Document Type
Article
Original Publication Date
2014
Journal/Book/Conference Title
Experimental Economics
Volume
17
Issue
3
First Page
488
Last Page
500
DOI of Original Publication
10.1007/s10683-013-9379-3
Date of Submission
February 2015
Abstract
We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List's (2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that the recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.
Rights
© Economic Science Association 2013. This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Experimental Economics, September 2014, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 488-500. The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9379-3.
Is Part Of
VCU Economics Publications
Comments
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9379-3.
Springer PDF of record indicates first published online: 26 October 2013. Authors accepted manuscript presented on Scholars Compass after 12 month embargo.
The authors gratefully acknowledge research support provided by NSF grant SES-0904695 to Razzolini, by NSF grant SES-1024357 to Korenok, and the VCU Presidential Research Incentive Fund to Millner.
JEL Classifications: C91, D01, D64, H30, H41