the events in Russia. By mid-February, growing rumors regarding the approach of Russian Cossacks and the evacuation of French officials and their wives and children led to increased tensions throughout the city. Well-connected members of

\textsuperscript{147} As Katherine Aaslestad has shown, only 22 percent (1,829) of soldiers from Hamburg’s garrison were fit enough to serve, half of who never made it home from Russia, \textit{Place and Politics}, 259-60. See also conscription notices in \textit{Gemeinnützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg} 1811-1813; August Campe, \textit{Rathegeber für Conscribirte und deren Verwandte} (Hamburg, 1811); Henke, \textit{Davout und die Festung Hamburg-Harburg}, 114-5, 169-70.

\textsuperscript{148} Schmidt, \textit{Hamburg im Zeitalter}, 541-7; Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 260.

\textsuperscript{149} Schmidt, \textit{Hamburg im Zeitalter}, 683-5.
Hamburg’s literary, political, and artisanal communities began stockpiling illegal weapons and even planned to resurrect the city’s Civic Militia as an “alternative to French authority.” With Russian troops only miles from the city, French police intensified their presence in the hopes of preempting a popular uprising before it could start.

Late on 23 February, in front of a starving crowd and only minutes before the gate was to close, French police arrested a number of smugglers at Millenstor. The following morning, popular unrest spread rapidly throughout the city as crowds of women, children, unemployed workers, and deserting conscripts, burned and looted customs and watch houses, stoned despised French customs officials (before throwing them into the canals), destroyed Imperial symbols, and burned the Police Commissioner’s home to the ground. While violent, these events were not the product of mindless mob revolt. These actions fall squarely into the tradition of popular justice and public shaming which had help to govern both urban and rural communities since at least the eleventh century. The targets were symbolic, and the harm done was aimed at ending dignity rather than life. Nevertheless, French police were caught off-guard and opened fire on the crowd, killing several and wounding a number of others. The revolt was suppressed later that afternoon when French General Carra St. Cyr called on Danish troops from Altona and reinstated

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153 The stoning and throwing of customs officials into canals suggests that these events shared certain aspects of rituals of shaming that sought to upend power hierarchies only temporarily until certain demands were met. The fact that no soldiers or officials were murdered is further evidence for the continued resonance of communal justice. See Beik, *Urban Protest in Seventeenth-century France*.

Hamburg’s Civic Militia to help maintain order throughout the city. And while the pacification of the remaining crowd proceeded peacefully, as neither the Danes nor the Civic Militia were considered potential targets or threats by the protesters, the damage to French authority was irrevocable.

Following the events of 23 February, the French countered with heavy-handed police action that further eroded their authority and intensified what Hamburg’s residents perceived as slide from an acceptable use of force to state-sponsored violence. Days after the revolt, those French authorities that remained in Hamburg began carrying weapons in public and, over the course of the next two weeks, shot and killed a number of Hamburg’s residents. Strict regulations against public gatherings were enacted as the French forced coffee houses and taverns to close in the early evenings. General St. Cyr also repositioned four of Hamburg’s cannons as a warning against future insurrection. Military courts were hastily convened on 27 February and 3 March trying and executing individuals (on the same day) suspected of spying for Russia. A number of other Hamburgers were shot and killed in the next two months. None of these deaths caused more outrage, however, than the death of a poor deaf carpenter shot on his way home from work, by a French soldier. In the wake of such unprecedented violence, Hamburg’s upper-class citizens, who had supported the Imperial regime in the hopes of mitigating the destruction of private property, now viewed the French as being responsible for

155 Carra St. Cyr began his career in 1803 as a Division General and, in 1806 was named Governor of Magdeburg and, later that year, Governor of Dresden. Upon returning from Russia in 1813, St. Cyr was named Governor of Hamburg. He spent the years 1814-1819 as the Governor of French Guyana. See Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 711 n.1838, 712-14; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 267. See also StAH 341-1, B6 Bürgerwache.

156 Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 726-730.

157 Henke, Davout, 7.

158 One individual on 27 February was arrested and executed while 20 individuals were arrested and six executed on 3 March. See Schmidt, Hamburg im Zeitalter, 727-31.
the increase in unrest throughout the city. On 4 March, Mayor Abendroth wrote to General St. Cyr with the disturbing news that peace could no longer be guaranteed and that popular agitation against French rule could no longer be contained. The Imperial regime’s attempt to forestall popular revolt through harsh measures had backfired, radicalizing Hamburg’s poor and, eventually, alienating the city’s wealthy inhabitants. The French use of force in the defense of law, order, and security increasingly appeared to all segments of society as indiscriminate, lawless, and disruptive violence.

On 7 March, the full-scale evacuation of French administrators and civilians began as the arrival of Russian Cossacks appeared inevitable. Five days later, on 12 March, General St. Cyr ordered the withdrawal of all French military personnel. Expecting French reinforcements to reengage with the Russians, St Cyr issued the city a prophetic warning: “Goodbye for two months.” Even so, the Imperial administration remained intact, as Hamburg’s Mayor Abendroth continued to communicate with Paris and implored Hamburg’s residents to maintain order and security. As Aaslestad argues, a number of local authorities in Hamburg were “reluctant” to “assert themselves,” as they were skeptical of Russia’s ability to defend the city from the return of the Imperial Army and were concerned with the reprisals they would face if the city were retaken. Yet, assured by the presence of Russian soldiers, a rump Senate convened on 17 March and declared Hamburg’s independence. The following afternoon, Colonel Friedrich Karl von Tettenborn and his Russian troops paraded throughout the city, where they were hailed as liberators and saviors.

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159 Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 269.

160 As quoted in *Ibid*.


162 Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 270. The French had already begun making concessions with Tettenborn for the peaceful evacuation of the city since at least 11 March. See Prell, *Errinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit*, 50.
Chapter 2
Society and Politics in Restoration-Era Hamburg:
Militarization, Police Repression, and the Rise of
Economic Liberalism, 1813-1830

Those who were on hand to witness Tettenborn and his 1400 Cossacks march into Hamburg on 18 March 1813 remembered the event as one of the most festive days the city had ever experienced.\textsuperscript{163} Marching through Hamburg’s southeast gate at Steintor, the Cossacks were received as liberators by thousands of overwhelmed Hamburgers who had decorated city streets and market places with the colors of the city. The Cossacks, who had adorned their horses with French pistols, sabers, and uniforms, and hung watches and Legion of Honor medals from their immense beards, were showered with white flowers as they continued their northwest march throughout the city.\textsuperscript{164} The crowds offered their liberators cake, cheese, meat, wine, brandy, and beer; busts and statues of Tsar Alexander lined the streets as cheers of “Long live Tsar Alexander!” could be heard throughout the evening. As night fell, candles were lit and placed in every window to mark the solemnity of the event.\textsuperscript{165} Later that evening, Tettenborn proclaimed Hamburg’s independence and announced the re-instatement of the city’s Senate so that “anarchy and unrest” could be avoided.\textsuperscript{166}


\textsuperscript{164} Prell, \textit{Errinerungen aus der Franzosenzeit}, 56-7; Erik Verg, \textit{Das Abenteuer das Hamburg heißt} (Hamburg, 1977), 102.


\textsuperscript{166} “Proclamation,” \textit{Altonaischer Mercurius}, Nr. 45, 19 March, 1813. See also the section on Tettenborn in Victor Dirksen, \textit{Ein Jahrhundert Hamburg, 1800-1900: Zeitgenössische Bilder und Dokumente gesammelt und herausgegeben} (Munich, 1926), 75-77.
Fig. 6. Christopher Suhr, Cossacks in Hamburg on Jungfernstieg, 1813.
More importantly, however, Hamburger understood the event as marking a return of the republic’s “ancient rights” and independent status.\(^{167}\) Similar to other regions throughout Central Europe, Hamburg’s population experienced their struggle throughout 1813 as anti-French, celebrating the end of taxation, billeting, and the financial exploitation of the city.\(^{168}\) And while the restoration of Hamburg’s economic prosperity was immediately fixed upon by the press as central to the revival of the city’s livelihood,\(^{169}\) close attention to publicized debates as well as the string of new ordinances suggest a post-occupation Senate aware of its precarious political situation. It is true that the Senate’s return, and with it an ante-bellum constitution, resonated with a beleaguered population, wary of any reform that smacked of French influence.\(^{170}\) Yet many Hamburger considered the reinstated Senate as rather undistinguished, while others derided it for its treachery in negotiating with the French army, who would eventually return three months later. While the Senate formed under Russian occupation immediately folded after Imperial forces re-occupied the city in May 1813, the establishment of an armed militia in the preceding months, and the triumphant return of the militia in 1814, is a crucial factor in understanding how the Senate was able to reestablish its legitimacy and the city’s sovereignty in April 1814. Positioning themselves as the only party able to provide order and security, the Senate immediately claimed victory over the French and proclaimed the restoration of the republic’s independence. Recognizing that its authority was secure and that its interests lay in


\(^{170}\) See Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 275, 306-14.
the promotion of free trade, the Senate distanced itself from the same militias that provided this post-war stability, relying solely on its French-inspired policing agencies to maintain order and security throughout the city so that trade could once again flourish.

The government that emerged after the so-called Wars of Liberation against French oppression had fundamentally redefined its relationship to its subject population. As the Senate began to sift through the republic’s 1712 constitution as well as all French reform, to “examine everything and keep the best,”\(^{171}\) the ensuing public debates, and a series of new proclamations and police ordinances, show a government increasingly adhering to a socially noninterventionist agenda. This new post-war, laissez-faire atmosphere was at odds with Hamburg’s traditional sense of civic activism, and relied on the Senate and its police force’s ability to identify and prosecute new classes of social undesirables. And while the city had always had its share of working poor, orphaned children, as well as a migrant population, the emerging post-1815 government was no longer centered on poor relief, but instead focused entirely on the defense of its liberal economic policies and the livelihood of the city’s elite minority. Peace, order, and prosperity in nineteenth-century Hamburg came at the expense of the city’s increasingly policed and economically marginalized majority.

**Patriotism and Defense during the Russian Period**

In March 1813, with the return of Imperial forces likely, Hamburg’s Senate welcomed the Russians not only as heroes but as defenders of the city. Within the first days of the so-called “Russian Period,” Tettenborn, along with the Senate, called upon Hamburg’s citizens to enlist in a defensive regional militia to protect their cities and to join other northern Germans in the

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continuing fight against Napoleon. In an open proclamation to the city on 19 March, “Zu den Waffen für Vaterland und Recht!,” Tettenborn touched on the more broad German struggle against French “tyranny,” while specifically addressing Hamburgers’ need to fight in order to defend their city.172 The city’s response to the creation of a Hanseatic Legion was overwhelming, with over fourteen hundred infantry volunteers and two hundred cavalry volunteers signing up within the first two days. Also, it was announced that a Citizens Militia (Bürgergarde) was to be re-instated, a move that was also met with marked enthusiasm.173 By the following week, Hamburg’s once-empty streets were occupied by raw recruits drilling with arms supplied to them by Britain, whose ships lined the harbor almost immediately following the French evacuation.174 As Katherine Aaslestad argues, the establishment of the Hanseatic Legion as well as the Citizen’s Militia marked a clear watershed in the history of Hamburg’s sense of “patriotism and civic allegiance.”175 However demonstrable that may be, the popular enthusiasm of March and April soon gave way to a general sense of despair as the logistics of defending the city against the French appeared increasingly difficult to manage. The Senate itself proved utterly incapable of managing the military crisis and, according to many Hamburgers, cravenly began secret negotiations for the surrender of the city weeks before the French actually arrived. And while Hamburg’s so-called “Russian period” was an abject financial and political disaster,

172 “Zu den Waffen für Vaterland und Recht!,” StAH 341-2, A2: Hanseatische Legion und Bürgergarde.

173 See StAH 341-2, A-B: Hanseatische Legion und Bürgergarde for dates regarding establishment and numbers of volunteers for both orders; Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 55. See also Cipriano Francisco Gaedeche, “Die Hanseatische Legion,” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 8 (1889): 601-40; Jürgen Huck, Das Ende der Franzosenzeit in Hamburg: Quellen und Studien zur Belagerung und Befreiung von Hamburg, 1813-1814 (Hamburg, 1984), 82; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 276, n.10. Here Aaslestad draws attention to distinction between the pre-1813 Bürgergarde, the Civic Militia and the 1813 militia, the Citizens Militia.


175 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 275. For an earlier, account, see Aaslestad, “Paying for War,” 662-666.
ending with a second, and far more brutal, occupation by the French military, the creation of armed militias in March and April suggests that the returning Senate clearly understood the importance of maintaining a legitimate armed policing force.

As noted by Englishman Robert Semple, the Hanseatic Legion, impressed by Russian military strength, styled their new uniforms in a similar Russian fashion. The uniforms consisted of a buttonless, knee-length coat of a deep green with a pale blue collar and similar deep green trousers. A green cockade was added to each soldier’s cap, helping to establish a sense of regional solidarity and territorial allegiance, while simultaneously increasing awareness of specific identities and loyalties. These so-called “national cockades” also fulfilled a purely functional need throughout the allied armies by identifying friend from foe on the battle field. The flag of the Hanseatic Legion incorporated the colors of the Hanseatic cities’ arms, red and white, and consisted of a red Maltese cross on a white field that appeared on uniforms and flags as well as medals. The Legion’s battle standard also included the inscription “Gott mit Uns” in gothic script written above the Hanseatic Cross on one side and, on the other side, the combined arms of Bremen, Lübeck, and Hamburg. A number of similar slogans, such as “A Strong

176 It seems children were also taken by Russia’s professionalism as many of them dressed in green and marched alongside the parading soldiers and could be seen practicing their own drills throughout Hamburg. For a good description see Semple, Observations made on a Tour, 30-3.


179 This consisted of a golden-bound shield split horizontally white over red (Lübeck) on top of a red three-turreted castle (Hamburg) with an upright key (Bremen) connecting the two. See Stieve, “Uniforms,” 9-10; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 279.
Fig. 7. Handbill for the Hanseatic Legion, 1813.

Designed to protect Hamburg itself, as well as the suburbs and the Elbe islands just south of the city, a Citizens Militia (Bürgergarde) was created to enlist male volunteers from all social classes between the ages of 18 and 45. Organized into eight battalions, six of which were from the inner city and two from the suburbs of St. Georg and Hamburger Berg (now St. Pauli), including a company of artillery and a small cavalry, the militia’s primary function was maintaining peace and order in the city.\footnote{“Proclamation,” 18 March 1813 (Anderson, vol. 10), 4; “Proclamation,” 30 March 1813 (Anderson, vol. 10), 10; Wöchentliche Gemeinnützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg, 16 May 1813.} Publicist and doctor Jonas Ludwig von Heß, the militia’s commander and former officer in the Swedish military, was joined by Gerhard Beneke and Friedrich Perthes as majors with David Mettlerkamp and Karl Sieveking as battalion commanders.\footnote{Beneke and Perthes were two of Hamburg’s most successful publishers and members of the Senate. See their lengthy correspondence in StAH 341-2, B3: Hanseatische Legion und Bürgergarde. Ahrens, “Von der Franzosenzeit,” 424.} All 6,000 volunteers, who were to be outfitted by the Senate with gunpowder, cannons, and sabers, initially received little attention from Tettenborn as it became clear that it would be impossible to supply the Citizens Militia adequately with British muskets. Despite the initial enthusiasm, it was apparent to Hamburg’s Senate that not all the city’s inhabitants were making the appropriate sacrifices for the city’s defense. In late March, the Senate publicly chastised those who shirked or abused night-watch duties, stressing their importance for peace
and order. By May, the Senate was forced to remind Hamburger that all men between the ages 18 and 45 were required not only to join the Militia but, more importantly, were obliged to attend now mandatory drills as well as night patrols. Those who would neglect this duty were threatened by the Senate with heavy fines and public shaming.

Throughout April and May, 1813, the Senate focused almost exclusively on the defense of the city, urging women and men to join the struggle for freedom as both “Hanseatics and Patriots.” Hamburg’s press, now freed from French censorship and reemerging in late March publishing exclusively in German, likewise pursued a similar, “patriotic,” agenda by imploring their compatriots to sacrifice time, money, their children, and their comfort in the ongoing battle against Napoleon. As Aaslestad has argued, the war against Napoleon was not fought with bullets alone. A newly liberated press that sought to politicize and popularize the struggle through emotional lyrics, poetry, as well as a series of other publications such as a field newspaper (Feldzeitung), was crucial in organizing whole populations to fight against the French. By May, eight new papers were reporting on German military preparations, field

183 Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 86, 30 March 1813.
185 See the series of proclamations in StAH 341-2, B:1 Hanseatische Legion und Bürgergarde; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 281-95.
186 One paper, such as the Hamburgischer Correspondent, not only included Hamburg’s ensign but added lions flanking the tri-turreted castle, suggesting the city was well defended. See Hamburgischer Correspondent, 29 March, 1813 Nr. 68. “Hamburg’s Befreiung,” Politisches Journal, March 1813; “Publicandum,” Wöchentliche Gemeinnützige Nachrichten von und für Hamburg, 7 April 1813; “Zuruf an die Freiwilligen der Hanseatische Legion,” and “Einzug der Russen in Hamburg,” Orient 1 April 1813; “Standhaftigkeit,” Orient, 25 May 1813.
187 The Feldzeitung was modeled after Napoleon’s Bulletins de la Grand Armée and reported the latest news from the front lines while including patriotic songs and emotional poems. See Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 280-1; Obst, “Die Presse in der Franzosenzeit,” 183-92. Regarding the role of the press in the larger German struggle against Napoleon see Moran, Towards the Century of Words, 113; Karen Hagemann, “Männlicher Muth und Teutscher Ehre”: Nation, Militäer, und Geschlecht in der Zeit der antinapoleonischen Kriege Preussens (Paderborn, 2002), 245-55; Karen Hagemann “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’: Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon,” Central European History 30 (1997): 187-220.
movements, as well as the “foul crimes of the French.”188 While Tettenborn welcomed the press as a useful tool in the rallying of the city’s spirit, the Senate, worried about the potential disorder caused by large crowds surrounding journal and pamphlet vendors, placed restrictions on “unqualified” and “unregistered” publicists and threatened imprisonment, fines, and public “embarrassment” to those caught printing offensive material.189

The press not only played a role in publicizing the anti-Napoleonic struggle, organizing the city’s campaign to collect money and materials, it also functioned by articulating distinctly gendered styles of participation and patriotic commitment. While men were called to take up arms in defense of Hamburg’s independence, women were implored to “renounce fashion by sacrificing their pleasures, jewels, and belongings to contribute to the liberation of their beloved Vaterstadt.”190 Women’s societies, such as the Hamburger Frauenverein founded by Elisabeth von Struve and Philippine Kleudgen at the Church of St. Katherine, immediately set to work sewing shirts and knitting socks for the Hanseatic Legion.191 Such organizations allowed women to express solidarity with the soldiers by sewing uniforms and flags, raising money, as well as through medical care and hospital support.192 As skirmishes between regional militias and Imperial forces erupted throughout northern Germany, women soon became the sole caretakers of all victims of warfare (civilians as well as soldiers). Through this work, some women, especially those from propertied backgrounds, moved into acceptable, publicly-recognized

188 “Vorward,” Der Deutsche Beobachter, April 1813.


190 As quoted in Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 288.

191 Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 60; Elise Campe, Hamburgs außerordentliche Begebenheiten und Schicksale in den Jahren 1813-1814 während der ersten Besitznahme durch den General Tettenborn bis zum Allgemeinen Frieden (Hamburg, 1814), 16.

positions. While most women’s participation followed traditional gendered norms, a few women defied those roles, such as Anna Lühring from Bremen, who at 17 disguised herself in her older brother’s clothing and fought with the *Lützowsche Freikorps*, earning public recognition as a patriot and war hero.193

Regardless of the early enthusiasm and public presentations of solidarity with Hamburg’s armed forces, it was painfully clear by May that the city was unprepared to defend itself against what was now considered to be the imminent return of Imperial soldiers. Woefully undertrained and inadequately provisioned, most of Hamburg’s recruits spent more time drilling in public than learning how to handle a firearm; many would eventually face the French military without having ever held a weapon.194 It was also noted that many of the Citizen Militia’s captains spent more time writing and theorizing about the positive effects of regular drilling on a man’s constitution that few found the time to actually do so.195 Tales of inefficiency, abuse, and neglect at the hands of the city’s military authorities ultimately led to a major military crisis in mid-May as entire battalions evaporated along with the pool of new recruits.196 By 20 May, von Heß, the Citizens Militia’s commander, had lost control over the Citizens Militia, the city’s last line of defense. Resistance against the French military came in the form of acts of bravery by

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193 Ms. Lühring was the toast of Berlin and eventually decorated with the Iron Cross by Princess Wilhelmine herself. See Hagemann, *Männlicher Muth*, 384. For more information regarding Hamburg’s press and the gendered call to patriotic duty see Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 286-91.

194 Prell, *Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit*, 60-64. Prell estimates that by May, some 6000 recruits had only 1500 muskets between them.


196 Stories such as the detachment of Citizen’s Militia being left to defend the city’s dikes for weeks without relief or supplies quickly wore away at Hamburger’s general enthusiasm. It was also clear that most of the weapons soldiers were supplied with were useless as ammunition was virtually non-existent. And finally, the sons of Hamburg’s elite families often bristled at the stern discipline of their commanders and often refused to wear military clothing. For similar stories see Stieve, “Troops of the Hanseatic Republic,” 15-17; Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 277, 293.
individual Hamburger who prepared themselves to fight with lances, scythes, spears, butchers’ knives, and even the old executioner’s sword.  

Contributing to the city’s increasing sense of despair was the disenchantment with their Russian occupiers. Once hailed as heroes and saviors of the city, Tettenborn and the Russians insinuated themselves within Hamburg’s Senate and lived quite comfortably at the expense of the population. Not only did Tettenborn demand 10,000 *louis d’ors* for his troubles, he personally confiscated all the property left behind by the retreating French. The Senate eventually paid half of Tettenborn’s demanded recompense but made him an honorary citizen in the hopes of tempering his disappointment. Accounts from the period touch not only on Tettenborn’s greed, but on his military incompetence as well as his time spent throwing lavish parties, rather than preparing the city’s defenses. In one instance, Tettenborn publicly threatened to exile former mayor Abendroth to Siberia after Abendroth spoke out about such costly extortions. After the first week, the free gifts of food and drink offered to the Cossacks turned into billeting obligations by the Russian military. As one contemporary Hamburger complained, Russian soldiers incurred the ire of the population as they smoked pipes and played cards in the streets while demanding three warm meals, black coffee, and a daily ration of dark

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198 See Tettenborn’s initial list of demands in StAH 112-3, 135, III. 17-v.7: *Mairie Hamburg* “Einquartierungsprotokolle der Russischen Periode.”  
200 *Ibid.*, 230-34. Tettenborn’s “allowance” increased virtually every week and doubled on the weekends, see the records kept by the Senate in StAH 112-3, 135, III. 17-v.7: *Mairie Hamburg* “Einquartierungsprotokolle der Russischen Periode.”  
201 Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 294.  
202 See the billeting deputation created on 30 March in StAH 112-3, 135, III. 17-v.7: *Mairie Hamburg* “Einquartierungsprotokolle der Russischen Periode.”
rum. Arriving in Hamburg with only the goods they could carry, the Russian military evacuated the city with a train consisting of over ninety packed wagons. “We never had a French general,” one Hamburger claimed, “that was as expensive to keep up as this Russian.”

To make matters worse, Hamburg’s Senate, fearful of potential reprisals from both the French as well as the Russians, wavered in the defense of the city as Napoleon’s reorganized Grand Army resumed its offensive in late April. By 29 April, French forces under the command of General Dominique-Joseph René Vandamme, Count of Unseburg, had successfully captured Harburg, a city lying three miles south of Hamburg. Legionnaires spent the first week of May fighting a series of skirmishes with the French advance guards over the Elbe Islands, and particularly the city of Wilhelmsburg that lay less than two miles directly south of the city center. Tettenborn, attempting to ward off the threat of a siege and prolonged bombardment, went on the offensive on 12 May. By the end of the first afternoon, over 1,000 Hanseatic Legionnaires had lost their lives in Tettenborn’s bid to save the city. By 13 May, not only had Wihlemsburg been lost, but with it, the town of Veddel, a city southeast of Hamburg. Witnesses to the debacle describe poorly trained militia men firing on each other and their allies in the confusion, and entire battalions of Legionnaires abandoning strategic positions to the battle-hardened French army without firing a single shot. Any hopes that the Senate had in defending the city were lost.

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204 As quoted in Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 294.


Failing either to defend Hamburg adequately or to surrender it peacefully, the Senate began secret negotiations with Marshall Davout in Altona, attempting to mitigate French reprisals against the government. The Senate’s representatives hoped to persuade the French that they had been forcefully occupied and militarized by the Russians against their will. Following the second French evacuation in 1814, Hamburg’s publicists recognized the Senate’s selfish and indecisive actions and publicly criticized the government for its failure to defend the republic. Referred to as the “war of the pens,” this emotional and public outcry against the Senate in 1814 focused not only on the government’s cowardice in 1813, but also on its subsequent lack of legitimacy after its second and final return. However publicly derided it was and regardless of how poorly it had handled city affairs during the Russian occupation, the Senate was able to harness a general anti-French sentiment while positioning itself as the defender of law and order. While both the Hanseatic Legion as well as the Citizens Militia proved utterly incapable of defending the city, a precedent had been set. As a product of Hamburg’s first post-liberation Senate, the militia’s triumphant return in 1814 (after the final evacuation of the French) allowed an unpopular government to claim victory and establish a visible presence throughout the war-ravaged city.

Reoccupation and the Increased Militarization of Politics

As Tettenborn and the Senate had feared, the French laid siege to the city and began a series of heavy bombardments on 19 and 20 May. The city was defended by 1200 of the original 6000 members of the Citizens Militia as well as a number of brave citizens who initially offered

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207 Tilman Stieve, *Der Kampf um die Reform*, 120-5.

208 These men included the Citizen’s Militia’s commander Jonas Ludwig von Heß, and at least one of its battalion commanders David Mettlerkamp. See Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 294 n. 89.
their lives in the defense of Hamburg’s independence. Respectable citizens sent what belongings they could to their neighbors in Altona while sending their wives and children to the countryside. Yet most citizens of means fled entirely, leaving the city populated by its defenders and the tens of thousands of Hamburg’s lower classes who had no other option but to weather another occupation. Aid in the defense of the city was promised by the Russians, the Danes, the British, and finally the Swedes, although each country eventually recognized Hamburg’s desperate situation and withdrew its support, leaving the city to its fate.209 After 21 May, as the city’s “spirit of resistance” had been broken by French cannons, officers of the Citizen’s Militia deserted en masse.210 On 29 and 30 May, Tettenborn and the Russians evacuated Hamburg, along with soldiers of the Hanseatic Legion. The Senate briefly adjourned and chose to flee the city, investing a rump Senate with authority to negotiate with the French and manage escalating public pandemonium. To those left within Hamburg, the city and its population had been forsaken; women cried and screamed in disbelief in city streets that were littered with rubble from destroyed homes, businesses, smashed muskets, broken sabers, and cartridge pouches.211 On the evening of 30 May, Danish and French detachments entered a sullen, “deathly still” city where they would remain for an entire year.212

The second occupation would be remembered as being far more exacting and harsh than the seven years from 1806 to 1813. Napoleon wished for Hamburg to be made an example of for those territories that would openly defy his designs for Europe. As such, he instructed Marshal

209 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 296.

210 Rist, Johann Georg Rist in Hamburg, 256-280; Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 76-8; Henke, Davout und die Festung Hamburg, 16; Carl Henke “Hamburg in den Kriegsereignissen 1813 und 1814” Zeitschrift des Vereins für Hamburgische Geschichte 28 (1914):

211 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 297.

212 Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 81-2.
Davout to execute five leading Senators of the so-called “Cossack Senate” and to have the rest removed from the city and placed in French prisons. Those who defended the city or were captured during the weeks leading up to Hamburg’s surrender were to be placed on French galleys and their officers summarily shot. While no one was executed and only twenty-eight citizens (who had fled the city weeks earlier) were officially banished, the city was forced to suffer financially. Recognizing Hamburg’s inhabitants as overwhelmingly merchant based, and, according to Napoleon, concerned only with their own self-interest, the city was forced to pay over 48 million francs for its liberation in March.\textsuperscript{213} In addition to the crippling financial burdens, Hamburg’s inhabitants would also be subject to martial law.

The French administration would once again rely on public presentations of authority which entailed a steady militarization of politics that would ultimately affect the nature of post-war political culture in Hamburg. On 1 June, thirty-five battalions of French and Dutch soldiers, led by Davout and Division General Vandamme ceremoniously marched into Hamburg and announced the official return of Imperial rule.\textsuperscript{214} French authorities wasted little time in resurrecting the legal system that had governed Hamburg from 1811 to 1813. In a proclamation dated 26 May, Davout outlined French control over Hamburg’s finances and reinstated the civil and criminal justice system put in place by the Imperial regime in northern Germany in January 1811.\textsuperscript{215} All rights and “legal dispositions” of Hamburg’s citizens would once again be protected under the constitution of 28 Flôreal XII (18 May 1804) while sharp distinctions were made.

\textsuperscript{213} Ahrens, “Von der Franzosenzeit,” 425-6. For a detailed discussion on the financial strains placed on the city see Aaslestad, “Paying for War,” 666-8; Gallagher, \textit{The Iron Marshal}, 276-80.

\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Hamburgischer Correspondant}, Nr. 87, 1 June 1813.

\textsuperscript{215} These regulations were to go into effect midnight on 31 May. “Proclamation Nr. I 26 May,” 26 May 1813 (Anderson, vol. 11), 8-15.
between secular and religious duty and authority. All appointments to positions within the court system would likewise conform to the constitution and would limit the role religious authorities could play in the world of Hamburg’s politics. And finally, Davout’s proclamation established the authority of the French police under the control of General Director d’Aubignosc. Davout promised discipline and behavior “befitting of French professionalism,” established a military court under his control, and instituted nightly patrols to ensure his instructions were followed.

Before the French entered the city, d’Aubignosc reestablished tight control over Hamburg’s press, requiring all publicists to register with the department of police, and threatening heavy fines for the printing of unregistered pamphlets and for the possession of foreign newspapers. In addition, d’Aubignosc reinstated the ban on the housing of foreigners and gave innkeepers and landlords twenty-four hours to obtain special permits allowing them to rent rooms. Restrictions on large assemblies were put in place throughout the following months, allowing only those individuals with written permission to attend theater performances, balls, and even church. Individuals were banned from congregating in private houses and all clubs, associations, and “companies” were outlawed entirely. Restrictions on occupancy in


217 StAH 212-1, B42: *Französische Gerichtsbehörden.*

218 A “*Manuel de service pour la Garnison de Hambourg*” was distributed that outlined the proper attire for soldiers and officers as well as guidelines concerning the correct way to make arrests, see Henke, *Davout und die Festung Hamburg*, 114-15.

219 “*Polizei Reglement,*” 31 May 1813 (Anderson, vol. 11) 25. On 1 June, the *Hamburgischer Correspondant* once again added the title *Journal du Department des Bouches de l’Elbe*, printing pro-French articles in both French and German.

taverns, coffee houses, and guest houses eventually limited the number of patrons to six customers in the morning and eight in the evening. Anyone “caught in the act” was to be immediately arrested and removed from the city; those attempting to return were to be executed as spies.221

No later than 15 June, the French administration in Hamburg could rely on both its police force and National Guard units to maintain order throughout the city.222 As Howard Brown has argued, by the late 1790s the French army increasingly helped supplement regular forms of government throughout the provinces. This, he contends, would lead to a steady militarization of politics as well as everyday life throughout the French First Republic.223 The increased use of armed force in the establishment of law and order that Brown traces holds true for the French administration in Hamburg after 1813. While the army has been considered the sin qua non of Directory-era and Napoleonic France, virtually no attention has been paid to the role the French army played in the establishment of Imperial administrations in northern Germany. In the case of occupied Hamburg, then, the French army not only offered expedited justice for what were considered “political crimes,” but it gave courage to weak administrators and acted as the public representation of Imperial authority.224

In addition to the reestablishment of the Civil and Criminal court system, the French immediately began making arrangements for the creation of a “Cour Spéciale” to be staffed by

221 See the letter from Division General and Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor, Governor Hogendorp to the Senate in StAH “Franzosenzeit,” Kapsul IV A322/20.

222 The National Guard consisted of 500 men, all French. The officers were distinguished by their white sashes while the rank and file wore braid loops running under their left arm. See Heinrich Christensen, Ein Tagebuch aus dem Belagerungsjahr 1813/1814 (Hamburg, 1908), 28-9. It would appear that the French also maintained a small contingent of Hamburgers to help police the city, see StAH 341-1, B6: Bürgerwache.


224 Ibid., 354.
four judges and three military personal.\textsuperscript{225} Herr Schlechendal, a German, was appointed as the court’s acting president, with three Germans, Dr. Hesling, Dr. Boelling, Dr. Jelting, and one Frenchman, Mon. Greffier, appointed as the court’s four judges. Little is known about each of these men other than that they were recommended by Eichhorn himself and all had legal backgrounds.\textsuperscript{226} Also appointed to the court were three French officers: Captain d’Anvers, commander of the gendarmerie in Hamburg; Captain Bagelaar, captain of the 33\textsuperscript{rd} Regiment and commander of recruitment throughout northern Germany (\textit{Department l’Ems Oriental}); and Captain Danneron, captain of the 125th Regiment of the Line. In accordance with the Constitution of 28 Fl\öreal XII, each individual was publicly sworn into office on 15 July, 1813, an event that took place at the \textit{Hôtel de Mairie}, the retitled Goertz Palace and former site of the Holy Roman Empire’s administration in Hamburg. What little documentation survives suggests that the court was active throughout the thirty-second Military District (of which Hamburg was the capital) and was reserved for crimes of a “political” nature. This would include recalcitrant mayors or entire city councils, publicists of anti-Imperial literature, and those caught directly “aiding” France’s enemies or “advancing the interests” of the countries with which France was at war. Because military justice was designed to be swift and extra-legal, and because the War of the Sixth Coalition was well under way, trial and sentence records are virtually non-existent. The sheer amount of correspondence between the court’s president and the Minster of Justice in Paris, Mathieu Louis Molé, suggests that the court was somewhat overwhelmed in the month and a half before the Battle of Leipzig.\textsuperscript{227}

\textsuperscript{225} See the correspondence between Division General Carra St. Cyr and Procurer General of the Imperial Court Eichhorn in StAH 212-1, B42: \textit{Französische Gerichtsbehorden}.

\textsuperscript{226} A list of appointments can be found in StAH 212-1, B42: \textit{Französische Gerichtsbehorden}.

\textsuperscript{227} Molé was appointed as the Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals in mid-1813 and would remain at the post until April 1814; see StAH 212-1, B42: \textit{Französische Gerichtsbehörden}. For information on the “Cour
As the holding of Hamburg became central to Imperial designs in northern Germany, Napoleon issued Davout orders to begin the fortification of the city and its surrounding suburbs. Thousands of Hamburg’s remaining residents were recruited for the rebuilding of the city’s old ramparts and crumbling city walls while others were forced to construct a bridge connecting the city with the town of Harburg across the Elbe. Sections of Hamburg’s inner wall, which ringed the entire city, had long ago become elegant, tree-lined promenades populated by street vendors and musicians. Within twenty-four hours of his arrival, Davout his officers to marshal ten thousand Hamburgers to begin the refortification of the city. This entailed repairs to the walls, key defensive fortifications outside the city gates, and the building of a citadel in Harburg able to quarter four to five thousand men who would police the towns south of Hamburg and engage, if necessary, with enemy forces. Davout also ordered the leveling of all the towns, churches, gardens, and farms outside the city walls and had the suburbs of Hamm and Hamburger Berg burned to the ground to clear fields of fire for French artillery. Private residences, empty warehouses, and other public buildings, including the Stock Exchange and four of Hamburg’s churches, were requisitioned and converted into barracks, hospitals, and horse stables.

The building of the Hamburg-Harburg bridge was equally taxing on Hamburg’s inhabitants. The bridge, whose construction was headed by Christian Friedrich Lange, the Chef supérieur des ateliers des ponts et chaussées, was to link the two cities that were separated by a

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229 Ibid., 26-30; Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 81-113; Campe, Hamburgs außerordentliche Begebenheiten, 62-200; Christensen, Ein Tagebuch, 30.

230 St. Jacobi, St. Nikolai, St. Katherinen, and St. Petri were all transformed into horse stables, leaving only St. Michaels, Hamburg’s famed, Baroque-styled church, intact. See Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 301.
Fig. 8. Christoph Suhr, Hamburg-Harburg Bridge completed in 1813. Here, French cavalry enter Harburg.

Fig. 9. Christopher Suhr, Hamburg-Harburg Bridge with Hamburg in the background, 1815.
series of swampy islands that dotted the Elbe. Davout ordered the bridge be wide enough so that an army of 30,000-40,000, marching five abreast, could traverse it in under twenty-four hours.\textsuperscript{231} Begun on 5 June, the 15,173 foot long bridge eventually took 3798 Hamburgers, 1800 French soldiers, and sixty horses eighty three days to complete.\textsuperscript{232} The day after its completion, a division of French cavalry in full parade uniform, ceremoniously crossed the bridge into Harburg where they remained stationed until France’s final retreat in May 1814. The two cities had effectively become a double fortress, with a series of smaller redoubts guarding the western and eastern march to the city. Both Davout and Napoleon felt a protracted siege and battle for the city was imminent. And while that great battle never materialized, the fortification of Hamburg not only wrought untold misery on the population but effectively changed the face of the city with astounding speed and exclusively with military concerns in mind.\textsuperscript{233}

In preparation for what Napoleon was certain to be a protracted siege, he ordered all Hamburg’s remaining inhabitants to provision their homes with food and fuel to last six months. Hamburgers, who were living week to week, found it impossible to adequately provision themselves, especially the city’s poor.\textsuperscript{234} Saddled with the cost of quartering French soldiers and with the building of new homes for French officers, Hamburgers were also forced to supply their occupiers with wine, meat, tools, wagons, and horses. Not only were public buildings

\textsuperscript{231} Davout’s real concern, however, was that the bridge be wide enough so that an entire cavalry division and a battalion of soldiers could cross the bridge in 7-8 minutes. For Davout’s specifications see Henke, \textit{Davout und die Festung Hamburg-Harburg}, 77-80.

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., 80; Prell, \textit{Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit}, 107-9. See also the paintings of the completed bridge as well as the “Schanzarbeiters” collected in Dirksen, \textit{Ein Jahrhundert Hamburg}, 76-82; Verg, \textit{Das Abenteuer}, 108-11.

\textsuperscript{233} Unlike cities such as Turin, Frankfurt, or Brussels, whose medieval neighborhoods and fortifications were demolished in favor of straight, wide, and tree-lined boulevards, Hamburg was purely of military and financial concern. See Spiro Kostof, \textit{A History of Architecture}, 568-75, 630, 721; idem., \textit{The City Assembled: The Elements of Urban Form throughout History} (Boston, 1992), 14-33, 151, 196.

\textsuperscript{234} Prell, \textit{Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit}, 136-8.
requisitioned as hospitals, but the city’s population was forced to build new facilities at their own expense. It was estimated that in June alone Hamburgers had contributed eight million francs to the French war effort. In July, oil from the streetlamps was requisitioned, leaving city streets in total darkness at night; streets increasingly fouled by waste and excrement which made some sections of the city uninhabitable. In June and July, Davout ordered prisoners to be transferred to Lübeck (most of whom escaped en route) and orphaned children to Eppendorf. By December, the French were systematically expelling all foreign-born inhabitants, vagrants, and the insane (released when administrators requisitioned their hospital) from the city. On Christmas Eve, 1813, French soldiers drove 20,000-25,000 of the city’s poorest and weakest citizens out of the city into the freezing winter evening without any provisions. While many made it to Altona and Bremen, where Assistance Societies, created by exiles from Hamburg, were able to feed them, 1,138 never made it and are buried in a mass grave in the town of Ottensen, outside of Altona.

Beyond their policing and juridical functions, the French military participated in moments of Imperial spectacle as both a representation of authority and as a focal point of French prestige. Announced to the city on 7 August 1813, by temporary mayor Georg Rüder, the city would be hosting a celebration in honor of Napoleon’s birthday on 15 August. Parade routes were outlined and provisions were made for the cleaning of the streets and public squares in which the celebration would take place. The day was to begin with a burst of cannon fire

235 Contemporary accounts of the disastrous second occupation are numerous, see Christensen, Ein Tagebuch; Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 101-193; Campe, Hamburgs außerordentliche Begebenheiten, 62-220; Erlebnisse 1813-1814: Leidensgeschichte der Stadt Hamburg (Stralsund, 1813); Friedrich Wilhelm Chistian Menck, Erzählung der Begebenheiten in dem unglücklichen Hamburg vom 30. Mai 1813 bis zum 31. Mai 1814 (Hamburg, 1814).

236 Prell, Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit, 146-52; Campe, Hamburgs außerordentliche Begebenheiten, 113. See Aaslestad, “Paying for War,” 669. The victims would eventually receive a memorial on 28 May, 1815, the anniversary of the final French departure. It was dedicated to them by Hamburg’s Patriotic Society. After 1951, the tombstone was relocated to Hamburg’s famed botanical gardens, Planten un Blomen, where it remains to this day.
followed by the ringing of bells and the offering of a Te Deum at every church in Hamburg.\textsuperscript{237} At noon, thirty battalions of French soldiers, led by Davout and Vandamme, marched through the city, along the bastions, ending on the Alster with a speech that freely associated the vitality of the Empire with the lives of its “guarantors” and “defenders.”\textsuperscript{238} While dinner was made available to four thousand of the city’s poorest residents and tickets to free entertainment were distributed, the entire event was clearly meant as both a display of military might and a display of Imperial authority. In fact, similar events, such as celebrations of military victories and funerals for fallen heroes, drew similar parallels between the control of armed force and modern political authority and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{239}

This, then, is a crucial legacy of French occupation in Hamburg, as well as for most of Europe in the nineteenth century. The enhanced repressive character of the justice system, the monopolization and display of armed force as the basis of legitimacy, and the further professionalization of policing forces increasingly responsive to state demand, are all products of Imperial rule. Updating Carl Schmitt, Howard Brown has argued that the increased and focused use of force in defense of liberal constitutional aims has become one of the defining features of European liberal democracies. Brown contends that neither totalitarianism nor democratic republicanism was the most important outcome of the French Revolution or of the Empire. Rather, it was a “Faustian pact” citizens made with the “instruments of repression” that destroyed the foundations of an organic society and enabled the emergence of the modern security state, where legitimacy was derived from the restoring and preserving of order.\textsuperscript{240} And

\textsuperscript{237} “Programm,” 7 August 1813 (Anderson, vol 12), 40.

\textsuperscript{238} “Proclamation,” 16 August 1813 (Anderson, vol. 12) 45.

\textsuperscript{239} See the description of two military funerals in Hamburg in Christensen, Ein Tagebuch, 16-7.

\textsuperscript{240} Brown, Ending the French Revolution, 354-8.
Fig. 10. Jeß Bundsen, The Ruins of Hamburger Berg (St. Pauli), 1814.
while the post-Napoleonic Hamburg Senate did not maintain a significant amount of French reform, it did, recognize the uses of a substantially more modern approach to the establishment and defense of its legitimacy and authority.

**The End of French Rule and the Return of the Citizen’s Militia**

After the complete breakdown of military authority in Hamburg during the French advance in May 1813, David Mettlerkamp organized those still willing to fight in Mecklenburg. There, with the aid of exiled men from Lübeck, he established the Hanseatic Citizens Militia, initially comprised of some 380 men, with the goal of re-liberating their home cities.\(^{241}\) Pledging an oath to the Hanseatic Federation, Mettlerkamp and his men refused to join the Hanseatic Legion or accept foreign payment in the hopes of maintaining their independence.\(^{242}\) The ranks of the Hanseatic Citizen’s Militia soon swelled as more exiles joined, especially after October 1813 and Napoleon’s retreat back into France. However, Hamburg would remain garrisoned by French troops until late May, 1814, one month after the Treaty of Fontainebleau exiled Napoleon to the Island of Elba.\(^{243}\) Exiled Hamburgers met between August and November 1813 to devise plans for Hamburg’s post-war independence as well as the establishment of an interim government. By January, soldiers of the Hanseatic Legion and Citizen’s Militia were actively harassing French detachments south of Hamburg. In late April, the French finally sued for peace and began their final evacuation in mid-May, allowing Allied troops as well as the Hanseatic Citizen’s Militia to reenter the city as liberators on 31 May. And while the Hanseatic Citizen’s Militia...
Militia would be disbanded in late September, its presence was crucial for the discredited Senate to establish order and security, and in so doing, its own legitimacy.

Self-described Patriots, those members of Hamburg’s Senate exiled from the city during the second French occupation, began meeting between August and November, 1813, to establish the Hanseatic Directory, the body through which Hanseatic military and foreign policy would be articulated. Men such as Friedrich Perthes, Beneke, and Mettlerkamp, meeting in the towns of Rostock and Wismar, and in the camp of the Swedish army, implored fellow exiles to support the Hanseatic Legion and Hanseatic Citizens Militia. In a series of broadsheets, they publicized the goals of the Directory, calling all Hanseatics and Germans alike to support the armed struggle against France, offering aid to all Hanseatic exiles, and even proposing to enter into negotiations with the Great Powers to ensure post-war independence.\textsuperscript{244} Official recognition of the Directory as the representative of Hanseatic interest was eventually secured, but only after slow and tedious negotiation. Many of the younger representatives, such as Perthes and Beneke, proposed a series of legal and constitutional reforms designed to democratize Hamburg’s 1712 constitution.\textsuperscript{245} Allied support for the Patriots’ reforms, however, was not forthcoming as commanders and statesmen would not tolerate “internal strife” and extended their assistance only in the reestablishment of traditional government.\textsuperscript{246} Yet the Directory was able to secure the Hanseatic cities’ independence while at Allied headquarters in Frankfurt and eventually thwarted Prussian expansion westward at the Congress of Vienna. In 1814, and again in 1815, the Great

\textsuperscript{244} StAH, 341-2, B3, \textit{Hanseatische Legion und Bürgergarde}; “Über die Hanseatische Legion,” StAH 622-1 Lorenz-Meyer, C VIII e.2; \textit{Zur Auflösung von Mißverständnissen unter Deutschen: Aus dem Hamburgischen an die Nachbarschaft in Januar 1814}; See also Stieve, \textit{Der Kampf um die Reform}, 124; Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 298.

\textsuperscript{245} Stieve, \textit{Der Kampf um die Reform}, 146-56.

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 163-69.
Powers formally announced the continued independence of the three cities. 247 The Senate’s ties to the popular Citizens Militia, and vice-versa, would come to serve it well in the period following its return, allowing an undistinguished government to position itself not only as the legitimate heir of the struggle against Napoleon but also as the defender of peace and security.

The final battle for Hamburg would begin on 4 January 1814, with a siege of the city that introduced unprecedented levels of suffering among both citizens and occupiers alike. By the end of the month, shortages of food led to desertion throughout the ranks of the Imperial army and brought with it waves of typhus that took a ghastly toll on French soldiers. 248 More homes were requisitioned as hospitals for ill soldiers, while belongings such as mattresses, bedding, and clothing were increasingly demanded by the military. Hamburg’s doctors and surgeons were instructed to report to military hospitals or face imprisonment. It was estimated that in February and March somewhere between 60 to 100 soldiers died daily: 11,000 in total, all buried in a mass grave in St. Georg, dug by the same French soldiers who would eventually share it. French officers, however, still managed to live in relative comfort. Stories of expensive balls thrown by administrators abound, with one contemporary noting (with a mix of horror and delight) a French officer who escorted his daughter through a maze of some fifty dead horses into a lively soirée. 249

Throughout January and February, the Hanseatic Legion was engaging in a series of small skirmishes with Davout’s forces south of Hamburg, while the Hanseatic Citizens Militia began an assault on the city of Harburg. By March, both Hamburg and Harburg were under

247 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 300.

248 Historians of the period of French occupation in Hamburg have largely agreed upon the epidemic illness that spread through the city in 1814 most likely being typhus. See Richard J. Evans, Death in Hamburg, 189-90; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 302; Christiansen, Ein Tagebuch, 14, 19.

249 Christiansen, Ein Tagebuch, 23-4, 30-3.
siege by Russian soldiers as well as the Hanseatic Citizens Militia whose ranks were increasing daily as exiles returned home.\textsuperscript{250} In late May, as the Hanseatic Citizens Militia’s numbers had reached its peak, the French surrendered the city of Hamburg, all without the great battle that Napoleon and Davout had anticipated. Yet the French maintained a presence in the city, under the flag of the Bourbons, a month after Napoleon was exiled to Elba.\textsuperscript{251} Davout obtained honorable terms with Allied officers for the evacuation of his men and marched what remained of the French garrison out of Hamburg on the morning of 26 May.\textsuperscript{252} Those French soldiers who remained in Hamburg’s hospitals, some five thousand, would eventually fall victim to ridicule that often escalated into violence. Popular anti-French sentiment was the direct cause of at least two acts of brutal mob violence, one of which included the harassing and beating of visibly ill convalescents, most under the age of 16. The other, somewhat less serious case, involved a detachment of soldiers who were attacked and forced to denounce France publicly. In his correspondence, Georg Parish claimed the violence was due to the final year of French occupation: “The French Nation have to thank the atrocity of Davoust [sic.] for the cruelty which an exasperated people may exercise toward their unfortunate countrymen."\textsuperscript{253}

The first proclamations from Hamburg’s reestablished Senate came as French soldiers were hurriedly packing what documents and belongings they could carry. The Senate appealed to Hamburger’s desire for order and security, and claimed it was every citizen’s “duty” to once


\textsuperscript{251} It is unclear as to whether Louis XVIII had designs for the occupied city. However, French presence in Hamburg may have checked Prussian expansion westward.

\textsuperscript{252} Davout would eventually rally to Napoleon during the One Hundred Days and was appointed Minister of War and charged with the defense of Paris before and after the Waterloo Campaign. During the Second Restoration, Davout was stripped of his marshalate as well as his titles. By 1817, however, Bourbon distrust of Davout had cooled and he regained his titles and a seat in the Chamber of Peers. His name is carved into the Arc de Triumpe and he has a boulevard in Paris named after him; see Gallagher, \textit{The Iron Marshal}, 298-346. See also Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 302-3.

\textsuperscript{253} Georg Parish, as quoted in Ibid., 304.
again allow the “rudder of government” to be transferred “safely into their hands.”

The Senate followed with a proclamation that established a police department whose authority was effective immediately. The creation of a single policing institution, based on the previous French model, required that traditional bodies of authority, such as the harbor and shipping authorities (Hafen- und Schifffahrtsdeputation), or the street and building authorities (Gassen- und Baudeputation), be merged into a concentrated department under the control of the city’s Senate. This marks the establishment of the first professional police force consisting solely of Germans in Hamburg’s history. And while the police department would undergo structural changes throughout the nineteenth century, enlarging its purview and streamlining its bureaucracy, the basic formula of a more modern, armed force responsive to state demand had been established.

The Senate had one final proclamation to make that day which effectively solidified its authority and guaranteed that it would remain the body responsible for the organization of coercive means. In the proclamation’s first section, the Senate announced that all the city’s residents were required to give a certain amount of their private stock of gunpowder or pay the equivalent directly to the police department so that policing and the nightwatch could continue. The second section, however, went a step further by making the ownership of gun powder, whether as a private citizen or as a soldier, illegal. City authorities not only encouraged fellow citizens to report anyone who was known to have large stock-piles of powder, they threatened to


256 It would appear, however, that the city was forced to rely on the traditional “night watch,” comprised of private citizens, for purely practical reasons such as the immediate lack of funds and manpower. See Redecker, Die Reorganisation der hamburgischen Polizei, 17-25; Hatje, Repräsentationen der Staatsgewalt, 289-90.

imprison and fine those who did not turn over their remaining stores of powder to city authorities within twenty-four hours. If politics, as prolific social historian Charles Tilly argues, is about governing and the exercise of authority, that authority, he suggests, is grounded in the state’s ability to monopolize coercive resources in defense of its interests. While a fear of continued post-war violence may have informed the Senate’s insistence on collecting all private stores of powder, the fact that a returning and, in the eyes of a number of prominent Hamburgers, suspect government was willing to go so far as to incarcerate, suggests that the Senate had learned a fundamental lesson about post-Napoleonic political authority. As the relationship between the state and its population evolved throughout the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, conflicting ideological positions were required not only to win adherents in a bourgeoning public sphere but also to be defended by force when necessary. And while the returning Senate would not face a serious armed threat, their initial police measures indicate that the Senate clearly understood the importance of a hierarchical monopolization of force and its centrality for the establishment and defense of legitimacy and authority.

258 There is no mention of authorities confiscating either shot or muskets. Confiscating powder would guarantee that firearms would be virtually useless while also limiting the possibility of large explosions. “Proclamation,” 26 May 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 7-8; Redecker, *Die Reorganisation der hamburgischen Polizei*, 6.

259 Central to much of Tilly’s work is the analysis of the long, bloody struggle lasting until the twentieth century that pitted centralized state authority and its tendency to monopolize legitimate force in its defense against “dispersed, overlapping, and democratized” bodies of authority and their contrasting control over armed force. See Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States*, esp. 17-28.

260 Throughout 1806-1813, the French likewise limited Hamburger’s access to firearms, see Chapter 1, n. 72. Additional police decrees would follow on 1 June 1814; 15 June 1814; and 15 August 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19).

The structure of the new police authority in Hamburg would largely follow the model put in place by Chief of Police d’Aubignose in February 1811. On 26 May, the Senate named two of its own, Senators Dr. Johann Heinrich Bartels and Dr. Brunemann, as the provisional “managers” (Handhabung) of police policy and security.\footnote{StAH 111-1 Senat Cl. VII Lit. Lb Nr. 28 a 2 Vol. 12; “Proclamation,” 26 May 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 6.} The Senate also made provisions for the police authority to be stationed in the City Hall (Rathaus) on Neuerwall, one of Hamburg’s main thoroughfares.\footnote{StAH 111-1 Senat Cl. VII Lit. Lb Nr. 28 a 2 Vol. 12.} The placing of the police department within the City Hall is important to consider for a number of reasons. On a purely practical level, it was thought that the centralization of the police administration would allow Hamburgers to find the necessary personnel “by night or by day.”\footnote{For a discussion on the choice of location, see Hatje, \textit{Repräsentationen der Staatsgewalt}, 279.} The placement of the police department in City Hall also had a certain symbolic power as it was undoubtedly a calculated demonstration of authority which grounded the legitimacy of the returning Senate in its ability to preserve order through the use of armed force. And finally, it had a purely political function that clearly stated to the population that no post-war power vacuum existed in Hamburg.\footnote{StAH 111-1 Senat Cl. VII Lit. Lb Nr. 28 a 2 Vol. 7a; “Publicandum,” 30 May 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 45. The police authority’s first two public announcements concerned a prohibition against the firing of weapons in the streets (schießen in der Gassen) and a following public announcement that reiterated the ban on private ownership of powder and made it mandatory that all citizens turn their stocks over to the authorities now located in the City Hall. See “Publicandum,” 1 June, 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 48-9; “Publicandum,” 1 June, 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 65.} The fact that the police department was headed by members of the Senate also guaranteed that the department would serve the interests of the government which would become increasing conservative in the post-war years.

Once again, aping the French model, the police authority in Hamburg instituted a hierarchical chain of command and policed the city in much the same way the French had done after 1811. Serving directly under Brunnenmann and Bartles was one “Bruchvoigt,” a position
similar to Hamburg’s old Prätur (however, stripped of its policy-making function), charged with the translation and execution of policy. Two city sheriffs (Gerichtdiener), Herr Clausen and Herr Galle, were placed under the immediate control of the Bruchvoigt and served in a similar capacity as the French Huissier de justice, processing arrests, executing court orders, and confiscating illegal goods.266 The actual policing of Hamburg’s six districts fell to sixteen armed officers (Unterofficianten).267 While these men were not initially issued uniforms, the officer’s presence was to be signaled by their lawful bearing of arms: a musket, a bandolier, and a saber at their hip.268 Restrictions against private persons owning or carrying powder and firearms in public makes sense when officers of the law had no other way in which to distinguish themselves. It is unclear to what extent these early formations of the police actually were recognized. Repeated insistence from the Senate that respect towards armed officers was mandatory suggests that the institution was not immediately welcomed with open arms.269

For the time being, however, the city itself had much to celebrate. On 31 May, Russian General Levin August Gottlieb Theophil, Count von Bennigsen, a German in the service of the Tsar, along with David Mettlerkamp, triumphantly led Allied troops and the Hanseatic Citizens Militia into Hamburg. Once again the city welcomed the Hanseatic Citizens Militia and Russian Cossacks as liberators and saviors of the city and celebrated its final liberation with a day of

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266 Gerichtdiener translates in English to “bailiff.” In this instance, the position had more to do with executing policy and little to do with the city’s legal system.

267 In 1814, policing of the suburbs St. Georg and St. Pauli as well as in the countryside, remained under the purview of traditional authorities, see Redecker, Die Reorganisation der hamburgischen Polizei, 12. On 15 February, 1820, the suburbs of St. Georg and St. Pauli would be incorporated into Hamburg’s jurisdiction. See StAH 111-1, Senat Cl. VII. Lit. Lb. Nr. 28 a 2, Vol. 12.


festivities remembered as being more joyous than the liberation in March 1813. On 28 May, parade routes were published alongside a series of ordinances that restricted travel along Hamburg’s most busy thoroughfares. All traffic in and out of the city was to be stopped promptly at 11 o’clock so that the parade could begin at noon. Hamburgers were also warned of a heavy police presence throughout the entire afternoon and that arrests would be made against those who could not keep themselves or their children under control. That afternoon, as bells tolled in every church, soldiers marched from Hamburg’s Heiligengeistfeld through the city’s western gate where several white-clad women crowned the men with wreaths of flowers. Homes along the parade route were filled with women and men who waved white handkerchiefs while young men and women covered the marching soldiers with flowers from second story windows. That afternoon, all inhabitants of the city were required by the Senate to attend a speech given by General Bennigsen outside Hamburg’s theater. The speech concluded with a performance of the play, Tag der Erlösung, given in honor of the city’s liberators as well as Hamburg’s allies (Austria, Prussia, Sweden, England, Russia, and Spain) in the struggle against the usurper Napoleon.

Throughout the following weeks, both theatrical presentations and Hamburg’s press began openly ridiculing Davout and Napoleon. A series of plays and mock “confessions” emphasized the material and human cost of eight years of French occupation (even if sometimes


273 For a description of the afternoon as well as the language and imagery of the play, see Der deutsche Beobachter, No. 91, 3 June 1814; “Publicandum,” 31 May 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 25-6.
sensationalized). These plays often depicted a woeful Davout, crying at the feet of Louis XVIII, who was represented as the definition of legitimate authority and God’s chosen medium of justice in France. Napoleon himself was often chased across the stage by mounted Cossacks and lectured to by a collection of “such righteous ghosts as Denghien, Palm, Hofer, Schill, and Nelson” as to the folly of his ambitions. Hamburg’s press also vilified the French, leading not only to increased violence against wounded French soldiers but also to a general anti-French sentiment that the returning Senate would exploit in the coming months. Locals who had maintained too close a relationship with French authorities or who visibly cooperated with the Imperial administration were also subject to scrutiny from the local press.

The returning Senate wasted little time in preparing festivals to honor the sacrifice of the Hanseatic Citizens Militia while simultaneously presenting themselves as the legitimate heirs of the armed struggle against Napoleon. On 24 June, the Hanseatic Citizens Militia marched through the city where they were welcomed by church bells and the loud cheers of onlookers. Stopping at one of Hamburg’s largest public squares, the Neuenmarkt, a number of the city’s Senators made speeches and, according to the one newspaper, “magnified the solemnity of the event through their very presence.” At St. Michael’s church, in 1814 positioned at the southern end of Neuenmarkt, Senator and senior member of Hamburg’s city ministry, led the

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274 Mock accounts of Davouts confessions are numerous, see Widerlegung der Schußschrift des Marschall Davout vor Ludwig XVIII und der Französischen Nation (Hamburg, 1814); Memoire gegen die Verteidigungs-Schrift des Herrn Marschall Davout vor Majestät Ludwig XVIII (Hamburg, 1814). The press also joined in, see “Genau Übersicht der seit 1806 von dem ehemaligen franz: Senat beschlossenen Aushegungen von Conscripirten,” Orient, 7 July 1814; “Über den Presse Zwang unter Napoleon Boneparte,” Orient, 9-20 July 1814.

275 For a closer reading of other contemporary poems, lyrics, and theater performances, see Aaslestad, “Paying for War,” 670-72; Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 303-06, here 305.


crowd in a rendition of “A Mighty Fortress is our God,” while the flags of the Citizens Militia were hung above the church’s alter. The ceremony, according to the *Hamburgischer Correspondent*, was attended by an “incredible amount of people” and ended after the Citizens Militia slowly marched to the City Hall where David Mettlerkamp, commander of the militia, gave a speech announcing the restoration of peace. A similar event was held on 30 June, when the Hanseatic Legion followed the Hanseatic Citizens Militia into Hamburg. The Legion paraded through Hamburg’s streets, where young girls crowned the soldiers with garlands. Toasts and speeches were given, while songs and sermons were offered throughout the city. Lively festivities continued well into the evening as city residents voluntarily lit candles in their windows and offered Legionnaires a huge feast of meat, bread, wine, beer, delicate confections, smoked salmon, lobster, strawberries, tobacco, and cigars. Even Hamburg’s poor were said to have eaten to excess (relatively speaking).\(^\text{278}\)

The Hanseatic Citizens Militia and the Hanseatic Legion had returned to a grateful city and Imperial occupation had officially come to an end. A Senate had been reestablished, a substantially more modern police authority patrolled the city’s streets, and ships soon lined Hamburg’s harbor.\(^\text{279}\) But as exiles and refugees returned home, many did not recognize the city they had recently left. Hamburg’s suburbs and thriving gardens had been burnt to the ground, its once tree-lined promenades were now vacant military installations, and all the city’s vegetation had either been hacked down or had withered and died. Excrement and cadavers (human and animal) were piled high along the city’s streets and filled the canals; the city,

\(^\text{278}\) For details of the upcoming event see a letter from Mettlerkamp published in *Hamburgischer Correspondent*, Nr. 24 28 June 1814. For a more detailed account of the actual events of 30 June, see Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 305.

\(^\text{279}\) While trade had returned to Hamburg immediately after the French evacuation, free trade was officially re-established under the control of Hamburg’s Custom Union (*Zollverein*) on 4 June. See “Publicandum,” 4 June 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 74-80.
according to one contemporary, was the very “imagine of destruction.”

Hamburgers now turned their attention to the cleaning of city streets and destroyed churches while reclaiming their homes and businesses. For years to come, the city would be reminded of its years of occupation as the number of orphaned children skyrocketed and lingering disease posed perpetual threat. The Senate now turned its attention to the securing of its authority and the return of traditional government which would, however, cut all ties with Hamburg’s long-established sense of civic patriotism that had emphasized the common good. The post-1814 Senate would respond to the needs of a growing city in an increasingly laissez-faire and defensive manner.

**Political Restoration, Economic Revival, and the Triumph of laissez-faire in Hamburg**

While the recovery of Hamburg’s economy occupied the attention of most of the city’s inhabitants in the months following liberation, close attention to public debates and a string of civic ordinances suggests that the returning Senate was not without its detractors. Also, it is clear that throughout the following year, the government’s authority was never entirely secure. However, the outcome of these same debates and the ability of the Senate to successfully articulate itself as the rightful heir of the struggle against the French, guaranteed that the Senate and with it, Hamburg’s 1712 constitution, would remain intact. After the Senate had emerged victorious from a series of political battles it could turn its attention to pressing fiscal and social issues. Historians of Hamburg have noted that the men who ruled Hamburg after 1815 would be the same ones who had ruled it before 1806. And while the post-war elites would remain

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280 Wilhelmine Amsinck to her brother Wilhelm Amsinck, 19 June 1814 as quoted in Aaslestad, *Place and Politics*, 306. No trees stood for a mile in every direction and the suburbs of St. Georg, Hamm, Horn, Eimsbüttel, Harvesthude, and Hamburger Berg (St. Pauli) were effectively leveled or stood as burnt ruins. See Prell, *Erinnerungen aus der Franzosenzeit*, 111-13.

politically conservative, the Senate would eventually introduce liberal social and economic reform that marked a break with its republican past. The need for both collective controls on the economy as well as on social welfare would be disregarded as collective civic duty gave way to a French-inspired sense of individual responsibility. The failure to introduce Liberal political institutions would guarantee that government in Vormärz Hamburg (and at least until 1860) would remain in the hands of an ever-shrinking pool of elites who would increasingly rely on police authority to identify and control new classes of social undesirables.

Debate regarding constitutional reform dominated public discussion in the months after France’s final evacuation. As Mary Lindemann has noted, plans for constitutional reform in Hamburg had existed before the Revolution blew hurricane winds of reform northward. Most of Hamburg’s elite, though, were horrified by the events in France and agreed with French émigré Charles de Villers that Hamburg’s 1712 constitution was “a masterpiece of political organization for a small state.” Yet the Revolution did, in fact, find numerous adherents among the elite, prompting the Senate to convene a Reorganization Deputation in late 1814. The Deputation was to consider various proposals and to draft a set of improvements to Hamburg’s constitution. Twenty members (hence their name, the Twenty) were drawn from existing government bodies, such as the Senate, the Treasury, and the Chamber of Commerce, most of whom were intimately tied to Hamburg’s traditional political structure. Eventually, the Twenty drafted a thirty-six-point proposal for modifications to the constitution, none of which could be considered even remotely radical. Of these thirty-six points, the most important called for the French-style separation of justice from administration (previously connected in the person of the Prätur and the Weddeherren), the election of Oberalten (a significant step towards the separation of

282 As quoted in Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 202.
church and state functions), the easing of Hamburg’s restrictions on immigration, citizenship for Jews, and the restructuring of city finances. Few of the Deputation’s initiatives found their backers and reform was ultimately very limited; as Mary Lindemann has argued, representative government in post-war Hamburg never received full study.\textsuperscript{285} The Senate’s ability to co-opt calls for reform by initiating and organizing a Deputation run by individuals whose careers depended on the very continuation of a sociopolitical structure the old constitution inherently propped up, is a masterful stroke of modern, self-serving politics.

Calls for constitutional change dominated public discussion as leading reformers, as well as Hamburg’s press, continued to advocate fundamental reform, especially in the realm of civic rights and criminal law.\textsuperscript{286} In addition, following the city’s final liberation, numerous publicists criticized the Senate, charging it with illegitimacy and cowardice, pointing to the Senate’s lack of commitment to the city’s defense and its willingness to sell the city out to the French.\textsuperscript{287} This outpouring of public attacks was referred to as the “war of the pens” (\textit{Federkrieg}) and counted as one of its most out-spoken and well-respected voices Jonas Ludwig von Heß, the Citizens Militia’s first acting commander. Heß openly criticized the Senate and demanded it publicly recognize its treachery in negotiating with the French in May 1813.\textsuperscript{288} Others soon joined in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See Chapter 1 for a description of these positions, 9-10.
\item The Oberalten was a body that dated back to the 1520s and consisted of 12 deacons who well-ensconced in the world of Hamburg’s politics.
\item Lindemann, \textit{Patriots and Paupers}, 202.
\item Johann Michael Hudtwalcker, \textit{Bemerkungen über die Schrift: Wünsche bey Hamburgs Wiedergeburt} (Hamburg, 1814); \textit{Gedanken und Vorschläge über die künftige Einrichtung unsers Justizwesen} (Hamburg, 1814). See also, Stieve, \textit{Der Kampf und die Reform}, 149-78.
\item \textit{Das Kammerherrn Oberistleutenants von Haffner Oeffentliche Erklärung über seine Theilnehme an den Verhandlungen, welche der Wiederbesetzung Hamburg durch französische Truppen im Jahre 1813 vorangegangen sind} (Hamburg, 1814); David Mettlerkamp, \textit{Ueber Hamburgs Vertheidigung im Frühjahr 1813} (Hamburg, 1815).
\item Jonas Ludwig von Heß, \textit{Die Agonieen der Republik Hamburg im Frühjahr 1813} (Hamburg, 1814).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
publicly denouncing the Senate, including a well-known city pastor who found Heß and his compatriots’ arguments relevant and morally compelling. Hamburg’s press also quite openly joined in the call for constitutional reform. In three monthly articles appearing in September through November, the Hamburg newspaper, Orient, oder Hamburgisches Morgenblatt, championed constitutional reform and asked, rhetorically, why little had been accomplished.

The Senate, however, was able to counter public outcry by successfully labeling reformers, even moderates, as demagogues and as the party of unrest. Harnessing popular anti-French sentiment, the conservative Senate galvanized anti-reform opinion by reminding the public of the disasters of French-style reform. The Senate also stressed the inherent cost of reform, the possible legal complications, as well as the loss of certain religious privileges.

Members of the Hanseatic Directory, established in 1813 by exiled patriots such as Perthes, Beneke, Mettlerkamp, von Heß, and even moderates such as former mayor Abendroth, were regarded by the Senate with suspicion and referred to as “revolutionary demagogues and enthusiasts.” The Senate’s public campaign against social and political reformers was eventually successful, not only because it was able to co-opt the reform movement through the government-sponsored Deputation, but because it was able to tie reform to the horrors of Imperial occupation. With the public outcry for reform largely silenced by early-1815, the

289 Dr. Ludolf Holst, Gegenstück der Agonieen des Herrn J.L. v. Heß die Republick Hamburg im Frühjahr 1813 betreffend (Hamburg, 1815); Pastor Funk, Treumanns Friedensworte an Hamburgs Bürger veranlaßt durch die neusten Schriften der Herrn von Heß. Doktor Holst, Senator Bartels (Hamburg, 1815).


292 Not one of the members of the Directory was chosen to be part of the Reorganization Deputation and a number of them would be ostracized from Hamburg politics altogether. See Stieve, Der Kampf und die Reform, 135-6.
Senate was then able to press its interests through a series of new ordinances and through choreographed spectacle that sought to establish the Senate as the legitimate heir of the so-called Wars of Liberation.

On 14 January 1815, the Senate celebrated the sacrifices of the Citizens Militia with two days of festivities to be held in its honor. That evening, the festivities began with a series of prayers and vigils offered throughout Hamburg’s churches. It was a solemn event that came to an end when the Senate officially made Count von Bennigsen a citizen while offering its condolences to those men who, knowing their city had fallen to the French, had continued the fight.\(^{293}\) The following afternoon, the Citizens Militia gathered under torchlight at Gänsemarkt, a large public square, to reenact its establishment. Accompanied by a corps of Hamburg’s best musicians, the Citizens Militia, joined by a corps of cavalry, marched slowly to the center of the city via Jungfernstieg, one of Hamburg’s best-known promenades. One witness reported that the large crowd seemed to be moving as one with the soldiers.\(^{294}\) The event came to an end when the parade stopped in front of the City Hall, where members of Hamburg’s Military Commission and numerous Senators were on hand to meet them. The militiamen then formed a circle around the city’s governing elite, where the Senators offered praise of the soldier’s sacrifice not just for the city but for the safe return of traditional government, which the post-war Senate claimed to represent.\(^{295}\)

Throughout the following year, the Senate participated in numerous public festivities all of which tied military service to the city with service to traditional government. In March 1815, the city awarded medals of honor to members of the Citizens Militia and gave ceremonial “keys

\(^{293}\) “Publicandum,” 15 January 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 16.

\(^{294}\) Hamburgischer Correspondent Nr. 9, 16 January 1815.

\(^{295}\) Hamburgischer Correspondent Nr. 9, 16 January 1815.
of the city” to Mettlerkamp for his service, with a subsequent parade. On 31 May of that year, the Senate announced a great parade to celebrate its first year of liberation. Beginning on Heiligengeistfeld, a parade once again wrapped its way through Hamburg, ending at City Hall. More than any other event to date, this bit of spectacle tied the Senate and Hamburg’s “perfect Constitution” together with the struggle of the Citizens Militia. Senators performed an extended review of Hamburg’s military forces and four Senators, Johann Bartles, Jencquel, Johann Ernst Friedrich Westphalen, and Stephan Hasse were awarded Hanseatic medals for their participation in the Wars of Liberation. The city celebrated Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo and the role the Senate had in the “achieving of a prosperous peace” on 28 June 1815. Such public spectacle would continue throughout the nineteenth century, all of which would celebrate the role the Senate played in Hamburg’s liberation. In October 1817, the Battle of Leipzig (16-19 October, 1813) became the city’s official holiday as it marked both the beginning of the end for the French in Hamburg and the eventual return of the Senate.

By the beginning of 1815 the Senate’s authority and legitimacy were no longer at stake. The city had been granted its independence by the Congress of Vienna and had its governing body and constitution ratified by the Great Powers. The Senate had emerged successful in its highly publicized struggle against would-be reformers and a mechanism for the enforcement of its authority was established in the form of the city’s police. But the Senate’s public displays of

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298 Hamburger Nachrichten, Nr. 128, 31 May 1815.
300 See Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 168, 21 October 1817. October 1813 was chosen over Hamburg’s short-lived and disastrous “liberation” by Tettenborn in March 1813. For an insightful discussion on the ways in which the celebration of the Wars of 1813-1815 changed throughout the nineteenth century and the accompanying transformation of public memory that fostered emerging nationalist myths see, Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 321-49.
armed force continued throughout the nineteenth century. Such spectacle acted as a medium for the Senate to represent itself publicly as the legitimate defender of order, security, and private property. But these events also fulfilled a basic post-Napoleonic political reality, as sovereignty and legitimate authority were now based on the state’s total monopolization of the means of coercion and ability to defend its established legal order with force.  

After 1814, politics had become officially militarized in the city of Hamburg. And as the nineteenth century progressed, and as Hamburg’s government faced increasing calls for constitutional reform, the Senate, which represented the interests of a shrinking pool of elites, could counter such threats to its authority through recourse to armed force. It would not be until 1860, after almost five decades of unrest, that serious changes to Hamburg’s civic government were finally enacted that would liberalize the city’s political institutions, end the three centuries of cooperation between church and state, extend full legal equality to religious minorities, and extend citizenship rights to all tax-paying citizens.  

The generation of men who governed Hamburg during the occupation and after 1815 held a vastly different view of the Senate’s social responsibility then the body of men who governed in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. As Mary Lindemann has argued, specifically in the case of Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief, after 1815, “quite simply,” the city’s governors had lost their “social conscience” as they openly refuted the traditional sense of community, patriotism, and civic responsibility that had motivated previous generations. As the Senate rejected or co-opted challenges to the sociopolitical structure it represented, it also

301 Schroeder, *Transformation of European Politics*, 570-93.


303 Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers*, 211.
began adopting a new *laissez-faire* and noninterventionist approach to social issues and ignored fundamental concerns of the recovering city while regulating its growing population through its police. After Hamburg’s economy suffered massive upheavals in the 1750s and 60s, reformers and intellectuals, influenced by the spread of Enlightenment ideals, began to rethink the role of government, arguing that economic control and planning should be the main concern of a centralized and, increasingly, paternalist government. Poverty was redefined by these Enlightenment thinkers as the outcome of impersonal workings of economies and not as punishment for sin. Patriotism in late-eighteenth century Hamburg, then, was defined by one’s commitment to the welfare of the city: political careers began in poor relief, and poor relief became the business of government.304

In a post-war environment that emphasized economic recovery, an emerging philosophy of economic liberalism that celebrated the interests of the individual flourished while the role of government in the community dwindled. As was the case in 1815, when the wealthy fought to regain lost income and the middle classes struggled against impoverishment, those who would appeal to the government for assistance were labeled as “immoral,” “unbelievably vicious,” “degenerate,” and “depraved”: poverty had become a personal flaw of the lower classes.305 And while the city did maintain some forms of poor relief, notably for the registered poor, such as free schooling, a one-time allotment of clothing, and medical care, many of the relief programs


305 The number of families in need of assistance rose from 883 in July 1814 to 1,304 in July 1815; by December 1815, 1,389 families were receiving roughly sixteen shillings a week. See Lindemann, *Patriots and Paupers*, 206; Stephan Pielhof, *Paternalismus und Stadtarmut: Armustwahrnehmung und Privatswohltätigkeit im Hamburger Bürgertum* (Hamburg, 1999), 45-94.
once offered by Hamburg’s famed Poor Relief would be pruned altogether. By July 1815, the Senate had already begun issuing orders for the arrest of those who could either not show proof of poor registration or proof of employment. Similar laws followed that sought to dissuade individuals from offering charity, whether in the form of money or clothing, to orphaned children. As the prevention of poverty increasingly appeared as idealistic and “naïve,” the Senate focused more on the alleviation of preexisting problems. Free health care soon was identified as a “cause” of poverty as it was argued that fathers abused the system, relying on free aid rather than working to support their children, who were always too numerous. Between 1820 and 1829, several tight restrictions were placed on medical care: recipients were forced to have their documents embossed with the sigil of the Poor Relief, allowing them to be easily recognized, and were forced to “donate” their remaining possessions to the Relief. By 1830, poor families were no longer able to receive any monetary support for any type of illness.

The Senate also relied far more heavily on its police authority who dealt with the identifying and arresting of recalcitrants and recidivists. In 1821, the city streamlined its police bureaucracy and created two permanent positions of First and Second Police Chief (Erster and Zweiter Polizeiherr). On 16 February 1821, Amandus Abendroth, Hamburg’s mayor during the French occupation, returned to City Hall as the city’s First Police Chief. However, Abendroth’s appointment, and his plan to extend the scope of police authority by supporting

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308 For the debates regarding the restructuring of poor relief in the 1820s, see Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 208-9.
309 The Second Police Chief was to be appointed by the Senate but would have no real authority until the Frist Police Chief stepped down or was unable to fulfill his duties. See Redecker, Die Reorganisation der hamburgischen Polizei, 12.
310 StAH, 111-1, Senat Cl. VII. Lit. Lb. Nr. 28 a 2, Vol. 12.
efforts to help combat misery among Hamburg’s lower classes, received little welcome.  

Senator Martin Hieronymus Hudtwalcker, a leading figure in Hamburg’s post-war religious revival (Erweckungsbewegung), argued that the police authority must only act as a “paternal guardian” and that individuals’ exposure to government intrusion should be minimized at all costs in defense of individual freedom. He pointed to England where, he argued, “men” are so over-governed that they are little more than “machines” and that increased government intrusion often led to a certain litigiousness that would prove disastrous to business.  

The debates regarding the nature of the police force and the role the city government should play in protecting its citizenry were happening as the number of families in need of support was skyrocketing. In 1817, 9,089 persons obtained some form of medical care from the city; by 1821 the number had increased to 16,442 persons. These statistics shocked the Senate, who attributed such an increase to excessive generosity and began slashing medical care, schooling, and make-work schemes, citing the individual’s need to escape oppressive government assistance.  

The size and scope of the police authority grew through the 1820s and took on a much more modern, militarized form. As the Chief of Police, Abendroth was responsible for four subordinate officers (Unterbeamten), three official scribes (Schreibern), forty officers, and three stewards (Aufwärter) who supervised the running of the department. Officers were now equipped with weapons as well as with a large metal shield pinned to their chest. In March 1822, the city night watch received a thorough reworking that saw its character become increasingly more professionalized. Headed by a Captain and staffed by two lieutenants, twelve

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311 For a discussion on Abendroth’s appointment, see Redecker, Die Reorganisation der hamburgischen Polizei, 13-5.  
312 StAH, 111-1, Senat Cl. VII. Lit. Lb. Nr. 28 a 2, Vol. 13.  
313 Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 208-9.  
sergeants, twelve corporals, two drummers, and 390 citizens (Gemeinen), the night watch patrolled the streets and the city’s gates from nine o’clock in the evening (eight in the winter) until six o’clock in the morning. Security and the protection of private property were first priorities of the police authority, however, actively preventing petty theft, fraud, public drunkenness, and the investigation and prosecution of “community concerns” were now part of the police authority’s job description. Punishments for such crimes - considered to be of the “Second Instance” - increased, adding a two to five month incarceration period to the traditional fifteen Thaler fine. Series offences - violent crimes or “First Instance” - were now punished with up to six years of incarceration. The defense of order and security in Hamburg had taken a harsh and rather modern turn. In a paradoxical twist, as the Senate moved away from public support programs in order not to over-govern, laws became more numerous and stringent, increasing police repression as well as the mechanisms necessary to identify and prosecute new categories of criminals. While the topic requires a considerable amount of research, this study would suggest that increased legislation and policing efforts in Hamburg after 1815 led only to a perceived need to legislate and police.

Yet voices for social and political reform would never truly disappear. Casper Voght, the original founder of Hamburg’s poor relief, continued to lobby the Senate until 1830 for increased attention to the city’s relief efforts. He argued that the lack of support for the most basic subsistence, vocational, and educational programs were not only immoral but posed a threat to

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315 For a very succinct break-down in nightly posts and patrol roots throughout the city and its suburbs, see *Ibid.*, 30-34 n. 74.

the future of the city.\footnote{For a detailed account of Voght’s and Beneke’s appeals to the Senate, see Pielhof, \textit{Paternalismus und Stadtarmut}, 78-9.} He lamented a lack of the personal and financial resolve necessary to address adequately the rapidly increasing number of Hamburg’s poor. He also decried the loss of honorary offices and civic institutions that had once been able to support the poor.\footnote{Aaslestad, \textit{Patriots and Politics}, 312; Lindemann, \textit{Patriots and Paupers}, 207.} Voght’s propositions, however, found few proponents in the Senate as his eighteenth-century approach to community welfare had, by 1815, become \textit{passé}. One of the few remaining Poor Officers from the older generation, Ferdinand Beneke, resigned from his office with some eighty families still under his charge. Men of the next generation were unwilling to follow Beneke’s or Voght’s example as community welfare ceased being a crucial aspect of \textit{Patriotismus}.\footnote{Pielhof, \textit{Paternalismus und Stadtarmut}, 64-135.} As the nineteenth century wore on, middle-class reformers, troubled by the growing needs of Hamburg’s poor, the rise of Social Democrats, and apathetic urban elites, turned to the promotion of personal responsibility in the lower classes through character education (\textit{Bildung}). Education became central to nineteenth-century concepts of reform that focused on individual self-improvement as one’s civic duty.\footnote{Jenkins, \textit{Provincial Modernity}, 79-145.} And while the state would eventually assume the control over a number of programs initiated by private organizations, any sense of the eighteenth-century “spirit of utilitarian cooperation” between public and private organizations was dead.\footnote{Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 312-3.}

In the years following the Senate’s reestablishment, there was no revival of the city’s traditional sense of patriotism based on the promotion of the wellbeing of the community. The Senate increasingly responded to Hamburg’s growing needs in a defensive and libertarian...
manner, using its policing forces to control a growing mass of urban poor rather than finding ways to alleviate their condition. The Senate had abandoned any sense that economic structures or dislocations in the economy - over which individuals had little control - “principally determined” the level of poverty among Hamburg’s lower classes. They insisted that poverty was a personal flaw of certain individuals who created their own misery by frivolous marriage, disordered households, and thoughtless living. As Hamburg’s elites retreated from any sense of social accountability or responsibility for the common good, they also began closing their ranks. Up until 1806, twenty percent of Hamburg’s inhabitants were actual citizens, by 1870 only eight percent of the city’s inhabitants were citizens.  In this environment, Hamburg’s poor and working classes were completely shut out from the community and left with no guardians or champions in city government. It took disasters such as the Great Fire of 1842 (which leveled twenty-five percent of the city), working-class politicization in the 1860s, and a series of deadly cholera epidemics to demonstrate to Hamburg’s elite the deficiency of the city’s civic infrastructure and need for constitutional reform.

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Chapter 3
Political Culture and Public Space in Hamburg, 1815-1820: Updating Jürgen Habermas’s Concept of *Representative Publicness* for the Nineteenth Century

On 26 May 1814, Hamburg’s Senate in exile announced that the second French occupation of the city had officially come to an end. On 31 May, accompanied by Russian General Bennigsen, captains of the Hanseatic Legion, and the entire Hanseatic Citizens Militia, Hamburg’s Senators entered the city’s gates and proclaimed an end to the “deep sleep of slavery” brought on by eight years of Napoleonic occupation. The members of the reconvened Senate claimed that it was now the official “duty” of every citizen to recognize their authority so that peace and order could prevail. Four days later, the Senate announced the creation of a police ministry, and a city-wide ban against private ownership of stocks of powder and munitions. As Hamburg’s authorities moved quickly to secure a complete monopolization of armed force, they also prepared a series of parades to honor the city’s liberation as well as the soldiers who fought and died in the great Battle of Leipzig in (16-19) October 1813. On 24 June, all seven battalions of the Hanseatic Citizens Militia marched throughout the city to the ringing of church bells. Hamburg’s flag, a white tri-towered castle on a red-field, not flown since 1806, was hung throughout the city and accompanied the Hanseatic Legion’s flag that was draped over the altar of St. Michael’s Church, which, until very recently, had been requisitioned as a stable for French horses. The event drew thousands of spectators and a number of individuals remarked on the emotionally charged atmosphere, claiming the ceremony as one of their most cherished memories. Yet, as one observer reported, the solemnity of the event was heightened by the very

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325 *Hamburgischer Correspondent*, Nr. 23, 25 June 1814.
presence of distinguished members of the city’s Senate who, outside the church, offered praise to the sacrifices of Hamburg’s soldiers and stressed the importance of rallying around the Senate’s leadership.

Similar parades followed in June, July, September, and October 1814 and in January, March, April, June, and October 1815, all of which not only *publicly* showcased the Senate in dramatic fashion but, in effect, reinforced its claim to authority by connecting post-war peace, order, and prosperity with the Senate’s control over professionalized armed forces. These events also positioned Hamburg’s returning Senate as the rightful heir of the struggle against Napoleon, grounding their legitimacy in the defense of traditional authority. Debate regarding the nature of Hamburg’s post-war government swirled in the immediate aftermath of the occupation. By the mid-eighteenth century, Hamburg had one of Europe’s most lively public spheres, with internationally recognized newspapers and journals and numerous coffee shops and public houses that were the envy of the rest of the continent. Yet the struggle over the nature of Hamburg’s post-war political structure did not always take place in print. Parades and public ceremonies established Hamburg’s city streets, promenades, public squares, and churches as stages for the articulation and practice of politics. Public space in Hamburg had played host to lower class protest in defense of what E.P. Thompsons referred to as a “moral economy,” or the defense of traditional economic rights. Yet, city space in the eighteenth century had yet to become fully * politicized*, a phenomenon born out of the French Revolution and one central to the political culture of the nineteenth century.
Politics of the Public Sphere: Assessing Jürgen Habermas’s Relevance for Nineteenth-Century German History

Published in 1962 as his Habilitationsschrift at the Frankfurt School’s Institute for Social Research, Jürgen Habermas’s Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, initially received little international attention. By the mid-1980s, a re-examination of Habermas’s first and most historical work was underway, led by mainstream historians, specifically those working on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France and America. In 1989, the book was translated into English as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and soon sparked one of the most significant historiographical developments of the last twenty years.  

By the mid-1990s dozens of interdisciplinary case studies had already been written under the aegis of the theory, leading one historian to comment with thinly-veiled contempt that the concept had become a prescriptive disciplinary category to be invoked “in studies that aspire to significance.” Nevertheless, the “public sphere” has become an indispensable concept for historians of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and has come to inform any discussion regarding the emergence of modern political culture. Yet the history of the public sphere and its relation to emerging nineteenth-century political cultures throughout Germany (and vice versa) is still rather rudimentary.

In Habermas’s formulation, the public sphere is a politically neutral zone of communication that accommodates a plethora of voices. By the eighteenth century, he argues, a Western European and North American “public” had informed and organized itself as a cultural

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and political force powerful enough to erode the foundations upon which the old regime had stood for centuries. This “imagined collectivity” positioned itself, then, as the only legitimate subject of public affairs, in effect redefining the theoretical precepts of statecraft.

Scholars point to the rise of new reading practices that promoted a “sensibility of individualism” that sat uncomfortably within a world of collective identities and corporate society. The spread of reading material opened up a broader spectrum of expectation and experience among eighteenth-century readers, who eventually came to question the social and political privileges of birthright. And while absolutist rulers sought to disseminate knowledge in order to shape more efficient and productive subjects, these reading publics eventually perceived the “transparency” and “publicity” of Öffentlichkeit as a means of initiating reform and placing checks on arbitrary rule. Concepts such as “rationality” and “natural law” also helped individuals reimagine “subjects” as rights-bearing “citizens.” Following the outbreak of revolution, many Europeans began to define sovereignty not only as “dynastic prerogative” but as the collective will of the nation. In fact, the very concept of the nation as a political community, imagined or otherwise, is difficult to conceive without reference to “public opinion.”

Habermas’s definition of the public sphere would, not surprisingly, be severely critiqued, reimagined, and ultimately redefined, as historians began questioning the accuracy of the

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328 Tim Blanning argues that the public sphere “was not essentially or even mainly bourgeois” as nobles “made the most of the emancipatory opportunities provided by the public sphere.” And while this view is plausible, most research suggests the dynamic of “opinion formation” critically undermined the status society of Old Regime Europe. See Tim Blanning, The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660-1789 (Oxford, 2002), 181.

329 James Brophy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere, 2-3.


concept. For example, by addressing the normative exclusion of women from the public sphere, historians initially critique the concept’s claim to universality. Similarly, other historians have questioned whether or not “opinion formation” is class-specific and necessarily national in nature. Social histories of “Grub Street” printers and journalists have also added correctives to Habermas’s claim that print culture was, first and foremost, a medium for rational and critical debate. Recent work has also queried Habermas’s insistence on strict dichotomies regarding state and society and private and public: where Habermas posited division, these studies suggest certain interconnectivities. And finally, numerous scholars have disavowed the concept altogether.


336 Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, Going Public: Feminism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Private Sphere (Urbana, IL.: 2004); Ian McNeely, The Emancipation of Writing: German Civil Society in the Making, 1790-1820 (Berkeley, 2003), 82-4, 150-9.

was in danger of being “reified as a thing-in-itself, a causal agent that produces effects.” It is clear that the public sphere, as a concept, functions largely as an ideal-type and should be considered as part of the modern West’s political imaginary rather than a concrete, universal space of rational communication. With this and other critiques in mind, however, the term remains a useful analytical tool allowing historians to grasp how and where politics happen.

As James Brophy has succinctly stated, for historians of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany, the most obvious criticism of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is the little attention it pays to specific German conditions. Throughout the book, Habermas repeatedly distinguishes between a nascent literary public sphere and a subsequent and more fully-formed political public sphere, while not adequately addressing the question of how, when or even why such a transformation occurred. As such, the literary and political spheres have largely been handled separately. As Brophy points out, historians have “sketchy impressions” of how clubs, lodges, reading societies and other voluntary associations produced a “social field” wherein which various publics could access concepts such as nationality, citizenship, popular sovereignty, or individual rights. The effect has been the creation of an historical void between eighteenth-century historians who draw attention to a nascent bourgeois public sphere, and nineteenth-century historians whose research on the politics of the Vormärz period presupposes the existence of an established public sphere and a fully-formed bourgeois

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340 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 71-3.

341 Brophy, “Carnival and Citizenship,” 875. The emergence of table societies (Tischgesellschaften), literary societies, and clubs, or what Habermas refers to as literarische Öffentlichkeit, is an established theme in the German-language historiography. The study of early political organizations in post-1815 Central Europe is equally well researched. The number of such works is far too numerous to be cited handily here. For a succinct breakdown of the two competing schools of historical discourses, see Brophy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere, 7-8 (n. 21).
political culture.\textsuperscript{342} It is crucial for historians of the German nineteenth century then, to uncover the conditions under which the public sphere emerged and the ways it was utilized by competing political discourses. Documenting the distinct regional or urban political behavior, such as that in post-1815 Hamburg, will allow for historians to understand the events leading up to and proceeding the Revolutions of 1848.

A concept of the public sphere remains meaningful as it provides historians with a useful, if somewhat broad, analytical tool to discuss the articulation, practice, and efficacy of politics in the modern era. First, it leads historians to question where politics takes place, which offers a more nuanced and complex understanding of such a question. Second, it helps historians think about the ways individuals access specific public identities in which they act through politically, while also uncovering just how identities are formed.\textsuperscript{343} Third, it challenges teleological accounts of the development of modern politics, showing politics as a series of opposing articulations and not as “ideal-types.”\textsuperscript{344} And finally, as Belinda Davis has argued, the concept is important as it complicates an imposed binary of “good” and “bad” politics, based on “rationality” verses “emotion,” and, applied as such, problematizes (rather than naturalizes) the concept’s application.\textsuperscript{345} These, then, are useful correctives to Habermas’s theory of the public that allow for the fundamental components of the theory to remain intact while updating the concept’s basic framework.


\textsuperscript{343} Scholars have identified “counter” and even “subhegemonic” publics that, by vying for legitimacy with one another, place contradictory demands on the state. See the seminal work of Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, \textit{Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere}, trans. by Peter Labany et. al. (Minneapolis, MN., 1993), esp. 54-95.

\textsuperscript{344} Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Struggle: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (London, 2001), xiii, xvii-xviii, 93-145.

\textsuperscript{345} Davis, “Reconsidering Habermas,” 399.
One particularly fruitful avenue of revision is the work of historians who have begun to stress the dynamics of public sociability and the public representation of authority, rather than private individuals’ public use of enlightened reason. Over the course of the last three decades, a series of historical studies have reexamined the role played by festive culture and public space in German history. This body of research has drawn attention to the literal and symbolic language and to the rituals of these festivals, through which new ideals of citizenship and participation were articulated. Other work has focused on the specifically bourgeois festivals of the post-Napoleonic era created explicitly for political purposes. Strung together sequentially, large public events such as the Wartburg Festival (1817), the Nürnberger Feier of Dürer (1828), the Hambach Fest (1832), the Gutenberg Festivals (1837-40), and the revolutionary festivals of 1848-9 showcase evolving forms of “representative publicity” for nineteenth-century bourgeois political culture. Others have similarly situated celebrations, monument dedications, railroad building, and cultural associations within the context of

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346 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 19-26.


Germany’s liberal-national movement.\(^{349}\) This avenue of research, then, has offered historians new ways to understand how ritual, public representations of authority, and “oppositional political discourse” has influenced popular culture and shaped the political agency of both “common” social groups as well as state authorities.\(^{350}\)

As James Brophy has pointed out, a key component of this historiographical trend is the attention it pays to the sociopolitical construction of public space. Social control of public space, as well as the cultural representations and the specific discourse regarding that space, has come to define a critical aspect of political power and sovereignty.\(^{351}\) With the emergence of new doctrines such as individual rights and popular sovereignty emanating out of the French Revolution, the use of public space would likewise become increasingly complex and contested. While the city of Hamburg itself would not see major constitutional reform until the 1860s (and only after a series of monumental disasters) social identities and public life in the city after 1815 had been transformed. Whereas eighteenth-century artisans and burghers used city space to stake claims or defend hard-won rights, change remained within the narrow framework of traditional economic rights.\(^{352}\) But the precedent of French constitutionalism moved nineteenth-century politics beyond such traditional concepts of liberty and politicized public space as an

\(^{349}\) See the seminal articles in Dieter Düding, Peter Friedmann, and Paul Münch, eds., *Öffentliche Festkultur: Politische Feste in Deutschland von der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg* (Reinbeck, 1988); Green, *Fatherlands*; Brophy, “The Politicization of Traditional Festivals,” 75-82.


arena for the practice of legitimacy and authority. This may, perhaps, be the fundamental divide between the social and political worlds of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This recent scholarship has undercut Habermas’s insistence that “representative publicness” and the modern politicized public sphere are mutually exclusive. A fundamental aspect of Habermas’s work is an analysis of what is deemed “private” and what is thought of as being “public.” The Middle Ages, he suggests early in The Structural Transformation, evidence no clear distinction of “public” and “private” because a concept such as “private property” had yet to be fully articulated.353 The men who exercised power represented their status in public in non-abstracted medium, such as royal insignia, gesture, clothing, and rhetoric: power and authority were performed by “being made present.”354 As long as the “prince and the estates of the realm still ‘are’ the land,” rather than acting as mere deputies for it, Habermas continues, “they are able to ‘re-present’; they represent their power ‘before’ the people, instead of for the people.”355 This, then, is what Habermas titled “representative publicness,” which he argues is successfully replaced by print culture after a long process that saw the emergence of a distinct private sphere and, through the exchange of information (or, communication), a cohesive and authoritative public sphere.356

Historians are now becoming increasingly more aware of the ways in which parades, ritual, ceremony, festival, and the dedication of monuments helped enact, articulate, or reassert

353 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 5.

354 Ibid., 8. We now know that noblewomen as well used similar media to represent their power and authority, a fact Habermas was probably not aware of in 1962. See Susan M. Johns, Noblewomen, Aristocracy and Power in the Twelfth-Century Anglo-Norman Realm (Manchester, 2003).

355 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 8.

356 Ibid., 11-2, 27, 43-51.
authority throughout the nineteenth century. It should be stressed, however, that in understanding the methods by which political identities are expressed, form and representation are critical to content. Yet, the intersection of political discourse(s) and public space and the effect on political culture has gone largely unexplored. How the social, political, and institutional space of the public sphere (print culture) and popular culture (festival, ceremony, public sociability) mutually affected one another has not been examined with any precision.

Habermas argues that by the time of the July Revolution in France, the eighteenth-century moment of possibility for a universal public sphere had passed, as it had lost its coherence and class exclusivity. Instead, nineteenth-century bourgeois culture, he contends, exclusively used print culture and commercialization of the public sphere in an attempt to control the widening publics of civil society. By looking at the ways in which Hamburg’s post-occupation government used public space to represent their claims to legitimacy, it becomes clear that representative publicness was not simply replaced by nineteenth-century print culture. On the contrary, public space in the post-Napoleonic era played a central role in the assertion and practice of modern political authority, authority based less on traditional notions of deference towards wealth and status and predicated on the government’s ability to maintain order through armed force.

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359 One excellent exception is Brophy, Popular Culture and the Public Sphere. See also his article, “Carnival and Citizenship,” 876.

360 Habermas, Structural Transformation, 168.
Politics and the Public Sphere in Hamburg

While initially claiming victory, Hamburg’s reinstated Senate was widely viewed as being rather undistinguished and faced immediate pressure from prominent Hamburger who advocated reform similar to those enacted under Imperial rule (criminal law and civil rights, separation of justice and administration, separation of political and church functions, political equality). In a series of public showdowns between the Senate and reform-minded individuals, referred to as “the war of the pens” (Federkreig), the Senate was charged by some with having sold out the city too easily to the French while others stressed the immediate need for constitutional reform. But the Senate was able to exploit popular anti-French sentiment by successfully painting these reform parties as pro-French and by labeling reformers as “revolutionary demagogues and enthusiasts.” By articulating itself as the only body able to provide the peace and security necessary to revive their shattered economy, the Senate was successful in co-opting reformists and eventually enacted a return to an ante-bellum constitution, remaining socially noninterventionist while pursuing liberal economic policies that clearly suited the interests of the commercial and governing elite. Despite the Senate’s success, calls for reform would continue throughout the following years, as men such as Johann Bartels and Ferdinand Beneke decried the Senate’s treatment of an increasing urban poor.361 Yet, the Senate, concerned almost entirely with the question of how to rebuild Hamburg’s economy, continued to refuse constitutional reform and maintained a staunch libertarian position throughout the

361 In 1812, Caspar Voght wrote to friends of a city “barren and uninhabited” due to eight years of blockade and occupation. By the end of the year, Hamburg’s finances were destroyed after years of Imperial extortion. In 1813, Voght once again wrote to friends detailing the “deep suffering of the lower classes” and “the degeneration of morals.” By 1814/5, Hamburg’s economy was in utter ruin, further impoverishing an estimated 20-30,000 women, men, and children who now turned to the state for support. The city’s famed Poor Relief went bankrupt in 1814, running a debt of 260,000 Thaler. That year, begging was permitted. In 1816/7 the number of registered poor was 9,089 persons, in a city of 100,000. In 1820, that number had risen to 16,442 persons out of 130,000+. It has been estimated that there were some 10,000 nonregistered poor within the city in 1820. See Lindemann, Patriots and Paupers, 177-213.
Fig. 11. Hamburg’s Jungfernstieg with the famed Alster Pavilion to the left.
nineteenth century. In response to the Senate’s resistance to political reform, one contemporary boldly compared Hamburg’s Senate to the Bourbons, “who don’t forget but never learn.” And while that may prove correct in regards to Hamburg’s antebellum constitution, the Senate did learn a crucial lesson in modern politics: public space had become thoroughly politicized and was transformed into a legitimate arena for the practice of politics.

Throughout the eighteenth century, Hamburg had an extremely vibrant print culture which allowed Hamburger to experience the “public sphere” on a regular basis, whether by reading newspapers, journals, or sermons or discussing both local and international news with others in coffee houses, reading societies, bookshops, and other civic organizations. The consumption of print in Hamburg was so enormous that it had struck one British traveler to comment that “A newspaper is almost a necessity to the existence of an Englishman, and they are still more eager after them here than anywhere else: the moment the mail is announced, everyone is running to get a sight of them.” Other contemporaries describe a “craze for reading” (Lesewut), a “reading mania” (Lesesucht), and a “ceaseless pen-pushing” (Vielschreiberei) which underscores a common image of the Hamburger as a reader (and ergo, a political creature) while also pointing towards a general printing revolution experienced throughout German Central Europe. As in France and Britain, the press in Germany was

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362 Diederich Gries to Karl Gries, 22 July 1814 as quoted in Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 308.

363 Leman Thomas Rede, A Sketch of Hambourg, its Commerce, Customs and Manners with some Account of the Laws respecting Bills of Exchange and Bankrupts (Hamburg, 1801), 36.

364 This “revolution” witnessed not only the expansion of popular education but the dominance of secular over devotional literature. These new forms of print culture engendered a new literary world where print media became the dominant form of communication. See Gonthier-Louis Fink, “The French Revolution Reflected in German Literature and Political Journals from 1789 to 1800,” in The Internalized Revolution, German Reactions to the French Revolution, 1789-1989, eds. Ehrhard Bahr and Thomas Saine (New York, 1992), 11; Sheehan, German History, 153; Aaslestad, “Old Visions and New Vices,” in Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and National Culture, 144-9; Mary Lindemann, “Fundamental Values: Political Culture in Eighteenth-Century Hamburg,” in Patriotism, Cosmopolitanism, and National Culture, 17-32; Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution in Early Modern
instrumental in creating and politicizing the public as it both replaced elitist language with informal prose and ran stories expressing new political ideas that moderately educated individuals could read.365

Much like the rest of Europe, Hamburg’s reading population followed the events of the French Revolution closely, as literature on events in France eclipsed all other news. Locals commented on the press and pamphlet literature’s inability to satiate Hamburger’s interest in the events of 1789-1792. The events of the Revolution were greeted positively by most locals and were overwhelming supported by Hamburg’s educated elites, as the reforms were held as confirmation of their own “enlightened attitudes.”366 A number of Hamburg’s prominent citizens, such as Jonas Ludwig von Heß, Georg Sieveking, and Caspar Voght, regularly traveled to Paris to witness the events while cultivating warm relations with individuals such as Charles Maurice Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles de Villers, and even Madame de Staël. Some Hamburger, such as Leonhard Wächter, fought to defend the Tricolor during the war of the First Coalition.367 By 1792, the city had a reputation among European conservatives for being a known den of revolutionary Jacobin activity. And while Hamburg’s educated elite shared sentiments with their revolutionary counterparts in Paris, their numbers and influence were greatly exaggerated by the northern-European conservative press who applied the term Jakobiner

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367 Wächter fought as a captain under General Charles François Domouriez, the hero of Valmy. However, after 1793 and defeat in Flanders, Wächter returned home to Hamburg and began a career in teaching. Joist Grolle, Hamburg und seine Historiker (Hamburg, 1997), 37-40.
rather freely (and pejoratively) to anyone who sympathized with the Revolution. Regardless of the level of local revolutionary commitment, it is clear that Hamburg’s reading population was aware of the swirling events of the Revolution, and that well-informed locals were discussing the merits of the revolutionary rhetoric emanating out of Paris. Yet with such a cultivated public sphere, considered to be one of the richest in all of Central Europe, Hamburg’s intellectuals remained largely reform-minded, and tended to view the events of 1789 as evidence for the validation and superiority of their own republic and their own constitution.

While the events of 1789 to 1793 had captured Hamburg’s imagination, wide-spread agitation by the city’s laborers failed to capture support from the city’s would-be reformers. In 1791, 6,000-7,000 thousand artisans and journeymen took to the streets to protest the growing power and exclusivity of Hamburg’s guilds. Similar to other uprisings throughout Central Europe, such as in Saxony and Mainz in 1790 and in Schleswig-Holstein in 1792 and 1793, this rebellion of laborers was deeply rooted in traditional patterns of urban life. Protesting against the power of the guilds, demands for higher wages, better working conditions, and a reduction in working hours, were well-established sources of contention in early modern Europe, and point


369 Both Hamburg and Altona had few restrictions on their press, which was fairly liberal for the time. The cities also boasted a number of international recognized and respected journals with readership throughout Europe. Hamburg also had dozens of coffee and public houses located in and around the Stock Exchange, City Hall, and the city’s main promenade, Jungfernstieg. These houses included the Borsen Hall, Boldts, Stuarts, Tonquists, Baumhaus, London, Eckmeyers, Marthens, Chinois, Dresserschen, and the famous Alster Pavillion, designed especially for women. Contemporaries noted the popularity of these houses and all referred to them as “little stock exchanges.” These years also saw the rise of Hamburg’s Patriotic Society as a well-organized and powerful organization committed to combating economic and social problems in the city. Its ranks would swell between the years 1789 and 1805 with 514 new members, mostly representing Hamburg’s elite. For information on the Patriotic Society, see Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 108, 124.


371 Sheehan, German History, 216-7.
more towards the defense of a moral economy rather than a new political ideology.\textsuperscript{372} As Aaslestad has pointed out, despite the opportunity for revolutionary action, local “Jacobins” were unable to connect a distinctly political agenda with the rebellion’s primary source of agitation: their economic grievances.\textsuperscript{373} It has also been noted that the rebellion, which crippled public life and eventually turned violent, likely cooled middle-class empathy for the Revolution as well as for the cause of enhanced political rights for Hamburg’s laboring classes.\textsuperscript{374}

Regardless of the rebellion’s outcome, the event is instructive as it entailed a distinctly traditional use of public space that lacked the overtly politicized rhetoric and agenda future workers movement would utilize. As compared to southern German towns, Berlin, or Vienna, Hamburg remained relatively free of worker unrest until 1847 when bread prices skyrocketed throughout Europe. This too suggests a pre-politicized laboring class whose attacks on symbolic targets were largely understood in terms of a defense of a “moral economy.”\textsuperscript{375} But in the years following French occupation, public space in Hamburg almost immediately was reimagined as a site for the practice of authority and political legitimacy. The returning Senate was forced to


\textsuperscript{373} Aaslestad, \textit{Place and Politics}, 123.


\textsuperscript{375} See Arno Herzig, “Organisationsformen und Bewusstensprozesse Hamburger Handwerker und Arbeiter in der Zeit 1790-1848,” in \textit{Arbeiter in Hamburg, Unterschichten, Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegungen seit dem ausgehenden 18. Jahrhundert}, eds. Arno Herzig, Dieter Langewiesche, and Arnold Sywottek. (Hamburg, 1983), 95-108, esp. 103; Evans, \textit{Death in Hamburg}, 78-9. However, after 1860, this would change as radical organizations of journeymen began the process of politicizing an industrializing working class that, by the late 1870s, had emerged as a strong supporter of the Social Democratic Party. Central to the party capturing all three Reichstag constituencies was their ability not only to organize, but to showcase its power through massive demonstrations and parades, or by politicizing public space. So much so, that in 1875, August Babel referred to Hamburg as the “capital city of German Socialism.” For the work of these organizations and the workers movement in general after 1860, see Arno Herzig, “Vom augehenden 18. Jahrhundert bis zu den 1860er Jahren,” in \textit{Arbeiter in Hamburg}, eds. Herzig \textit{et al.}, 9-16, esp. 15-6.
defend itself against new and distinctly *politici*zed threats to its hegemony, a clash evidenced not only in Hamburg’s newspapers and journals but also on the city’s promenades and public squares. It is to this process that we now must turn.

**Public Space and the Establishment of Post-War Political Authority**

As cited above, Hamburg’s public was not uniformly supportive of the Senate and many turned to the city’s remaining public outlets to press for reforms to the constitution. As has also been suggest, reformist opinion had found fertile ground in the late-eighteenth century with Hamburg’s reading population. And while the bloody turn toward Terror in 1793, Revolutionary war, and Napoleonic occupation had a substantial cooling effect on reformist zeal, calls for liberal political reform resurfaced in 1814 and 1815. But in the immediate post-war environment, when Hamburg’s war-weary population desired a return of order and security, the Senate responded with shows of martial force that positioned them as the sole body able to provide stability and hence, political legitimacy.

As early as 1 June 1814, the Senate began a series of highly-choreographed public displays designed to politicize public space as an arena for the representation of their authority. On 22 June, the city of Hamburg was virtually shut down as final preparations for a festival celebrating the renovation of Hamburg’s pre-1806 Senate were completed. Event times and parade routes were published in virtually all newspapers and journals, as well as made public by a series of police orders. Travel throughout the city was severely restricted as major thoroughfares were cordoned off as part of a route that wound its way through the city’s busiest and most prestigious districts. Restrictions on the use of the city were followed by warnings against public disorder and, added to this list of observances, was a somewhat curious

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announcement that shooting in the streets would no longer be tolerated. On 24 June, the parade started at Hamburg’s Millenntor gate, on the southeast corner of the Heiligengeistfeld, as Senators, accompanied by officers of the Hanseatic Legion, re-enacted their entrance into the city after the final departure of the French in late May. The symbolic weight associated with a liberating army marching through city gates was not lost on commentators who also compared Hamburg’s soldiers to valiant Roman warriors and the city Senators to triumphant Roman Generals.\(^{377}\) The parade then passed through the square that housed Hamburg’s armory (Zeughausmarkt) and to the Grosse Neumarkt, via Neuer Steinweg and passing St. Michael’s Church, and up Neuerwall past the Rathaus. Wrapping around St. Peter’s Church, the parade moved north to St. Jacob’s Church and continued past the city’s famed Zuchthaus (correction house). From there, the parade followed Jungfernsteg, Hamburg’s most well-known promenade, and exited through the gate at Dammtor.

That evening, a series of speeches were given outside of the Rathaus by members of the Senate as well as by the newly appointed police minister, Johann Bartels, who spoke about the need to accept the Senate’s judgment concerning the management of city affairs.\(^{378}\) Attendance at these speeches was made mandatory for all citizens, who were to be marshaled by order of the city police. The entire event ended later that evening with a fire-works display and an illumination of street lights surrounding the City Hall while Hamburg’s flag was “officially” raised, reinforcing to those in attendance that legitimate government had returned. This parade and the following speeches connected many of Hamburg’s most important and politically


\(^{378}\) Commentators noted the “magnified solemnity” that Senators’ very presence added. See Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 23, 25 June 1814.
Fig. 12. Map of Parade Route, 24 June, 1814.

The parade enters on the left, at Millerntor (38) and the southern end of the Heiligengeistfeld (not pictured, see Fig. 1). The arrows indicate its path.
charged sites: its armory, the center of city government, the city’s main promenade, its most wealthy districts, and three of its five Hauptkirchen (the churches located within the city walls). It is worth note that these three churches had been converted into stables or were used as hospitals for Imperial soldiers during the final months of the occupation. Their incorporation in the parade, then, was not only a reclaiming of sacred space but a symbolic linking of the city’s traditional bodies of authority.

A similar event was held on 30 June, when the Hanseatic Legion followed the Hanseatic Citizens Militia into Hamburg. The Legion paraded through Hamburg’s streets, where young girls crowned the soldiers with garlands. Toasts and speeches were given, while songs and sermons were offered throughout the city. Lively festivities continued well into the evening as city residents voluntarily lit candles in their windows and offered Legionnaires a huge feast of meat, bread, wine, beer, delicate confections, smoked salmon, lobster, strawberries, tobacco, and cigars. While the festivities were relatively spontaneous, popular, and carried out with little input from the Senate, the military parade and the accompanying songs and patriotic speeches articulated the day’s events as celebrations of the return of order and security (Ruhe und Sicherheit) and the triumph of Hamburg’s leadership as embodied by city authorities (political and military). The Senate itself, though, would be front and center during a city-wide event announced on 12 August. The event was to be held on Sunday, 14 August, in celebration of the “Renovation” (Renovierung) of Hamburg’s pre-war Senate. That morning, services at all of Hamburg’s churches were to be offered in the name of the Senate, who not only represented

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379 For details of the upcoming event see a letter from David Mettlerkamp published in Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 24, 28 June 1814. For a more detailed account of the actual events of 30 June, see Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 305.

380 Preparations for and a schedule of the day’s events can be found in “Mandat,” 12 August 1814 (Anderson, vol. 19), 190-2.
Fig. 13. Entrance of the Hanseatic Legion and Citizens Militia in Hamburg, 30 June 1814.
“just and honest authority” but did so through God’s “grace.” After the church service, a host of Senators led a processional out of St. Michael’s Church, up to the City Hall on Neuerwall where attendees gathered to hear a series of speeches.381

These events take on increased significance when read back into a context of the immediate post-war setting. This was at the height of the Federkrieg, when the Senate’s legitimacy was in question and when prominent individuals and entire newspapers were publically calling for constitutional reform. By incorporating the church within the days events, the Senate’s renovation, and the conservative socio-political order it represented, was invested with a sense of legitimacy, as the Senate articulated itself as the defender of the faith and of traditional authority. The speeches themselves freely mixed concepts such as order, security, and legitimacy, while touching on the strength of Hamburg’s existing constitution and style of government. The Senate’s rule was “just,” strengthened through the “flame of battle,” and only sought to ensure order and prosperity for a “grateful population.”382 The event on 14 August, then, was both a deft political maneuver and a masterful use of public space where the Senate’s authority was represented to the population and its legitimacy symbolically enacted through a tying together of sacred and secular space.

On 15-16 January 1815, city space was once again turned into stages for political theater. On 15 January, the city celebrated the creation and triumph of its own Citizens Militia by staging a dramatic re-enactment of the original enlisting of volunteers in the same marketplace where, in 1813, thousands of Hamburgers had eagerly joined.383 Senators and members of the city’s military commission emerged from surrounding buildings to lead a procession of soldiers

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dressed in full parade uniform. Accompanied by forty-four of Hamburg’s best musicians and a platoon of cavalrymen, the parade moved throughout the city via Hamburg’s main promenades. One eye witness remarked on the movement of the crowd, estimated at some 10,000, which made it seem part of the spectacle. The day’s penultimate event was a speech from General Bennigsen, who received thunderous applause when he announced that “bliss” (Seligkeit) had returned to Hamburg’s citizens. The day was brought to a close when members of the Citizens Militia, as well as their officers, encircled a number of senators, including Senator Ernst Friedrich Johann Westphalen, who gave a speech in honor of the officers and citizen-soldiers who fought in defense of their Vaterstadt and its age-old rights. The speech was received with similar applause as Senator Westphalen announced to the crowd that “Hamburg has been healed” and that the Senate is now working to “heal Hamburg’s citizens.” This last piece of political performance not only reinforced the Senate’s right to speak on the behalf of a grateful public, but it also represented the government as the protector of the city’s independence and livelihood. It also hints at a theme which would occur in future events: by tying the Citizens Militia’s service to the defense of traditional authority, Senator Westphalen positioned the Senate as the legitimate heir of the struggle against the usurper, Napoleon.

If the connection between the reinstated Senate and the defense of traditional authority had not been fully expressed, a highly-publicized event in January 1815 left no question as to the Senate’s position regarding Restoration and the meaning of the Wars of Liberation. On 21 January, twenty-two years to the day after his beheading, St. Michael’s Church held a funeral for

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385 Here, the crowd is not part of the spectacle and is reduced to the role of spectator and witness to presentations of authority. See Kostof, The City Assembled, 196.

386 “Die erste feierliche Parade der Bürgergarde auf dem Gansemarkt,” Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 9, 16 January 1815.
King Louis XVI, that “unfortunate victim of anarchy” whose “Christian majesty” both “Frenchmen and German alike still recognized.” The church itself had been cleared so that more individuals could gaze at the King’s “coffin,” which was raised upon a catafalque and draped in white cloth, surrounded by white lilies, and adorned with “royal attributes.” Present to witness the event were virtually the entire Senate as well as General Bennigsen, Prussian Minister Graf Grote and his entire general staff, numerous General Consuls of other German states, and, there on behalf of the French, was Commander Chevalier Monnay. An entire detachment of the Citizens Militia was on hand to handle the large crowds that gathered throughout the afternoon to catch a glimpse of the king’s “coffin.” It was remarked that the service was “both solemn and noble” and that many men shed “tears of remembrance for the most unfortunate of kings.” In an interesting twist, the same reporter suggested that Hamburg’s misfortunes mirrored the king’s, and pondered whether or not “without his unfortunate death would Hamburg have endured so much suffering?” This event not only positioned Hamburg’s authorities on the side of traditional government, it also turned the events after the establishment of the First French Republic into a European-wide tragedy, a tragedy that cost Hamburkers dearly and that the Senate had helped defeat.

As news reached Hamburg of Napoleon’s return to Paris in March 1815, calls for the reinstatement of a voluntary corps from Hamburg to join the Hanseatic Legion were once again voiced by members of various reforming parties. Dissolved on 1 September 1814 due to its popular ties and its political unreliability, the Hanseatic Legion in Hamburg was a site of tension

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387 King Louis XVI was beheaded on 21 January 1793 after the Convention voted 380 to 310 for his immediate execution. And, of all days, he was beheaded on a Monday.

388 A solid-white flag became the standard of France during the Bourbon Restoration lasting from 1815 until 1830, replaced by the tricolor after the July Revolution. The white sheet clearly was used to represent renewed Bourbon rule. The lilies are, again, in clear reference to the restored French monarchy.

389 The entire article can be found in Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 13 24 January 1815.
between reformists and city authorities. The Senate had reluctantly compensated each Legionnaire 24 Marks for all losses during the campaign against the Grand Army yet refused to acknowledge veterans who had lost homes during the siege or who had fallen into poverty and unemployment after the Legion was dissolved. It eventually fell to private societies such as the Hanseatic Association (Der Hanseatische Verein), the Club for Hanseatic Fighting Comrades in 1813 and 1814 (Freundsschafts-Club der Hanseatischen Kampfgenossen von 1813 und 1814), and the Hamburg Women’s Association (Hamburger Frauenverein), to develop and organize programs that provided veterans with medical and burial assistance as well as institutions to support widows and orphaned children. Hamburg’s Patriotic Society also privately recognized victims of French occupation by awarding honorary medals to those who aided refugees in December 1813, and also dedicated a monument in Ottensen cemetery to the 1,138 who did not survive in exile.

These acts by private organizations not only pinpoint a site of early-nineteenth century middle-class politics, they also directly contested the Senate’s increasingly noninterventionist agenda. But the Senate would not be outdone. In March, it announced that on 18 and 19 March, the city would host a series of award ceremonies to be followed by parades,

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390 The dissolving of the Legion in Hamburg caused a stir throughout the city, with a number of high ranking individuals, such as Colonel von Baumbach and, one of the heroes of 1813, David Mettlerkamp, publically denouncing the Senate’s negligence toward both the city’s well-being but also Europe’s. See Mettlerkamp, Vorschläge, Hamburs Männern gewindet von Mettlerkamp. Eventually, a corps of 1,000 soldiers and 200 cavalrymen (equipped at their own expense) were recalled by the Allies to fight against the now reorganized Imperial Army in 1815. See “Publicandum,” 5 April 1815; “Publicandum,” 28 April 1815; “Bekanntmachung,” 3 May 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 64-6, 80-1, 85-7. However, soldiers from the Hanseatic Legion arrived too late to see action and served as part of an army of occupation until their return in January 1816. See, Stieve, “Troops of the Hanseatic Republics,” 24.


392 Aaslestad, Place and Politics, 311.

illuminations, and free entertainment for Hamburg’s lower classes. The first evening, church services were held throughout the city in honor of the sacrifices made by the men of the Citizens Militia and Hanseatic Legion. Both the Militia and Legion were hailed as patriotic saviors of the Vaterstadt, while simultaneously held up as models for the rest of German Central Europe to emulate. The following afternoon, the Hanseatic Campaign Medal was awarded to all soldiers who served in the campaign against the Grand Army, while medals of honor were awarded to soldiers whose service was deemed exemplary. The Senate also offered full citizenship to all servicemen and waived the requisite fee. The ceremony was followed by a three-hour long parade of Senators and soldiers, which ended at Hamburg’s City Hall. The entire award ceremony positioned the sacrifice of Hamburg’s warriors as their patriotic duty to defend the welfare of the city and its governing body. The event also played on a distinct theme the Senate had slowly begun to introduce. By the very act of creating and then awarding medals, the Senate was publically declaring itself as the legitimate heir of the armed struggle against the French. It is also important to note that the Senate participated in such events at a time when it was being publically derided for the lack of attention to servicemen and when private, reformist societies were organizing public events themselves. Through such symbolically charged spectacles, the Senate was able to redirect challenges to its authority while defining the meaning of the Wars of Liberation.


395 It should be stressed that while the Citizens Militia and the Hanseatic Legion were praised as examples for the rest of Germany, this does not necessarily mean Hamburger understood the struggle against Napoleon within a national framework. Newspaper and journal articles articulated this service as undertaken in the defense of Hamburg’s independence and regional identity. For the event on 18 and 19 March, see “Publicandum,” 15 March 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 55; Heyden, “Öffentliche Feste in Hamburg,” 202-3.

By late May 1815, the recalled corps of Legionnaires from Hamburg was ready for the long march to France. Yet before their final departure, the Senate announced that on 31 May the Hanseatic Legion would partake in a massive “Celebration of Victory” that included church services, a parade of Senators and soldiers, and would end with an award ceremony. Once again, the city was shut down by orders of the Police Authority, who limited travel in and out of the city and threatened severe punishment to anyone who attempted either to leave during the celebration or disrupt it in any way. On 31 May, the events began with services and a singing of a Te Deum in every church throughout the city. At 10 o’clock, thousands of Hamburgers lined the city’s large parade ground, Heiligengeistfeld, to witness a revue of the Legion by the city’s Senators and its commanding officers. The following parade of 1,500 soldiers, a platoon of cavalry, as well as a number of artillerymen, entered the city gates at Dammtor, and after three hours, wound its way to the City Hall on Neuerwall. Outside the City Hall, Hamburg’s “esteemed government” and “happy constitution,” which the city “rightly deserved,” were fêted, a moment which, according to one witness, “stirred the heart of every Hamburg citizen.” Here, Senators Bartels, Jencquel, Westphalen, and Hasse were all awarded the Hanseatic medal for their leadership and participation during the years 1813 and 1814. As reported in Hamburgische Nachrichten, those in attendance truly “recognized the Senate’s merits,” its “right to rule in the name of God,” and its willingness to defend the Vaterstadt, its traditions, and its laws.

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397 No one was allowed to enter or leave the city under any circumstances between the hours of 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. See “Polizei-Verfugung,” 30 May 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 106.

398 Hamburgische Nachrichten, Nr. 128, 31. May 1815.


400 Hamburgische Nachrichten, Nr. 128, 31. May 1815.
After the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in mid-June 1815, Hamburg’s Senate had secured its position as the legitimate defender of the city’s sovereignty and heir of the Wars of Liberation. And while reform-minded individuals such as Caspar Voght and Ferdinand Beneke, two of Hamburg’s most prominent citizens, continue to press for political and social reforms, the Senate’s authority would go virtually unquestioned until the 1840s. Yet the city still played host to similar state spectacles that utilized city space in the demonstration of the Senate’s authority. Parades and church services on 2 July 1815 held in celebration of victory in France and Hamburg’s final “deliverance,” saw the Senate once again associating itself with the “unmistakable involvement of Providence.” On 3 January 1816, in honor of the signing of the Treaty of Paris in November 1815, and the return of the Hanseatic Legion, services were offered and a day of festivities including a parade and speeches by Senators Bartels and Hasse who once again reiterated the role played by the Senate in the Wars of Liberation.

The meaning of the anti-Napoleonic struggle would finally be solidified when, in October 1817, the Senate announced that 18 October (the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and the Senate’s second and final return) would become the official date for the celebration of the Wars of Liberation. Accordingly, on 18 October 1817, Hamburg hosted one of the largest festivals in city history that included highly publicized church services, award ceremonies, and a massive parade that consisted of the entire Senate, Hanseatic Legion, and Citizens Militia. The day began with uniformly regulated services throughout the city’s churches, which included a special collection for Hamburg’s disabled population as well as surviving families of fallen soldiers.

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401 “Bekanntmachung,” 28 June 1815; “Publicandum,” 3 July 1815 (Anderson, vol. 20), 118-9; 120.
After the service, the Citizens Militia marched to St. Michael’s Church where the flags of 1813 were honored and a bronze memorial listing the names of the 175 Hamburger who fell at Leipzig was dedicated to the city on behalf of a “grateful Senate.” The memorial was decorated with palm and oak branches, a medieval helmet, Hamburg’s ensign, and the inscription, “To the fallen for freedom and justice. The Risen Hamburg,” all of which combined notions of freedom, independence, and the defense of the city’s traditional institutions. It was estimated that some 10-15,000 people were on hand to witness the day’s events, all of whom were said to have shown “their devotion to the constitution, their love for their government” and a longing for an “ancient sense of freedom” that relied on “cordiality, morality, and desire for peace.”

Festivities marking the anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig and the triumph of Hamburg’s Senate were held every year. As Aaslestad has shown, the celebration and meaning of the Wars of Liberation subtly changed over the course of the nineteenth century in response to political and cultural trends throughout Central Europe. In 1817, the celebration of the Battle of Leipzig, as well as the accompanying literature, stressed the regaining of Hamburg’s freedom and independence and was articulated as a victory for the city’s autonomy. Twenty-five years later, in 1838, the event still marked a unique experience for Hamburg, as the literature focused on Hamburg’s regained independence while also criticizing Prussian expansion westward. But by 1863, the fiftieth anniversary of Leipzig, public celebration had begun to mingle the local experience with that of a national experience. Commemorative literature featured Hamburg as a “prototype for self-liberation” for the rest of Germany and tied Hamburg’s 1813 ordeal into a shared German historical experience and stressed a sense of “belonging to a larger cultural

404 Hamburgischer Correspondent, Nr. 168, 21 October 1817.

405 The following information relies on Aaslestad’s sharp reading of the contemporary literature in, Place and Politics, 321-49.
entity." The Revolution of 1848, the Danish wars in Schleswig-Holstein, and centenary anniversaries of German classicist Friedrich Schiller (and the Central European-wide Schiller festivals) introduced the concept of German nationalism to a young and expanding population in Hamburg. Yet a growing sense of nationalism did not translate into support for Prussia. Hostility towards Bismarck and Prussian expansion continued, and concerns regarding the city’s independence were clearly evident until 1870. Finally, by 1913, after the formation of the Second German Empire in 1871 and Hamburg’s incorporation into the new German state, celebrations of Leipzig subsumed Hamburg’s liberation as part of a shared common German cultural experience and, more importantly, rendered the city’s experience as the initial realization of a nationalist agenda. While such a close reading of the contemporary literature has implications for the study of historical memory, it also points to the fact that the use of public space went far beyond the realm of local politics. In response to international events and intellectual trends, urban space could be appropriated to represent a host of political positions while being invested with a certain didactic function.

The historiography of post-war Hamburg tends to suggest that the Senate was concerned exclusively with saving the city’s economy to the point that politics appears as an afterthought. And while there is a certain amount of truth there, it misses a crucial point: that the Senate was immediately engaged in a series of power struggles, from which it emerged victorious, that had real consequences for the future of the city. Through the Senate’s combined use of popular media and public space, the government was able to represent itself to its populace as the legitimate heir of the struggle against Napoleon and as the party of order and security. It did this in a number of ways. On the one hand, as the first two chapters argue, the Senate monopolized the use of legitimate force in the form of a professionalized Police Authority (a product of

406 Ibid., 332-3.
French occupation) which not only enforced the Senate’s agenda but also magnified the government’s visibility through its very presence. On the other hand, the Senate deftly addressed challenges to its legitimacy through a series of highly-choreographed and ideologically charged spectacles that transformed city space into a stage for the representation of its authority. Hamburg’s post-1815 Senate was then able to promote a laissez-faire social and economic agenda that favored its mercantile elite only after it effectively established the ideological contours of its rule.

An understanding of Hamburg’s nineteenth-century political environment also suggests a critical modification of Jürgen Habermas’s model of the public sphere. By neglecting forms of public representation, Habermas failed to fully integrate elements of the public sphere into the discussion of nascent modern political cultures. Historians of post-Napoleonic Germany then must pay greater attention to the ways in which discursive formations became externalized and made accessible to emerging public(s). By placing greater weight on regional political cultures and the role of public space between the crucial years 1780 and 1840, historians will be able to reconfigure the social and political frontiers of the Vormärz and even reperiodize German Central Europe’s transformation from the old order to modern mass society. As this chapter has shown, representative publicness is not simply replaced by print culture and rational-critical debate; on the contrary, public space itself was becoming increasingly politicized as the nineteenth century progressed. To conclude, attention to early-nineteenth century “publicness” in Hamburg is useful in that it enables the socio-political dispositions of the Restoration era to be more precisely determined. The post-war Senate’s use of public space deepens our understanding of the public sphere by pointing to the ways in which space became politicized as an arena for the assertion, articulation, and representation of political authority.
CONCLUSION

The debate regarding the extent to which Imperial occupation affected how the city of Hamburg was governed is one that has split historians for decades. Were the years between 1806 and 1814 a watershed or do distinct continuities outweigh any noticeable changes after 1815? I argue that there was a clear shift not only in the political culture of the city but also a change in the practices and conceptions of authority and legitimacy. Many historians, however, have stressed continuity, arguing that Hamburg’s pre-modern elites maintained their hold over city politics until the 1850s.\footnote{407} Richard Evans, among others, has argued that this “crassly self-serving regime” is to blame not only for cholera epidemics in the 1830s and for the Great Fire of 1842 (which destroyed almost half of the city), but, more tellingly, for renewed cholera outbreaks in the early 1890s, a time when cholera had been eradicated from western Europe by sanitary reform.\footnote{408} While there is no disputing the fact that the same lawyers and merchants still firmly held the reins of government, the argument that Hamburg’s post-1815 political culture was the same as that which existed before 1806 (or in 1811, after its annexation) is less credible. The men whose political career began under occupation approached the governing of Hamburg in new and decidedly modern ways. There was also a change in the way city functionaries related to its population, as older notions of community and civic commitment were rejected in favor of a socially noninterventionist and laissez-faire approach to governing.

\footnote{407} For a discussion regarding this argument, see Baasch, \textit{Geschichte Hamburgs}, vol. 1, 2.

\footnote{408} Evans, \textit{Death in Hamburg}, 1-49; Lindemann, \textit{Patriots and Paupers}, 211.
While deliberately sidestepping questions regarding Hamburg’s post-war identity or the rise of German nationalism, this study concerned itself with the modernization of the city’s social and political worlds in the years after 1814/5. A fundamental issue here is the increased centralization of the Hamburg’s administrative bodies and the state’s total monopolization of force in the form of a professional policing agency. Much of the city’s sprawling and decentralized Reformation-era administration had remained up until 1806; private organizations, the Wedde (the body most responsible for overseeing social policy), and virtually all departments of Hamburg’s government maintained some form of policing powers. This authority was often wielded summarily as formal legal processes simply did not exist. Yet within the first years of French occupation after 1806, Hamburg witnessed an unprecedented transformation in the running of city affairs. This process of change was quickened after the city’s incorporation into the Empire and with the full introduction of the Napoleonic Code in January 1811. Administrative bodies were streamlined and had their ties to the church severed, the guilds were stripped of their influence, a rationalized legal code and court system was put in place, a hierarchical and professionalized police force was established, and all vestiges of Hamburg’s feudal past were eradicated.

Many of these French reforms were scaled back after the end of the occupation in 1814, yet the introduction of a substantially more modern and rationalized administrative structure in Hamburg was not without its lasting effects. Most notably, Hamburg’s post-1814 Senate chose to maintain reforms to the city’s policing institutions. This decision to centralize the police force (now armed and divested of any role as social caretaker) entailed two other significant changes in the way politics was understood and practiced. On the one hand, the Senate’s monopolizing of force under the newly minted Police Authority in 1814 and 1815, redefined concepts of
authority, legitimacy, and sovereignty, making them contingent on the government’s ability to establish and defend order and security. Support for Revolutionary ideals such as popular sovereignty found support in Hamburg and calls for constitutional reform plagued the city’s Senate both before and immediately after Imperial occupation. And while the Senate would not face armed insurrection, as the overwhelming majority of the city’s population desired a return to peace, their legitimacy was no longer based on recourse to tradition. New concepts of the relationship between rulers and ruled forced the Senate, and the socio-economic order it represented, to militarize itself in order to defend its interests. It is one of this study’s fundamental precepts that at its very core, modern political authority and legitimacy rests on the state’s ability to monopolize and apply (or threaten) force against internal and external threats to its existence.

On the other hand, the reliance on a professionalized police force also redefined the way in which the Senate related to its population. Well into the nineteenth century, republicanism and concern for the common weal informed city politics. In fact, virtually all members of Hamburg’s Senate at one time or another worked in the world of poor relief. But after 1815, the Senate began a full-scale retreat from its past social concerns and instead pressed an economically liberal agenda that clearly suited its mercantile elite. The city’s famed Poor Relief was drastically reduced, medical care for both adults and children was cut, laws restricting residency for the unemployed were given teeth, and it eventually became illegal to feed or clothe orphaned children. Rather than recognize the effect fluctuations in the market had on families, poverty and unemployment were articulated as a personal flaw of the individual. Thanks in no small part to the religious revivalism of the post-Napoleonic period, the influx of refugees, and the exigencies of rebuilding a shattered economy, the Senate’s response to the growing number
of urban poor was increased surveillance and policing. This recourse to expanded policing of newly-created categories of deviants only reinforced the need for increased police presence as arrests skyrocketed. This would inevitably lead to a lack of supporters or champions of Hamburg’s working poor in the established channels of city government. The inability of the Senate to adequately address the problem of urban poverty is certainly to blame for the horrible cholera epidemics and is likely the reason why, by 1860, Hamburg had, according to August Bebel, become the capital of socialism in Germany.

This study also investigates other aspects of modern political culture that are often neglected: the politicization of urban space and importance of political performance in the practice of legitimacy and authority. While city space had always been a stage to present economic grievances, to establish and defend honor, or to dictate and force proper behavior on individuals, space had yet to become an arena where distinctly political concerns could be addressed. During the first years of the French Revolution, space was invested with political significance as new ideas (and their respective proponents) clashed for control over public opinion. During the Imperial occupation of Hamburg, the French administration routinely took to the streets and market squares to represent its authority before the city’s inhabitants. In the post-Napoleonic years, Hamburg’s Senate similarly used the built environment to establish its ideological contours, to reinforce its commitment to the defense of traditional authority throughout Europe, and to position itself as the legitimate heir to the Wars of Liberation. This offers a crucial rereading of Jürgen Habermas’s concept of “representative publicness” by arguing for its continued usefulness for historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

By 1815 Central Europe had witnessed almost twenty-five years of unprecedented brutality, warfare, political instability, and economic upheaval. Historians of the late nineteenth
century and of the *Kaiserreich* are now beginning to turn their attention to the period following Napoleon’s final defeat and the international system established by the Congress of Vienna. Focusing on the distinct regional political cultures that emerged after 1815 should help historians to better understand the political contours of the Restoration as well as the Vormärz. The ways in which popular festivities and public space were invested with political meaning and how discursive formations were articulated and eventually received by an emerging public are crucial themes for historians to wrestle with. The issues raised by this particular study undoubtedly revolve around the (re)establishment of power and authority and the means by which that was accomplished. But the process by which everyday individuals accessed (internalized and identified with) concepts of traditional authority, citizenship, popular sovereignty, individual rights, and socialism, in the years after 1815, has yet to be adequately researched and awaits its historian.
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